The Potential Populist Voter: A Comparative Study About The Rebellious Voter In Europe

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The Potential Populist Voter

A Comparative Study About The Rebellious Voter In Europe

Bachelor Thesis

Author: Juan Manuel Fernandez Supervisor: Yonhyok Choe

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Abstract

This quantitative paper explores the mean value between selected countries with the ambition to compare the different regions and to understand the conditions in which populist parties grow. The main question that runs through this paper is “How does the potential populist support vary between different regions in Europe?”. This was done by drawing a framework based on the theory of the four D’s of Distrust, Destruction, Deprivation and De-alignment.

The selected countries were divided in a similar order from the comparative study of 2015 conducted by Kriesi and Pappas. A survey from 2014 provided the necessary variables in order to measure the mean value of each category and summed up together in order to measure the

“pool of potential populist voters”. The paper concludes that the regional and theoretic framework is validated judging upon the mean numbers in each country.

Key words

Right-wing, left-wing, populism, comparative, quantitative analysis, 4 D’s,.

Acknowledgments

I want to thank Yonhyok Choe for his invaluable help with the software and professional critique when writing this paper.

I also want to thank Marcus Karlén who helped me to brainstorm, organize my thoughts and helped in making a study schedule during the process of writing this paper.

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1 Introduction

The latest general elections over the last ten years have shown that right-wing populism continues to grow throughout Europe without any signs of changing in the close future (Müller, 2018: Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: Mouffe, 2018: Norris and Inglehart, 2019: Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

The electoral success can be seen throughout the European continent. Most of the successful parties over Europe have been parties with a populist nature and stands on the right side of the political spectrum, although there exist some anomalies in the southern regions of Europe where left-wing populist parties have gained a significant representative influence (Mudde, 2007:

Inglehart and Norris, 2019). This modern phenomenon has affected the political landscape over Europe and the US, challenging the status quo over the western world, it has also shaped the European integration due to its politicization (Bickerton et al, 2015: Schimmelfennig et al, 2015).

The populist parties and movements have also put the liberal free trade expansion on hold and hindered international free trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the United States and European Union, putting the typical liberal free transatlantic trade since the second world war in question. Furthermore, Brexit followed by the electoral victory of Boris Johnson managed to put the European integration on the defence (EU- LAC, 2018: BBC, 2019). This political move was made possible only because of UKIPs instance of having a referendum on the British membership of the EU. The electoral results shook the European establishment to its core when it was clear that the pro-Brexit campaign won in 2016 (Norris and Inglehart, 2019: Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

An example of how populist parties are gaining momentum can be seen in Hungary, where the election in 2014 the resulted 20,3% for Jobbik while Fidezs enjoyed 45,05% of the total vote (OSCE, 2014). This means that the populist parties had managed to enjoy 65,35% of the total vote, cementing a clear hegemony in its country. This hegemonic order has managed to be maintained and was reflected in the last election results of 2018 where 19,06% of the vote went to Jobbik and 49,28% of the vote went to Fidesz. This means that the last election gave the populist parties a total vote share of 68,38% (OSCE, 2019).

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Furthermore, the Austrian populist party FPÖ presents an interesting anomaly where it initially gained momentum from the election of 2006, receiving 10,01% and the election of 2017 where it received 26% of the eligible vote (Bundesministerium, 2006: Bundesministerium. 2017).

However, the FPÖ suffered a major setback due to a major scandal that triggered a snap election in 2019 and remained with 19,02% of the total vote, losing a substantial number of votes compared to the election of 2017 (Bundesministerium, 2019: France 24, 2019)

The Swedish political sphere had during the last years been shaped under the populist party of SD. The party entered the parliament during the election of 2010 with 5,7% of the eligible vote.

SD maintained its political momentum and grew electorally towards 12,9% in 2014 and increased its share of the vote up to 17,5% in 2018. The party has thusly gained a large influence in the Swedish Parliament (Valmyndigheten, 2010: Valmyndigheten 2014: Valmyndigheten 2018).

In addition, new populist parties are continuing to grow and take political space, the last elections in Spain saw VOX entering the parliament due to the total collapse of the regular right-wing party in the wake of a major corruption scandal (Jones. 2018: infoelectoral, 2019).

It was the third new party that entered the parliament after the moderate populist party CIUDADANOS and leftist populist PODEMOS had entered in parliament just three years before in a dramatic manner (infoelectoral, 2011: infoelectoral, 2016).

It can by this reason be argued that the populist parties are shaping the political map in relation to how the established parties have failed to maintain authority towards its populace in different countries and in different ways that varies between countries and regions during the last decades.

1.1 Main Question

The papers aim is based upon how one is to understand the appeal of populist parties between different regions.

It is widely acknowledged that populist parties grow electorally from the distrust and frustration against already existing parties that are established in the political order due to a lack of authority from the ruling parties (Müller, 2018: Laclau, 2005: Kriesi and Pappas 2015: Mouffe, 2018: Loxbo: 2016: Kitschelt, 2007: Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018: Norris and Inglehart, 2019:

Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: Laclau, 2005: Hoare and Smith, 1999: Mudde, 2010 ).

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However, this is where the consensus ends. The academic discussion surrounding the root cause of the authoritative erosion and its process for such a political development to take place is widely discussed in the academic field with different conclusions, negating the possibilities for an academic consensus (Manonova and Franquesa, 2020).

The fact that there is little to no consensus surrounding what factors leads to a populist party growth and the fact that there are different kinds of populist party support in different countries leads me to ask the following question which will run through this paper:

• How does the potential populist support vary between different regions in Europe?

I will begin the paper with a presentation of the previous research, followed by a definition of populism and a presentation of the four D’s theory, this will be followed by a presentation on the materials and methods which will also be made up for operationalization. The operationalization will be conducted by comparing answers from a 2014 survey and select the relevant questions which will be transformed into variables and then be sorted and categorized in accordance to the presented theoretical framework. The mean value from these variables will then be presented in the form of diagrams with a short analysis of each diagram. The result will then be discussed with the previous research and the theoretical presentation in mind.

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2 The Populist Research Divide

There is a shortage of theories regarding populism, despite a lively debate and discussion about the populist parties successes and failures that challenges the status quo. The lack of theories is in turn divided into the viewpoints from a demand and supply side, where the latter describes the populist parties behaviour and inner logic while the former describes its support and conditions in which a populist party can gain influence amongst the electorate. The demand side is divided further between scholars who place the primary demand factor on cultural issues, while other scholars argue that the populist demand factor is triggered mainly by economic factors. This division of the previous research has thinned out the already small numbers of theories about the subject due to its dependence on which factor is going to be researched and complicates a scientific exploration of the phenomenon (Mudde, 2010: Norris and Inglehart, 2019: Kriesi and Pappas, 2015: Loxbo, 2016: Manonova and Franquesa, 2020).

However, much of the previous research has been concentrated on the demand side with no measurement of the variations between each country. On the contrary, a comparative study between different nations has remained largely untouched (Mudde, 2010). The first large scale comparative work on populism was published just as recently as 2015 where the analytical areas were divided into regions instead of nation states (appendix - 1). The research concluded that each region had a different result and depending upon the area one looked into after the European monetary crisis in the wake of the banking crisis in 2008, it was clear that some populists parties gained momentum while others did not grow electorally due to the banking crisis consequences depending upon the region where they were active. The populist surge was most prevalent in the southern and anglo-celtic regions together with the eastern-central region albeit with different styles. The Nordic region on the other hand, did not experience any populist surge due to its institutional stability while the western region experienced a modest surge with France acting as an anomaly due to a substantial growth on popularity for its populist right- wing party lead by Le Pen (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015).

Populism seem to follow an inner logic outside of the left and right political spectrum. A populist can draw up “the people” as a homogenous righteous entity against other elected representatives and undercut their own electoral failures by relying on the “silent majority”

during electoral defeats. This constant “shadow of a representative democracy” is the result of its own failures (Müller, 2018).

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These failures can be seen through a set of links of crises on the economic situation or corruption scandals. The loss of authority towards the status quo, creates an opportunity for populist parties to success electorally (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: Laclau, 2005: Kriesi and Pappas, 2015:

Hoare and Smith, 1999: Mudde, 2010). This can however be contested since other findings concludes that populism and Radical right parties are not dependant on economic factors for it to succeed and depends more on identity amongst the citizenry such as immigration, culture and morals than on economic woes. The success of the radical right can therefore rely heavily on the identity factor (Oesch. D, 2008: Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

Another failure is the lack of ideological competition between the dominating parties and the resulting ideological vacuum. The same vacuum creates a space for other opinions to grow in importance and is filled by identarian populist issues which previously were not so important on the political stage (Kitschelt, 2007).

The common goal for national populist parties is their intention to halt or heavily reduce immigration. However, they don’t necessarily share a common ideological background (Loxbo, 2016). Another observation that was found when touching upon the subject of the right-wing populists. By following its thinkers who have enjoyed an international audience and recognition from the time of the first world war until recently, it was concluded that the philosophy follows four themes in which the first is Apocalyptic thoughts, this theme is made up from a fear for the decline of the western Judaeo-Christian civilisation by mass immigration from Muslim countries. The second theme is fear of global liberal elites in which the apocalyptic fear is knitted together in which a cosmopolitan elite will contribute to the decline of the western civilisation by its universalism. The third theme is the friend-enemy distinction. This concept is made up from the idea of a political class which is incompatible with the classic definition from the state or nation and is the fundamental basis of the liberal democratic society. The fourth and most important theme for the radical right is metapolitics. This theme circulates about how people behave and think about certain issues will lead to a change of a concept on the political and social sphere and is based on a Gramscian perspective (Sedgwick, 2019).

2.1 Previous Demand Research

One of the existing theories regarding the demand side of populism, is the theory of the four D’s. This theory acts as a framework for mapping out the term “pool of potential”. The term is related to the demand side of which voters are open for right-wing populist rhetoric. This “pool

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explains the growth and the demand side of the populist right-wing parties. It is in theory possible to measure the demand for right-wing populism by measuring the categories of Distrust, Deprivation, De-alignment and Destruction by using a quantitative method. This theory will be explained in more detail in the chapter of theoretical presentation (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

A critical point of view is the discussion circulating around populism and its discursive approach whereas populism is used as a tool for constructing a political frontier between the underdog and the powerful in a liberal democracy. This perspective argues that the vague concept of populism is not to be linked with an ideology but is linked to a variety of institutional frameworks. A populist moment is seen from the context of the Gramscian term hegemony in which the dominant hegemony has lost its authority due to pressures of political or socioeconomic factors. Populism and liberal democracy are thusly linked together (Laclau, 2005). This view is built upon a Gramscian perspective on society which views the society through social consent, it has coined the terms social hegemony and interregnum. The term social hegemony adheres to two power factors which can be observed when analysing the societies social consent. The first is seen as the spontaneous consent by the public to the dominating power which with its prestige sets the direction in which the society follows. The second is the legal coercive power that is possessed by the state to suppress any active or passive consensual anomalies, this second factor is however only used when the first factor fails to uphold the hegemonic façade of consent The term interregnum adheres to the moment when the social hegemony is widely rejected and non-existent in a society while the coercive force is unable to restore normalcy inside of its society. A crisis of authority becomes a fact, forcing the hegemonic power to rely on more coercive force to uphold its status. The interregnum can thusly be viewed as the period between the old ideology which has been rejected by the public and a new one which has not yet unfolded, rendering the future ideological arrangement of a society into obscurity (Hoare and Smith, 1999).

Populism can be understood when approaching the democratic core in which agonism is seen as a central part for democracy to thrive, the Gramscian term hegemony is found again in this theory in relation to agonism and a populist moment. Another term is also used which is agonism. Agonism is described as a defused stage of antagonism in which a ‘we/they’ relation between opposing hegemonic projects is defused from enemies to be destroyed into political adversaries whose existence is legitimate. This interpretation suggests that an ideological conflict existence is necessary for a democracy to exist. This view of democracy and conflict

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approaches the central nature of the liberal democratic system in which its conflicts cannot be solved through a consensus and that any attempts to strive for it leads to an erosion of the liberal democracy’s nature. Agonism is thusly the very condition for the existence of a democracy. An abandonment of the agonistic structure inside a democracy leads by this reason to a post- democracy. This term is referred to as the political relationship of democracy in which free market is central to the established political order. The word democracy has been reduced to only signify free elections and a defence of human rights while the other liberal aspects have been reduced in importance or eliminated. This erosion of democratic ideals lays the foundations of a populist moment where democracy can be radicalized or weakened (Mouffe, 2018).

2.2 Lacking Research Area

Despite a major research effort and several electoral gains as previously mentioned, there is little research done that measures the different areas or countries between each other to map out the populist appeal and by this way either prove or disprove populist theories.

This fact about the small number of measurements between different areas or countries makes it necessary to build upon this research area. With only one large comparative study that touches upon the electoral results depending on each region and its common factors makes it necessary to explore whether demand is varying between each country and by this way find out the electoral support for populist parties.

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3

Defining National Populism

A definition of populism is necessary to map out the types of parties that are populist. Populism can be described as a thin ideology which can be on either side of the left-right political spectrum in nature and works more as a framework without any particular set of goals (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018: Müller, 2018: Laclau, 2005: Norris and Inglehart, 2019: Manonova and Franquesa, 2020).

Populism bases its values on three factors:

1. A striving for making the popular will to be heard and acted upon (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018: Müller, 2018: Laclau, 2005: Norris and Inglehart, 2019).

2. A defense of the interests of the ordinary people (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018: Müller, 2018: Laclau, 2005: Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018: Norris and Inglehart, 2019: Manonova and Franquesa, 2020).

3. A desire to replace distant and corrupt elites (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018: Müller, 2018:

Norris and Inglehart, 2019: Kitschelt, 2007: Manonova and Franquesa, 2020) A populist party turns into a national populist party when adding a fourth factor.

4. An emphasis on nationalism in which a desire to preserve a territorial identity from radical change and promote a national interest (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018)

This broad definition is defined within the possibility of being both right-wing and left-wing. It is in theory possible for the Scottish Nationalist Party in Great Britain to be classified as a national populist party just as Jobbik in Hungary to be classified as such. The definition is thusly made with an exclusion from identity, class and ethnicity as defining factor for national populist parties and can stretch from left to right (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

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4 Theoretical Presentation

The four D’s acts as a theoretical framework in which the different dimensions are put under a set of variables, this makes it possible to map out the different factors contributing to the creation of a “pool of potential” in which a demand side is created for a national populist party to rise. However, it is necessary to account them together in order to have a clear analysis on the popular rise of popularity at a national level. The theory centralizes in a bottom up trend but can also be criticised for lacking on the perspective from the supply side.

Furthermore, it is important to take into account that populist parties started to grow and enter the parliaments in different European countries prior to the economic recession in 2008 and that economic factors alone are not the reason for populist parties to grow into a relevant parliamentary force (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018)

4.1 Presenting Distrust

The divorce between the represented and the representatives is closely linked in the behavioural patterns by the politicians who behaves increasingly alike, with its own rules and norms and thusly behaves less like the people they are supposed to represent. This argument relates especially when discussing different moral values regarding diversity which voters to a large degree think have gone too far (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

Distrust is by this reason presented as the following:

- A widespread feeling of a relational distance between the represented and representatives in terms of background, lifestyle and values (ibid).

- Frustration about the way representative democracy is working leads to a growing support for direct democracy (ibid).

The relation between the frustration between the elected and the electorate can often be seen in relation to the European Union (EU) and the binding nature of different policies due to the top down design by its foundation. This top down approach was relatively stable were the population passively accepted decisions taken by the European Community and was called the period of “permissive consensus”. This started to decline however, after the Maastricht treaty was implemented (Bickerton et al, 2015: Schimmelfennig et al, 2015).

The argument can be strengthened by analysing the integration process post-Maastricht where the problems of the European integration has started to show due to a divorce between the pro

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integrational elites and a more sceptical population in the persecution of policy implementations on the European level (Bickerton et al, 2015).

Another argument for the divorce between the electorate and the politicians can be seen in the aftermaths of the monetary crisis of 2008 in which the monetary crisis in 2008 paved the way for populist parties to grow in Germany and the southern Europe and formed the European integration. (Guerra and McLaren, 2016: Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

4.2 Presenting Destruction

A fear for a destruction of the popular culture in a nation due to immigration and hyper ethnic change is a factor which is taken into consideration in relation to the “pool of potential”. This fear does not mean necessarily that it is based on facts. This leads however to xenophobic fears due to the strong sentimental feelings that exists between a national identity and the fear for losing it (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

Destruction is by this reason presented as the following:

- A widespread anxiety of a looming destruction of society caused by hyper ethnic change and immigration (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

This fear can be traced in different regions throughout Europe and is reflected in the western and nordic parts of Europe where the fear of change of the national culture is greater than economic issues amongst the national populist electorate and thusly plays a smaller role amongst the electorate (Oesch. D, 2008).

The nationalistic sentiment or patriotism which some might call it during a time of a widespread fear is seen as a virtue amongst nationalists but does not necessarily mean that it is racist in its core nature. Nationalistic fear regarding the cultural core moral concerns comes in conflict with the neoliberal vision of open borders, particularly during immigration crises events such as the one that took place during 2015 (Haidt, 2016). When these concerns are not taken into consideration in the established political order amongst the electorate but rather converge into a consensus without any discussion, this creates a vacuum in which the national populist can fill with their rhetoric (Haidt, 2016: Kitschelt, 2007).

4.3 Presenting Deprivation

A widespread deprivation became a dominating phenomenon in Europe due to the eurozone monetary crisis. The political backlash in response to this had a decisive impact on the European

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integration due to the unpopular policy implementations in exchange for loans (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

The sentiment of a widespread deprivation is presented as the following:

- An economic environment which creates a widespread feeling of economic deprivation in relation to others in society (ibid).

- A widespread belief of an economical priority which favour of the rich and powerful at the cost of others in society (ibid).

- A widespread fear of the future (ibid).

The answer to the monetary crisis of the eurozone came in the form of austerity measures which the European Monetary Bank, International Monetary Fund and the European Commission (the troika) insisted on implementing in exchange for loans. The end result was a systemic override of democratic national institutions in its implementation of policy, which created a deep division between the troika and the citizens of the eurozone. The resistance to these austerity measures would serve as catalyst for populist parties, particularly in the southern region and would for example in Spain lead to the emergence of the 15-M movement. This movement would in turn serve indirectly as a catalyst for the populist party of PODEMOS (Iglesias, 2015, Errejon and Mouffe, 2015: Guerra and McLaren, 2016). The monetary crisis led to a mixture of authority crises over Europe where the nordic and western regions (with the exception of France) did not experience any surge of populist parties. This comes into contrast with the southern and Anglo- Celtic region that experienced a populist rise in direct correlation to the aftermath of the economic crisis. The central and eastern regions were more complicated in relation to the monetary crisis due to the populist presence before the crises but the conclusion was that this regions populist growth is not in a direct correlation to the recession that started in 2008 even if populist parties are present in the region (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015).

4.4 Presenting De-alignment

The term De-alignment refers to the abandonment of the traditional parties and a more volatile electorate that are not particularly loyal to one party. The growing centrism from the traditional left has particularly meant an abandonment of the working class creating a vacuum to be filled (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

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A period of de-alignment is presented as:

- A widespread abandonment of loyalty towards previously dominant parties (ibid).

- A widespread practice of party switching between elections (ibid).

- Larger sections of non-voters (ibid).

The growth of populism can be attributed towards a decline of the rhetoric between the right and left that dominated the modernistic cold war era. This abandonment of former political ideals has led to a vacuum in which other policy questions are prioritized due to the rising similarities between the traditional left- and right-wing parties (Loxbo, 2016: Mouffe, 2018:

Kitschelt, 2007). This means that the democratic system as it exists today, is discouraging participation amongst the citizens instead of encouraging it by making it meaningful in any way. The conventional politics has been degraded and people are not engaging in any meaningful way on the political arena due to the consensual nature of the established political parties. With no signs from the political establishment of any change have resulted in a political rupture between the established non-political experts and populists, making people more volatile when voting. This is shown by the electoral behaviour on election day for making a decision on who to vote for instead of making a long-term commitment, if they vote at all (Mair, 2013).

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5 Necessity Of A Comparative Research

It is necessary to explore the underlying reasons for the growth of populism and why it has become a constant phenomenon in the political scene all over Europe. The liberal established order has been shaken to its core, thusly it has in turn, shaped the European integration during the last decade. A comparative exploration through quantitative means over different areas of Europe is by this reason the best way to find out how the electoral support varies between each country to understand this phenomenon on a deeper level.

5.1 Hypothesis

I intend to use the theory of the four D’s to draw a map over the fertile soils in which populist parties can grow. I will do this by doing a quantitative comparative research study in European countries in order to draw a statistical map over the areas in which the national populist parties can grow. The main Hypothesis (U) and UnderHypotheses (UH) are the following:

H: Based on the four D´s, a low mean value of each D leads to a high pool of potential.

UH1: A low Distrust mean score contributes to the pool of potential

UH2:A low Destruction mean score contributes to the pool of potential

UH3:A low Deprivation mean score contributes to the pool of potential

UH4: A low De-alignment mean score contributes to the pool of potential

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6 Materials and Methods

6.1 Material

The primary source of this paper for testing the theory will be the European Social Survey from 2014 (ESS, 2014) in which I will measure the different D’s. The survey consists of answers from ca 40 000 participants spread throughout Europe in which the respondents gave a variety of answers regarding their opinions on a range of relevant subjects suitable for the testing of the four D’s. These subjects touches on the political opinions about what the theoretical section above mentions which are: the amount of distrust between the electorate and the politicians, the conceived deprivation amongst the respondents in relation to others, the de-alignments resulting volatility amongst the electorate and lastly the fear of destruction of its own culture. The large number of participants gives a stable base for measuring the opinion in different European countries. The surveys answers from the respondents will therefore be the main data for the paper in which the questions and resulting answers will be translated into variables.

The secondary sources will come in the forms of books and scientific articles to add into the academic discussion regarding the theory of the four D’s. Many of the sources touches upon populism from left to right but also the voter’s behavioural nature and philosophy about the reasons for the existence of populism and the behaviour of populist actors.

6.2 Problems With The Material

One of the problems which can be visible in the mapping of the four D’s as a tool for a general mapping of populist voter behavior is that it is compatible with local nationalistic parties with separatist tendencies in countries which might consist of several cultures or states. This means that the four D’s cannot stand on its own when measuring radical right-wing populist parties and its success in an individual country.

Another problem is their concentration on populism from a demand side point of view which comes at the cost of a nearly total abandonment on the supply side. This research is by this reason formed more of a behavioral pattern amongst the electorate in relation to populism, rather than a theory about a nationalistic right-wing populism with radical historic roots.

The authors of the theory also mention these problems. They argue however, that the primary goal with this broad definition is to map out the radical right parties such as UKIP and political phenomenon’s like Donald Trump in the US (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018).

Furthermore, their assumption regarding the theory in relation to left-wing parties can be contested. They argue that the arguments presented by left-wing populism are only compatible

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with three of the four D’s left-wing populism, they continue to argue that this is the main reason why these parties found themselves unable to draw support in equal numbers for radical right- wing parties. The problem with this argument is that the left-wing populism is a phenomenon that only recently grew in relevance. Populist parties on the left like SYRIZA and most notably PODEMOS used populist theory for the launching of its own political project by using populist analytical tools from Laclau and Gramsci, which was frowned upon by the traditional left initially (Mouffe, 2018, Iglesias, 2015, Errejon and Mouffe, 2016).

6.3 Methods

The method of choice will be a quantitative research of the gathered material from ESS14 which gathered material from 21 countries from which I will draw up the mean value of each variable.

In addition, I will also test the statistical reliability by measuring the ANOVA results.

These variables will be divided up into regions in a similar fashion as the comparative work of 2015, with the exception of adding Spain from ESS14 in the southern region. I will in turn choose one variable from each of the region.

Furthermore, the mean value will be used for drawing four charts for measuring each of the four D’s throughout the European countries in which the survey took place (appendix -1).

To narrow down the number of variables, I will choose the parties of one country in each region to spread out the variables over Europe for a bigger variance between the regions (appendix - 2). The selective process will then be selected to avoid the extremities of each region and thusly avoid a selection of any anomalies, France was for example not chosen due to the growth of the populist party in the wake of the financial crisis while the rest of the countries in the western region had little to no growth of any populist party. The results will be followed by a comparison to each other to give an approximation of the four D’s levels between the countries.

Table 1

Nordic region Sweden

Western region Austria

Southern region Spain

Central and Eastern region Hungary

Anglo- Celtic region United Kingdom

(Kriesi and Pappas, 2015)

The four D’s will be measured by the categories they consist of, which are Distrust, Deprivation,

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relevant variables in relation to these categories. The independent variables of Distrust and Destruction will by this reason consist of three variables. While the variables of Deprivation and De-alignment will consist of two variables. These dependent variables were selected in relation to the theoretical presentation of the four D’s which were presented earlier in this essay.

The questions were selected to be as relevant as possible to the categories with little room for interpretation, they were also selected in proportion to each other to avoid any imbalance in the analysis section.

6.4 Methodological Problems

One of the problems I encountered was the lack of variables in the deprivation and de-alignment factors which lead to the analysis consisting of unequal number of variables in the categories leading to a small imbalance in the research. The lack of a third variable in the deprivation and de-alignment variables was due to the absence of a question regarding the future prospects amongst the participants, nor was there any closely related question about these issues and I had no other choice but to content with two variables since it is not practical to try and find similar surveys that were taken during the same time with the same amount of people in the relevant areas.

Another issue I found was the absence of Spain or Portugal in Kriesi and Pappas comparative research, this is unfortunate since the main source did not conduct any research on Greece or Italy. I found it therefore necessary to implement Spain as the acting representative country of the southern region in this essay. Another reason for choosing Spain was the fact that populist parties gained a sudden political momentum in the year 2014, the same year in which the ESS14 survey took place, making it possible to arrange the Spanish nation into the southern region in this essay.

Addressing the issue of validity, the choice of theory provided the necessary framework in choosing the variables in which its reliability would be tested and explored in correlation to each other. The usage of a theoretical construction organized the variables into four categories where the main source (ESS14) provided with some but limited variables in each category, this shaped the design of the method. It is by this reason that there are two categories with three variables and two other categories with only two. The validity of the method can therefore be argued to be high which is imperative when exploring an empirical question (Esaiason et al, 2017, p 65).

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Addressing the issue of reliability, the nature of the method in which the mean is measured, and the theoretical framework provides a stable systemic assurance against any systematic empiric errors. This stable theoretic ground in combination of an explorative measure of the mean values negates the necessity of having a high reliability when measuring the reliability and correlation of the variables due to the explorative nature of the main question in this paper (Esaiason et al, 2017, p 65).

7 Statistical Presentation And Analysis

The following chapter consists of presentations and analyses of each of the four D’s. This chapter is therefore divided into five different sections that addresses all the mean values and reliability testing observation followed by a presentation of each D with its relevant variables.

I will start with presenting a table which presents the total mean count and it will be followed by a reliability testing in which I will address its results. The four sections that follows will start with a chart presenting each mean value of each country and a total sum of the mean value of the D’s of the countries together. The sections are shortly followed by an observation of the differences of the mean value between the countries and finished with a summary of the observation.

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7.1 All Mean Values

The mean values were drawn together and have a wide array of results with no clear uniformity except for some minor repetition and become problematic in its statistical reliability (which are presented and discussed in appendix 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).

Table 2 (Some numbers are rounded of)

Austria Spain United

Kingdom

Hungary Sweden Total

Distrust ^Political

system allows people to have a say in what government does

3,11 2,84 3,74 2,2 4,47 16,36

Politicians care what people think

2,7 2,32 3,51 2,21 4,72 15,46

How satisfied with the way democracy works in country

5,27 4,16 5,17 4,06 6,69 25,35

Total mean of Distrust

3,69 3,1 4,14 2,82 5,29 19,04

Destruction Immigration bad or good for country's economy

4,76 4,91 4,91 3,58 5,62 23,78

Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

4,87 5,94 5,07 4,83 7,12 27,83

Immigrants make country worse or better place to live

4,39 5,00 4,91 3,98 6,5 24,78

Total mean of Destruction

4,67 5,28 4,96 4,13 6,41 25,45

Deprivation How satisfied with present state of economy in country

4,92 2,85 4,74 3,72 6,1 22,33

Government should reduce differences in income levels

4,3 4,5 4,00 4,5 4,1 21,4

Total mean of Deprivation

4,61 3,67 4,37 4,11 5,1 21,86

De- alignment

Trust in political parties

3,5 2,2 3,8 3,6 5,00 18,1

How close to a party

4,7 4,4 3,6 4,4 4,9 22

Total mean of De-alignment

4,1 3,3 3,7 4,00 4,95 20,05

Pool of potential

Combined D Score

17,07 15,35 17,17 15,06 21,75 86,4

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7.2 Distrust

Table 3 presents the points from 0 representing the lowest negative score and highest on 10.

The overall mean of all countries in the political system lies above the third point with the variable that touches open the satisfaction of the countries democracy clearly lying on a higher value than the other variables.

Regarding the variable “Political system allows people to have a say in what government does”

It becomes clear that neither country manages to extend its favourability above the fourth parallel except the mean value of Sweden. Hungary scores the lowest on its trust with the government which barely reaches two points. The variable consisting of “Politicians care what people think” reflect the results of the previous variable with the Swedish mean value is the highest score and the Hungarian mean value reaching the lowest, What becomes interesting to observe is the Spanish mean value which almost reaches the same levels of the Hungarian value.

What can be observed on the variable of “How satisfied with the way democracy works” are the general higher values with three reaching above the fifth level and thereby gaining a small majority on the mean value, although the Swedish mean value is consistent on also scoring the highest value in this variable. Although it is worth mentioning the observation of the Hungarian consistency on reaching the lowest levels out of the other countries.

All in all, when measuring the mean value of the distrust factor one can see that Hungary on average had the lowest score on all the variables, followed by Spain on low point scoring. This comes into contrast with the mean value on the Swedish mean opinion but most notably on the

3,11 2,84 3,74 2,2 4,47 3,3

2,7 2,32 3,51 2,21 4,72 3,1

5,27 4,16 5,17 4,06 6,69 5,07

3,69 3,1 4,14 2,82 5,29

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Austria Spain United Kingdom Hungary Sweden Mean of all

countries

Mean Value Of Distrust

Political system allows people to have a say in what government does Politicians care what people think

How satisfied with the way democracy works in country Total Mean of Distrust

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it is worth mentioning that the mean value on the variables regarding trust to the government and politicians does not surpass the five point threshold for a net positive feedback on these issues in a meaningful manner. It is also worth mentioning that the extremes on both the Swedish and Hungarian countries affect the mean between the countries, this is also reflected on the total mean of each country with Sweden having the highest and Hungary the lowest.

The numbers that are shown on the Distrust factor enjoyed a considerable set of reliability with the exception of the United Kingdom and Austrian respondents, which is rather curious and raises a set of questions since the other variables enjoyed a reliable outcome and remained below the four point score on the diagram. The mean value in these countries can with other words be tested again in a different setting whereupon the mean value can be calculated upon.

It is also curios that these variables are the variables above the mean threshold of five points in order to have a positive outcome in term of the distrust level. A removal of these variables would affect the whole mean value of the combined countries and the country itself and lower the total mean score considerably with Sweden being the only country with a mean value above five points.

The unsure number of different variables in Austria and the United Kingdom poses certain questions regarding the Distrust factor but it does not affect the main question, nor does it affect the general public relation towards the democratic process in their respective country. The pattern one sees in every country except Sweden is that the Distrust factor remains below the five point threshold and therefore is either in a delicate balance between a polarised nation or deeply mistrusting public relation between the democratic representatives and its process. The results can however be discarded due to the low correlation numbers as shown on the eta calculations if one is going to follow the numbers that are shown on the statistical software.

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7.3 Destruction

The mean value on all the variables are all lying around the five point threshold which signals a certain uniformity about immigration between the countries. Although Hungary and Sweden affect the mean value by lying on the more negative and positive side respectively than the rest.

Touching upon the variable “Immigration bad or good for country’s economy”, it becomes clear that Austria, Spain and the United Kingdom have similar stances while Sweden remains on the positive side, Hungary on the other hand are on the negative side of the variable. When one looks at the variable “Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants”, it is worth noting the Spanish and Swedish cases where the majority has a positive stance on immigration.

Hungary is consistent in its negative stance but is more closely in line with the United Kingdom and Austria. Lastly, the variable “Immigrants makes country worse or better place to live” is again reflected by the positive attitude by the Swedish country while remaining low on the Hungarian side.

To sum it up, it seems as if the immigrational attitude is fairly divided between the respondents in each country. The relative uniformity signals however that there exists a net division between the respondents when addressing the immigrational attitude. However, the Swedish are seen to be more optimistic when addressing the immigrational issue with the highest total mean score while Hungary has the lowest total mean score. Regarding the reliability of the variables it is only the Spanish mean that comes into question, affecting its total mean value. The real issue

4,76 4,91 4,91 3,58 5,62 4,8

4,87 5,94 5,07 4,83 7,12 5,6

4,39 5 4,91 3,98 6,5 54,67 5,28 4,96 4,13 6,41

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Austria Spain United Kingdom Hungary Sweden Mean Of all

countries

Mean Value Of Destruction

Immigration bad or good for country's economy

Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants Immigrants make country worse or better place to live Total Mean of Destruction

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comes when one is addressing the eta score that shows a low correlation, which according to the software makes the numbers disposable as a scientific issue.

7.4 Deprivation

The mean of all countries is presented and appear to be relatively balanced and below the five point threshold. With Spain and Sweden affecting the mean value the most on the first variable, although Hungary also affects the mean on the first variable.

Sweden is the only country with a positive mean value when addressing the first variable concerning the economical satisfaction in its country while the Spanish satisfaction lies below the three point threshold. Spain is followed by a Hungarian negative score hitting clearly below the four point threshold. The variable “Government should reduce differences in income levels”

is presented as a fairly balanced and uniform attitude which is reflected on the mean score. Yet Sweden is the country that reaches the lowest score on the scale.

To sum it up, it appears as if the uniformity of the variables is a reflection of a relative silence in the economical subject. Even the sum lies below the five point threshold to show a mean satisfaction it instead shows a mean dissatisfaction. The total mean value continues to stay high in Sweden while Spain achieves the lowest score. The reliability of these numbers are uniformly positive except for the mean value of the United Kingdom. The eta score shows a low correlation however which puts the destruction factor according to each country in jeopardy.

4,92 2,85 4,74 3,72 6,1 4,5

4,3 4,6 4,5 4,5 4,1 4,44,61 3,67 4,37 4,11 5,1

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

countries

Mean Value of Deprivation

How satisfied with present state of economy in country Government should reduce differences in income levels Total Mean of Deprivation

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7.5 De-alignment

The de-alignment variables mean value between the countries lies clearly on the negative side.

With the mean value lying around the third parallel, it becomes clear that the values here are uniform.

This uniformity is demonstrated on the first variable where neither country surpasses the fourth point and it is by this reason that the mean result is negative. The same can be applied on the second variable where the mean value of the identity lies on low levels.

All in all, the de alignment factor is clearly on the low side with Sweden having the highest score and Spain the lowest.

Touching upon the reliability, it is the United Kingdom and Austria that comes into question when summing up the total mean score. But the eta test shows a low correlation score which puts the whole diagram in a negative light.

3,5 2,2 3,8 3,6 5 3,6

4,7 4,4 3,6 4,4 4,9 5

4,1 3,3 3,7 4 4,95

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Countries

Mean Value of De-Alignment

Trust in political parties How close to party Total Mean of De-alignment

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8 Discussion

The software showed a significant low level of correlation between the participants of the survey and the factors that were measured. However, it can be considered questionable to simply discard the numbers that are presented in this paper. The electoral success of the populist parties in each country only a few years after the survey took place is undeniable. The numbers follow a clear pattern which is reflected on the different theories presented earlier in this paper.

Not least on the comparative study of 2015 where Nordic region was concluded to be the most stable while the southern and central-eastern regions were the most volatile.

The Hungarian combined mean score of 15,06 and the Spanish total mean score of 15,35 does reflect the fact about this issue. Both countries summed up a considerable total number of populist representatives of a range of different parties mostly from the right end of the political spectrum but also on the left during the elections that took place the same year as the survey took place. This can be compared to the high level of the Swedish pool of potential with its high number of 21,75. It is however noticeable that the Sweden Democrats have grown considerably since the survey was conducted.

In addition, it is also noticeable that Austria and the United Kingdoms accumulated pool of potential stands on 17,07 to 17,17 points respectively which is below the line of mean satisfaction. These results are later followed in the Austrian parliament which had an increase in the growth of its populist party while the United Kingdom marched further down the line of what would eventually become a Brexit vote.

When comparing the total mean of each factor it is noticeable that Hungary is constantly scoring low and this can be compared to the electoral results which gave the populist parties a considerable majority. A low score on the D of Destruction is also noticeable. This can be compared to the Spanish case which also had low scores and therefore a very high pool of potential populist growth, the differences become visible however when comparing the higher score of Destruction which does not seem like a polarizing issue amongst the participants of the survey at the time. This might explain why the populist party of moderate and leftist ideas grew instead of national populist parties the same year that the survey was conducted (although the low significant level on the reliability scale might be problematic in this kind of discussion).

In addition, it is also noticeable how corruption scandals affect the pool of potential and its destructive factor in favour of populist parties due to the power vacuum amongst the electorate

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when the de-alignment factor becomes a major factor in combination with the distrust factor as the Austrian and Spanish case shows.

When touching upon the loss of the established orders authority and the resulting interregnum, it appears as if a hypothesis can be formed on which a score below 16 points out of 40 (maximum 10 in each D) creates a period of an interregnum by which the authority of the political establishment is especially vulnerable to sudden political blows by outsiders due to the loss of spontaneous consent and the social hegemony being open for change in the political field which will shape the agonism in the future.

The constellations of the score divisions in the framework of the four D’s might tell if the political setting for a left-wing or right-wing populist party can make a breakthrough, mostly surrounding the Destruction factor which in Hungary’s case showed a score that was closer to the third point rather than the fourth while the Spanish mean barely lied on the positive side (5,28) rendering the factor dormant during the survey while other factors scored low. It is also noticeable that the Hungarian participants scored a higher mean value on deprivation than Spain, which might suggest that the destruction and deprivation categories are at odds on how the populist agonism will be shaped electorally during the period of interregnum.

If these numbers are to be followed, it might give an insight into how the rebellious voter behaves and why these parties become a relevant factor in the mainstream political field, this is however not necessarily news. What could be considered as new with these numbers however, might be the fact that the Deprivation and Destruction could be at odds with each other where fear of the economic future turns into a fear of identity and by this reason moves the political spectrum from a modernistic view into a postmodern one. This could offer a sort of academic compromise between the populist scholars who are divided between an economic camp and the identity camp where both sides argues that their side is correct while the other is wrong, when it can be argued both sides to be correct depending on which region is being analysed due its regional agonistic condition.

8.1 Future Research

It appears as if the age-old debate between the qualitative and quantitative schools of thought is at an impasse in this subject. It might also be worth asking oneself a question about the choice of method, maybe it is more suitable for a univariate method to compare the regions or a multivariate method to add more independent variables into the equations.

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However, it is relevant to study these tendencies between the countries in different contexts and situations in more detail. It would have been interesting to be able to analyse more variables in a similar framework and analyse the results with high significant rates and compare these in relation to each other and the countries or regions.

The lack of comparative research is problematic. Mostly because of the lack of knowledge for the populist parties to grow in each region, which might in turn contribute to the lack of consensus on the academic field. The comparative work could also in the future help guide qualitative researchers and help with a framework to work from.

It also appears as a mean score around five suggests that a factor is relatively apolitical which in this case might be worth researching more about if one is to explore the validity of the four D’s theory. This kind of research would benefit in a substantial manner if more variables and countries could be measured to increase the reliability and accuracy when conducting research in a certain area.

Another area that could be researched is the psychological relation amongst vast swathes of a population in relation to the Destruction factor which in turn is related to the identity of the voting citizens and thusly appeal much to the fear of losing an identity. One could argue that the Destruction factor hangs almost exclusively on fear and identity. It would by this reason be necessary to try to incorporate a psychological discussion into the populist debate in a serious manner.

9 Conclusion

This paper started with an ambition to explore the mean value between each region in accordance to the comparative work from 2015. A framework was developed by using the four D’s theory from 2018 whereupon a hypothesis with four underhypotheses was created. A survey from 2014 was used to provide the mean numbers to compare the numbers, these numbers were in turn summarized as a point counter to measure the total pool of potential for national populist parties to grow.

What can be concluded is that the numbers follow a pattern where the total score of the pool of potential is equivalent to the popularity of populist parties on its extremities while countries that stayed around the 17 point score remained with a clear populist presence that would eventually affect the political field in the future in a decisive manner.

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The Swedish case shows a certain mean satisfaction, but the electoral gains of the Swedish Democrats the same year it was conducted shows that the pool of potential starts to grow with the mean values being above half of the total numerical value, showing that a breakdown of an authoritative order starts to take place and might grow in the future due to the same parties successes in the election of 2018.

Another observation that can be seen is the difference between the Spanish and Hungarian mean value for Destruction which differentiates with 1,15 where the Spanish mean was more dormant than Hungary. Although both had a similar point score of the total pool of potential, the numbers showed that Hungarian participants worried more about than Spain during the time of the survey. The electoral result of the respective parliaments the same year in combination with this comparative study might explain the differences of the populist electoral results.

The validity of the 4D’s remains intriguing just as the comparative study of 2015. They show a certain pattern in their conclusive understanding of the populist factor. Their theories can by this reason be validated and the hypothesis be confirmed as correct.

However, the low score of reliability remains a constant thorn in the side for this research.

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The Potential Populist Voter: A Comparative Study About The Rebellious Voter In Europe