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3. UNCERTAINTY

3.2. D EALING WITH UNCERTAINTY

wolves that where hunted virtually to oblivion in North America in order to protect both farm animals and game animals (or to be more precise, to protect human farmers and hunters from the competition). This resulted in an explosive increase in the number of deer, which in turn caused a lot of damage to the ecosystems. It also had a negative economic effect on the human population since it destroyed the grazing for domesticated animals such as sheep.211

All the examples above confirm the problem of predicting what will happen in an ecosystem as a result of human encroachment. The lesson that seems to emerge from this section is that we will probably never reach a situation where we have enough information to make a fully informed decision as to which course of action is the most rational from an anthropocentric instrumental point of view. We therefore need some kind of strategy for how to handle the uncertainties that we cannot get rid of. In the coming sections we will try to find such a strategy, and we will in particular take a closer look at one that has recently become very popular.

approach. It would also be very important for our investigation. Lack of knowledge regarding the future value of a species is sometimes used as an argument for preservation.214 That argument would be refuted if we find that lack of knowledge cannot be an argument for any particular strategy. 215

There are problems with this idea however. The most important problem is probably that deciding to wait is also a decision, and in bi-polar decisions like preserving or not preserving, waiting must mean something. The question is: Does it mean that we preserve the species until we know more or that we exploit the species until we know more? The answer to the question “what do we do while we wait” is often very important. In situations where we deal with irreversible changes it is extremely important, and that the “wait and see” strategy do not have an answer to this question (it cannot have one – that is the very point of the strategy) is very problematic.

It is also possible that we will never reach an understanding that is much better than the one we have. In the previous section, we saw that this is a quite plausible option when we deal with some changes in nature.

Finally, we have to be aware that there is a risk in waiting. It is in general true that waiting for more information before we make a decision increases the probability that the decision will be better when it comes. On the other hand, there is a risk that it will then be too late. The time factor can in some situations make waiting a very dangerous strategy.

II. A slightly different strategy is to wait for a better understanding, but monitor what is happening while we wait and prepare for the possibility of problems materialising along the way. This strategy has the same advantages and drawbacks as the previous one, with the difference that we are better prepared to deal with problems as they appear. This does not seem like a good solution when dealing with nonlinear or irreversible changes though since we will not be able to act until the problem has already appeared.

III. Another strategy is to act immediately on the best available information, and hope it is correct. By doing that we will not lose any time, but we run the risk of the information not being correct. There is also the drawback that since we are treating our inadequate information as adequate, we leave no room for precautionary measures in case it turns out to be wrong.

214 See previous chapter. See also Gärdenfors 2005 p.119

IV. Finally, we have the strategy of making a decision based on the information we have but adapting it to the uncertainties, and building in some precautionary measures in case events turn out differently than predicted. There are different versions of this strategy but the version that has received the most attention recently is the so-called precautionary principle. This strategy is recommended or even prescribed by many official sources, including international declarations and treaties such as the Rio declaration, Agenda 21 and the constitution of the European Union, but also by national as well as regional and local legislation in many countries.216 If we can show that the precautionary principle is ethically and rationally in accordance with anthropocentric instrumentalism, or even required by anthropocentric instrumentalism, and if we can show that it is applicable to our situation, then we may have a method for dealing with some of our problems.

In the next section, I will try to produce an interpretation of the precautionary principle that is in accordance with basic moral intuitions. In the section after that, I will go on and take a look at some proposed problems with the principle. Finally, I will try to apply it on the species problem and see first of all whether it is possible, and in that case, what the result would be.

215 Sober 1986 pp.175f

216 Herremoës et al 2001 p.14 contains a list of international treaties that contain the precautionary principle.

See also Beltrán 2001 p.3, Case, David 2005, Environmental commons, Gollier & Treich 2003 p.81, Grandjean 2004 p.206, Grandjean et al 2004 p.482, Lin 2001 p.129, Melin 2001 p.98, Rio Declaration §15, Sandin 2004:2 pp.2f, Sandin 2004:3 p.8, San Francisco Adopts the Precautionary Principle, SF Precautionary Principle Ordinance, Turner & Hartzell 2004 p.450, Walsh 2004 p.69. See also

http://www.institute.redlands.edu/p3/tthome.htm for an extensive list of treaties containing references to the precautionary principle.