Geographical overview of the security situation

© BFA/SEM, August 2017.

‘Operational Areas

d) Operational areas in which the highlighted parties have relevant influence (monochrome): this is where the parties have access to significant resources (armament, troops, financing, structure, administration, etc.) to ensure a longer-term influence. These are the Republic of Somaliland, Puntland, in some cases also Galmudug, AMISOM in tandem with the Somali government or with regional states;

Ethiopian forces in the border area; Al Shabaab; Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a in central Somalia.

e) Some areas (crosshatched), predominantly in South/Central Somalia, are under the influence of two relevant parties.

f) All of the cities and towns entered in the map have been assigned to one of the aforementioned parties. They are not crosshatched […]. To the extent known, AMISOM bases or garrisons of bilaterally engaged troops have been assigned to the cities. In the cities without this kind of presence, there is an SNA presence or alternatively security forces of the individual regional states, or Somaliland.

g) Operational areas in which smaller parties have limited influence (dotted line): these are areas in which, besides the aforementioned relevant parties, other parties with limited resources are active as well. The relevance of their influence in these operational areas fluctuates and depends on the available resources and their use’ (⁴²⁷).

BFA/SEM includes the below annotation on the content of the map in its FFM report (⁴²⁸):

a) ‘The map displayed shows the well-known fragmented picture of Somalia. Large parts of northern Somalia are made up of the consolidated entities of Somaliland and Puntland.

b) The eastern third part of the regions of Sool and Sanaag is disputed between Puntland and Somaliland.

c) In the districts of Buuhoodle, Laascaanood, Xudun and Taalex there are sporadic disputes between Somaliland and individual Dulbahante militias […]

d) In the district of Laasqoray, neither Somaliland nor Puntland have significant influence; parts of the district are de facto self-administered by the local Warsangeli.

e) In the region of the Galgala [Golis] Mountains, on the border between Somaliland and Puntland, an AS group has been established for many years. From there, this group carries out, mostly small, operations in the surrounding area.

f) Islamic State is establishing a presence in the northern part of Bari region, in the districts of Qandala and Iskushuban; its range is limited due to clan dynamics and resources.

g) Regular conflicts between local clans occur in Galkacyo, on the border between Puntland and Galmudug.

Galmudug:

h) Parts of the regions of Mulug and Galguduud are assigned to the regional state of Galmudug. Galmudug already borders AS areas and the range of influence is aligned to the Hobyo-Dhusamareb axis. The districts of Xaradheere and Ceel Dheere are under the control of al Shabaab; this is also true for the district of Ceel Buur. Following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in March 2017, the town of Ceel Buur was re-occupied by AS.

(⁴²⁷) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), pp. 24-25.

(⁴²⁸) The quote is translated from German by EASO and translation has been approved by the authors. For the original quote in German see: BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), pp. 25-27.

i) ASWJ has established itself in the district of Dhuusamarreeb. The relationship between ASWJ and Galmudug as well as with the Somali government remains unclear.

However, the group is a declared adversary of AS. Dhuusamarreeb is home to the northernmost base of the bilaterally deployed Ethiopian troops.

The following can be stated for the remaining parts of South/Central Somalia:

j) The regional capital Buale (Middle Jubba) as well as the district capitals of Saakow, Jilib (Middle Jubba), Jamaame (Lower Jubba), Sablaale, Kurtunwaarey (Lower Shabelle), Diinsoor (Bay) and Tayeeglow (Bakool) are under the control of AS. The latter two towns were previously occupied by bilaterally engaged Ethiopian troops, but these have withdrawn, primarily for political reasons.

k) All other regional and district capitals are held by anti-AS troops. Many of the towns are also AMISOM garrison towns.

l) Some of the towns and positions are of particular strategic relevance, whether this is to keep supply or deployment routes clear or to secure the relevant hinterland.

m) The situation of towns that were held by bilaterally engaged Ethiopian troops (Xudur, Ceel Guur, Tayeeglow, Diinsoor) has proven to be problematic in the past. Ethiopia has continuously used its troops to exert pressure on the Somali government and/or international donors. While Ethiopia will not simply withdraw from towns, which are occupied together with AMISOM contingents or which are of strategic importance for its own troops or its own situation, the bilaterally occupied towns of Xudur and Maxaas are particularly exposed.

n) The extent to which Somali troops will be able to hold the areas and FOBs [Forward Operational Bases] in Eel Leheli, Goof Gaduud, Afcad, Adan Yabaal, Wabxo, Miir Taqwo, Biyo Cado, Abdale Birole and Badhaade [these are areas indicated on the map by green/blue stripes] without foreign support remains to be seen.

o) The map also shows FOBs in small villages and protected positions along important supply routes, to which an AMISOM garrison has also been assigned. In contrast to the aforementioned towns, in most cases, these kinds of garrisons cannot be referred to as permanent (exceptions include K50 and Berdale).

p) The range of the relevant garrison differs and cannot be assessed in detail. However, in many cases, the effective influence of AMISOM and the Somali allies remains focussed on the town itself, although more extensive excursions may occur in some cases.

q) Al Shabaab controls vast tracts of the rural areas and uses guerrilla activities to isolate several towns, some of which appear as islands in AS-territory.

r) In rare cases, larger combat units of AS infiltrate the towns. In general, the penetration is terminated by AMISOM and Somali allies within hours (past examples include Afgooye, and Qoryooley).

s) In some towns, undercover AS-agents infiltrate the towns. In some parts of Mogadishu, influence differs depending on the time of day.

t) The Liyu police, often in cooperation with local militias, operates on the Ethiopian border’ (⁴²⁹).

More detailed information on the security information and violent incidents by region and regional state is presented in the following Section 3.2. Security situation by region and regional state.

(⁴²⁹) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), pp. 25-27.