CESIS Electronic Working Papers Series

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CESIS

Electronic Working Papers Series

Paper No. 117

THE RISE OF THE NUCLEAR SYSTEM OF INNOVATION IN SWEDEN

Maja Fjaestad och Thomas Jonter

(Royal Institute of Technology and Stockholm University)

March 2008

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Introduction

In the white book from 1970 called Svensk atomenergipolitik (Swedish atomic energy policy), the Minister of Industry Krister Wickman is summarizing the nation’s hitherto experience of developing nuclear energy. Twenty-three years have passed since the government owned company AB Atomenergi was created in order to be responsible for the Swedish research and development of nuclear power based on heavy water technology where domestic uranium should be used. This huge and capital-costly project that later was called “the Swedish line” for its ambition to reach independence in the nuclear energy field was now abolished and replaced by the light water reactor technology that had started to dominate the nuclear market in Sweden and globally since the beginning of 1960ths. The government controlled AB Atomenergi (AE), which by and large dominated “the Swedish line” was dissolved in 1968 and its resources were transferred to the new private company ASEA-ATOM owned by the Swedish multi-national corporation ASEA. The private taking over of AE in 1968 marked in several ways that an important shift in the Swedish energy policy had taken place; a period characterized by strong government planning and the political ambition to reach self-sufficiency had lost its grip to a policy dominated by free market and private industry. Over the years, the liberal-conservative opposition and private industry maintained that the nuclear energy development that was run by AE was too much government controlled and hindered free enterprise in this new and emerging nuclear energy sector. In addition, the “Swedish line” was considered as a failure because so much investments were made without any tangible results in terms of produced energy.

At the backdrop of all this criticism, the Minister of Industry wanted now to close the books and deliver his Social Democratic government`s view on what has been achieved and the lessons learned. He argues that the “Swedish line” was not a failure if all these efforts are viewed as investments in a successful nuclear system of innovation which bore fruit in the subsequent light water technology that took over.

In the introduction to the white book the Minister of Industry states three main reasons why the Swedish nuclear energy program was initiated:

“Firstly, this was due to the fact that the overall aim was to reach self-sufficiency in the

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nuclear power field. Investing in waterpower and oil only would be too risky. It was considered that it would take too long to develop the waterpower. Moreover, to be dependent on oil import could be a hazardous policy, which the Suez crisis of 1956 had shown in a dramatic way. In comparison, nuclear energy seemed to be a much more attractive alternative, particularly since Sweden had rich uranium deposits. Secondly, there was an industrial-political reason as well: to create a vital domestic industry in an important future energy sector. Thirdly, it was considered that only the government could bear the investment costs in such a planned large nuclear energy program.”¹

According to the social democratic Minister of Industry it was only the government that could bear the investments costs for such a huge program. He had his reasons to believe this since the Social Democratic Party was in favor of a strong government controlled nuclear energy development. However, there was in fact also another incentive to establish a government owned company that was not mentioned in the governmental report: Sweden’s plans to manufacture nuclear weapons during 1950ths and 1960ths.

Shortly after the nuclear weapons were dropped over Japan, the Swedish National Defense Research Establishment (FOA) was commissioned to investigate the possibilities of manufacturing what was then called an atomic bomb. A co-operation between FOA and AE was initiated in 1949 to explore the possibilities of manufacturing nuclear weapons. This incentive was strongly connected to the Swedish non-alignment policy; leading politicians and military argued that the nation needed a strong defense equipped with nuclear weapons in order to uphold her neutral policy.² AE would deliver basic information about possible production of weapons-grade plutonium and investigate the possibilities of production or procurement heavy water. AE would also build reactors and a reprocessing plant and manufacture fuel elements to be used in the reactors for production of weapons-grade plutonium. In other words, a civil nuclear energy program would be designed in such a way that it could include a Swedish production of nuclear weapons, if the Swedish Parliament took a decision in favor of such an alternative. It was deemed that a company run by the government, not the private industry, could and should take care of such a program. However, these nuclear weapons acquisition plans were finally abolished in 1968 when Sweden signed the Non- Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons, the same year as AE was dissolved.

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“The Swedish line” can also be seen as an offshoot from the social democratic planned economy debate in the 1940ths; i.e. to create a rational division of labor between government and private industry and to use science and industrial development as tools in building a strong welfare-state in Sweden. In this concept, the planned nuclear energy system should serve as main supplier of energy for industry and society in order to improve social and economic conditions among a broad mass of people.

It was not a unique situation that the Swedish government took the lead in the development of nuclear energy. This was actually the case in all states in the early phase of nuclear energy development. However, what was rather unique was that the Swedish government not only wanted to be responsible for the research and development but also for the construction of reactors, building of uranium production and heavy water plants and manufacture of fuel elements. The private industry was not against a strong involvement by the government, quite the opposite. In their view, only the government had the financial resources to invest in such a long run and capital-costly project.

However, the government should not infringe on the free enterprise and private companies` rights to act and invest according to principles of a free market. Some big private players in Sweden such as ASEA and the Johnson Consortium and the government owned Vattenfall also wanted to play the leading role in a future profitable market. A conflict pattern was established between the government and the private industry about who should be the leading player and on what terms in the national development of nuclear power.

The purpose of this article is twofold. Firstly, the ambition is to analyze the role of the government in relation to private industry in the development of the nuclear power infrastructure in Sweden in the period of 1945-1970. Secondly, the purpose is to account for what was actually made in terms of education, research and financial funding in “the Swedish line” and to assess its importance for the swift take over by the light water reactor system.

The Beginning: 1945-1955

The first step towards Swedish nuclear energy was taken in 1945 when the Atomic

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Committee (atomkommittén, AC) was founded. AC was an advisory committee of experts with the mission to work out plans and prioritize between alternatives how to develop the nuclear energy in Sweden. The committee was appointed by the government and its members represented military, industrial, political and academic interests. In fact, the initiative to establish AC came from the military which shows that the nuclear weapons plans played an important role in the creation of “the Swedish line”. On top of that, five of the Atomic Committé´s members were members in the board for FOA.³ The academic research had several representatives in AC, among them the Nobel prize winners Manne Siegbahn and Hannes Alfvén (he received the prize for physics in 1970). The industry was represented by the director-general for the Swedish telephone company, Håkan Sterky, and the technical director at ASEA, Ragnar Liljeblad. represented the military and the industry was represented by Ragnar Liljeblad from ASEA. Chairman of the AC was county governor Malte Jacobsson, politician from the Social Democratic party and professor of philosophy, and secretary was Gösta Funke, a young physicist.⁴

In 1946, the FOA was commissioned by the AC to explore the prerequisites for production of Swedish uranium, as well as separation of isotopes and plutonium production. This decision clearly shows the interdependence between civilian and military research at that time. Importing uranium was considered difficult given the strict US export control of nuclear materials and equipment. In that sense, it was not neither possible to use the imported nuclear material in a manufacture of nuclear weapons. It was primarily the skiffer and kolm in the Swedish provinces of Närke, Västergötland, and Östergötland that were deemed to be of interest for the possible production of uranium in Sweden. The Swedish uranium reserves, al though of low grade quality, had been deemed as one of the richest in the western world by American and British investigations shortly after World War II.⁵

The organization of the nuclear power program was an issue of some discussion within AC. Two alternatives were considered: either to create a research institute or a government owned corporation. AC recommended the latter, since that would involve industry in a more active way, and also give a considerable freedom. The company’s income would be rendered from research assignments, mainly from the government –

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similar to a research institute. The industry approved even though they wanted to play a more active role.⁶ AE, which was founded in 1947, was a four-sevenths government owned company. The rest of the shareholdings were split between 24 different Swedish companies belonging mainly to the energy, mining, steel, and engineering industries.

The board had seven members, four from the state sector and three representing industry.⁷ The members of the Atomic committee were also represented in the board of AE. For example, the general-director Håkan Sterky was member of the board in the period of 1947-1969.⁸ Sigurd Naukoff was the fist president of the company, and he was succeeded in 1951 by Harry Brynielsson.⁹

When AE was created the uranium research including equipments and staff at FOA was transferred to the newly founded company. One of the first more important tasks for the company was to acquire and extract uranium. To extract uranium was the basis of the plan for self-sufficiency that Sweden early on decided to fulfill. For this reason, Sweden chose a technology where the reactors could be loaded with natural uranium to be used without preceding enrichment. Consequently a reactor technology was chosen where heavy water could be used as moderator. As early as 1948, a method for extracting uranium from kolm was developed, and in 1950 the board of the AE decided that a uranium extraction facility would be built in Kvarntorp, Närke, with an annual production capacity of five tons. The facility was completed in 1953. As already mentioned, Sweden also had plans to manufacture nuclear weapons. Research in this field started as early as in 1945 at FOA. A close collaboration between FOA and AE was started in 1948 in order to work out technical and economic estimates for such a production.¹⁰ AE made several technical investigations within this co-operation regarding choice of reactors and preconditions for a production of weapons-grade plutonium. In theory, AE should be responsible for the civilian nuclear development while FOA should be in charge of the military aspects of this new technology. The division of responsibilities that was made did not mean to draw a clear line between civilian and military activities. The division of work was rather made in order to economize on the limited resources of the country. According to the political scientist Stefan Lindström, it is correct to talk about an extended division of work between FOA, AE and AC at that time.¹¹ Also, the cooperation between the AE and the Military can be understood in terms of seeking to develop new expertise. There simply weren’t enough

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people in the country with knowledge about nuclear physics to be able to separate civilian and military development.

Figure 1: This figure describes in a simplified form how the co-operation between FOA and AE was planned in a possible manufacture of nuclear weapons. AE was responsible for the production of uranium and fuel elements, the procurement of inspection-free heavy water and the design of reactors and a reprocessing plant in order to enable a production of weapons-grade plutonium. AE’s responsibility extended to the point where weapons-grade plutonium was produced. Further steps, until the nuclear weapons were manufactured, was FOA’s responsibility.

The first reactors see the light of day

In 1954, Sweden’s first reactor R 1 went into operation. R 1 was located at the Royal Fuel element

factory Reactor

Uranium concentrate

Fresh fuel

Reprocess- ing plant

Spent fuel

Waste depository Recycling of

uranium

Fission products Uranium

plant

Fuel Cycle with Production of Weapons-grade Plutonium in a Natural Uranium Reactor

Weapons- grade plutonium

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Institute of Technology in the center of Stockholm, which shows that the security and environmental risks were deemed low in the early phase of the development of Swedish nuclear energy. The reactor was not, however, loaded with uranium produced in Sweden as such a production had not yet been started. For this reason, AE borrowed three tons of uranium from the French Commissariat á l’Energie Atomique (CEA). It was decided that the reactor should be moderated with heavy water (five tons were imported from Norway) even if graphite was considered to be a technical possibility.

The choice of heavy water was natural because this particular technology demanded less amounts of uranium.¹² Interesting to note is that the man in charge of the reactor project was the head of the physics department at AE, Sigvard Eklund, who later became IAEA’s second General Secretary between 1961 and 1981. R 1 was built 15 meters down in a rock cavern, and eventually had an output of 1 MW. R 1 was mainly a training facility. On the basis of the results from the measurements and experiments conducted in the reactor, the research could take a step forward. For instance, the researchers were occupied with studies of different materials behavior under neutron radiation and cross-section measurements of uranium. Such information was of great value for both AE’s and FOA’s estimates of different reactions.¹³

The nuclear research took many steps forward during this period and dominated this first phase. However, concerning how the industrial ventures should be designed was characterized by uncertainty and wait-and-see-policy until mid-1950ths. The government had not yet given clear directions on how the nationally based nuclear energy system should be worked out. This uncertainty gave life to many ideas and plans. The “Atoms for Peace” program, which was launched by the U S president Eisenhower in the mid-1950ths, was regarded as a substantial step forward for research in the nuclear field. The “Atoms for Peace” program was a gigantic global cooperation project to develop civilian nuclear energy in the world and simultaneously prevent the participating states to produce nuclear weapons. States which promised not to acquire nuclear weapons should be supported in order to develop their civilian nuclear energy.

They could borrow or buy fissile material and nuclear equipments on beneficial conditions regulated by bilateral cooperation agreements between, on one side United States, or Soviet Union and receiving states on the other. An outcome of this cooperation program was the creation of IAEA in 1957. “Atoms for Peace”-program was also a part of the cold war game between the superpowers. The restrictive

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American policy had not been able to prevent the Soviet Union to acquire nuclear weapons. It was now considered that a more open and helpful attitude to other nation’s developments of their civilian nuclear energy could better serve US interests. By and large, this policy was considered to be more effective in terms of controlling and supervising that the received nuclear materials and devices were not used for military purposes by the co-operative state.¹⁴

Within this program, the so-called Geneva Conferences were held in 1955 and 1957, wherein the United States and other states released previously secret information to collaborating countries. As a consequence of the first Geneva conference in 1955, the private industry in Sweden started to show a growing interest in what was considered as a future business with splendid opportunities. For this reason a consortium for nuclear power co-operation (Krångede AB & CO, AKK) was created by several Swedish private companies, just two months after the conference. However, the first over- optimistic prognoses made shortly after the “Atoms for Peace” program was launched were changed after a couple of years. When it was realized that reactor developments required enormous investments in terms of capital and human resources, the interest faded.

Nevertheless, one of all these cooperation ideas with strong private interests took a more steady shape during these years, namely the nuclear power projects that ASEA and Vattenfall were planning together with AE. Even though this cooperation continued, it was a cooperation based on different interests. In the eyes of the private company ASEA, the driving incentive was to expand the possibilities as a constructor and a builder of reactor systems in a future prosperous market. At this backdrop, ASEA maintained that the principles of free market and free enterprise should be the steering instruments in the development of the Swedish nuclear industry. The state owned energy producing company Vattenfall initiated cooperation with AE from another direction. As a producer of electricity and heat, the main incentive was to produce sufficient energy to competitive prices. At that time, Vattenfall argued that waterpower should be the vital energy source in the future even though it had to be complemented with other energy sources, especially nuclear energy. However, Vattenfall itself lacked competence in the nuclear field and therefore the company started to cooperate with AE.

The newly founded AE, on the other hand, was first and foremost a research and development company with its roots in the academic world. AE lacked workshops for

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manufacturing of reactors and advanced equipments, as well as experiences from construction work. For this reason, AE searched for cooperation partners. ASEA could be used as a subordinated supplier and manufacturer of different products and Vattenfall could contribute as a future buyer and operator of the reactor systems. Besides these incentives, AE had also other objectives to fulfill, which had to do with political aims formulated by the government such as to handle a possible nuclear weapons production and to reach self-sufficiency in nuclear energy field. As a result, a conflict was growing between these actors, especially so between ASEA and AE and in their struggle for the authority over the construction of nuclear power reactors. In the aftermath of the first Geneva conference in 1955, the government also assigned a committee, the Atomic Energy Commission (Atomenergiutredningen). In the directives to the commission, the Minister of Trade, Gunnar Lange, stressed that a development of nuclear energy demands great economic and personnel efforts and therefore only the government should have the responsibility to coordinate such a large program. The ambition was clear: to restore the position of AE as the most dominant actor in the development of the nuclear energy system. In addition, the nuclear weapons research that was carried out within the civilian nuclear energy development was also an important reason why the government preferred an organization run by the state and not the private industry. ¹⁵

The launching of “the Swedish line”: 1956-1961

In 1956, two important government commissions were presented. One of them, the Fuel Commission (Bränsleutredningen) had been working since 1951 and for the first time the scope was to analyze the Swedish need for energy in a comprehensive way. Before the 1950ths, it is not correct to talk about one single Swedish energy policy, instead there was one policy for electricity and one for coal etc. The investigation concluded that the Swedish energy system was very much dependent on import of energy. In fact, 75 % of all used energy came from foreign sources, mostly coal and oil. According to the commission, the growing population, the expected raising living standard and continuous industrialization all over the world will lead to an increasing need for energy. To use the coal reserves of the world was not considered profitable due to high production costs. As a consequence, if nothing dramatically was done to change the strong dependence on foreign energy supply, oil would make up around 70 % of the

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Swedish energy system in 1980, the commission concluded. This vulnerability could be avoided by an “active energy policy” which strived for an independent and domestic oriented energy order. In Sweden, the commission argued, the water power could be increased. However, water power could only be developed to a certain level, determined by how many of rivers should be exploited. The commission came to the conclusion that the water power could be fully built out in 15 years. However, the maximized output for water power in 1970ths was estimated to make up for 20-25 % of the Swedish energy system. Therefore, the commission argued, the nuclear power could meanwhile be developed as to take over as a base in the Swedish energy system in the 1970ths.¹⁶

The second, and in our context even more important, government commission that was presented this year was the atomic energy commission (Atomenergiutredning, AC). In the commission report, it was stated that an increased supply of energy was a presupposition for an industrial expansion, and that energy demand would increase 4 % per year in the period 1955-1965. Furthermore, this increased demand meant a double production of energy in 18 years. The water power could only partly solve the Swedish energy need. The atomic energy commission landed in the same conclusion as the fuel commission, namely that nuclear power could take over after the water power was fully developed.¹⁷

In 1956, the Swedish parliament took the decision to initiate “the Swedish line”, which was based on the conclusion by the Atomic Energy Commission. In that year, a new bill, the law on atomic energy (Atomenergilagen, 1956:306) was also passed Sweden.

This law regulated the management of nuclear energy in Sweden. In connection with the new bill, a governmental body was founded to deal with control and supervise of nuclear energy management, the Delegation of Atomic Energy Matters (Delegationen för atomenergifrågor, DFA). A subordinated body to DFA, Reaktorförläggningskommittén, was also created in 1956 to be responsible for security related issues.¹⁸

The heavy water reactor system should cover the whole fuel cycle in order to reach self- sufficiency in terms of uranium, heavy water and plutonium. The ambitious program planned to build 5 to 6 nuclear power stations until 1965 based on an independent Swedish reactor system. In the first phase of this nuclear program, that was expected to

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endure until 1970ths, massive research and education should be conducted in order to establish a nuclear innovation system able to put the planned heavy water reactor system into commercial practice. Reactors for heat production should also be built in this first phase. These were not considered as complicated as to work out reactors for production of electricity. Thereafter, in the next phase, the time should be mature for building nuclear reactors for producing electricity on a broad scale as to switch over from water power to nuclear power.

The private industry had, in principle, no objections to these goals in general. It was the way that it should be carried out that upset Swedish private players in the energy field.

Since AC recommended a government controlled development under the leadership of AE, Vattenfall and ASEA felt that their efforts were underestimated and that there was too much state intervention.¹⁹ ASEA even threatened to leave Sweden if the suggestions were realized.²⁰ In the end, the governmental bill was somewhat milder than the recommendations of the committee report, but the concentration to AE remained.

However, the program was, according to ASEA, a restriction for private companies´

right to conduct research and to give offers of nuclear reactors in a free market.

Vattenfall also stressed the importance of economic incentives. The government rejected this criticism and emphasized the importance of coordination of the program in order to fulfill the objectives in the Atomic Energy Commission. In the government´s view, AE should play the coordinative role. In this respect, AE should have the main responsibility for construction and manufacturing of prototype reactors in a three years period. In that role, it was expected that AE would assign private Swedish companies to construct and manufacture reactor parts.²¹

The launching of the “Atoms for Peace” program was indeed decisive for the choice of the next Swedish reactor. An extended co-operation agreement was signed between the United States and Sweden on 18 January 1956 within the framework of the “Atoms for Peace”-program. The agreement enabled Sweden to purchase enriched uranium and heavy water to be used for research purposes. The agreements contained a matter of course condition; the receiving state promised not to use the nuclear material for a manufacture of nuclear weapons or to export it to other nations to be used for this purpose.²² In April 1958, the United States Atomic Commission declared that the

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government of the United States was willing to contribute $ 350 000 in order to build R 2 at Studsvik. This reactor was built at Studsvik close to Nyköping in 1959. R 2. This alternative was not previously possible because of lack of enriched uranium. However, after the Geneva conference in 1955, it was possible to buy both enriched uranium and complete reactor systems from the United States at favorable prices. R 2 became a bigger and more powerful reactor than R 1 and it was mainly used for materials testing for the future reactor development and reactor fuel in Sweden.²³

In 1960, AE’s monopoly position was abolished. The new directives stated that AE should still allocate the financial resources for the development in the nuclear energy field in Sweden, however, the company should not produce and sell reactors.

Furthermore, it was decided that the production of fuel elements should be handed over to the private industry. AE had already initiated cooperation with ASEA, which had strong interests in such a production.²⁴

How did it come to pass that the government gave up this monopoly and gave in for the private industry? It is important to understand that the global supply side of oil changed in the end of 1950ths. After the Suez crisis in 1956, prices sunk and the oil supply increased. This new situation, with, as it seemed, a more stabilized oil market, had weakening consequences for the goal of the “active energy policy” to reach self- sufficiency in the energy field in Sweden. The politically based directives in the investigation had lead to a delay in building reactors for a domestic nuclear production.

In fact, two reactors had been postponed in the light of the new global fuel situation.

The plans to build reactors for production of heat were abolished in 1958 without any political debate. On top of that, the light water technology was close to a major breakthrough in the United States. The light water technology could be put on the market as an economically favorable and reliable reactor system compared to the heavy water system. In addition, the further lowering of the prices of enriched uranium in the United States in the end of the 1950ths, reduced the fuel costs for running light water facilities.²⁵ When the United States drastically lowered the prices of uranium, an investigation was made by the AK’s successor the Delegation of Atomic Energy Issues (DFA) in 1959. The investigation concluded that a Swedish production of uranium was estimated to cost 70 % more than uranium imported from the United States. The experts in DFA who by and large represented the industry were in favor of import of uranium even though it would imply restrictions in the form of foreign inspections.²⁶ As a

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consequence, the private industry saw real opportunities for light water technology in Sweden.

The ambition of the government was to step by step move from creating a nationally self-sufficiency in the nuclear energy field to the objective to help the Swedish private industry to be a successful manufacturer of nuclear rectors and other nuclear related facilities. In addition, this change of the government’s focus can also be interpreted as the new phase in the nuclear development that demanded a new organization system focused on manufacturing and delivering reactors. AE was a successful player only when the focus was on basic research and education in order to develop a nuclear infrastructure. All in all, the private industry was not able to carry these huge investments costs. In the turn of the decade between 1950ths and 1960ths, the perspective was different. Oil was still an important supply for a foreseeable future and the AE had played out its innovating role.

The third reactor sees the light of day

The Atomic Energy Commission talked about building 5 to 6 nuclear power stations until 1965. In fact one of these nuclear power stations was already in the process of concrete design when the program was written, R 3 in Ågesta south of Stockholm. The government decided in 1957 to go ahead with the project. The reactor facility was constructed for a combined heat and electricity production. AE and Stockholms Elverk (The municipal authority of Stockholm responsible for electricity production) signed an agreement regarding the use of the Ågesta Nuclear Power Station for distant heat production to Farsta, a suburb of Stockholm. The reactor was based on heavy water technology and loaded with natural uranium in the form of oxide as fuel.²⁷ Even though there was enriched uranium available to favorable prices, it was decided that the Ågesta reactor should be based on heavy water technology. One reason was that so much investment had already been done in the heavy water technology in terms of building up facilities and developed research. It was considered important that this planned power station could be used as a test reactor for larger projects in the future. One of these investments was AE’s uranium production plant at Kvarntorp, which went into operation in 1953, and had shown that such a project could be carried out in industrial scale. In 1957, AE decided to build a larger industrial uranium plant with a capacity of

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120 tons a year. Furthermore, the uranium plant should be located at Ranstad where the total deposit was estimated to about 300 000 tons.²⁸ Despite the conclusion of the study on the uranium issue in 1959, a majority of the members of DFA recommended that the Ranstad project should be continued with regard to the aspect of self-sufficiency.

Another reason was that Sweden still had plans to produce nuclear weapons, and if the Ågesta reactor was loaded with enriched uranium from United States (which would imply restrictions in the form of U S inspections), the reactor could not be used for a production of weapons-grade plutonium.²⁹ This reason was, of course, not an officially expressed since the research on nuclear weapons was a highly secret activity.

AE, Vattenfall and ASEA agreed to cooperate in the construction and building of the Ågesta reactor. ASEA delivered the reactor part and finally, it went into operation on 17 July 1963. The reactor was a prototype facility with a thermal output of 65 MW, from which 55 MW was used as distant heating of Farsta and 10 MW for electricity generation. In 1965 the operation was taken over by Vattenfall. In the end, the Ågesta Nuclear Power Station was closed down in 1974 for economic reasons.³⁰ Another important reason for abandoning the reactor was new safety demands, which in turn would have necessitated costly renovations.³¹

The reactor was in the end not furnished with devices to enable frequent fuel changes under operation, which was one of the conditions for a production of weapons-grade plutonium. On the other hand, had the incentives to manufacture nuclear weapons been weaker among the political and military elite of Sweden in the beginning of 1960ths.

Neither did the Ågesta Nuclear Power Station become an important power producer of power. Despite this, the white book Svensk atomenergipolitik considers that the most important aim was fulfilled: to gain the necessary experience for industrial reactor manufacture, reactor operation and fuel element production for the benefit of the continued nuclear energy development.³²

The Marviken reactor

Notwithstanding that Ågesta went out of operation in 1974, the project was, however, considered rewarding because necessary experience was gained for the continued reactor development. On the contrary, the second Swedish nuclear power reactor, R 4 at Marviken close to Norrköping, was built but did not go into operation. The project

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became a complicated venture, which, after several steps of remodeling, was abandoned in 1970. As a consequence, the heavy water program went into the grave.

Why then was Marviken constructed? The Swedish heavy water program was not expected to be a competitive power-supplier until reactor plants with an output of 400 MW or more could go into operation. A medium size reactor was needed between Ågesta and an industrial reactor power station. As early as 1955, both AE and Vattenfall had their own plans for a medium size nuclear power reactor.³³ For the fiscal year 1957/58, Vattenfall requested appropriation to start its heavy water reactor project by the name Eva. The request was not accepted. The minister of trade maintained that the time was not ripe for the next step. Instead a continued co-operation between AE and Vattenfall regarding a joint project was recommended. For this reason, an agreement was closed in 1957 between AE and Vattenfall in order to build a nuclear reactor by the name R4/Eva. AE should be in charge of the reactor construction while Vattenfall was to be responsible for the power station. The following year the private industry became involved as well. ASEA and NOHAB were contracted in order to take part in the manufacture of the reactor.³⁴

At first AE chose a pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR). Moreover, it was decided that the reactor should be designed in order to enable on-load refuelling. With such an arrangement a higher burn up was possible and the cost of the fuel cycle could be lowered.³⁵ On-load refueling also enabled plutonium-production. The Marviken power station was planned to go into operation in 1963. However, when the prices dropped and the supply of oil increased in the beginning of 1960’s, the need for a Swedish nuclear power station was not considered as urgent as before. Therefore more time for construction plans was gained and the building of the reactor could be postponed until 1968. The remodeling of R 4 was a matter of intense internal debate during these years.

Mainly two issues were discussed: boiling and superheating. In the end, it was decided that Marviken should be equipped with a superheating system. Expensive equipment for such an arrangement had already been purchased and thus blocked the possibility of changing the construction plans. In July 1964, ASEA was contracted to deliver the BHWR. The following year the order was complemented with devices for superheating and with a control system including an integrated computer for registration and control AE should construct the reactor part while ASEA should deliver it, and Vattenfall was

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to be in charge of the power station.

In 1965, an agreement between AE and ASEA was signed which meant that ASEA should deliver a heavy water reactor. In the same year, the first Swedish order was made of a commercial power reactor station based on light water technology. ASEA should manufacture a light water reactor with an output of 400 MW to Oskarshamn 1 belonging to the Oskarshamnsverkens Kraftgrupp AB (a private consortium).

The following year the Swedish government signed an agreement with the United States concerning a purchase of enriched uranium. The agreement should be in force for 30 years and accordingly it worked up to 1996. This meant the nuclear weapons plans had to be abolished if not a strictly military reactor program were to be built which was considered but not realised.³⁶

In 1968, ASEA and Vattenfall ordered the first light water reactor to Ringhals power station. During the summer that year, AE’s design and nuclear fuels departments were united with the nuclear power department of ASEA. The new company ASEA-ATOM was 50 % government owned, but ASEA had a casting vote. The company should be a part of the ASEA group.³⁷ The reactor orders for Oskarshamn 1 and Ringhals were transferred to the new company. The reactor delivery to Marviken, which was considered to be a development project, was not, however, transferred to the new company. The newly founded company’s field of action implied that Swedish nuclear energy had by now changed its direction to industrial development.

From then on, it was obvious that the light water technology was to dominate the future of the Swedish nuclear power energy. In spite of this, the government was of the opinion that Marviken should be continued due to the aim of self-sufficiency. During the year of 1969, the problems increased. Several reports from different countries came to the conclusion that a superheating system only would give marginal improvements.

In addition, when the superheating arrangement at Marviken was considered to be insufficient for safety reasons, a decision was taken to abandon this system.

Nevertheless, it was shown that the arrangement for superheating could not be changed unless a costly renovation was conducted. The renovation was calculated to cost 40 million Swedish crowns and imply a delay of a couple of years. In May of 1970, the Marviken project was discontinued.³⁸ And that meant also the death of the “Swedish line” and the heavy water reactor system.

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Research and competence

Creating a Swedish nuclear program was a task that required new knowledge – and personnel with advanced knowledge. Research was an important task already from the creation of AE in 1947. The first reactor, R1, was intended as a research instrument.

When the physics section from FOA was transferred to Atomenergi in 1950, Sigvard Eklund followed and became head of the physics section at Atomenergi, where most of the research was conducted. Sigvard Eklund’s way of managing the research department made it more like a university institution that an industrial corporation.³⁹ Much of the fundamental research on nuclear topics in the 1950ths was performed at the AE, with money from the Government. There was also a relative liberty on topics to do research about, due to the strong belief that virtually any knowledge brought to the nuclear society was useful.⁴⁰ This would also reflect the general belief in the linear causal relationship between basic research and industrial development, what have been called the “assembly-line model”.⁴¹ The purpose of nuclear research was for AE also a matter of building competence and educating personnel.⁴² For example, the president of AE Harry Brynielsson writes in 1950 that the physics department serves as a center of education for reactor physicists.⁴³

AE encouraged the researchers to publish articles in international scientific magazines.⁴⁴ This made the company visible in the scientific community. However, the secrecy that prevailed for military and security reasons contrasted notably with the academic freedom of the universities, where open international publication is a part of the

working process. There was in the 1960s a severe criticism of the secrecy of the Atomic Energy Company. This was discussed in the Swedish parliament in the 1960ths.⁴⁵ The fact that researchers were bound by professional secrecy was criticized in a motion in parliament in 1968.⁴⁶

The unclear motives of the R1-reactor created a serious conflict – was it a research instrument or a part of the Swedish nuclear program? Sigvard Eklund was a man that advocated basic research, and he preferred to advance in moderate tempo with caution about the dangers. His opposite number was Harry Brynielsson, who was urgent to proceed in developing nuclear power plants and wanted to hasten the research.⁴⁷ This was a conflict between a scientific and an industrial view on the reactor. Was R1 a

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scientific instrument or a link in a chain towards nuclear energy? The conflict led to the research director Eklund having to leave the company.⁴⁸ Instead, he switched to

working with international questions as a director general at IAEA in 1961.

The research at AE could be associated to an intention of building up scientific expertise and competence in Sweden, also partly for military purposes. It was important to have this kind of knowledge within the country. The education of physicists and the

increasing numbers of Ph.D. students in post-war America have been discussed by David Kaiser in the article ”Cold War Requisitions, Scientific Manpower, and the Production of American Physicists after World War II”.⁴⁹ Here, he discusses how certain rhetoric connected the production of physicists with potential weapon-makers and cold war manpower – even though most physicists did not work with weapon- related issues. Kaiser describes how the number of Ph.D.s granted in physics in the US doubled every seven years in the period 1945-71. In Sweden, the “modern” physical topics as nuclear physics took long time to enter the relatively conservative universities.

But instead, there were Ph.D.s produced at the Atomic Energy Co, even though academic work in the industry was unusual by this time. During the years 1951-1963, an average of 1.8 Ph.D. dissertations a year were published in physics at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm – to be compared with a yearly average of 5.4 dissertations during 1964-70. Of 23 physics-dissertations published 1951-1963, five had obvious connections to AE.⁵⁰ The contribution of the nuclear company was thus

significant.

The 1960s were golden years also in Sweden for Masters of Engineering – and

Atomenergi was a large employer. The increase in funding to Atomenergi 1956 gave the company more that 500 employees, and the number peaked in 1963 with 1600

employees.⁵¹ This can be compared with the nuclear section of ASEA, which

constituted of 20 persons in1956, 100 in 1958, and 350 in 1960.⁵² And while AE peaked in 1963, ASEA had that year diminished their work staff to 200, due to low oil prices.⁵³ The governmental organization was thus the most important employer, and guaranteed continuity.

The generous education possibilities in nuclear energy matters at AE served as a means

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to recruit young talented people. Sigvard Eklund started courses in reactor technology and gave occasional lectures at the Royal Institute of Technology.⁵⁴ The topic reached the academic sphere in the end of the 1950s, when Nils Svartholm, former Atomenergi co-worker, started to teach reactor physics within Mathematical Physics at Chalmers Technical Institute.⁵⁵ A committee for reactor engineering education was formed, with representatives from both industry and universities, to discuss issues of education and how the fields of atomic science should be integrated in the training of engineers.⁵⁶ AE held courses for the industry at R1, starting as early as 1956, for companies as ASEA, Sandviken, Nohab and Vattenfall.⁵⁷ Companies could also send co-workers for training at Atomenergi as secondment.⁵⁸ This became an important transfer of knowledge from state-owned AE to the industry.

In summary, AE was an essential actor in collecting and spreading knowledge in nuclear matters. AE served as a center of knowledge, providing both industry and academia with competence. Atomenergi laid the bases to academic nuclear science when their researchers entered the universities in the 1960^th and created departments for reactor physics.

Was governmental funding necessary in the nuclear program?

But what about the volumes of funding? Nuclear power development is a costly business, and the grants from the government were vast.

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Table 1 State funding for nuclear program at AB Atomenergi.⁵⁹

Year Received

funding, Mkr

% of state expenses, as stated in Rikshuvud-boken

Adjusted by consumer price index MKr

1955/56 61.5 0,30 753.4

1956/57 43.7 0,19 509.8

1957/58 63.5

0,25 708.91

1958/59 65.0 0,23 695.73

1959/60 127.0 0,44 1348.92 1960/61 116.2 0,37 1185.69

1961/62 102 0,29 1018.28

1962/63 108 0,27 1028.72

1963/64 113 0,26 1045.19

1964/65 108 0,21 968.73

1965/66 98 0,17 835.72

1966/67 93,5 0,14 748.18

1967/68 92 0,13 707.55

1968/69 78 0,09 587.90

1969/70 62,2 0,07 456.39

1970/71 60 0,06 411.87

1971/72 51,8 0,04 330.96

1972/73 50,8 0,04 306.20

1973/74 49,8 0,03 281.39

1974/75 47,9 0,03 246.20

The added funding, including additional grants as loans, special funding to Ranstad or Marviken etc, for the nuclear program during the period 1955-1971 is 2198.2 million Swedish crowns. For financing AB Atomenergi during years 1947-1969, the state granted 1716 Mkr, while external commissions only constituted 88 Mkr and bond

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capital only 14 Mkr of the company’s revenues. The governmental funding was thus essential for AE:s existence.⁶⁰

The role of the state and of AE was criticized by the industry in connection with Atomutredningen 1956.⁶¹ On the other hand, the governmental influence implicated strong financial support, and less risk for the private companies. Wittrock and Lindström discuss in their book De stora programmens tid – forskning och energi i svensk politik what the ”Swedish line” really imply to Swedish nuclear industry. They state that the government-sponsored line way essential to ASEA’s gaining of experiences in the nuclear field, and diminished the risks for the companies. ASEA could participate in AE’s activities during the years 1959-1963, when the oil price weakened the interest for atomic power, which made the company ready to jump when the interest increased again. This was probably important for the possibilities to build a light water reactor without an American license. The knowledge at ASEA also became important for the state when Marviken proved a failure – a favorable interpretation would be that the experiences from the heavy water line were made useful in the light water program.⁶² However, the future formation of governmental energy research programs was different from the great nuclear program. Wittrock and Lindström argue that the ministries did not want a direct responsibility and control of research and technology as in the nuclear power program.⁶³ One might also argue that times had changed – the age of warfare and welfare looked different in the 1970s.

It is understandable that it would be in the interest of the state to justify large sums spent with the assertion that the heavy water line laid the bases for the light water reactors.

But what does the industry say? In the historical account of ASEA (parentes?, representatives for ASEA states that they think that the heavy water line should have been put off earlier. On the other hand, Ingvar Wivstad, technological director at Vattenfall, considered Marviken important for building competence at ASEA. “Without Marviken, ASEA would never have been able to construct Oskarshamn1 on their own”, he said.⁶⁴ And, while Marviken contributed to valuable experiences for ASEA, that state took the entire risk. The profit for ASEA on Marviken was 65 Mkr. The loss was on the state.⁶⁵

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So when we ask us the question whether AE’s achievements in the heavy water field was wasted energy we should consider that much of the expertise, experience and technology could be used by the light water system that by now had taken over. In the words of Karl-Erik Larsson: “The light water technology got off to a flying start”.⁶⁶

1 Svensk atomenergipolitik. Motiv och riktlinjer för statens insatser på atomenergiområdet 1947-1970.

Industridepartementet 1970, pp. 5-6.

2 Alltjämt starkt försvar. ÖB-förslaget 1954 (ÖB 54). (Strong Defence Preserved. The Supreme Commander’s proposal 1954 (ÖB 54), Kontakt med krigsmakten 1954:9-10 (Stockhom: The Swedish Defense Staff, 1954).

3 Sigfrid Leijonhufvud, (parantes? En historia om svensk kärnkraft.Västerås 1994, p. 18.

4 Karl-Erik Larsson, ”Kärnkraftens historia i Sverige”, Kosmos 64 (1987), pp. 125-126.

5 Skogmar, Gunnar, De nya malmfälten. Det svenska uranet och inledningen till efterkrigstidens neutralitetspolitik, Forskningsprogrammet Sverige under kalla kriget, Arbetsrapport nr 3, 1997.

6 Björn Wittrock & Stefan Lindström, De stora programmens tid – forskning och energi i svensk politik (Stockholm, 1984), p. 55.

7 Lindström, Stefan, I hela nationens tacksamhet. Svensk forskningspolitik på atomenergiområdet 1945- 1956. Dissertation, Stockholm 1991 1991, p. 92.

8 Larsson 1987, p. 128.

9 Larsson 1987, p. 128.

10 Jonter 2002, Nuclear Weapons Research in Sweden.. The Co-Ooperation Between Civilian and Military Research. SKI Report 2002:18.

11 Lindström 1991, pp 92-93.

12 Svensk atomenergipolitik 1970, pp. 17-18; Larsson 1987 p. 131. Erik Svenke has discussed different methods to produce uranium and the Swedish uranium policy, in a lecture with the title “Svensk uranhistoria” (Swedish history of uranium) at the Technical Museum in Stockholm, November 14 2000.