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Civil society in the post-communist EU states
Is democratic backsliding affecting CSO presence, access, and funding at the EU level?
Department of Government Uppsala 2020
Author: Marcus Wåhlberg
Supervisor: Thomas Persson
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Abstract
The EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 welcomed post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as member states of the union. This influx of new CEE member states not only changed the power dynamics of the EU, but it also highlighted institutional contrasts between the old fifteen member states (EU-15) and those from the CEE region. In recent years some of the CEE member states have also experienced what has been identified as ‘democratic backsliding’. This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of civil society development in the EU, comparing the development of the new CEE member states to the old EU-15. In addition to comparing these two blocs, it also examines if states associated with ‘democratic backsliding’ show similar developmental trends.
The analysis is based on civil society presence, access, and funding at the EU level drawing on data from the EU institutions as well as previous research. The main findings of the analysis support the idea that the CEE member states are developing civil societies more akin to those in the EU-15 to some extent. However, there is major intragroup variation within the CEE member states. This also holds true for the group of ‘democratic backsliders’.
The main contribution from this thesis is that it provides a regional mapping of civil society in the post-communist EU states useable for further research. In addition, it highlights areas where more in-depth research should be focused on.
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Table of contents
1.1 Introduction _____________________________________________ 3
1.2 Prior research and theory __________________________________ 5 2.0 Method _________________________________________________ 9
2.1 Definitions and limitations _________________________________ 11
2.2 Data and sources _________________________________________ 13
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1.1 Introduction
Civil society organizations (including NGOs) are vital partners for decision-makers, as they are best placed to know the population's needs in terms of development. (Commission 2019)
The inclusion of civil society in decision-making to increase democratic legitimacy has been high on the EU´s agenda for almost two decades. The White Paper on Governance (European Commission 2001) clearly states that it “concerns the way in which the Union uses the powers
given by its citizens. Reform must be started now so that people see changes well before further modification of the EU Treaties” (Commission 2001). Furthermore, the Juncker Commission
released a progress report in December 2018 on Citizens´ Dialogues and Citizens´ Consultation reaffirming the Commission´s commitment to a ‘Union of citizens’ where civil society is to be included in the future of the union. Civil society and organized interests are thus a major part of informal and to some extent formal decision-making at the EU level where online consultations and citizen dialogues, in addition to targeted lobbying, affect the political agenda and legislative process. The inclusion of civil society does not only adhere to the EU´s principles of civil liberties but is an explicitly political goal to increase the democratic legitimacy at the EU level. The EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, with the accession of eleven countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), highlighted stark contrasts between the old EU-15 and the new member states. It also affected the EU system of interest representation with twelve new member states given access to the EU institutions (Eising 2008:9). While the accession process had some impact on civil society in the CEE countries (Kutter & Trappmann 2010), civil society organizations (CSO) in these states are historically few and weak in relation to the executive (Howard 2002:157-158). While historical and political factors in the post-communist regimes can account for the differences between the EU-15 and CEE to some extent, a new problematic issue arises when states begin to slide back on the democratic ideals the EU is founded upon. The forerunners of this ´democratic backsliding´ in the EU are currently Hungary and Poland, but several other countries in the region exhibit similar traits to some extent (More et al 2019:7). The Fidesz party in Hungary and PiS (Law & Justice) in Poland, as well as other regimes in the region, have been criticized for being in breach of the EU´s democratic principles and for being on the path towards illiberal regimes, or even authoritarianism (Vandor et al. 2017:58, O'Dwyer & Schwartz 2010, Schlipphak & Treib 2017:352, EU Observer 2019). These member states do not strive to include civil society in decision-making nor to grant CSOs political autonomy (Meyer et al. 2019:8-9). As member states of the EU, this becomes a political problem at the EU level.
During the accession process, the EU institutions tried to raise awareness of different paths to empowerment for the civil society in the new member states. This included information
campaigns on participatory rights and opportunities for transnational partnerships. However, this mainly strengthened the most resourceful actors already capable and compatible with the
5 After the eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007, however, scholarly interest in the region has largely waned (Horváthová & Dobbins 2019:140).
Many EU policies grant participatory rights to civil society and the Copenhagen Criteria for accession explicitly grants civil society autonomy for political action. Unionwide harmonization of laws and regulations concerning civil society is therefore of interest to the EU institutions. However, even if the inclusion of civil society in decision making is increasing across Europe the development is far from even and some member states have even labeled CSOs as direct
opponents to the state. Domestic institutional preconditions in member states that affect the capacities and resources of CSOs are therefore not always strictly domestic affairs. Some governments have also established organizations to pursue their own agendas, further polarizing civil society along ideological lines. Increasingly hostile attitudes towards, especially foreign-funded, CSOs in some of the CEE member states show a trend towards more centralized governance and even autocratic tendencies (Meyer et al. 2019:9).
If civil society is considered opponents to the government rather than the collective interests of the community included in decision-making, the regime will not work towards the EU goal of more inclusion of civil society (Vandor et al. 2017:16). Neither will CSO:s consider it
worthwhile to work together with their governments, and vice versa, if they consider each other adversaries. However, as member states of the EU CSOs in the union also have access to
decision-makers at the EU level and are not bound to the regional or national level. It is possible for CSOs to engage directly with Commission officials and try to influence policy-making at the supranational level. It is also possible to apply for funding from the EU institutions,
circumventing national authorities when governments have imposed legislative roadblocks for civil society.
6 - How have civil society presence, access, and funding for the CEE member states
developed at the EU level since accession to the EU, in comparison with the EU-15?
- Have countries associated with democratic backsliding developed differently in these
aspects compared with others in the CEE region?
After reviewing prior research and theory to summarize previous findings, and highlighting the gaps this paper aims to fill, three hypotheses are formulated. This is followed by a discussion on the methods and operationalization of concepts used here, explaining the definitions and
limitations as well as an overview of the data and sources collected. The paper is then structured into analysis in three parts looking at civil society presence, access and funding at the EU level, comparing the CEE member states with the EU-15. The findings of the analyses are finally discussed in light of the hypotheses put forward and lastly followed by concluding remarks.
1.2 Prior research and theory
Prior research on civil society in CEE countries finds a differing degree of progress towards the EU-15 regarding capacities, inclusion, and resources (Meyer et al. 2019, Horváthová & Dobbins 2019, Ekiert & Kubik 2014). Most previous research on civil society in CEE has mainly focused on the impact of EU accession and how the implementation of the acquis Communautaire affected civil society in new member states (Parau 2009, Börzel 2010, Pleines 2010). Some recent contributions have focused on the institutional context in the region (Meyer et al. 2019) and others have conducted comparative case studies (Horváthová & Dobbins 2019) or in-depth analyses of specific CEE countries (Lewis & Benson 2014). However, since Bernard´s (1993) overarching study of the democratic transition of civil society in the region not much academic attention has been given to the issue except around the time of EU enlargement 2004/2007. This is not to say there have not been any contributions to this issue over the years. However, after the EU enlargement process, the academic interest of civil society in the region appears to have faded. Considering the current democratic backsliding in the CEE region a new overview of the development of civil society is warranted. This is also the research gap this paper aims to fill. By building on previous findings from research on the CEE region, as well as research on civil society and organized interests in the EU, this paper will serve as a foundation for further studies on civil society development in the CEE member states. In addition, it adds to the discourse on how democratic backsliding possibly affects this development.
7 institutional preconditions compared to the liberal democracies of EU-15, with many traits “inherited from communism, such as a low degree of intrapersonal trust, atomisation, double
morals and the retreat into a private sphere that was clearly delineated from the public controlled by the communist party” (Kutter & Trappman 2010:45). However, several scholars
have noted a positive development of civil society in the region and this is in part attributed to the EU. As Lewis and Benson (2014:68) note “transition from the communist regime to
democracy led to a significant increase in interest group formation in former Soviet bloc countries, especially when these nations were preparing to join the EU”. In addition, Parau
(2009:136) finds that the “civil society empowerment sprang from the Executive’s overriding
desire to accede to the EU” and that “civil society empowerment may thus be contingent upon which stage of accession the state is passing through”. This highlights the important role the EU
played, and perhaps still plays, for civil society in the CEE countries. Today the civil society empowerment may be contingent upon the relationship between the CEE member state and the EU. However, the main reasons for the weakness of civil society in the region such as lack of funding, lack of institutionalized interaction with governments and lacking mobilization might even have been reinforced by the EU during the pre-accession of the CEE member states. This was because “accession conditionality focused on formal compliance only, tended to exclude
civil society organisations from the formulation of accession policies” (Kutter & Trappman
2010:62).
How civil society in the CEE member states has developed after the EU accession is a research area often overlooked by scholars, especially comparative research on the CEE member states and the EU-15. Even though the rise of democratic backsliding in some member states has renewed scholarly attention towards the region these studies primarily focus on the national level. Some comparative studies analyze two or more countries in the region, but not at the EU level and not compared with the Western member states of the EU-15. In addition, regional reports on the development of civil society in the CEE region focuses on regional differences only. As member states of the EU, the development of civil society in the CEE region should also be considered in comparison with the old member states, the EU-15. This is precisely the contribution this paper aims to provide. A regional mapping of civil society development in the CEE member states compared with the EU-15, in addition to highlighting any similarities in the development of countries associated with democratic backsliding.
With the Commission´s explicit goal of strengthening civil society in Europe, more research is needed on how civil society in CEE countries has developed in the years after accession. This paper will build on previous insights about the development of civil society in the CEE region of the EU, and to contribute to an overview of the region and if and how the issue of democratic backsliding in some countries has affected civil society. As noted by Ekiert and Kubik (2014:52) one key factor for how civil society develops is the type of political regime and the
8 civil society must also include how often and how civil society is involved in political decisions (Ekiert & Kubik 2014:52).
The first hypothesis is that if CEE member states are on the path to civil societies in line with the EU-15, over time we expect to see CSOs from CEE to increase their presence at the EU level.
H1: Over time, we expect to see an increased presence of CSOs from CEE member states in relation to the EU-15 at the EU level.
Being present at the EU level is only one part of civil society, and if the CEE member states are developing civil societies akin to the ones in the EU-15 there should also be an increase in activity and access to EU decision-makers. With the multilevel governance of the EU, these contacts between CSOs and decision-makers can take many forms and occur at different procedural levels of policymaking. In the analysis in this paper, we focus our attention on contacts between CSOs and high-ranking Commission officials. If CSOs from the new CEE member states are indeed on the path to civil societies in line with the EU-15, we should, therefore, expect an increase in these contacts. The second hypothesis is formulated as;
H2: Over time, we expect to see an increase in contacts between CSOs from CEE member states and Commission officials.
With the stated goal of strengthening the capacities and inclusion of civil society in decision-making, the EU offers to fund CSOs in the union. The Commission has two incentives for funding civil society in the EU, increasing legitimacy and creating a “vibrant social sphere for social cohesion and policy entrepreneurship” (Mahoney & Beckstrand 2011:1342). The input of civil society across the union can be considered both an efficient tool in creating policies
acceptable in the member states, as well as increasing the legitimacy of the EU decision-making process (Greenwood 2007). Therefore, the third hypothesis is that we should see an increase in EU funds directed to CSOs in the new CEE member states.
H3: Over time, we expect EU funding of civil society to increase in CEE member states in relation to the EU-15.
Finally, this paper will contribute to the research on democratic backsliding in CEE member states. It is a new phenomenon and previous research on democratic backsliding is divided on how to best deal with the issue. Some argue that judicial mechanisms are the best way to handle it (Blauberger & Keleman 2017), while others favor social political pressure stressing the limitations of material sanctions (Sedelmeier 2017). Schlipphak and Treib (2017) also warn for the unintended consequences of outside intervention, reinforcing the anti-EU sentiments these governments often foster allowing them to “play the blame game on Brussels”. Since the concept of democratic backsliding with member states sliding back on democratic values is relatively new, research on the subject is also scarce but growing. Therefore, there is no
9 a paradigm likely to be reproduced to a greater or lesser or degree elsewhere” (Cianetti et al. 2018:245). Instead, it should be understood as a general trend of illiberalism sliding back on democratic values such as rule of law, a free press, freedom of speech, separation of powers, and minority rights. It is not one specific illiberal occurrence, but rather a degree of illiberalism. Arguably, this will also affect the political environment for civil society in countries showing signs of democratic backsliding (Greskovits 2015:29). However, we do not know how this affects civil society at the EU level in these member states. There is, however, consensus in the discourse on that it constitutes a political problem at the EU level for the union. An overview of the development of civil society in CEE member states, with those countries associated with democratic backsliding, will, therefore, be useful to examine if these states develop similarly to each other. The mapping of civil society in the CEE member states in this paper could be used for further studies, to more closely examine any connections between democratic backsliding and civil society development.
In addition to the first three hypotheses, the analysis will also examine whether civil society in countries associated with democratic backsliding develops similarly to each other. All three parts of civil society examined in this paper – presence, access, and funding – will also be analyzed and discussed through the lens of democratic backsliding. If democratic backsliding is affecting civil society in a member state, then both CSO presence and contacts with EU officials should be affected as well. This is based on two main underlying assumptions. First, if the institutional and legislative framework hampers an active civil society and strengthens the executive, there could be fewer contacts between CSOs and EU officials. The same goes for CSO presence at the EU level. Weakened civil society actors without access to national decision-makers are unlikely to mobilize at the EU level if they are constrained by an illiberal regime. In addition, access to the Commission requires access to resources, and if an illiberal regime successfully withholds resources from CSOs their ability to access Commission officials will also be affected (Meyer et al. 2019:10). Second, the Commission has shown an unwillingness to interfere at the national level in member states associated with democratic backsliding. The sentiment behind this is fear of an anti-EU backlash for doing so (Kochenov & Pech 2016:1072). Furthermore, in member states with less than favorable conditions for civil society funding at the EU level is a way of bypassing national authorities. The initiative can be taken either by the national CSO itself applying for funding or by EU institutions aiming to promote civil society in a member state. It is, therefore, in the interest of both civil society in member states associated with democratic backsliding as well as the Commission to increase funding of CSOs in these countries. To conclude, civil society presence, access and funding are all likely to be affected somehow by democratic backsliding. Our fourth and final hypothesis is therefore;
10 In sum, prior research has concluded that civil society in the post-communist CEE region is weak when compared to the Western member states of the EU-15. During accession to the EU, some new CEE member states appeared to be on the path to civil societies more akin to those in EU-15, and the regional trend was a steady growth of CSOs and new registrants in the Transparency Register (TR). Democratic backsliding is a new phenomenon in the EU, and it is unclear how this affects civil society in the member states. However, the region is far from homogenous and the new member states have taken different paths regarding the legislative and institutional framework in which their civil societies are to exist. A comprehensive mapping of the
development of civil society in the CEE member states of the EU is therefore needed to test the above hypotheses. This can then be used as a platform for further scholarly studies.
2.0 Method
By combining data from the study by Wonka et al., the EU Transparency Register (TR), the Commission, and Eurostat I have created a dataset allowing for extensive mapping of civil society in the CEE member states and EU-15. Furthermore, building the dataset on data from several different sources increase the accuracy of the analysis. The work done by Wonka resulted in the most comprehensive register of organizations lobbying the EU institutions before the launch of the TR. The data from Wonka is, as opposed to data from the TR, not based on voluntary registrations by actors. Instead, it is a compilation of data from the Commission database CONECCS, the EP accreditations register and a list of actors lobbying the EU institutions put together by Landmarks. By cross-referencing the data in Wonka´s lobbying register with data in the TR, the data on the lobbying population in 2010 will be more accurate. Even though it was officially launched in 2011 the TR contains data from 2008 and onwards, making it possible to analyze the development over a decade from 2008 until 2018. However, the data before 2011 is mainly based on the Commission´s database CONECCS.
Here I will use the registrations in the TR and meetings between civil society organizations from CEE member states and Commission officials as indicators of how present and active civil society in these countries are at the EU level. Being registered in the TR will be used as an indicator of how present civil society from the member states is at the EU level. Furthermore, increased contacts with the Commission would indicate that the new member states are
11 agreement of the TR and does not require organizations to be registered to meet with them. It is, however, likely that if civil society from a member state is both present and active in the TR as well as in the published meetings with the Commission it is also present and active in their contacts with the Council.
To examine if a member state is accurately represented in relation to its population I have also included population as a variable. For the purpose of this analysis, I have looked at the
population in the member states in 2010 and 2018. This allows me to examine whether a member state is under- or overrepresented in the TR seen to population. While this data is also available from national agencies in the member states, I have chosen to rely on data from the European statistical agency Eurostat (Eurostat 2019). This is to avoid and national bias in the data collection. Eurostat collects and makes available, data on a vast number of statistics across the EU.
After a quantitative mapping of the development of civil society in the CEE member states compared to the EU-15 from 2008 to 2018, I will examine how the contacts between CSOs in these countries have developed over five years. Since November 2014 Commissioners, their Cabinets and Director-Generals publish their meetings and only meet with lobbyists registered in the TR. These contacts between CSOs and the Commission will be used as an indicator of how present a state´s civil society is at the EU level and used to analyze the development over time. Even though the data on meetings with Commission officials is only available for a five year period, between 2015 and 2019, it is enough to show any potential outliers in the member states examined in this paper.
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2.1 Definitions
Throughout the paper, the concepts EU-15, CEE, democratic backsliding, and civil society are used frequently and should be understood as defined below. Mentions of organized interests or lobbying should be understood as being part of civil society.
EU-15
The EU-15 are the fifteen member states of the EU before the 2004/2007 enlargement and is comprised of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. This group of member states is also sometimes referred to as ´Western Europe´ as opposed to the Central and Eastern member states. This group of member states will serve as the ‘EU standard’ that I will compare the CEE member states to. All states in this group have civil societies well-entrenched and familiar with lobbying at the EU level. Even the newest members in this group have been part of the EU for over ten years more than the new CEE member states. These fifteen states also share many political traits as liberal democracies. This makes this group a relevant point of comparison for the new CEE member states with a communist past and relatively weaker civil societies.1
CEE
Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) is here to be understood as only the countries in the region that are member states of the EU, namely: Bulgaria, Croatia1, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Even if other countries in the region might have civil societies developing along the same lines as the ones included here, the focus of this paper is to examine the civil society development at the EU level and only member states are therefore included. While Austria can be considered part of the CEE region, the country has more in common with the EU-15 for the purpose of this paper. It is a liberal democracy and a member of the EU since 1995 and does not share the same communist past as the CEE countries examined in this paper. Furthermore, even though Malta and Cyprus became members at the same time as the CEE countries they are excluded from the analyses here. They are not part of the EU-15 nor the CEE region that this paper examines and are therefore not within the scope of this analysis.
Democratic backsliding
The concept of democratic backsliding is difficult to define since it is not one specific occurrence. Rather it is a general trend of dismantling and rollback of liberal democratic
institutions and values, such as rule of law or minority rights. Even though Hungary and Poland have been the forerunners of this backsliding, and so far the only ones threatened with the use of Article 7 of the TFEU which could ultimately suspend their voting rights in the union, some
13 scholars note that democratic backsliding should be considered in a wider perspective (Cianetti et al. 2018). The main notion by Cianetti (2018:244) is that democratic backsliding is not always as clear as in the cases of Hungary and Poland, where a political party gains a majority and begins dismantling liberal checks and balances. For the sake of this analysis, democratic backsliding should here be understood as the systemic dismantling of liberal democratic institutions and core values, the intensity and scope of which may vary. Using data from Freedom House (2019) and World Governance Indicators (WGI) to measure the aggregated freedom, and voice and accountability of civil society in a country, Greskovits (2015:32) divided the CEE countries into two categories of democratic backsliding – low and high. In addition to Hungary, we also find Slovenia, Romania, Latvia, and Bulgaria in the group categorized as countries showing strong signs of democratic backsliding. I have also included Poland in this group for the analysis. However, it should be noted that Greskovits did not include Poland in the group of countries associated with high democratic backsliding. This is most likely due to that Greskovits categorization was published in 2015 and the Law and Order party (PiS) gained parliamentary majority the same year. Poland has since showed a steady and alarming trend of democratic backsliding and is therefore included in the group of backsliders in this paper. This is also the consensus in the discourse on democratic backsliding. These six countries are the ones referred to in discussions about countries associated with democratic backsliding in this paper. In the category of low democratic backsliding, we find the Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovakia, Estonia, and Lithuania. These five countries are the ones we compare the backsliding countries within the intragroup analysis of the CEE member states.
Freedom House measures freedom in countries every year, grading them on a scale of 1 – 7 where 1 is the freest and 7 the least free. From 2016 and forward they also post a score between 1 and 100, where 100 is the freest and 1 the least free, making it easier to spot developmental trends (see table 8 in Appendix 1). World Governance Indicators draw on data from several sources to create “a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance
provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries” (WGI 2019). They measure governance through six different variables, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These are all variables relevant to measuring and defining democratic backsliding. The categorization by Greskovits (2015), drawing on data from Freedom House as well as WGI is, therefore, a good measurement of democratic backsliders for the sake of the analysis in this paper.
Civil Society
For the purpose of this paper, I will rely on the more inclusive definition used by the
Commission. It states that “The EU considers Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to include all
non-State, not-for-profit structures, non-partisan and non-violent, through which people
14 (Commission 2019a). This definition also means that what is defined as civil society in this paper encompasses those actors that are expected to register in the EU Transparency Register.
Organized interests and organizations lobbying the EU institutions should also be understood as being part of civil society.
2.2 Data and sources
The launch of the EU Transparency Initiative in 2006 which would become the joint
Transparency Register (TR) in 2011 aimed to increase transparency in lobbying activities in the EU. The register “covers all activities designed to influence - directly or indirectly -
policymaking, policy implementation and decision-making in the EU institutions, no matter where they are carried out or which channel or method of communication is used” (TR 2019,
emphasis in original). However, the TR is not mandatory and while it has grown to almost 12 000 registrants in 2019 the register is based on incentives and voluntary compliance.
Nonetheless, the TR offers a massive data set for scholars analyzing the civil society of the EU. With data available from 2008 this means that the TR offers a unique insight into how civil society has developed across the union. While the TR was officially launched in 2011, but the Transparency Initiative was put forward already in 2006 (TR 2019) and the register today contains data from June 2008 and onwards, using data from the Commission database CONECCS and accreditations to the European Parliament (EP). Previously CONECCS and accreditations to the EP offered only limited insight into lobbying efforts by different actors. The TR was created to be an Interinstitutional Agreement between the EP and the European
Commission. The goal of the register was to make it more transparent which organizations or representatives met with which decision-makers at the EU level. Today the register contains almost 12000 entries with information about the registrants, such as funding and EP
accreditation. With data available from 2008 this makes it possible to study the development of civil society at the EU level over a ten year period. However, the TR is not a mandatory register for those lobbying the EU institutions. Instead, it relies on incentives, offering those registered hall passes to the EP, access to the Commission and a reputational gain for adhering to the code of conduct in the register.
15 register needs a fundamental overhaul” (ALTER-EU 2009). However, the voluntary approach taken by the Commission was also the path taken with the interinstitutional agreement that led to a joint register, the TR, and the critique from ALTER-EU and others remained the same in the first years of the TR (Greenwood & Dreger 2013, Kretschmer & Schmedes 2010, Manko et al. 2014).
A revised register was launched in 2015, with the Commission publishing a roadmap for the adoption of a mandatory register. While the register as of today is still voluntary, many of the flaws pointed out by critics after its initial launch was remedied with the revised register. Even though the TR lacks a dedicated watchdog ‘naming and shaming’ by other registrants, as well as other actors such as ALTER-EU, have proven efficient in increasing the quality of data in the register (Greenwood & Dreger 2013). In addition, the revised register saw a major overhaul to its search engine, making the register more accessible and transparent. This makes the TR a great tool for accessing and analyzing information about the development of civil society in the EU. In addition to the TR, some scholars created an EU lobbying register on their own in 2010 (Wonka et al. 2010), with the long term-goal of updating and improving it over the years to come. This register is based on three different sources; the Commission´s database CONECCS, the European Parliament’s (EP) accreditation registry and Landmarks’ ‘European Public Affairs Directory’, a commercial register of organized interests at the EU level. While the introduction of the TR in 2011 made this register by Wonka et al. (2010) somewhat redundant, their lobbying register offers a register of the lobbying population in the EU which is not reliant on voluntary registration. Furthermore, the lobbying register from 2010 looks at the EU-15 and the new member states separately. A comparison with data from both the TR and the lobbying register by Wonka is therefore of interest in an analysis of the CEE civil society development over time. The data that the Commission publishes about their meetings is not perfect, and there can be some duplications and delays. A single meeting attended by two officials from different DGs can be reported twice, even though only one meeting actually took place, and this can distort the figures. However, this is marginal and will not affect the results in this analysis since it is the general trend that is examined. Furthermore, as stated previous, the Commission only publishes meetings with high-ranking officials such as commissioners, their cabinet members, and
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2.3 Operationalizations
To analyze the development of civil society in the CEE member states I use the concepts
presence, access, and funding to produce a complete overview of civil society at the EU level.
These three concepts are used to examine actual representation at the EU level, access and activity concerning contacts with EU officials, and finally, the funding that CSOs receive from the Commission. Together, this will form a regional mapping of civil society in the CEE member states. Both the current level of civil society at the EU level and the developmental trend is analyzed with these concepts. To be able to measure civil society in this analysis the following operationalizations of the above-mentioned concepts have been done.
Presence
Presence is operationalized by looking at organizations from the EU member states being registered in the TR, or the old register by Wonka (2010). By combining data from the register by Wonka with the data in the TR we get an accurate picture of the lobbying population in 2010 and 2019. Furthermore, by looking at new registrants year by year it is possible to analyze the developmental trend in addition to the levels in 2010 and 2019 respectively. By comparing not only the actual number of registrations, but also the share of registrations among EU member states with population it is possible to see whether a member state is over- or underrepresented in the register. Even though the register is voluntary, and some actors chose not to register, it is estimated that it contains around 75% of the lobbying population in Brussels (European Parliament 2015). This makes being registered in the TR a good indicator of whether civil society from a member state is present at the EU level.
Access
Being registered in the TR is only one part of an active civil society at the EU level. Activity and access to decision-makers is another important variable for measuring levels and trends of civil society. This is measured by looking at contacts between high ranking Commission officials and civil society from the member states. Since the Commission publishes data on all high-ranking meetings of this kind since December 2014 it is possible to examine and analyze the
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Funding
Lastly, EU funding of civil society in the member states is a crucial component of how civil society in the new CEE member states has developed since accession. To avoid bias I have operationalized this variable as the EU funds distributed exclusively by the Commission, which constitutes 20% of the total EU budget. While this share of the total EU budget is not exclusively distributed among civil society interests it is a good indication of where the Commission sees a need for more financial support. Since a strengthened civil society at the EU level is a stated goal for the Commission it is also likely that they will direct funds towards member states with civil societies in need of outside funding. This makes it a good indicator for an overview of EU financial support of civil society in the member states. Other parts of the budget are decided upon through deliberations among the member states, and therefore vulnerable to member state bias and vetoes. By operationalizing funding as only the part of EU funding distributed solely by the Commission the purpose is to minimize this bias in the data. The role of the Commission as the ‘guardian of the treaties’, as well as its explicit goal of strengthening civil society and core liberal values across the union (Commission 2019a), makes this operationalization suitable for the analysis in this paper. It should be noted, however, that this operationalization is not suitable for more in-depth studies of civil society funding in the member states. Any such analysis would need to more closely analyze the recipients of EU funds and which civil society interests are funded. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.0 Analysis
3.1 Presence
18 country in EU-15 experiencing growth in population. We see that even though the CEE member states experience a decrease in population, they still increase their share of registrations in the TR. This appears to strengthen the hypothesis that the CEE member states are on the path to increased civil society presence at the EU level.
When comparing the EU-15 and the new CEE member states over time of both groups show similar trends with an exponential increase in registrations as well as a major influx of new entries from 2014 to 2018. Table 1 below shows the number of registrants with the main office in a member state, comparing the lobbying population in 2010 and 2019. The variable population has been included to control for any increase or decrease in a country’s population, as well as examining whether a country is over- or underrepresented in the register. In addition, using the country where an organization has its main office is used here as an indicator of the country of origin. Even if many of the organizations in the TR also have a dedicated office in Brussels, the country of origin is almost always where the main office is located. This is also how the
Commission themselves classify which member state an organization comes from in their ‘Annual Report on the operations of the Transparency Register 2017’ (Commission 2017). The EU-15 has seen its dominance in the register decline over time, as seen in figure 1. In 2010 they comprised 90,7% of all registrants which had decreased to 82,1% in 2019. With a combined share of 79,6% of the total EU population in 2018, the EU-15 is now only slightly
overrepresented in the TR as a region. There have also been major changes at the state level in the EU-15, with several states greatly increasing their presence while others are becoming less dominant. One of the most striking changes from 2010 to 2019 is the decreasing German presence, with the country dropping from 17,3% in 2010 to 12,9% in 2019. Italy, Greece and Spain almost double their relative presence from 3,7%, 0,6% and 3,4% respectively to 6,6%, 1,2% and 6,2% in 2019. This is also the case for smaller member states in the EU-15 such as Sweden, Finland, and Ireland. However, in the EU-15 Portugal stands for the largest increase going from 0,3% to 1,5%. These results indicate that not only does the CEE member states gain ground, but Germany decreases its presence notably and other EU-15 states stand for a larger share in 2019 than in 2010.
19 Furthermore, looking at the individual CEE member states we do find that some countries
increase their presence at the EU level more than others in the region (table 1). The Czech Republic, Romania, and Croatia being examples of this with almost five times higher share of the organizations in 2019 compared to 2010. However, most CEE member states are still
underrepresented when we control for the population. Especially Poland stands out in this regard, with 7,8% of the EU population but only represented with 1,8% in the TR. Of the countries associated with democratic backsliding, Hungary stands out with a more modest relative increase from 0.5% in 2010 to 0.8% in 2019. Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Latvia all triple their relative
presence in the register and Poland more than doubles its presence. In this group, Slovenia is the only country that is overrepresented in the register when controlling for population, with Latvia close to a presence equal to its population. In sum, the group of member states associated with high degrees of democratic backsliding display major intragroup variations in their increase in presence over time. However, the country considered the forerunner in this group, Hungary, increase its presence the least.
Finally, we find that the category Other which includes the smaller member states Cyprus and Malta in addition to all registrations from non-member states also increases their presence in the register over time. In 2010 this group stands for 6,5% of the registrations and has increased to 10.1% in 2019. In this group, the US and Switzerland stand for the largest share of registrations, but the group contains civil society organizations from across the world lobbying the EU
institutions. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that this group has a bigger relative presence than the CEE member states.
It should be noted that including Belgium will affect the results since some registrants are
20 Table 1. Organizations registered to lobby the EU 2010 and 2019
Country 2010 2019 2010 2018
EU-15 states Freq. % Freq. % Pop. % Pop. % Germany 214 17.3 1529 12.9 81.8 16.3 82.8 16.2 UK 95 7.7 1089 9.2 62.5 12.4 66.3 12.9 France 113 9.1 1177 9.9 64.7 12.9 66.9 13.0 Belgium* 441 35.7 2208 18.6 10.8 2.1 11.4 2.2 Netherlands 59 4.8 681 5.7 16.6 3.3 17.2 3.4 Italy 46 3.7 785 6.6 59.2 11.8 60.5 11.8 Spain 42 3.4 735 6.2 46.5 9.2 46.7 9.1 Austria 31 2.5 255 2.1 8.4 1.7 8.8 1.7 Sweden 14 1.1 261 2.2 9.3 1.8 10.1 2.0 Denmark 25 2.0 188 1.6 5.5 1.1 5.8 1.1 Finland 15 1.2 261 2.2 5.4 1.1 5.5 1.1 Portugal 4 0.3 181 1.5 10.6 2.1 10.3 2.0 Ireland 9 0.7 189 1.6 4.5 0.9 4.8 0.9 Luxembourg 8 0.6 79 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.1 Greece 7 0.6 141 1.2 11.1 2.2 10.7 2.1 Total EU-15 1123 90.7% 9759 82.1% 397.4 78.9% 408.4 79.6%
New CEE states
Poland 9 0.7 213 1.8 38 7.6 38 7.3 Czech Rep. 3 0.2 116 1.0 10.5 2.1 10.6 2.1 Slovakia 1 0.1 64 0.5 5.4 1.1 5.4 1.1 Hungary 6 0.5 93 0.8 10 2.0 9.8 1.8 Romania 3 0.2 105 0.9 20.3 4.0 19.5 4.0 Latvia 1 0.1 37 0.3 2.1 0.4 1.9 0.4 Estonia 4 0.3 47 0.4 1.3 0.3 1.3 0.3 Slovenia 3 0.2 69 0.6 2 0.4 2.1 0.4 Lithuania 2 0.2 51 0.4 3.1 0.6 2.8 0.5 Bulgaria 3 0.2 70 0.6 7.4 1.5 7.1 1.4 Croatia 1 0.1 59 0.5 4.3 0.9 4.1 0.8 Total CEE 36 2.8% 924 7.8% 104.4 20.8% 102.6 20.1% Other 76 6.5% 1195 10.1% 1.5 0.3% 1.4 0.3% Total 1235 100% 11878 100% 503.2 100% 512.4 100%
Sources: Wonka et al 2010, Transparency Register 2019, Eurostat 2019
21 Figure 1.Organizations registered to lobby the EU 2010 and 2019
Sources: Wonka et al 2010, Transparency Register 2019
Figure 2. Distribution of CSOs from CEE member states
Sources: Wonka et al 2010, Transparency Register 2019
90,7 2,8 82,1 7,8 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 EU-15 CEE P e rc ent
Share of CSO presence in the Transparency Register
2010 2019 61 63,5 39 36,5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2010 2019 P er cent Year
CEE member states share of CSO presence
22 Since the TR is open for all actors lobbying the EU institutions the register contains registrants not only from EU member states but from all around the world. However, the United States, Switzerland, and countries applying for membership in the EU stand for most of the non-EU entries in the register (Greenwood & Dreger 2013:148, Wonka et al. 2010:468, TR 2019). I have included all these non-EU registrants as well as Cyprus and Malta in the category Other in table 1. As stated above, in 2010 this group comprised more than double the share of registrations compared to the CEE member states with 6,5%. This gap has decreased significantly in 2019 with the non-EU registrations comprising 10,1% and the CEE 7,8%. It is noteworthy, however, that this group still has a higher presence in the register than the CEE region of the EU. Since the focus of this paper is the development of CEE member states, the registrants in the category
Other are excluded from any further analysis when examining the development at the state level.
The CEE region stands for over 20% of the total EU population but is still underrepresented with 7,8% in 2019. However, the CEE member states have almost tripled their presence in the TR since 2010. If the trend shown here in these findings continue, the CEE member states will be more accurately represented at the EU level within another decade. This will, however, require that the observed trend of increased presence continue. The region almost tripled their presence, in relation to the 15, in the TR between 2010 and 2019. To have a presence equal to the EU-15 would require more than a doubling of the current levels. At the current levels, the CEE member states are still severely underrepresented in the register compared to the EU-15.
The TR has grown exponentially since launch with a growing number of new registrations each year. By looking at the new registrations in the TR from EU-15 and the new CEE member states it is possible to see the development from 2008 to 2018 (see table 2 in Appendix 1). This not only shows the EU-15 dominance diminishing but that the bulk of all EU registrations in the TR comes from registrations between 2015 to 2018. During this period there are 6026 new
23 Figure 3. New registrations in the TR, EU-15 and CEE member states
Source: Transparency Register 2019
When excluding Belgium from the analysis the share of new registrations from CEE is even higher (see table 3 in Appendix 1). Here we see that the CEE stands for 3,7% of new
registrations in 2008, peaking at 16,7% in 2017 and then 14,8% in 2018. The total in table 3 shows CEE and EU-15 combined when Belgium is excluded. While the development of new registrations of civil society actors in the TR shows a steady increase when looking at the regional level, there are major differences within the region at the state level. When comparing the development of the democratic backsliding CEE member states to the other CEE member states we find that while both groups increase the amount of new registrations in the TR the group of backsliders stands for the majority of these new registrations. However, CSOs from the other CEE member states appear to diminish this gap over time (figure 4).
Even though all countries in the region increase their presence in the TR over time, some states are notably more present than others. Poland stands out with between 25-30% of the total of new registration from the CEE region every year, and peaking at 4,2% of the total EU registrations in 2017. After Poland, both Romania and Slovenia, as well as Hungary, increase their presence more than others in the region over time. Interestingly, Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Slovenia are all part of the group of CEE member states associated with democratic backsliding. It should be noted as well that with the exception of Poland, Hungary, and Romania the entire CEE region stays almost dormant regarding new registrations until after 2012. This indicates that most of the new CEE member states were present at the EU level to a lesser degree in the first few years
97,8 98,4 96,8 97 97,1 93,4 93,4 93,3 89,3 85,8 87,5 2,2 1,6 3,2 3 2,9 6,6 6,6 6,7 10,7 14,2 12,5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 P er cent Year
Share of new registrations over time
24 after their accession, and did not begin to increase their presence to a notable degree until after 2012. The findings in table 1 also support this, with the total CEE presence amounting to only 2,8%.
To summarize the findings here, CSOs from the EU-15 have seen a decrease over time in their share of presence in the TR and CSOs from the CEE member states have in turn increased their presence. In 2010 CSOs from the EU-15 dominated the register with 90,7% of all registrants, but this has decreased to 82,1% in 2019. At the same time, CSOs from the new CEE member states have increased their presence exponentially over the years, primarily from 2013 and onwards. While still underrepresented seen to population, CSO from the CEE member states has nearly tripled their presence at the EU level. This supports our first hypothesis H1 that, over time, we
expect to see an increased presence of CSOs from CEE member states in relation to the EU-15 at the EU level.
Figure 4. New registrations from the CEE member states in the TR
Source: Transparency Register 2019
* - The TR only contains data from June 2008
5 7 10 14 11 21 28 57 105 139 122 1 2 2 5 5 10 19 32 76 73 65 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 2008* 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 N um ber o f reg is tr ati o ns Year
New registrations in the TR
25
3.2 Access
The indicator used here to analyze the access of civil society from a member state at the EU level is the number of meetings organizations have with Commission officials. One of the major incentives for registering in the TR is that Commission officials are only expected with actors registered. This makes meetings with Commission officials a relevant variable to include in the analysis together with civil society presence in the TR. Since the Commission publishes
meetings with high-ranking officials since November 2014 it is possible to analyze this development over time. Commissioners, their Cabinets, and Director-Generals are the high-ranking officials who publish their meetings with organized interests. This means that data on meetings occurring at lower levels are not published and difficult to analyze over time. However, an organization often meeting with high-level Commission officials is arguably also active at lower levels and vice versa. For this analysis, we have excluded data on the EU-15 due to resources. To include data on these meetings from both the CEE member states and the EU-15 would require resources simply not within the scope of this paper. An intragroup analysis will, however, highlight any similarities and differences within the group that is the focus of this paper. It is worth mentioning, nonetheless, that the differences in the number of meetings with Commission officials are even larger between CEE and EU-15 than the presence examined previously.
When comparing the group of democratic backsliders to the other CEE member states we see here that, over time, the group of backsliders increase their share in relation to the other CEE member states. In 2015, which is the first year we have data from, both groups of CEE member states conduct the same amount of meetings with Commission officials. Over time, however, CSOs from the group of democratic backsliders increase their share in relation to the other CEE member states with 63,5% the coming two years. After a return to a more even distribution of meetings between the groups in 2018, the group of backsliders peaks with a share of 74,4% of the meetings between CEE CSOs and Commission officials in 2019 (figure 5).
When looking at the individual CEE member states we see vast differences in the number of meetings organizations from each state have conducted (figure 6). Many CEE member states show very little activity as and no signs of any notable increase in the number of meetings. A few are extremely active compared to others in the group, and some appear to gradually increase their activity at the EU level. This shows that there are major variations within the group of CEE member states regarding their access to EU decision-makers. Some of this can be explained by political events of importance to a member state, where the EU has competence. For example, Commission directives on energy and fossil fuels might spark lobbying campaigns from a myriad of CSOs. The civil society representing both the energy sector as well as
environmentalists are likely to be involved. This will in turn likely affect the number of meetings with Commission officials that year. Therefore, spikes in the number of meetings can be
26 been over a period of time. However, even if this explains some of the spikes in meetings there are still some clear trends within the CEE group of member states.
Yet again, Poland is the main outlier in the group with almost a third of all CEE meetings during the five year period. In 2015, Poland together with the Czech Republic stands for 75% of all CEE meetings with Commission officials. A large share of Poland’s meetings with the Commission can be explained by the country’s large and very active energy sector. The organizations Polish Electricity Association, Polskie Gornictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo SA - Polish Oil and Gas Company, Polish Wind Energy Association, and Polish Confederation Lewiatan together stands for 35% of all meetings by Polish CSO:s. The Polish Confederation Lewiatan is a nation-wide representation of employers to the state and trade unions. However, they list the energy sector as their number one priority (TR 2019, Commission 2019b).
Nonetheless, Poland remains a high level of meetings throughout the period examined here. This, in junction with Poland’s growing presence in the register, indicates that the country is becoming both more active and present at the EU level.
After Poland, the Czech Republic is the CEE member state most active in their access to
Commission officials. Even if the number of meetings by organizations from the Czech Republic drops from the peak in 2015 the share is close to 15% in the following three years. The country, together with Poland, stands for 50% of the meetings in 2016 and 2017. Opposed to Poland, the most active CSO from the Czech Republic is the CEE Bankwatch Network (BWN) which monitors the activities of the international financial institutions. The BWN also “proposes constructive alternatives to IFI and EU policies and projects in the region” (TR 2019), meaning the spending and distribution of the EU Cohesion Fund favorable to the CEE member states. However, the second most active organization from the Czech Republic is from the energy sector. While not as dominant as the energy CSOs from Poland, the CEZ Group stands for 18,5% of the total meetings during this period. The group is an electricity conglomerate with its
headquarters in the Czech Republic, as opposed to the national energy CSO:s from Poland. Overall, civil society from the Czech Republic that has access to Commission officials appears more diverse than those from Poland. In addition, Czech CSOs appears to be more connected to their European peers than CSOs from Poland.
Of the Baltic countries, Estonia is the most active in terms of meetings with the Commission. After 2015, with a share of 2,9%, Estonia takes turns with the Czech Republic in holding second place in share of meetings with Commission officials. Estonia peaks at 16,7% of the meetings in 2016 with shares of 11,5% and 14,4% in the following two years. This can be seen in contrast to Latvia and Lithuania in the Baltics. The former having a share of between 8,6 – 10,6% the first three years and then a sharp decline in 2018 and 2019, and the latter being very sparsely
27 representatives from the banking system, agriculture, and infrastructure. The lack of a large and powerful energy sector, as in Poland, might explain the low levels of access to some extent. However, interests other than banking, agriculture and infrastructure are close to non-existent in their access to high-ranking Commission officials and the trend is a steady decrease in contacts overall.
The other countries primarily associated with democratic backsliding - Hungary and Poland, and to some extent Bulgaria and Romania - do show similar trends in their meetings with
Commission official, with the exception of Poland as noted previously. Organizations from Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania are rarely meeting with the Commission compared to organizations from other member states in the CEE region. Looking at Hungary, the foremost country associated with democratic backsliding, the country has a small peak in meetings in 2017 accounting for 7,7% of the total meetings from the CEE member states. Other than that, the CSOs from Hungary are rarely active in their contacts with the Commission. This is in stark contrast to the Czech Republic, which is the CEE member state closest to Hungary in population size with both member states having close to 10 million inhabitants. As with Poland, it is civil society representing the energy sector that dominates the meetings between Hungarian CSO:s and the Commission. Other than energy CSOs, it is the Magyar Tudományos Akadémia (MTA) promoting scientific cooperation that is the most active Hungarian actor. The activity from MTA indicates that NGOs without ties to the regime, such as the energy sector, are still active at the EU level to some extent. The overall level of access is, nonetheless, low compared with other CEE member states and there is no trend showing an increase.
Furthermore, civil society from Romania appears to stay almost dormant in their activity at the EU level until 2019 when there is a large spike in the number of meetings. The types of CSO:s from Romania that has access to the Commission is almost exclusively from the financial and commercial sector. Among the top, we find the organizations Fundația Romanian Business Leader, Banca Comerciala Romana SA, Bucharest Stock Exchange, and Romanian Investor Relations Association (Commission 2019b, TR 2019). This shows that, in addition to an overall low level of access, these are the civil society interests primarily having access to the
Commission.
28 compared to other member states associated with democratic backsliding, where it is primarily the energy sector or financial interests that are being active in meeting with the Commission. Finally, the last two CEE member states, Croatia and Slovakia, show low levels of access and no clear trend of increase. Meetings between CSOs from Croatia and the Commission are close to non-existent during the period examined here, except for a small increase in 2018 and 2019. Slovakian civil society retains low levels of access throughout the period, with a peak of 6,7% in 2017.
This analysis of the CEE member states access to Commission officials shows that there are major differences within the group. The countries associated with democratic backsliding show varying levels of access as well, with some of them showing signs of an increase over time. This contradicts the hypothesis that member states associated with democratic backsliding should see a decrease over time in contacts between CSOs and Commission officials. However, a common denominator among the group associated with democratic backsliding is a high share of certain interests that have access to Commission officials. These interests are typically the energy sector, finance, and banking, agriculture and infrastructure. In the group, Slovenia is the exception to this rule with more diverse civil society interests having access. The country considered the forerunner of democratic backsliding among the CEE member states, Hungary, show overall low levels of access and no clear trend of increasing activity. However, it is noteworthy that the other member state most associated with democratic backsliding, Poland, shows the opposite behavior during the entire period examined here. Even though some of this activity by Poland is explained by the large energy sector lobbying at the EU level, CSOs from Poland are still more active than other member states associated with democratic backsliding.
The findings in the analysis does not support our second hypothesis H2 at the regional level, that over time, we expect to see an increase in contacts between CSOs from CEE member states and
Commission officials. Nevertheless, over time, CSOs from some of the new CEE member states
do increase their activity and access to Commission officials. However, there is no clear trend over time of an increase at the regional level. For the fourth hypothesis H4 there is both some support for the hypothesis as well as findings that contradicts it. The hypothesis H4 stated that;
In all aspects, presence, access, and funding, we expect civil society in backsliding countries to develop differently than other CEE member states, i.e. lower presence, less access, and more funding than other CEE member states. In the group of democratic backsliders only CSOs from
29 Figure 5. Meetings with Commission officials
Source: Commission 2019b
Figure 6. Meetings with Commission officials, individual CEE member states
Source: Commission 2019b 50 63,5 63,5 51,4 74,4 50 36,5 36,5 48,6 25,6 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 P er cent Year
Share of meetings between CSOs and Commission officials
Dem. Backsliders Other CEE MS
21 1 2 5 4 0 0 2 2 29 9 18 15 4 2 11 12 16 8 2 2 8 2 4 6 7 9 11 5 0 1 1 8 2 24 29 35 33 19 0 0 2 2 14 3 3 7 3 5 1 3 10 14 15 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 N um ber o f m eeti ngs Year
Meetings between CEE CSOs and Commission officials
30
3.3 Funding
With the explicit goal of the Commission to strengthen civil society in the EU (Commission 2019) it is relevant to look at the EU funding of CSO:s. Table 5 shows the development of EU funding between 2010 and 2018, comparing the EU-15 and CEE member states both at the regional level as well as looking at individual states. The table only includes the part of the EU budget directly implemented by the Commission. This is because the part of the budget subject to intrastate deliberations can be affected by bargaining between member states, as well as blocked by member state vetoes. Only considering the part of the budget implemented directly by the Commission is, therefore, a more accurate measurement of EU funding of civil society, at least for the purpose of this analysis. If the stated goal of the Commission to strengthen civil society in the union holds true we should see support of the third hypothesis, namely an increase of EU funding of civil society in member states associated with democratic backsliding.
When looking at the data in figure 7 we see that it much resembles the data in table 1, examining the distribution of organizations in the TR, with a clear EU-15 dominance. In 2010 the EU-15 receives over 96% of the funding, and this distribution is practically unchanged until 2015. In 2015 we see that the EU-15 total funding from the Commission amounts to just under 90%, further decreasing to 83% the next two years and 85% in 2018. This means that the CEE member states increase their share from 3,4% in 2010, to 14.5% in 2018. In 2016 and 2017 the share is even higher, with 16,8% and 16,6% respectively. Therefore, at the regional level, it appears as the development of EU funding is in line with the increased presence of the CEE member states. The new CEE member states are getting a larger share of EU funding for their civil societies. At the state level in the EU-15 group, the UK experience the largest decrease in funding
accounting for 14-17% of the budget from 2010 to 2016 and only 10,1% and 8,4% respectively in 2017 and 2018. However, this can most likely be explained by Brexit and reluctance to direct EU funds to a state leaving the union. The other two larger member states of the EU-15 often both active and present at the EU level, Germany and France, also experience some decrease in their share over time but this fluctuates, and no clear trend can be seen. Germany receives 13,3% of the budget in 2010, peaks at 15,7% in 2013 and stands for 12,6% in 2018. Most notable of the two is perhaps France, accounting for 18,3% in 2010 but only 10,9% in 2019. The years in between are, however, relatively stable in terms of funding with France receiving approximately 10% every year. Looking at the other member states of the EU-15 the trend is stable, with the states receiving similar shares of the budget each year. Within the group, Austria, Spain, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Greece have gained most when comparing the levels of funding in 2010 and 2018. Four of these member states have increased their share of the budget with approximately 50% compared to 2010, and Austria showing a doubling of its share of the funding (see table 5 in Appendix 1).
31 variations within the group can be seen. Poland and Lithuania gain the most in relative shares between 2014 and 2015, with Poland increasing their share from 0,7% to 2,4% and Lithuania 0,1 to 2%. Hungary and Latvia also increase their received share of funding substantially between these years. Hungary receives 1% of the total budget in 2015, up from 0,6, and Latvia sees an increase from 0,1% to 0,7%. When looking at the developmental trend for the member states associated with democratic backsliding – Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Latvia – we see that, with the exception of Slovenia and Latvia, there is an increase over time. Poland is, once again, the major outlier of the group with both high levels and a steady trend of increase. Hungary sees its share of the EU funding peak in 2016, with 2,6%, and then returns to levels close to 1% in the coming years. Furthermore, Romania shows a steady trend in increase mirroring the development of Poland albeit at lower levels. In sum, the countries associated with democratic backsliding show some similar development when looking at received shares of EU funding for civil society.
Of the Baltic countries, Latvia shows a decreasing trend after its peak in 2015 dropping to 0,2% in 2018. This is in contrast with Estonia which sees a steady increase over time, going from 0,2% in 2010 to 0,7% in 2018. Finally, Lithuania drops from its peak of 2% and appears to stabilize at around 1% in the last two years examined here. This is also the case with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Croatia, where all three countries experience a peak in received funding in 2016 and then decreasing in levels. It should be noted, however, that the budget is implemented as a multiannual financial framework (MFF) over periods of seven years. This means that the period examined in this analysis encompasses two MFFs, with the second one beginning in 2014. However, due to extensive pre-accession negotiations, both the Commission and the member states of the EU-15 were well aware of the needs of civil society in the new CEE member states when they decided on the budget.
At the group level, there is no clear trend over time in the distribution between democratic backsliding CEE member states and other CEE member states (figure 8). However, when looking at the individual CEE member states at the state level we find an increase in funding over time in most member states associated with democratic backsliding (see appendix 1). This gives some support for the hypothesis H4 that the Commission supports civil society member states associated with democratic backsliding, with a majority of these countries experiencing higher levels of funding and an increasing trend over time. Furthermore, at the regional level, the CEE member states increase their share of EU funding in relation to the EU-15 over time, as seen in figure 5. This supports our third hypothesis H3: Over time, we expect EU funding of civil
32 Figure 7.
Sources: Commission Financial Transparency System 2019
Figure 8.
Sources: Commission Financial Transparency System 2019
96,6 95,7 95,9 95,8 96,4 89,9 83,2 83,4 85,4 3,4 4,3 4,1 4,2 3,6 9,1 16,8 16,6 14,5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Sha re o f fun di ng Year
EU funding of civil society
EU-15 CEE 71 67 66,5 64,4 69,4 61,2 71,7 67,4 69 29 33 33,5 35,6 30,6 38,8 28,3 32,6 31 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Sha re o f fun di ng Year
