UPPSALA UNIVERSITY

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UPPSALA UNIVERSITY

Master Programme in Peace and Conflict Studies

May 2021

Examining Mediation Onset in Recurring Conflicts

Author:

Wera Terhaag

Supervisor(s):

Annekatrin Deglow

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

‘Under the current circumstances’ or ‘in these uncertain times’ are sentences forever burned into many university students’ recollection of the 2020/21 academic year. To say that it has been an interesting time would be an unjust simplification of the otherwise already high-intensity experience of writing a Master’s thesis. It is perhaps because of the increased exhausting and stressful circumstances that make it imperative for me to acknowledge and convey my gratitude to those who have supported and helped me during the last semester. First, thank you to my supervisors, who were always available to support, suggest and, in some cases, steer me in alternative directions when needed. It is one thing to try to be confident in your own thought process and quite another to hear reassuring words from an academic who ‘has been there’ and arrived on the other side: thank you Sebastian and Annekatrin!

Second, thank you to my student-support group who ensured that despite not being able to support each other in person, there was nonetheless a shared sense of ‘we’ while working on our respective theses, often from the same four walls for weeks on end. We did it!

Third, thank you Tove and Lou for the many shenanigans and adventures that we have enjoyed over the last two years – and for those yet to come!

Lastly, thank you to my family, who scattered on three continents, prove every day that home is not a place but is found with people. To my sister, her husband and dog, whose shared pictures of the beach were always a timely reminder that there is, literally, sunshine every day – we simply are not always able to see it ourselves. But it is there. To my older brother and his partner, who I admire for their determination and for always being open to adventure. To my younger brother, who suffers greatly with three older siblings but who (perhaps as a result?) is the strongest out of all of us – you and your golden heart will go far! To the four-legged Terhaag, whose furry cuddles and consistent shenanigans continue to provide welcome distractions. And lastly, to my parents, who, in my unbiased and objective opinion, are simply the best. For your support of each other as well as for us kids. For giving us a solid foundation that has enabled us to be brave and pursue our dreams – wherever that may take us.

“One's life has value so long as one attributes value to the life of others, by means of love,

friendship, indignation and compassion.”

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ABSTRACT

After the Cold War, mediation as an armed conflict resolution process was thought to become an increasingly common tool to address even the most complex armed conflicts. Recurring conflicts especially should be the focus of mediation. However, with regards to armed conflicts that reoccur, there is a gap in the research of mediation in relation to the rounds of violence. This thesis argues that the more rounds of violence a recurring armed conflict experiences the less likely it will experience mediation. To examine the relationship between the rounds of violence of a recurring armed conflict and mediation onset, this thesis employed Structured Focused Comparison (SFC) to compare two recurring armed conflicts. One with a low mediation occurrence (West Papua) and one high mediation occurrence (Aceh). While the case comparison provides limited support for the hypothesized relationship between rounds of violence and mediation, the results instead may provide support that recurring armed conflicts are not increasingly resistant to mediation the more rounds of violence they experience.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CWM Civil War Mediation (Dataset) EIR Enduring Internal Rivalry

GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/Free Aceh Movement GoI Government of Indonesia

HDC Humanitarian Dialogue Centre ICG International Crisis Group

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross MHS Mutually Hurting Stalemate

MIO Muhammadiyah Islamic Organization MoU Memorandum of Understanding MOZ Military Operation Zone

NYA New York Agreement

OPM Organisasi Papua Merdeka/Free Papua Movement PPC Papuan Peace Conference

RoV Round(s) of Violence

SFC Structured Focused Comparison

TNI Indonesian National Military/Tentara Nasional Indonesia UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program

UN United Nations

US United States

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LIST OF FIGURES, GRAPHS, AND TABLES

Table 1 Operationalisation of Constant Variables ... 20

Table 2 Operationalisation of the Independent Variable (Rounds of Violence) ... 21

Table 3 Operationalisation of the Dependent Variable (Mediation Onset)... 22

Table 4 Operationalisation of the Dependent Variable (Mediation Offer/Request) ... 23

Table 5 Operationalisation of Alternative Explanations ... 25

Table 6 Rounds of Violence in West Papua (Indonesia)... 28

Table 7 Summary of Mediation Onset in West Papua ... 29

Table 8 Summary of Mediation Offers ... 30

Table 9 Summary of Mediation Requests for West Papua ... 31

Table 10 Intensity of the Armed Conflict in West Papua ... 31

Table 11 Rounds of Violence in Aceh (Indonesia) ... 40

Table 12 Summary of Mediation Onset in Aceh ... 42

Table 13 Summary of Mediation Offers for Aceh ... 43

Table 14 Summary of Mediation Requests for Aceh ... 44

Table 15 Intensity of the Armed Conflict in Aceh ... 45

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the two decades following 1988, most of the world’s conflicts were resolved through signed agreements and there were as many mediation processes in the 1990s as during the entirety of the Cold War period (Baumann and Clayton 2017). The immediate post-Cold War period was marked by a significant rise in mediation as a conflict resolution tool and was widely predicted to continue to increase in the 21st_{century (Gowan and Stedman 2018, 175). This}

hopeful trend has been the general stance accepted in academia and policy; however, the reality is that two-thirds of armed conflicts did not receive mediation in the last 15 years. In addition, many now believe that the decade following the end of the Cold War may have been an anomaly rather than an indication of a ‘new normal’ (Lundgren and Svensson 2020).

While mediation capacity and support have increased significantly since the turn of the century, the number of armed conflicts where third-party intervention has occurred has stagnated, and more recently, gone into decline (Lundgren and Svensson 2020; Harland 2018). In light of this stagnation and decline in mediation as a conflict resolution mechanism, this has not corresponded to a similar stagnation and decline in conflicts that need resolving (Harland 2018; Kreutz 2010). This thesis specifically focuses on recurring conflicts or conflicts that have experienced more than one round of violence (RoV). Recurring conflicts, by their definition, exhibit resistance to permanent termination, and as such, are perhaps the most concerted effort for resolution through mediation. However, despite theoretical argumentation that recurring conflicts should experience more mediation, this relationship remains understudied. In addition, recent quantitative analysis of recurring civil wars has indicated that there is a negative relationship between the number of rounds of violence (RoV) a recurring conflict experiences and mediation onset (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011).

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This thesis argues that the more RoV a recurring conflict has experienced the less likely it will be that mediation occurs. However, this thesis examines mediation, by its very definition, as a process in which actors engage or deny participation: mediation is determined through actor-centric decisions. As such, this thesis argues that the more RoV a recurring armed conflict experiences the less likely it will be that mediation will occur.

The hypothesised relationship between RoV and mediation is tested through the employment of qualitative analysis. Using Structured Focused Comparison (SFC), this thesis examines and compares two cases of recurring conflicts in Indonesia: West Papua and Aceh.

The SFC analysis of West Papua and Aceh lend some support for the hypothesis that recurring conflicts with a high number of RoVs are less likely to experience mediation. However, there are significant caveats to the findings based on the disaggregated examination of mediation by offers and requests.

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2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE

2.1 Recurring Conflicts

The distinctive classification and categorization of conflicts is a fundamental tool in conflict research: it helps to understand as well as group different types of armed conflicts based on shared as well as differentiating elements. This thesis will focus on especially one fundamental aspect of conflict: recurrence. More than half of the armed conflicts captured by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) have experienced reoccurrence and the pattern seems to have become more entrenched in the last two decades (Pettersson and Öberg 2020). Therefore, recurring armed conflicts seem to pose a challenge to permanent conflict resolution.

In previous research, terms such as protracted conflicts (Azar 1990), intractable conflicts (Coleman 2003), or enduring internal rivalries (EIRs) (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008) have all been used to describe armed conflicts that occur over a prolonged period of time. While these three categorizations of conflicts encompass the aspect of time, the label of ‘recurring conflicts’ adds the additional aspect of fluctuating cycles of intensity and; therefore, armed conflicts that experience more than one RoV or experienced several, but ultimately brief, termination periods. While the application of terms such as protracted or intractable conflicts and EIRs all offer frameworks for conflicts that occur over long periods of time, these frameworks do not incorporate that conflicts are not linear in their intensity, even when experienced over long periods of time. Instead, armed conflicts are often cyclical with moments of low levels of violence so that the conflict has seemingly ‘stopped’ only to flare up again at a later point in time.

Recurring conflicts are by no means a new category of armed conflict; however, their very nature means that the cost of conflict has been lower than the cost of continued termination of violence. A common element of the above classification is that these types of conflicts remain unresolved to the extent that they have continued conflict potential – even when the violence decreases to the extent that the conflict appears ‘inactive’. Continued saliency and eventual recurrence can occur for a variety of factors including shifts in the domestic, regional and international spheres. Even conflict resolution processes such as negotiation or third-party mediation may only decrease the violence while not resolving fundamental conflict potentials; therefore, the potential for future outbreaks of violence remains and often does lead to a subsequent outbreak or RoV.

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(Coleman et al. 2007, 1470). Therefore, it is empirically difficult to distinguish the causes of renewed conflict since these causes may inherently change during and after each round of recurred conflict. As such, addressing elements of conflict potential makes resolving recurring conflicts or permanent termination especially difficult and complex (Coleman et al. 2007). In addition, empirical data has consistently shown that societies that have previously experienced one conflict are at a significantly higher risk to experience subsequent conflict than societies without a prior history (Walter 2004; Derouen, Bercovitch, and Wei 2009; Jarland et al. 2020). Despite a cessation of violence these conflicts resume and in turn, the previous cessation of conflict only ever remains temporary (Collier and Sambanis 2002). Given their recurring nature, these conflicts should normatively be of particular focus for mediation attempts given that they repeatedly demonstrate that the actors are unable to permanently resolve incompatibilities through violence.

2.2 Mediation

Mediation is a highly varied phenomenon that has experienced substantial changes since the end of the Cold War. This has resulted in limited consensus on a single definition of mediation. However, definitions generally include that mediation is a non-violent third-party intervention with the aim of affecting, changing, modifying, or influencing the actors and; therefore, the outcome of a conflict (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2012; Baumann and Clayton 2017; Lundgren and Svensson 2020). As such, mediation can and will manifest differently in different contexts. For example, mediation can be third-party sponsored talks, conferences, or unofficial meetings with each conflict actor. Bercovitch and Gartner (2009) define mediation as a non-coercive, nonviolent, and, ultimately, non-binding form of intervention. This definition highlights the more diplomatic and neutral understanding of mediation. However, mediators are not always inherently neutral or non-coercive with some research even suggesting that biased mediation is more effective than neutral mediation (Vuković 2011; Svensson 2015). Mediators can also be representing an international organisation, a government or civil society (Regan, Frank, and Aydin 2009). As such, it is important to recognise that mediation manifests on a wide spectrum.

2.3 Window of Opportunity and Mediation

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mediation efforts lead to longer rather than shorter disputes (Regan and Stam 2000). However, they also acknowledge that the limited number of cases hinders conclusive results and that more nuanced and case-specific examination is necessary in order to expand on initial findings (Regan and Stam 2000).

Alternatively, Zartman (Zartman 1989; 1985) proposes the notion of ‘ripeness’ and a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) as determining for the opportune moment for a conflict to be resolved. Recognising and making use of the MHS seems to be positively related to brokering mediated settlements of conflicts as well as peace that is ultimately longer than settlements negotiated prior to this point in the conflict under more coercive means (Zartman 1985; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007, 189). This again puts timing at the forefront of when mediation has the most potential to resolving a conflict. Therefore, timing overall seems to be a vital aspect of mediation efforts and as such, disaggregating conflicts temporally corresponds to this notion.

Alternatively, some research has rather pointed out that instead of this ‘moment in time’, data has shown that mediation seems to simply be more likely ‘late’ in civil wars, thereby indicating that timing is not necessarily concentrated on a ‘moment’ but perhaps a time frame (Melin and Svensson 2009; Greig and Regan 2008). As such, while timing is ultimately understood to be an important factor, previous research has ultimately focused on conflicts as linear events and not as disaggregated, often cyclical events. Ultimately, however, recurring conflicts are not linear since each RoV is not independent of the RoV that came before it: RoVs in a recurring conflict will affect the subsequent RoV(s).

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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis will examine the relationship between rounds of violence and mediation onset. As such, based on the above understandings of recurring conflicts and mediation, this section will argue why mediation onset is affected by the number of RoVs a recurring conflict experiences.

3.1 Recurring Conflicts and Rounds of Violence

To begin with, recurring conflicts can be defined as simply: conflicts that undergo more than one RoV or conflict episodes and, thus, seemingly ‘repeat’ more than once (Crocker et al. 2004, 7; DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008; Walter 2004). However, this arguably requires a distinct understanding of when a conflict starts and each time it seemingly terminates. For this thesis, conflict termination is based on Kreutz (2010) definition which stipulates that a conflict is conceived as terminated when it no longer fulfils the UCDP’s 25 battle-related deaths per year threshold in addition to remaining below this threshold for at least one year. Arguably then, recurring conflicts can be disaggregated into distinct RoVs that it has experienced. This disaggregation allows for a given conflict to be examined in terms of how many rounds of violence it has experienced. Based on the newest data from UCDP, there have been 108 recurring conflicts between 1989 – 2019 with each experiencing between two and eight rounds of violence.

3.2 Barriers to Mediation: Entrenchment and Institutionalisation

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With each round, recurring conflicts are ‘locked in’ further, thereby increasing the barriers to permanent resolution and, perhaps then, to efforts to reach this end as well. In this vein, Bohrer and Hartzell (2005) suggest that mediation should occur before the institutionalisation of a rivalry. Therefore, it is suggested that armed conflicts have the lowest barriers to mediated resolution in their earliest RoVs.

3.3 Actors and Mediation Occurrence

Regarding mediation onset in a given armed conflict, it is important to recognise that the decision to engage a mediator or in mediation is made by the conflict-fighting actors. This again relates to the predominant understanding of what mediation is, namely: a process whereby third-party intervention is accepted by the conflicting actors as a legitimate process in order to facilitate a de-escalation of a particular armed conflict (Greig and Regan 2008). According to Gadlin (2013, 102–3) actors are the inherent participants in the construction, and perpetuation of belief systems, statements and actions that manoeuvre and transform conflicts. Essentially, this means that actors are the most elemental component and it is actors who the decision to either escalate or deescalate armed conflicts – it is actors that decide to continue fighting or to engage in mediation; therefore, it is actors that either resist or choose to engage in a mediation process. Recurring conflicts, specifically

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may refuse to accept or request mediation efforts in order to not sent certain signals.

In addition, it is also a matter of the mediator who chooses to offer to mediate an armed conflict. While traditionally, mediators have been state actors, such as diplomats, as well as super- or non-state actors such as international organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), who increasingly play an important and active role as mediators (Gartner 2011; Lundgren 2016; Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Shannon 2009).

These mediation actors are categorised into different mediation tracks: Track I encompasses state actors; Track II mediation is conducted by IGOs/NGOs or prominent civil actors, and; Track III mediation is executed by civil society actors or at a grassroots level. While mediation is seen as a normative and popular conflict tool, mediators may balance their decision to mediate an armed conflict against their calculated chance of manoeuvring the actors in a desired direction (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2012). Mediators must not only examine their capabilities to intervene but must also be considered a viable actor that the conflicting parties are willing to engage with. Again, it is the actors who are vital in examining whether mediation may or may not occur in an armed conflict: several actors’ decisions must align for mediation to occur. Therefore, mediation onset is a phenomenon that is intimately linked to the decision-making process by actors prior to the point where mediation is observable.

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a non-state armed conflict actor challenging the state. 3.4 Mediation Onset

Mediation is in it of itself an opportunity for an improvement of the conflictual context, regardless of if an agreement is reached. When examining mediation in relation to conflict termination and conflict recurrence, it is important to examine if mediation was accepted as a conflict resolution option and if this acceptance is based on an offer by a third-party or a request from the parties involved in the conflict. The onset of mediation is anything but a dichotomous phenomenon. Third-party mediation can be requested by one or both of the conflict actor or it can be offered by the third-party actor; there is always an interplay of requests or offers and acceptance. Only when these factors align does mediation actually occur. Mediation onset means that these preconditions to mediation have been met. As this thesis is examining if recurring conflicts become more resistant to mediation, this inherently means that these conflicts become more opposed to mediation onset – they do not consent to third-party intervention. Mediation offers and requests, while from a policy perspective are important to determine when actors conduct them, are only the foundational step to the process that has the potential to end the conflict. For the sake of conflict resolution, examining mediation onset allows for an understanding of contextual and temporal elements which make mediation onset more or less likely, which is inherently important to mediation scholars and practitioners. Just as there are elements or strategies that can be employed to make mediation onset more likely, there are in turn conflict dynamics which can act as obstacles for mediation to occur. Given that recurring conflicts with multiple rounds of violence are characterised by high degrees of entrenchment and institutionalisation of conflict relationships, the resistance to mediation is likely higher in conflicts that have experienced more rounds of violence since these dynamics may be reinforced with every round.

Hypothesis 1: The more rounds of violence a recurring armed conflict experiences the less

likely it becomes that mediation will occur.

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4. METHODOLOGY

This study compares two armed conflicts in Indonesia to examine whether more RoVs decreases the likelihood of mediation onset. The study intends to build on the existing theory regarding mediation occurrence and conflicts as well as testing whether the existing theory captures the reality of a specific case. In the following section the methodological choices are outlined.

4.1 Structured Focused Comparison (SFC)

The method of SFC is used to test the theoretical argument outlined in the sections above. SFC is a qualitative method employed to systematically examine selected cases based on a focused set of questions that are applied to each case (George and Bennett 2005). The method of SFC increases the consistency of the data collected from each case as the collection of data is standardised and systematic; each case is ‘treated’ the same. Through the employment of SFC, the analysis of cases can be focused on particular aspects that are of interest to the analysis. The systematic analysis of the cases allows for an examination of the correlation between the variables of interest by asking the same questions of each case (George and Bennett 2005, 218–19).

The use of SFC as an in-depth qualitative comparison of the chosen case is due to both methodological as well as pragmatic reasons. To begin with, an in-depth qualitative comparison of an otherwise understudied relationship allows for the theory regarding this relationship to be examined and expanded based on the inferences drawn from the analysis pf specific cases. The relationship between RoVs and mediation onset is one that has been noted but has not been examined on a specific case basis (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011). Therefore, to examine the variation of mediation onset regarding RoVs, there needs to be a focused and systematic data collection on a chosen set of cases.

4.2 Case Selection

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One limitation stemming from research using SFC is decreased external validity due to the small number of cases being examined to draw inferences from. This thesis examined will only focus on two cases; therefore, all inferences drawn are arguably highly case-specific. While the case specificity can be decreased to some degree, it cannot, by the nature of SFC, be eliminated. The degree to which these findings are indicative of the total

population of cases is, therefore, lower than if more cases were included in the SFC. While this is largely due to time constraints, it does, unfortunately, limit the external validity of the analysis.

In order to decrease systemic error through selection bias and, thus, risking drawing conclusions that are deducted from biased inferences, the selected cases were chosen based on variation on the primary dependent variable (mediation onset) rather than the independent variable (rounds of violence). The most-similar case design was chosen where two selected cases appear to be identical with regards to constants but different with regards to the variable of interest (Plümper, Troeger, and Neumayer 2019).

In addition, cases were chosen that are viewed as broadly representative of the examined population of cases as this will provide the strongest basis for generalisation (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 298). The most-similar case design requires a minimum of two cases (Lijphart 1971; 1975). Thus, ensuring that the cases can be examined individually as well as with relation to each other to draw inferences with regards to the relationship of interest. The cases were also chosen based on comparability: contextual and conflict characteristics were similar between cases. This ensures a high degree of comparability and means that alternative explanations can be mitigated to some extent (Höglund 2011, 116).

The cases are chosen based on the dependent variable (mediation onset) in order to examine mediation in relation to RoVs. To determine if mediation took place, information from the CWM dataset was looked at with respect to both cases. However, the CWM dataset was only used as indicative of the mediation that took place, not with regards to offers or request made as this information is not captured in the CWM dataset. Therefore, a case with a high mediation onset and a case with low mediation onset were chosen. Based on the UCDP dataset, Indonesia has experienced three recurring conflicts between 1946-2019 (Pettersson and Öberg 2020). The case with a high number of coded mediation was in Aceh (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011). On the other hand, the armed conflict in West Papua saw no official mediation based on the CWM dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011).

4.3 Operationalization of Variables

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While the case selection allows for both within as well as between case comparison, in order to increase comparability between cases with regards to the conflict specific elements, this study ensures that certain elements are held constant between cases. These constants are: the incompatibility of each armed conflict; the classification of the armed conflict, and the intensity of the armed conflict.

First, the armed conflicts’ incompatibility refers to the expressed claim of the conflict parties of what they are fighting over (Pettersson 2020, 8). According to UCDP, there are three different types of incompatibilities: over territory, over government or a combination of both territory and government. This classification is aimed at capturing what armed conflicts are being fought over, not why or what the causes of armed conflict are. Therefore, it is a useful tool to categorise and compare armed conflicts that have the same classification with regards to the incompatibility. In addition, when comparing armed conflicts, it is important to compare conflicts with the same type of incompatibility. Armed conflicts fought over territory are distinct from armed conflicts fought over government. Overall, the willingness of governments especially to accept mediation is affected if the armed conflict is fought over territory: governments feel that third-party intervention signals that it is unable to control its own territory (Greig and Regan 2008; Melin and Svensson 2009; Clayton 2013). Therefore, as the incompatibility is likely to affect actors’ willingness to engage in mediation it is kept constant between the two cases.

Second, the type of conflict is kept constant in order to compare both within as well as between the cases. The type of conflict refers to if the conflict was interstate, intrastate, internationalised intrastate or extra-systemic. Again, the type of conflict affects the actors’ willingness to engage in mediation as well as the level of mediation offers made (Clayton and Gleditsch 2014). As such, in order to ensure comparability, the cases fall into the same category of the type of conflict, namely: intrastate armed conflict.

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Table 1 Operationalisation of Constant Variables

SFC Question Indicators Source(s)

What type of incompatibility is coded

for this conflict?

“Incompatibility [as stated by the parties]

concerning the status of a territory […]”. UCDP

What type of conflict is it?

Conflict is classified as an internal armed conflict when it is fought between the Government and an armed group without

external interference.

UCDP

Was the conflict/conflict episode considered a minor (between 25 and 999 deaths in a given year)

or major (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a

year?

Conflicts are categorised into two different levels: “The intensity variable is

coded in two categories: 1. Minor: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths

in a given year. 2. War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year.”

UCDP

4.3.2 Rounds of Violence (RoVs)

In order to capture how many rounds of violence the two armed conflicts experienced, data from UCDP was used to determine what dates are coded for each armed conflict over the duration of the captured timeframe. UCDP disaggregates conflicts into what is classified as separate conflict episodes: each episode is coded as starting with the date that the violence first passes the 25 battle-related death threshold and each episode ends when the battle-related deaths does not pass the 25 threshold deaths for an entire year (Pettersson and Öberg 2020). This disaggregation allows for distinct rounds associated with active armed conflict years to be determined and examined. In order to be classified as a recurring conflict, an armed conflict must have at least two armed conflict episodes coded. Therefore, each conflict episode. As captured in the UCDP dataset corresponds to one RoV of that conflict. An armed conflict with three or fewer RoVs is classified as having a low number of RoVs. An armed conflict with four or more rounds of violence is considered as having a high number of RoVs.

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Table 2 Operationalisation of the Independent Variable (Rounds of Violence)

How many RoVs did the armed conflict experience so far?

UCDP coded years for when the battle-related death threshold passed the 25 battle-related

deaths threshold.

UCDP

How long did each RoV last?

One RoV is made of the number of consecutive years an armed conflict passes the

25 battle-related death threshold. A RoV ‘ends’ when this threshold is not passed for

one year.

UCDP

4.3.3 Mediation Onset

This study assumes that mediation is enough of a general process that it can be recognised and that there is an element of comparability between one instance of mediation and the next. In this thesis, the following definition of mediation will be used as the point of departure for the operationalisation of the mediation-related variables: “[mediation is a] process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences […]” (italics added; Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991, 8). As such, mediation onset is operationalised as encapsulating the intervention of a third-party actor who is not militarily involved in the armed conflict, in order to facilitate non-violent interaction between armed conflict actors. Furthermore, third-party mediation can result from either a request made by one or both armed actors or an offer made by a third-party. In addition, the request must be accepted by the third-party in addition to the other armed actor as well as any offer must be accepted by both conflict actors for mediation to occur. Therefore, this operationalization highlights that mediation onset is preceded by offers or requests being made which will be either accepted or rejected.

As mentioned previously, mediation is not a standardised phenomenon, however, there are nonetheless sufficient similarities that mediation can be recognised and analysed. In order to capture a wide spectrum of mediation the operationalization is intentionally broad without concentrating on a specific mediation track.

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Table 3 Operationalisation of the Dependent Variable (Mediation Onset)

Did mediation occur?

Press releases relating to mediation taking place. Reports released by the mediating

actor. News reports specifying requests/offers as well as responses.

Factiva CWM Dataset

Primary and Secondary

Sources

What form did mediation take?

Information on mediated conference, direct talks, or private talks between a mediator

and each armed actor.

Factiva Primary and

Secondary Sources When did mediation

occur? Dates or temporal information of specific mediation events.

Factiva UCDP Dataset

CWM Dataset

Was the mediator new or did the same mediator

repeatedly engage?

The mediator/mediating organisation (according to the indicated name) is the same as during a previous mediation onset

according. CWM Dataset Factiva Primary and Secondary Sources

How long did mediation by last?

Publication of scheduled mediation events and information regarding the contents of

mediation efforts. CWM Dataset Factiva Primary and Secondary Sources

Who was the mediating actor?

Mediator is a state, multilateral or civil society actor. The mediator functions a representative for a state, multi-state or

private level. CWM Dataset Factiva Primary and Secondary Sources 4.3.4 Offers/Requests for Mediation (DV)

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Table 4 Operationalisation of the Dependent Variable (Mediation Offer/Request)

Was there an offer made to mediate in this conflict by

a third-party?

A mediator indicates an offer to mediate to one of the conflict actors.

CWM Dataset Factiva Primary and

Secondary Sources Who was the offer/request

made by? To whom was the offer/request made?

Official press releases/reports by either of the armed conflict actors or the mediator or a news source reporting that mediation

was requested or offered.

Secondary Sources Did either/both of the

conflict actors request mediation?

Official press releases/reports by either of the armed conflict actors, or the mediator

that mediation was requested.

Secondary Sources Was a mediation offer by a

third-party denied by an armed conflict actor?

A conflict actor contacts communicates that an offer by a mediator or a request by

the opposing actor is rejected.

Secondary Sources During/after which RoV

was the request/offer made?

Based on the dates published in primary and secondary sources regarding when contact with or by a mediator was made.

CWM Dataset Factiva

UCDP

4.4 Operationalisation of Alternative Explanations

In order to examine possible alternative explanations for conflict actors to request, deny or accept mediation offers, the following elements will also be examined: the intensity of an armed conflict, presence of natural resources in the territory, were there other intrastate armed conflicts active at the time, were there alternative conflict resolution processes, the comparable strength between the government and the armed actor, the fragmentation of the group and the human rights situation.

First, the intensity of the armed conflict may significantly impact the likelihood of mediation to occur. The likelihood of mediation has been linked to a change in conflict intensity: low-intensity conflicts that increase in intensity are more likely to receive an offer of mediation than armed conflicts that remain constant in their intensity (Ruhe 2015, 255–56). Therefore, to ensure that the variable of interest is isolated as much as possible, the intensity of each RoV is also captured as variation in the intensity may affect the ability to link mediation onset with the IV.

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and can be a motivating factor for mediation to be offered (ONUE and UNE 2016, 11–12). The presence of natural resources in a particular location often means that any conflict which affects the extraction of these resources impacts not only the local economy but reverberates to a wider cross-border range of actors (ONUE and UNE 2016, 11). Therefore, conflicts fought in areas with high-value natural resources may affect the likelihood of offers for mediation to be made as outside actors will urge for a timely resolution of armed conflict to safely continue operations.

Third, the contextual volatility surrounding an armed conflict is likely to impact mediation onset. Parallel armed conflicts can increase the costs governments associate with accepting third-party intervention, therefore, making it more resistant to accept or request mediation (Clayton and Gleditsch 2014, 271). Therefore, to examine mediation onset in relation to contextual factors that affect the overall likelihood for mediation to occur, the presence of parallel armed conflicts will also be captured and examined.

Fourth, alternative and local peace initiatives may impact the likelihood of mediation taking place. Local peace initiatives may provide armed conflict actors with a fruitful context to engage each other in mediated talks since localised peace initiatives grant legitimacy to non-violent conflict resolution to the two armed actors (Mitchell and Hancock 2012, 3–4). The interplay of local and national conflict resolution initiatives may therefore impact the DV.

Fifth, the comparable strength of the armed actors is linked to mediation onset. Specifically, in armed conflicts where the Government is not significantly stronger than its opponent, mediation is more likely to occur (Clayton 2013, 620). Relative strength, therefore, may impact the DV and must also be captured.

Sixth, fragmentation of the armed actors may impact mediation onset. Clear and authoritative representation is necessary, lacking these, mediation is unlikely to occur (Crocker et al. 2014, 151). Mediation inherently requires that each side is legitimately represented as any agreement or consensus reached with members of either group which does not legitimately represent each actor are unlikely to be adhered to or even be agreed to in the first place. Therefore, fragmentation is also examined to determine if it may influence the DV.

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Table 5 Operationalisation of Alternative Explanations

Was the armed conflict considered minor or a war

during a RoV?

Based UCDP thresholds for the related deaths in a year: 25-999 battle-related – minor conflict; over 1,000

battle-related deaths – war.

UCDP

Are there natural resources/economic

interests?

Natural resources are present in the contested territory and is specifically

mentioned in relation to the armed conflict. The natural resources can either

be related to: mining, oil and gas, and/or timber.

Factiva Primary and

Secondary Reports

Are there parallel armed conflicts?

More than one armed conflict is coded for the years the armed conflict is considered

active.

UCDP Were there direct

negotiations or domestic peace initiatives aimed at

fostering an end to the conflict?

Alternative processes to address the conflict can be direct talks/negotiations

between the armed conflict actors, conferences hosted by civilians or

civil-society actors or local peace initiatives.

Factiva Primary and

Secondary Reports

Fragmentation The structure of each actor is centralised or highly fragmented. Factiva Primary and Secondary Reports Comparable Strength

The disparity in military-strength between the military and the armed actor based on reports or estimates regarding the number

of fighter or weapon capabilities.

Factiva Primary and

Secondary Reports

Human Rights Violations

Specific mentions of human rights abuses by either actor as being perpetrated either against the opposing actor or within the

contested territory.

Factiva Primary and

Secondary Reports

4.5 Time Frame and Data Sources

The time-period examined is limited to the years of the latest UCDP Dataset as this provides the framework of when the examined case was ‘tracked’ as an active or inactive armed conflict: the latest published dataset covers the years 1946-2019.

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of conflict the case is classified as.

The structured collection of data regarding the dependent variables will examine both primary sources (such as news articles, press releases and reports by mediating actors) and secondary sources (such as databases on academic articles). This study will employ source triangulation to increase the consistency and accuracy of the information gathered. The use of source triangulation is a common tool to achieve a high degree of information verification and subsequently, confidence in the information gathered to conduct an analysis (Flick 2007). Source triangulation also prevents over-reliance on a limited number of sources which could significantly bias the data collected, thus limiting the strength of the analysis and its subsequent generalizability to other cases or the relationship being examined (Flick 2007, 118). In order to collect comprehensive information to the questions to conduct the SFC, sources for the dependent variable included the CWM dataset, results from Factiva searches as well as reports from the International Crisis Group (ICG), reports from the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) as well as reports from the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC).

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5. WEST PAPUA

5.1

Background

The armed conflict in West Papua has its roots in 1945 when Indonesia declared independence (Saltford 2003). However, despite Indonesia independence, an agreement was made that the province of West Papua would remain under Dutch administration and a referendum would be held for West Papuans to decide to either stay part of Indonesia or gain independence (Osborne 1985; Chauvel and Bhakti 2004). In 1962, as the Dutch were officially preparing to hand-over administration of the province, the West Papuans, prepared to declare West Papua independence. In reaction, the Indonesian political and military establishment started an active campaign to prevent this declaration (Scott and Tebay 2005, 599–600). As a result, in 1962 the United States brokered the New York Agreement (NYA) between the Dutch and Indonesia governments whereby West Papua would be handed over to Indonesia. West Papua officially became a province of Indonesia in 1963. However, West Papuan aspirations of self-determination did not disappear leading to the growth of a well-established resistance movement by the name of Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) in 1965 (Blades 2020; Osborne 1985; UCDP 2019b). With the growth of the OPM and its classification as a separatist movement by the Indonesian Government, West Papua was declared a Military Operation Zone (MOZ) in 1969 until 1998 during which West Papua experienced an increasing presence of the Indonesian National Military (TNI) (Scott and Tebay 2005, 602).

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5.1 Rounds of Violence (RoVs)

According to UCDP (Pettersson and Öberg 2020; UCDP 2019), the dyad in West Papua between the OPM and the TNI has experienced six rounds of violence between 1965 and 2019. The armed conflict’s first RoV began in 1965; the second in 1967 ending in 1969; the third in 1976 ending in 1978; the fourth in 1981; the fifth in 1984; and lastly the sixth in between 2018 and 2019. The intrastate conflict in West Papua has experienced 11 years of active conflict between 1965 and 2019 where more than 25 battle-related deaths were captured for each year, divided into six rounds of violence. The first, fourth and fifth round lasted a year each; the sixth has, so far, lasted two years; and the second and third lasted three years.

Table 6 Rounds of Violence in West Papua (Indonesia)

Round of Violence (RoV) Year(s) RoV Duration (Years)

1 1965 1 2 1967 – 1969 3 3 1976 – 1978 3 4 1981 1 5 1984 1 6 2018 – 2019 2

Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Pettersson and Öberg 2020) 5.2 Mediation Onset

Based on the CWM Dataset, no mediation occurred in the armed conflict regarding West Papua (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011). However, according to additional sources, at least four instances of mediation did occur with regards to the armed conflict between the GoI and OPM. The first instance occurred in 1996 by Roman Catholic Bishop Herman Munninghoff (Reuters 1996; Wagstaff 1996; BBC 1996). The Bishop mediated between OPM and Indonesian authorities after OPM took Indonesian and international staff members from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) hostage in West Papua (Reuters 1996). The mediation by the Bishop occurred as a result of OPM specifically requesting Bishop Munninghoff to mediate (BBC 1996; Bendeich 1996a). Bishop Munninghoff held separate talks with OPM and GoI in order to resolve the tensions resulting from the hostage situation (Reuters 1996). This instance of mediation occurred in January of 1996 during the 5th_{and 6}th

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The second instance of mediation occurred in 2004 in Port Villa in Vanuatu (AFP 2004). The mediated talks with both OPM and officials from Indonesia occurred during July and were hosted by the Government of Vanuatu (AFP 2004). Vanuatu had previously not mediated between OPM and the GoI but had offered to mediate in the armed conflict. The mediation also took place between the 5th_{and 6}th_{RoV (Table 7). By all indications, Vanuatu also did not seem}

to be involved as mediator beyond this one instance.

The third and last instance of mediation took place in 2017 (Pamungkas 2017). The mediating actor was once again a religious figure: Catholic Priest John Jonga acted as mediator between OPM and Indonesian authorities in West Papua (Somba and Batu 2017). The mediation also occurred between the 5th_{and 6}th_{RoV (Table 7). This mediation occurred in}

West Papua with Indonesian authorities in the province to address local tensions (Pamungkas 2017). Mediation is believed to have only occurred in 2017 but it is unclear if mediation was offered by Mr. Jonga or requested by either OPM or the local Indonesian authorities. Overall, two of the three mediations were by religious figures (Track II) with only one instance of State-mediation (Track I).

Table 7 Summary of Mediation Onset in West Papua Preceded by a

Request/Offer Mediating Actor Year RoV

Request Bishop Munninghoff 1996 Between the 5

th_and

6th

Offer Government in

Vanuatu 2004

Between the 5th_and

6th

Unclear John Jonga (Priest) 2017 Between the 5

th_and

6th

5.3 Offers/Requests For Mediation

The armed conflict in West Papua saw two offers for mediation: one in 2000 by New Zealand’s Foreign Minister Phil Goff in 2000 (HDC 2011, 36). The offer was made between the 5th_{and 6}th_{RoV. The 2000 offer to mediate by New Zealand was rejected by the GoI (HDC}

2011, 36).

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Table 8 Summary of Mediation Offers

Offering Mediator Response Year RoV

New Zealand’s

Foreign Minister Rejected by the GoI 2000

Between the 5th_and

6th

Government of Vanuatu

Accepted by both

GoI and OPM 2004

Between the 5th_and

6th

On the other hand, several requests for mediation were made by OPM. The first request was made by OPM in 1996 with regards to the hostage crisis: the request was made for a specific mediator and resulted in mediated talks (Bendeich 1996b). The request was made between the 5th_{and 6}th_RoV.

The second request was made in 2000 also by OPM for the Netherlands or the United Nations to mediate between OPM and GoI (The Australian 2000; ICG 2001c, 15; 2002, 5). The second request did not lead to either requested mediator becoming involved in the armed conflict. This request was also made between the 5th_{and 6}th_RoV.

The third request for mediation occurred in 2010 (Mariani 2010; HDC 2011, 34–35; ICG 2010b, 7). Once again, the request was made by OPM, namely an OPM General Thadius Jhoni Kimema Jopari Magai Yogi (Mariani 2010; HDC 2011, 34–35). The request was made for an international mediator without naming a specific actor (Mariani 2010; HDC 2011, 34– 35). The third request did not lead to a mediator becoming involved.

The fourth request was made in 2011 by the OPM General Hans Yoweni for an international mediator (Lloyd-George 2011). No specific mediator was requested and this request also did not lead to mediation occurring. The fourth request was also made between the 5th_{and 6}th_RoV.

The fifth and last request was made in 2019 (Radio New Zealand 2019). The request was once again made by OPM and the request was also for mediation by an international actor (Radio New Zealand 2019). No mediation resulted from this latest request. This final request for mediation was made during the 6th_RoV.

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Table 9 Summary of Mediation Requests for West Papua Requesting Actor Requested Mediator Request Response

Year Request was

Made RoV OPM Bishop Munninghoff Accepted 1996 Between the 5th_and 6th OPM The Netherlands or the United Nations No Response 2000 Between the 5th_and 6th OPM International Mediation (Unspecified) No Response 2010 Between the 5th_and 6th OPM International Mediation (Unspecified) No Response 2011 Between the 5th_and 6th OPM International Mediation (Unspecified) No Response 2019 During the 6th

5.4 Alternative Explanations For Mediation Onset

An alternative explanation for possible mediation onset might be the level of intensity an armed conflict has in a given active year. The two classifications are: minor conflict or war as based on the UCDP thresholds of 25-999 battle-related deaths or over 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year. Table 10 below indicates that the armed conflict in West Papua was considered minor for the years 1965; 1967; 1968; 1969; 1984; 2018 and 2019. However, the armed conflict was considered as an active war in the years 1976; 1977; 1978 and 1981 (Pettersson and Öberg 2020).

Table 10 Intensity of the Armed Conflict in West Papua

Round of Violence (RoV) Year(s) Intensity

1 1965 Minor 2 1967 – 1969 Minor 3 1976 – 1978 War 4 1981 War 5 1984 Minor 6 2018 – 2019 Minor

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The presence of natural resources in the contested territory may also be a considerable factor for a government's or external actor’s interest with regards to the territory. Based on reports from the ICG (2010, 7; 2012, 10–11), West Papua is the location of the world’s largest gold and copper mine. The mine, operated by an American firm, contributes the second-highest amount of corporate taxes to the Indonesian state annually (ICG 2012, 11). The mine has been a point of contention with civil society actors repeatedly calling for the closure of the mine as a way to deescalate tensions (ICG 2010b, 7). In mid-2010, illegal miners operating near the Freeport mine asked OPM to act as security, thereby indicating that OPM was specifically contacted by miners in the area to protect their livelihood which was based on the extraction of natural resources in West Papua (ICG 2012, 11). Clashes between TNI or police and OPM frequently centralised around the mine indicating that it was an area of high tensions (ICG 2012, 11–12). The grievance with regards to the mine originated in the fact that the local population did not benefit from the mining activity in West Papua (ICG 2012, 11).

In addition, Indonesia experienced several armed conflicts simultaneously. With regards to armed conflict regarding territory, Indonesia experienced conflict in West Papua, East Timor and Aceh (Pettersson and Öberg 2020). Indonesia also experienced conflict regarding an incompatibility based on government in Sumatra (Pettersson and Öberg 2020).

Also, the armed conflict in West Papua saw alternative conflict resolution processes to mediation. Starting in 2010, civil society actors, academics and activists were brought together under the umbrella of the Papuan Peace Network (PPN) to design a roadmap to bring OPM and the GoI together for direct talks (ICG 2011, 1–2). In 2011, the PPN also hosted a three-day peace conference with various civil and political actors from West Papua to discuss the ongoing armed conflict and possible future initiatives to resolve it (HDC 2011). The conference was two years in the making from 2009-2011 and inspired by similar initiative in Aceh in 2005 (HDC 2011).

Next, OPM was considered highly fragmented in terms of its organisational structure (ICG 2006, 4; HDC 2011, 40). For example, OPM split into three large factions in 2009 and was no longer considered to be under a centralised command (HDC 2011, 7). Furthermore, by 2011, OPM was believed to have split into as many as 30 different factions, each under a different command and controlling different areas in the province (HDC 2011, 1-2).

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was an MOZ while OPM was believed to have only 30 guns spread between the entire movement (2011, 7-9). Further pointing to the disparity in strength was the GoI and TNI attitude that the OPM controls no territory and that it poses no serious threat to Indonesian sovereignty (ICG 2006b, 4).

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6. ANALYSIS: WEST PAPUA

The armed conflict in West Papua between the GoI and OPM experienced six RoV between 1965 and 2019. Each RoV lasted between 1-3 years each. Accordingly, the conflict in West Papua has a relatively high degree of recurrence as the most recurrences any armed conflict has currently experienced is eight RoVs (Table 6).

However, over the course of the entire armed conflict, West Papua has only experienced three instances of mediation. All instances of mediation occurred between the 5th_{and 6}th_RoV.

However, while all mediation occurred between the same RoVs, it should be noted that the timespan between these two RoVs was 34 years and constituted the longest period of time between two RoVs in the West Papuan conflict.

Contrary to the hypothesis that the more RoVs an armed conflict experiences, the less likely it is to experience mediation, mediation in West Papua exclusively occurred during later RoVs rather than during the earlier ones. According to the literature that states that an actors’ willingness to engage in mediation is reduced the longer an armed conflict lasts due to increased entrenchment and intractability, West Papua suggests that entrenchment or institutionalisation may not have functions as a barrier to mediation. Previous research has proposed evidence that conflicts become increasingly entrenched and actors; therefore, become increasingly resistant to the intervention of a mediator (Crocker et al. 2004; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007). However, instead, West Papua may demonstrate that despite the conflict having experienced several RoVs, the dynamics during the later rounds developed towards an increased willingness to engage in mediation. According to Mayer (2009) dynamics in an armed conflict are subject to shift. Therefore, the willingness of both the GoI and OPM to engage in mediation may have shifted between the 5th_{and 6}th_{RoV, thus, leading to the three instances of mediation that the}

armed conflict in West Papua experienced between the 5th_{and 6}th_RoV.

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further mediated talks. The three-day mediated talks did not yield specific outcomes, and; therefore, failed to lead to both subsequent talks or de-escalation between OPM and the GoI (AFP 2004). The lack of significant progress in terms of bringing the GoI and OPM closer together or encouraging further talks, the Vanuatu mediation may have led to less willingness to engage in talks with the opposing actor.

Overall, West Papua experienced little mediation despite almost 60 years of conflict. Contrary to the hypothesis that armed conflicts are more likely to experience mediation in the earlier RoVs rather than later ones, West Papua experienced no mediation in the first 5 RoVs and the mediation it did experience all occurred during the last two recorded RoVs. However, the armed conflict experienced little mediation in absolute terms making it difficult to evaluate if the level of mediation decreases after subsequent RoV as no mediation was identified for the first five RoVs.

In addition to experiencing only three instances of mediation, the conflict in West Papua only received two offers of mediation: one in 2000 by New Zealand and in 2004 from Vanuatu. Both also occurred during the 5th_{and 6}th_{RoV, meaning that both offers were made later in the}

conflict. However, despite the offer by Vanuatu being accepted, the offer by New Zealand was rejected by the GoI. According to a report by the HDC (2011, 42), the mediation in Aceh between GAM and the GoI was likely to have made the GoI reluctant to concede to further mediation in other conflicts within its borders. However, it remains questionable why the armed conflict in West Papua received so few offers of mediation considering the recurring nature of the armed conflict.

Contrary to experiencing only three instances of mediation and only two offers by potential mediators, several requests to engage a mediator were made. In total, five requests for mediation were made – all by OPM. All, except for the last request, were made between the 5th

and 6th_{RoV. The most recent request was made during the 6}th_{RoV. Noticeable is also that that}

except for the request in 1996 to Bishop Munninghoff, none of the requests garnered an international response or offer of mediation. In the case of West Papua, all requests were made after 5 RoV had occurred. Noticeably, all requests were made by OPM – none were made by the GoI. This may be indicative of the GoI unwillingness to engage a mediator in the armed conflict between itself and OPM. This may point to an increased entrenchment of the conflict within the GoI and an increasing reluctance to engage in mediation.

However, the high number of requests between the 5th_{and 6}th_{RoV and the low level of}

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all five requests were made by OPM and none by the GoI, indicates that the willingness of OPM to engage in mediation was highest during this point in the conflict. On the other hand, the GoI seems most reluctant to even request mediation. As such, OPM’s requests suggest an increased willingness to engage a mediator, while the GoI’s lack of requests and refusal to follow-up on requests made by OPM, suggest an increased unwillingness to have a mediator involved during the 5th_{and 6}th_{RoV. Therefore, while OPM does not adhere to the predicted trend that mediation}

requests are more likely at the beginning of an armed conflict, the GoI’s rejection of New Zealand’s offer and lack of response to OPM’s repeated requests, indicates that requests may be more likely to be rejected later in an armed conflict as the conflict actors become more resistant to outside intervention; however, in the case of West Papua, only the GoI seems to have become increasingly resistant to mediation.

The ICG reports highlighted that the requests and voiced support for mediation came from OPM actors in the 2000s (ICG 2010a, 2; 2006a). While no specific mediating actor was requested, except for on one occasion, the primary objective seems to have been to internationalise the conflict by making general requests for international mediation. Perhaps because the conflict had, during the fifth and sixth rounds of violence, reached an impasse, the OPM did not feel it would be able to navigate in its favour without international mediation. On the other hand, the aim of internationalising the conflict in West Papua is what prevented the GoI from showing a willingness to engage in mediated talks. After all, Indonesia had continuously experienced movements within its borders regarding more autonomy or even independence since 1963. Overall, the armed conflict in West Papua does not provide evidence that mediation is more likely to occur during early RoVs.

6.1 Alternative Explanations For Mediation Onset

When and where mediation occurs is and will remain a complex process where a myriad of factors must align – not without reasons do scholars such as Zartman talk about a ‘moment’ that must be seized before it is too late. Therefore, there exist multiple possible explanations why mediation occurs between some conflict actors and in some contexts but not between or in others. Possible alternative explanations may include the intensity of the conflict, the presence of natural resource in the contested territory, additional armed conflicts occurring simultaneously, alternative conflict resolution initiatives, fragmentation of the armed actors as well as the comparable strength between the Government and the armed actor, and, lastly, the humanitarian situation within the contested area.

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experienced or preceded offers of mediation near the time of either RoV. The 5th_{RoV was only}

considered minor in intensity, thus, the same as the 1st_{, 2}nd_{, and 6}th_{RoV. Neither the first two}

RoV experienced increased mediation or mediation offers/request. Therefore, it is unlikely that the intensity of the conflict was a significant motivator for mediation to be offered or requested. However, the classification of being minor in intensity may also have led to the armed conflict not being considered as warranting extensive international attention and consequently, offers of mediation. As such, the low intensity of the conflict during the majority of the RoVs may have led to a lack of international initiative to offer to mediate in West Papua.

On the other hand, the presence of natural resources, specifically the Freeport gold and copper mine, may have been a significant motivation for international interest in the armed conflict. However, despite the US-operated mine and US economic interest in continued access to the mine, the US did not offer to act as mediator. Noteworthy is also that the GoI, despite the economic relationship between the GoI and the mine, that the GoI also did not request the US to act as mediator. In addition, tensions between OPM and the US surrounding the mine would likely have made a request from OPM to the US to act as mediator unlikely. As such, the presence of the mine may have acted as a deterrent for mediation to be offered or requested, especially by the GoI as it likely views the mine as non-negotiable. The mine was specifically mentioned by reports as a point of contention for West Papuans, meaning any mediation would likely have addressed or pushed for a change in the operation of the mine.

In addition, Indonesia sometimes experienced four armed conflicts simultaneously during some of the RoVs. The armed conflicts in Aceh, Maluku and East Timor each saw a degree of international attention; especially Aceh and Eat Timor. The GoI itself indicated that they viewed the armed conflict in West Papua as a ‘domestic matter’ (Jakarta Post 1999b; BBC 1999). Therefore, it would have been unlikely for the GoI to request mediation. The OPM’s repeated requests for mediation may have been made as a result of the fact that the GoI was experiencing several challenges to territorial claims.

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that led to dialogue between civil as well as political actors took place almost exclusively between the 5th_{and 6}th_{RoV (HDC 2011, 37). As such, this would indicate that the local}

engagement to address the conflict in West Papua did not translate to an increase in willingness to engage in the conflict on a national level. However, the OPM may have seen the local-led initiatives as incentive to request mediation since the West Papuan population seemed to experience a high degree of willingness to engage in non-violent de-escalation initiatives.

Also, the OPM was considered to be a highly fragmented collection of actors loosely held together by the aim of West Papuan independence (ICG 2011, 5). However, a unified leadership is key for facilitating dialogue between a government and an armed actor (HDC 2011, 49). The lack of centralised leadership may have made the GoI reluctant to give weight to any attempt to negotiate with OPM, mediated or otherwise. Interestingly, the OPM was considered increasingly fragmented. The multiple requests for mediation may; therefore, not have been indicative of OPM as a whole but of separate factions within OPM. Overall, the increased fragmentation could have led to less incentive or ability to engage in mediated talks as it would be difficult to ensure that OPM would function as a unified actor in mediated talks.

In addition, the significant disparity in military capability between the TNI and OPM is likely to have contributed to the GoI unwillingness to engage in mediated talks. The GoI did not perceive OPM to be a significant threat after the TNI’s presence was significantly expanded (HDC 2011, 40). Again, the disparity in military capability may be a contributing factor to why the GoI did not request mediation. On the other hand, it may also have been a contributing factor as to why OPM did make several requests for mediation. OPM may have been acutely aware that a mediator would be able to act as a diplomatic barrier preventing the GoI from exploiting the disparity in capabilities.

Lastly, the range of human rights abuses recorded in West Papua during the armed conflict did not seem to lead to offers of mediation. Additionally, the TNI was accused of perpetrating the majority of the human rights abuses. Perhaps this is a contributing factor to the GoI’s reluctance to engage a mediator. On the other hand, the OPM’s multiple requests may have been because it hopes that a mediator would address the TNI’s violation of human rights in West Papua.

UPPSALA UNIVERSITY