SVERIGE I BRITTISKA BE DÖMNINGAR UNDER FÖRSTA VÄRLDSKRIGET
20 O'Beirnes kommentar återfinnes bland anteckningar anslutning till Find lays rapport 4/2 1916.
Nicolsons direktiv �terfinnes bland anteckningar i anslutning till Findlays rapport 13/2 1916,
21 Anteckningar av Grey m f1 om risk för svensk intervention i maj 1916. PRO, FO 800/96 s 144 ff. Greys papper.
Howard meddelade 12/5 att den brittiske militän1ttachen haft kontakt med sin norske kollega. Den norske militärattachen hade inte funnit något som tydde på svensk mobilisering. PRO. FO 371/275 3.
22 Howard 1/3 1916 med Summary of Report by French Military Attache in Stockholm. PRO. Cab. 37/14419. Circulated to the Cabinet.
Ministry of Munitions to Foreign Office. 15/2 1916. H Llewellyn Smith. Cir culated to the Cabinet. PRO. Cab. 37/142/48.
23 Keilhau, W, Norge och verdenskrigen. Oslo 1927. Särskilt s 20 ff, 42 ff, 138-152, 158-177, 190 ff.
Riste, 0, The neutral ally. Norway's relations with belligerent powers in the First World \Var. Oslo 1965.
Ristes arbete saknar såväl person- som sakregister, vilket försvårar använd ningen. Hänvisningen avser främst: Part three. 1916-1918: Neutrality in Eclipse. Särskilt s 148-154, 166-169, 180-183, 187-191, 212-224 passim.
Jmf också Orvik, N, The decline of Neutrality 1914-1941, With special reference to the United States and the Northern Neutrals. Oslo 195 3, s 38-112 passim. (Orviks bok har 1971 komit ut i en andra upplaga, som förf dock inte har haft tillfälle att ta del av).
Fransk oro jmf PRO. FO 371/2755/213288/213376/214911/215910/217164 217638.
24 Crowe, Eyre A, Memorandum. Foreign Office, October 29, 1916, PRO. Cab. 42/22/13.
War Committee 31/10 1916. PRO. Cab. 42/22/13.
Robertson, W R, The situation in Norway. Prepared by the Admirality War Staff and General Staff, War Office. 2nd November, 1916. PRO. FO 371/3023.
Howard 28/10 1916. PRO. FO 371/2755/216835. Howard 30/10 1916. PRO. FO 371/2755/217819. Howard 16/11 1916. PRO. Cab. 37/160/29.
25 Aberopade handlingar rörande Joffres propå. PRO. Adm. 137/1637. Jmf not 23. Fransk oro.
26 War Cabinet nr 3 m 4. 12/12 1916. PRO, Cab. 23/1. Findlays rapport 9/12 föredrogs av Cecil vid sammanträdet med War Cabinet 12/12 1916.
Amiralitet till Beatty 20/12 1916. PRO. Adm, 137/1637.
Beattys framställning 15/12 med kommentarer i amiralitet. PRO. ADM, 137/ 1637.
Howard 12/12 1916 till Cecil. PRO. FO 800/196 p 57-63. Cecils papper. Consetts framställningar i basfrågan och diskussionen i detta ämne: PRO. FÖ 371/3023/25780/48382/54126. Adm. 137/1637.
Consett (senare amiral) gav efter kriget ut en bok eller snarare pamflett om de neutrala makterna och kriget: The triumph of unarmed forces (1914-1918).
An account of the transactions by which Germany <luring the Great War was able to obtain supplies prior to her collapse under the pressure of economic forces. London 1923. Consett är synnerligen kritisk mot Foreign Office. Käns lorna var besvarade. I brev till Crowe 14/10 1918 föreslog den konciliante Howard någon form av belöning åt Consett för dennes insatser som marinattache under kriget. Crowes kommentar förtjänar att räddas från glömska: "We should be stultifying ourselves egregiously if we were to recommend Captain Consett for a decoration. If Captain Consett has rendered valuable services to the Admirality and they desire to reward him on that account that is their affair. Bnt so far as Captain Consett's services to the Foreign Office are concerned they are not deserving of any special reward. On the contrary. He has been an inju dicious and unsound adviser, a grossly insubordinate official and disloyal col league. On account of his apparent total lack of the sense of discipline, as weH of his frequently wrong advice we had him recalled from his post, and only reluc tantly later on conserted to lus resuming part of lus old duties, when pressed by the Admirality. - If on his record Captain Consett is to be specially rewarded, it will be, to put it mildly, a great injustice to scores of more competent and more deserving officials who have done their work without the prospect of special recognation. PRO. FO 371/3361/181080.
27 Howards planerade framstöt oktober 1917. PRO. FO 371/3022/196277. Gihl a a s 309.
Hellner,
J,
Minnen och dagböcker. Stockholm 1960. s. 356. Uppskattande karakteristik av Howard, s 475 ff.Howard, sannolikt influerad av Findlay, var synnerligen kritiskt inställd till den svenske ministern i Kristiania, Ramel, som ansågs gå tyskarnas ärenden och vara allmänt opålitlig. Under regeringskrisen hösten 1917 nämndes Ramel som kandidat till utrikesministerposten. Howard meddelade härvid den liberala poli tikern Eliel Löfgren, att enligt ministerns uppfattning en utnämning av Ramel inte skulle göra något gott intryck de allierade rcgcdngarna. Hellner ville under en övergångstid ha Ramel som adjoint. Detta var ett av de villkor som han ställde för att acceptera utrikesministerposten. Ramels placering i Stockholm hos Hellner föranledde bistra kommentarer i London. PRO. FO 371/3022/3076/5998 i anslutning till rapporter från Howard resp Findlay. Om Ramels placering jmf Hellner a a s 348 f.
Spring-Rice 31/7 1917. Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1917. Supplement 2. Vol II. Washington 1932. s 1030 ff.
28 Cecil till Lloyd George 11/4 1917. PRO. FO 371/3021/75137.
Foreign Office-Amiralitetet-Foreign Office i norska frågan april/maj 1917. PRO. Adm 137/1637. FO 371/3021/93105.
Kontakter Cecil-Vogt: Cecil till Findlay 26/4 1917. PRO. FO 371/3021/86464. Cecil till Findlay 30/4 1917. PRO. FO 371/3021/90183. Vogt till Cecil 7/5 1917. PRO. 371/3023/97868. Vogts brev 7/5 med den norska regeringens avböjande svar på den brittiska alliansinviten översändes efter cirkulation med en missiv skrivelse 14/5 till Foreign Office för aktläggning. Vogts brev hade delgivits ami-
ralitetslorden, förste sjölorden och amiralen Oliver. Följande notis i missivbrevet tyder p� kontakter på attachenivå: "In accordance with Ld. Robert's minute of the 8th of May, wich I am keeping, conversations have begun." (Oläslig namn underskrift).
Detaljplan Kristiansand, 30/6 1917. PRO. Adm. 137/1637. 29 War Cabinet nr 126 m 9. 25/4 1917. PRO. Cab. 23/2. War Cabinet nr 141 m 13. 21/5 1917. PRO. Cab. 23/2.
War Cabinet. Situation in Norway. Note from the Director of Military In telligence to the U. S. of States for Foreign affaires. War Office. 11th June 1917. G T 1116. PRO. Cab. 24/17. Jmf FO 371/3023/116212.
War Cabinet nr 168 m 13. 22/6 1917. PRO. Cab. 23/3. War Cabinet nr 191 m 6. 20/7 1917. PRO. Cab. 23/3.
The position of the Northern Neutral Countries. Report of Committee 27/8 1917. G-153. PRO. Cab. 23/4.
War Cabinet nr 227 m 3. 3/9 1917.
Möjligheten av svensk intervention i kriget på Norges och de allierades sida. Jmf Howard 23/6 1917. PRO. FO 371/3023/1928. Howard trodde inte på svensk anslutning av eget initiativ. Men omständigheterna kunde tvinga Sverige att ta ställning. Växande opinion för de allierade.
30 Admirality Naval Staff. 6/12 1917. G T-2885. The position of Norway. PRO. Cab. 24/34.
War Cabinet nr 295 m 23. I0/12 1917.
The Position of the Northern Neutral Countries. G-184. 14/12 1917. PRO. Cab. 24/4.
31 Carlgren, W M, Neutralität oder Allianz. Deutschlands Beziehungen zu Schweden in den Anfangsjahren des ersten Weltkrieges. Uppsala 1962, passim. Jmf Holtze B, Några militära bedömningar 1915 avseende Sverige (Aktuellt och historiskt 1969), samt rörande opinionen i tyska sjöofficerskretsar, Sverige i sjömilitärt tyskt perspektiv 1910-1914 (Aktuellt och historiskt 1970).
S11mmary
The present paper deals with British opm1ons concerning Sweden during the First World War and is based on political and military material about Scandi navia in the Public Record Office.
At the outbreak of hostilities and during 1915, a critical year for the Allies, as well as in the beginning of the following year before Verdun, the British were doubtful about the Swedish attitude and some quarters expected Sweden to join the war on the side of Germany. A German offensive against Petrograd was considered as constituting a particular temptation for the Swedes to improve their position in the Baltic.
On British initiative the Allies in August 1914 and later, during the Italian crisis, made representations in Stockholm guaranteeing Swedish independance, and meanwhile the British and French in Petrograd also advised the Russians to be
cautious in their relations with Sweden, particularly stressing the need for mode ration with regard to Finland. The Russians in their turn repeatedly sought to persuade Britain to make concenssions to Sweden in the commercial field. Britain was at this time very receptive to Russian wishes and demands, hut there was, however, no question of changing the main principles governing the blockade.
In a report to the War Committee in January 1916 the Imperial General Staff estimated that the Swedes would be able to send six divisions tö the Baltic States to reinforce the German troops there in the event of an attack on Petro grad. The Swedish Army was considered to be of high quality and capable of adding considerable strength to the German side if reserves were to run low. However, no British countermeasures were discussed and the general opm10n in the War Committee was that nothing could be done to prevent such a develop ment.
The Imperial General Staff expected the Swedes to send detachments to the Norwegian fronder, hut speculations at the end of 1915 and the beginning of 1916 that Sweden would attack Norway in order to take Narvik as a base for the Germans were discounted. Norway once again became the centre of interest in February and March of that year, when the Russians suggested that a British expeditionary force should be sent there in case of a Swedish mobilisation. The British troops were to cooperate with the Norwegian Army and hold clown enough Swedish troops to prevent a Swedish attack on Finland. This idea was sounded out by the British envoy in Kristiania, who with the help of the Nor wegian King drew up directives for a British rapprochement with Norway. However, the Minister did not consider the moment opportune on account disa greements between the two countries in the commercial field, which would first have to be sett!ed. Meanwhile reports about the Swedish attitude reaching Kristia nia were generally reassuring and the question was dropped when the course of the war took a new turn in the spring of 1916.
From the autumn of that year onwards Britain's political leaders ceased to regard Swedish intervention on the side of Germany as being very likely, although the British military leaders still reckoned with the possibility. The Imperial General Staff thus believed that the Swedes might attack Norway in the event of a war between that country and Germany, a development which appeared imminent when Norway became more closely linked with the British blockade. Uncertainty in Britain regarding the Swedish attitude was also to some extent a limiting factor when the question of an Allied base on the south coast of Norway came up for discussion. After America's entry into the war, the collapse of Russia and the advent in Sweden of a left-wing government with pro-Allied sympathies, the risk of Swedish aid to the Germans regarded as finally eliminated in the antumn of 1917.