Between Hope and Denial?
Hendrik Schoukens*
Progress is impossible without change, and those who cannot change their minds cannot change anything (George Bernard Shaw)
Abstract
It is a well-known fact of life that public interest litigation before the EU courts is rendered virtu- ally impossible due to the strict application of the Plaumann-doctrine. However, in the wake of the ratification of the Aarhus Convention by the EU in 2005, it was hoped that the implementation of Ar- ticle 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention would usher in an era of wider access to justice in environmental matters. This expectation has been belied. It soon emerged that, even with the adoption of Regulation No. 1367/2006, which specifically aimed to imple- ment Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention for EU institutions by enabling environmental NGOs to file a request for internal review of EU decisions in relation to the environment, nothing has changed on the ground. In fact, it turned out the internal review procedure was applied so restrictively that almost none of the requests that were filed by the environmental NGOs during the past years were treated on their merits. Recently, the rigid applica- tion of the admissibility requirements laid down by Regulation No. 1367/2006 was debunked by the General Court in its recent rulings of 14 June 2012.
Whilst ostentably progressive, it will be argued in this paper that, even if the rulings of the General
Court of 14 June 2012 are upheld by the CJEU on appeal, they will only bring limited changes in the non-compliance by the EU as to its obligations un- der the third pillar of the Aarhus Convention. It will be maintained that, in the end, the reconsideration of the Plaumann-doctrine, alongside a thorough revision of Regulation No. 1367/2006, is the only sensible solution for this perennial flaw in the EU legal system.
I. Introduction
In spite of the recent growth of environmental protection statutory provisions, the environ- mental degradation continues. By collecting and disseminating information to the wider public about the state of the environment, environmen- tal NGOs (ENGOs) are playing a seminal part in the raising of the environmental awareness in society1. In the past decades, ENGOs have suc- ceeded in fostering the political debate about im- portant issues, such as acid rain, climate change and deforestation. Concepts such as sustainable development, natural resource conservation and the restoration of ecosystems have been put on the agenda of policy makers, largely thanks to
1 See, amongst others: A Agarwal, ‘Role of NGOs in the Protection of Environment’ (2008) Journal of Environmen- tal Research and Development, pp. 933–938.
* Ph.D. Researcher, Faculty of Law, Ghent University, Belgium, hendrik.schoukens@ugent.be. The text is up- dated as of 15 May 2014.
the relentless efforts of ENGOs. In a world char- acterized by the retreat of the state from a num- ber of public functions and regulatory activities, the watchdog activities of ENGOs in safeguard- ing the public interest become all the more im- portant for ensuring an adequate environmental performance, not only by national authorities but also multinational companies.
Notwithstanding the obvious benefits that accompany the rise of ENGOs in society, they still face important barriers when bringing en- vironmental claims before courts. The political interests that are tied to the decision making process urge authorities to impair the possibili- ties for access to justice in environmental cases.
Often the actions of ENGOs are being viewed as important impediments for further economic development. The enhanced eagerness of many ENGOs to go to court in order to enforce their viewpoints is increasingly being tagged a serious impediment for the business and economic prog- ress. From the courts’ side, it is moreover feared that lenient standing rules for ENGOs will lead to an exponential growth of litigation. And thus ENGOs are often confronted with rigid stand- ing requirements whenever go to court with environmental claims. In a certain way, these strict admissibility requirements can be seen the procedural compound of the leading discourse amongst many business people, who become increasingly fearful of the impact of ENGOs on their profits.
Since 1998, the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision- making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention)2 has played an in- creasingly important role in the strive for a better
2 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participa- tion in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Envi- ronmental Matters, done at Aarhus, Denmark, 25 July 1998 (‘the Aarhus Convention’). The Aarhus Convention entered into force on 1 October 2001.
access to justice for ENGOs. As is widely known, the Aarhus Convention aims to enhance public participation in environmental governance and lift the existing barriers for ENGOs and citizens to effectively challenge decisions that possibly contravene environmental law. It is grounded on the assumption that a wider involvement of indi- viduals and ENGOs in environmental matters, if supplemented by effective access to justice, can lead to significant improvements in environmen- tal protection. Accordingly, the Aarhus Conven- tion, which was adopted under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commissions for Europe (UNECE), calls for the recognition of a number of procedural rights for individuals and ENGOs with regard to the environment. To that end, the quintessential third pillar of the Aarhus Convention, laid down by Article 9, aims at em- powering ENGOs and citizens to assist in the enforcement of environmental law. Especially Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, that pro- vides for a general right to challenge acts and omissions by private parties and public persons allegedly infringing national environmental law, has recently come to the forefront as a seminal provision in the strive for a wider access to jus- tice in environmental cases for ENGOs.
By ratifying the Aarhus Convention in 20053, along with its Member States, the EU committed itself to guaranteeing sufficient access to justice in environmental matters, both within the EU Member States and on the EU level. However, it is a well-known fact of life that public inter- est litigation is seriously compromised by the strict standing requirements maintained in the settled case-law of the EU Courts. Until today, no single ENGO has ever succeeded in gaining
3 Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, of the Convention on access to information, public partici- pation in decision-making and access to justice in envi- ronmental matters, [2005] OJ L124/1.
access to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) or the former Court of First In- stance (CFI) – which has been renamed General Court since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty – in order to obtain judicial review of a contested measure adopted by a European insti- tution. Traditionally, such actions are hindered by the prevailing CJEU interpretation of what is of “individual concern”, one of the two conditions that need to be fulfilled pursuant to Art. 263 (4) of the TFEU for private entities in order to be able to challenge in an admissible manner an act origi- nating from an EU institution4. The strict stance of the EU Courts has turned the implementation of the third pillar of the Aarhus Convention in a very troublesome endeavour.
In order to ensure compliance with the EU’s obligations under the Aarhus Convention, the European Parliament and Council enacted Reg- ulation (EC) No 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention to Com- munity institutions and bodies, which aims to implement the third pillar of the Aarhus Conven- tion for EU institutions5. The Aarhus Regulation sought to transpose the obligations enshrined in Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention into Union law by enabling ENGOs meeting certain criteria to request an internal review under environmen- tal law of acts adopted, or omissions, by EU in- stitutions and bodies. Subsequently, ENGOs can institute proceedings before the CJEU. By some authors, the Aarhus Regulation was welcomed
4 Case 25/62, Plaumann [1963] ECR 95 at 107.
5 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parlia- ment and the Council of 6 September 2006 on the ap- plication of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision- making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies, [2006] OJ L 264/13 (‘Aarhus Regulation’). See extensively on the Aarhus Regulation: K Lenaerts, J A Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The General System of EU Environmental Law Enforcement’ (2011) Yearbook of European Law 30 (1), pp. 21–24.
as a significant step forwards in the pursuit of a better access to justice in environmental matters on the EU level6. Over time, it was hoped that the Aarhus Regulation might open new doors for ENGOs on the EU level and hence allow them to weigh more on the outcome of the decision mak- ing process in environmental matters. However, most legal scholars believed that, taking into ac- count the limited material scope of the Aarhus Regulation, the latter would make little differ- ence in enhancing access to justice in environ- mental matters on the EU level7. The latter were proven right by the reluctant application of the internal review procedures by the EU institu- tions and bodies in the recent years. Yet in two eagerly awaited judgments the General Court – more in particular in Stichting Natuur en Mi- lieu (case T-396/09)8 and Vereniging Milieudefensie (case T-338/08)9 – the General Court somewhat surprisingly rejected the strict application of the Aarhus Regulation by the European Commis- sion so far, invalidating two Commission deci- sions in this regard.
At first sight, these two rulings appear to be ground-breaking for the strive for a more wide access to justice in environmental cases on the EU level. Both decisions seemingly depict an
6 See, amongst others: T Crossen, V Niessen, ‘NGO standing in the European court of justice – does the Aar- hus Regulation open the door?’ (2007) RECIEL 16 (3), pp. 332–340.
7 P Wennerås, The Enforcement of EC Environmental Law (Oxford Studies in European Law: 2007), at p. 234; J Jans,
‘Did Baron von Munchausen ever Visit Aarhus. Some Critical Remarks on the Proposal for a Regulation on the Application of the Provisions of the Aarhus Convention to EC Institutions and Bodies’ in R Macrory (ed.), Reflec- tions on 30 Years on EU Environmental Law: A High Level of Protection (Europa Law Publishing: 2005), at p. 480 and 484.
8 Case T-396/09, Stichting Natuur en Milieu [2012] ECR I-0000 (Appeal Cases before the Court of Justice C-404/12 P, C-405/12 P).
9 Case T-338/08, Vereniging Milieudefensie [2012] ECR I-0000 (Appeal Cases before the Court of Justice C-401/12 P, C-402/12 P and C-403/12).
increased openness towards the wide access to justice in environmental matters which is put forward by the Aarhus Convention. However, in this paper it will be substantiated that, even if the judgments of the General Court are upheld by the CJEU on appeal, they will only bring limited changes in the non-compliance by the EU as to its obligations under the third pillar of the Aarhus Convention. At the same time, it will be estab- lished that, taking into consideration the partial findings and recommendations issued by the Aarhus Compliance Committee (ACCC) in 2011 on access to justice before the EU Courts, a more fundamental shift in jurisprudence is needed in order to bring about a genuine improvement as regards legal standing in environmental cases.
Apart from the introduction, this paper is comprised of fiver parts. In the second section a brief account will be given of the redress pos- sibilities in Union law before the entry into force of the Aarhus Regulation. After having explored the content of the Aarhus Regulation in the third section, as far as the implementation of the third pillar of the Aarhus Convention is concerned, the paper will zoom in on the two rulings of the Gen- eral Court of 14 June 2012. In the fifth section of this paper it will be submitted why the rulings of the General Court, even if reasserted on ap- peal, do not significantly improve the standing criteria for ENGOs before the EU Courts. In fact, it will be asserted that the rulings are, in the end, providing a fig leaf for maintaining limited ac- cess to justice for ENGOs before the EU Courts.
In the final section it will be established that also the modifications on standing requirements be- fore the EU Courts, as introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, fall short of bringing about the much de- sired sea change in access to justice for ENGOs.
II. Access to Justice before the Aarhus Regulation: The Road to Nowhere?
II.1. Art. 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention
Before delving into the recent case-law develop- ments of the EU Courts as to legal standing in environmental cases, we need to briefly recall the main requirements set about by the so-called
“third pillar” of the Aarhus Convention. This succinct analysis will serve as main touchstone in our subsequent analysis of the recent jurispru- dence of the EU Courts.
a. the basics
The Aarhus Convention is widely hailed as one of the most innovative environmental treaties of the past decades, and rightly so. Whereas most environmental agreements include material obligations that Parties have to each other, the Aarhus Convention also imposes obligations on Parties and public authorities towards the public as far as access to information, public participa- tion and access to justice are concerned. This is grounded on the assumption that sustainable development can only be achieved through the involvement of all stakeholders. It is therefore often being referred to as a “proceduralisation of the environmental regulation”, as it focuses more on setting and listing procedures than establish- ing standards and specific outcomes10.
As is widely known, the Aarhus conven- tion more specifically encompasses three pillars:
access to information, public participation and access to justice11. Arguably, the final and most
10 G Aarti, ‘Transparency under scrutiny: Information disclosure in Global Environmental Governance’ (2008) Global Environmental Politics 8 (2), p. 2.
11 See more extensively: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide (2nd Edition, New York and Geneva: 2014), (‘Aarhus Implementation guide’), avail- able at: http://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/
treaties/public-participation/publications/public-partic- ipation/2013/aarhus-convention-implementation-guide-
contentious right is the right of access to justice, as enshrined in Art. 9 of the Aarhus Convention.
The latter article, which includes the provisions on access to justice, adopts a threefold approach.
It aims to provide access in three distinct con- texts: review procedures with respect to informa- tion requirements (first pillar)12; review proce- dures with respect to specific (project-type) deci- sions which are subject to public participation requirements (second pillar)13, and challenges to breaches of environmental law in general14. Interestingly, Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Conven- tion is not merely aiming at enforcing the en- vironmental rights that have been accorded to the public by virtue of the first two pillars of the Aarhus Convention. It creates a further class of cases where citizens can appeal to administrative or judicial bodies. By some, Art. 9(3) is referred to as a separate right to file a public interest law suit15. Art. 9(4) prescribes the minimum qualita- tive standards that must be met in all such proce- dures, as well as the type of remedies that must be provided. Under Art. 9(5) Parties are obliged to ensure that information is provided to the public on access to administrative and judicial procedures and appropriate assistance mecha- nisms to remove or reduce financial and other barriers to access to justice.
b. the specific requirements of Art. 9 (3)
Pursuant to Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention, in situations where Art. 9 (1) and Art. 9 (2) do not apply, Parties to the Convention have to ensure
second-edition-text-only-version.html (accessed 15 May 2014).
12 Art. 9 (1) Aarhus Convention.
13 Art. 9 (2) Aarhus Convention.
14 Art. 9 (3) Aarhus Convention.
15 See in a similar vein: T P Vidovic, ‘Access to Justice (steps to Procedural Harmonization on grounds of the Aarhus Convention’ in V Sancin and M K Dine (eds.), International Environmental Law: Contemporary Concerns and Challenges in 2014 (GV Založba: 2014), p. 190, fn 8.
that “members of the public have access to admin- istrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private parties and public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relat- ing to the environment”. Admittedly, in compari- son with Art. 9 (1) and Art. 9 (2) of the Aarhus Convention, the wording of Art. 9 (3) remains rather vague. It also seems to allow greater flex- ibility than Art. 9 (2) of the Aarhus Convention.
This should not come as a surprise, not only tak- ing into account the above-mentioned drafting process, but also given the wide array of acts and omissions to which Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Con- vention applies16.
The latter was strikingly illustrated by the Aarhus Compliance Committee’s (ACCC) findings on communication ACCC/C/2005 (Belgium)17 and communication ACCC/C/2011/58 (Bulgaria)18. This being the case, many countries still expected the actual added value of Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention to be very limited19.
Regarding the object of the possible adminis- trative or judicial review, Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention does not, at first glance, give many clues either. Hence, the scope of Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention is very broad, entailing that any act or omission by private parties and/or public authorities that contravenes environmen- tal law must be challengeable. Either way, read in conjunction with Art. 2 (2) d of the Aarhus
16 J Ebbesson, ‘Impact of the Aarhus Convention and European Union Law’ in M Pallemaerts (ed.), The Aar- hus Convention at Ten. Interactions and Tensions between Conventional International Law and EU Environmental Law, (Europa Law Publishing: 2011), p. 269.
17 Communication ACCC/C/2005/11 (Belgium), ECE/
MPPP/C.1/2006/4/Add.2 (28 July).
18 Communication ACCC/C/2011/58 (Bulgaria), ECE/
MP.PP/C.1/2012/14, par. 83.
19 See more extensively: A Wetzel, ‘The Influence of In- ternational Institutions on Access to Justice in Environ- mental Matters in the EU and its Member States’ in O Costa, K E Jørgensen (eds.) The Influence of International Institutions on the EU: When Multilateralism Hits Brussels (Palgrave Macmillan: 2012), p. 85.
Convention, a first clear delimitation becomes apparent. Pursuant to Art. 2 (2) d of the Aarhus Convention bodies or institutions acting in their legislative or judicial capacity or not included in the definition of public authorities. This exemp- tion will also proof relevant in EU-context, as will be portrayed later on in this paper.
As regards the nature of the review proce- dures that need to be provided by the Parties to the Aarhus Convention, Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention, once more, remains open to ques- tion. It merely sets out that the public should have access to administrative or judicial proceed- ings. Nonetheless, in comparison with Art. 9 (2) of the Aarhus Convention, the wording of Art. 9 (3) remains rather ambiguous. Whereas Art. 9 (2) of the Aarhus Convention obliges Convention parties to ensure access to a review procedure before a court of law or some other form of in- dependent and impartial body, Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention does not contain any specific requirements in this respect.
Still, taking into account the additional qual- itative standards of Art. 9 (4) of the Aarhus Con- vention, it surely can be contended that also the procedures provided by Convention parties in the context of Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Conven- tion, whether administrative or judicial, must be
“adequate and effective”20. Again, this feature will turn out crucial for the further assessment of the recent EU efforts in this regard.
Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention obliges Convention parties to provide for access to the aforementioned review procedures for “members of the public” where they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in national law. The wording of Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention appears to be quite broad in comparison to Art. 9 (2) of the Aarhus Convention. Art. 9 (3) does not refer to “members of the public concerned” but to “members of the pub-
20 Aarhus Implementation Guide (see above n 11), p. 200.
lic”. Given the broad definition of “the public”21, it can be upheld that it effectively covers any natu- ral or legal persons, including, amongst others, environmental organisations. On the other hand, the referral to “the criteria, if any, laid down in na- tional law” seems to allow a great deal of flexibil- ity to the Convention parties in delimiting the scope of the review procedures. Indeed, already from the outset it was clear that the Convention parties are not obliged to establish a system of popular action (actio popularis) in their national laws with the effect that anyone can challenge any decision, act or omission relating to the en- vironment. Nonetheless, in its earlier findings the ACCC underscored that Convention parties cannot use the clause “where they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in national law” as an excuse for introducing or maintaining so strict criteria that they effectively bar all or almost all environmen- tal organisations from challenging acts or omis- sions that contravene national law relating to the environment22.
II.2. Three different ways to say “no”
Already before the entry into force of the Aarhus Convention the EU Courts had been confronted with pleas for a more lenient application of the admissibility requirements in environmental cas- es. The below section will briefly tackle the most seminal rulings of the EU Courts in this regard. It will be revealed that many of the arguments that were invoked in these proceedings still pop up in the ongoing debate and thus remain relevant for the assessment of the current day situation as regards access to justice in environmental cases.
21 See Art. 2 (4) of the Aarhus Convention: “one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national legis- lation or practice, their associations, organisations or groups”.
22 ACCC Belgium (see above n 17), par. 35. See more recently: Communication ACCC/C/2006/18 (Denmark), ECE/MP.PP/2008/5/Add.4, paras. 31, 35 and 41; ACCC Bulgaria (see above n 18), par. 65.
a. Greenpeace: no different treatment for environ- mental cases!
Prior to 1 December 2009, ex Art. 230 (4) of the TEC (now Art. 263(4) of the TFEU) provided that
“(a)ny natural or legal person may (…) institute pro- ceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former”. As is widely known, the strict interpretation by the EU Courts of the criterion of “individual concern”, is representing an effective restriction on public interest litigation, especially so in environmental cases where diffuse interest are at stake.
The obvious starting point for any analy- sis of the treatment of legal actions instigated by ENGOs before the EU Courts are the rulings in Greenpeace, which date 199523 and 199824 re- spectively. In the latter case, Greenpeace Interna- tional, some local ENGOs and residents of Gran Canaria more specifically sought the annulment of a decision adopted by the European Com- mission to provide financial assistance from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) for the construction of two power stations on the Canary Islands, without requiring an environ- mental impact assessment as was provided by EU environmental law25. In order to substantiate the admissibility of their lawsuit, the plaintiffs invited the CFI to adopt a more liberal approach, recognising that their locus standi depended not only on a purely economic interest but on their
23 Case T-585/93, Stichting Greenpeace Council [1995]
ECR II-2205
24 Case C-321/95P, Stichting Greenpeace Council [1998]
ECR I-1651.
25 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 of 24 June 1988 on the tasks of the Structural Funds and their effective- ness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with the operation of the European In- vestment Bank and the other existing financial instru- ments, [1998] OJ L 185/9.
interest in the protection of the environment26. However, most importantly, the CFI refused to reconsider its well-established Plaumann-ap- proach, which puts forward that in order to ini- tiate an admissible action against a measure of general application, the individual plaintiff must be singled out by it from the public at large in en- vironmental cases. More in particular, it held that the Plaumann case-law remains good law regard- less “the nature, economic or otherwise, of those of the applicants’ interests which are affected”27. The CFI concluded unambiguously that “the applicants thus cannot be affected by the contested decision other than in the same manner as any other local resident, fisherman, farmer or tourist who is, or might be in the future, in the same situation”28. The action of the ENGOs suffered a similar fate.
The same line of reasoning was upheld by the ECJ on appeal. No additional lip service was paid to the seminal role of ENGOs in the strive for more environmental protection and sustain- able development in modern day society. The ENGOs were left as a “prophet in the wilderness”
and were send home by the EU Courts. When faced with the supplementary argument of the appellants that rejecting the actions would cre- ate a legal vacuum, which might not be filled by the possibility of bringing procedures before the national courts, as it was not possible to chal- lenge the decision of the European Commission before the national courts, the ECJ maintained that the necessary remedies were still available in the national courts, based on ex Art. 234 of the TEC concerning preliminary rulings29. The same reasoning was later on also applied by the CFI in Danielson30.
26 Greenpeace (see above n 23), par. 32.
27 Ibid, par. 38
28 Ibid, par. 55.
29 Ibid, par. 32.
30 Case T-21/95 R, Marie-Thérèse Danielsson [1995], ECR II-3051, par. 77.
Not surprisingly, the outcome in Greenpeace was met with some fierce criticism in the legal literature as it exposed the blatant lack of suffi- cient access to justice on the EU level31. The strict rationale applied by the EU Courts rendered it virtually impossible for individuals and ENGOs to successfully challenge the legality of EU deci- sions. The latter will not be able fulfil the strictly applied Plaumann-test in environmental cases, as, most of the time, environmental harm cannot be singled out to the extent that it is exclusively related to only one person.
At the time, Jans submitted that the ECJ seemed to assume that the decision of the Euro- pean Commission is merely a kind of “prepara- tory decision”, to which no specific legal effects were attached32. Other authors argued that the opposite is true, as, what was at issue in the Spanish case, was the lawfulness of the Com- mission decision and not, as the CJEU seemed to suggest, the decision of the Spanish authority granting the authorisation33. Likewise, the litera- ture questioned whether the so-called standard of a “complete” system of judicial remedies, as was highlighted by the ECJ in Les Verts34, is lived up to in this case.
31 See amongst others: N Gérard, ‘Access to the Europe- an Court of Justice: A Lost Opportunity’ (1998) Journal of Environmental Law 10 (2), pp. 331–346; A Albors-Llorens,
‘Locus Standi of Private Parties in Environmental Cases (1999) Cambridge Law Journal 58(1), pp. 1–48; D L Torrens,
‘Locus Standi of Environmental Associations under EC Law – Greenpeace – A Missed Opportunity for the CJEU’
(1999) RECIEL 8(3), 336–346; J Jans, European Environmen- tal Law (2nd edn, Europa Law Publishing: 2000), p. 217.
See for a more recent critical assessment: C Poncelet, ‘Ac- cess to Justice in Environmental Matters – Does the Euro- pean Union Comply with its Obligations?’ (2012) Journal of Environmental Law 24(2), pp. 287–309.
32 J Jans (see above n 31), p. 219.
33 A Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EC Law, (Oxford University Press: 2000), pp. 154–156.
34 Case 294/83, Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ [1986] ECR 1339, par. 23.
Taking the long way round via the national courts might again confront the applicant with different rules of standing which might, in turn, bar cases from getting through to the ECJ. This being the case, the ruling in Greenpeace clearly indicated that, in the ECJ’s view, the denial of standing for ENGOs under the annulment pro- cedure does not result into a lack of effective ju- dicial remedy.
b. a failed revolt: it’s up to the national courts and the Member States!
As such, the deplorable situation for ENGOs and individual applicants before the EU Courts re- mained unchanged since Greenpeace. It is tempt- ing to say that the rulings in Greenpeace mark both the starting point and the end point of the quest for environmental justice before the EU Courts so far. Since then, the EU Courts consistently dismissed pleas for a more progressive reading of the admissibility requirements enshrined in the treaties. The underlying reason therefore was the fear for a massive influx of direct actions by ENGOs, taking into account the high number of legal persons that have as their object the protec- tion and conservation of the environment. And thus, the quasi-constitutional of the jurispruden- tial definition of “individual concern” prevailed over the pledges for a more open approach for ENGOs and concerned individuals.
Admittedly, in Jégo-Quéré, the CFI famously reversed the so-called Plaumann-test when in- terpreting Art. 230 (4) to that extent that “there (was) no compelling reason to read into the notion of individual concern a requirement that an individual applicant seeking to challenge a general measure (had to be) differentiated from all others affected by it in the same way as an addressee”35. From environmental point of view, it remains somehow ironic to note
35 Case T-177/01 Jégo Quéré [2002] ECR I-5137, par. 49
that the CFI seized this particular case, in which the legality of an EC measure aimed at the recov- ery of the stock of hake in the waters of the south of Ireland was contested, as testing case.
That said, the CFI held that one could not expect from Jégo-Quéré to initiate a national pro- cedure and contesting the validity of the Regula- tion by violating its rules and then questioning their illegality in subsequent judicial proceed- ings brought against him36. It reasoned that such a premise would violate the effective judicial protection, enshrined in Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union37. The revolt of the CFI was only short lifted.
As is widely known, the ECJ effectively struck down the uprise by the CFI and Advocate-Gen- eral Jacobs with its decision in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA) in 200238. Subsequently, it also overturned the CFI on appeal in the Jégo-Quéré- case39, thereby firmly closing the sudden win- dow of opportunity. The ECJ effectively shifted the responsibility to the Member States and the national courts. In the end, it was up to the Mem- ber States to grant individuals effective judicial protection. Next to interpreting national proce- dural rules in a way that enables individuals and ENGOs to challenge the legality of national im- plementing measures, there was only one option left to overcome the ECJ’s strict admissibility-test and that would be by amending the Treaties on this point.
Although the strict view of the ECJ has been met with mixed feelings by many commenta-
36 Jégo Quéré (see above n 35), par. 45. See more exten- sively: K Lenaerts and T Corhaut, ‘Judicial Review as a Paper to the Development of European Constitutional- ism’ (2003) Yearbook of European Law 22 (1), pp. 1–43.
37 Ibid, par. 41 and 42.
38 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002]
ECR I-6677.
39 Case C-263/02 P Commission v Jégo Quéré [2004] ECR I-3425.
tors40, the CFI quickly fell into old habits, once again reasserting its strict view on the admissibil- ity of direct actions by private individuals. The so-called European Environmental Bureau (EEB) cases exemplified that access in environmental matters was still as remote in 2005 as it was in the nineties41. In these cases the CFI also refuted an alternative line of argumentation, based on the procedural rights granted to ENGOs throughout the decision-making process, which was believed to ease up the standing requirements to some ex- tent42. Ultimately the CFI took all hope away by noting that, at the time being, the Community legislation did not bestow procedural rights on the ENGOs which could alter their locus standi43.
c. post Aarhus: more of the same!
Bearing in the mind the entry into force of the Aarhus Convention for the EU in May 2005, it was hoped that the ECJ (later on, the CJEU) and the CFI (later on, the General Court) would be prompted to alter their strict view on access to justice in environmental matters.
But again, all too overly optimistic views were quickly denounced by the outcome of the WWF-UK- case. Here, the annulment was sought of Council Regulation of 21 December 2006 fix- ing for 2007 quotas and total allowable catches for cod (TACs) applicable in community waters44
40 See amongst others: B Vesterdorf, ‘The Commu- nity Court System Ten Years from Now And Beyond:
Challenges And Possibilities’ (2003) 28 E.L. Rev. 28(3), pp. 303–323.
41 Cases T-94/04 EEB [2005] ECR II-4419; Joined Cases T-236 and T-241 EEB [2005] ECR II-4945.
42 See amongst others Joined Cases T-38/99 to T-50/99 So- ciedade Agrícola dos Arinhos [2001] ECR II-585, par. 48;
Case T-47/00 Rica Foods [2002] ECR II-113, par. 55; Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health [2002] ECR II-3305, par. 81–
106.
43 EEB (see above n 41), par. 62.
44 Council Regulation No 41/2006 of 21 December 2006 fixing for 2007 fishing opportunities and associated con- ditions for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Community waters and, for Community
before the CFI. The CFI held that WWF UK, being merely a member of the North Sea RAC, could not, by relying on its procedural guarantees, claim that is was distinguished individually in this respect45. Also a final plea based on the ir- reparable environmental damage cause by the disputed TACs and to right to effective judicial remedies, was rejected46. In essence, these views were also upheld by the ECJ on appeal47.
This case-law is to be read in conjunction with the decision of the CFI in Região autónoma dos Açores where the CFI, admittedly, in an obiter dictum, pointed out that, in any event, Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention referred to the crite- ria laid down in the national law, and in EU law such criteria were set by ex Art. 230, (4) of the TEC and the related jurisprudence48. Equally, the CFI, in line with the earlier case-law which was outlined above, set aside the argument that no effective legal remedy would be available if the action were to be declared inadmissible49.
II.3. A first warning issued by the ACCC a. partial findings …
Needless to say, it was to be expected that sooner or later an environmental NGO would submit this troublesome situation to the ACCC50. This eventually happened on 1 December 2008, when ClientEarth, supported by a number of entities vessels, in waters where catch limitations are required, [2007] OJ L 15/1.
45 Case T-91/07, WWF-UK Ltd [2008], ECR II-00081, par. 81–82.
46 Ibid, par. 86–88.
47 Case C-355/08, WWF-UK Ltd [2009] ECR I-00073.
48 Case T-37/04, Região autónoma dos Açores, [2008] ECR II-00103, par. 93. The view of the CFI was also upheld by the ECJ in appeal: Case C-444/08 P, Região autónoma dos Açores [2009] ECR I-00200.
49 Ibid, par. 92.
50 Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Aarhus Convention, the parties to the Aarhus Convention have established the ACCC in October 2012 to review compliance by the par- ties with their obligations under the Convention. See more extensively: J Ebbesson (see above n 16), 250–251.
and a private individual, submitted a commu- nication to the Committee alleging a failure by the European Union to comply with its obliga- tions under Art. 9 of the Aarhus Convention. The ACCC decided to defer further consideration of the communication until the CJEU had decided in Stichting Milieu en Natuur, one of the two cases that finally gave rise to the judgments of the Gen- eral Court of 14June 2012. Accordingly, at its 32nd meeting, 11–14 April 2011, the ACCC adopted only partial findings in this case, delaying cer- tain issues awaiting the future decisions of the EU Courts in cases where application had been made of the Aarhus Regulation51.
b…which nevertheless severely criticises the strict standing requirements on the EU level
In its partial findings and recommendations of April 2011 the ACCC openly refrained from as- sessing in detail each and every possible form of challengeable decision-making by EU-institu- tions or each decision rendered by an EU Court52. Still, the ACCC easily concluded that a consistent application of the Plaumann-test would result in no member of the public ever being able to chal- lenge a decisions or a regulation in environmen- tal cases before the CJEU. Such an outcome could hardly be deemed reconcilable with Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention53. No big surprises here.
However, whilst the ACCC held that the general traits of the case-law of the EU Courts clearly run counter to the requirements of Art. 9 (3) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention, it appar- ently did not want to issue an outright, uncondi- tional non-compliance statement54. Ultimately, the ACCC held that “if the jurisprudence of the EU
51 Communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I) (European Union), par. 10.
52 Ibid, par. 63.
53 Ibid, par. 87.
54 Ibid, par. 93.
Courts, as evidenced by the cases examined, were to continue, unless fully compensated for by adequate administrative review procedures, the Party con- cerned would fail to comply with article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Convention”.
Notwithstanding its strict wording on the existing case-law of the EU Courts in respect of access to justice in environmental matters, the ACCC therefore did not issue clear-cut recom- mendations towards the EU. In the end, it was held “that a new direction of the jurisprudence of the EU Courts should be established in order to ensure compliance with the Convention”55. To that end, all relevant EU institutions are recommended to
“take the steps to overcome the shortcomings reflected in the jurisprudence of the EU Courts in providing the public concerned with access to justice in environ- mental matters”56.
III. Access to Justice after the Aarhus Regulation: The Road to Nowhere (Bis)?
By all means, it had become clear that the EU, in order to in order to fulfil its obligations under the third pillar of the Aarhus Convention, had to establish new rules in respect of the EU insti- tutions. The aforementioned case-law on locus standi in environmental cases had painfully illus- trated the need for supplementary legal tools in this respect. Those new rules were laid down by the Aarhus Regulation, that grants public rights and imposes obligations on Community institu- tions and bodies regarding access to environ- mental information (title I), public participation concerning plan and programmes relating to the environment (title II) and access to review pro- cedures (title III).
The Aarhus Regulation itself is implemented by means of two Commission Decisions 2008/50/
55 Ibid, par. 97.
56 Ibid, par. 98.
EC57 and 2008/40/EC, Euratom58. Interestingly enough, the Aarhus Regulation, apart from ex- panding the scope of Regulation No 1049/200159 in order to implement the provisions enshrined in Art. 9 (1) of the Aarhus Convention60, only fo- cuses on the implementation of the requirements on access to justice included in Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention.
Although the solution provided for by the Aarhus Regulation to the application of the strict Plaumann case-law is, at first sight, fairly straightforward, it was the result of a long and hard decision-making process, including recon- ciliation61. By granting ENGOs the right to seek for an internal review of EU administrative acts, the issue of standing could be solved without having to revise the strict Plaumann-doctrine.
It was presumed that the ENGOs could easily challenge the reply given by the EU institution to which a request has been made, as it would be only addressed to the applicant. Or, to put in
57 Commission Decision 2008/50/EC of 13 December 2007 laying down detailed rules for the application of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parlia- ment and the Council on the Aarhus Convention as re- gards requests for the internal review of administrative acts [2008] OJ L 13/24.
58 Commission Decision 2008/401/EC, Euratom of 30 April 2008 amending its Rules of Procedure as regards detailed rules for the application of Regulation (EC) No 1367 of the European Parliament and the Council on the application of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Infor- mation, Public Participation in Decision-making and Ac- cess to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community Institutions and Bodies [2008] OJ L 140/22.
59 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parlia- ment and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, [2001] OJ L145/43.
60 See more in detail: K Lenaerts and J A Gutiérrez-Fons (see above n 5), p. 22; T Crossen, V Niessen (see above n 6), p. 332.
61 See more extensively: M Pallemaerts, Compliance by the European Community with its obligation on access to jus- tice as a party to the Aarhus Convention, (Institute for Eu- ropean Environmental Policy: 2009), available at http://
www.ieePeu/assets/422/aarhus_report.pdf (accessed 15 May 2014), p. 26.
the words of the European Commission’s Pro- posal62, “this preliminary procedure was introduced in order not to interfere with the right to access to justice under Article 230 EC Treaty, under which a person may institute proceedings with the Court of Justice against decisions of which it is individually and directly concerned”63. As a reform of the TEC in order to allow for a more generous locus standi for ENGOs was to be ruled out from the very be- ginning, the only option left was the creation of a preliminary administrative review procedure which would then, indirectly, but sufficient to grant the ENGOs in question access to justice (Art. 12 of the Aarhus Regulation).
III.1. New admissibility hurdles
In order to get access to the internal review procedure under the Aarhus Regulation some substantive and, to a lesser extent, procedural, hurdles need to be taken. First and foremost, the administrative review procedure is only accessi- ble for ENGOs which meet certain requirements, laid down in Article 11 of the Aarhus Regulation.
Natural persons have been left out of the person- al scope of the international review procedure, which seems at odds with Art. 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.
Yet a more fundamental constraint is creat- ed by Art. 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation, which stipulates that “Any non-governmental organisa- tion which meets the criteria set out in Article 11 is entitled to make a request for an internal review to the Community institution or body that has adopted an administrative act under environmental law or, in case of an alleged omission, should have adopted such
62 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of the application of the provisions of the Århus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to EC Institutions and Bodies, COM (2003) 622 final (‘Commission Proposal’).
63 Ibid, 13.
an act”. Accordingly, the substantive scope of the internal review procedure is limited to “an ad- ministrative act adopted under environmental law, or an alleged administrative omission [to adopt such an act]”. However, the term “administrative act” was, as such, nowhere to be mentioned in the TFEU, nor in the former TEC. By referral to Art. 2(1) litra g of the Aarhus Regulation it is further defined as
“any measure of individual scope under environmen- tal law, taken by a Community institution or body, and having a legally binding and external effect”, re- stricting the scope of the internal review proce- dures in a significant manner.
Most worrisome was the limitation of ad- ministrative acts to acts of individual scope64. By inserting the word “individual”, many environ- mental measures, which are deemed to be of a general nature, such as implementing measures adopted by the European Commission, seemed to fall outside the scope of the internal review procedure. Many commentators, such as Jans and Wennerås, feared that a strict interpretation of this notion, might effectively undo the internal review procedure of much of its added value as to access to justice in environmental matters65.
III.2. The return of Plaumann via the back door?
And this is exactly what happened. In the few cases in which, up until today, a request for inter- nal review of an environmental measure of an EU institution has been submitted, the relevant EU institution chose to reject it being admissible66.
64 Common Position (EC) No 31/2005 adopted by the Council on 18 July 2005, [2005] OJ C 264E/18
65 P Wennerås (see above n 7), p. 234; J Jans (see above n 7), p. 480.
66 Reply of the Commission services to Justice & Envi- ronment of 26 May 2008, published on the Commission’s website at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/
title_iv/Reply%20to%20J_E.pdf (accessed 15 May 2014) and Reply of the Commission services to Justice & Envi- ronment of 6 July 2010, published on the Commission’s
Some requests were declared inadmissible for straightforward reasons, such as the lack of
“legally binding and external effects”67. Yet more significant was the fact that many of the requests that were received by the European Commis- sion were rejected since they did not amount to a “measure of individual scope” as laid down by the Aarhus Regulation.
Accordingly, a request by PAN and Green- peace internal review of Commission Imple- menting Regulation (EU) No 1143/2011 approv- ing the substance prochloraz, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, was declared in- admissible as the concerned provision are “ap- plicable to all operators manufacturing or placing on the market plant protection products containing prochloraz”. In that regard, the Commission held that the contested decision had to be regarded as an act of general application addressed to all op- erators68. Earlier on, the European Commission had reached a similar outcome when addressing several requests for internal review of a decision amending Directive 91/414/EEC to include sev- eral hazardous substances69. Also outside of the scope of the EU rules on the listing of hazardous substances, the European institutions, adopted a
website at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/
requests/9_reply%20.pdf (accessed 15 May 2014). For a more thorough overview, see: J Jans, G Harryvan, ‘In- ternal Review of EU Environmental Measures. It’s True:
Baron Van Munchausen Doesn’t Exist! Some Remarks on the Application of the So-Called Aarhus Regulation’
(2011) Review of European and Administrative Law Review 3 (2), pp. 53–65
67 See for instance: Reply of the Commission services to EPS of 6 August 2008 published on the Commission’s website at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/
title_iv/Reply%20to%20EPS.pdf (accessed 15 May 2014).
68 Reply of the Commission services to Pan Europe and Greenpeace of 9 March 2012, published on the Commis- sion’s website at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aar- hus/pdf/requests/11_reply.pdf (accessed 15 May 2014).
69 E.g. Reply of the Commission services to Stichting Natuur en Milieu of 21 April 2009, published on the Commission’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
aarhus/pdf/snm_reply.pdf (accessed 15 May 2014).
narrowly interpretation of the notion of “measure of individual scope”. The rejection of the European Council of a request filed by WWF-UK seeking to review a CFP regulation establishing TACs for certain fish stocks is perhaps the most notable example thereof. Hence, the internal review pro- cedure, at least when applied very rigidly, does not seem to able to fill the gap that was left by the above-mentioned strict jurisprudence of the EU Courts.
IV. The First Test-Cases: Is the Aarhus Convention Here to Stay?
Let us now turn to the first acid test for the strict interpretation adopted by the European Com- mission in its above-studied administrative prac- tice in relation to the notion of “measure of indi- vidual scope”. Recently, two ENGOs challenged the strict interpretation of the notion of “measure of individual scope”, as enshrined in Art. 10 (1) of the Aarhus Regulation, before the General Court.
By doing so, the ENGOs effectively put the strict interpretation of the notion “administrative act”
under judicial review70. It was the first time the EU Courts were offered the opportunity to assess the legal soundness of the new instruments en- acted in order to implement the third pillar of the Aarhus Convention on the EU level. And, rather surprisingly given the earlier case-law on access to justice in environmental cases, the ENGOs seem to have driven their point home.
IV.1. Factual background
The importance of having put in place a com- plete and effective system of judicial protection, also in the specific context of EU environmental law, becomes all the more apparent when we take a look at the factual background of both
70 Currently, there are also two similar proceedings pending before the General Court (cases T-232/11 and T-192/11).
cases. They exemplify the need for additional le- gal review procedures which are available both to the ENGOs and the public concerned in the context of decisions enacted by EU institutions.
The first case revolved around health safety issues. In the Stichting Milieu en Natuur case, two Dutch ENGOs requested an internal review of Regulation No 149/200871 amending Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and the Council by setting maximum residue levels for listed products. The ENGOs were of the opin- ion that the European Commission, when adopt- ing these maximum residue levels for pesticides, did not duly take into consideration the “high level of consumer protection” enshrined in Regula- tion No 396/200572, which formed the legal basis of the adoption of the contested regulation. The European Commission declined from reviewing the contested decision on the merits, as it held that the contested regulation did not amount to an administrative act meeting the criteria of Art. 2 (1) (g) of the Aarhus Regulation73.
The second case related to air quality is- sues in the Netherlands. Two Dutch ENGOs had launched a request for internal review against a Commission Decision74, made on the basis of a derogation clause enshrined in the Air Quality
71 Commission Regulation (EC) No 149.2008 of 29 Janu- ary 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and the Council by establishing Annexes II, III and IV setting maximum residues levels for products covered by Annex I thereto, [2008] OJ L 58/1.
72 Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parlia- ment and the Council of 23 February 2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and animal origin and amending Council Direc- tive 91/414/EEC, [2005] OJ L 70/1.
73 Reply of the Commission services of 1 July 2008 to Stichting Natuur en Milieu en Pesticide Action Net- work, available on the Commission’s website at: http://
ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/title_iv/Reply%20 to%20SNMpdf and http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
aarhus/pdf/title_iv/Reply%20to%20PAN.pdf (accessed 15 May 2014).
74 Decision C(2009) 2560 final (not published in the OJ).
Framework Directive75, by which the Nether- lands were allowed to postpone compliance with air quality limit values for nitrogen oxides and altogether exempted from compliance with limit values for particulate matters in certain zones in the Netherlands. The ENGOs, however, main- tained, that the conditions to apply the derogato- ry clause in this particular case were not fulfilled.
Yet again the European Commission upheld that the decision at issue could not be qualified as a
“measure of individual scope” within the mean- ing of the Aarhus Regulation76.
IV.2. The outcome
The two cases before the General Court revolved around two specific lines of argumentation put forward by the ENGOs against the decisions of the European Commission declaring their re- quests for internal review inadmissible. In their first plea, the ENGOs claimed that the European Commission, in finding that the challenged acts could not be considered an act of individual scope, wrongly held that their requests for in- ternal review of these acts were inadmissible. By their second plea the ENGOs contended that, if indeed it would turn out that the strict interpre- tation upheld by the European Commission is in line with the provisions of the Aarhus Regula- tion, Art. 10 (1) would contravene Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention.
By considering these arguments the Gen- eral Court would finally have the opportunity to shed view on the two conflicting interpreta- tions that, in the absence of any case-law of the
75 Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe, [2008] OJ L 152/1.
76 Reply of the Commission services of 28 July 2009 to Vereniging Milieudefensie en Stichting Stop Luchtve- rontreiniging Utrecht, available on the Commission’s website at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/
requests/8_reply.pdf (accessed 15 May 2014).
EU Courts in this respect, had been upheld in the legal literature.
On the one hand, there were commentators, such as Jans, who were quite sceptical about the added value of the Aarhus Regulation and maintained that Art. 2 (1) of the Aarhus Regula- tion excludes administrative “measures of general application”77. On the other hand, authors like Wennerås advocated a more liberal reading of the aforementioned provisions78.
From the very beginning it was clear that the first claim of the ENGOs had little chance of success, bearing in mind the specific wordings of the Aarhus regulation. It was therefore not at all surprising that the General Court finally held that the European Commission, by rejecting both requests for internal review as inadmissible, had, as such, not acted in violation of Art. 10 (1) of the Aarhus Regulation. In that respect, the General Court affirmed that the European Commission, when assessing whether the contested measures constituted a measure of individual scope for the purposes of Art. 2 (1) (g) of the Aarhus Regula- tion, could effectively rely on the established case-law under ex 230 (4) of the TEC in relation to action for annulment79. Accordingly, in order to determine the scope of a measure, the EU Institu- tions should not look merely at the official name of the measure but should first take account of its purpose and its content80. In the same vein, the General Court ruled that for a measure to be re- garded as being of general application it needs to apply to objectively determined situation and to entail legal effects for categories of persons envis-
77 J Jans (see above n 7), p. 480; T Crossen and V Niessen (see above n 6), p. 336.
78 P Wennerås (see above n 7), p. 235.
79 Stichting Natuur en Milieu (see above n 8), par. 29;
Vereniging Milieudefensie (see above n 9), par. 26.
80 See e.g. Case C-307/81 Alusuisse [1982] ECR 3463, par. 8.
aged generally and in the abstract81. Accepting the Commission’s argument, the General Court held in both cases that the contested measures, of which the internal review had been sought, did indeed qualify as a measure of general nature.
Likewise, it was found that the requests as such did not meet the requirements laid down by the Aarhus Regulation82.
In both cases, the ENGOs alternatively sub- mitted that, in case the General Court would indeed hold that the requests did not meet the strict criteria enshrined in the Aarhus Regula- tion, it nevertheless should find that, by limiting the concept of “acts” in Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention to “administrative acts”, which, in their turn should be defined as “measures of indi- vidual scope”, Art. 10 (1) of the Aarhus Regulation would violate the Aarhus Convention. Hence, the ENGOs more in particular raised a plea of illegality against the mentioned provisions of the Aarhus Regulation83. Generally, EU Courts agree to review the legality of measures of secondary legislation in light of provisions of international agreements, even in the absence of direct effect, when the latter aim to implement a particular obligation under an international agreement or, alternatively, where the measure makes an ex- plicit renvoi to particular provisions of that agree- ment84. In the present case, the General Court quickly came to the conclusion that the condi- tions to apply this reasoning were fulfilled as it could not be doubted that that regulation indeed intended to implement the EU’s obligations un- der the Aarhus Convention85.
81 Stichting Natuur en Milieu (see above n 8), par. 30;
Vereniging Milieudefensie (see above n 9), par. 27.
82 Stichting Natuur en Milieu (see above n 8), par. 42.
83 Stichting Natuur en Milieu (see above n 8), par. 52;
Vereniging Milieudefensie (see above n 9), par. 52.
84 Case C-69/89, Nakajima [1991] ECR I-2069, par. 31.
85 Stichting Natuur en Milieu (see above n 8), par. 57–58.
As to the limitation of the concept of “acts”
to “administrative acts” in the sense of Art. 2 (1) (g) of the Aarhus Regulation, the General Court found this to be incompatible with Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention.
Although the term “acts” in itself is not de- fined by the Aarhus Convention, the General Court considered the limited scope of the inter- nal review procedure to be in contradiction with the objectives thereof. Whilst recognising that under Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention, the Parties to that Convention retain a certain mea- sure of discretion with regard to the definition of the persons who have a right of recourse to administrative or judicial procedure and as to the nature of the procedure (whether administra- tive or judicial), the General Court rightly notes that the Aarhus Convention does not offer the same discretion as regards the definition of “acts”
which are open to challenge86.
IV.3. The aftermath
In the above-mentioned decisions, the General Court availed itself of the opportunity to point out the flaws and deficiencies of the Aarhus Reg- ulation as regards access to justice. And thus, at first glance, both judgments must be considered an important step forwards in the pursuit of a better implementation of the obligations con- cerning access to justice enshrined in the Aarhus Convention on the EU level87. Likewise, the rul- ings stand out as the first ever decisions where a referral to the Aarhus Convention was accepted as a means to enhance access to justice in envi- ronmental matters on the EU level. However, the
86 Stichting Natuur en Milieu (see above n 8), par. 77;
Vereniging Milieudefensie (see above n 9), par. 66.
87 See also in this regard: C Sisler, E de Götzen, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters: What is New on the Implementation of the Aarhus Convention in the Europe- an Union’ in V Sancin and M K Dine (eds.), International Environmental Law: Contemporary Concerns and Challenges in 2014 (GV Založba: 2014), pp. 207–208.
EU institutions were clearly not convinced by the General Court’s more progressive approach to- wards the Aarhus Convention in the EU-context.
The European Commission, closely followed by the Council and the European Parliament, launched an appeal against the two judgments of the General Court. Accordingly, it will be the CJEU which will have a final say on the matter88. Below, it will be examined to what extent the ob- jections of the European Commission, the Coun- cil and the European Parliament, could possibly lead to a reversal of the judgments by the CJEU on appeal and, subsequently, what would be the implications thereof for access to justice in envi- ronmental cases.
a. on the lack of direct effect of Art. 9(3) of the Aar- hus Convention (and how to circumvent it)
One of the fiercest critiques issued by the Eu- ropean Commission, the Council and the Eu- ropean Parliament against the judgments of the General Court is related to the fact that the latter
88 See: Appeal brought on 24 August 2012 by the Euro- pean Parliament against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 14 June 2012 in Case T-396/09 Vereniging Milieudefensie, Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging v Commission, [2013] OJ C 9/26; Appeal brought on 27 August 2012 by the Euro- pean Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 14 June 2012 in Case T-396/09 Vereniging Milieudefensie, Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging v Commission, [2013] OJ 9/26; Ap- peal brought on 27 August 2012 by the Council of the European Union against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 14 June 2012 in Case T-396/09 Vereniging Milieudefensie, Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging v Commission, [2013] OJ 9/25;
Appeal brought on 27 August 2012 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 14 June 2012 in Case T-338/08 Stichting Natuur en Milieu, Pesticide Action Network Europe v Commission, [2013] OJ C 9/28; Ap- peal brought on 3 September 2012 by the Council of Eu- rope against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 14 June 2012 in Case T-338/08 Stichting Natuur en Milieu, Pesticide Action Network Europe v Commission, [2013] OJ C 9/27.
