Expecting the Unexpected
How can the nexus ’state sovereignty/integration’ explain the choice of Estonia and Hungary to go-it-alone or cooperation during the Migration crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic?
Writer: Victor Sjölander Date: 20/5-21
Word count: 16227
Supervisor: Anna Michalski
Key words: Nation-state, Sovereignty, Integration, Intergovernmentalism, Neofunctionalism, Governance in crisis, Estonia, Hungary, EU
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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the EU has been facing more crises than ever before, a trend that most likely will not be broken. Over the last few years, we have seen an economic crisis, migration crisis and a pandemic to name a few. With every new crisis where there is no set agenda on how to act member states are presented with a choice of either take the matter in their own hand and go-it-alone or pursue integration and cooperation. With each member state being able to chose there is potential for the cooperation to become strained. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to understand the choice of go-it-alone or integration in a context of the nexus of state
sovereignty/integration. The nexus will be used to understand the choices of Estonia and Hungary during the Migration crisis and Covid-19 pandemic.
The study was conducted by making use of a qualitative comparative approach of Estonia and Hungary. To engage with the concept of sovereignty four criteria were established from previous theory, Intergovernmentalism and Neofunctionalism. Each perspective was constructed into a pole structured ideal type to allow for analysis based on official governmental material, such as press releases.
The results show that the nexus ’state sovereignty/integration’ can explain the choices made of Estonia and Hungary to either go-it-alone or cooperate. The results show that Estonia was more likely to, in times of crisis, approach integration, but only slightly. Hungary on the other hand was more likely to go-it-alone.
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Introduction
In the last decade, the world has seen drastic change in many ways. A change in international politics with new key players, as well as a changing climate and all its effects. A new world with a new normal where states and other actors are forced to adapt. A changing climate brings an increasing risk of natural disasters such as wildfires, earthquakes, heavy rain, drought and tornadoes to name a few (Kaplan, 2020). A changing political climate brings increasing risk of international and national political polarization, driving a wedge between different parties (Carothers and O’Donohue, 2019). Both changes bring a different set of challenges in the modern era and give rise to unforeseen events which may impact a single state or affect several or even the world. With a new normal where global or regional effects are seen, states are forced to take a stance in their approach to unforeseen events, go-it-alone or pursue international cooperation.
During the last decade, the European Union (EU) has faced several crises where its capacity as a unitary actor has been tested. Two recent examples being the migration crisis of 2015 and the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 (Bayraklı, 2020). During these events, the member states of the EU took a different approach choosing to either pursue further integration or go it alone, trusting their own capabilities. We saw France seize personal protective equipment (PPE) on its way to another country when passing through French territory during the early stages of the pandemic. During the migration crisis Austria refused to take in migrants against the wishes of the EU (Harris, 2017; Marlow, 2021). During both examples, the EU increased its competencies in many areas to further European integration to be better prepared for the future. By strengthening the institutions of the EU the aim was to be able to act quicker during the initial phase of future events/crises providing aid where most needed (European
Commission, 2020; Hestermeyer, 2020; Algann et al., 2017; Sarhaddi Nelson, 2020; Duval, 2020).
In what instances are states inclined to follow a European line rather than a national and vice versa? By exploring the foundation of the state, sovereignty, and integration one can explore a state’s approach to sovereignty as a driving factor in its approach to unforeseen events.
Exploring this nexus of state sovereignty/integration the thesis benefits from a comparative study of two similar cases to compare the one area their difference is apparent. For the purpose of this thesis two eastern European countries, Estonia, and Hungary, were chosen to act as points of comparison. When choosing countries there are many candidates to choose from, but Estonia and Hungary share some crucial characteristics. To start, identifying the difference in outcome becomes important. In our case, it is the difference in their willingness to comply to EU laws and regulations. Moving on, they share similarities which make them good candidates for a comparative study. For a start, they share similar historical trajectories.
In the past they both belonged- or had close ties to a communist regime during the mid-1900’s (Schöpflin, 1990, pp.61–62).
With the limit inherent in a thesis some strategic choices in terms of material needs to be made. In this case it is in our interest to single out two crises to serve as examples of unforeseen events where the everyday life of the EU project was challenged across several sectors. The migration crisis of 2015 and the Covid-19 pandemic has been chosen as the unforeseen events in this thesis as they both have had great effect on the EU and challenged the idea of “business as usual”. These two crises are in many ways different. However, what makes them comparable is that they both changed the way the EU operate and made clear in
3 which areas cooperation were weaker and in need of strengthening. Dimensions present during one of these crises may not appear during the other and vice versa. Thus, the initial response to the pandemic could not rely on information learnt during the migration crisis. In our case the uniqueness of both crises is in our favour in trying to understand the nexus sovereignty/integration as previous knowledge could not be drawn upon. Thus, we are left with two distinct crises where improvisation and quick action in policy making is to be expected along the lines of the theory of “window of opportunity”.
Purpose
In recent years, the EU has been facing more crises than ever before, a trend that most likely will not be broken. Over the last few years, we have seen an economic crisis, migration crisis and a pandemic to name a few. In addition, the changing climate comes with its own
problems the EU and the member states will have to deal with. With every new crisis where there is no set agenda on how to act member states are presented with a choice of either take the matter in their own hand and go-it-alone or pursue integration and cooperation. With each member state being able to chose there is potential for the cooperation to become strained.
Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to understand the choice of go-it-alone or integration in a context of the nexus of state sovereignty/integration. The nexus will be used to understand the choices of Estonia and Hungary during the Migration crisis and Covid-19 pandemic.
RQ:
How can the nexus ’state sovereignty/integration’ explain the choice of Estonia and Hungary to go-it-alone or cooperation during the Migration crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic?
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Theory
Intergovernmentalism
Intergovernmentalism among the theories of integration shares certain characteristics with broader theories of international politics such as realism. The nation-state and its role as an actor are placed at the forefront of the analysis. As the main prospect of analysis, the founder of intergovernmentalism Stanley Hoffmann would argue that the role of the state was too important to change in the foreseeable future (Hoffmann, 1995, p.71). In addition, Hoffmann would argue that international politics is built upon cooperation of independent, sovereign states. However, said cooperation is only possible through interconnected interactions among states where the own values are being adhered to (Hoffmann, 1995, p.88). The independent sovereign state was further elaborated on by Hoffmann (1966) where he would argue that a newly formed state or a state that has been autonomous and sovereign in its own right for a long time would be unwilling to yield or compromise on their sovereignty for the sake of integration. As such, in a scenario of cooperation between long standing sovereigns complete integration is unlikely (Hoffmann, 1966, pp.864, 906). Integration becomes more complex as the conditions of cooperation amongst states are formed internally and then turned into complex international preferences leading the way in which manner to cooperate
internationally (Bickerton, 2012, p.23). The responsibility of transforming the internally formed conditions of cooperation into international preferences lies with the national government. Thus, to some degree it is the national government deciding in which areas cooperation is pursued and to what extent one is willing to yield parts of the own sovereignty to better international cooperation (Pelkmans, 1984, p.125). An important presupposition is that the national government will act rationally to base their decisions on long-term
underlying public attitudes. Thus, a national government is expected to attempt to preserve national sovereignty when possible (Taylor, 1982, p.742). By focusing on long-term attitudes, intergovernmentalism is ideal to consult in understanding the complex relationship between nation-state sovereignty and European integration which are bound together. As the rationale of the actor (state) is seen as dependent on the flow of attitudes over time the changing nature of the state is captured. Even as the political climate changes through democratic elections.
The underlying long-term attitudes of the state and public remains a central part of the road chosen by the government in traversing the nexus state sovereignty/integration.
In an attempt to modernize Intergovernmentalism Bickerton built on the core ideas of
Hoffmann and introduced what he would call “New Intergovernmentalism”. This was done in the belief that the old theory was no longer fit to explain the complexities of modern-day EU.
At its core, the national governments are still seen as key actors in driving the process of integration further. However, Bickerton argued that governments are more willing to cooperate than the old theory would assume but simultaneously being unwilling to transfer more power to traditional institutions such as the Commission or Court of Justice. As such, the main contribution of Bickerton is the idea that states are willing to cooperate but by doing so de novo new institutions are formed to house these further competencies (Bickerton, Puetter and Hodson, 2014, p.7). As states remain in focus as the key actors the importance of institutions is not forgotten in a modern EU. By transferring competencies to different
5 institutions within the EU the national governments show an unwillingness to downsize their own power while at the same empowering the EU fully. By keeping the institutions diverse power is transferred but rarely to the very same actor. As such, national governments remain in power of their own sovereignty (Fabbrini, 2013, p.1008). Despite Bickerton’s attempt at moving forward, the precise meaning of European integration remains elusive throughout but is argued to be closely connected to the delegation of policy-making powers to these de novo institutions as engines of integration together with the Commission and Court of Justice (Bickerton, Puetter and Hodson, 2014, p.304).
Intergovernmentalism is thus not on its own capable of explaining the full puzzle in understanding the nexus state sovereignty/integration due to its close ties to realism and dependency on the balancing of power. However, intergovernmentalism will aid us in
understanding and exploring the ideal type that is state sovereignty. Thanks to the close ties to realism and state-centric approach intergovernmentalism can aid us in understanding the choice of going it alone.
Neofunctionalism
Neofunctionalism is another classical integration theory often used. The main concepts of Neofunctionalism centres around the idea that states may choose to cooperate without the need of an external threat or to balance regional power. Regional cooperation is based on consensus seeking amongst sovereign states. In the process of establishing a regional
cooperation it needs to be agreed upon that the effects of cooperation are more positive than negative. The main goal of the theory is not to explain the outcome of cooperation but rather explain and explore in which direction the existing cooperation is heading (Archick, 2018). It is implied within Neofunctionalism that the process of further cooperation once established is driven by so called “spill-over effects” which is a central concept. Spill-over as a concept is the idea that actions once agreed upon will only be realized once the task is expanded upon.
By deciding to perform one task, smaller tasks surrounding and originating in the original task will make themselves known and needs to be dealt with. Thus, one may argue that the concept of integration is only realized once the process of integration becomes more complex and incorporates many areas. A trickle-down effect may be assumed where one big task leads to several smaller ones before the larger one can be realized in practice and thus establishing a foundation of cooperation before the large original task is even considered in practice (Ernst B. Haas, 1961, pp.367–372). As the idea of spill-over has been developed the
Neofunctionalists have shifted their focus away from the state as the only actor. Instead, it is argued that a deepening process of integration has resulted in states carrying an implied residual sovereignty. Thus, there are great benefits in acting as a conglomerate of actors to prusure integration further strengthening the supranational entity in the global arena
(Schmitter, 2005, p.259). However, the idea of spill-overs has been widely criticised as being outdated and its only purpose is its capacity to explain the early days of the integration
process. However, in recent years more scholars have once again embraced a neofunctionalist stance.
6 Given the development within Neofunctionalism and claims of residual sovereignty the theory is not perfect in trying to explain sovereignty. However, the aspect of integration, a corner stone of the thesis is best explained by neofunctionalism, especially the core idea of why states choose to cooperate in the first place. In understanding the nexus state
sovereignty/integration neofunctionalism can explain the integration process if drawn to its theoretical end. A state pursuing integration in its purest form without nuances of state sovereignty/ go it alone is best explained by Neofunctionalism. Thus, the inclusion of
Neofunctionalism allows us to establish and explore one of our ideal types within this thesis, an approach with full focus on integration.
Governance in crisis
Unforeseen events can take many forms, for example, earthquakes, hurricanes, epidemics, international conflict, terrorist attacks or even war. Common for all these types of unforeseen events are that they are temporary breakdowns of the everyday framework which makes a society function. By definition an unforeseen event should be large in scope as to truly set itself apart from the everyday life where the resilience of the society is tested just as much as the political leaders and public institutions (Boin, Hart and Mcconnell, 2008, p.3). Unforeseen events of this magnitude usually induce a sense of urgency and creates impossible scenarios for leaders to follow protocol in making quick decisions. Oftentimes decisions made during these circumstances are made while essential information is still unavailable (Boin et al., 2005, p.4; Reynolds and Seeger, 2005, p.45).
The dynamic changing nature of an unforeseen event may destabilise current policies and security and create so called “windows of opportunity” (Boin, Hart and Mcconnell, 2008, p.10; Rosenthal and Hart, 1991, p.356; Bakker et al., 2019, p.1411). In a liberal democracy, traditionally a chosen leader must respond to an event in the context of the country’s political and legal order. However, this course of events is likely to change when urgent action is called for, the window of opportunity, and there is a trade off in going against embedded social values in favour of acting quickly. Far reaching decisions are made quickly and may pose as both restrictive and empowering for the leaders in charge. There is no set way to act instead the window of opportunity can be used to act in favour of the best of a society but might as well serve as a way for the ruling leader or party to enforce their own agenda under the guise of being for the best. These decisions are unlikely to meet major opposition even within the own political system as based on the urgency of the matter (Boin et al., 2005, p.8;
Keeler, 1993, pp.1436, 1441).
Due to the high-risk nature of both the Migration crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic we can assume that the process of policymaking and action-taking in Hungary and Estonia should follow the trends of quick decisions while information is still unavailable. Thus, the setting of crises in this thesis is beneficial in understanding the nexus state sovereignty/integration.
Given the high-risk nature and the possibility of a window of opportunity we can assume that it becomes apparent what the ruling actors will pursue. When the EU does not have a clear way forward the national governments are forced to make the decision to either go it alone or pursue cooperation together with the other member states. It is within this decision we can assume that underlying inclinations toward the state’s sovereignty vs integration can emerge from underneath. Thus, a crisis provides us with an opportunity to discover and explore the
7 ruling elites most basic inclination towards sovereignty or integration when a decision has to be made quickly.
Dimensions of Nation-state sovereignty vs integration
To be able to analyse and engage with the research question of this thesis some core
principles need first to be established. To be more precise it is of importance to engage with the concept of sovereignty and what it means to carry nation-state sovereignty. The definition becomes important in our case as we will have to create ideal types of each definition before engaging with our material and analysis. Thus, the following section will engage with four main criteria of nation-state sovereignty to be able to better understand the approaches of either going-it-alone or pursuing integration.
Regional Cooperation
With the aim of understanding the nexus state sovereignty/integration it is first important to establish why states choose to cooperate in the first place. While realism and subsequently intergovernmentalism often sees cooperation as futile and mainly based on the balance of power fact is that states do still cooperate, and effectively at that (Bailes and Cottey, 20005, pp.219–220).
In classical neofunctionalism as mentioned earlier states are actively choosing to cooperate as the effects are beneficial in the grand scheme of things. Despite being set under heavy
criticism the concept of spill-over is seen and observable. Drawing on similar patterns of cooperation being an active choice Deutsch established a theory of security communities in the ‘50’s. A security community is a group of actors which to some capacity has become integrated. Integrated in the early sense did not refer to integration as we see it today but simply the establishment of a sense of community. Within these communities’ institutions and practices would be established and enforced garnering a widespread support. The institutions would be a driving force for peaceful change (Vesa, 1999, p.18).
Security communities and their creation are related to integration in a sense. However, rather than being a sign of integration they are proof of an increase of interaction amongst actors.
Inherent in the community is large flows of transaction within the system which serves as important indicators for integration. In a sense integration happens in communities where constant interaction and increased transactions are flowing creating a beneficial relationship for everyone involved. Following the interaction, integration becomes possible (Vesa, 1999, p.19).
Another concern in regional cooperation is the existence of external threats. The external threat common to more than one state may serve as the glue to hold the first primal form of cooperation among states together (Hurrell, 1995, p.340). Panke (2020) goes further in her argument claiming that states will only cooperate if there is high uncertainty for the individual state’s existence. Thus, the integrity of the nation-state need to be threatened before a state willingly approaches others in search for cooperation (Panke, 2020, p.476).
Thus, we can argue that regional cooperation is dependant on the active choice of continuous interaction within a region where an external threat is initially present. By means of
interaction and transaction states become more interwoven and conflict between them is unlikely and peaceful change is likely. Following interaction and transaction is integration.
8 Within the idea of actively choosing to cooperate there is also room to at any given time choose to not cooperate in certain areas and states inherently remain in charge for the extent of which they are willing to integrate into the community.
The Nation-state and national autonomy
If indivisible sovereignty is assumed an actor capable of holding it is to be expected. In traditional international politics this actor would be the state. Thus, the state and the nation- state are two concepts which need to be engaged and set apart.
First, the state is the core concept needed before moving forward to the nation-state as the latter can be seen as an extension of the former. Jessop (2016) built his ideas of the state starting form Max Weber’s classical definitions of the state. The three basic criteria of the state are thus.
1) States needs institutions and a functioning state apparatus,
2) There needs to be a clear state territory under clear and uncontested control of the state, institutions,
3) Lastly, there needs to be a permanent or stable population within the territory which is under control of the institutions. In addition, the population is required to be bound by the laws of the state, institution, or other aspects of the state apparatus.
(Jessop, 2015, pp.25–26).
The above criteria serve us well in defining a state. However, they are mainly applicable to the idea of the state in its most basic primal form. Many of the criteria in the basic form are applicable to more than the traditional state function in modern times. When a nation-state joins a regional cooperation some aspects of its sovereignty is willingly transferred to the EU.
Thus, creating a member state. Making the matter more complex the member state does not exist without the EU and the EU does not exist without the member state. But the EU could not have been formed without the nation-state. By becoming a member state and yielding some sovereignty to the EU the EU can “borrow”, in lack of a better word, sovereignty from the nation-state and thus fulfils criteria of what constitutes a state. It is within this dichotomy and convolution many of the present tensions of sovereignty lies. First, the EU has institutions formed around polity. Secondly, there is a clear territory derived from the territory of the member states. Thus, the EU does to some degree have a territory brought into the existence by its member states national borders. An outer perimeter is created where the benefits of the ratification of the Schengen agreement stops. This outer reach of the EU is common to all member states and thus the EU does indeed have a set territory drawn from the national borders and by social means a European Union zone can exist despite not having borders of its own. The same argument can be made about the need for a stable population. While the EU does not have a population of its own where residents are only European in nationality residents within any member state has the same overarching rights and laws as any other Europeans. If the nation-state has a stable population, so will the EU.
Where the nation-state makes itself different from the state is the evolution to some of the basic criteria. One key change to the criteria of territory and stable population becomes the core difference between a state and nation-state. A criterion the EU is unable to fulfil. A
9 nation-state in its core definition requires a clear connection between population and territory (Breuilly, 2017, p.24). Thus, before the EU could fulfil the criteria of the nation-state a European identity stronger than that of the national identities would need to be established (Kallis, 2018, p.299). As such, we can distinguish the difference between a state, nation-state, and member state. As such, the state in its basic form is easily replicated by a supranational organization such as the EU through states becoming member state and effectively “lend”
some of the sovereignty to the EU. A nation-state on the other hand, which is a pre-requisite of forming a regional organization, is not as easily replicated. A nation-state forms from a state when the three criteria are fulfilled and in addition the stable population has a clear and strong connection to the territory in which they reside, a sense of belonging.
Sovereignty
As a simple definition is a sovereign an actor who can feasibly claim power of a territory and the state apparatus. Hence, it is implied that said actor also has monopoly of legitimate violence and decision-making within the territory and state apparatus (Encyclopedia
Britannica, 2020). In a classical sense the response to the treaties of Westphalia is seen as an early modern rendition of sovereignty where states are the main actors. Within the state a ruling party or leader would have a clear territorial claim and hold the monopoly of violence.
It is also implied that external actors in the form of other states would refrain from involvement outside of their own territory (Zielonka, 2006, p.144). In addition, a people whose loyalty centres around the idea of the nation-state is central when discussing the
sovereignty of the state. The people of the state are required to accept the rule of the sovereign and feel a belonging to the individual state bound together by nationalism (Hoffmann, 1966, p.862). Thus, a basic understanding of sovereignty could be based on the three criteria of having a clear sense of territory in which other actors do not interfere, monopoly of violence within the territory and a people defined by their connection to the state through nationalism and belonging. Sovereignty in its more basic form is complex when addressing the
relationship between a supranational organization and the nation-state in case where some, or all, competencies of the state has been yielded to the supranational actor. Wind (2001) argues that no true equilibrium between actors is possible if more than actor shares any aspects of competencies in acting (Wind,2001, p.8).
Sovereignty in relation to integration and supranational organisations are however a bit more complex. When states become member states of the EU they are still seen as sovereign. The active choice of cooperation and integration creates a scenario where the individual state retains in power of their own right to act on their own or cooperate further. Some sovereignty is willingly yielded to the EU, but the state retains the power of their won way forward. In times of crisis where the EU has no formal competence each member state is reminded of their own sovereignty and their responsibilities to their population and are faced with the decision of go-it-alone or integrate. Formally the states can choose a rational approach from their own interest where no common ground is in existence initially.
By combining the concept and criteria of the nation-state and sovereignty we can reach an operationalization of what sovereignty is for the nation-state and how it may be challenged once becoming a member state. The criteria of state sovereignty thus become four where the
10 same idea can be seen as way to further EU integration. Though simultaneously be a template for areas in which a state may be unwilling to yield further sovereignty and competencies to the EU in the name of state sovereignty. The combined four criteria of the sovereignty of the nation-state would then be,
1) An established territory in which other actors do not interfere, 2) Autonomous institutions and state apparatus,
3) Monopoly of violence within the territory,
4) A people defined by their connection to the state through nationalism and a sense of shared belonging to the nation.
METHOD
Ideal type construction
When the aim is to measure and engage with differences on a scale rather than absolute numbers it is beneficial to construct an ideal type analysis. Inherent in an ideal type analysis is the nature of deciding the positions of the ideal types. The ideal types in question are not designed to properly reflect the true state of nature and reality but rather extreme values of an illustrative example of the phenomenon to be studied. The main benefit of constructing an ideal type analysis is the ability to explain and enhance certain key characteristics of the phenomenon to be studied.
Important to note is that the aim of the construction of ideal types is a simplified explanation of the phenomenon and thus, not a falsification. The aim is to isolate a typical characteristic of the phenomenon to be studied. In measurement the phenomenon studied is not aimed at being placed within a give classification. Instead, the aim or goal is to determine to what extent the phenomenon is like the refined ideal type. In most research it is practical to use of polar types in the construction of ideal types. In that case, the ideal types are to be determined as extreme point on a linear scale. In using a polar structure, the actual measurement of the phenomenon is made easier for the research. With the opposite poles on the scale, it is possible to discuss closer or farther away from the ideal type rather than attaching a numerical value. There is no inherent value attached which adds flexibility.
When constructing ideal types, it is important to rely on previous theory and research to determine what feasible ideal types may look like and not be subjective and reliant on the researcher. The constructed poles may be direct parallel to each other to better represent the ideal types and enable the ability to determine a move further or closer to respective ideal type. If poles are not close to being parallel the researcher run the risk of getting incorrect results which are not reflected in the ideal type construction.
In our case of the four perspectives of sovereignty there is a proper parallel between our poles.
On the one hand there is always a full national approach drawing on the ability to go-it-alone or to pursue supranational integration. Thus, the construction of ideal types allows us to determine to what extent Estonia or Hungary are moving away from the ideal types (Esaiasson et al., 2017, pp.141–143).
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Operationalization
To be able to work with and engage our perspectives of sovereignty we first need to construct ideal types based on the criteria. The intention being to draw each side of the criterion to its furthest possible edge in either full adoption of going-it-alone or cooperation. By drawing them to each end we will still retain a parallelism between our poles which allows us to move our countries in direction of towards either ideal type constructed. As each pole is not based on actual reality, we will not see any given country achieve a full out movement towards one end but rather position themselves along the line. By doing so we can look for tendencies in the response to various aspects of the chosen events by Hungary and Estonia, respectively.
For the first perspective the main aspects are based on freedom of movement within the EU.
The idea of an established territory in which other actors do not interfere is two-fold. By joining the EU, the inner border of the union is softened and opened for migration, movement, and trade. An external border takes sit place where the combined territory of the member states makes up the territory of the EU. The poles of the perspective would be a full national control of internal matters and the own territory and not adhering to joint decisions made in the EU. On the other side would be the opposite, embracing an idea of softer inner borders of the EU and more focus on the external. Another dimension would be accepting/not accepting aid from the EU on the external border in the form of funds, know-how and other personnel.
The second perspective would be incomplete enforcement or out-right refusal to implement EU rules made under traditional European jurisdiction. In such a case the national
governments are responsible for implementing and enforcing EU rules and refuse to do so. On the other hand, we have full compliance with inter-regional cooperation and rules and
regulations are effectively enforced by the national government. By transferring competencies to the institutions of the EU the single state agrees to transfer some of their own sovereignty.
If a process of qualified majority voting is used within these institutions, there are a clear way of opposition in terms of sovereignty for the single state. A state may vote against a decision, be in a minority and thus must adopt decisions which were not wanted. On the other hand, the European institutions often act on a larger spectrum than national and partaking in these may yield international benefits where the EU is a stronger player collectively.
The third perspective monopoly of violence needs to be tweaked slightly to allow us to use it in our context of going at it alone/integration as our modern-day example is less reliant on outright force. Instead focus should be on who controls the border and internal affairs. Thus, one side would be the refusal to either allow or wait for the EU to make a joint decision on how to move forward relying on the own national means in moving forward. On the other hand, is willingness to allow the EU to be in charge during unexpected events joining the collective way forward as decided on.
Lastly, a people defined by their connection to the state would on the one hand focus solely on one national identity which is the be one, end all identity. In other words, the only one to exist. On the opposite side a scenario where only, a European identity is enforced would be assumed. Thus, no national identities would exist, only an all-encompassing EU based identity would exist. A people defined by their connection to the state has been a cornerstone of the nation-state for centuries and thus is a simple yet important aspect to include.
12 Perspective Nation-State sovereignty Integration
An established territory in which other actors do not interfere,
- Full national control of internal matters.
- Not adhering to joint decisions made in the EU
- Soft inner borders of the EU and stronger external one.
- Adhering to joint decisions.
Autonomous institutions and state apparatus,
- Incomplete
enforcement or out- right refusal to implement EU laws
- Full compliance with inter-regional
cooperation and rules
Monopoly of violence within the territory,
- Establish a national point of control - No sharing of
information
- Wait for the EU to establish a common way forward
- Sharing of information A people defined by their
connection to the state through nationalism and a sense of shared belonging to the nation.
- Only a national identity
- Only a European identity
Table 1 Matrix of the ideal types for each perspective
Case Selection
Given the research question and the main interest of this thesis a few directions are possible.
An analysis of this kind could make use of a single case study to truly deep dive into the mechanisms driving the choice between going it alone/cooperate. However, by doing so some variation could be lost as only one way of action was studied, either go it alone or cooperate.
Thus, a two-case study is beneficial and allows us to see two sides of the problem, what drives the decision-making in times of unexpected events. While our two chosen cases are not to be seen as direct opposites or true points of comparison, they are seemingly different in their approach and thus make for good cases and allows us to discuss the nexus in a broader sense.
With the use of only two cases in study there are no means to generalizer the results on a grander scheme, which is also not the aim of this thesis. Even if the term comparative study is used loosely the nature of our chosen cases should follow the standard practice for a
comparative study, either a most similar system design or most different system design. In the first example, most similar system design is when the cases chosen are decided on how the cases are similar in all regards except one, the outcome. In the most different system design cases are chosen where the outcome is the same, but the countries differ in all other regards (Anckar, 2008, p.389). As previously alluded to the interest of this thesis is to see how our
13 two cases differ in their response to unexpected events, thus they have been chosen based on the most similar system design.
As two similar countries with differing approaches alluding to nation-state sovereignty and regional cooperation Estonia and Hungary have been chosen on their previous willingness to adapt to further European integration. In many ways Estonia is seen as a success story of integration after joining the EU whereas Hungary in recent years has become somewhat of a black sheep of the EU. Both countries share characteristics that can be seen as foundational as they share a political culture rooted in the east. One may assume that it is within the political cultural the foundation and basic understanding of the state comes and thus within this culture we should be able to find the core ide of the role of the state and view of nation-state
sovereignty as an underlying driving factor. They both share a similar historical trajectory in joining the EU in the same year, thus being subject to the same criteria of joining. Also, they both have or have had close to ties to communism. Taking it further in their relationship to communism they both share the process of transforming from a communist regime to a liberal market economy and democracy. Going further back, returning to the idea of political culture they both are of an eastern political culture. A culture previously dominated by high degrees of concentration of power within the state apparatus making itself different from the
historically weaker state apparatuses of western Europe during the same time (Schöpflin, 1990, p.61).
Material
Material on our chosen events and the effects on both Hungary and Estonia are plentiful.
However, they have mainly focused on the impact of the events rather than looking at the initial responses. Most sources are dated to a few years after the events in a looking back and analysing kind of way. As material is plentiful and often written long after the effects of the approaches has made themselves known we will here aim to look at sources closely connected to official government statements. Thus, the material will be official documents and press releases directly from the official webpages of Estonia and Hungary. These have been
collected from the official webpage of each government and made use of their search function to find relevant information from each crisis. The material may be official guidelines
presented towards the population on how to act, press releases in short about what the government will do about a specific occurrence or press releases on law proposals, among other things.
In addition, newspapers have been used in instances where there was not an abundancy of official material, either because they are not translated into English, or lacklustre information not enough to allow us to say anything about it. Where newspapers have been used the material have been carefully reviewed before hand and compared to the information of the official site of the government. Clear quotes, and clear courses of actions has been searched for as to avoid the writer of the newspapers own subjective thoughts to the furthest extent possible. When comparing the sources on Hungary and Estonia it became clear that information on Hungary was easier to find where there was a clear indication of in which direction the country chose to go in terms of going at it alone/cooperation. Estonia on the other hand, had shorter more condensed official statements. Where the information was not enough to make a statement newspaper articles from mainly the Baltic times was used to provide further details. Further on, the Baltic Times is a monthly independent newspaper which focus only on the Baltic region with one office in each capital of the three Baltic states.
14 With such a choice of material there are certainly some issues when material comes directly from the official governmental outlets as information may be altered in favour of the interest of the state. In other words, to what degree is the information trustworthy and what would be in the interest of the state to hide? In this insecurity is where newspapers come in to mainly serve as backup in addressing official releases of strategies. When looking at Hungary uncertainty of official statements is one of the major pitfalls of the material coming from the Hungarian government. With Hungarian media being heavily restricted one can only assume that some information will not reach the official channels (Reporters Without Borders, 2020).
As with all sources when conducting a study such like this it is of importance to limit oneself to a certain timeframe. When it comes to unexpected events and the nature of the sources available, we can assume that new information and new studies will most likely continue to appear long after they are finished. Thus, a limitation is needed. As such, I will focus on sources which mainly dates from the first year of the event to capture the initial response of a country. Which would mean that for the migration crisis, starting in 2015, sources used will mostly be dated from 2016 as it is difficult to pinpoint the exact starting point during 2015. In addition, where sources from 2017-2018 are used mainly quotes and actions detailed to take place during 2015-2016 are used. As for the pandemic, the initial timeframe used is 2019- 2020 to capture the initial responses. December 2020 and onwards is not considered as the first batches of vaccine for Covid-19 were starting to be distributed which cannot be argued to be part of an initial response.
Analytical approach
With the material consisting of official documents, press releases and newspaper articles a qualitative content analysis in the vein of Kracauer will be beneficial. With a content analysis we can not only look at the texts at face value but also analyse the meaning of what is said and done. Thus, apply meaning to our four criteria of sovereignty (Kuckartz, 2014, p.31). An aspect which could be essential when looking at official documents from a government durin the window of opportunity (Kuckartz, 2019, p.639). The texts will be analysed based on the theory section making use of the definitions of nation-state sovereignty by applying them to the meaning of the texts. With a qualitative content analysis, we can make use of thematic summaries rather than strict categorisation of a quantitative approach. If we were to use a quantitative approach there is a risk of placing values in the categorization where some options are more or less desirable, thus inhibiting our ability to approach Estonia’s and
Hungary’s approach with an equally open mind (Kuckartz, 2019; Kracauer, 1952, p.631). The written press release may at face value say one thing but the implication is something
different, as such a qualitative approach is in this case favourable (Kracauer, 1952, p.639).
However, by taking a qualitative approach one may become subject to subjectivity in interpretation. A scenario where the researcher’s own views and values spill over into the research. Thus, imposing value to the subject matter which is looked upon. To deal with this issue it is of importance that the analytical framework constructed prior to the gathering of material is constructed relying on theories and definitions drawn from previous literature.
Which has been done within this thesis. As such, the researcher can avoid, to the length possible, imposing her or his own subjectivity on the matter.
15
Validity
When conducting a qualitative study, it is important to be aware of the validity of the study. In other words, is the research able to measure what it sets out to do and do so effectively.
Validity becomes especially important to discuss in our case as we are also constructing ideal types which are not true reflections of reality and thus needs to be grounded in theory and be constructed in a way that the distinction made are logical. In any research, more so a
qualitative one, it is essential that there is a compliance between the theoretical definitions and operational indicators to be able to measure what we set out to do.
The validity may become an issue in the construction of ideal types as they often become abstract and difficult to find a mirror in the real world. Thus, it is of increased importance in our case to truly fall back on theory and previous research when constructing and defining our definitions. The definitions have been made in previous section and rely on previous research and theory to determine an adequate setting for the concept of sovereignty. In addition, the balance between theoretical definitions and operational indicators is important to keep in mind as to not conduct a study where one is weighs heavier than the other (Esaiasson et al., 2017, pp.59–61).
Also important is the distinction of what type of questions am I as the researcher asking and whether assumptions made initially are rationally constructed based on the phenomenon to be studied. In our case of ideal types it is a more difficult thing to answer as the ideal types are not based on reality. However, that does not hinder us as inherent in the ideal type
construction the research does not fall on the empirics alone but rather rests on a strong connection to theory and sensemaking of the material. Though, it must be taken into
consideration and the researcher has to be aware of the potential consequences of the choices made (Esaiasson et al., 2017, p.222).
Generalisability
When constructing a study, the goal should to some extent be to be able to generalise the results on a larger spectrum. However, it does not necessarily have to be in the direct subject matter. Instead, it is also possible to pursue greater understanding of a certain phenomenon and attempt at identifying patterns which may be replicated in other cases as well. When dealing with patterns the results can never be directly translated to another case but similar inclinations may be seen and the results may contribute to broaden the discussion or contribute to a greater study (Esaiasson et al., 2017, p.28).
Returning to our thesis we need to ask ourselves to what extent the results may be applied to other cases or if the phenomenon of the nexus state sovereignty/integration is a semi-isolated event only distinguishable in our chosen cases. If a more empirically based data were used it would have been in our interest to include more controls and more data. However, by making use of the ideal type construction and a qualitative approach the aim is not to generalize to the furthest possible extent but rather understand the patterns of choosing to go-it-alone or pursue integration in line with our ideal types. With countries as cases and their respective actions during a window of opportunity and being presented with the choice the inherent perception of sovereignty there are limitless ways to go forward. With the inherent complexity of understanding sovereignty there is an argument to be made that no two countries will be the same. In this regard, the ideal types lessen the impact of distinct differences of more than our
16 two cases. However, a comparative analysis of the two cases that in many ways are similar except the approach to the nexus ’state sovereignty/integration’ based on their perception of sovereignty provides us with an excellent starting point for a discussion where similar trends may be seen in more countries. In other words, we may find results that imply that indeed sovereignty is a big or bigger factor in a country’s initial response to a crisis and is something worth researching further. Despite not following the exact same approach more countries may follow similar trends as either Hungary or Estonia.
Analysis
Attempting an analysis of the nexus state sovereignty/integration in the Estonian and Hungarian choices will be based on previously determined four criteria of nation state
sovereignty. From each perspective we have constructed ideal types in a pole-based structure keeping the extremes parallel. In the analysis section the analysis will be structured around each crisis one by one. Each crisis is divided into four parts, one for each perspective where both countries are treated and discussed in line with their movement towards either ideal type.
At the end of each crisis follows a shorter summary of an overall movement for each country by discussing all four perspectives together in brief.
Migration Crisis
An established territory in which other actors do not interfere,
The first perspective of sovereignty is the idea of an established territory in which other actors do not interfere. The perspective has two extreme points of a more national, go it alone, approach where the border is closed, and freedom of movement is suspended. On the other side is full freedom of movement within the EU where goods and people are free to roam.
During the migration crisis Estonia pursued voluntary quotas to be mandatory for all member states. The quotas would dictate how many refugees each state would be required to take on.
The quotas would be based on respective member states’ capabilities to accept more or fewer migrants (Turovski, 2019; Baltic Times, 2018). Establishing binding quotas are interesting from the perspective of controlling the border and who can enter as the decision would not be made on the national level but rather on the European. Thus, Estonia in their approach to voluntary quotas rather than binding is taking an approach of a more restricted border.
Proposed quotas would be presented in the EU, but the implementation would rest with the state itself, as they are voluntary and Estonia would, in theory, not have to abide by the quotas if decided against it. Further on, the Baltic states together strengthened their borders in 2016 during the height of the migration crisis. However, the border was mainly strengthened towards Russia and not their fellow EU member states (Mardiste, 2016). By strengthening the common external border, the Estonian government is seemingly seeing a potential problem in leaving the outer border weak. Without going too far into speculation by not strengthening the border to fellow EU states the Estonian government is seen as trusting the European system of dealing with freedom of movement during the migration crisis. Further on the Estonian prime minister Juri Ratas advocated during a speech in the European Council for a tighter grip on the outer border of the EU. During the same meeting Ratas once again opened the discussion
17 on voluntary quotas of migrants rather than forcing the states to accept the proposed quotas from the EU (Baltic Times, 2018).
Hungary quickly became a “hot spot” for migration in Europe during 2015. Hungary’s geographical location on the perimeter of the EU makes Hungary one of the first points of contact with the EU for many migrants. Due to the great increase of migrants Hungary decided to seal its southern border completely (Aljazeera, 2020). The decision to close the border was made on direct orders of Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán who advocated forced returns of illegal migrants. When migrants where to leave Hungary Orbán wished them to be relocated outside of the EU to protect the European border against criminals (About Hungary, 2016). When the southern border was sealed Hungary also shut the border with fellow member state Croatia. The approach places an emphasis on the protection of the own border first rather than protecting the freedom of movement of the EU. Making the issue more complicated is the fact that Hungary claimed the border was closed to protect Europe against criminals. In Hungarian media Orbán made clear that it is the duty of Hungary to protect the EU like they have for the past five centuries (About Hungary, 2017b). Thus, the Hungarian approach is interesting in the sense that a decision was made to close the entire border, including the Croatian/Hungarian border but still proclaiming the goal is to protect Europe.
Seemingly it is a careful balancing act of wanting to protect both Europe and the own border but being unwilling to compromise Hungarian safety.
Autonomous institutions and state apparatus,
Autonomous institutions and state apparatus is closely connected to non-interference within the own territory. However, slightly more geared towards the actual decision-making. As such, the two extreme points of the perspective are referring to complete reliance on national institutions where all binding decisions and laws are made “in house” in the national arena.
On the other hand, is further empowerment of European institutions in which states take part in cooperation and reaching joint decisions where the ultimate best of the EU is placed at the forefront.
Readily available on the Estonian governments webpage is a statement saying that it is of importance that “Each country shall retain the right to decide whether to apply a permanent crisis system” (Valitsus, 2016). Thus, during the migration crisis the Estonian way forward was continued importance of the own state to decide on matters of introducing new systems to deal with the issue at hand. No common European institutions tasked with introducing a system of redistributing migrants binding to all member states were wanted. Instead, the decision would lie with the national governments of each state. This strict approach has been criticised by the commission. The Estonian response to the criticism pointed to the
effectiveness and speed one had in relocating the migrants in the country (Baltic Times, 2016). Thus, the Estonian approach was leaning towards a national approach as based on their capabilities to integrate incoming migrants which outperformed many other member states. If one has strong national institutions, it makes sense that further European integration is not necessary from the national point of view. Estonia, thus, took an approach where trust in the national institutions became the defining factor of choosing whether to go it alone or pursue integration.
18 In Hungary on the other hand the approach to state apparatus is seemingly more straight forward. Discontent with the EU and the way migrants were dealt with is seen in many places.
In addition, decisions made in the Hungarian parliament has been overruled by the EU. One of the most glaring examples was when Hungary refused to take in more than one thousand immigrants despite them coming from a so called “safe transit zone”. Hungary argued that these migrants were illegal immigrants who would need to be relocated outside of Europe (Thorpe, 2017). Refusing the migrants and asylum seekers resulted in backlash from the commission and the issue was brought to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ruling made was in favour of the commission1 (ECJ, 2020). The ruling against Hungary was domestically seen as a direct threat to Hungary and the EU. Thus, Hungary would go on to show signs of displeasure with the European institutions overriding decisions made on the national level (Aljazeera, 2020). In addition to the issue of the migration crisis the Hungarian parliament was simultaneously expressing dissatisfaction with the EU’s incapability to provide the country with satisfactory infrastructure to reduce their dependency on Russia as a cooperation partner (About Hungary, 2017a). Thus, we can see that during the migration crisis there was some concerning statements made by the Hungarian government regarding the viability of the European institutions. Rulings made, by for example the ECJ, was seen to be directly clashing with the needs of the Hungarian people.
Monopoly of violence within the territory
Monopoly of violence as a concept would first need to be re-addressed in line with more of who controls the border. When it comes to control the perspective takes the form of which institutions, national or supranational are the main enforces of rules and regulations. On the one hand we have the national approach of relying on the own police force and or military to control the border without external aid in the form of either economic means or know how.
On the other hand, would be a situation where rules and enforcing said rules rest with the EU and the facilitation of upholding control rest on economic aid and know how form the EU to the national forces.
During the migration crisis Estonia, like many others, had an ultimate goal of protecting the own country and their own citizens (Baltic Times, 2016). The Estonian police force was placed in full control in controlling incoming migrants to determine if they were a threat to Estonia. In addition, it would be the responsibility of the police to remove and relocate migrants charged as illegal or dangerous to the Estonian community. However, Estonia did take part in the bigger European project aiming at increasing the capabilities of the national forces to control the waves of migrants. Economic aid and know how as well as personnel was sent to Estonia from the EU to help in this endeavour. Surveillance on the Estonian border increased, and the responsibilities of the Schengen agreement were in most parts fulfilled (Baltic Times, 2017). Estonia
Hungary faced a different scenario than Estonia during the migration crisis. The sheer number of migrants coming in is not comparable between the two and Hungary saw great increase of
1 Court of Justice of the European Union PRESS RELEASE No 161/20 Luxembourg, 17 December 2020 Judgment in Case C-808/18 Commission v Hungary,
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-12/cp200161en.pdf
19 border crossings. The Hungarian border guards were tasked with protect the borders of
Hungary to protect the Hungarians and the EU alike bound by oath. Drawbacks were made to past centuries and how the destiny of the Hungarian nation has been shaped by the need to protect the own nation-state and Europe from external threats (About Hungary, 2017b).
Further on Orbán made it clear during a speech to the Hungarian police that Hungary was on its own in their endeavours and could not rely on the aid of Brussels. Hungary would need to organize their own defence without the help of the EU leaving the national guards in control.
No external aid was to be expected and seemingly was unwanted (About Hungary, 2017b).
Thus, in the regard of being in control we could argue that Hungary was to be seen as solitary actor not relying on the help of the EU in this instance.
A people defined by their connection to the state through nationalism and belonging.
Sovereignty in its core concept is somewhat dependant on the state which is bound together by the people of the state through nationalism. A state cannot exist without a people, and a people will not exist without the state. By submitting themselves to the laws of a state and borders of a territory the people indirectly create the idea of the state. This intricate
relationship between state and people may be challenged when the state becomes a member state, or a people may belong to more than one state just by being part of another one. Thus, the extreme points of the last perspective would be only national identity on the one hand and only a European identity on the other. In the latter case all national identities of the member states would be left behind in favour of a common European identity, thus changing the basic aspect of the nation-state.
In Estonia, the focus quickly became to organise support services to the incoming migrants.
The support services provided consisted of language courses, translation services and contact persons for migrants under international protection (Valitsus, 2016). While not taking the most migrants of the member states Estonia were quick to act in what seemingly was an attempt to integrate migrants into Estonian society as soon as possible. However, no approach is saved from hardships. The many migrants coming into the country were used by right wing parties in Estonia to scare residents and promote an anti-immigration agenda. Thus, right wing parties were able to gain ground and foster stronger support. Estonian officials rejected claims about the EU imposing and forcing Estonia to accept migrants and continued advocated for voluntary quotas (Turovski, 2019). Seemingly migrants were taken in based on the Estonian approach through means of voluntary quotas as presided by the EU. Migrants were quickly offered services to help them integrate into their new home. It was seemingly important to foster a strong sense of belonging within these new Estonians while simultaneously making sure anti-immigration and anti-EU discourses were held back as much as possible.
Important to note though, is that the reason for the complete focus on the voluntary quotas line being enforced by Estonia and their quick and extensive integration process of the migrants arriving may be attributed to the generally low number of migrants arriving. In the first two years after the start of the migration crisis the country officially stated that the goal was to take in and integrate more than 500 migrants (Valitsus, 2016). A goal they did fulfil (Statista, 2019). As such, the country has not seen the same dramatic flow of migrants as
20 many other member states did and thus could afford to be quick and generous in the way they decided to deal with the increased flow of migrants (BBC, 2018).
Hungary on the other hand did not do much to foster a European identity or lessen any criticism against the EU. Orbán continuously argued that the Hungarian people and Hungary as a nation was separate from the rest of Europe. Orbán went so far as to claim that Hungary was an island of stability in the tumultuous Europe as Hungary was successful in protecting itself form illegal immigrants. Thus, a Hungarian identity was enforced to be separate from that of the EU (About Hungary, 2016).
During the migration crisis Orbán also stated that “multiculturalism is only an illusion,”
“which we don’t want and we don’t want anything imposed on us.” (Nagy-Vargha, 2020). A quote that is quite direct in its sentiments against a European identity which in theory would draw on multiculturalism as a point of unification. With that argument multiculturalism would only be an illusion and the Hungarian and other national identities are the ones that are sought after. A European identity could not exist under these circumstances.
Migration Crisis Summary
By looking at the Migration crisis, which started in 2015 and its consequences can still be seen today we can argue that seemingly Estonia and Hungary have taken slightly different approaches in choosing whether more go it alone or pursue further integration.
Where Estonia seemingly took an approach where the common outer border of the EU needed to be protected jointly the approach also included the idea that states would need to be able to decide themselves on quotas of taking on migrants. As such Estonia is showing that the intention is to work together with the EU in a common idea of territory but still retaining the ability to decide on number of migrants themselves.
Hungary on the other hand sealed their southern border completely, including the border to fellow member state Croatia. Thus, there is a clear indication that Hungary is taking a more national approach in comparison to Estonia as there is no indication that a common European border was sought after or desired during the crisis.
During the migration crisis the approaches by Estonia and Hungary regarding state institutions have more in common than any other of the perspectives. While not similar in execution the goal has been quite alike across the two countries. Estonia took in a smaller number of migrants and thus were able to increase the capacity of their national institutions and managed to deal with the relative low flow of migrants on their own. Thus, while not a direct move against European institutions and regulations they acted on their own. Also, by relying on voluntary quotas Estonia did fulfil the regulations set by the EU but in their own pace. As such they can be argued to take quite a nationalist approach in the sense that they wanted to act on their own terms. Hungary on the other hand were extremely reluctant to the regulations set by the EU and out-right refused to take in migrants according to the wishes of the EU. Which resulted in them being taken into court by the ECJ and was ruled against their actions. A decision which was heavily critiqued by Hungarian officials. As such, Hungary is taking a very nationalist approach, relying on, and calling on their own state-centric
sovereignty.
21 When it comes to the monopoly of violence it is important to remember that the competence of security remains in the hand of the nation-state. At this point in time security and security of the state is not a competence which is transferred to the EU. As such, one would need to change the way we address the monopoly of violence and change the focus point from violence and instead focus on internal control. Internal control can take many forms, but increased border controls and surveillance are two examples of increasing control. Estonia did increase their border controls and more personnel where set aside for the mission. However, they still followed through with some key characteristics of the Schengen agreement,
increased sharing of information across borders and increased surveillance. By doing so, Estonia could increase their own security while also bolstering the surveillance across the EU where member states may work together to catch criminals and illegal migrants. Thus, taking an approach to strengthen the internal control and sharing information and making use of know-how from different countries to deal with their problems. Hungary on other hand, explicitly said they could not depend on the aid of Brussels and that the Hungarian border guards would be of uttermost importance in protecting the own borders and Europe. While mentioning Europe, there was no indication that Hungary would rely on the help of the EU but rather protect it as they always have been protecting Europe in days past, drawing on historical information. Thus, we can argue that Hungary took a nationalist approach,
depending on their own capabilities. As to be expected as a first contact point of migrants it would be difficult for Hungary to initially make use of European know-how.
As for a people defined by their connection to the state through nationalism and belonging the approaches during the migration crisis has differed quite a lot. Where Estonia fostered a strong sense of an Estonian identity in the incoming migrants by providing social services quickly and effectively, they also showed the already existing Estonian population that all of Europe is in this together. This was done by relying on a discourse around the voluntary quotas and that all of Europe would help each other in solidarity to take in migrants as to not have one country being overburdened. As such, we can argue that Estonia attempted to
balance the idea of identity. On the one hand that incoming migrants would become Estonians and on the other making sure that the current Estonian population would develop a sense of the EU being a stable institution promoting solidarity across the member states. Hungary’s approach is quite easy to summarize. The statement made by Orbán about the illusionary aspect of multiculturalism is quite telling. As such, there is a clear indication that the
Hungarian approach is that no European identity is possible or even real due to a theoretical grounding in multiculturalism.
COVID-19 Pandemic
An established territory in which other actors do not interfere,
In wake of the Covid-19 pandemic the idea of an established territory in which other actors refrain from interfering has seemingly become important to protect the own people from disease. As confirmed cases of Covid-19 increased in Europe many states decided to roll back on some aspects of free movement within the EU to hinder the virus from spreading. Estonia, not unlike other member states, enforced restrictions on who could enter the country. Foreign nationals had to adhere to new restrictions which were not binding to any Estonians.
However, the border was not closed entirely and nationals of the EU, the Schengen area or the
