8. Slutsats och implikationer
8.4 Förslag till framtida forskning
Vi har under studiens gång mött svårigheter vilket gör att studien har en del begränsningar, där vissa delar hade kunnat gjorts annorlunda. Då vi har reflekterat över detta vill vi ge förslag till framtida forskning.
En idé är att man vid liknande studier i Sverige hade kunnat kategorisera företagen utifrån vilken typ av kontrollägare dem har. Collin et al. (2017) nämner att olika ägartyper som familjer, enskilda personer, företag och institutionella ägare skiljer sig i sitt tänkande och prioriteringar vid företagets styrning. En av de skillnaderna är hur mycket arbete de delegerar åt styrelsen. Det hade då varit intressant att kolla ifall någon företag som kontrolleras av någon ägartyp tenderar att manipulera mer än de andra.
Ett annat förslag är att man hade kunnat göra en longitudinell studie där man undersöker resultatmanipulering över tid. Eftersom vi valde att studera endast 2017 kan det vara så att vårt studie har påverkats av tillfälligheter som konjunktur, lagändringar eller annat som har påverkat företagets sätt att redovisa. Med en longitudinell studie hade man kunnat mildra effekten av eventuella tillfälliga avvikelser.
Ytterligare ett annat förslag hade varit att ha större urval och göra större observationer. Då vi p.g.a. tidsbrist och ekonomiska skäl valde att använda oss av sekundärdata för att mäta den beroende variabeln, godtyckliga periodiseringar, var vi tvungna att ta bort en hel del företag som saknade mycket data. Med mer tid och ekonomiska resurser hade man kunnat hämta alla data manuellt och därmed få större antal urval. För att få större urval hade man även kunnat minska på antal variabler, där man hade kunnat ha kvar de viktigaste variablerna kring revisionskommitténs sammansättning och arbetsprocess. Då vi testade vilka av variablerna i vår studie som hade högst förklaringsgrad, visade det sig att mötesfrekvens, redovisningserfarenhet, redovisningskompetens, styrelsekompetens, närvaro, oberoendeställning i förhållande till bolagets större aktieägare samt närvaron av kvinnliga ledamöter i revisionskommittén var de med högst förklaringsgrad (se appendix 4). Ett förslag kan då vara att dessa variabler kan vara de mest intressanta att undersöka vid framtida studier kring revisionskommitténs förhållande till resultatmanipulering inom svenska börsbolag.
86 Avslutningsvis kan vi säga att vi i denna studie utgick till stor del från PAT & agentteorins antaganden om att alla människor agerar opportunistiskt för att maximera sin egennytta, och därmed antog att ledningen manipulerar resultatet för sin egen vinning. Som vi nämnde i denna studie behöver resultatmanipulering inte alltid ske i opportunistiskt syfte, utan kan även ske i informativt syfte där ledningen med hjälp av sina kunskaper och erfarenheter använder de redovisningsmetoder som ger rättvisande bild av företagets ekonomiska ställning. Det skulle då förse marknaden med relevant och tillförlitlig information som är värdefull för intressenternas beslut. Ett förslag för framtida studier hade därför varit att tillämpa mer av exempelvis stewardshipteorin, där ledningen antas vara goda förvaltare av bolaget.
87
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