Are there any signs of deconsolidation in Tunisia according to the deconsolidation theory? Bachelor Thesis

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Are there any signs of

deconsolidation in Tunisia

according to the

deconsolidation theory?

A qualitative theory consuming case study.

Bachelor Thesis

Author: Julia Törnberg

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Abstract

The Arab Spring put several revolutions in motion in the Middle East and North Africa. However, Tunisia was the only country that succeeded with a democratization process, making the country a fairly new democracy. Simultaneously, independent research networks and organizations which main focus is democracy and democratic values such as Freedom House, V-Dem and the Arab Barometer are presenting worrying information about democracy around the world. Democracy is in crises - evident by the remarkable decline or erosion in democratic norms and practices. While scholars have already begun investigating the causes of democratic deconsolidation or backsliding in the context of western democracies, notably those of western Europe and the US, still little is known with regards to new democracies from other parts of the globe. To fill this research gap, this qualitative case study focuses on Tunisia, with the core objective to investigate whether or not Tunisia is experiencing democratic deconsolidation. By using the three criteria described by the political scientist Yascha Mounk in his deconsolidation theory, the result suggests that while democratic values are still quite strong amongst the Tunisian citizens, it is evident that a majority of the Tunisian citizens are experiencing institutional dissatisfaction and low institutional trust.

Key words

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1 Introduction

Freedom House annual Freedom in the World report for 2018 shows global freedom around the world had declined for the 13th year in a row (Abramowitz, 2020). Similarly, a V-DEM report from 2018 describes similar patterns (V-dem Institute, 2019, p. 5). V-DEM paints a picture of overall decline across countries from every region of the world ranging from advanced democracies and consolidated long-term democracies such as the United States, Poland, Hungary and Brazil to authoritarian regimes such as China, Russia or Singapore. Overall, one might argue there has been a total gain in democracy over the last century, however, as a recent study by Abramowitz (2020) suggests there is a trend of democracy being in retreat. Although the topic of democratic decline, democratic retreat and or democratic backsliding is quite recent in the broader field of democratization studies, still the attention of many analysts has been mainly focused on advanced democracies of Western Europe and North America. Thus, in this thesis, my interest is to investigate the phenomenon of democratic retreat or decline by focusing on Tunisia.

1.1 Democratic Deconsolidation: The Tunisia context

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held credible presidential and parliamentary elections that were considered competitive, free and fair by the international committee and observers, with Freedom House confirming Tunisia as a free democratic country (Repucci, 2020). Tunisia was ranked as one of only two democracies in the MENA region, together with Israel, as well as the only country in the region to receive an improved score for that year according to the Freedom House statistics. The country has proven to be resilient in many aspects and have achieved many political improvements compared to other countries in the MENA region where free and fair elections are unusual (Repucci, 2020).

Although Tunisia has made many great transformations since becoming a democracy, still Abramowitz (2020) contends the country consolidation process may be facing a number of challenges. For instance, recent legislative changes have affected the freedom of assembly and also the association freedoms in a negative direction. There has also been an undermining of judicial independence and the rule of law since the authorities in the country have failed to install a Constitutional Court (Abramowitz, 2020). Although the people of the region have the freedom to participate politically, still participation in elections and reported membership seems to be relatively low (Robbins, 2020). Indeed, studies have shown such political apathy is a possible threat to democracy (Foa and Mounk, 2017). Based on the above discussion, what is clear is that although Tunisia is ranked as a free country by Freedom House, there has been a decline in recent years (Freedom House, 2020a). In fact, a V-Dem report from 2018 on Tunisia concludes the country went from being a liberal democracy to an electoral democracy (V-dem Institute, 2019 p. 16).

1.2 Research problem

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political system is the “only game in town”. The stability of consolidated democracies depends on the citizens and their beliefs that democratic values and political systems are superior over authoritarian values and political systems to the greatest extent possible (Foa and Mounk, 2017, p. 9). It is possible that democracy stops being “the only game in town” when citizens of a country start losing their democratic values and develop -or reverse into- authoritarian values. This transformation of values may then imply that the democracy is deconsolidating (Foa and Mounk, 2017, p. 9). Thus, focusing on Tunisia, I pose the following question:

Are there any signs of democratic deconsolidation in Tunisia according to the deconsolidation theory?

To answer this question, I will focus on the democratic values of citizens in Tunisia. With this ambition in mind, my main research question will therefore be answered by three sub-questions:

1. To what extent do the Tunisian citizens prefer a democratic regime over any other regime types in Tunisia?

2. To what extent do the Tunisian citizens believe that democracy delivers what they expected?

3. To what extent do the Tunisian citizens have trust in political institutions such as the government?

By focusing on these three sub-questions, I therefore stand on the shoulder of previous studies of deconsolidation that have used similar typology or measurement namely: declining democratic values, institutional dissatisfaction, and low institutional trust to account for the early warning

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2 Theoretical Framework and Previous Research

2.1 Deconsolidation Theory

Previous research in the field of democratization has come to empirical conclusions that countries that have had a long period of democratic governance, stable economy with high income in relation to institutional respect and political participation are secure democracies (Foa and Mounk, 2019, p. 5). There are a large number of criteria in which scientists explain several conditions to be important for a country and its institutions to experience democratic consolidation. When these conditions are realized, it is considered very unlikely that the country will fall back to authoritarian governance. Some of the conditions that are considered important criteria are the importance of expanded democratic legitimacy amongst a country’s leading politicians, army, and heads of civil service. Also, there is a broad acceptance towards democratic values in the country, and that the political processes include an active, widespread, independent civil society (Foa and Mounk, 2019, p. 2).

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attitude (Foa and Mounk, 2016, p. 15). The deconsolidation theory by Yascha Mounk suggests that lack of democratic values can be identified in the civil engagement in politics by the citizens.

There has been frequent research regarding countries developing from authoritarian regimes into democracies, but less about democracies reversing back into or transforming into authoritarian regimes. Yascha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa describe in their article “Democratic Deconsolidation in

Developed Democracies 1995-2018” that democratic consolidation does not

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There have been many attempts to measure whether or not countries are experiencing democratic development or democratic reversal, and there are various ways of doing it. Examples of how to measure it is to develop indexes that measure countries democratic engagement in for example political elections and to what degree elections are free and fair and how civil liberties are met such as freedom of speech. Freedom House and Polity Project uses measures like those (Foa and Mounk, 2019, p. 6). However, a country can be a democracy, following democratic norms and rules and yet still be experiencing deconsolidation and that is why a more nuanced way to measure democracy is needed (Foa and Mounk, 2019, p. 6). It is of great importance to measure democratic norms and ideas of citizens in a country when doing research about democratic development. The same democratic freedoms and opportunities can be given citizens of two different countries, yet one country may experience democratic deconsolidation whereas the other country may not because of the democratic values, ideas and norms carried by citizens in the countries (Foa and Mounk, 2019, p. 6). Since the quality of democratic governance is different from democratic deconsolidation, a measure for democratic deconsolidation is needed since it is not possible to measure it with the same measurements used when measuring quality of democracy (Foa and Mounk, 2019, p. 7). In order to create such measurements Foa and Mounk have looked into empirical indicators that are supposedly related to whether or not citizens in a country experience democracy as “the only game in town” (Foa and Mounk, 2019, p. 7-8).

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institutions in order for democracy to be “the only game in town” (Foa and Mounk, 2019, p. 8).

Second is to what extent citizens in a given country dismiss any other alternative to democracy whether it would be a one-party rule, monarchy, military dictatorship or any other kind of regime than democracy. There is a tendency that citizens may not believe democracy is the best type of regime, but it is yet very important that citizens still believe democracy is the best alternative out of other worse ones (Foa and Mounk, 2019, p. 8). Although people in a country may believe military rule would be good, not all are actually hoping for a military coup to occur, but a rise in values such as that are not very good in regards to the future of democracy (Foa and Mounk, 2019, p. 8).

Third, if anti-system parties are in a position of power and if there is a possibility for them to undermine important aspects of liberal democracy (Foa and Mounk, 2019, p. 9). It is important that politically active individuals are committed to democracy for it to be the only game in town. Main figures in the politics and its institutions such as representatives of the parliament must be dedicated to the ideas and norms of liberal democracy. If anti-system political movements manage to attract support from once pro-system actors, or if they manage to increase their support in the political environment in general there have been signs of gradually lower trust in democratic processes by the citizens in a country. Citizens may therefore consider supporting alternative arrangements (Foa and Mounk, 2019, p. 9).

2.2 Previous research - signs of democratic backsliding or decline

Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt describe in the book How Democracies

Die how a slow takeover of institutions by political leaders with authoritarian

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viewed upon as a threat to democracy. Citizens will not notice the changes to begin with since elections will be held and political opposition will remain in congress (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 77). Of course, rapid changes of regime type have occurred where some elected politicians have had a plan of autocracy, but more commonly in modern time it is a gradual change (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 75).

First, the early signs of democratic erosion have been identified as verbal provocative attacks by political leaders towards opponents and critics. These verbal attacks can be descriptions of political opponents and critics as enemies, troublemakers, traitors and even terrorists (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 75). Examples of leaders who have used this kind of method is Hugo Cháves in Venezuela, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey and Silvio Berlusconi in Italy (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 75). Although observers of politics often convince people that verbal attacks are not to be taken seriously, evidence shows a clear pattern that leaders who use this verbal strategy often tend to implement or realize the threats that have been made (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 76).

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When studying democratic erosion and upcoming authoritarian leaders in history, it is a significant trend that they justify centralization of power through portraying opponents as threats (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 106). When political leaders promoting democratic backsliding rise to power, the society has a tendency to polarize which not rarely leads to results such as a tendency of decreasing trust between people, a condition of rising panic and resentment (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 76).

Democracy does not come easy and politicians often experience frustration with democratic processes because it takes time, requires compromises and negotiations. Constraints are a part of democracy and democratic leaders know it is of great importance to accept and respect it (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 77). Authoritarian political leaders do not accept and respect it, but rather experience democratic constraints as a threat and attacks on themselves which makes them even more hostile (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 76). In democratic systems, the judicial system, law enforcement, and regulatory agencies are assigned the task of examining and executing individuals, private people and public officials, that are not following rules and laws that apply to everyone (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 78). The neutrality and independence of these institutions are crucial for democracy.

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implementation of the law in favor of the government. Political opponents and other critics such as businesses and media stations may be targeted by institutions such as tax authorities, and police can selectively tolerate violence by pro-government groups while opposing and shutting down protests by critics (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 78). Political leaders are especially eager to get rid of judges and replace them with loyal ones to begin with, and then they tend to turn to opponents like political opponents, business people, and the media whom they more commonly try to use bribes on (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 81). Other means are also used, like incarcerations, exiles and sometimes even killing although these means have decreased over time and authoritarian governments have increased their skills at hiding their oppression behind formal procedures. This is why political institutions and especially the court and judges are extremely important for authoritarian governments (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 83).

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either bribed to back off, imprisoned, exiled, or economically limited, the outcome is likely to be that others in the same position decides to withdraw from the political arena. When this becomes the reality, the authoritarian government has accomplished what it wanted without really breaking any rules, since the rules have changed little by little in favor of the government (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 87).

Fourth, another step in the process of ensuring power for authoritarian political leaders is to change the structure and processes of politics (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 88). Actions of public good are often used as disguises to implement reforms that can involve changing the constitution of the country, changing the electoral system and other meaningful institutions which creates a solid foundation for the government. Because of reforms such as constitutional changes, authoritarian leaders and governments can legally remain in position for years to come (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 88). It is difficult for citizens to recognize signs of democratic erosion due to the fact that changes and reforms by the government are slow, gradual and concealed behind what appears to be legal processes, and also because authoritarian governments tend to undermine democracy by claiming to protect it (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 92).

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Finally, democratic norms are a crucial factor in upholding democracy according to Levitsky and Ziblatt. Democratic norms are informal rules that are widely accepted and respected by citizens in a country, and do not formally exist as laws or in the constitution (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 100). There are two norms that are especially important in the upholding democracy which are mutual toleration and institutional forbearance (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 102). These norms are very connected to each other, and one is often followed by the other (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 111). Mutual toleration refers to the idea that as long as everyone plays by the same rules, everyone is equally entitled to strive and achieve goals such as political power and to govern. Institutional forbearance means that politicians do not use their institutional advantage in any way that can disadvantage the democratic system (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 102). When these norms are not accepted and respected, it is difficult to preserve democracy and democratic backsliding or not unlikely (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 104).

2.3 Determinants of democratic backsliding or decline

In the previous section (i.e. signs of democratic backsliding or decline) relying on previous studies, my task has been to reveal some of the signs of democratic decline or erosion. Although this is quite revealing, still it is important to pose the following question: what are the determinants or possible reasons for

democratic backsliding according to the democratic deconsolidation literature? To answer this question, the best place to begin is with the work of

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2.3.1 Political leaders

Strategic interaction; elite compromise- the hypothesis is that democracy is

safe as long as there is a political consensus between the political elites that democracy is the preferable way of governance and that compromising is part of democracy. Democratic backsliding may be a risk if this consensus declines (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 48-49). This claim categorizes into the level of moderate, with an explanation that ideas of this sort have not yet been tested systematically enough in order to provide a clear answer to if it can result in democratic backsliding. Democratic decline does not necessarily require political division, but can stem from economic distresses (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 48).

Super-presidentialism- the hypothesis is that presidents that are seeking to

centralize power and that are uncontrolled by political institutions may undermine democratic institutions. This is moderate, super-presidentialism and democratic decline has a causal relation but more accurate research of the origins of the super-presidentialism is needed in order to further explain this relationship (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 49-50).

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2.3.2 Political culture

Social capital- the hypothesis is that social capital is linked to collective action,

which in turn is linked to democracy. When citizens are politically engaged and active in civil society organizations, they develop social capital, which in turn increases possibilities of holding government officials accountable for actions. Political accountability is an important part of upholding democracy and preventing backsliding. When citizens lack social capital, trust in institutions is generally low, and when trust is low so is usually political engagement. This prevents citizens from holding government officials accountable. This is categorized as moderate, however more research is necessary in order to draw further conclusions (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 51-52).

The conclusion regarding political culture is that it is, with existing research, hard to determine whether or not social capital has an effect on democratic backsliding. There has been research regarding political culture in relation to citizens demands on democratic reforms, but it does not include similar research of topics regarding government's willingness to provide what is demanded. There is however evidence that demands for democratic reform can arise even without strongly developed social capital (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 45).

2.3.3 Political institutions

Consociational democracies- the hypothesis is that in societies that embrace

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be indirect, and it is important to evaluate institutions in research focusing on this (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 54-55).

Party system fractionalization- the hypothesis is that fractionalization within

the party system in a country may result in political instability, which may in turn promote democratic backsliding. This is categorized as moderate because it is possible to relate democratic backsliding to fractionalized party systems (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 55).

Party system collapse- the hypothesis is that when a party system collapses, a

possibility arises for political leaders to overthrow democracy from above. This is categorized as moderate, and there is plenty of research on it. However, it is hard to say if previous research of the subject makes it possible to generalize results (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 55).

Dominant party systems in Africa- the hypothesis is that when there is a party

system with one dominant party and a number of other small parties, it is unlikely to be competitiveness and changes of power (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 56). Dominant parties may prevent political opponents in order to stay dominant, which can promote democratic backsliding. This is categorized as moderate because a prediction of democratic backsliding could be a dominant party emerging in a party system that has previously been competitive (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 56).

Mobilizational asymmetry- the hypothesis is that party systems that are

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Hybrid regimes- the hypothesis is that hybrid regimes suffer a greater risk of

democratic backsliding because they are not fully developed democracies (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 56). Democratic quality is related to democratic stability, and the conclusion is that democratic backsliding therefore is a greater risk in hybrid regimes (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 57). This is categorized as a high risk because of the great amount of statistical evidence related to this subject (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 56).

Judicial review- the hypothesis is that countries that lack diffusion of power

that promotes a strong independent judiciary is at greater risk of democratic backsliding. The reason is that when a country lacks an independent judiciary, political leaders have a greater chance of taking advantage of the centralized power to benefit themselves. This is categorized as moderate because there are a significant number of theories that explore the role of the judiciary in relation to democracy (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 57).

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2.3.4 Political economy

Levels of income- The hypothesis is that higher levels of income will promote

higher levels of democracy. Higher levels of income will promote democracy through either decreasing the risk of democratic backsliding or increase the chance of a democratization process. This is categorized as moderate, although most previous research focuses more on democratization rather than democratic backsliding (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 58).

Distribution of income- The hypothesis is that countries that experience higher

levels of income inequalities might face greater challenges in democratization processes than countries where income inequalities are not as high. Wealthy powerful people oppose democratic processes in fear of distributions demanded by citizens not as well off, which instead may contribute to democratic backsliding (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 58). Previous research shows that democracy and inequality were more related in the twentieth century, more recent studies have however shown that democratic transitions have occurred in countries that experienced quite high levels of inequalities in income distribution. For those reasons, this is categorized as moderate (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 58).

Oil income hinders democracy- The hypothesis is that when states rely heavily

on oil income, they do not need the income that taxation of citizens provide. Since the state is not financing activities based on revenue from the citizens, the citizens in turn do not demand political accountability to the same extent and at the same time their demand for democracy decreases. This is categorized as a moderate risk of democratic backsliding since oil revenue separates the state from the citizens (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 58).

Oil income and democratic backsliding- The hypothesis is that rising oil

income causes democratic backsliding. This is similar to oil income hinders

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is focused on that countries will most likely experience democratic backsliding when a country can be governed largely on the income the oil provides (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 59). Similar to the previous factor, this has a negative effect on citizens demands of accountability which is also negative for democracy. This hypothesis has received support since previous studies have come to similar conclusions; however, it is debatable how previous studies can be generalized and applied on every case that experiences democratic backsliding and rising oil rent at the same time, and for this reason this categorizes as a moderate risk (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 59).

Macroeconomic performance- The hypothesis is that when a country

experiences economic decrease in GDP, the risk of democratic backsliding is higher, and vice versa. A country’s macroeconomic realizations correlate with changes in the political sphere. This is categorized as moderate since research suggests that there is some kind of relation between poor economic performance and democratic backsliding (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 59).

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leaders find it beneficial. Other political leaders with authoritarian traits rather combine democracy with personal privileges (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 46).

2.3.5 Social structure and political coalitions

The Bourgeoisie and democracy- The hypothesis is that a country with a

bourgeoisie (middle class) that does not widely support democracy suffers a greater risk of democratic backsliding. The bourgeoisie have historically been a great support of democracy, and there is plenty of previous research on the subject. Based on the findings of previous research, the result is that there is a relationship between democracy and a strong middle class supporting the democratization process and the democratic system. This factor therefore categorizes as a moderate risk for democratic backsliding (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 60).

The working class and democracy- The hypothesis is that without an organized

working class, democracy may suffer from democratic backsliding. Because of the prodemocratic legitimacy the working class behold, the power balance may shift in favor for the working and middle class and make democracy possible. But without a working class, this seems hard. This factor is categorized as a moderate risk for democratic backsliding, there is significant evidence that a working class is necessary to create democratic accountability (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 60).

Peasants and political order- The hypothesis is that for developing countries,

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Ethnic competition and polarization- The hypothesis is that in countries with

ethnical heterogeneity, democratic backsliding is of greater risk than in countries with ethnical homogeneity (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 61). Reason for this is that the ethnic divisions in a country may follow in politics, which creates political instability. Citizens loyalty is to a greater extent towards their community rather than towards the nation, which also reflects on politics where political leaders may tend to favor their own ethnical group instead of the nation as a whole. Research of this question has often produced results that mean that ethnical heterogeneity itself is not necessarily a threat to democracy, and rather the politicization of the ethnical divisions that are harmful to democracy (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 61).

The conclusion of social structure and political coalitions is that theories of this kind are generally quite weak because they are developed through relatively narrow case studies which makes them not generalizable. However, it is still important to recognize the hypothesis presented. Many of the hypotheses are based on the assumption that indirect power balance in weak democracies may be an explanation of democratic backsliding. There is room for further development regarding arguments related to social structure in relation to the balance of power framework (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 47). There is more significant research regarding the topic of ethnic politics on the other hand, yet it is still hard to connect it to the democratic dynamics in a country. Therefore, further development of a hypothesis that further explains the relation between ethnic politics and democratic development is encouraged (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 47).

2.3.6 International factors

International leverage and linkage- The hypothesis is that countries that do

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country is vulnerable to pressure posed by the west and an authoritarian country has important relationships such as economical and/or diplomatically to western countries, a democratization process is more likely to occur. This factor is categorized as a moderate risk of democratic backsliding, since there are strong indicators that leverage and linkage promotes democratic processes but not enough evidence to draw conclusions whether or not lack of leverage and linkage leads to democratic backsliding (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 62).

International organizations- The hypothesis is that membership in

organizations of international standard may prevent democratic backsliding. This connects to a certain extent to leverage and linkage, since memberships in international organizations creates the same type of relationship (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p.63). Memberships in international organizations can support the democratization process, and through that prevent democratic backsliding. This factor is categorized as moderate since not all international organizations are pro-democratic, which of course means that such organizations will not push for democratic reform, maybe rather push for anti-democratic reforms which creates democratic backsliding. International organizations sometimes lose some of its insights in an upcoming member country once it is a member which might decrease its possibility to monitor democratic implementations, which means that even a pro-democratic organization may not be able to prevent democratic backsliding (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 63).

Foreign aid- The hypothesis is that foreign aid received by a government may

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based on how the research has been carried out which makes it hard to generalize (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 63).

International election monitoring- The hypothesis is that by monitoring

elections, the international community might hinder or discourage countries from committing electoral frauds. Results from this can be higher quality of elections and stronger democratic development. This categorizes into moderate, and the reason is that an election that is well monitored and high-quality election does not automatically mean a country cannot experience democratic backsliding (Lust and Waldner, 2015, p. 64).

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3 Method

The aim of this study is to examine and evaluate democratic values in Tunisia during the time of the Arab Spring 2011 until 2019. This study will be a theory consuming case study since the aim is to explain a problem with a theory and applying it on a case (Esaiasson et al, 2017, s. 89). The case is Tunisia and the theory is deconsolidation theory. When using a theory consuming research, the main goal is not to get a result that can be generalized and be applied to other similar cases. Rather, the goal is to see how a given aspect can explain a certain outcome in the particular case that is being studied (Esaiasson et al, 2017, p. 89-90). The theory is applied to the case as a means to explain a certain trend in that particular case.

3.1 Case selection - why Tunisia?

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(Robbins, 2020). Such political apathy is a possible threat to democracy (Foa and Mounk, 2017). The Arab barometer has measured that multiple aspects of democratic values adapted by the country’s citizens has become less visible since the revolution, such as trust in the government and parliament (Emre Ceyhun, 2019, p. 5). Although Tunisia is ranked as a free country by Freedom House, there has been a decline in recent years (Freedom House, 2020a). In the V-Dem annual democracy report from 2018, indicators of democratic backsliding Tunisia was presented as well (V-dem Institute, 2019, p. 16).

3.2 Limitations

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this study provides a foundation for scholars to lean on for future research in the field of deconsolidation in Tunisia based on the deconsolidation theory.

3.3 Material

The material used in this study is mainly primary sources and, in some cases, secondary sources which have all been found mainly through the Linnaeus University database One Search, and a few through Google Scholar. When secondary sources were used, all sources were critically examined to ensure that the information used in this study comes from credible sources. Material used in this study in order to describe the theory is mainly collected from reports and publications written by Yascha Mounk who is the founder of the theory, and Roberto Stefan Foa. Material used in order to present the

previous research is mainly a book by Steven Levitsky and research that has been published as a report by the UNDP. Material used in the method part is mainly general research regarding democracy and democracy in Tunisia collected through different research institutes and data bases. Since the data material collected for this study are based on the same time frame, the

simultaneity of the material was strengthened. The material used in this study is politically independent and it is therefore possible to assume that the collected data is impartial and reliable.

3.4 Data

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3.4.1 V-Dem

Varieties of Democracy, the V-Dem institute is an independent research institute that is collecting data in order to measure democracy. The dataset used by V-Dem is extremely extensive in order to collect as much information as possible about the democratic system, which is a broad concept and stretches far beyond elections (V-Dem Institute, 2020). Data that is collected by V-Dem is used to measure five different foundational principles of democracy. Those five are electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and finally egalitarian. V-Dem publishes an annual democracy report where data regarding a large number of countries in the world are included, and in addition to that there is also a presentation of trends and occurrences included in the report (V-Dem Institute, 2020). The V-Dem annual democracy report has only been published since 2017 with results based on the previous year, which makes it difficult to measure results in Tunisia from earlier years. However, I will present the results in the reports based on the years of 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019.

3.4.2 Freedom House

Freedom House is an independent organization that is not politically bound, however takes stands in political issues worldwide. The main principle of Freedom House is that democracy is the foundation of freedom, and that main features such as government accountability, freedom of speech, the rule of law and mutual respect for the rights of all human beings are met (Freedom House, 2020b). Production of reports regarding democracy, political rights and civil liberties are the core subjects that Freedom House is focused on. They measure freedom in all countries all around the world, and they produce a number of publications varying from “Freedom and the Media”, “Nations in Transit”,

“Freedom on the Net”, and other special reports that are published every year

(Freedom House, 2020b). The main report is however “Freedom in the

World”, which is a comparison study of political rights and civil liberties in

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report is then measured in to a democracy index, and the measures ranges on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 to 2,5 points ranks as “Free” which is the most democratic, 3 to 5 points ranks as “Partly free” which are hybrid regimes, and 5,5 to 7 points ranks as “Not free” which is autocracies (Freedom House, 2019)

3.4.3 Arab Barometer

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3.5 Operationalization of democratic deconsolidation or erosion.

In order to be able to apply the factors of deconsolidation according to Mounks deconsolidation theory on Tunisia and the value of the country’s citizens, it is important to operationalize deconsolidation to be able to answer the three sub questions. Operationalize means make measurable. A clear definition of the theoretical foundation is necessary to make distinct operationalizations (Esaiasson et al, 2017, p. 40), and this has been made earlier in the chapter about the theory. The operationalization is based on the three ways of measuring democratic deconsolidation that Foa and Mounk have obtained. The theory is operationalized by dividing it into three measurable dimensions which are factors of deconsolidation, and then how the dimensions will be measured to answer the sub-questions in order to get a result. Table 1 presents the questions this study aims to answer, and how they connect to the factors of deconsolidation that this study will be focusing on. This chart, together with the theoretical framework that will be used in this study, is the foundation of further discussion about Tunisia's possibility of experiencing democratic deconsolidation.

Table 1

Factors of deconsolidation How it will be measured to answer the sub-questions

To what extent do citizens support the democratic regime is a crucial factor. Democracy is not necessarily the “only game in town”.

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Authoritarian values may develop because of dissatisfaction.

Institutional dissatisfaction:

Tunisian citizens do not believe that the democratic regime has met the expectations that were in place.

Power is rising amongst anti-system political actors.

Low institutional trust:

Tunisian citizens do not believe that their institutions do the best they can in order to uphold democracy and run for the benefit of the citizens.

3.6 Operationalization of democratic deconsolidation

So far, the core ambition of this thesis is to examine if Tunisia is experiencing democratic erosion by evaluating public opinion of ordinary citizens in Tunisia. That said, relying on the Arab Barometer, I provide some exploratory information on how democratic erosion, backsliding or deconsolidation is measured using the Arab Barometer.

1. To what extent do the Tunisian citizens prefer a democratic regime over any other regime types in Tunisia?

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your own opinion: 1, Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government. 2, Under some circumstances, a nondemocratic government can be preferable. 3, For people like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have. The question in wave 5 is formulated the same and has

the same answer alternatives, however they are in a different order which is as follows: 1, For people like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we

have. 2, Under some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. 3, Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government. 98, Don’t know. 99, Refuse to answer”. Coded accordingly in

SPSS.

The second question that will be used in order to answer the question to what extent Tunisian citizens prefer a democratic regime over any other regime types reads as follow in wave 4 and wave 5: “A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than any other system” and the answer alternatives are: “1= I strongly agree. 2= I agree. 3= I disagree. 4= I strongly disagree.

98= Don’t know. 99= Refused to answer”. Coded accordingly in SPSS.

2. To what extent do Tunisian citizens believe that democracy delivers what they expected?

In the surveys by the Arab Barometer from wave 4 and similarly in wave 5, the question that taps the extent to which Tunisian citizens believe that democracy delivers what they expected reads as follows: “On a scale from

0-10 measuring the extent of your satisfaction with the current government’s performance, in which 0 means that you are completely dissatisfied with its performance and 10 means you are completely satisfied. To what extent are you satisfied with the current government’s performance?”. Answer

alternatives: “0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. 96= Not concerned/not interested.

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3. To what extent to Tunisian citizens have trust in political institutions such as the government?

In the surveys by the Arab Barometer from wave 4 and similarly in wave 5, the question that taps the extent to which Tunisian citizens have trust in political institutions such as the government reads as follows: “I’m going to

name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them: 1, Government (Council of Ministers). 2, Courts and legal system. 3, The elected council of representatives (the parliament). 4, Police. 20, Political parties”. Answer alternatives are: “1= A great deal of trust. 2= Quite a lot of trust. 3= Not very much trust. 4= No trust at all. 98= I don’t know. 99= Declined to answer”. Coded accordingly in SPSS.

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4 Results and Interpretation

As previously mentioned, the core objective of this thesis has been to examine and evaluate if Tunisia is experiencing democratic erosion according to the democratic deconsolidation theory. To achieve this objective, I rely on data that is drawn from two democratic indices and a cross-sectional public opinion survey data from the Arab Barometer. Thus, the result for this study is reported in two stages. First, to clearly show if Tunisia is experiencing any kind of democratic erosion, backsliding, I rely on V-dem data and Freedom House data to provide descriptive and explanatory information on the state of democracy in Tunisia from the 2011 to 2019. Second and more importantly, I argue that any examination and evaluation of whether Tunisia is experiencing democratic erosion, decline or backsliding will be incomplete without surveying the opinion and attitudes of Tunisians themselves - so this is achieved using the Arab Barometer.

4.1 Are there any signs of democratic deconsolidation, erosion or decline in Tunisia - Evidence from two Democratic Indices

4.1.1 V-Dem

Below is a table that shows the result of Tunisia’s global democratic ranking made by V-Dem between 2016 and 2019. 2016 is the earliest report available, for that reason there will be no presentation of earlier ranking.

Table 2

Year Ranking

2016 39

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2018 41

2019 41

This table includes a compilation of Tunisia’s global democratic ranking between 2016 and 2019 (V-Dem Institute).

Being ranked as number 1 is the best. In the V-Dem annual democracy report published 2019, “Democracy Facing Global Challenges”, a trend demonstrating an ongoing wave of democratic backsliding is presented. Prevention and attacks on the media, weakening rule of law, restrictions that limit the freedom of civil society, and polarization are becoming more common in a large number of countries (V-Dem Institute, 2019, p. 10). Although the reports presented by V-Dem does not show a great change in the ranking of democracy, there are signs of democratic backsliding in Tunisia. Tunisia went from being a liberal democracy, which is the best ranking possible, to the stage of being an electoral democracy which is one step in a negative direction on the four scaled measure presented by V-Dem where electoral autocracy is the next step towards les democracy and the worse stage is closed autocracy (V-dem Institute, 2019, p. 16). V-Dem does not provide a general trend of democratic backsliding in Tunisia as such, but they do however report a warning sign regarding the health of Tunisia's relatively new and fragile democracy.

4.1.2 Freedom House

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Table 3

Year Civil liberties Political rights Ranking

2011 5 7 Not free 2012 4 3 Partly free 2013 4 3 Partly free 2014 3 3 Partly free 2015 3 1 Free 2016 3 1 Free 2017 3 1 Free 2018 3 2 Free 2019 3 2 Free

This table includes a compilation of Tunisia’s civil liberties and political rights between 2011 and 2019 (Freedom House).

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5 Are there any signs of democratic deconsolidation,

erosion or decline in Tunisia - Evidence from the

Arab Barometer

The next section seeks to provide answers to the three sub-questions used in order to try and answer the research question “Are there any signs of

democratic deconsolidation in Tunisia according to the deconsolidation theory?”. In order to reach a result, the answers are based on data collected

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a. To what extent do the Tunisian citizens prefer a democratic regime over any other regime types in Tunisia?

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Wave 5

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systems, the majority responded that they agree, 36,8%, or strongly agree, 48,9%. 5,4% responded that they disagree, and 4,1% responded that they strongly disagree, which is a relatively low percentage of the total.

When looking at the results based on the wave 5 survey, there are some changes in support for democracy. The respondents that replied that they believe that democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government has increased from 50,5% in wave 4 to 64,4% in wave 5. Only 14,2% believes that a non-democratic government can be preferable under some circumstances, while only 12, 5% replied that it does not matter. However, when looking at the results based on the statement that a democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than any other system, only 19,8% strongly agree with the statement, compared to 49,9% in the wave 4 survey. Although there is a significant decline in respondents strongly agreeing with the statement, 59,5% of the respondents agree with the statement that democracy is better than any other system which is an increase from 36,8% in wave 4. Respondents that disagree with the statement have also increased from 5,4% in the wave 4 survey to 12,1% in the wave 5 survey. 4% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement, which is only a 0,1% decrease compared to the wave 4 survey.

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b. To what extent do the Tunisian citizens believe that democracy delivers what they expected?

Wave 4

Wave 5

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completely satisfied. Number 5 on the scale is right in the middle and indicates neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.

The results based on the wave 4 survey shows that 8,3% of the respondents answered that they were completely satisfied with the government performance at the time, and a relatively small percentage of the respondents, a total of 17,1%, placed themselves between 6 and 9 on the scale of governmental satisfaction. A total of 21,4% of the respondents placed themselves on number 5 on the scale. Between 4 and 1 on the scale a total of 29% of the respondents placed themselves, and 21% placed themselves on number 0 which means complete dissatisfaction with the government performance.

When looking at the results based on the wave 5 survey, it is possible to identify changes in the scale of governmental satisfaction among the Tunisian citizens. There is a decrease in respondents being completely satisfied from 8,3% in wave 4 to 4,9% in wave 5. 14,9% place themselves between 6 and 9 on the scale in the wave 5 survey, compared to 17,1% in the wave 4 survey which is also a decrease in governmental satisfaction. Respondents placing themselves on number 5 are in wave 5 19,8%, which is a small decrease. However, the trend shows a greater number of respondents being on the dissatisfied end on the scale, with 31,2% placing themselves between 4 and 1 on the scale. 26% of the respondents are completely dissatisfied with the performance of the government which is a slight increase compared to 21% in the wave 4 survey.

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c. To what extent do the Tunisian citizens have trust in political institutions such as the government?

Wave 4

Wave 5

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Government (Council of Ministers), courts and legal system, the elected council of representatives/the parliament, the police, and political parties. These institutions are included in both waves used. The result based on the wave 4 survey shows that 11,9% of the respondents have a great deal of trust, and 22,9% have quite a lot of trust for the political institutions. 26,5% of the respondents do not trust political institutions very much, and 36,3% answered that they do not trust political institutions at all which means that a majority of the respondents do not have much, or any, trust in institutions.

The result based on the wave 5 survey shows a quite different result with a slight decrease in respondents having a great deal of trust in the political institutions from 11,9% in wave 4 to 10,2% in wave 5. The respondents having quite a lot of trust also decreased slightly from 22,9% to 21,1%. However, the most significant changes in the results are regarding the respondents answering that they have not a lot of trust in political institutions or no trust at all. Respondents having not very much trust decreased from 26,5% in wave 4 to 15,6% in wave 5, while respondents having no trust at all in political institutions increased from 36,3% in wave 4 to 47,3% in wave 5.

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6 Summary of results

To answer the research question “Are there any signs of democratic

deconsolidation in Tunisia according to the deconsolidation theory?” I will

now go through the three sub-questions and the results that emerged from the Arab Barometer data in relation to the criterias of democratic deconsolidation formulated by Yascha Mounk.

The first sub-question reads “To what extent do the Tunisian citizens prefer a

democratic regime over any other regime types in Tunisia?” and is the

question that captures if the Tunisian citizens are experiencing declining democratic values, which according to Foa and Mounk (2019, p. 8) is the first indicator of democratic deconsolidation. How committed citizens in Tunisia are to democratic governance and democratic values provides a good indicator whether democracy is “the only game in town”, which is a criteria for a lasting democracy according to Foa and Mounk (2019, p. 8), or not. The results gathered through the data from the Arab Barometer indicates that democratic values are spreading amongst the Tunisian citizens at the time of the wave 5 survey. This result strongly suggests that the first criteria of the deconsolidation theory therefore is not being met in this study.

The second sub question reads “To what extent do Tunisian citizens believe

that democracy delivers what they expected?” and is the question that captures

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the performance by the government in both waves included in this study which makes it difficult to determine whether it is a trend of declining satisfaction or if it will have increased slightly in the next survey conducted by the Arab Barometer. However, there is an increased dissatisfaction which according to the deconsolidation theory indicates a step towards democratic deconsolidation.

The third sub-question reads “To what extent do Tunisian citizens have trust

in political institutions such as the government?” and is the question that

captures if there is low institutional trust amongst the Tunisian citizens, which according to Foa and Mounk is the third and last indicator of democratic deconsolidation. It is extremely important that politically active officials are dedicated to democracy and democratic institutions. If anti-system politically active officials manage to increase their support within the political arena, citizens have a tendency to lose trust in democratic processes which may empower anti-democratic forces. The results gathered through the data from the Arab Barometer indicates that there is a trend of decreasing trust in institutions. A significantly larger share of the respondents in the wave 5 survey compared to the wave 4 survey have no trust in political institutions. According to the deconsolidation theory, this is an indicator of democratic deconsolidation.

6.1 Conclusion

The answer to research question “Are there any signs of democratic

deconsolidation in Tunisia according to the deconsolidation theory?” based

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are met since the Tunisian citizens still possesses strong democratic values. It is hard to predict what the future might hold for the democracy in Tunisia, but a conclusion possible to draw from the result presented in this study is that political officials need to put an extensive amount of work in building credible institutions. In order for institutions to gain the reliance that Tunisian citizens lacks, the democratic values and efficiency towards the Tunisian citizens within institutions needs to increase.

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Are there any signs of deconsolidation in Tunisia according to the deconsolidation theory? Bachelor Thesis