Då Nasdaq OMX Stockholm endast är en del av den svenska aktiemarknaden skulle det vara av intresse för vidare forskning att genomföra en liknande studie som denna men inkludera alla svenska aktiemarknader och samtidigt undersöka om och möjligen hur dessa marknader skiljer sig åt. Vid en inkludering av flera aktiemarknader skulle även samplets storlek öka och därigenom också validiteten. Förklaringsgraden i denna studies regressionsanalys är relativt låg vilket indikerar andra variablers påverkan än de som använts i studien. Vidare studier bör fokusera på användandet av andra företagsspecifika variabler för att undersöka vad som ger upphov till onormal avkastning i samband med nyemission. Då informationsasymmetri mellan företagen och marknaden kan vara en påverkande faktor till negativ onormal avkastning vid nyemission bör vidare studier fokusera på vilka faktorer som ger upphov till asymmetrin. Det bör vara av stort värde för bolag att beakta informationsasymmetrin och undersöka när den är låg eftersom detta kan minska den negativa onormala avkastningen i samband med nyemission.
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