Master Thesis, 30 hp
Master programme in Political Science, 12 hp
Spring Term 2020
Parliamentary standing committees in the EU policy-
making process
A comparative case study of two committees from the Bundestag
Yannick Stephan
Abstract
The EU integration process has led to severe changes in policy-making. On the one hand, authority shifted from the national level to the EU. On the other hand, national level executives have gained power relative to the national legislatures. However, since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, scholars argue for a comeback of national legislatures. In Germany, parliamentary standing committees have gained considerable power throughout these developments. Nonetheless, their traditional role as policy shaper is contested among scholars.
Thus, clarification of their role is needed.
While, previous analysis has mainly focused on the Bundestag as a unitary actor. This thesis investigates the role of two standing committees of the Bundestag – Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung and Ausschuss für Gesundheit – in the EU policy-making process across two different competence areas emerging due to the Lisbon Treaty. To answer the research questions, semi-structured interviews with committee members have been conducted.
The results of the study show a diverging picture. The members of the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung are considerably constrained in their ability to act as a policy shaper. The members of the Ausschuss für Gesundheit can secure their policy-shaping powers to a great extent. The former committee lacks these qualities concerning the shift of an increasing amount of policy authority in agriculture to the EU, the restricted use and abilities of the Early Warning Mechanism and the constrained ability to influence the minister’s position in the Council. The members of the latter are more successful in securing policy authority in public health at the national level by making use of the EWM. Nonetheless, the restricted ability to influence the minister’s position in the Council is present, too.
We can conclude that the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung has inherited the role of a scrutiniser and executer meanwhile the Ausschuss für Gesundheit can be described as policy shaper.
Keywords: EU policy-making; EU integration; Europeanisation; parliamentary standing committees; Bundestag; comparative case study
List of abbreviations
AfD – Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) Art. – Article
CAP – Common Agricultural Policy EAC – European Affairs Committee EU – European Union
EUZBBG – Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union (Law on the cooperation of the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag in matters concerning the European Union)
EWM – Early Warning Mechanism
FDP – Freie Demokratische Partei (The Liberals)
GO-BT – Geschäftsordnung des Bundestages (Internal regulations of the Bundestag) IntVG – Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz (Law on the responsibility of integration) SEA – Single European Act
SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party)
Table of Content
Abstract ... 2
List of abbreviations ... 3
1. Introduction ... 6
1.1 Statement of the problem ... 7
1.2 Purpose of the study and research questions ... 8
1.3 Previous research on parliamentary standing committees ... 9
1.4 Delimitations ... 11
1.5 Definition of key terms ... 11
1.6 Outline ... 12
2. Theoretical framework ... 13
2.1 Principal-Agent Theory and the “logic of consequences” ... 13
2.2 New Institutionalism, the strand of sociological institutionalism and its “logic of appropriateness” ... 15
2.3 The concept of policy shaping ... 16
2.4 The concept of Europeanisation ... 17
2.5 Connection to problem, purpose and research questions of the study ... 18
2.6 Operationalisation ... 19
3. Methods and data ... 19
3.1 Research design ... 20
3.2 Data collection method and material ... 21
3.3 Analyses of collected material ... 24
3.4 Ethical considerations ... 25
4. Results ... 26
4.1 Background ... 26
4.1.1 The principle of subsidiarity and proportionality ... 26
4.1.2 EU competences ... 28
4.2 Empirical findings from the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung ... 28
4.2.1 EU legislation, national implementation and the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung ... 29
4.2.2 The EWM as scrutiny device ... 33
4.2.3 Influencing governments’ position in Council negotiations ... 35
4.2.4 Summary of findings ... 36
4.3 Empirical findings from the Ausschuss für Gesundheit ... 37
4.3.1 EU legislation, national implementation and the Ausschuss für Gesundheit ... 38
4.3.2 The EWM as scrutiny device ... 40
4.3.3 Influencing governments’ position in Council negotiations ... 41
4.3.4 Summary of findings ... 42
5. Analysis of empirical findings ... 43
6. Conclusion ... 48
6.1 Discussion of the research questions, connection to previous studies and the bigger picture ... 49
6.2 Reflection on the theoretical framework and methods ... 52
6.3 Suggestions for future research ... 55
Bibliography ... 56
Appendices ... 61
Appendix 1: Interview guide in German (Original) ... 61
Appendix 2: Interview guide in English (Translation) ... 62
Appendix 3: Interview partners (Committee members) ... 63
Appendix 4: Coding procedure ... 64
6
1. Introduction
Ever since the European Union (EU) integration project began, it has led to profound changes at the national level of its member states. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, European integration has increased. The outcome for member states includes several shifts of legislative authority from the national to the supranational level (Wessels 2005, 446-447; Goetz & Meyer- Sahling 2008, 6) with the Single European Act (SEA), The Maastricht Treaty and The Treaty of Amsterdam as the peak of this process (Benz & Broschek 2010, 10). Additionally, the EU integration favoured the government’s position to the parliament’s position since they are represented in the EU Council where decision-making takes place. Thus, leaving a decreasing amount of legislative roles for national legislatures left. Overall, researchers referred to an erosion of the parliamentary democracy and national policy-making (Auel 2006, 249-250 + 255; Beichelt 2012, 143 + 146).
At the same time, the constitutional changes at EU level provided national legislatures with opportunities to check their respective governments. Equipped with enhanced information access, legislatures can scrutinise the position on a legislative proposal in the Council. Besides, all member states empowered themselves by establishing a European Affairs Committee (EAC) to process the vast amount of information. This was seen as a way to voice an opinion on legislative proposals from the EU level to their governments (Maurer & Wessels 2001b, 435;
Raunio 2009, 319). However, the constitutional position and provision of the EACs vary significantly among the member states. Also, outside of the EAC, standing committees have given more attention towards EU legislation (Raunio 2009, 319). Latter are central bodies in a parliamentary democracy itself. They can interact in the legislative process and fulfil the scrutiny of legislative proposals for the whole parliament (Marschall 2016, 84). Standing committees are the single most important institution to oversee the government and gather information needed for the monitoring process (Saalfeld 2000, 367-368).
Being categorised as a working parliament (Benz & Broschek 2010, 7), the Bundestag (German parliament) is traditionally considered as a powerful legislature compared to many other countries. With a stark institutionalised parliamentary standing committee system as a core element within the national policy-making process, standing committees are classified as policy-shapers (Auel 2006, 249-250; Hölscheidt 2017, 106). However, the above-described shift of authority from national to supranational level has marginalised their role in EU matters
7 where they play the main role in reviewing draft legislative proposals coming from the EU (Auel 2006, 253; Beichelt 2012, 143).
Within this time of a declining national role in the policy-making process, the Treaty of Lisbon was entering into force in 2009 and leading to severe changes for national level participation in the EU legislative process. The most important innovation is the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) under the Protocol on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality. Thus, national legislatures receive draft legislative proposals from the Commission in order to check their compliance with the principle of subsidiarity (Raunio 2011, 308-309; Cooper 2012, 447) (See: Chapter 4.1).
Above described development indicated a major enhancement of the standing committees’ role in the Bundestag. Through the Lisbon Treaty, they have now the central responsibility in EU matters. One the one hand, checking Commission’s draft legislative proposals and their compliance with the subsidiarity principle. On the other hand, negotiating the transposition of EU legislation into national law. Both is now in the hands of the respective standing committee within its policy area (Abels 2017, 123-124). Therefore, negotiations about handing-in a reasoned opinion to the Commission and decisions if the proposal complies with the subsidiarity principle, are made in the standing committees (Becker & Kietz 2010, 16).
1.1 Statement of the problem
Nonetheless, among scholars, the role of the standing committees in the Bundestag within the EU policy-making process is contested. On the one hand, scholars point towards the development as an active policy-shaper. One aspect frequently forwarded are the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that bolstered their abilities in the EU policy-making process since they can interact directly at EU level (Abels 2017, 115 + 118 + 127). Thus, a strengthening of the Bundestag’s institutions resulted from that. It positioned the parliament and its institutions as central policy-making players as they are at the national level (Beichelt 2012, 143-145 + 155).
On the other hand, other researchers established a different picture. From their perspective, national legislatures receive no possibility to shape European policy through the subsidiarity check enforced with the Lisbon Treaty (Becker & Kietz 2010, 35).
Apart from that, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a division of policy fields into three distinct competence areas. Sole EU competences, shared competences between the EU and member states, and sole national competences where the EU can only supplement. These constrained
8 actors in participating in the policy-making process (Craig & De Búrca 2015, 74-75) (See:
Chapter 4.1).
By combining the previous developments and argumentation strings, we have to raise the question which role the standing committees of the Bundestag play in the EU policy-making process and to which extent they can act as policy-shapers? Furthermore, if there is a difference present between the competence areas where policy-making, on the one hand, is shared between the member states and the EU and, on the other hand, where member states supposed to have sole competence?
1.2 Purpose of the study and research questions
While previous research has mainly focused on the analysis of the Bundestag as a unitary actor and how it has adapted to European integration processes. We should rather locate the various institutions of the Bundestag, such as standing committees, in the foreground of the analysis (Raunio 2009, 325). Only a few researchers have done so regarding the EU policy-making process. Thus, less is known about how they adapt to EU integration processes and how their roles in the EU policy-making process can be described (Abels 2017, 120-121).
Furthermore, previous research has shown that in competence areas where national parliaments share competencies with the EU, they rather act as policy reviewers than policy-shapers (See:
Liljeqvist 2018). On the other hand, where national parliaments have sole competencies, they can keep their traditional role and power. Thus, another purpose is to investigate this situation for the German Bundestag and committees with varying competencies.
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the literature on the role of national parliamentary standing committees in the EU legislative process. The focus will be on the parliamentary standing committees of the Bundestag and their role in the policy-making process related to the EU. Additionally, this thesis will shed light upon standing committees’ abilities to act as policy-shapers and how this role differs or is similar across standing committees of policy areas where the competence between the EU and its member states differs.
9 In order to meet the purpose, the following research questions are to be answered and guide the paper.
1. What role does parliamentary standing committees have within the policy-making process of the EU…
a) …in a policy sector where the Bundestag shares competence with the EU?
b) …in a policy sector where the Bundestag has the sole competence and the EU can only supplement?
1.3 Previous research on parliamentary standing committees
As it has been outlined in the introduction of this thesis, parliamentary committees fulfil different roles across countries depending on parliamentary settings and their granted abilities.
As von Beyme (1999) has pointed out, the role of the committees can differ from being able to actively participate in the policy-making process to playing a minor role compared to the parliament itself (von Beyme 1999, 121-122). In strong committee systems, they are the first platform where legislative proposals are discussed. Therefore, they can make changes and amend draft legislative proposals. Opposed to that, weak committees play a minor role. They fulfil more the role of a discussion platform for detail questions rather than making changes (von Beyme 1999, 222-223).
In the same vein, Mattson & Stroem (1995) and Stroem (1998) ranked committees in order to carry out a multi-dimensional analysis based on a distributional, informational and partisan perspective. They suggest that committee power is two-dimensional with drafting authority and agenda control as parameters. Committees having drafting authority can redraft a whole new legislative proposal or make at least amendments. Concerning agenda control, they have the ability to summon documents (Mattson & Stroem 1995, 296-300; Stroem 1998, 47-48 + 52- 55). Thus, the authors go even one step further than von Beyme (1999) by not only analysing the different characteristics but establish a two-scale graph to rank committees concerning their strength.
In contrast to Stroem (1990) and Powell (2000), Martin & Vanberg (2004) and Martin &
Vanberg (2011) focus on the intra-coalition sphere. They argue that not only the government- opposition dynamic but also the relation between governing parties in a multi-party system lead to an impact on legislative reviews in committees (Martin & Vanberg 2011, 5). A strong committee system institutionalised within the parliamentary system is an important factor in
10 obtaining necessary information and in scrutinising the coalition partner (Martin & Vanberg 2004, 17; Martin & Vanberg 2011, 34). As previous studies have outlined before (see: von Beyme 1999; Mattson & Stroem 1995), they argue that specialised standing committees are forerunners of increased scrutiny since they have the necessary institutional means to acquire information (Martin & Vanberg 2011, 35-36). Their results show that within the intra-coalition sphere, especially the ideological divergence matters for scrutinising the coalition partner (Martin & Vanberg 2004, 23). Likewise, even in strong parliaments, the scrutiny of each other is fostered by a strong standing committee system. Unlike that, it does not count for opposition parties (Martin & Vanberg 2011, 122).
While early research focused on the domestic level. Recent literature shifts the focus towards EU policy-making. Finke & Dannwolf (2013) focus on parliamentary committees as central scrutiny actor due to their broad powers regarding ex-post influence on EU politics. Based on previous research on parliamentary committees, they investigate opposition and government opportunities. Results show that the intra-coalition realm is an important factor for applying scrutiny measures in order to prevent one-sided legislation in favour of one coalition partner.
In comparison, the opposition faces the obstacle of information asymmetry and is therefore limited in scrutinising (Finke & Dannwolf 2013, 719-722).
Similarly, Finke & Herbel (2015) look at the opposition and coalition control (Finke & Herbel 2015, 493-494). Results show that opposition parties scrutinise if they differ in the position of the governing coalition. Their chances increase if the government is weak in terms of seat share.
The findings of the intra-coalition scrutiny correspond with Martin & Vanberg (2004).
Ministerial drift is the main reason why governing parties use scrutiny measures regarding EU legislation (Finke & Herbel 2015, 508).
Gattermann & Hefftler (2015) focus on the institutional capacity and the inclusion of parliamentary committees in the process of handing-in a reasoned opinion. Their results show that minority governments are more prone to hand-in reasoned opinions than majority governments (Gattermann & Hefftler 2015, 315 + 319-320). This goes along with the argumentation of Finkel & Herbel (2015) that governments with a weak share of seats increase the chances of using scrutiny measures (Finkel & Herbel 2015, 508).
Within these findings, the German Bundestag and its institutionalised standing committee system is rated as one of the strongest compared to other countries (Auel 2006, 250). As Martin
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& Vanberg (2011) point out, due to their vast amount of autonomous rights to participate in the policy-making process, they are, from a jurisdictional perspective, nearly as strong as government ministries. Therefore, they are the “real meeting ground” of the policy-making process (Martin & Vanberg 2011, 39-40). Both governing parties and the opposition can influence legislation (Martin & Vanberg 2004, 20-21). It follows the argumentation of Mattson
& Stroem (1995) that German committees belong to the cluster that has greater authority in amending legislation and in summoning important documents (Mattson & Stroem 1995, 299- 300).
However, turning to EU politics and the legislative process at the EU level, their role is contested among scholars. Holzhacker (2002) argues that they are the main ground used for scrutinising the government regarding EU positions by both the opposition parties and the coalition partner (Holzhacker 2002, 466-467). Unlike that, Finke & Dannwolf (2013) argue that especially opposition parties have difficulties to scrutinise EU legislation in standing committees at the national level (Finke & Dannwolf 2013, 738). Furthermore, Finke (2019) argues that ex-ante control in the transposition of EU directives does not matter if the governing coalition is stable, thus, leaving committees behind (Finke 2019, 18).
1.4 Delimitations
Due to the limited scope of the thesis, delimitations need to be determined. First, since the aim is to investigate the standing committees’ role in the EU policy-making process, this thesis is focused on EU legislation and how the standing committees can participate in it. Namely the EWM, the national implementation process and influencing the governments’ position in the Council. Second, rather than investigating all standing committees of the Bundestag, two standing committees were chosen for an in-depth analysis of their role in the EU policy-making process as cases. They will be presented in Chapter 3.1 of the thesis based on distinct criteria.
Third and finally, the interviews conducted with the members of the two standing committees of the Bundestag are time bounded to the ongoing legislative period (2017-2021).
1.5 Definition of key terms
Two terms, coming out of the German parliamentary system, are explained below and will be used continuously throughout the thesis according to it.
12 Parliamentary standing committees – Are ordinarily mirroring the existing ministries of the government during the term of office and consist of members of the Bundestag. Each faction is represented following their election results.1
Party factions – Are consisting of members of the same party that come together in the Bundestag after national elections by creating a faction representing this party.2
1.6 Outline
The thesis continues as follows. In Chapter 2, the theoretical framework is presented. On the one hand, a discussion of the Principal-Agent Theory and the connection to rational choice institutionalism with its “logic of consequences” is presented. After that, the strand of sociological institutionalism with its “logic of appropriateness” – emerging from New Institutionalism – is forwarded. Following that, the concept of policy shaping and the concept of Europeanisation are outlined. Furthermore, they are connected to the problem, purpose and the research questions of this thesis and ways in which they are beneficial to answer the research questions. Their operationalisation follows this.
Chapter 3 of the thesis is outlining and critically discussing the methods and empirical material used in this thesis. The research design with the Bundestag as a case study on a comparative basis with two of its parliamentary standing committees – Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung (Committee for agriculture and diet) and Ausschuss für Gesundheit (Committee for public health) – is forwarded. Additionally, it is argued why it makes a good case. Besides that, the data collection method of conducting interviews with members of the two standing committees is discussed in the light of advantages and disadvantages. Likewise, interpretive content analysis is presented as the analytical method of the empirical material. Again, advantages and disadvantages are discussed, and arguments in favour of this method are presented. The final part of the chapter reviews ethical consideration concerning the data collection and analysis methods.
Chapter 4 of the thesis starts with a short background section regarding the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and its implementations in the Bundestag. Additionally, the three degrees of EU competences are presented. After that, the empirical material is presented.
1 Deutscher Bundestag:https://www.bundestag.de/ausschuesse/aufgaben-19-532258 (Accessed: 24.05.2020)
2Ibid.:https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/fraktionen#url=L3BhcmxhbWVudC9mcmFrdGlvbmVuL2ZyYWt0a W9uZW4tMTk2Mzky&mod=mod485836 (Accessed: 24.05.2020)
13 First, the synthesised findings of the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung are forwarded. Likewise, the findings for the Ausschuss für Gesundheit.
In chapter 5, the empirical findings of both standing committees are connected to the theoretical framework and analysed accordingly.
Chapter 6 is presenting a conclusion. Results of the analysis will be discussed and synthesised in order to answer the research questions. After that, results will be discussed regarding previous research – similarities, differences and new insights will be outlined – and implications of its meaning for the standing committees’ role in the policy-making process in overall will be drawn. The conclusion ends with suggestions for further research in the field.
2. Theoretical framework
Recapturing the research questions and the aim of the study – to analyse the role of two parliamentary standing committees in EU policy-making in different competence areas of the EU and its member states – different theories and theoretical concepts have been chosen to create the theoretical framework and help answer them. This chapter introduces the theoretical framework. First, Principal-Agent Theory in connection with rational choice institutionalism and its “logic of consequences”, which has emerged as one strand of New Institutionalism. After that, sociological institutionalism and its “logic of appropriateness”, emerging as another strand of New Institutionalism, will be theorised. The concept of policy shaping will be presented as the third part of the theoretical framework. Lastly, the concept of Europeanisation will be presented and is implemented as an umbrella concept which provides an overall construct for the theoretical framework. Furthermore, it is discussed how they relate to the problem, the aim of the study and the research questions. Finally, the operationalisation of the theories and concepts in the analysis of the collected material is forwarded.
2.1 Principal-Agent Theory and the “logic of consequences”
Principal-Agent Theory has evolved within Rational Choice Theory and is based on the core assumption of self-interested individuals which actions ought to fulfil their preferences. A classical agency relationship is present when one individual – the principal – is delegating a certain degree of decision-making power to another individual – the agent. Latter gains the authority to fulfil the desires of the principal on his behalf (Jenson & Meckling 1976, 308;
Hindmoor & Taylor 2015, 179).
14 However, due to the assumption of self-interested individuals, the delegation of authority from the principal to the agent is causing agency problems since both aims on maximising their outcome. Besides, the objectives of the agent and the principal are not always congruent with each other. The main agency problem is agent-induced hidden information, which is causing information asymmetry between the agent and the principal. Meanwhile, the former has the advantage of knowing exactly his actions and next steps. The latter is not fully aware of the agents’ actions. Thus, the principal cannot be sure that the agent is using the delegated authority in order to reach intended desires or if he is following his agenda and “shirk” (Shapiro 2005, 264; Hindmoor & Taylor 2015, 179).
To limit or prevent such development, the principal can implement and make use of specific monitoring and scrutiny mechanisms to control the agent in his actions and their compliance with the principals’ goals (Jensen & Meckling 1976, 308). Thus, monitoring and scrutiny aim to reduce the information asymmetry between the agent and the principal and to make sure that the latter is fulfilling his objectives (Hindmoor & Taylor 2015, 179). Additionally, the principal-agent relationship can be influenced by underlying external forces. Both constraints and opportunities can, therefore, open-up for actors through legal rules that are present (Shapiro 2005, 269).
Closely related to the theoretical aspects of the Principal-Agent Theory are the thoughts of rational choice institutionalism – and the “logic of consequences” – which evolved as one strand of New Institutionalism. Meanwhile, the agency relationship is shaped by monitoring and scrutiny measures. Rational choice institutionalism emphasises structures of institutions which offer possibilities and constraints for actors in pursuing their goals and preventing others likewise (Lowndes & Roberts 2013, 34-37; Lowndes 2018, 58). Furthermore, rules determine when individuals can act and influence decisions (Lowndes & Roberts 2013, 55-56 + 58).
Similarly to Principal-Agent Theory, emerging opportunities and constraints are shaped by limited knowledge and restricted information access (March 1994, 10). Besides, external change can lead to the establishment of a new set of opportunities and constraints in institutions which influences actors’ behaviour (Lowndes 2018, 67).
The principal-agent relation can also be drawn into politics and the decision-making process where authority is delegated from legislatures to executives (Shapiro 2005, 270). In an account of Martin & Vanberg (2004) and Martin & Vanberg (2011), aspects from the classical agency problem are taken into consideration in the “joint policy-making” process of coalition
15 governments at the national level (Martin & Vanberg 2004, 13-14; Martin & Vanberg 2011, 9- 10). The agency problem within the coalition government arises when one of the partners is delegated with authority to draft legislation in a policy area of their respective ministry. Due to different preferences and the self-interest of the responsible ministry, the other coalition partner has to count that their interest will be left aside in the formulation of legislation (Martin &
Vanberg 2004, 14-15). To solve this agency problem, coalition partners have to establish monitoring mechanisms that give them the ability to control the partners’ policy-making process (Martin & Vanberg 2004, 16-18; Martin & Vanberg 2011, 18).
Recent literature builds on these accounts but taking EU policy-making into focus.
Furthermore, not only intra-coalition agency problems are emphasised rather both, the intra- coalition and government-opposition realm are in the centre of analysis. The attempts of Finke
& Dannwolf (2013), Finke & Herbel (2015) and Finke (2019) are looking at agency problems as situations in which agents can use of their advantage compared to principals by implementing EU directives in their preferred way (Finke & Dannwolf 2003, 715-716). Furthermore, they show how information asymmetry is present in Council decision-making (Finke & Herbel 2015, 491-492). Thus, for both, coalition partners and the opposition, scrutiny and oversight measure are key to overcome agency problems (Finke & Dannwolf 2013, 719-722; Finke &
Herbel 2015, 493-494). Similarly, Gattermann & Hefftler (2015) looking at the EWM to overcome the agency problem in the policy-making process (Gattermann & Hefftler 2015, 305).
2.2 New Institutionalism, the strand of sociological institutionalism and its “logic of appropriateness”
The second strand of New Institutionalism is sociological institutionalism. As Lowndes (2018) points out, from a sociological institutionalist point of view, political institutions (such as legislative committees) influence the behaviour of actors by shaping their “values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs” (Lowndes 2018, 58). March & Olsen (1989) denoted this as
“logic of appropriateness”. They emphasise that it is not the preferences that shape actors’
behaviour rather “beliefs, rules and behaviours” are in the foreground. They are shaping the role conception and the identity of individuals and determine appropriate behaviour.
Furthermore, rules, that are shaped by norms and practices, and the information possible to obtain from political institutions regulate which actions are available for individuals (March &
Olsen 1989, 160-161; March 1994, 58).
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“Beliefs, rules and behaviour” can also be subject to changes. It leads to a two-folded outcome.
On the one hand, a new set of rules emerges to which actors have to adapt. On the other hand, the decision-making process is changing and creates new opportunities and constraints. The new power structure is establishing a new “logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen 1989, 164; March 1994, 97-98).
Following the approach of March & Olsen (1989) in the analysis of the empirical material can be beneficial for answering the research questions.
2.3 The concept of policy shaping
Another approach used in this thesis is the concept of political institutions as policy shapers in the policy-making process.
A policy shaper has the distinct quality of being able to enforce pressures in policy-making processes and lead the outcome towards their preferences. Thus, an actor can shape policy throughout the whole policy cycle (Brunazzo 2010, 6-7) consisting of agenda-setting, policy formulation and policy implementation (Jann & Wegrich 2007, 43-44).
First, one crucial part of being a policy shaper is agenda-setting. Having the means in the form of the necessary power to influence policy and bring specific topics on the agenda, in comparison to other actors, is a vital part of controlling the outcome of the policy-making process. The “other” actors not having the means to influence policy are, as a consequence, left out of this process. Nonetheless, these actors can make use of “going public” or addressing higher levels of authority to intervene in the agenda-setting and ultimately in the policy-making process (Birkland 2007, 65-67).
Second, a policy shaper interacts in the policy formulation stage as the leading player of shaping the issues set in the agenda and determine overarching goals in their favour. Thus, the policy- shaping actor has the necessary means to take the lead in this process and follow its preferences.
Besides that, actors are influenced in the policy formulation phase by institutional rules and settings which are always present throughout the formulation process (Sidney 2007, 79-80 + 84).
Third, a policy shaper is a central actor during the implementation process. Enforcing the objectives that have been decided on as accurate as possible and define concrete measures to
17 reach them is central for a policy shaper. Power is aggregated in this actor (Pülzl & Treib 2007, 91 + 94).
2.4 The concept of Europeanisation
As it has been stated above, principal-agent relations and rational choice institutionalism with its “logic of consequences” outline that opportunities and constraints can be influenced by external forces leading to change (Shapiro 2005, 269; Lowndes 2018, 67). Furthermore, the strand of sociological institutionalism and its “logic of appropriateness” theorises constraints of actors’ behaviour in the decision-making process as occurring through a set of rules that an institution comprises. It can be subject to changes since external developments can lead to the establishment of new responses and routines (Lowndes & Roberts 2013, 29-30; Lowndes 2018, 60-62). Besides, due to the European political process changes for a policy-shaping actor can emerge (Brunazzo 2010, 6).
These changes can be explored with the concept of Europeanisation. Börzel & Panke (2016) emphasise the “bottom-up” approach, which can be used to explain member states’ ability to produce changes at EU level. Meaning, how the member states of the EU can “upload” their interests to the supranational level and lead to changes in policies, politics and the polity (Börzel
& Panke 2016, 111-112).
A different approach of Europeanisation is the idea of a “top-down” path. The focus is on changes at the national level that result from the influence of the EU. Institutions’ adaption, their processes and how the EU is causing domestic change is in the foreground of the analysis.
As Bulmer (2008) stresses out, the “top-down” strand of Europeanisation can be understood as penetration mechanism that leads to changes of institutional structures, policy-making and the behavioural patterns in politics caused by the “download” of EU policies, politics and polity.
Furthermore, this is followed by changes in norms and rules within domestic level institutions (Bulmer 2008, 47-48).
A more extensive understanding of “top-down” Europeanisation in scope is presented by Radaelli (2003). He argues that the process of Europeanisation at the member state level is causing shifts in rules and procedures as well as in “ways of doing things” in politics through newly established and shared beliefs which are implemented from EU level into national-level procedures. Thus, domestic policy areas become to a great extent subject of EU policy-making
18 and disempower national institutions in decision-making procedures (Radaelli 2003, 29-30;
Raunio 2009, 326; Börzel & Panke 2016, 113).
Throughout the thesis, the definition of Radaelli (2003) is followed.
2.5 Connection to problem, purpose and research questions of the study
The purpose of the thesis is to investigate the role of parliamentary standing committees of the Bundestag in the EU policy-making process and how this varies across committees with different competencies concerning actions in it. Each of the above-presented theories has its benefits that can help to answer the research questions.
Principal-Agent Theory and the aspects of intra-coalition and government-opposition perspective can be beneficial to describe how the different actors in standing committees perceive the monitoring and scrutiny possibilities that have emerged throughout the EU integration process. Additionally, how they make use of them to scrutinise and influence the EU policy-making process. It can be bolstered by rational choice institutionalism and the changes in the current possibility and constraint structure that occurred due to the EU integration process for political institutions at the member state level (Here: standing committees) and the actors within them. Furthermore, it allows elaborating new empowerments and veto points that appear and their effects on domestic level actors (Bulmer 2008, 50; Börzel
& Panke 2016, 114). Thus, making it possible to investigate how new material and resources are creating new power structures as a consequence of domestic changes caused by the EU integration process (Börzel & Risse 2003, 58-59).
The “logic of appropriateness” makes it possible to identify if and how the process of EU integration has fostered a change of “rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning” in domestic structures (Börzel & Panke 2016, 114-115). Furthermore, if and how the newly established collective understanding has developed as new “appropriate” behaviour and change in the domestic EU policy-making process (Börzel & Risse 2003, 58-59; Börzel & Panke 2016, 114-115).
Using the concept of policy shaping is vital to connect the empirical findings of the committees to the role they play within the three phases of the policy cycle – agenda setting, policy formulation and policy implementation. First and foremost, to identify if they can act in a policy-shaping manner (Brunazzo 2010, 6-7).
19 In connection with the benefits elaborated above, the concept of Europeanisation following the definition of Radaelli (2003) helps to analyse the changes that appeared in the standing committees. Additionally, the shifts of rules and procedures that they are facing now in influencing the policy-making process. Thus, their new role in the decision-making process can be investigated and show how they are connected to an, over time, increasing importance of the EU as legislator and agenda-setter in the form of the Commission.
2.6 Operationalisation
To operationalise the Principal-Agent Theory in the analysis of the material, the focus will be on the monitoring and scrutiny mechanisms that are available for the two standing committees in the Bundestag. These are the EWM and the chance handing-in a reasoned opinion to the Commission and the ability handing-in a position statement regarding decisions made in the Council. It will be connected to aspects of the Principal-Agent Theory in order to conclude actors’ abilities to use them. In connection with this, the operationalisation of rational choice institutionalism and the “logic of consequences” will be conducted by connecting empirical findings together with theoretical implications of changing structures and set of rules emerged after the EU integration process.
Sociological institutionalism and “the logic of appropriateness” will be operationalised by connecting empirical findings to theoretical notions of the approach. In the foreground are especially the perceptions of committee members concerning changes of “rules, norms and behaviours” – “the way of doing things” in policy-making.
The concept of policy shaping will be operationalised by connecting the empirical findings with the distinct functions of a policy shaper and the analysis to which degree the standing committees can act accordingly.
The concept of Europeanisation will be operationalised by providing a broad base for the above-discussed theories and approaches. It will be used to connect the findings of the collected material, theoretical aspects of the concept and with the other theories and approaches. Thus, to make statements on how the integration process has led to changes in their role in the policy- making process.
3. Methods and data
Turning to Chapter 3 of the thesis, the following part will deal with and discuss the selection of the cases under investigation, selection of methods, how empirical data will be conducted and
20 how this data is analysed. Ethical considerations during the collection of empirical material and its use in the analysis are discussed as a final part.
3.1 Research design
As it has been outlined in the Introduction and subsequent chapters above, this thesis will focus on the Bundestag and two parliamentary committees as a comparative case study. Generally, a case study is carried out since this method allows us to investigate the phenomena from a multitude of perspectives. Besides, it allows making a full account of different perspectives and explanations. Furthermore, to identify present patterns and latent elements of explanations (Berg 2004, 251; Lewis & McNaughton Nicholls 2014, 66-67). Including a comparison of multiple cases (Here: 2 parliamentary standing committees) makes it possible to explore and provide findings to show differences and similarities of the phenomena present within comparative cases (Berg 2004, 258; Lewis & McNaughton Nicholls 2014, 65). Additionally, and since the theoretical stance within this thesis is based on the concept of Europeanisation, its links to rational choice and sociological institutionalism, Principal-Agent Theory and the concept of policy-shaping, comparative research allows to analyse factors that lead to the adaption of EU integration pressures or their absence among the chosen entities. When looking only at cases where it is known that the EU has substantial power that lead to adaption, causal effects cannot be made visible. Causality can be explored by including a comparison between cases where we can expect adaption and where we do not expect adaption (Haverland 2006, 134-135).
As the chapters on the Problematisation (Chapter 1.1) and the Literature review (Chapter 1.3) have shown, the Bundestag and the ambiguous role of parliamentary standing committees within the EU policy-making process is presenting an interesting case of analysis. The rest of this chapter will focus on the choice of two distinct standing committees as subjects of the analysis.
One the one hand, agricultural policy is selected as an area where competences between the EU and its’ member states are shared. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) at EU level – emerged during the 1960s – has constantly reformed and expanded in scope (Fouilleux &
Ansaloni 2016, 308). Furthermore, legislation under the CAP is affecting national policies immediately since they have to be fully implemented at the member state level. Additionally, the nature of formulating policy at EU level regarding the CAP is affiliated with Europeanising national policies (Michalewska-Pawlak, 235 + 238). Visible in the national policies which have
21 been influenced by a “European impulse”, the agricultural policy in Germany has been increasingly shaped by EU policy-making. Starting in 1983, where already 58,8% were influenced by the EU, it steadily rose to 75,0% in 2005 (Töller 2008, 8-10). Therefore, agricultural policy and the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung is making a good case where we can expect a committee having less policy-shaping possibilities.
On the other hand, public health policy is chosen. Even though the Lisbon Treaty is categorising it as shared competence between the EU and member states, policy-making itself remains sole competence of member state legislators. The EU can only supplement national legislation (Böhm & Landwehr 2014, 17-18) and act in a supportive and coordinative manner. Therefore, EU competence is restricted. Member states have the sole competence to formulate public health policies (Greer 2014, 14-15). Furthermore, the policies have been influenced only slightly by a “European impulse” around 20% - 25%. Furthermore, the study of Töller (2008) combined public health and family policies in the analyses. Therefore, we can expect a lower impulse in public health alone (Töller 2008, 8-10). Thus, public health policy and the Ausschuss für Gesundheit is a good case where we can expect the committee to have more policy-shaping possibilities.
By choosing the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung and the Ausschuss für Gesundheit, we provide a significant variation between the two comparative cases. One policy that has a shared competence between national level and the EU. The other policy area is described as sole national policy competence with the EU as supplementing actor (Haverland 2006, 142-143).
3.2 Data collection method and material
In order to approach and answer the two research questions, in-depth interviews with members of the two parliamentary standing committees under investigation was conducted. On the one hand, previous research has mainly focused on using descriptive methods to analyse differences among countries and their parliamentary committee system (See: Mattson & Stroem 1995; von Beyme 1999). On the other hand, quantitative methods have been used to analyse developments over time and the effect of different sets of scrutiny measures (See: Martin & Vanberg 2004;
Martin & Vanberg 2011; Finke & Herbel 2015; Gattermann & Heftler 2015). Nonetheless, the qualitative method of conducting in-depth interviews has been preferred to previous attempts due to distinct reasons which are directly connected with answering the research questions and the overall aim of this thesis. They are forwarded in the following.
22 Since the interest is in exploring the role of standing committees in EU policy-making, the qualitative method of in-depth interviews offers the benefit to receive insight knowledge and explanations from participants themselves. Trough the sole use of quantitative methods, this is not possible. Especially, personal experience, perspectives and values will be vital to analyse the way members of the standing committees can use scrutiny measures in ways to interact in the policy-making process (Yeo et al. 2014, 184; Johnson 2001, 104). Another advantage of using in-depth interviews as an approach is the full exploration of the topic under investigation from multiple and different perspectives. Besides that also actions of the participants.
Therefore, it offers the possibility of creating insights from committee members from multiple perspectives such as individual perceptions, perceptions affiliated to their party or government and opposition party perceptions (Johnson 2001, 104-105). In addition, not only common sense can be retrieved, but further exploration of possibilities and boundaries of actions and their perceptions among interviewees can be uncovered. The limits and range of scrutiny measures within the context of EU policy-making can be analysed (Johnson 2001, 106).
Nonetheless, in-depth interviews provide pitfalls one must consider throughout the process of collecting and analysing the material. Using the content of interviews depends highly on interpretations of researchers and how sense-making of the material is happening. Furthermore, the own understanding of the topic can bias interpretations to make them fit into the practical purpose of the study (Johnson 2001, 105-106). However, for this study, the advantages of in- depth interviews exceed the critique of the method. Furthermore, reliability and validity of results are made sure of (see the end of this paragraph).
The final interview guide is built as a semi-structured one and compiles a total of 11 questions (See: Appendix 1 & Appendix 2). The advantage of a semi-structured guide compared to a standardised interview guide is the possibility to ask probing questions to deepen the knowledge production and to gain deeper insights regarding the topic, important for answering the research questions (Berg 2004, 78 + 80-81). Furthermore, the questions are designed as open and non- leading questions in order to prevent steering the participants respond to a distinct direction.
Rather focus on neutralising them and let the interviewees lead to a direction (Yeo et al. 2014, 190-192).
The choice of interview partners is based on purposive sampling. Since the research is focused on two parliamentary standing committees of the Bundestag – Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung as well as the Ausschuss für Gesundheit – members of the respective
23 committees have been contacted. They represent a study population that has the knowledge and can answer the questions thoroughly. In order to receive a sample as diverse as possible to cover all viewpoints (e.g. different parties or opposition and government position) no members were excluded (Odendahl & Shaw 2001, 301-302; Ritchie et al. 2014, 113-114). In overall, 79 committee members have been approached via Mail (38 from agriculture and diet and 41 from public health) with a total of 5 members responding positively to participate in the research.
Four of them are from the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung and one from the Ausschuss für Gesundheit. The sample ought to be heterogenous to foster knowledge gain from committee members of different parties and to include different point of views regarding the research questions. However, due to the dependence of their consent to participate in the study, it is difficult to reach diversity (Ritchie et al. 2014, 114). From the 5 participants, one is from the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), four from the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) and one from the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) (See: Appendix 3). Interviews lasted from 32 to 42 minutes.
Due to the time constraint of committee members and the scope of scheduled interviews, they have been conducted via Skype-call, telephone call and written answers. Participants have been provided with the interview guide beforehand (Odendahl & Shaw 2001, 309). The reason behind this is to make them accustomed to what they can expect and to use the interview time effectively. Even though telephone interviews and written interviews have disadvantages such as the lack of identifying non-verbal communication and difficulties to answer long questions (Shuy 2001, 540-542; Berg 2004, 93; Yeo et al. 2014, 182-183). For answering the research question, non-verbal communication is not central. Rather the content of the answers themselves is. With the consent of the participants, interviews have been recorded with a tape recorder and transcribed for further analysis (Johnson 2001, 111).
The reliability and validity of qualitative research and its findings are highly discussed in the literature of generalising from qualitative research studies. Critiques forward a too-small sample size in order to conclude the bigger parent sample and the non-statistically representation of samples as arguments. Besides, unique settings and specific context can hinder the approach of generalising findings (Lewis et al. 2014, 348-350).
Nonetheless, looking at reliability and the replicability of this study and its findings, by presenting in detail how conclusions of the empirical material have been drawn the necessary openness is given to be able to follow the steps that lead to them. Furthermore, the
24 generalisation of results is perceived as robust since multiple interviews will be conducted, and conclusions are based on their overall statement regarding specific phenomena (Lewis et al.
2014, 355-356). Even though the analysis of the Ausschuss für Gesundheit consists of one interviewee only. Results are perceived as reliable due to the responsibility of his office and detail knowledge of internal committee developments.
The validity of the results is secured by well-grounded links between the theoretical framework and the positioning of the findings that occurred from the interviews with the committee members. Furthermore, a rich and detailed description of how conclusions have been drawn from linking the data to the theoretical framework incorporated will be given (See: Ch. 3.3) (Lewis et al. 2014, 356-357).
3.3 Analyses of collected material
In order to analyse the collected, interpretive content analysis is used and follows the approach of Drisko & Maschi (2015).
Interpretive content analysis – compared to other qualitative analysis methods such as thematic analyses or grounded theory – has several advantages. On the one hand, manifest context (what is visible within writing) can be extracted. On the other hand, latent context, which is developing throughout multiple sentences or even across paragraphs, can also be explored (Drisko & Maschi 2015, 2). Thus, the meaning and reason behind actions and motives can be identified, and the underlying conversation of committee members regarding their role within the EU policy-making process can be obtained. Furthermore, content analysis allows making data available in a condemned, comparable and systematic manner with retrieving inferences from the interviews in a replicable and valid process (Berg 2004, 265-266; Drisko & Maschi 2015, 3-6). Moreover, content analysis is exploratory and supports the process of finding new views and experiences concerning the phenomena under investigation (Drisko & Maschi 2015, 70). Within different forms of content analysis, the interpretive approach is favoured. Compared to the quantitative approach (basic content analysis), it offers the possibility not only to count words but further gives them meaning (Drisko & Maschi 2015, 1). Besides, the basic content analysis approach is using deductive coding and categorisation, fewer inferences from the material itself can be drawn, and less focus is on communication (Drisko & Maschi 2015, 58).
Since the manifest and latent statements of the standing committee members can be given a meaning towards the research questions, the interpretive approach is used. Attitudes and views towards phenomena can be retrieved and placed into the context (Drisko & Maschi 2015, 2).
25 Furthermore, it has the advantage of making comparisons of similarities and differences between committee members and their statements possible. It is helpful to explore the full picture of how committees can act within the EU policy-making process and how they make use of their possibilities. Additionally, contextualising the statements of the interviews with empirical data opens-up the possibility of making concrete judgements of the role of committees (Drisko & Maschi 2015, 65-66).
The coding process itself includes several steps. Furthermore, codes were established inductively rather than deductively to provide a full exploration of possible themes of codes and prevent a restriction to a specific amount of pre-fixed categories (Drisko & Maschi 2015, 73). In the first step, an initial coding of the interviews was processed to explore a full variety of themes and categories present in the material. After that, codes were refined and developed to prevent the possibility of double categorising them and to ensure that a consistent and reliable set of codes is established. After that, codes are clustered into categories of specific and meaningful topics. This list was refined in order to ensure a consistent and reliable list of categories including the clustered codes and to allow the possibility to sub-categorise overarching categories (Drisko & Maschi 2015, 73- 76).
The validity and reliability of results and conclusions made with interpretive content analysis were fostered by verifying and combining the findings with previous studies and general empirical data (Neuendorf 2002, 53; Berg 2004, 269-270; Drisko & Maschi 2015, 58-59).
Furthermore, rigour is strengthened by illustrating how codes are produced, attached to parts of the interview and how conclusions will be made. To provide an overview of how the coding and sense-making has proceeded, a short description in form of a picture is forwarded (See:
Appendix 4).
3.4 Ethical considerations
Throughout the process of addressing possible research objects (members of parliamentary standing committees), during the interviews itself and after the interviews, ethical consideration and their implications are in the foreground and followed.
Before the interviews took place, the assistants of the members of the standing committees received adequate information about the topic of the study, the aim as well as the contribution that ought to be reached through conducting in-depth interviews with them. In addition, and to make sure the committee members itself are fully informed of topic, aim and their contribution,
26 this information was forwarded again at the beginning of the interview. Both, in order to reach informed consent of the participants of the study themselves (Webster, Lewis & Brown 2014, 87-92; Taylor, Bogdan & DeVault 2016, 54).
Throughout the interviews, participants have not been coerced or forced to answer the questions in any manner. They had, at all times, the chance to not answer a question if they were not willing to or if they had problems to answer specific questions in order to avoid adverse consequences (Webster, Lewis & Brown, 94-96).
After the interviews were conducted, further information about the use of the material was forwarded to the participants. It was clarified that neither their names nor other personal information, which could lead readers of the study to trace information back to the participants, will be used when referring to their statements in the study. Furthermore, participants have been informed how and where the audiotapes and the transcript of the interviews have been stored.
The raw data was tagged with distinct but anonymous shortages for both, referring to them in the study and saving them on the laptop. Thus, their confidentiality and data protection can be assured (Webster, Lewis & Brown, 96-103).
4. Results
Turning to Chapter 4 of the thesis, the findings of empirical material collected via interviews with members of the two standing committees under investigation will be presented. Before that, a brief background section will be forwarded. On the one hand, the EWM, introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon as scrutiny mechanism of Commissions’ legislative proposals for national legislatures and its implementation in Germany is discussed. On the other hand, the three distinct competence areas for legislative authority in policy areas – that the Treaty of Lisbon introduced – are presented. After that, the focus will be on the findings from the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung. Likewise, the findings of the Ausschuss für Gesundheit.
4.1 Background
As it has been outlined in the Introduction of this thesis, the Lisbon Treaty had several implications for EU member states. To establish meaningful results from the presentation of the empirical material and its analysis, a brief background on them will be given.
4.1.1 The principle of subsidiarity and proportionality
The main novelty of the Lisbon Treaty is Protocol No. 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the establishment of the EWM to scrutinise EU legislative
27 drafts conformity with subsidiarity (Raunio 2011, 308-209). The Treaty of Lisbon states in Article (Art.) 2 – Article (Art.) 4, that consultation of national legislatures is sought before EU legislation is decided on by sending it to the member states and their respective scrutinising body (Treaty of Lisbon 2012, 206-207). For this cause, they receive an 8-weeks timespan. Each of the parliamentary bodies has two votes (in bicameral systems they are shared between both legislative chambers) on the legislative proposal (De Wilde 2012, 5).
If one-third of the legislative bodies are handing in a reasoned opinion concerning subsidiarity, a so-called yellow card is given to the Commission. Thus, a review procedure is activated. As an outcome, the yellow card can be accepted, amended or leading to the rejection of it, if the Commission can reasonably explain, why no harm of subsidiarity is present (Cooper 2012, 447).
If a simple majority of legislative bodies are handing in a reasoned opinion, the so-called orange card is enforced. Again, the Commission needs to explain the non-harm of subsidiarity in order to reject the orange card. However, if at least 55% of the Council or the European Parliament cast a vote in favour of the reasoned opinion, the legislative proposal will receive no further consideration (De Wilde 2012, 5).
In the Bundestag, the provision of information for national legislatures is regulated in the Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union (EUZBBG). Measures of scrutiny are regulated in the Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz (IntVG) (Deutscher Bundestag 2017, 92).
Art. 3 EUZBBG regulates that the Bundesregierung (German government) needs to pass information concerning the negotiation process, developments in EU institutions and other formal meetings in the form of written documents exhaustively and as early as possible forward.
Following the principle of the Überweisungsverfahren (method of transfer), these are forwarded to the standing committees of their respective policy area in order to form an opinion which will be voted on in the Bundestag. This opinion has to be considered at Council negotiations and decision-making procedures. In case of non-conformity between the opinion and Council negotiations, the Bundesregierung has to forward a Parlamentsvorbehalt (parliamentary reservation). However, in extraordinary circumstances, the Bundesregierung is not obliged to follow (Deutscher Bundestag 2017, 93 + 95-96).
28 Following §11 IntVG & § 93a Abs. 1 Geschäftsordnung des Bundestages (GO-BT), standing committees are responsible for scrutinising EU legislative proposals from the Commission.
Before that takes place, a particular administrative body responsible for EU issues is filtering the relevance of proposals for further discussions regarding subsidiarity in the standing committees and prioritise them. A cluster of cases for further discussions and no further discussions is decided on by the factions of the Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag 2017, 102- 103 + 127).
4.1.2 EU competences
Besides the two protocols, the Treaty of Lisbon defines specific competencies divided between the EU and its member states. Three types are present, exclusive EU competence, shared competence between the EU and member states and the EU having a supporting, coordinating and supplementing competence (Cremona 2011, 253; Liljeqvist 2018, 54).
Exclusive competences for the EU imply that they are the only body able to produce and enforce legal acts. Member states are only able to act in case the EU is explicitly asking for it. In opposition to that, shared competences imply that both the EU and its member states have the authority to enforce legislative acts (Liljeqvist 2018, 54-55). However, member states are only able to regulate as far as the EU has not already regulated a specific issue of a policy area – the primacy of EU law. Thus, over time, the authority of member states is steadily decreasing (Cremona 2011, 253). Furthermore, the EU can interfere in specific issues across policy areas through the internal market and their connectedness. In policy areas where the EU can only support, coordinate or supplement national policies, member states keep their legislative authorities, and the power remains by them (Liljeqvist 2018, 55-59 + 61).
4.2 Empirical findings from the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung
Agricultural policy is formally a shared competence between the EU and its member states. It implies not only that both, the EU and its member states, can enact legislative acts but also that member states will be restricted in their authority when the EU regulates a particular policy area due to primacy of EU law (Cremona 2011, 253). Over time, the influence of the EU in enforcing legislation in the agricultural policy arena increased, leaving only small accounts left for national legislatures. Scholars tend to consider it de jure as shared competence but de facto as exclusive competence for the EU and the Commission as drafting institution (Liljeqvist 2018, 55-58). The question of the role of national legislatures needs to be asked. In this case, the role of the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung. Therefore, the following is presenting the
29 central part and is committed to shedding light upon the perception of members of the committee emerging from interviews. The main themes include their influence of EU legislation – influencing legislation at EU level, influence during the national implementation process itself and the rising importance of public relations -, the EWM as scrutiny device and their opportunity to influence via the position of the government minister of agriculture in the Council.
4.2.1 EU legislation, national implementation and the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung
A common view amongst the interviewees appeared concerning the influence of EU legislation.
Respondents emphasised that agricultural policy is under constant changes and reforms since the beginning of the EU integration process (AfLE4). The Bundestag is handing over more and more national competences to the EU. Thus, a vast amount of legislation – such as regulations and directives – is coming from the EU (AfLE2) where decisions are made in Brussels binding for whole Europe and not at national level anymore (AfLE4).
Furthermore, not only the “big” agricultural decisions influence the committee members in their work but also small decisions that have been implemented a long time ago and had less impact, in the beginning, have a strong influence suddenly at the national level. In addition, the increasing amount of EU legislation can also lead to inconsistent regulations that further the recent development and limit the national level policy-making process (AfLE4). For example, one interviewee said:
“Besides those “big” agricultural topics are recent years showing that even small decisions which are existing already since a long time and showed less attention in the beginning suddenly have a massive influence at agricultural operations. I think about the nitrate directive, which is in operation since 1991 and with other different laws on fertilisers legally binding” (AfLE4).
Concerning this, a respondent from the SPD put forward the EU Water Framework Directive, which is now pressuring the government to fulfil its goals of keeping the water clean. The EU can enforce penalties on the German government in case they do not comply with it (AfLE3).
A contested view amongst interviewees emerged concerning the influence of the legislative procedure between committee members from the opposition and the government. Meanwhile, the respondent from the SPD emphasised the possibility to intervene, members of the opposition described a different picture. Former pointed out that negotiations are made, and
30 decisions are finally taken in the Council. The EU can act and propose, but in the end, the ministers of agriculture are deciding and continuously need to approve what the EU is doing.
Drawing this on Germany, he emphasised its influential role in the Council (AfLE3). The latter forward the opposite by stating that there is not a possibility to influence the EU legislative process directly (AfLE1), especially not the content of legislative acts. Here, opposition parties are dependent on the minister of agriculture who needs to forward interests. It is aggravating their work and the effect of it (AfLE4).
Therefore, especially committee members from the opposition forward the constraining development they are experiencing in their committee work (AfLE4). A reason for that is the CAP which leads to an increasing amount of legislation coming from the EU leaving not much left for the national level (AfLE2). As this respondent expressed himself:
“[…] we are, concerning agriculture, only, or nearly only an executing authority from things coming from above” (AfLE2).
Members of the opposition also agreed that compared to other standing committees of the Bundestag the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung is under more substantial influence of the EU (AfLE4 + AfLE2) and that every decision has an immediate consequence for them (AfLE1). Nevertheless, a respondent from the governing faction agrees in parts with respondents from the opposition, too. As he expressed repeatedly:
“The European legislation is, in the end, compelling and has much influence” (AfLE3).
“Yes, this is expressing itself in agricultural policies principally in all processes” (AfLE3).
Thus, one interviewee from the FDP emphasised a transformation in his work. From an actor dealing with national issues to an actor dealing with European issues demanding European solutions. As his comment illustrates:
“If I am making demands, then they are decreasingly national but increasingly European” (AfLE4).
More frequently, committee members emphasised that they perceive the committees’ role in the EU legislation process as only minor with having no intervening mechanism left except the EWM. As two interviewees from the FDP commented:
“The Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung has only a minor influence on the EU legislation process” (AfLE4).
