The formal political − guardians, overloaded and stagnated

6.5.1. Identity, motives, structure and agency and organizing principle

The political real type is based on the diplomatic profession. Thus, although, ‘being a politician’ commonly is a lifelong career, in this inquiry, it is not regarded as a professional order, nor as a deep structure.¹⁸³ Instead, this formal political real type is based on observations of the diplomatic community and to a lesser extent on other governmental officers involved with outer space. The diplomatic profession is for social scientists and citizens viewed as a prestigious and elevated occupation. In many countries, the diplomatic career starts with a thorough selection process of applicants. Becoming a diplomat requires great language skills, and the right personal abilities and attitudes. It is rare for a diplomat to have a technical background. Professional training is entrenched in situations in which the state is at the center and it remains at the center throughout the diplomatic career. This political suborder is assumed to carry out the work following the will of the leadership of the state. It implies that sometimes the political real type is obliged to speak for a national position that runs counter to their own beliefs (political). Diplomats are never free but always representatives of the state. For example, “[i]f you are concerned with, for example, space debris regulation, you better work from another angle” (political). The identity is formed by being a representative of the state and the

183 Hence, this real type is constructed to reflect the deep structures (persistent patterns) of the emerging space order. The quantum-mind entangled professional orders display the institutionalized professional order.

international order. The identity is imposed and trained from the outside rather than stemming from within. Compared to the scientific real type, identity is more mechanic for the political real type.

The drive is mostly based on spirit. Thus, the real type strives for individual, as well as national status and standing. The diplomatic organization is traditional and hierarchical with the strongest individuals in the most prestigious positions. The hierarchical professional structures are competitive. At the same time, although this is a traditional and highly symbolic suborder, it has become routinized to that degree that the telos has faded. Hence, classic diplomacy of dialogue has turned into procedures and imitation. Reason is characterized by instrumental rationality albeit with finesse. The political real type is a guardian of the familiar international order on which the professional privileges are based.

To this real type, the world is familiar, known and predictable. The stock of knowledge concerns different states, their characteristics, processes and positions. In the global setting of the emerging outer space order, the underlying organizing principle is the balance of power amongst states.

For the diplomatic real type, this balance should be managed by state representation within the most important and prestigious parts of the diversified and intensified international institutional landscape or managed by lateral discussions and negotiations. The world consists of different diplomatic fora, agenda issues, working groups and procedures that should be navigated and prioritized. Symbolic gestures and priorities contributed to this real type’s work of establishing an advantageous individual and national image. Structure is more pronounced than agency, especially since the world is rather predefined.

6.5.2. Outer space and critical issues

Outer space was initially a minor issue to the highly traditional political suborder. Generally, the political real type had not yet understood the increase in activities in outer space, nor the potential risks or the societies’ dependence on outer space. This might also reflect the more widespread forgottenness about outer space.¹⁸⁴ When the political real

184 Characteristic for the political real type is that this professional must be “accountable to multiple masters, to everyone in the chain, to the president, and then to the congress and committees, and then to media and the public” (political).

type did encounter outer space, it was perceived as an opportunity to project national symbolic power and for signalling.

The primary critical issue was to uphold the state interests that increasingly have come to equate economic standing. For some, it meant using the institutional landscape for national interests. For some, this implied working for the rule of law and an institutionalized international landscape. The political real type increasingly found themselves in a situation where they needed to handle a world resembling the great power game described under the military real type. Since many of the high-ranking diplomats (as well as political leaders) did have experience from the symbolism of outer space during the Cold War, they brought this worldview into the present. This made their stock of knowledge adequate again. Understanding the balance of power, national interests, arms reduction and signaling was yet again rewarding.

On a general note, I observed a reluctance to embrace the new and unfamiliar as well as an eager to hold on to the strong tradition of negotiating ‘old questions’. For example, terrestrial weapon reduction agreements and regimes are given high priority. To take something new into account within this established traditional suborder risks imply that something old must give room for this novel issue. This involves the risk of disrupting established hierarchies and procedures. It also implies possible embarrassment, uncertainty and a less comfortable situation since outer space is initially time consuming to grasp.

On occasions, when outer space does receive attention, the political suborder views the development in outer space as firmly bound to the terrestrial international order. This might be due to that the diplomats are crossing in and out between issue areas, which risks making them appear more familiar than they are. In very general terms, this suborder reproduced the traditional modern order and renationalized outer space.¹⁸⁵ In this respect, the political suborder shows strong continuity from the first space age into the contemporary conditions. There was no energy,

185 For example, already in 1999, Bill Clinton’s administration for the first time in the US national security strategy declared that unimpeded access to and use of space was a vital national interest for the US (Sheehan, 2007:94ff). In 2002, the Bush-administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM-treaty) of 1972, which can be associated with military technology in outer space (Sheehan, 2007:102).

attempt or enthusiasm to see anew. Reluctantly, I am obliged to write that there was a sense of pessimism and concern.

The expressions of national interests in space have amplified over the last few years. Illustrating the symbolic value, internally and externally, of outer space, the US President Donald Trump has been outspoken and decisive about US space power ambitions.¹⁸⁶ The French President Emmanuel Macron has been vocal too about the need for the protection of the national satellites, the approved creation of the French Space Forces and the ‘staff up’ of ‘space high command’ in Toulouse (Posaner, 2019). The capabilities would include ‘active defense’ of the French array of space capabilities (Posaner, 2019).¹⁸⁷ As mentioned earlier, China (2008), the US (2008) and India (2019) have carried out anti-satellite tests.

Interestingly, space debris is not an overly critical issue within the political suborder. Space debris can be handled by experts and does not require diplomatic attention, other than a routinized and appropriate number of national statements about sustainability at the right moment.

Typically, outer space is a remote and minor issue on the political agenda. There are more urgent and rewarding agenda issues to handle.

Hence, outer space is an ‘agenda issue’ that needs to be addressed in the smoothest way possible to save time for more acute world order events and negotiations. There was no sign of this political real type contributing to innovations, visions or long-term goals for a sustainable outer space order beyond the mentioning of the UN Sustainability Development Goals (SDG). Occasionally statements mentioned capacity, transparency and confidence building measures (TCBM).

Another critical issue for the political suborder is how to cope with the commercial suborder. One expert explained that the “government is

186 See for example the video from the reestablished US National Space Council held in front of the national flag and space shuttles (The White House, 2017).

187 This French initiative did cause some worries within the EU and ESA because of the tradition and will of the member states to address space collectively within these organizations (Posaner, 2019). Macron then, underlined that these capabilities would strengthen the “national autonomy” but at the same time fit within the “European framework” (ibid). Relatedly, in 2019, the European Commission established a new Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space to strengthen the space sector. This Department is responsible for the defence industry and space and for “improving the crucial link between space and defence and security” (European Commission, 2020).

going to be more and more dependent on the private actors. Much expertise is within the private sectors, but nowadays the expertise has expanded a lot in the industry, in academia. It is much broader. For the government it is harder to come up with [the] money, the private sector can apply more money” (political). A diplomat echoed this sentiment:

“companies are capable, and they decide whether [something] is worthwhile and meet their goals” (political). Thus, the political suborder is under pressure of the commercial suborder, which can also move its production to another country. This in turn would not be beneficial in the political suborders view as building or maintaining a capable aerospace workforce is a general state interest. Therefore, the political suborder promotes outer space to inspire new generations of engineers, which in the end is understood as beneficial for the economy of the state. The EU’s outer space policy also shows how economic considerations are driving policy. For example, in the conclusion of the European Space Strategy, it is written: “The EU cannot afford to fall behind in this domain. It must remain in the first rank, building on Europe’s talents and expertise, capitalising on its investments and anticipating the opportunities of tomorrow” [my emphasis] (European Commission, 2016:13). To summarize, although there are political visions and attention to SDG and the sustainable development of outer space, for the political suborder the construction of outer space and critical issues are strongly influenced by the military and the commercial suborders.

6.5.3. Language set, visual frames,

temporality and constitutive materiality

As evident from above, for the political real type, the language set and visual frames are increasingly reflecting those of the first space age. Only now, there was no indication of the creation of new treaties. Substantial negotiations, formulations or shared understandings of the first space age were strikingly lacking. Still, this language set, with associated critical issues, was to be passed from the first generation of space nations to the newcomers. The newcomers should be socialized into a reality and order that were not characterized by their massivity but by uncertainty and loss of leadership. The latter can be explained by the situation in which most political real types are keen to imitate and fit in, making few apt to take the lead as it might imply risks.

The language set and visual frames are written text. UN texts are defined by abstract principles about humanity, equality and future generations.

Visual frames also consist of organizational schemes and agendas illustrating the procedures of the institutional landscape this suborder had to navigate. Diplomats are very attentive to signals such as body language. The diplomatic real type should look and act safe and predictable. This real type is also skilled in perceiving nuances and signals from peer diplomats and in the diplomatic room. Despite this skill, the formal political awareness of what was going on in the room and the perception of the other participants’ roles and goals indicated a deductive perspective on world politics. Notably, prescriptive role-descriptions were widely imposed on different nationalities and their agendas. Before a delegate even started to speak, the outcome/message was known/given. As some nationalities “are always”, for example,

“obstructive” (political). It was presumed that behind the role expression was a unitary state actor. In other words, the quantum-tangled diplomats have very rigid expectations of each other, as the roles are set no matter what information is transmitted. Hence, there was a tangible tendency to simplify and reproduce the roles no matter how much the actor in question tried to break out from an old or prescribed role. Besides the deep socialized professional worldview, this can primarily be explained by temporality.

Except for the motive of spirit, there was a strong sense of stress. Hence, the political real type, more than the other suborders was characterized by filled agendas, deadlines and pressure. Thus, the chronos of this suborder induced a widespread sense of work overload. For an observer, it was evident that this narrows the cognitive possibilities, which consequently leads to stereotyping. This is caused by a social time defined by deadlines and procedures but also due to the complexity of the issue and the political real type always being accountable to different masters.

Diplomats “work hard and are really dedicated. They just have a lot of requirements […] and sometimes, conflicting goals as well. It is more difficult than goals that are easily defined, like make [a] profit or stock evaluation […] for the governmental official it is ‘hard to show that you are productive’” (political).

Although the diplomatic profession is still perceived as a privileged profession to outsiders, it is characterized by hard work and long working days. Rather than reflective reasoning and dialogue, the political real type

is literally running on routine adhering to political processes that uphold perceptual order. The level of innovation and agency was low. When representatives from outer suborders were communicating with the political suborder, simple messages were chosen. As a space expert notes about his recent PowerPoint presentation prepared for representatives of the political suborder “[w]ell, look here! This is very, very pedagogical”

(engineer). Concerning temporality and the view of history, they are heavily contextualized by state history and judgements are based on previous experiences. The world and its representatives were viewed as static or cyclic. History is possibly altering from more violent to less violent times. Altogether, this made the political real type less inclined to see anew. The political suborder is suffering from ‘deep frame capture’

and stagnation. This observation might not have been so apparent if it was not for that this real type was contrasted to the other real types.

Another important observation about the political real type concerns the constitutive materiality. After a period of participant observations, it became evident that the political real type commonly showed up at symbolic moments, made a national statement and then left. Hence, the national statements formulated in the capitals were rather free-floating from the ongoing negotiations amongst the experts. There was a general absence of the political real type in the physical (political) sites where ordering of outer space took place. When the diplomatic real type showed up, they were already in mental preparations for the next event. Besides temporal constraints, this real type (on a world order level) is also limited due to economic reasons. For example, at the very beginning of the sessions formulating resolutions to the UN General Assembly (GA), a representative from the GA presents the budgetary situation. This aptly set the boundaries for the discussion and what was considered possible.

6.5.4. Form, robustness, authority, politics and political reason The political suborder of the emerging outer space order is medium-sized but not strongly involved in ordering. It works in a familiar and predictable way. It is robust and persistent with its wide validity across the globe. However, in relation to the world order transformation, it is a stagnated order. Hence, this suborder did not cope with changing world order constitutive materiality, diffusion of power, technical innovations and fluidity. Instead, the suborder continued discussing familiar

questions. Political solutions and visions beyond minor steps of diplomatic progress were possibly introduced from the outside, but the solutions did not originate from within the political suborder. While the standing of the political suborder might be high to social scientists and citizen, to the space community, authority requires some knowledge about outer space. The political real type has knowledge about the states in the system but not that much about outer space. Clearly, there are exceptions to this generalization, but in general, the diplomatic suborder has a low level of authority. While familiarity, routines and procedures uphold a sense of authority, compared to the other suborders this real type inhabits foremost formal authority.

Therefore, other suborders needed to inform the real typical political suborder about outer space and the nature and character of the ongoing outer space ordering:

A lot of times you find, that in the government offices, people in there are so busy. They have so many things in their inbox that they do not have time to really think through the long-time strategic planning of things. So, those of us who are outside of the government, or contractors, we often get the opportunity to do that long-term strategic thinking for them. Hopefully, it will be useful (commercial).

Moreover, as one member of the commercial suborder highlighted “the important thing is to show [diplomats] what the options are and the pros and cons of these options. Because they do not have the time or the background to do that” (commercial). The sentiment of obligation to inform the political suborder was held among all the other suborders.

As mentioned, the political suborder is characterized by stagnation in relation to the changing world. While, stagnation relates to the concepts of stability, predictability and order, in the modern understanding of progress it is a concept to dislike. As there is a need for the political suborder to adapt to the exogenous forces and pace of the contemporary world, the concept of stagnations was thus deliberately chosen. The stagnation of this suborder has, however, become less apparent in recent years. Rather the professional stock of knowledge and familiar procedures of the diplomatic suborder have been reinvigorated by a horizontal renationalization of outer space. However, although a

seemingly robust order, it is far from defining the emerging space order.

Although under hard pressure and burden with internal deadlines, it has also not much influence on the direction of the emerging outer space order. Altogether, the strong commercial suborder, as well as thinking in terms of state interests equating economic growth, narrowed the room for reflective reason within the diplomatic suborder.