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6 Slutsats och implikationer

6.4 Framtida forskning

Till framtida forskning ger vi förslaget att utöka urvalet med fler listor på Stockholmsbörsen för att på så sätt få tillgång till fler observationer. För denna uppsats använde vi bara tre listor men genom att använda sig utav alla listor hade man fått in ytterligare data som hade varit relevant för uppsatsen. Det hade även varit intressant att jämföra de olika listorna mot varandra för att se om det interna ägandet skiljer sig mellan dem. På så sätt hade forskningen gett en helhetsbild över den svenska noterade handelsplatsen och inte bara en del utav den.

Ett annat förslag för att få mer observationer och data hade kunnat vara att använda sig utav flera år under en längre tidsperiod. På så sätt hade man kunnat eliminera vissa störningar som kan ha influerat företagens finansiella siffror, exempelvis konjunkturer alternativt vissa engångshändelser som lagförändringar.

Sedan finns det även möjlighet att angripa denna uppsats på ett annat sätt, nämligen genom en kvalitativ studie. Vid en kvalitativ studie hade man exempelvis kunnat intervjua

företagsledare och ägare för att öka förståelsen kring hur de upplever det interna ägandet som kontrollmekanism och hur det fungerar i organisationen. Detta hade kunnat leda till en något djupare analys för hur företagsledarna upplever huruvida internt ägande som

kontrollmekanism fungerar eller inte. Genom att göra en kvalitativ undersökning med

intervjuer av företagsledare kan ge ett mer rättvisande resultat, eftersom det finns vissa brister i att göra analyser baserat på företagens finansiella information eftersom vi kan ha tolkat fel eller fått fel information från insamlingsbaser.

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