Do Your Bit, Claim Your Share
Justice, Ethos, and the Individual Duty to Contribute
Markus Furendal
Markus Furendal Do Your Bit, Claim Your Share
Department of Political Science
ISBN 978-91-7911-304-9 ISSN 0346-6620 Markus Furendal
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-2378-750X
What does justice require of individuals, and why? These questions are increasingly important in times when the everyday advocacy of justice is more and more focused on evaluating and criticising the principles and values that people find acceptable and act on in their daily lives.
Yet, since much contemporary political philosophy generally conceives of justice as a virtue of social institutions, it is incapable both of recognising how individuals’ daily choices steer society towards, or away from, an ideal of justice, and to evaluate and guide the practice of socially sanctioning unjust behaviour. This dissertation answers the questions above, by arguing that justice requires individuals to not only comply with just institutions, but to also fulfil a pro tanto duty to contribute in their daily lives towards the furthering of a just society – to do their bit. Further, it argues that a system of informal and decentralised social sanctions – an ethos – is the best way to promote adherence to this duty. The study thereby develops and defends an account of contributive justice, specifying who should contribute to justice and why, as well as what a contribution is and how an individual duty to contribute should be enforced.
Justice, Ethos, and the Individual Duty to Contribute
Markus Furendal
Academic dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science at Stockholm University to be publicly defended on Wednesday 4 November 2020 at 13.00 in Aula Magna, Frescativägen 6.
Abstract
Contemporary political philosophy primarily conceives of justice as a virtue of major social institutions. Yet, much advocacy of justice is increasingly focused on how well particular individuals live up to its demands, and proceeds by calling out and criticising their unjust behaviour. The institutional focus renders political philosophy unable to inform and evaluate such attempts to change, not legal frameworks, but rather the principles that people find acceptable and act on in their daily lives. To address this shortcoming, this dissertation provides a political philosophical analysis of what justice requires of individuals, and why. It does so by developing and defending an account of contributive justice, which answers the inquiry’s guiding questions of who should contribute to justice and why, as well as what a contribution is, and how individual duties of justice should be enforced. The arguments provided support the conclusion that achieving a just society is not simply a question of designing and complying with the right kind of institutions, but that we all have a pro tanto duty to contribute in our day-to-day lives towards the furthering of a just society, and that relying on informal and decentralised social sanctions is the best way to promote adherence to this duty.
The duty to contribute defended in this dissertation differs from existing policies that make access to welfare state services conditional on individuals’ willingness to work or study. It also differs from prominent existing philosophical defences of similar positions, centred around the ideas of equality, reciprocity, and fairly sharing burdens. Critically analysing these accounts, the dissertation shows that, although each account can justify a duty to contribute, their specific answers to the guiding questions are ultimately unsatisfactory. For instance, they are unable to explain both why it is unjust to opt out from doing your bit of the labour necessary to meet the demands of justice, and why individuals who cannot contribute should nevertheless be able to claim the share that they are due.
These shortcomings can be avoided, however, by combining concerns about equality, reciprocity, and fairly sharing burdens into a hybrid account. This generates a two-part pro tanto duty to contribute whereby, firstly, everyone has a duty to contribute towards making sure that everyone receives what they are due as a matter of justice. If and when this level is reached, everyone then has an obligation to benefit others, conditional upon them benefitting from the work of others.
While it is unjust to refuse to contribute in the first way, the hybrid account leaves room for people to reject additional benefits and thereby absolve themselves from having to contribute further. Furthermore, the pro tanto nature of this duty means that it could be outweighed by other morally important considerations. Although demanding, it will hence not crowd out all personal pursuits.
The dissertation also suggests that adherence to this duty should be enforced not through state action, but rather by individuals responding to and upholding a system of social sanctions. Contrasting this so-called ethos of justice with similar systems of social control, such as peer-to-peer online monitoring and sanctioning, and the Social Credit System currently being implemented in China, arguably shows that the informal and decentralised nature of the ethos allows it to avoid the potentially freedom-curtailing effects of the similar systems.
Keywords: duty to contribute, distributive justice, contributive justice, reciprocity, fair burdens, markets, ethos, social sanctions, John Rawls, G. A. Cohen.
Stockholm 2020
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-185258
ISBN 978-91-7911-304-9 ISBN 978-91-7911-305-6 ISSN 0346-6620
Department of Political Science
Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm
Markus Furendal
Justice, Ethos, and the Individual Duty to Contribute
Markus Furendal
ISBN print 978-91-7911-304-9 ISBN PDF 978-91-7911-305-6 ISSN 0346-6620
Cover illlustration: "Pigen i køkkenet" ("Girl in the kitchen") by Anna Ancher, 1883-86.
Anna Ancher / Public domain. Digital image: Villy Fink Isaksen
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Girl_in_the_Kitchen_(Anna_Ancher).jpg Printed in Sweden by Universitetsservice US-AB, Stockholm 2020
Acknowledgements ... x
Chapter 1 – Introduction. An account of contributive justice ... 1
1. Summarising the account and the political and philosophical context of the inquiry ... 2
2. Guiding questions and the structure of the inquiry ... 8
3. Theoretical background and the contributions of the inquiry ... 9
3.1 Rawls’s theory of justice and Cohen’s critique ... 9
3.2 Literature about who should contribute... 13
3.3 Literature about why contributing is a duty ... 16
3.4 Literature about what a contribution is... 19
3.5 Literature about enforcing the duty to contribute ... 21
3.6 Distributive, productive, and contributive justice ... 23
3.7 Summary – What the account contributes... 26
4. Theoretical framework ... 27
4.1 Preliminary notes on the taxonomic tree of justice ... 27
4.2 The scope, ground, site, and currency of justice ... 29
4.3 Outcome-based and procedure-focused theories of justice ... 31
4.4 Comparative and non-comparative justice ... 34
4.5 What does it mean for justice to require something? ... 36
4.6 Summary – How the account conceives of justice ... 39
5. Methodological framework ... 43
5.1 The pro tanto nature of the duty ... 46
5.2 Pluralism and the metatheoretical disagreement between Rawls and Cohen ... 47
5.3 Summary – How the account is developed and defended... 50
Chapter 2 – Who should contribute? The division of labour and individual duties of justice ... 53
1. The division of labour and the primacy thesis... 55
1.1 A preliminary argument for the non-division thesis ... 60
2. Three kinds of primacy ... 61
3. Causal primacy ... 63
3.1 The profundity-of-effects argument... 64
3.2 The injustice caused by gender roles and aggregated market behaviour ... 65
3.3 The collapse reply and the qualification reply from proponents of a division of labour ... 68
3.4 The capacity argument and background justice ... 72
4. Moral primacy ... 75
5. Conclusions ... 79
Chapter 3 – Why contribute? Cohen and the equality-based account ... 83
1. Cohen’s egalitarianism, the Indifference Challenge, and Cohen’s dilemma ... 87
2. How justice requires equality ... 92
3. The productivist egalitarian duty: local or global? ... 95
4. Overcoming indifference by embracing maximisation ... 99
4.1 Justice as equality and efficiency ... 99
4.2 Equality and human flourishing ... 101
5. Evaluating the solution ... 104
6. Conclusions ... 107
Chapter 4 – Do your bit, claim your share: Reciprocity, burden-sharing, and the hybrid account ... 110
1. The social product, the social surplus, and socially necessary labour – Some conceptual groundwork ... 112
2. Reciprocity-based accounts ... 115
3. Limitations of reciprocity-based accounts ... 119
3.1 Absolute vs. relative output and the problem of unequal ability to contribute ... 119
3.2 Opting out, underproduction, and the limitations of procedure-focused accounts... 123
4. Burden-based accounts ... 127
4.1 Limitations of burden-based accounts – mute on the social surplus ... 133
5. The hybrid account ... 135
5.1 Countering three objections to the hybrid account ... 138
6. Conclusions ... 142
Chapter 5 – What is a contribution? The limits of the market solution ... 143
1. The market solution ... 145
2. When market prices and social value come apart ... 148
2.1 Questioning the efficiency aspect of markets ... 148
2.2 Questioning the value feature of markets ... 152
3. Implications for the market solution ... 158
4. The market solution as the second best? ... 164
5. Conclusions ... 168
Chapter 6 – Tying ourselves to the mast or acting for the sake of justice? Ethos, internal motivation, and social sanctions ... 169
1. Internal and external motivation accounts of ethos ... 172
2. Internal motivation and the moral ethos as full compliance ... 176
3. Tying ourselves to the mast – External motivation and the social ethos ... 178
3.1. Norms and social sanctions ... 179
4. The role of intentions and the dilemma of just citizens and just distribution ... 182
5. Does the social ethos limit freedom? Decentralised and informal monitoring and sanctioning 187 5.1 The legitimacy of systems of social sanctions – Online public shaming and the Social Credit System ... 190
6. Conclusions ... 194
Chapter 7 – Conclusions ... 196
1. A brief summary of the argument ... 196
2. Responding to objections ... 198
2.1 “The account demands the impossible” ... 199
2.2 “The duty in the account is not a duty of justice” ... 201
2.3 “The account demands too much and would have objectionable consequences”... 203
2.4 “The account is too indeterminate to guide action” ... 208
3. Implications of the account ... 211
3.1 What the account says about real-world work requirements ... 211
3.2 Opting out through philanthropy, retirement, and emigration ... 212
3.3 Individual duties to combat climate change? ... 216
4. Modest proposals for future research ... 217
Bibliography ... 219
Sammanfattning på svenska ... 236
Acknowledgements
This dissertation is the result of long and arduous work, and I consider myself incredibly lucky to have had the privilege to undertake it. I have also had the great fortune to be surrounded by people who have helped me, both before and throughout this project. This is an attempt to thank as many of them as possible.
First of all, I wish to thank my supervisors Eva Erman and Simon Birn- baum. Everyone who knows Eva can attest to her rapid thinking and su- perhuman capacities. Having these put to work to improve my own writ- ing and thinking has been indispensable, and I have found that her belief in my project has led me to aim higher, and to be confident that everything will fall into place. Similarly, everyone who knows Simon will agree that he is an incredibly reflective and thoughtful person. Every word of advice and critique he speaks is carefully considered, and firmly rooted in a sea of knowledge. Combined with his kindness, this means that I have left each supervision session with a rekindled interest in my own research, and a reasserted confidence in my abilities. Ever since we started discussing the issues addressed in this dissertation a decade ago, Simon has been a true mentor and friend.
Many other people at the Department of Political Science have been in- strumental. Hans Agné, Magnus Reitberger, Maria Jansson, and Andreas Duit were vital during the first year of the doctoral programme. Emma Bergström, Lena Helldner, Schauki Karim, Sebastian Klarås, Anneli Lin- dén, Christian Möllerop, Pernilla Nordahl, Jonas Rådne, and Sofie Trosell have sorted out all kinds of administrative and teaching-related issues.
Naima Chahboun, Viktor Elm-Schulin, Andreas Gottardis, Magnus Jedenheim, and Aaron Maltais have read and commented at different stages of the process, and Ludvig Beckman, Jouni Reinikainen, and Max Fonseca read a late draft very carefully and provided a final round of com- ments that helped me say what I want to say more clearly. Outside of the department, I have received useful feedback from Lars Lindblom, Jonas
Hultin-Rosenberg, Fredrik D. Hjorthen, Frej Klem Thomsen, Sune Lægaard, and Margaret Moore. Two of the chapters in this dissertation are revised versions of articles previously published in European Journal of Political Theory and Social Theory and Practice.1 Thanks to these journals for allowing me to use the texts, and to the editors and the anonymous reviewers whose comments helped improve them, and to Alexandra Seger- berg for providing extensive comments on a draft of the second one.
Thanks also to Liz Sourbut, for copy editing the whole manuscript. Need- less to say, no one above is responsible for the mistakes and flaws that re- main in the dissertation. Ronny Ambjörnsson, Jens Ljunggren, Tommy Möller, as well as Lars Gogman and Erik Andersson at the Swedish Labour Movement’s Archive and Library, have all helped me research the slogan in the title of the dissertation. I have also benefitted from talking about my project, and political philosophy more generally, with Huub Brouwer, An- dreas Brøgger Albertsen, Ian Carter, Jens Damgaard Thaysen, Willem van der Deijl, Søren Flinch Midtgaard, Anca Gheaus, Kasper Lippert-Rasmus- sen, David Miller, Andrés Moles, Ulf Mörkenstam, Tom Parr, Adam Swift, Patrick Tomlin, Nicholas Vrousalis, and Pär Villner, as well as with participants in conferences in Aarhus, Copenhagen, Pavia, and Stock- holm.
The Ph. D. student collective at the department have been wonderful col- leagues and friends. Thanks to Henrik Angerbrandt, Johanna von Bahr, Kalle Ekholm, Maria-Therese Gustafsson, Elín Hafsteínsdottir, Helena Hede Skagerlind, Tyra Hertz, Ian Higham, Livia Johannesson, Faradj Koliev, Cornelia Leander, Sanna Lundquist, Alba Mohedano Roldán, Sara Moritz, Tua Sandman, Eleonora Stolt, Per-Anders Svärd, Karin Sundström, Helena Tinnerholm Ljungberg, Carl Vikberg, and Ogi Zugic, and everyone else I have had the pleasure of talking to in the lunch room on floor five, and who have put up with my endless urge to let you know about whatever I have just learned from a podcast. Special thanks to the small but critical group of recent and current Ph. D. students in political philosophy. My understanding of the discipline has been shaped by all the exciting conversations with Naima Chahboun, Viktor Elm-Schulin, Max Fonseca, Carolina Janson, Jasmina Nedevska, and Martin Westergren.
1 Chapter 3 is a revised version of Furendal, “Rescuing Justice from Indifference: Equality, Pareto, and Cohen’s Ethos”, and chapter 5 is a revised version of Furendal, “Defining the Duty to Con- tribute: Against the Market Solution”, and a few passages from the articles have been moved to other chapters.
Special gratitude also goes to the others in my cohort. I have enjoyed talk- ing and thinking with Ragnhild Nilsson and Magnus Christiansson, whenever we have been in the same place. I value the personal and intel- lectual discussions with Tarek Oraby, and fondly remember our walks around Norra Djurgården. Thanks to my inspiring roommate for several years, Karim Zakhour, whose prima facie cynicism about life never stands in the way of seeking out and taking on new adventures. And thanks to Hedvig Ördén, for finding humour in all our shared trials, and for being so fun to be around.
I have also had the great opportunity to spend time away from Stockholm during the work on this dissertation. Thanks to E & H Rhodins stiftelse, S:a Ragnhilds Gille, Gålöstiftelsen, Widar Bagge & Signe Bagges stiftelse, and Stiftelsen Siamon for generously funding these visits. Zosia Stemplow- ska made sure I got the most out of visiting Oxford University in 2017, and discussions with her helped shape central building blocks in the dis- sertation. Cécile Fabre and Jonathan Wolff were generous with their time and helped me to sort out and understand essential questions, and so was David Leopold, who also kindly let me audit his course on Hegel and Marx. I also appreciated staying in Rosamund Bartlett’s lovely house dur- ing this visit. My visit to Harvard University’s Philosophy department in 2018 would not have happened without Lucas Stanczyk, who was excep- tionally generous with his time during my time in Cambridge. Our dis- cussions helped me figure out how to make my disparate lines of interest converge, and were crucial in finding the final shape and theme of the dissertation. Similarly, Gina Schouten and Brian Berkey listened to me trying to formulate my ideas, and provided invaluable feedback and en- couragement. I also wish to thank Nyasha K. Bovell for helping to sort out administrative issues, and Judy and Steve Leff for accommodating my wife and me, and our not-always-quietly-playing children.
Thanks to my social science teacher Steven Dahl, for being the first person to point out that there was such a job as being a researcher, and that I might find it worth trying to become one. Endless thanks to my late grand- father Allan Furendal, for kindling my sense of curiosity as a child, and for all the long conversations where I did not only learn things, but fell in love with learning things. Thanks to his son, my father Tomas, for showing me how exhilarating it can be to think hard about difficult questions. Thanks also to my grandmother Eva, aunt Ulla, mother Karin, siblings David and
Hanna, and my parents-in-law Ingegerd and Rolf, for being a wonderfully kind and loving family.
Although I am happy to have turned out to be enough of a researcher to have produced this dissertation, I am infinitely more grateful for the chance to be Lilly and Henning’s father. Apart from the way you balance me every day when I am with you, the two periods of parental leave we got to spend together were wonderful ways of corroborating my conviction that an individual is not simply reducible to one aspect of what they do. I know that you have a vague notion that “dad is writing a book at work”.
If you ever read this, please know that I love you, and that I could not have done this without you.
Finally, none of this would have happened, and I would not have a reason to thank any of those mentioned above, were it not for the incredible stroke of luck of meeting my wife, Lovisa Furendal Berndt. There are no words to express my appreciation for all the love and support you have given me during the almost 15 years we have had each other. I really mean this: there are no words that can describe how grateful I am. You are won- derful, being around you makes me better, and always remember that “I love you more today than yesterday, but not as much as tomorrow”.
Stockholm 2 October, 2020
Chapter 1 – Introduction. An account of contributive justice
The pursuit of justice has become doubly individualised in recent times.
New technologies allow individuals to identify perceived transgressions of norms of social justice, and to publicly call out the individuals who have committed them. While much of the historical struggle for justice called for the reform or abolition of unjust laws, the goal now seems to be to transform, not institutions or legal frameworks, but rather people’s moral character and the values and principles that they find acceptable and act on in their daily lives. Contemporary political philosophy is poorly situ- ated to evaluate and guide this practice, however, since the discipline gen- erally conceives of justice as a virtue of institutions rather than of individ- uals. In light of this, this dissertation explores how individual action influ- ences justice, and how principles of justice should influence individual ac- tion. This helps to further our understanding of how individuals’ daily choices steer society towards, or away from, an ideal of justice, and the way in which informal and decentralised sanctions can influence these choices.
By developing and defending an account of what justice requires of in- dividuals, and why, the dissertation tries to provide a comprehensive argu- ment for the conclusion that individuals have a duty to contribute towards the furthering of a just society. While it is beyond the scope of this disser- tation to specify what this duty demands of us in all situations, I suggest that it will often be substantial and demanding, even though it does not crowd out all other values. The dissertation also defends the idea that in- dividuals should respond to and uphold a decentralised system of social sanctions that helps to monitor and enforce adherence to this duty. The arguments developed thus provide support for the idea that achieving a just society is not simply a question of setting up the right kind of institu- tions and legal frameworks, but that it requires all of us to help promote justice in our day-to-day lives. The label “contributive justice” is meant to signal that our understanding of justice should not be limited to how in-
stitutions distribute the benefits of social cooperation, but should also ad- dress the related problems of determining what this requires from individ- uals, and what constitutes a fair contribution to the burdens involved in striving towards a just society. In a word, the dissertation provides an ac- count of why you ought to do your bit. These first few pages summarise the arguments for this view.
1. Summarising the account and the political and philosophical context of the inquiry
The idea of an individual duty to contribute is philosophically underthe- orised. Although the question of what justice asks of individuals is clearly as old as political thought1, most contemporary theorising tends to focus on the justice of institutions. This is probably due to the enduring influ- ence of John Rawls’s theory of justice, and the broadly Rawlsian view stat- ing that as long as individuals support justice indirectly through sustaining just institutions, and interact in just ways within them, they are free to pursue other values. This mainstream view states, somewhat crudely, that while justice might require that we tax people and redistribute resources, it leaves the same people free to choose whether, with what, and how much to work, and to spend their net income as they wish.2 The dominance of this view is also due to its inherent attractiveness. Faced with the poten- tially endless demands of justice, where one’s interests risk going unrecog- nised among every other person’s interests, this kind of division of labour offers us a sensible reprieve; a way to balance impartial and partial con- cerns.3
The idea of a duty to contribute is nevertheless politically prevalent, in the sense that political institutions are often set up to induce individuals to perform or seek paid work. The last few decades have seen a general
1 Even though it is often interpreted as being concerned with the nature of a just society, Plato’s Republic is purportedly also about the just individual. Plato, The Republic, l. 368 c-369 a.
2 Note that I will refer to Rawls’s A Theory of Justice as TJ, throughout. Rawls, TJ, 295.
3 The distinction I am alluding to above is common but has many names. Nagel, Equality and Partiality, 3 f. distinguishes between the personal and impersonal standpoint, Parfit, Reasons and Persons discusses agent-relative and agent-neutral values, and Barry, Justice as Impartiality discusses partiality and impartiality. Reconciling the two is clearly one of the most fundamental problems in moral theory generally, and has been discussed extensively by, for instance Williams, Moral Luck, chap. 1; Barry, Justice as Impartiality, and Keller, Partiality.
trend towards making welfare state services conditional, increasingly re- quiring individuals who claim them to work, study or seek employment.
This essentially constitutes a legal duty to contribute, and is often moti- vated through rhetoric reminiscent of Lenin, and the apostle Paul, who stated that “he who does not work, neither shall he eat”.4 At the same time, however, those who are lucky enough not to rely on welfare state services can avoid the duty altogether, gaining their income from whatever their highly valued talents happen to fetch in the labour market. This political practice of institutions only coercing some individuals to contribute pro- ductively, combined with the philosophical position that individuals are only required to respect just institutions, seem to suggest that those who most need support can be rightly forced to work, while those who are for- tunate enough to be self-sufficient are free to opt out from contributing. I believe that this is flawed political practice, based on flawed philosophical reasoning.5
The account offered in this dissertation differs both from political prac- tice and the philosophical mainstream. I reject the conventional institu- tional focus and defend the view that there are at least three justice-related grounds for why individuals have a duty to contribute. One is based on equality and states, roughly, that individuals have a duty to contribute to bringing about just states of affairs, which includes there being an equal distribution of benefits and burdens in society. A second is based on reci- procity and states, roughly, that individuals who benefit from the contri- butions of others have a duty to reciprocate by contributing themselves. A third is based on a form of fair burden-sharing, and states, roughly, that realising an ideal of distributivejustice requires that which is to be distrib- uted fairly to be produced to begin with, and that individuals have a duty to do their part of this work.
What I will call the weaker thesis of this dissertation is that each of these three aspects of justice can explain a corresponding duty to contribute to justice, and roughly what it consists of. That is, ifwe accept that one out of equality, reciprocity, or the fair sharing of burdens constitutes an im- portant aspect of justice, then we should also accept that there is a corre- sponding duty for individuals to contribute, based on that aspect. I am also defending a stronger thesis, however, to wit; that all of these three
4 Lenin, “On the Famine: A Letter to the Workers of Petrograd,” 391.; 2 Thessalonians 3:10-12.
See section 3.5 below.
5 I spell out what this statement means in section 3.1 of chapter 7. My analysis here echoes the lucid diagnosis offered by Stanczyk, From Each.
aspects are indeed important parts of justice. This thesis says that equality, reciprocity, and fair burden-sharing combine into a hybrid account, which is more attractive than accounts grounded in just one of them. Indeed, it avoids crucial shortcomings that each of the accounts face when taken on their own. The point of distinguishing the weaker from the stronger thesis is that, even if some may not be convinced that all three aspects actually are part of justice, few people would wish to claim that none of the aspects is relevant to justice. Hence, even those who reject my stronger thesis should accept the weaker thesis that there is a duty to contribute to justice.6
The fully developed version of the duty to contribute that I defend could be summed up as saying that firstly, everyone has a duty to contrib- ute towards making sure that everyone receives what they are due as a mat- ter of justice. This duty is unconditional and equal for all: Everyone must make an equally good effort, in relation to their ability, to contribute the socially necessary labour needed to realise just states of affairs, even if work- ing harder does not make them better off than others. Secondly, if and when this level is reached, everyone has a conditional obligation to further benefit others, if they benefit from the additional work of others. This part is conditional, and leaves you free to opt out from contributing if you re- ject the benefits of others’ contributions. Everyone is required, then, to do their bit by contributing, but they also get to claim their share of what they are due as a matter of justice.7
6 The weaker thesis is hence weak in the sense that it is easier to accept, but for that same reason it is also less interesting. The stronger thesis is stronger, then, because more argumentative work is necessary to make the case that we should accept it, but the consequences are more interesting if we do. My point in separating the two is to show that even if the reader ultimately only accepts the weaker thesis, the dissertation has at least shown that the idea of contributive justice is not a fringe idea. That is, it shows that concerns regarding equality explain a duty to contribute based on equal- ity, concerns regarding reciprocity explain a duty to contribute based on reciprocity, and that con- cerns regarding fairly sharing burdens explain a duty to contribute based on fairly sharing burdens.
The three concerns thus produce three different duties to contribute. Alternatively, as the stronger thesis suggests, they combine to produce a single hybrid duty.
7 I have translated the slogan “Gör din plikt, kräv din rätt” as “Do your bit, claim your share”, although a more literal translation would perhaps be “Perform your duty, claim your right”. Despite some research, I have not been able to determine the origins of this slogan. The Swedish labour movement of the early 20th century used it, but it is difficult to tell to what extent, and how it was interpreted by contemporaries. It is clear, however, that there is sufficient vagueness in the words
“duty” and “right” to enable the slogan to be used to make radically different points. For instance, in a poster from 1918, which calls for workers to attend a labour union meeting, the duty in ques- tion seems to consist of joining a union and helping to organise the political struggle which will secure the right to a share of the fruits of production. Today, however, the slogan is sometimes appealed to in order to make the point that unless you discharge your duty to produce – for instance by taking up paid employment – you will not qualify for certain rights, such as unemployment
The hybrid nature of this account, combining equality, reciprocity, and burden-sharing, distinguishes it from related positions that have been de- fended in the philosophical literature, and allows it to avoid some implau- sible and unattractive shortcomings that I will argue the others face. Im- portantly, it also differs in several ways from actual policies designed to induce people to work, and can avoid many of the objections faced by the latter. Firstly, my notion of contribution is wider than that of paid work, and recognises that people can make contributions in a broader range of activities than those that are commonly rewarded by the market. Secondly, the account is sensitive to the difficulty of implementing work require- ments, and would neither make access to goods and services fully condi- tional upon working, nor be upheld by a centralised and formal system of sanctions or threats. Furthermore, it is a non-perfectionist account, in the sense that it does not rest on the assumptions that work is good for us as individuals, or that leisure is pernicious to our character – I only claim that it is unjust to refuse to contribute to furthering justice. Finally, at the core of my account of contributive justice is the insight, formulated by Karl Marx and many others since, that how much you can contribute is to a large extent beyond your control and that what you receive back thus must reflect not only this but also other considerations.8 Consequently, if any group is singled out as non-contributors in my account, it is not those who object to toiling in low-paid and dreary jobs but those who, thanks to the high market demand for their arbitrarily acquired talents, are able to work relatively few hours but still fetch a high reward, and employ it in the pur- suit of their own self-interest.
insurance. This interpretation surely goes against the traditional one, since those who embrace the Marxian idea that workers – unlike capitalists – produce value, would not question whether the working class contributes to the social product, nor doubt their willingness to make a contribution if they can. The next note develops this point. Notwithstanding these different interpretations, the point of using the slogan as the title of this dissertation is that it rejects the current and inversed interpretation in favour of the older one I have outlined above. It also neatly captures the gist of the account of contributive justice I defend: everyone should do their bit by discharging the duty to contribute, but everyone should also claim their share of what they are due as a matter of justice.
Importantly, as chapter 4 explains, the two parts are distinct, in the sense that what you are due is not wholly dependent on what you contribute.
8 See Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Programme,” 321, in which he famously defends the principle
”From each according to abilities, to each according to need”. I will not discuss Marx’s ideas about this in detail, other than to note that my account, just like Marx’s, recognises the need to answer both the contributive and the distributive questions that make up the two parts of the slogan, avoids giving the same answer to both questions, i.e. rejects the idea that distribution should merely mirror contribution, and describes a kind of ideal that it might not be possible to implement in either the short or medium term.
I will generally keep the discussion of the implications of my account relatively abstract, and refrain from formulating anything like a specific work requirement. Two points are important to stress, however. Firstly, the conclusions I reach are circumscribed by the limitations of the study, and specifically the fact that the duty I defend must be weighed against considerations that I am unable to address in this inquiry. As I explain in section 5, below, I adopt a form of pluralism about values and characterise the duty to contribute as having a pro tanto nature. This means, roughly, that justice is not the only thing that matters, and that what individuals ultimately ought to do depends on how we weigh the duty against addi- tional values and concerns. This dissertation hence does not provide an answer to what individuals ought to do all-things-considered, but rather develops and defends an account of one of the things we need to consider when pondering this complex question. In practice, this means that, not- withstanding my characterisation of individuals as having a duty to con- tribute, they may in some circumstances be excused for not discharging it, for instance, when it is difficult to tell exactly how to do so, or when doing so would be too costly.
Secondly, I should stress that I do not claim that individual efforts to promote justice either should or can replace institutional efforts. The ac- count does not, for instance, prescribe widespread philanthropy, or that individuals or private organisations should start providing justice-promot- ing services that are currently provided by welfare states. The point is ra- ther that individuals have a duty not only to support such institutional arrangements, but to supplement them where they cannot reach, and to enhance them by acting in ways that make them more effective.9
Individuals could support just institutions by, for instance, voting for justice-promoting representatives to public office, or perhaps by reasoning with their peers and trying to convince them to do so as well. But they can go further, and supplement institutions by taking concerns about justice into consideration when making daily choices, such as with what, and how much, to work. I will argue that shouldering our share of the work that is needed to reproduce society and justice is the just thing to do, and that opting out is unjust. Similarly, returning benefits received by producing goods and services that others value or need is the just thing to do, and free-riding on others is unjust. Finally, individuals can enhance the efforts of institutions by acting in justice-promoting ways in spheres that are not
9 The distinction between supplementing and enhancing institutional efforts is offered by Cohen, RJE, 374–77. I will use the abbreviation RJE to refer to Cohen’s Rescuing Justice and Equality.
directly regulated by laws or institutions, or where they work imperfectly.
For instance, even though it might be perfectly legal for individuals to in- tentionally avoid or evade taxes, my account is able to explain why it is unjust to do so, and why the duty to contribute requires us to respect not only the letter of the law but also its spirit.10 The account also explains why people ought to refrain from upholding norms and social practices that reinforce injustices in a wider sense. 11
In sum, since my account calls for individuals to not only support but also supplement and enhance institutional efforts, it is clearly more de- manding than the common view that individuals only have to support jus- tice indirectly. This suggests that if people acted on this duty, it would enable a closer approximation to ideals of justice than is currently the case in real societies.12 I do not believe, however, that it will be objectionably demanding. This is because I do not claim that the promotion of justice is the only value that matters when deciding what individuals should do, and even if it were, the hybrid account I defend does not require endless sacri- fice regardless of the circumstances. The metatheoretical assumptions that
10 Some estimate that multinational companies hide up to 40 % of their profits in tax havens each year. Tørsløv, Wier, and Zucman, “The Missing Profits of Nations.” See also Alstadsæter, Johan- nesen, and Zucman, “Tax Evasion and Inequality.” In the language used in this dissertation, a burden-based argument against this practice would stress that, assuming that tax revenue is used to make sure that each person gets what they are due, individuals and companies who hide their wealth are acting unfairly towards both those who fare worse because of this, and those who have to shoul- der an extra burden. Furthermore, the reciprocity-based part of my account prescribes that we should return the benefits received, but companies and individuals that actively use strategies to minimise their tax bill in the country providing public goods – a labour force educated in free or subsidised public education, relying on public health care, commuting using public infrastructure, and staying safe thanks to functioning property laws, for instance – fail to reciprocate to the system that enabled them to thrive in the first place. Senator Elizabeth Warren made this argument in her 2020 presidential campaign. “Senator Elizabeth Warren Speech in Washington Square Park.” The problem of tax evasion and some possible solutions are also discussed by Brock and McMaster,
“Global Taxation and Accounting Arrangements: Some Normatively Desirable and Feasible Policy Recommendations.”
11 As I will discuss in chapter 2, the duty to contribute to realising the ideal of justice also means that we must treat each other respectfully in our daily lives, and avoid letting prejudices affect who we decide to interact with and how. Similarly, not only what we produce but what we consume has a bearing on the degree of justice, and a full account of a duty to contribute must surely recog- nise the way in which choosing to consume some products but not others eventually affect how just a society is. While recognising this point, this dissertation does not primarily focus on these ways of contributing.
12 Readers who are familiar with G. A. Cohen’s claim that an egalitarian ethos is required to realise a just society might notice the similarities with my account. For reasons that will become clear, I focus on a duty to contribute rather than an egalitarian ethos. I introduce Cohen’s view in section 3.1, below.
explain this are introduced in section 5, below, and I return to this issue in section 2 of chapter 7.
2. Guiding questions and the structure of the inquiry
The overarching questions this dissertation tries to answer are “What does justice require of individuals, and why?” In answering these questions, the dissertation aims to provide an account of contributive justice.13 There are a number of desiderata that such an account should fulfil in order to be as clear and convincing as possible. Although potentially endless, the most comprehensive list of desiderata that is consistent with the limitations of time and resources that a dissertation entails, is the following sequence of questions, which forms the organising structure for this inquiry:
I Who should contribute?
II Why should they contribute?
III What is a contribution?
IV How should the duty to contribute be enforced?
Chapter 2 answers question I and says, roughly, that both institutions and individuals are bound by principles of justice and should contribute in suitable ways. Chapters 3 and 4 answer question II by considering and critiquing the three prominent answers appealing to equality, reciprocity, and fairly sharing burdens, and defending the hybrid that I have summa- rised above. Chapters 4 and 5 answer question III, by explaining that to contribute something is to provide a good or service that others value or need, and by criticising the commonly used market-based solution to the problem of deciding the value of contributions.14 Chapter 6 then answers question IV, by arguing that the nature of the duty to contribute entails that it should be promoted through a decentralised and informal system of social sanctions and by encouraging people to internalise and act upon
13 As I elaborate in sections 3.6 and 4.1 below, one way to define contributive justice is to say that, while distributive justice takes what is produced as a given and asks how principles of justice suggest it should be distributed, contributive justice takes principles of distributive justice as a given and asks who should contribute what in order to best satisfy them. I qualify this view below.
14 Some might suggest that the third question comes prior to the first and second questions, since we presumably need to know what a contribution is before we can tell who should contribute and why. As I see it, however, we need to know which aspects of justice explain a duty to contribute before we can tell what a contribution is. As I explain in chapter 5, we need to know, as it were, what the point or goal of justice is before we can decide which particular acts contribute to it.
principles of justice. Chapter 7 briefly summarises the dissertation, re- sponds to a number of anticipated objections, and considers the implica- tions of the account and what further desiderata future research should aim to satisfy.
This introductory chapter sets the stage for the inquiry that follows.
The next section reviews the existing literature pertaining to the four guid- ing questions and explains the background to and contributions of the inquiry. Sections 4 and 5 complement the body of the dissertation by spec- ifying as clearly as possible the theoretical framework driving the analysis, and the methodological framework that I employ when pursuing the aim.
3. Theoretical background and the contributions of the inquiry
This section aims to introduce some of the existing debates and lines of inquiry in political philosophy that my account draws upon and can be contrasted against. I will introduce the main tenets of Rawls’s influential theory of justice and Cohen’s critique of it, and then outline some of the central argumentative points that have been made in relation to each of my guiding questions. Importantly, section 3.6 then relates my account of contributive justice to two similar contemporary projects. Hence, this sec- tion anticipates and summarises some of the arguments made in the body of the dissertation. The point is to help elucidate the main characteristics of my account by directing attention to what it contributes in relation to existing debates around the central ideas.
3.1 Rawls’s theory of justice and Cohen’s critique
Much of my account draws upon and expands the debate initiated by phi- losopher G. A. Cohen’s critique of John Rawls’s influential theory of jus- tice. Due to its enduring importance as a point of reference, I will often follow the practice of setting one’s own position into relief against Rawls’s.15 And due to the force and intellectual rigour of Cohen’s compre- hensive critique, there are often similarities between my account and Co- hen’s. Yet, it is important to stress that this dissertation is not primarily an immanent critique of either Rawls or Cohen. Unlike Cohen, I am trying
15 A (somewhat outdated) review of the reception of Rawls is offered by Laden, “The House That Jack Built: Thirty Years of Reading Rawls.”
neither to derive a duty to contribute from Rawls’s theory, nor to attack it for neglecting contributive issues. And although I draw on Cohen’s work, my account is importantly different from his. The primary aim is not to study their writings and draw out what they “should” say about individual duties, or to show that a duty to contribute follows from either account. I do not attempt to justify or defend my account by appealing to the way in which it fits with either. That said, my analysis does indeed have bearing on these questions, and I believe that parts of my account are compatible with how Rawls and Cohen each think about justice, although I ultimately defend the alternative hybrid duty that I believe yields a more convincing account of contributive justice. The centrality of Rawls and Cohen in this dissertation nevertheless motivates the following short summary of the main tenets of their positions.
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, first published in 1971, offers a compre- hensive defence of a particular conception of what a just society would be like, continuing the social contract tradition in political thought that in- cludes Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau. In short, Rawls offers a procedure for determining principles of justice that should guide society, in the form of a thought experiment that, very roughly, asks people to agree on principles of justice, while lacking access to knowledge about which position they will occupy in the society governed by these princi- ples. If we do not know whether we would be benefited or disadvantaged by any particular principle, we are more likely to reach a fair outcome, or so Rawls suggests. He thus imagines that the hypothetical deliberating par- ties’ knowledge about who they are is concealed by a “veil of ignorance”, in an effort to induce them – and by extension, us – to be more impartial than they or we would otherwise be. The outcome, according to Rawls, would be that the parties would rationally agree to one principle dictating equal basic liberties16, and to a second principle requiring that
[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, […] and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.17
16 The first principle is lexically prior to the second principle, such that “…the basic liberties can be restricted only for the sake of liberty”. Fully spelled out, it says that ”Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all” Rawls, TJ, 266.
17 Rawls, 266.
It is primarily the first part of this second principle, the so-called differ- ence principle, that has become central to contemporary theorising on jus- tice. Importantly, the principle means that Rawls is proposing that we should not aim for strict equality, since some inequalities may possibly enable everyone to become better off. It is commonly assumed, for in- stance, that the difference principle could justify paying economic incen- tives to people who would otherwise withhold their productive efforts, since everyone gains from this (although not equally much). While Rawls restricts the impact of this assumption by endless philosophical qualifica- tions, it is reminiscent of the idea of trickle-down economics, and the thought that inequality-inducing incentives would be justified if they were to the benefit of the worst off.18
Over the course of several decades, Cohen developed a critique of Rawls and those following him, thereby indirectly defending an alternative view similar to the one developed in this dissertation. The critique begins by noting that economic incentives are superfluous since, arguably, individu- als could simply choose to contribute their labour even if they would not get higher compensation: At the very least, it is not impossible for them to work harder, and their unwillingness to do so should not be accepted at face value, Cohen suggests. A duty to contribute at the equality-preserving level of compensation could thus allow us to reconcile equality and effi- ciency, at least if we reject the notion of a “division of labour” between institutions and individuals.19 Cohen believes that a just society would not only have just institutions, but that “…social justice requires a social ethos that inspires uncoerced equality supporting choice…”20, and that with such an ethos in place, people would willingly make productive decisions that further justice even if they were not compensated for them by equal- ity-upsetting economic incentives.21
18 As an illustration, the Swedish government has motivated income tax cuts by arguing that they function as incentives to participate in the labour force, and to start working full time. Proposition 2020/21:1, 34; 321.
19 Cohen, RJE, pt. 1. The papers that make up this part of Cohen’s magnum opus, Rescuing Justice and Equality, published in 2008, are Cohen, “Incentives, Inequality, and Community”; Cohen,
“The Pareto Argument for Inequality”, and Cohen, “Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distrib- utive Justice.”
20 Cohen, RJE, 127.
21 Cohen, 181. As chapter 6 will make clear, I believe that the role of the ethos is often misinter- preted. What matters is that people act in line with principles of justice, in accordance with a duty to contribute. On my interpretation, the ethos is that which encourages them to do so, and it is not the same thing as the duty.
Cohen’s critique is often recognised as one of the more forceful and important challenges to the Rawlsian approach to justice, and even those who believe that Rawls’s theory could ultimately avoid it usually recognise its relevance.22 His observations have provoked a wide range of reactions – some offering interpretations of Rawls that supposedly avoid Cohen’s cri- tique, others offering interpretations of Cohen’s critique that supposedly reduce its force23 – and it is within this debate, broadly conceived, that this dissertation is situated. I should note, at this stage, that some might wish to reiterate one of the objections Cohen has faced and direct it against my position. Specifically, both Cohen and I could be accused of marginalising the role of Rawls’s first principle, and the prioritised position that it gives to our basic liberties. In fact, this principle seems to explain why Rawls does not ultimately endorse an individual duty of the kind defended in this dissertation, but rather the position that “[w]hat kind of work people do, and how hard they do it, is up to them to decide in light of the various incentives society offers”.24 Given the dominance of the Rawlsian view, and its assumption that liberty is an integral part of justice, sceptics might claim that it is, in fact, misleading to characterise the duty I defend as a duty of justice. In reply, I must stress again that, whenever I use this phrase, it refers to a kind of pro tanto duty that can be outweighed by further factors relevant to the process of applying the duty to a particular situation, in- cluding the value of individual freedom. Anticipating the discussion in sections 4 and 5, below, I should note, moreover, that the way I use “jus- tice” is closer to Cohen’s than to Rawls’s usage: while Rawls’s principles are the outcome of a process where he has tried to take all, or at least many, relevant considerations into account, the duty I defend is the outcome of a less comprehensive process.25 More modestly, my account can serve as an input into a further process of balancing competing demands, in order to determine what individuals ultimately ought to do. This is a complex is-
22 See, for instance, Titelbaum, “What Would a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice Look Like?,” 315.
23 For instance, Freeman, Rawls, 120–25 exemplifies the former strategy and Thomas, “Cohen’s Critique of Rawls: A Double Counting Objection” contains much of the latter strategy. Estlund,
“Debate: Liberalism, Equality, and Fraternity in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls” arguably relies on both.
24 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 64.
25 One reason for this is, as I explain in sections 4.3 and 4.6 below, and in chapter 4, that I believe the procedure-focused character of Rawls’s theory ultimately fails to explain central intuitions about justice.
sue, though, which quickly raises fundamental questions of how to con- ceive of justice, and I will explain and defend my use of these concepts in section 5, below.
Now, although I generally share Cohen’s central intuitions and what I believe were his driving motivations, I also think that his account is criti- cally underdeveloped. In one sense, then, this dissertation picks up where Cohen, who passed away in 2009, left these issues, and tries to provide a more coherent account than the one he offered. In some places this in- volves a more exegetical approach: Much of chapter 3, for instance, criti- cally examines whether a duty to contribute can be derived from Cohen’s position, and I claim that his strong commitment to a narrow view of equality constituting the whole of justice means that his duty is much more limited than commonly thought, unless qualified in the ways I suggest there. In other places I diverge from his views and investigate what follows if we share the impetus of Cohen’s project, but revise whatever is necessary to circumvent the problems faced by his, and similar accounts. Chapter 6, for instance, provides a unique development of Cohen’s idea of an egali- tarian ethos that can potentially clear up what I perceive as misunderstand- ings around this idea in the literature. One of the contributions of this dissertation is thus that it addresses the blind spots and shortcomings of the existing debate around justice and individuals, and tries to provide bet- ter alternatives. Specifically, the hybrid account that I defend is, I believe, a superior way of understanding what justice requires of individuals com- pared to Cohen’s equality-based conception and other relevant views in the literature.
3.2 Literature about who should contribute
Chapter 2 begins by asking who should contribute; that is, to whom the duty to contribute applies. I start here because some have argued that the very idea of individual duties of justice is misguided. This view is often expressed using Rawlsian terms, claiming that principles of justice are not all-encompassing moral principles that cover all of human interaction but, rather, are specific to “…the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of ad- vantages from social cooperation.”26 If Rawls is correct that the “primary
26 Rawls, TJ, 6.
subject”of justice is the basic structure of society – roughly, the major po- litical and economic institutions27 – then principles of justice do not apply directly or in the same way to individuals. So, should we agree with this suggestion to divide the labour between institutions and individuals, and abandon the project pursued here?
One reason to believe so is that institutions appears to have deeper ef- fects and wider capacities compared to individuals. Rawls famously states that the basic structure is primary “…because its effects are so profound and present from the start.”28 Since individual behaviour is not consequen- tial in the same sense, there are good reasons to think that principles of justice do not apply in the same way to both the basic structure and indi- viduals.29 In reply, others have pointed out that aggregated individual be- haviours can indeed come to have similarly profound effects, and have in- sisted that they can be sources of injustice.30 The examples I discuss in chapter 2, for instance, are how aggregated individual behaviour can make up market forces and systems of social norms that fundamentally shape our lives.
A second reason to support a division of labour has to do with the great costs and threats to freedom that an individual duty may entail. As I men- tioned in the last section, this also finds support in Rawls, and specifically his principle of basic liberties, and the way in which his account, unlike mine, gives these a prioritised place. Demanding that individuals contrib- ute to promoting justice directly would seemingly violate the freedom of occupational choice that many believe is a central part of liberal egalitari- anism. Furthermore, individuals have to be attentive to a broad range of values, including those arising from special commitments and relations to,
27 Rawls, 6.
28 Rawls, 7.
29 See, for instance Scheffler, “Is the Basic Structure Basic?”; Freeman, “The Basic Structure of Society as the Primary Subject of Justice”; Nagel, Equality and Partiality; Estlund, “Debate: Liber- alism, Equality, and Fraternity in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls”, and Joshua Cohen, “Taking People as They Are?” For an argument that individuals cannot live up to Rawls’s demand that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done, see Williams, “Incentives, Inequality, and Public- ity”; Williams, “Justice, Incentives and Constructivism”, and for replies, see Cohen, RJE, chap. 8, as well as Matthew, “Purview and Permissibility”; Gosseries and Parr, “Publicity,” sec. 3, and Lip- pert-Rasmussen, “Publicity and Egalitarian Justice.”
30 See, for instance Berkey, “Against Rawlsian Institutionalism about Justice”; Berkey, “Obligations of Productive Justice: Individual or Institutional?”; Matthew, “Purview and Permissibility”, and Porter, “The Division of Moral Labour and the Basic Structure Restriction.”
for instance, their family. Institutions, on the other hand “…don’t have their own lives to lead.”31
In reply, proponents of individual duties often stress that they are de- fending moral demands which cannot straightforwardly be assumed to limit individual freedom in the way that legal obligations do.32 Some have also tried to reduce the distance between the two views by questioning whether there is any real occupational choice in market-based systems where one’s survival depends upon getting a job.33 My systematic answer to this so-called demandingness objection can be found throughout the dissertation but is summarised here, and in section 2 of chapter 7. Firstly, my duty is not based on maximalist principles that constantly demand more: Once you have done your share of the socially necessary labour, you can opt out from further production and be absolved from the reciprocity- based part of the duty. Secondly, as section 5 of this chapter describes, the duty is just one of many things that matter when deciding what individuals should ultimately do, and should always be weighed against other relevant factors. So, although the objection raises an important point, which should inform all accounts of contributive justice, I do not think it can establish that there are no substantial duties of justice for individuals.
Chapter 2 is an extended discussion of versions of these criticisms and replies. It is perhaps the least original chapter, since it primarily relies on previously voiced arguments against the division of labour like the ones I have summarised here. An important difference compared to many earlier replies to this objection, however, is that I try to be clear about what, more precisely, the division of labour view says. I believe a charitable interpreta- tion suggests that its proponents do not claim that justice is restricted to institutions, but that it primarily applies to them. This allows them to concede many of the critical points that have been levied at them. Recog- nising this distinction, and calibrating my argument against the division
31 Nagel, Equality and Partiality, 59, 85 f. For versions of this view, see Smith, “Incentives and Justice: G. A. Cohen’s Egalitarian Critique of Rawls”; Estlund, “Debate: Liberalism, Equality, and Fraternity in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls”; Pogge, “On the Site of Distributive Justice”; Joshua Co- hen, “Taking People as They Are?”; Tan, “Justice and Personal Pursuits”; Farrelly, “Dualism, In- centives and the Demands of Rawlsian Justice”; Scheffler, “Egalitarian Liberalism as Moral Plural- ism”; Otsuka, “Prerogative to Depart from Equality”; Casal, “Occupational Choice and the Egali- tarian Ethos”; Lang, “Rawlsian Incentives and the Freedom Objection”, and Frye, “Incentives, Of- fers, and Community.”
32 Cohen, RJE, 191 ff; Carens, “An Interpretation...,” 164 f. Note that I will use this abbreviated title for Carens’s article instead of the full title “An Interpretation and Defense of the Socialist Principle of Distribution”.
33 Stanczyk, From Each.
