INADEQUATE PROTOCOLS

Given the wide variety of situations that operational officers may face when policing

demonstrations, they have a certain degree of discretion in order to adapt to changing needs. To ensure that this discretion is in line with appropriate criteria, the commander must ensure that there is an adequate operational framework.

This means that the framework, for example protocols on conduct, must be in accordance with the international standards and continuously revised;³²⁷ the equipment must be appropriate and its effects properly evaluated;³²⁸ officials must be equipped with a wide range of methods that allow differentiated use of force;³²⁹ training must ensure the appropriate use of force; and only those with specialized training may use firearms.³³⁰

Within the police operational framework, protocols or regulations on the use of force must be established in order to provide guidance to officials when policing demonstrations. These guidelines are subject to binding national regulations, most notably the Constitution;³³¹ the Constitutional National Police Organic Law (which establishes the military character of the force);³³² Decree No. 1364;³³³ and the Penal Code.

The Penal Code addresses crimes against life, integrity and personal liberty, namely: the crimes of homicide (aggravated, simple or misdemeanour); crimes of wounding, torture and unlawful coercion (ill-treatment); crimes of arbitrary detention;

and criminal exemption based on legitimate defence – the main crimes analysed in this report.

The Penal Code, in light of the gravity of such conduct, explicitly addresses criminal command responsibility by omission in relation to the crimes of torture and unlawful coercion (ill-treatment) as well as failure to report a criminal act by certain officials.³³⁴ In addition, those who prevent the avoidance of a criminal act are held responsible, as well as those who

“arranged for it to be carried out, facilitate the means with which it is carried out...without taking part in it.”³³⁵ In such cases, the responsibility of those who are in a position to guarantee the legal right affected by the omission is analysed.

Regarding the guidelines, on 9 March 2018, the State of Chile signed an Agreement to comply with the recommendations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the case of Edmundo Alex Lemun Saavedra v. Chile.³³⁶

Among other measures, it agreed to review and update Circular No. 1756 of 2013 on the use of force and General Order No.

2284 of 2014 on protocols for interventions to maintain public order, which were both repealed in March 2019 by Circular No. 1832 and General Order No. 2635, of the National Police General Directorate.³³⁷

327 UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 1, 1990.

328 UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 3, 1990.

329 UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 2, 1990.

330 UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 19, 1990.

331 The Constitution gives the Forces of Order and Security a state monopoly on the use of force in the domestic sphere. Article 101, second paragraph, Constitution of the Republic of Chile.

332 It confers on the National Police legal authority as a technical, armed and military police institution, in accordance with Law No. 18961 of 20 March 1990, arts 1 to 4.

333 Establishes the general guidelines on the use of force in police interventions to maintain public order, dated 13 November 2018, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, published in Official Gazette No. 42221, dated 4 December 2018.

334 Penal Code, Article 150.

335 Penal Code, Article 15.

336 On 21 March 2017, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights approved Merits Report No. 31/17 in case 12880, Edmundo Alex Lemun Saavedra et al., in which it establishes Chile’s responsibility for violations of the rights to life, physical integrity, equality and non-discrimination and the rights of the child and rights to judicial guarantees and to judicial protection. See www.interior.gob.cl/media/2018/10/PUBLICACION-ACUERDO.pdf

337 Circular No. 1832 of the General Directorate of the National Police dated 1 March 2019 “Uso de la Fuerza: Establece instrucciones al respecto; Orden General núm. 2635 de la Dirección General de Carabineros de Chile de 1 de marzo de 2019” Protocolos para el Mantenimiento del Orden Público approves new text and repeals the regulations listed.

70

EYES ON CHILE: POLICE VIOLENCE AND COMMAND

The National Police Deputy Director General, who was responsible for drawing up these new protocols, set up a roundtable involving members of force.³³⁸ Initially, the Director of Order and Security was also directly in charge of the roundtable.³³⁹ It should be noted that the 2018 Settlement Agreement with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated that civil society and the INDH would be involvement in realizing them. The latter, in a meeting with the National Police prior to the publication of the new protocols, delivered a document with 68 observations on the preliminary draft prepared by the police force, but received no response before publication. They noted that of the 68 observations made, only 10 had been accepted.³⁴⁰

These protocols (the circular and the general order) include the principles of necessity, legality, proportionality and command responsibility, the “differentiated use of tools and the gradual nature of interventions”, as well as special protection for children, adolescents and elderly and disabled people, among others.

However, they have serious shortcomings. The wording is mostly ambiguous, excessive discretion is granted to riot police officers, the type of assembly is determined according to closed categories, and certain definitions contravene international standards, among other things.

For example, four categories of demonstrations are defined: legal with authorization or without authorization, and illegal aggressive or illegal violent, which creates scenarios of a single type, which could be used to justify restrictive interventions against a whole demonstration rather than promptly addressing the source of any violence that may emerge.

Furthermore, the very definition of these categories in the protocol contravenes international standards. One characteristic of lawful demonstrations is that they are “calm”. The Human Rights Committee considers that campaigns of collective civil disobedience, direct action or any other form of peaceful expression, even if they are not “calm”, form part of the right to assembly.³⁴¹

Regarding demonstrations that are lawful but not authorized, the protocol includes references to “deterrence” (“disuasión”),

“dispersal” (“despeje”) and “detention” (“detención), because they are spontaneous or have not been previously communicated to the authorities; these references do not appear in relation to authorized protests, even though such terms are relevant based on the level of violence.

However, according to international standards, a peaceful meeting in a public place does not require prior authorization and whether or not the authorities have been notified should not change the standard regarding the use of force in case of public order disturbances.³⁴²

On the other hand, the protocol defines a “violent illegal” demonstration as one in which “actions result in the violation of the rights of third parties, such as free movement on the roads”, which limits the right of assembly.³⁴³ In the type of gathering considered illegal, there is no dialogue phase and the police can resort to the use of water cannon and so-called

“reactive tactical teams” can deploy gases. In other words, there may be scenarios where the obstruction of a public thoroughfare is taken to indicate that all possibilities for negotiation have been exhausted beforehand, in violation of human rights standards.³⁴⁴

338 Statement of the National Police Director General to the Attorney General’s Office in Case RUC 1901217258-6 of the Santiago 7th District Court, investigation case file, volume IV, p. 18.

339 Statement of the National Police Director General in Case RUC 1901217258-6 of the Santiago 7th District Court, investigation case file, volume IV, p. 2.

340 Follow-up report on the settlement agreement in the case of Edmundo Álex Lemun Saavedra et al. Chile, approved by the INDH Council on 19 August 2019, in ordinary session no. 497.

341 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 37, 27 July 2020, CCPR/C/GC37, para. 16.

342 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 37, 27 July 2020, CCPR/C/GC37, para. 73. See also, Constitution of the Republic of Chile, Article 13, No. 13.

343 The Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment No. 37, notes that “extended blocking of traffic, may be dispersed, as a rule, only if the disruption is ‘serious and sustained’”.

344 UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, principles 4 and 20, 1990.

Regarding weapons, it stipulates that firearms loaded with lethal ammunition may only be used as an extreme measure, when a level 5 lethal attack puts the physical integrity or life of a person at serious risk, in line with international standards.

However, regarding the use of riot-control shotguns, it introduces their use in situations of level 4 active aggression, which implies non-lethal aggression and which, therefore, contradicts the principle of proportionality, because of the kind of ammunition that was used.

In addition to this, level 4, like other aspects, is poorly defined and indicates a certain degree of direct confrontation with the officer: “the person being restrained tries to attack the police officer to resist or evade restraint. Example: the person clenches their fists to attack or tries to hit the police officer with an object”. The wording of this definition is problematic, because according to the protocol, level 4 authorizes the use of certain weapons such as riot-control shotguns.

When describing the use of this weapon, it should be for their “necessary, legal, proportionate and progressive application, when the effect of other methods such as water cannon, smoke, gases and others, are insufficient”. This would permit the use of riot-control shotguns to disperse demonstrations and not solely in line with the criterion of proportionality to the threat that is being countered, as required by international standards.

It also establishes that they can be used “when the level of aggression makes their use advisable to avoid a greater harm”

to people’s physical integrity. As a result of being defined so broadly, numerous police reports show that the fact that there were protesters throwing stones was interpreted as a sufficient level of aggression to use shotguns, regardless of whether the specific integrity of the officer was at risk.³⁴⁵ In relation to this weapon, it is not specified at what distance it should be fired or the angle of fire.

Similarly, with regard to chemical deterrents, the definition is equally problematic and does not explicitly regulate the use of the grenade launcher or “gas-launcher carbine”, but rather refers to the Public Order Control Operations Manual.³⁴⁶ As mentioned above, regional jurisprudence establishes that inadequate internal regulations do not exempt the state from responsibility. In this case, any ambiguity or contradiction in the protocol should have been corrected by the operational and strategic commanders in view of human rights concerns.

When asked by the Attorney General’s Office about the process of updating the regulations on the use of force, the Director of Order and Security said that it had been his turn to participate in the roundtables as substitute from January “since the responsibility fell to the Deputy Director General...I was involved at the start of the roundtables”. In other words, these strategic leaders were aware of the limitations of the protocol and the concerns that have arisen from a human rights perspective.

These concerns were based on the high number of pellet injuries that were being recorded, which indicated that the use of the weapon was not necessary or proportionate. The large number of bullet injuries to the chest and head showed that the weapon had an indiscriminate effect, and that on many occasions they were not aimed at less lethal parts of the body.

However, as will be analysed in depth in the chapter “Similar and imprecise orders”, commanders continued to rely on compliance with the protocol, despite knowing its notable shortcomings, particularly in light of the harmful outcomes.

On 10 November, the Director General made his first announcement on the “limited use of shotguns” with TEC ammunition and made explicit that their use was allowed in cases of “clear threat of attacks on public or private property.” In other words, for a month, shooting at people who threatened material goods was permitted. As mentioned above, it was on 19 November that the Director General announced that shotguns (with TEC Harseim ammunition) could only be used in cases of risk to life.³⁴⁷

345. Official Minutes No. 381 of the Special Operations Prefecture, Vol. III, p. 573 of the investigation case file, Case RUC 1901217258-6 of the Santiago 7th District Court.

346 It is framed on the basis of level 4 violence being decreed, (a category already poorly defined) and it briefly establishes that it will be used when personnel are being “violently attacked and overcome, or in order to avoid a greater harm” (“agredido y sobrepasado violentamente, o con el fin de evitar un mal mayor”).

347 CNN, Mario Rozas suspende uso de balines tras peritajes realizados por laboratorio de Carabineros, See www.cnnchile.com/pais/mario-rozas-suspende-uso-balines-antidisturbios_20191119/#:~:text=Mario%20Rozas%20suspende%20uso%20de%20balines%20tras%20peritajes%20realizados%20por%20 laborat orio%20de%20Carabineros,- El%20general%20director&text=Seg%C3%BAn%20el%20%C3%BAltimo%20informe%20del,perdigones%20y%20 67%20por%20balines

72

EYES ON CHILE: POLICE VIOLENCE AND COMMAND

This chapter has shown that despite commanders’ obligation to ensure that there was an operational framework that was in line with international standards in the context of the protests, they failed to comply with this obligation and avoid harm to the population. This failure was principally the responsibility of the Director General and the Deputy Director General, whose duties, as noted above, include the development of the institution’s policies and doctrines.

The protocols were flawed from their conception and the relevant strategic commanders did not modify them in a substantive way until more than a month after the start of the protests, when the use of pellet shotguns was at least limited.