14 | Steering Capability Question Score
The long-term development ambitions for the country are laid out in the Uganda Vision 2040. It projects a transformation of Ugandan society “from a peasant to a modern and prosperous country within 30 years.” The overall vision translates into concrete implementation designs in five-year National Development Plans (NDPs).
The third plan (NDP III) - formulated with the goal of “increased household incomes and improved quality of life,” was adopted by parliament in January 2020. The plan sets the objective to reach middle-income status, a 2020 goal from the previous plan (NDP II) which was missed. Experts remain skeptical whether this objective is attainable in the current five-year-period ending in 2025.
The NDP goals are at times jeopardized by the de facto short-term orientation of many policy measures, as government actions often follow a logic of regime survival.
The majority of employees in the civil service are driven by the desire to amass wealth through the projects they oversee. The costs of a substantial state apparatus and
Prioritization
5
system to ensure political loyalty, as well as corruption, are likely to constitute the main hindrance to the achievement of long-term objectives. Factors such as poor absorption of funds, financial indiscipline, inconsistent resource allocation and implementation, as well as corruption in various government departments, are all a result of a system designed to ensure political loyalty. The socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic will make the goals of NDP III even more difficult to meet.
While the government responded to the crisis by promising some short-term measures, including supplementary budgets and emergency funds for supporting businesses affected by the pandemic, the overall structure of the national budget remained largely similar for the financial year 2020/21. Major adjustments to long-term plans were not expected at the time of writing.
The president continues to articulate his view of economic modernization, seeing the export of raw materials both as a cause and a symptom of “backwardness.” In recent times, the president has consistently emphasized that major infrastructure projects such as road construction should take priority over all other investments. He argues that human development will follow infrastructure development, while critics point to a neglect of public investment in areas such as health and education.
Strategic economic priorities and their implementation tend to be in line with market-oriented policies. The process of deepening and strengthening democratic structures appears to be regressing however.
There is a prevailing perception in Uganda that while the government has the capacity to formulate adequate policies, implementation is frequently inadequate. Moreover, in some areas the government lacks the political will and commitment to implement policies. In the civil service, there is substantial knowledge and professionalism. The fundamental limitation, however, remains pervasive corruption at all levels. Another hindrance is the strong factor of patronage practices and the widespread tendency to reward political loyalty rather than performance, both of which frequently undermine official hierarchies and sanction mechanisms. The structures of public administration tend to be bloated and are often inefficient.
Policy areas in which criticism over poor or inconsistent implementation has been particularly prominent include health, education and agriculture. Examples in the agricultural sector are the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) and Operation Wealth Creation, comprehensive government programs designed to transform agriculture for rural development. Both have been shrouded in controversy over inefficient and inconsistent implementation, biased contract awarding procedures and the fact that the national army (UPDF) was assigned the role of lead implementing agency. Similarly, the implementation of the Youth Livelihood Program (YLP), meant to stimulate income-generating activities among young
Implementation
5
Faced with the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, Ugandan authorities undertook a swift response. Health protection and lockdown measures were implemented in a rigid and mostly consistent manner. However, critics observed that the implementation of pandemic-related regulations was highly politicized and provided an excuse for a crackdown on opposition activities through selective application. In addition, the implementation of support measures to alleviate the impact of the crisis on vulnerable groups was criticized as slow, inconsistent and patchy: only reaching a small proportion of the population.
Though depicting himself as the major driver of reform, in certain respects the president blocks progress. Despite his focus on modernization, his political style frequently resembles an old-school authoritarian attitude.
Museveni’s government has become exceedingly pragmatic when it comes to economic and fiscal policy. The original intention of “following an economic strategy of mixed economy” as articulated at the beginning of Museveni’s tenure, quickly gave way to heeding the advice of the international financial institutions and other development partners. The measures the latter recommended were usually swiftly implemented. Independent advice provided by academic experts and others in the field were given scant attention. In the political realm, advice from international donors, national academia or NGOs was rarely welcomed. Unsurprisingly, policy learning has been fairly inconsistent. One example is the constant expansion of an already bloated administration (including the creation of districts) which experts have continuously criticized. It remains to be seen whether the recent cabinet decision to merge and realign numerous government agencies will bring about the desired results and address the wastage of public funds, which would make it a successful example of (much delayed) policy learning.
While President Museveni has long been hailed for his pragmatism in leadership, he is increasingly perceived as a hindrance to adaptation and learning. In its first two decades, the president’s party, the NRM, followed the path of establishing a no-party democracy. It found expression in the “movement system,” an innovation at the time;
and indeed, this policy enabled stability to return to Uganda. However, internal demands and donor pressure ultimately led to a return to multiparty politics. Despite lip service being paid to multiparty democracy, the degree of its acceptance by the NRM remains low. Favoring a patrimonial system and a winner-takes-all attitude are deeply rooted in Uganda.
Policy learning
5
15 | Resource Efficiency
The incorporation and co-optation of diverse political interests, buying support and rewarding loyalty with handouts and positions, is deeply entrenched in the leadership approach of Museveni and the NRM and rooted in the historical characteristics of ascension to power. As a result, public administration has become bloated and constitutes a considerable strain on the financial resources of the state. Competitive recruitment and performance-orientation are often undermined by short-term political considerations by the ruling party. One obvious indicator is a grossly oversized cabinet of 80 people. In addition, there are well over 100 well-paid, mostly functionless presidential advisers.
In a bid to increase efficiency and service delivery and to enhance accountability, Uganda adopted a decentralized system of government, but this initiative appears to have completely lost its original course. The local government system has been turned into an ever-expanding network for patronage and clientelism, for example, through the creation of new districts. There were 33 districts at the time the NRM took power.
The number had risen to 135 districts by 2020. Furthermore, the president appoints resident district commissioners to represent him in all districts, who tend to interfere in what should be the business of elected local governments.
Essential services such as health, education and the judiciary remain significantly understaffed and underfinanced. Yet security agencies, namely the military and the various intelligence services, as well as Museveni’s State House, enjoy generous funding. Uganda has a relatively strong track record of budget transparency.
Moreover, it has experienced a significant surge in classified budgets, with a striking tendency of supplementary budgets that mostly benefit the State House and the military.
The allocation of a supplementary budget in light of the COVID-19 pandemic has generated significant criticism regarding the government’s budget priorities. The security sector received the lions’ share of the budget – rather than the Ministry of Health as the lead agency in the fight against COVID-19. In general, a questionable scramble for additional public resources became apparent during the process, as different ministries and agencies assumed similar responsibilities in order to get a share of the supplementary budget.
At the beginning of 2021, the cabinet resolved to merge over 180 agencies, commissions and authorities, with the aim of realigning functions and preventing the duplication of roles, reducing the salary bill and addressing the wastage of public funds. Public debt rose in the period under review and is projected to continue rising due to ongoing ambitious infrastructure investments as well as the lasting effects of
Efficient use of assets
3
Ugandan politics are characterized by a strong president who has to balance the diverse interests represented within the ruling party. In the end, however, the president is the one who calls the shots and, though sometimes with considerable difficulty, is able to keep the parliament in line. Neither the vice president nor the cabinet have much of a role of their own. More important is the government’s informal hub of power, made up by the top army brass and the president’s family.
The powerful position the constitution accords to the president and the way in which the incumbent exercises (and frequently oversteps) his role serve to ensure that disagreements and conflicting priorities and actions within the government are not too problematic. For the day-to-day running of public affairs, the finance ministry and the Bank of Uganda are well suited to their tasks and do play a useful coordinating role.
Uganda’s initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic was swift and generally well-coordinated by the responsible Ministry of Health, which demonstrated fairly strong leadership. However, with time more and more inconsistencies became apparent, especially as President Museveni resorted to personal directives with little prior consultation and ad hoc communication. Swift implementation was often a challenge as presidential orders had to be translated into practicable regulations after they had already been announced, and they were expected to come into force with immediate effect.
Policy coordination
7
Institutional arrangements for containing corruption exist. The Auditor-General is charged with auditing and reporting “on the public accounts of Uganda and of all public offices” (Article 163 of the constitution) and presents annual audit reports to parliament. An Inspectorate of Government has been given wide powers “in respect of cases involving corruption, abuse of authority or of public office” (Article 230).
A division of the Ugandan High Court operates as the arm of the judiciary for combating corruption. Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee, headed by an opposition member, has the mandate to examine government expenditure. Public procurement is regulated. Adequate legal instruments and institutional mechanism to deal with fraud in its different forms are in place, including the Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2015, which provides for mandatory confiscation of the property of persons convicted of a corruption offense.
Day-to-day reality is a far cry from this legal situation. Anti-corruption institutions are plagued by weak capacity and inefficiency, generally performing poorly. Public perception in Uganda is that corruption is deeply entrenched in society. The Uganda National Governance Baseline Survey of 2014 revealed that 95% of the population felt that corruption was a problem. In daily life, people often have to pay bribes even to see the completion of simple administrative acts. The more prominent corruption cases occasionally make national and even international headlines; the disappearance of donor funds has in the past led to the suspension of budget support by development partners.
Anti-corruption policy
4
In December 2018 President Museveni launched a new anti-corruption unit (ACU) operating out of his office. It is supposed to receive and act on complaints related to corruption. Citizens are encouraged to report corruption to the ACU through a secure phone line and online platform. Since its establishment, the unit has courted headlines by carrying out publicized arrests. In 2019, the unit publicized the arrest of some Bank of Uganda officials. At the time, the arrests captured public attention since Ugandans felt that the Bank of Uganda was corrupt yet untouchable. The government has since withdrawn the case.
16 | Consensus-Building
The government pays lip service to multiparty democracy. Legitimate opposition meetings are disrupted by government functionaries and opposition supporters are arrested and held in jail without trial for indefinite periods of time. Freedom of assembly has been curtailed. The president has called protesters terrorists and publicly justified the extrajudicial murder of opposition supporters. The president has also repeatedly lashed out against international voices from “the West,” rejecting what he calls “lectures” on democracy.
There is wide agreement between all relevant actors over the goals of development.
The market economy and market mechanisms are generally accepted as the avenue to achieve these goals. There is occasional nostalgia for elements of the former mixed economy, with its important parastatals.
Consensus on goals
7
The government is an anti-democratic actor, using several anti-democratic tactics to remain in power. Gerrymandering is used by the NRM to keep its majority in parliament. Despite a facade of democracy, the government uses its majority to block electoral reforms that would provide a fairer democratic playing field. Even the Supreme Court was ignored when it ruled in 2016 that the attorney general should propose laws to parliament that would reform Uganda’s election process. Another directive by the Supreme Court in 2019 on this same matter was also ignored. The most important holder of veto power is the president, who uses money and the army to bolster his position. The army has 10 specially elected representatives that routinely vote with the ruling NRM party, but also supports President Museveni in more informal ways such as the arrest and torture of opposition figures. President Museveni’s political power is reliant on the armed forces, particularly with the Special Forces Command.
Anti-democratic actors
4
Despite its cultural and religious diversity and the variety of conflicts experienced in the past, Uganda has in recent years been generally successful in containing societal cleavages. The ending of the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the north of the country led to an easing of internal tensions, though a strong feeling of marginalization still persists among northerners. Ethnic conflicts (often clashes over resources) are generally defused by government interventions that achieve a sometimes fragile compromise. However, the government is not always consistent in its approach, and is at times criticized for exacerbating ethnic conflicts when it pursues divide-and-rule strategies.
There is a strong tendency in parts of the country, and especially among opposition supporters, to accuse the government of favoring the western region, the president’s home. To date, the potential for anti-western-region sentiment has not manifested politically, partly because the region has produced some of President Museveni’s most vocal opponents.
The Inter-Religious Council, together with other civil society umbrella bodies, launched a national dialogue process that aimed to promote peace and address political tensions by seeking consensus on key national goals and values. However, this process was overshadowed by a widening polarization between the supporters and opponents of Museveni’s regime. Constructive political dialogue across the political divide has become difficult. The developments during the 2021 election campaign have further contributed to the political tensions and are likely to contribute to a more confrontational style of political competition within and outside the formal institutions.
Protests by unemployed youth indicate widening social cleavages. A growing sentiment of political exclusion and lack of economic prospects, especially among the young urban population, are likely to be a key source of tension and conflict in the years to come.
Cleavage / conflict management
5
President Museveni demonstrates a fairly traditional understanding of non-state actors in society. He interacts with businesspeople and peasants, listens to religious and cultural leaders and consults with his fellow soldiers. He is less inclined toward an exchange with the more modern elements of society, even though many came into being only as a result of Uganda’s transformation during his tenure.
Agenda-setting and decision-making over major issues at least in the initial stages is conducted in the inner circles of power, which include the army and the NRM leadership, without much attention being paid to the views of NGOs, academia or media. At the same time, the government is keen to involve various civil society actors in development issues, encouraging their commitment and participation. It is less prone to heed civil society concerns over human rights or on political topics. In some cases, the government may even ignore requests by civil society organizations to be included in the agenda-setting and policy-formulation process. The government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been dominated by a repressive approach driven by state (security) institutions, with little effort to actively involve civil society actors.
Civil society participation
5
Ugandans preserve conflicting - and at the same time selective - memories of their past. These include the atrocities committed against the local population by the Obote II government’s army, comprising many Acholi soldiers, when pursuing the guerilla force led by Museveni in the Luwero triangle north of Kampala. These also include crimes perpetrated against Acholi by the present government’s army in the course of action against the LRA. President Museveni publicly acknowledged that excesses were committed by rogue elements of his army.
The activities of the LRA cut deep wounds into Acholi society, which will take considerably longer to heal. One way of healing was the use of traditional reconciliation efforts in the local community. Peacebuilding efforts have been systematically brought forward by the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) since 1997. In 2015, the amnesty clause of the Amnesty Act, reinstated in May 2013 for two years, was extended for two more years. Its purpose is to induce mainly LRA fighters (now chiefly active in the territory of the Central African Republic) to surrender; it does not apply to the top leaders.
While the Amnesty Act and non-governmental initiatives like the ARLPI played a positive role, there was no effort on the part of the government to establish a truth and reconciliation commission, despite calls to this effect from civil society actors.
Similarly, proposals by some prominent voices from churches and civil society, as well as some politicians, for some form of a national dialogue on unity and reconciliation have not to date led to any concrete initiative.
Reconciliation
5
17 | International Cooperation
Uganda has for decades been among the top recipients of aid in Africa. Despite growing apprehension about corruption and democratic backsliding, donor density remains high. There are international multilateral and bilateral donors, as well as a multitude of NGOs active in the field. The country has been open to suggestions put forward by donors and has adopted many policy measures prescribed by international financial institutions.
Uganda has been lauded as a pioneer in adopting the Agenda 2030 and incorporating the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into its national development plans.
According to the Ugandan government more than 70% of the SDG targets have been adapted to the national context. Uganda’s performance toward achieving the SDGs, however, has been fairly weak. The 2020 Sustainable Development Report ranks Uganda 142 out of 166 with a score 53.49. The report identifies major challenges and stagnation or even regression in the progress toward 12 out of the 17 SDGs in Uganda.
Effective use of support
6
was kept in the current five-year plan (NDP III) with the new horizon being 2025. In the more recent past, Uganda’s relationship with international donors has become increasingly complicated and the effectiveness and aims of aid have been questioned.
Contributing factors have been multiple corruption scandals and reports about diversion of funds, temporary suspensions of aid, delays in the implementation of donor-funded projects, contested priorities in the national budget, as well as President Museveni’s increasing focus on prestigious (sometimes questionable) infrastructure projects funded by China. Critics also raise concerns about the country’s deteriorating democratic credentials and the role aid plays in the government’s systems of patronage.
In light of the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, Uganda sought the support of international donors and secured $491.5 million in emergency financing from the IMF in May 2020 under the Rapid Credit Facility. In June 2020, the World Bank approved a $300 million budget support operation under the Uganda COVID-19 Economic Crisis and Recovery Development Policy Financing, which supported reforms to provide immediate relief to individuals and businesses most affected by the pandemic.
Uganda is a member of the United Nations, Commonwealth and Organization of Islamic Cooperation. In addition, Uganda is party to practically all major human-rights instruments of the UN. The country has largely been seen as a reliable and consistent partner in the recent past, upholding most of its international commitments and complying with international agreements. Concerns have repeatedly been raised regarding Uganda’s ability and willingness to fully implement its commitments according to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Though it became a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 and played host to the ICC Review Conference in 2010, Uganda has become a vocal critic of the ICC due to its alleged preoccupation with Africa and has threatened to quit the organization.
Uganda’s relationship with Western donors has certainly become more complicated in the past decade as President Museveni increasingly concentrated on Chinese investment and repeatedly ranted about strings attached to aid from Western partners and what he considers undue “Western interference.” Aid flows from the West were, however, rarely affected. Museveni knows his trump cards very well: Uganda is still seen as a grantor of stability in a volatile region and a reliable ally in military cooperation. The country’s prominent role with regard to regional security and its constructive involvement in military missions makes it a valued partner in the region.
In international peacekeeping efforts, Uganda has taken the lead in Somalia, its military contingent providing the bulk of the AU Mission (AMISOM). Ugandan involvement with AMISOM has also demonstrated the country’s close political and military links with the United States. In addition, Uganda is lauded for its progressive refugee policy as the country hosts the largest number of refugees in Africa. The
Credibility