The Attitudes of Native Swedes Toward Refugees Bachelor Thesis

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The Attitudes of Native

Swedes Toward Refugees

- A Case Study on the Role of Social Identity

Bachelor Thesis

Author: Eric Sonesson Supervisor: Christopher High

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Abstract

Refugee-host community relations is a topic of increasing relevance, and so is the need to understand what shapes such relations. Sweden, having a historically liberal refugee and immigrant policy, accepted the biggest number of refugees in its recent history during the 2015 refugee crisis - the amount of which was the biggest per capita ever recorded in an OECD country. The attitudes of native Swedes toward refugees can be tied to whether they socially identify themselves as pluralists or nationalists, two opposing social identities which, especially in the years surrounding the refugee crisis, are observed harboring hostile attitudes toward each other.

Pluralists are inclined to have positive attitudes toward refugees; nationalists are prone to have negative attitudes. While these two groups can be

observed, it remains ambiguous to what extent the Swedish population identifies with them. The political popularity of openly pluralist and nationalist political parties gives some notion; however, the inherent complexity of Swedish politics makes this method of deduction overly simplistic. Seemingly contradictory, while support for multiculturalism and refugee acceptance is decreasing, the percentage harboring very negative attitudes toward migrants is historically and presently quite low, and a growing number of Swedes are observed having increasingly positive attitudes toward refugees and immigrants in their everyday interactions. As future events unfold, it will be interesting to see what identity “the silent majority” of the native Swedish population will sympathize with, as this will no doubt affect their attitudes toward refugees and change refugee-host community relations in Sweden.

Key words

Peace and Development Studies, Migration Studies, Refugee-host community relations, the 2015 refugee crisis

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my supervisor, Christopher High, for his efforts at keeping my feet on the ground and head above water.

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1 Introduction

What are the dynamics behind refugee-host community relations? How come one portion of a country’s native population is supportive and welcoming of refugees, and another rejects them, on both a political and personal level?

This thesis is centered around these questions, meant to provide answers using a sociopsychological approach. Understanding such group dynamics is becoming increasingly relevant; as our world is growing more

interconnected, different groups of people are interacting with, and affecting, each other more and more. Not unrelated to this, while many enjoy peaceful and comfortable lives, a significant proportion do not. According to the UN Refugee Agency (unhcr.org, 2018), at the end of 2018, 70,8 million people had been forcibly displaced because of persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations, 25,9 million of which being categorized as refugees.

About half of all forcibly displaced were children below the age of 18.

Understanding the dynamics between refugees and their host communities will help prevent prejudices and hostilities between the two groups, which is not only a goal in itself, but a necessary precondition for any society’s peace and development.

This subject is especially relevant in Sweden. A nation that through the 20th century turned monocultural to multicultural, and homogeneous to heterogeneous, a development that continues to this day, these events were put to the forefront of Swedish public discourse during the 2015 refugee crisis, when the country accepted more refugees per capita ever recorded in an OECD country. As such, the attitudes of native Swedes toward refugees living in Sweden, and the nature of, and causal mechanisms behind those attitudes, is arguably more important to understand now more than ever.

Second, Sweden was chosen as a country of analysis because of its rich economy; analyzing a nation with a well-off economy allows for a deeper analysis of the sociopsychological factors behind a native’s population toward refugees, whereas the attitudes of native citizens in a poorer country might be more affected by socioeconomic reasons, whether they are real or perceived. Third, Sweden was chosen due to the significant available data, the availability of which is caused both by the growing international and national debate on migration policy in Sweden, and due to the Swedish nationality of the author, making access to said data easier.

The context of this case study is on the attitudes of Swedes toward

refugees, applying the method of process-tracing on the period 2014 to 2018, together with events in Swedish history leading up to said period, 1910 to 2013. These four years cover the 2015 refugee crisis and its political

consequences, which, when observed through different sources, involve the attitudes of Swedes toward refugees and migrant policy in Sweden in detail.

Contemporary Sweden is experiencing an increased polarization on the topic

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of migration, with growingly vocal proponents of both liberal and strict migration policies on opposing sides. Nationalist populism and anti-refugee sentiments is growing in popularity. Both positive and hostile attitudes toward refugees are becoming more visible in the everyday. As these developments are unfolding, it remains uncertain whether Swedes are becoming hostile, or more welcoming, toward refugees, and what the causes might be. This research problem will be explored. As a method of

exploration, there are two research questions that will be serve a guide throughout the research of this thesis:

1. How does social identity affect the attitudes of native Swedes toward refugees, from a historical and contemporary perspective?

2. How are these attitudes reflected in Swedish politics?

2 Theoretical Framework Considerations

2.1 Previous Research

Research concerning the relationship between refugees and their host communities is continually expanding. As a field of study, as mentioned above, migration and integration studies is growing more relevant in an ever- more globalized and interconnected world - groups of different ethnicities interact with each other more and more. Theories and concepts that attempt to explain the determinants of this relationship usually fall into one of two categories: socioeconomic and sociopsychological.

Literature concerned with socioeconomic theories researches the economic impacts, real and perceived, that migrants and refugees have on their host countries, and therefore the lives of the people living in those countries.

These theories also research how those impacts, in turn, influence behavior, attitudes and beliefs. An example would be if tensions rose between migrants and natives because the former were perceived by the latter to weaken a country’s welfare system and increase labor market competition (Zubashvili, 2020, p.6-7). Literature using sociopsychological approaches attempt, in part, to explain prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict in society by understanding how people naturally tend to categorize themselves into groups, where one’s own is deemed superior while those outside of it, the perceived “other”, is subject to discriminative and prejudiced attitudes (McKeown et al, 2016, p.3-4). When researching refugee-host community

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relations, it is not uncommon to combine both approaches (Callens, Meuleman, 2017).

Looking back at recent Swedish history, during the early 1990’s and 2000’s, its role as a receiver of migrants grew. In 1992, 84 000 individuals reportedly applied for asylum in Sweden in the wake of the Balkan crisis.

Furthermore, during the late 2000’s, it was reported by the municipality of Södertälje that they had received more refugees from Iraq than the entire United States during the same period (Barlai et al, 2016). As these events unfolded, research on refugee-host community relations became increasingly relevant, as more people of different ethnicities settled in the so-far

homogenous Sweden. To some degree, such research exists. As an example, one study uses a sociopsychological approach to explain Swedes’ attitudes toward Muslims (Carlbom, 2003); similar works focus on the perceived, and actual, economic and cultural challenges of immigration and integration during the latter half of the 20th century and the 2000’s, together with the political discourse surrounding those issues (Dahlstedt, 2005, Folkesson, 2012).

There is considerable research regarding attitudes towards refugees that focus on Europe and the EU member states (Alkopher, Blanc, 2016; Callens, Meuleman, 2017; Coninck et al, 2020), with the impacts and consequences of the 2015 refugee crisis often taking center stage in more recent works.

Works aimed at measuring public opinion are often more quantitative rather than qualitative, using large population samples spread through different demographics (Czymara, 2020). This is also the case for research concerning Sweden. For example, the Diversity Barometer (Mångfaldsbarometern), issued first by Uppsala University and later the University of Gävle, is an annual national survey aimed at measuring ethnic Swedes’ attitudes toward immigrants (Ahmadi et al, 2020).

However, when it comes to applying socioeconomic and

sociopsychological theories, particularly in Sweden, the literature is not as extensive; the ones that do use them do so more to analyze which of them, generally, have more scientific support (Zubashvili, 2020, Wildros, 2017).

They are also used more as a source of discussion, or as possible answers, rather than being fully applied; at least, this seems to be the case for research concerning the events surrounding the 2015 refugee crisis. Still, a few exceptions to this can be found. For example, one thesis aims to apply securitization theory to explain the different ways refugees were portrayed in Sweden between 2014 to 2015 (Wildros, 2017; Jimenéz, 2017; Dahlstedt, Neergard, 2019). The major research gap here appears to be a lack of connection between recent Swedish history and the present, in terms of theoretical application. There is a possible correlation and causation of attitudes between these two time periods; analyzing the history of the late 20th, and the early 21st century with the events of the 2010’s with the aim of

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establishing causal mechanisms will help in this respect. One way to do this is through the application of a relevant theory.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

This thesis will apply a sociopsychological approach. More specifically, the framework will be based on the identity threat/anxiety-to-approach model, a theory that falls within social identity theory.

According to McKeown et al (2016, p.3-14), social identity theory relates to intergroup relations, conflict, and cooperation between groups, how people identify with groups, together with the societal consequences that

identification has. Originally created in 1970’s by Henri Tajfel, his passion was to understand intergroup conflict, discrimination and prejudice in society. Understanding social identity, and how people are categorized into those identities, by themselves and by others, held great significance for Tajfel; a Polish Jew that studied in Paris at the breakout of World War Two, he enlisted with the French army and was captured - he survived only because he was categorized as French rather than Jewish, and was thus sent to a prisoner-of-war camp instead of a concentration camp. An integral part of social identity theory is comprehending the ways people evaluate their own in-group compared to out-groups, the contrast between “us” and “them”.

McKeown et al describe this intergroup comparison as intrinsically

ethnocentric - people are likely to view their own group as superior. This is because a person’s sense of self is defined by their group, meaning that individual worth and group worth are felt as one and the same. Therefore, having a positive group-image means having a positive self-image. While this kind of judgement is ultimately subjective, in society some groups often have more status or prestige compared to others. In such cases, intergroup behavior manifests as lower status groups struggling to rid themselves of social stigma and promote their own worth, while higher status groups try to maintain their superiority. In the context of refugee-host community

relations, this social categorization affects how ethnic Swedes view refugees in different ways.

McKeown et al (2016, p.33-40) explain further that, when perceived threats to our group identity appear, people are prone to experience anxious

uncertainty. Events that can be judged as threats can be, for example, sudden, unpredictable changes in one’s environment or society in general that trigger people to question their worldview and who they are, leading to a perceived lack of control. This anxious state is in turn soothed by engaging in defensive and affirmative collective behavior that strengthens group identity. These defensive mechanisms are often accompanied by hostility towards out- groups, antisocial behavior, and extremist views. A specific example the authors use is when a wealthy country experiences a large influx of refugees

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from different cultural backgrounds. Radical ideologies grow in popularity in these situations because they are prone to strongly identify with certain in- groups, be more hostile to out-groups and provide simplified, easy to understand answers to increasingly complicated situations. In other words, exclusive radical groups are more likely to sooth the need for a positive self- image than those who are generally more inclusive, especially in times of crisis. Thus, the anxiety-to-approach model aims to understand how different groups respond to a perceived identity threat.

Naturally, people and groups react differently to events depending on how they perceive it (McKeown et al, 2016, p.40-44). A threat to one group may be an opportunity for another. This difference in perception is tied to

personal and political beliefs. In the context of refugee-host community relations, people who identify with, and advocate for, monocultural societies may view the arrival of large waves of refugees to their country as a threat to their traditions and well-being; those who believe in pluralist, multicultural societies may instead see this as an opportunity that will bring about mutual enrichment. The threat for the pluralists could instead be those who fight against this enrichment to occur. In other words, groups in society tend to view the world differently and have their own sense of morality, albeit to varying degrees. During times of uncertainty, when group-identity is emphasized, these differences, whether they are real or perceived, are underscored as well - this in turn fuels hostility and xenophobia (McKeown et al, 2016, p.47-49).

Of course, how people behave in response to threats also depends on the individual. One variable is self-esteem; those with higher self-esteem are less likely to experience anxiety, retreat into their in-groups and more likely to pursue goals that approach the perceived threat in different ways. People with lower self-esteem are prone to do the opposite and favor avoidance goals. Another factor is the need for structure and closure. As people relate to ambiguous situations and epistemic vagueness differently, in times of crisis and uncertainty, those with a higher need for closure and order tend to more strongly identify with their in-groups, be less tolerant towards other

worldviews and see out-groups as very different. This is because in-groups work as a solution to their needs, having a social identity to associate with and a set of social norms to follow - they bring about a sense of control.

Individuals with a lower need for structure are less likely to retreat into their in-groups to the same degree. While this thesis will not evaluate self-esteem or need for closure on neither an individual nor group basis, it is interesting to keep in mind (McKeown et al, 2016, p.45-47). An illustration of the anxiety-to-approach model is shown on the next page, as provided by McKeown et al (p.44):

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3 Methodological Framework Considerations

This thesis is a qualitative case study, the research of which is

operationalized through an abductive approach. The chosen method used for observing and gathering data within the given periods, 1913 to 2013 and 2014 to 2018, is known as process-tracing.

The case study approach is, to quote George & Bennett (2005, p.5, 17-18):

“... the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.” A case study examines a phenomenon of scientific interest; one event can be subject to several case studies. For example, a case study about the Covid-19 pandemic can be one of international political economy, welfare policy, crisis management, etc. A method commonly used in case studies, process- tracing, attempts to identify, and assess, the triggers and causal mechanisms behind events. A simplified example of this would be if a person was tasked with figuring out from which side a chain of dominoes started to fall, by only looking at the chain after the fact. By carefully tracing the falling process, how each domino is angled, which side is up, etc., it will be possible to establish which domino was the first to fall, and how the whole event unfolded (George, Bennett, p.205-206). While case studies are useful when investigating a specific element of an event, and the causal mechanisms behind it, a limitation of such an approach is the difficulty to discern how the variable, or variables, in a case relate to other factors that created a certain outcome. That is, it is easier to discover if certain factors influenced an event, but harder to decide to what degree, since case studies focus on a specific element of that event (George, Bennett, 2005, p.22-28). In this context, this paper focuses on sociopsychological factors; there are likely other variables that influence Swedes’ attitudes toward refugees that are not considered.

Nevertheless, the case study approach is useful in explaining events in society, and the causal mechanisms behind them.

In the context of this thesis, this process-tracing method will be

implemented to trace, and make more sense of, the attitudes of ethnic Swedes toward refugees. According to George & Bennett (p.207, p.213-215),

process-tracing is suitable for theory testing, the usefulness of which will be used to apply the different aspects of the identity threat/ anxiety-to-approach model. This makes the variation of process-tracing in this thesis one that utilizes hypotheses and general explanations. George & Bennett (p.210-212) explain that this variety of process-tracing has at least part of its narrative accompanied by one or several theories to establish historical causal patterns and subsequent explanations to those patterns. The explanation could be more explicit or general, depending on if the findings are not sufficient for a fully definitive conclusion, or if a general explanation is judged more suited for the research objective. A general explanation is deemed more suited for

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this case study, in part due to the method of analysis, which will now be explained.

Abduction, in the words of Danermark et al (2001, p.89-94), is a scientific method of analysis where the researcher uses a theoretical framework to observe, describe, interpret, and explain something in a different way,

gaining a deeper understanding of it in the process. What separates abduction from other research methods, like deduction, is that the latter explains the definite nature of something, while the former shows how something might be. A theoretical framework operated in an abductive fashion observes, rather than definitively proving something right or wrong. Danermark et al describe three types of abduction: overcoded, undercoded and creative.

Overcoded abduction observes an event through the lens of a society’s values and culture, observations which are done by people every day; undercoded abduction analyzes events through theories; creative abduction observes an event through a new theoretical framework, or one that opposes conventional interpretations. The undercoded variety will be used here. Thus, the

undercoded abduction method of analysis will be used in the context of contemporary Swedish-refugee relations, applying the identity

threat/anxiety-to-approach model as a theoretical framework.

The research in this paper aims at, through the implementation of the identity threat/anxiety-to-approach model, and the variables within it,

establish a general explanation of ethnic Swedes’ attitudes towards refugees.

This will be done through the use and examination of surveys, statistics provided by state institutions, academic articles, news articles, political manifestos, motions and articles by Swedish political parties, YouTube videos, and trending twitter hashtags. As such, the research is qualitative rather than quantitative. We will now go through the chosen time periods and different sources used in this thesis, outlining their overall credibility,

relevance, and usefulness for this essay - starting with the chosen time periods of 1910 to 2013, and 2014 to 2018.

3.1 Chosen Time Period

For the sake of establishing context, Swedish refugee and migrant policy history from the early 20th century needs to be explained; the significance of events during the more detailed period of analysis, 2014 to 2018. risks being missed otherwise. Analyzing the period of 1910 to 2013 will provide this context. The latter four years of analysis, 2014 to 2018, were specifically chosen due to the refugee crisis that surrounds them. As mentioned previously, Sweden accepted a very large number of refugees in 2015 and the few years prior. The debate surrounding migrant policy and refugee reception took more and more space in the public discourse and so did increasingly polarized political opinions of the topic. Following the logic of process tracing, to fully discern causal mechanisms behind events

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surrounding migrant policy and attitudes toward refugees in Sweden, together with being able to fully apply the anxiety-to-approach model, a longitudinal analysis is needed, an established historical pattern to follow (George, Bennett, 2005, p.205.207). This is what these two time periods are for.

3.2 Surveys

One of the main surveys used is the Diversity Barometer (Ahmadi et al, 2020). First issued in 2005 by Uppsala University and later by Gävle University, as the name implies, it is a survey meant to measure Swedes’

attitudes toward ethnic and cultural diversity in Swedish society. In each survey, the answers provided are put together into a “diversity score”, which is compared to previous years. Not all categories in the Diversity Barometer are used in this thesis. For example, the survey puts a specific focus on Muslims and Islam, asking questions about public support for burqas, Islamic schools, etc. These are not the focus because Muslims constitute a part, not the entirety of the refugee demographic in Sweden, and are included as such in this essay. Putting a special emphasis on such questions would imply that refugees and migrants are a homogenous group, which they are not. More general questions surrounding cultural diversity are instead used, because they do not exclude other refugee demographics. Using these general questions is also important because Swedes, when asked about what ethnic group they most often interact with, with the exclusion of other Nordic countries, mostly had interactions with foreigners from Europe, followed by people from the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, Africa, and North

America/Australia. Again, since putting emphasis on Islam and Muslims would imply homogeneity, or at least a Muslim majority within the refugee demographic in Sweden, this would be a flawed method of analysis

considering the demographics that Swedes more frequently interact with.

The second major survey used in this thesis is issued by the SOM-institute at Gothenburg University. Created in 1986, this organization continually issues surveys concerned with public opinion in Sweden (gu.se, 2020). One indicator they measure on an annual basis is public support for accepting fewer refugees, which is used within the period of 2014 to 2018.

Both surveys are deemed to be objective and reliable in their research, since neither of them put any ideological emphasis on their findings - this makes them suitable for use.

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3.3 Statistics Provided by State Institutions

To show an accurate representation of the refugee and migrant reception in Sweden, statistics is repeatedly used. Specifically, statistics provided by the Swedish Migration Agency (migrationsverket) and the Swedish Central Bureau of Statistics (statistiska centralbyrån/scb). Both institutions are state funded. Most importantly, they are politically unaffiliated, meaning there are no apparent reasons to distrust the information provided by them.

3.4 News Articles

News articles from the national TV station Swedish Television (SVT), national radio station Swedish Radio (SR), and from newspapers, are used extensively throughout the period of focus, 2014 to 2018, for the purpose of illustrating the political discourse, events and political polarization

surrounding refugee and immigration policy. Swedish newspapers are often politically subjective in their reporting. As an example, the newspaper Aftonbladet openly states their social democratic sympathies (aftonbladet.se, 2020). While Swedish Television and Swedish Radio are officially politically unaffiliated, a 2019 report from the Swedish Enterprise Media Monitor (Näringslivets Medieinstitut), shows that both organizations harbor left-wing liberal political sympathies, and are therefore prone to subjective reporting (Reimers, 2019). However, since this thesis does not consider how a news source judges or values an event, but only the event itself, the possible lack of objectivity is not deemed an issue. A liberal or social democratic

newspaper reporting on an event in a certain way can in fact be of use, since this will help illustrate a type of social identity in those who are being reported on. This will be explored in future sections.

3.5 Political Manifests, Motions and Articles by Swedish Political Parties

These kinds of sources are, obviously, subjective in the sense that they portray their own political party and political ideas as superior. However, this is not an issue since the purpose of these sources is only to portray and analyze changes in the parties’ political beliefs, or at least how these beliefs are portrayed to the Swedish public.

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3.6 YouTube Videos

YouTube videos can only be as objective as those who upload them, which is often ambiguous at best and blatantly biased at worst. But, as with the other subjective sources used in this thesis, this is not an issue, since the point of using them is to analyze the subjective opinions of Swedish politicians. The YouTube videos used are of political debates and political speeches, uploaded on either anonymous or politically affiliated YouTube channels. There is a risk that certain parts of said videos have been cut or are missing. Nevertheless, there has been sufficient information available for a thorough analysis.

3.7 Trending Twitter Hashtags

By showing specific trending Twitter hashtags in Sweden that fit within the case study, it will be possible to illustrate positive and negative attitudes towards different groups of people, attitudes of which are derived from their social identity. These twitter hashtags were collected from an existing database, created by researcher Peter Dahlgren from Gothenburg University, available via the Swedish National Data Service (snd.gu.se, 2017). The database is updated every hour, collecting trending hashtags from December of 2014 to present day. The Swedish National Data Service is driven jointly by nine Swedish universities, with Gothenburg University as its host.

Further, the site has been approved by the Core Trust Seal organization, an organization aimed at ensuring the trustworthiness of data infrastructures (coretrustseal.org, 2021). The trending Twitter Hashtag dataset is therefore judged reliable to use.

3.8 Secondary Data

Used in the establishment of historical context and the relevant social identities, the secondary data in this thesis is based on published works such as books, a doctoral dissertation, and academic articles. These sources originate from different disciplines within the social sciences, for example political science and migration studies. Limiting the source material to articles that fall within peace and development studies would severely limit the capability of the author to write a comprehensive thesis, due to the lack of source material. Even though the case study of this thesis falls within the field of peace and development studies, said field is transdisciplinary, including different fields within the social sciences. Therefore, articles from these different fields are deemed relevant.

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The academic articles are mostly used in a historical context, including the years leading up to the period of focus, 2014 to 2018. The date of publishing of such articles are, of course, of great relevance when researching and analyzing historical and contemporary events. As such, the articles used have been matched to the time/s they concern, and not applied to, or assumed to be relevant with, events or dates outside of said period. For example, articles concerning Swedish migration policy during the 1960’s are not assumed to be relevant in the 1970’s and 1980’s.

The credibility of these articles is not in doubt due to the inherent

trustworthiness of the peer reviewing process. When it comes to objectivity, it is not deemed an issue when the author of an article presents their own subjective opinion on the presented findings, since said subjectivity is made clear and for the reader (Rosenberg, 1995).

3.9 A Note on Terminology

The terms “refugee”, “immigrant” and “migrant” will be used

interchangeably throughout this thesis. While they are similar in nature, there are also differences. Refugees are immigrants, but immigrants do not have to be refugees; an immigrant can, for example, be a relative of a refugee, seeking to reunite. The term “migrant” involves both immigrants and refugees. Upon seeing these terms here, they are not meant to include high- qualified labor immigrants or other separate categories of immigration, instead staying within the specific context of this thesis. The only statistics that include other immigrant categories are the ones provided by the Swedish Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB), which shows a combined total. However, these statistics are included for illustrative purposes, not a source of analysis, and are made separate from the refugee demographics.

4 Limitations and Delimitations

A delimitation of this thesis is its approach - a desk study. The findings and the subsequent discussion and analysis of those findings are limited to what research is available. Answers risk being partial when derived from this form of research.

A limitation is the available data. The main measurement of Swedes’

attitudes toward refugees is the survey question regarding their interactions with people of foreign background. As mentioned previously, it must be remembered that the major group Swedes interact with are, first, people from Northern and other European countries. In other words, nations that, for the

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most part, are not sources of refugee, at least not in the present day. Swedes do interact with foreigners from, for example, the Middle East and Africa, albeit to a lesser degree. It is difficult to discern how many of Swedes’

positive interactions are with these smaller demographics, although they certainly are part of them.

5 Case Study

To provide answers in what way social identity plays a role in the attitudes of ethnic Swedes toward refugees, it is necessary to put the focused period in this thesis, 2014 to 2018, in a historical context. We will begin in the 20th century.

5.1 Monocultural to Multicultural (1910-2013)

Swedish immigration policy started to change during and after WWII, from what has been described as “heartless” by political scientist Tomas Hammar (Arnstberg, 2008, p.11). Up until that point, large numbers of people

migrating into Sweden had not been as common as immigrating out, especially during the late 19th and early 20th century; between 1850 and 1910, more than 1.5 million Swedes migrated, mostly to North America (in 1910, 150 000 people of Swedish descent lived in Chicago). Immigration of foreign citizens during the first decades of the 20th century was subject to strict control. The state implemented laws that were protectionist in nature, with the intent of protecting both the economy and the “purity” of the Swedish race. These restrictions were lifted in 1941 (Boguslaw, 2012, p.20- 29, p.91) and tens of thousands of refugees came to Sweden from, including but not limited to: Denmark, Norway, Finland, Hungary, and Estonia to find safe haven. Because Sweden had not taken part in the war, as it came to an end, its economy and industries were in better condition than other European nations and therefore held a very favorable position in terms of expansion.

This was the turning point for Sweden becoming a country of immigrants (Brochmann, Hagelund, 2012, p.33-34). In other words, it began to turn from monoethnic to multiethnic.

Sweden continued to (generally) soften its asylum laws in the years following WWII. Immigration of refugees in the first two decades of the after-war period was limited compared to the 1940’s - the largest groups were Hungarians in 1956 and Yugoslavs in the 1960’s. A notable event that would start to shape contemporary Sweden was the formulation of a

multicultural immigration policy in 1975. The state, led by the Social

Democrats, implemented policies that emphasized the importance of making

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sure that immigrants and refugees attained the same socioeconomic standard, and cultural rights, as ethnic Swedes. There was an emphasis on freedom of choice; those that immigrated to Sweden could choose for themselves whether to retain their own ethnic affiliation or assimilate into the Swedish majority culture (Brochmann, Hagelund, 2012, p.39-46). In these policies, labor immigrants and refugees were treated as one and the same - the

difference being that the former could enter the workforce immediately, and the latter often could not. The refugees that were granted asylum were put on welfare and sent to live in the communes that were willing to accept them.

They did not speak Swedish and there were no incentives from the side of the state for them to culturally integrate (Arnstberg, 2008, p.13-19).

Nevertheless, as the 1970’s transitioned into the 1980’s, Sweden’s self- image as a humanitarian power grew and refugees arrived in increasing numbers. Immigration was no longer seen as an economic necessity as it was a moral obligation. According to Rosenberg (1995), this shift in policy objectives was not based on public opinion, but by decisions made by the political elite and state institutions. This is not meant to imply that Sweden’s historically liberal refugee policy had no support from its populous. Indeed, humanitarianism seems strongly built into Swedish collective identity. In the words of Ålund & Schierup (1991, p.26):

…”it cannot be denied that Sweden harbours a genuine popular movement, which has long acted as a powerful autonomous political force in support of

a liberal refugee policy. From the left it confronts the social-democratic political and administrative elite mainly in the name of international solidarity; from the conservative right and the middle of the political spectrum it is more often in the name of humanitarianism or liberal Christianity. It acts as a powerful force even in the midst of the social-

democratic movement itself.”

By contrast, at the same time, immigrants and refugees were increasingly seen by some as a threat. Racist and xenophobic attitudes started to increase.

Worried discussions became more common, with the topics of the dangers

“those people” are bringing to Sweden, with their foreign cultures and faiths.

(Arnstberg, 2008, p.19). Could the enlightened and superior Sweden be brought down by these inferior elements, such as the influence of Islam?

These pro- and anti-refugee sentiments manifested, on one side, as demonstrations against the opposition’s perceived xenophobic and racist views, and on the other, debates that emphasized the ineffectiveness and discontinuation of the liberal refugee policies; cases of violence against refugees and refugee settlements also occurred as isolated incidents.

Interestingly, during the 1970’s and 1980’s, for the first time, the largest immigrant demographics came from Asia, Latin America, and Africa;

previously, most had come from neighboring countries such as Finland and

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Denmark (Ålund, Schierup, 1991, p.32-34). As the 1990’s started, the percentage of people born abroad in Sweden was 9,2 percent of the total population, compared to 2,8 percent in 1950.

During the last decade of the 20th century, Sweden would experience refugee waves like those of WWII. According to statistics provided by the Swedish Migration Agency (migrationsverket.se, 2020), in the 15-year period from 1984 to 1999, 142 000 people applied for asylum from Bosnia &

Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (former Yugoslavia), representing forty percent of all applicants. The second largest demographic came from Iraq and Iran, representing 21 percent, with over 30 000 applicants,

respectively. While the political establishment held firm to what was named

“the politics of open doors”, the socioeconomic costs of such policies grew and became more apparent. To finance them, the state spent an estimated twenty to thirty billion Swedish kronor (two to three billion $USD) every year. At the same time, neighborhoods with large immigrant populations grew more segregated and violent (Arnstberg, 2008, p.20-23). As these events unfolded, Swedish society saw the increased emergence of nationalist, right-wing, anti-refugee political movements. Among these were the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna).

The beginning of the 21st century in Sweden can be defined as the

continued progression of events that transpired in the 1990’s. That is to say, the liberal refugee policies were maintained, and the political divide

continued between those who supported the policies and the subsequent multicultural society they were bringing, and those who did not. Aje Carlbom (2003, p.23-24) label these two groups as pluralists and nationalists. To quote Carlbom:

“The pluralists are opposed to the nationalists, who understand the Swedish nation-state from a position which pluralists label as Islamophobic, racist,

popularly orientalist, or xenophobic; to be a good human being is to be a pluralist and advocate diversity, and to be bad is to represent society as the nationalists do. Nationalists represent the homogeneous Swedish nation-state

as worthy of protection, and want to save it from what they consider a general breakdown of traditional values and social structures, which they

believe would be a consequence of the imposition of cultural pluralism.”

The political influence of the Sweden Democrats was limited in the 2000’s, getting 1,44 percent of the vote in 2002 and 2,93 percent in 2006. However, this growth would continue (which will be discussed in coming sections). In an article written by Hellström & Nilsson (2010), they discuss the self-image that SD is portraying to the Swedish voters - they are “the good guys”, anti- elitist and represents the everyday Swedish person. They claim that they alone recognize the failures of the established refugee policies and the

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damage they have brought to the welfare state and Swedish society; the socioeconomic costs have been, and are, too great for Sweden to manage.

Looking at statistics from the Swedish Migration Agency again

(migrationsverket.se): 16 300 people applied for asylum in 2000; 23 500 in 2001; 31 300 in 2002; between 17 500 and 24 300 each year from 2004 to 2006; 36 200 in 2007; 24 000 in 2008 and 2009; and 31 800 in 2010, the largest demographics being from North Africa and Southeast Asia. In 2008, during an international Iraq conference in Stockholm, previous Swedish prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt pointed out that Sweden, a nation with close to ten million citizens at the time, had accepted over 40 000 Iraqi refugees since 2003 - the only country in the EU to do so, an amount which was more than the United States had received, a country with a citizenry of over 300 million people (Brochmann, Hagelund, 2012, p.71). Undoubtedly, a pluralistic society was forming.

Looking at the years leading up to 2014, the beginning of the recent refugee crisis, the number of asylum seekers decreased somewhat in 2011 to 29 600, to later increase to 43 800 in 2012 and 54 200 in 2013

(migrationsverket.se, 2020). Based on data from the Swedish Election Authority (data.val.se, 2010), in 2010, for the first time, the Sweden

Democrats would enter the Swedish Parliament (riksdag) with 5,7 percent of the total vote.

5.2 The European Refugee Crisis

5.2.1 Case Study Graphs & Statistics

This section will illustrate certain data that will be referenced throughout the coming chapters. The reader is recommended to return here for a visual representation whenever the data is referred to. The first graph can be found on the next page.

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1. Diagram five from the Diversity Barometer, concerning experiences working/studying with people of foreign backgrounds (Ahmadi et al, 2020).

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2. Chart ten from the Diversity Barometer, about people of foreign background preserving their cultural traditions (Ahmadi et al, 2020).

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3. Chart eleven from the Diversity Barometer, asking if foreigners should have the same social rights as Swedes (Ahmadi et al, 2020).

Note: It is somewhat ambiguous what is meant by the term “social rights”, as the Diversity Barometer does not say. The term has

therefore been taken at face-value, entailing rights like healthcare and other social security benefits.

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4. Chart twelve from the Diversity Barometer, concerning whether people of foreign background should keep their native language and teach it to their children (Ahmadi et al, 2020).

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5. Chart from the SOM-institute survey, asking about whether to accept fewer refugees (Martinsson, Andersson, 2018).

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5.2.2 2014

As the refugee crisis started to emerge, the number of asylum seekers that Sweden would accept would drastically increase from previous years.

Specifically, 84 300 in 2014 (migrationsverket.se, 2020). Established liberal refugee policies continued, even expanded, during this time. The Prime Minister at the time, and previous party leader of the center-right Moderate Party (Moderaterna) Fredrik Reinfeldt urged the Swedish people to “open their hearts”, emphasizing Sweden’s moral obligation to help those in need.

The leader of the Social Democrats (SAP) Stefan Löfven, future Prime Minister after the 2014 election, spoke in similar terms, saying that Sweden is a rich country and can therefore manage future refugee challenges, no matter what those challenges may look like (Barlai et al, 2017 p.286-287).

Moving on to the Sweden Democrats, in their 2011 principal program, which was maintained during the 2014 election, there is a specific advocacy against the multicultural policies that were established in 1975. In this program, SD label themselves as strong opponents to multiculturalism, which they blame for many issues that now plagues Swedish society.

Immigration and refugee policies created by SD would prioritize making sure that Swedish culture maintains its “majority culture” status. Swedish

immigrants are to be assimilated into the Swedish culture, in part by state- established education programs (snd.gu.se, 2014). In the 2014 election the Sweden Democrats would get 12,8 percent of the vote in the national

election, making it the third biggest party in the Swedish Parliament. A graph illustrating the 2014 election results is shown here (data.val.se, 2014):

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Furthermore, a survey conducted by Swedish Television (SVT), showed that seventeen percent of all respondents viewed SD as having the best immigration policy (Holmberg, 2014). This questionnaire is illustrated below. Observe the sixth column, named “flyktingar/invandring”:

:

It needs to be remembered that all other parliamentary parties, at that point in time, supported the generous welfare policies that were in place. Four of these parties that not only supported these policies, but strongly advocated for them, were the Green Party, (Miljöpartiet), the Center Party

(Centerpartiet) and the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet); these three varied between either dropping or gaining under one percent compared to 2010.

(centerpartiet.se, 2014; mp.se, 2014; vänsterpartiet.se, 2014; data.val.se, 2014). Further, Aylott & Bolin (2015) writes that this increasing support for parties having opposite views on refugee policy represents a growing

polarization within the Swedish electorate. The Sweden Democrats’ political opponents reportedly responded to SD’s growth by increasingly engaging in debates about racism, tolerance, diversity, and anti-racism, with some emphasis on SD's influence regarding the first (Hedström, Müller, 2014).

This, in part, took the form in demonstrations during SD-held rallies and

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speeches in different towns and communities in Sweden (Fjellman, 2014;

Larsson, Nilsson, 2014; Widegård, 2014).

Looking at the data provided by Ahmadi et al (2020) in the Diversity Barometer (see section 5.2.1), most of all age groups reportedly had a “good or very good” experience working or studying with colleagues with foreign backgrounds; between those of eighteen and 65 years of age, this majority represented 74 to 81 percent of all respondents. The lowest majority group was with the age group 65 or older, 53 percent. It is worth noting that this last group also had the biggest percentage of respondents with no experience.

The response rate for “bad or very bad experience”, within all age groups, varied between thirteen and six percent; to the idea whether society should create opportunities for people of foreign background to preserve their cultural traditions, thirty percent answered negatively and 57 percent

responded positively; to the question whether people of foreign background should have the same social rights as Swedes, fifteen percent thought that they should not, and 77 percent thought that they should; the respondents were also asked to give their opinion to what they thought about people with foreign background preserving their native language and teaching it to their children - 22 percent thought it was a bad idea and 61 percent thought the opposite.

Another survey (see section 5.2.1) conducted by the SOM-institute

(Society, Opinion, Media), via the University of Gothenburg, asked members of the public whether it was a good idea or not to accept fewer refugees; 44 percent answered that it was a good proposal, and 32 thought it was a bad proposal (Oscarsson, Bergström, 2015). It needs to be noted that the survey from the SOM-institute did not ask the respondents about their opinion towards refugees, but only if fewer should be accepted.

5.2.3 2015

Swedish society experienced the arrival of 162 877 asylum seekers in 2015, the most common nationalities coming from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea and Somalia and Iran (migrationsverket.se, 2020); 3 000 individuals were reportedly stateless, a much higher number than previous years. OECD writes in a 2016 report (oecd.org) that this, combined with 2014, was the largest per-capita inflow of refugees ever recorded in an OECD-country.

Moreover, according to data provided by the Swedish Central Bureau of Statistics (Statistiska Centralbyrån), in 2015, 17 percent of the entire

population was born abroad. Comparing this with the proportion of 1990, 9,2 percent, we can observe an almost double increase of people born abroad living in Sweden in 15 years.

In an interview done by the Swedish Newspaper Sydsvenskan in April of 2015, Prime Minister Stefan Löfven was asked if there is a limit to how

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many refugees Sweden can accept. The answer was no, there is no limit - Sweden can manage. To support this claim, Löfven pointed to the Balkan refugee crisis of the 1990’s, Swedish society has accepted and integrated large amounts of refugees in the past and they can do it now (Lönnaeus, 2015).

Further, in parts of the public discourse surrounding a double murder in August of 2015, committed by an Eritrean immigrant, negative and hostile attitudes are noticeable toward the immigrant and refugee population, and by extension the refugee policies. A Facebook post by an SD member of the Swedish Parliament (Björn Söder) captures this sentiment, in which he blames the previous government’s “open hearts” politics for allowing the perpetrator to come to Sweden; he ends the post by calling for the Swedish people to “wake up” so that said politics can be put to an end. This post has, as of the writing of this essay, received 1,800 likes and has been shared 316 times (facebook.com, 2015). At the same time, politicians from other parties, such as the SAP or the Left Party condemned Söder’s statement (Holmqvist, Svensson, 2015).

In May of 2015, SVT organized a party leader debate with all

parliamentary parties, with immigration and refugee policy as one of the talking points. In this debate, Jimmie Åkesson, party leader of the Sweden Democrats, repeatedly brings up the socioeconomic costs (and his perceived failure) of the current and historical refugee policies implemented by the political establishment (youtube.com, 2015). He is the only one to do so, and points to the failure of the Swedish government to address these issues. Let us take a brief look at what the socioeconomic costs that correlated with these refugee policies looked like in 2015.

In 2017, economist Tino Sanandaji published a book about the socioeconomic costs of Sweden’s recent historical and contemporary

immigration policies. He writes that, between 1990 and 2012, the number of areas of exclusion in Sweden increased from three to 186. In 2015, despite only representing 17 percent of the population, people born abroad that live in Sweden stood for: 53 percent of prison inmates with long prison

sentences; 54 percent of all the unemployed; received 60 percent of all social security benefits; 71 percent of all children living in poverty; and 76 percent of all gang members had an immigrant background. Events such as the throwing of rocks against police and rescue personnel, together with cases of arson, were concentrated in immigrant-dense areas (p.15).

By November of 2015, the minority government of the Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the Greens introduced restrictive measures that would reformulate Sweden’s refugee policy - from one of the most liberal in Europe to meeting the bare minimum EU requirements. The reasons for these

measures, according to Stefan Löfvén, were not to calm the Swedish people for the sake of popularity, but solely for socioeconomic reasons - Sweden

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had, contrary to his statements in April, reached its limit (Barlai et al, 2017, p.291-294).

Connecting to this, in another tv-debate organized by SVT, broadcasted after the refugee policy restrictions were implemented in November, party representatives from the Green Party, the SAP and the Moderates discussed the then newly imposed refugee-policy restrictions. While the Greens

disapproved of the restrictions, the consensus was that they were a necessity, to tackle growing socioeconomic challenges. In other words, this is the same rhetoric used by the Prime Minister at the time (youtube.com, 2015).

The Diversity Barometer (Ahmadi et al, 2020) was not conducted in 2015, so at least from that source, there is no data concerning public opinion towards refugees from that year. Viewing the SOM-institute survey for 2015 (see section 5.2.1), 40 percent of respondents answered that it was a good proposal to accept fewer refugees, while 37 percent thought the opposite (Oscarsson, Bergström, 2016). Observing the answer rate from the year prior, there is a four percent decrease in those who were positive to the idea and a five percent increase in those who were not. In closing, examining the trending Twitter hashtags in Sweden during 2015, online support for the refugee policies, and the refugees themselves, can be observed. On several occasions throughout the latter half of the year, the hashtag

#refugeeswelcome was trending. In August, two hashtags were trending with the captions #SD-Reklamen and #SLSpriderRasism; this refers to the

controversy surrounding political ads that the Sweden Democrats had placed in subways in Stockholm. The ads, together with Stockholm Public Transport (Stockholms Lokaltrafik), were accused of spreading racist messages and were eventually torn down by protestors (Kasurinen, Rogberg, 2015).

5.2.4 2016

While fewer people applied for asylum in Sweden in 2016 than in 2015 (28 900), the number of immigrants was much greater: 163 000. With the

exclusion of returning Swedish nationals, the six biggest demographics came from Syria, Eritrea, Poland, Iraq, India, and Somalia (migrationsverket.se, n.d., scb.se, 2019).

In a party leader debate arranged by SVT in May of 2016, where the socioeconomic challenges of the refugee crisis were discussed, SD’s party leader Jimmie Åkesson challenged the parties of the previous government, claiming that by now supporting the strict refugee policies that were implemented in 2015, they are agreeing with the proposed actions of the Sweden Democrats, which have advocated for such policies (albeit stricter) to be implemented for years. Then, by extension, he claims that the current government coalition (consisting of the SAP and the Greens) is doing the same thing.

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Later, in July the same year, in a party-held speech, Åkesson talks in similar fashion; the current parties in power and those that previously held it are only now realizing what SD, and in his words, the Swedish people, have known all along - that the historically liberal refugee policies, and the multicultural society they have created, are responsible for many of the challenges that Sweden now faces. Further, he states that the foreign cultures that have been “imported” by these policies have put the Swedish people in danger. He continues to put the blame for these perceived dangers on the current and previous political establishment.

If we observe more statistical data, increased support for the Sweden Democrats is shown. An online collection of opinion polls (val.digital, 2016), shows that, in 2016, the popularity of SD varied from 14,1 to 28,8 percent, with an average of 19,8. Comparing this to the 2014 election results, 12,8 percent, there is an estimated growth of at least 1,2 percent, and at most sixteen percent.

The Diversity Barometer (Ahmadi et al, 2016), unlike the year prior, was conducted in 2016 (see section 5.2.1). Observing the response rate for those who had either a “good or very good” or “bad or very bad” experience working with people of foreign background, the two age groups that saw increase in the good experience category were 18-30 and over 65, five and eight percent respectively 81 to 86 percent and 53 to 61 percent. The

response rate with the age group 51-65 in the same category did not change, and the age group 31-50 decreased slightly from 78 to 76 percent. Within all age groups, the bad experience category varied from ten to seven percent of all respondents, with the age group 31-50 dropping four percent from 2014.

The respondents were also asked whether or not they support the idea that society should create opportunities for immigrants to keep their cultural traditions, 49 percent answered positively and 31 percent responded

negatively, showing eight percent less with those who answered yes and one percent more with those who answered no compared to 2014; the

respondents were also asked to give their opinion about the notion of people with foreign background having the same social rights as Swedish citizens - 55 percent thought it was a good idea and 31 percent did not - compared to 2014, the negative side increased from fifteen to 31, more than double, and the positive side decreased from 77 percent to 55; the respondents were asked about immigrants keeping their native languages and teaching it to their sons and daughters; nineteen percent did not approve of the idea and 60 percent did approve, showing a three percent decrease in the negative and a one percent decrease in the positive from 2014.

Moreover, the survey by the SOM-institute from the same year (see section 5.2.1) shows increasingly polarized responses. Like previous years, they asked the respondents what they thought about the idea that Sweden should accept fewer refugees - those who thought it was a good proposal had increased from forty percent to 52, while those who answered the opposite

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had decreased from 37 percent to 24, showing a variance of twelve percent in the positive category and thirteen percent in the negative (Oscarsson,

Bergström, 2017). Finally, looking at trending Twitter hashtags from 2016, in March the Islamophobic hashtag #StopIslam was trending on five separate occasions; in April, the hashtag #refugeeswelcome was again trending.

Finally, the Twitter hashtag #withrefugees was trending throughout June, referring to a campaign by the UN Refugee Agency (UNCHR), meant to increase worldwide support for refugees (unhcr.org, n.d).

5.2.5 2017

The increasing polarization regarding Sweden’s refugee policy is apparent in 2017, the year before the 2018 national election. With the refugee policy restrictions still in place in 2017, 25 600 people applied for asylum in 2017, a decrease of 3 300 (11 percent) since 2016 (scb.se, 2018). In 2017, including those seeking asylum, Sweden experienced the immigration of 144 400 individuals. With the exclusion of returning Swedish nationals, the six biggest demographics came from Syria, Afghanistan Iraq, India, Poland, and Iran.

In a 2017 interview by the Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet, Maria Ferm (The Greens), Member of Parliament, stated that they are working towards easing the imposed restrictions on Sweden’s refugee reception, which will be implemented once “the current situation” looks more promising; Ferm believes that the Swedish people will support a, what she calls, humane refugee policy again, if they see it as a sustainable option (Karlsson, 2017).

By contrast, in a party-leader debate held in the Swedish Parliament, SD leader Jimmie Åkesson again emphasized that the policies that are now implemented should have been done so much sooner, policies which he claims, previously, his party alone advocated for, and that the socioeconomic problems that Sweden faces today are a consequence of the weak leadership of the other parties (riksdagen.se, 2017). In October of 2017, in an interview organized by SVT, Åkesson used similar rhetoric, claiming that the

Moderate’s new refugee policy is a copy of his party’s policies, and that this copying is part of an effort to prevent voters from leaving the Moderates in favor of the Sweden Democrats (youtube.com, 2017).

Outside of the Swedish Parliament and TV-stations, in 2017 tensions can be seen between those representing opposing sides on Sweden’s refugee policy - in this context, the Sweden Democrats and the Left Party. While SD runs on a nationalistic and monocultural platform, the Left Party strongly values pluralism and diversity; looking at the Left’s 2017 political platform, there is a strong advocacy for combating (what they see as) growing

xenophobic, racist, and nationalistic sentiments in the political discourse, and

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in Swedish society (vänsterpartiet.se, 2016). In January, the Left Party declined to take part in arranging a memorial for victims of the Holocaust, held in Gothenburg, on account of SD being involved. In an interview by the newspaper Göteborgs-Posten, the then district chairman for the Left Party in Gothenburg, Adriana Aires, states her party does not support (what they view as) racists organizing such an event (Larsson, 2017). Moreover, In February, SD had to cancel a speech in Umeå, a town in Northern Sweden, due to disruptions and protests with the involvement of hundreds of people,

organized by the Left Party’s youth organization (Ung Vänster). The reason for the demonstration was to combat the perceived racist views of SD (Karlsson, 2017). Another similar instance in February occurred in the town of Eskilstuna, where a group of political opponents used fireworks and other measures to disrupt an SD-held meeting (Malmgren, 2017). However, the exact political affiliations of this group remain unknown.

Political support for the Left Party increased from receiving 5,7 percent in the 2014 national election, to getting an average of 7,6 percent in 2017 opinion polls (val.digital, 2017). In 2017, the Sweden Democrats received a 0,2 percent lower average in opinion polls than in 2016, 19,6 percent. The Diversity Barometer was not conducted in 2017. But, the SOM-institute survey was (see section 5.2.1); the respondents who answered positively to the idea of accepting fewer refugees increased by one percent, from 52 to 53, and the response rate of those who thought it was a bad idea remained the same as in 2016, 24 percent (Martinsson et al, 2018). In June of 2017, the Twitter hashtag #withrefugees was again trending.

5.2.6 2018

The number of asylum seekers decreased between 2017 and 2018, from 25 600 to 21 500. The number of immigrants in total in 2018 was 132 600; with the exclusion of returning Swedish nationals, the six biggest demographics came from Afghanistan, Syria, India, Eritrea, Iraq, and Iran

(migrationsverket.se, 2020, scb.se, 2020).

The Sweden Democrats’ 2018 election manifesto, in terms of immigration and multiculturalism, is like their 2014 principal program. There is a strong advocacy against multiculturalism. Sweden is not to accept any refugees, with the exception if asylum seekers should come from neighboring

countries. Return migration should be encouraged and assimilation programs are to be implemented, all to protect the Swedish nation state and Swedish culture (sd.se, 2018).

On a related note, a notable turn of events in March of 2018 was the launch of the ethnonationalist, right-wing populist party Alternative for Sweden (Alternativ för Sverige). AfS for short, the party was first registered with the

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Swedish Electoral Authority in 2017; its party leadership consists of former high-ranking members of the previous youth organization of the Sweden Democrats, called Sweden Democratic Youth (Sverigedemokratisk

Ungdom). In 2015, The Sweden Democrats cut ties with their previous youth wing and excommunicated several members in 2015 from the mother party, due to their perceived extreme ethnonationalist and extremist views

(Helmersson, Olsson, 2017, Juhlin, 2015). Looking at how AfS describes their political agenda, there is a focus on the return of homogeneity and the protection of Swedish society and traditional Swedish values, all of which, according to them, is under threat by the existing and growing

multiculturalism in Sweden. Immigrants from different cultures are by extension, and specifically, blamed for the issues Sweden faces. Therefore, AfS believes there needs to be an immediate stop to the reception of immigrants, and an implementation of an active return migration and deportation program (alternativförsverige.se, 2020).

The main ideological difference between the two parties (according to Jimmie Åkesson) is that while the Sweden Democrats believe that biology and ethnicity does not decide whether a person can, as he puts it, become truly Swedish or not, Alternative for Sweden thinks it does. Interestingly, looking at SD’s earlier principal programs, this “open Swedishness” that Åkesson mentions was described as early as 1989 (snd.gu.se, n.d). In other words, SD is open to the idea of immigrants and refugees of different ethnicities becoming Swedish in a way that AfS is not; in every sense that SD is nationalist, ethnocentric and against multiculturalism, AfS is even more so (youtube.com, 2018). During their 2018 political campaign, AfS called for the deportation of migrants from, to name a few: Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Romania, Syria, and Eritrea (youtube.com, 2018). That is to say, migrants who are ethnically and culturally different. Further, in connection with an AfS-held rally in September of 2018, large numbers of demonstrators gathered, four to five hundred people, to protest the perceived racist and extremist views of the party. This resulted in breakouts of violence between the opposing sides (Mikaelsson, Lundberg, 2018).

Observing the immigrant policies of the Social Democrats in 2018, there is an intent on maintaining the restrictions put in place in 2015- the Social Democrats do not wish for larger amounts of refugees to come to Sweden.

Furthermore, the focus has shifted from solely Sweden’s responsibility to help refugees, to making sure that other countries do their part, especially in the EU (socialdemokraterna.se, 2018). Concerning the remaining members of the Swedish Parliament, it is necessary to backtrack a bit to understand how each party changed (or kept) their immigration and refugee policy in response to the refugee crisis of 2015, and the implemented restrictions, in time for the 2018 election. With SD and SAP covered, we will now do an overview of the remaining parties: The Moderates, the Christian Democrats

The Attitudes of Native Swedes Toward Refugees Bachelor Thesis