Major flashpoints in other geographical areas impacting on the security

the “escalation in serious violence” in Ituri, calling on the Congolese authorities to properly investigate the alleged crimes.³¹²

Similarly, Amnesty International reported that:

[…] Between March and June [2020], ethnically motivated attacks by militias resulted in around 444 civilian deaths in Ituri and the displacement of more than 200,000 people. Most killings were carried out by fighters from the Lendu community, and the majority of victims were ethnic Hema and Alur residents. There were reports of inter-communal clashes in May and June [2020] between Alur and Hema communities in Ituri […]³¹³

The International Crisis Group added in July 2020:

Since December 2017, violence in the province of Ituri, in the north east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), has left nearly 1,000 people dead and half a million displaced.

Breaking out in the territory of Djugu, small-scale attacks first pitted the two main communities in Ituri, the Hema and Lendu, against each other. Subsequently, Lendu militias targeted the Hema, and then the national army, before attacking nearby territories. External actors, including from North Kivu province and bordering countries, are also involved. […]

The current crisis differs from the 1999-2003 conflict in Ituri, during which Hema and Lendu communities participated in massacres undertaken by associated militias.

Today, most assailants are recruited from within the Lendu community and brought together in an association of militias, the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo. In contrast to the previous conflict, Lendu leaders have distanced themselves from these militias. Still, given the limits of the government’s military response, the possibility of escalating ethnic violence cannot be dismissed. Lendu militias continue to expand. Thus far, the Hema have not mounted systematic reprisals, but they do not rule out mobilising their youth if attacks continue. Young Hema have organised into self-defence groups and erected roadblocks in Ituri, which should be seen as forewarning of the risk of ethnic confrontation.³¹⁴

6.4. Major flashpoints in other geographical areas impacting on the security

47 Several interviewees insisted on calling the Banymulenge ‘Banyarwanda’, as the term Banyamulenge links the community to an area in South Kivu that the Banyamulenge claim as their chiefdom. The conflict between Banyamulenge and other communities has deep roots in provincial history and is an important driver of conflict. Throughout the wars of recent decades, the aspirations of the Banyamulenge have been manipulated by various sides such as Rwanda and the DRC Government in Kinshasa.³¹⁵

The Kivu Security Tracker reported that there had been an uptick in regional involvement in the eastern Congo in recent years:

[…] in particular in hotspots such as the Hauts Plateaux of South Kivu, where Burundi and Rwanda continue to wage some of their power struggles – both internal to each country and between each other. Here, as in North Kivu, where Rwanda has intervened more forcefully to target Rwandan rebels since President Felix Tshisekedi came to power in January 2019, these regional dynamics compound local conflicts over land and resources – mixed with political and customary power struggles.³¹⁶

Covering the period 1 September 2019 to 15 March 2020 a UN Secretary-General report stated with regards to cross-border incidents:

Isolated cross-border security incidents occurred elsewhere in the region during the period under review. On 5 October [2019, suspected members of the FDLR splinter group Rassemblement pour l’unité et la démocratie (RUD-Urunana), reportedly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, carried out an attack in Musanze district in Rwanda, near the Volcanoes National Park, in which 14 people were killed. Rwanda stated that its defence forces had repelled the attackers, killing 19 of them and capturing 5. On 9 November [2019], the commander of RUD-Urunana, General Juvenal Musabimana, also known as Jean-Michel Africa, died during a FARDC operation in Binza, Rutshuru territory, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.³¹⁷

Covering the period 16 March to 15 September 2020 a follow-up UN Secretary-General report stated with regards to cross-border operations:

On 14 April [2020], the vice-president and spokesperson of the civil society coalition of North Kivu Province raised concern over the alleged presence of RDF troops near the provincial capital, Goma. The Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda both rejected the report. In the same vein, on 16 April [2020], civil society groups in South Kivu Province alleged movements by elements of the Burundian army south of Uvira town, followed subsequently by media reports alleging that the Burundian troops had retreated to Burundi […]

Incidents involving South Sudanese troops were reported in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. In Ituri Province, members of the South Sudanese army were accused by the Congolese authorities of looting and burning houses between April and June [2020]. A bilateral meeting between the concerned security services after the incident resulted in the release of a Congolese hostage and the return of looted goods by the South Sudanese authorities. […]

On 9 April [2020], UPDF exchanged fire with soldiers of the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) on Lake Albert after the latter had allegedly entered Ugandan territory. Two FARDC soldiers were reportedly killed while two others were injured and

315 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Securing Legitimate Stability in the DRC: External Assumptions and Local Perspectives, 30 September 2019

316 Kivu Security Tracker, The Landscape of Armed Groups in Eastern Congo: Missed Opportunities, Protracted Insecurity and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, 28 February 2021

317 UN Security Council, Implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, 3 April 2020, para. 6

arrested. Following the incident, Congolese and Ugandan officials met and resolved the issue.³¹⁸

The International Crisis Group reported in July 2020 about the conflict in Ituri:

Rwanda and Uganda both have historical ties to armed groups and rebellions in Ituri and North Kivu. Rwanda, which borders North Kivu, has had greater involvement there, while Uganda has played a bigger role in Ituri. Several Congolese actors who were active in previous Congo wars are involved in the conflict in Ituri and operate from Uganda.

Among these different actors, former members of the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani/Liberation Movement (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Kisangani/Mouvement de Libération, or RCD-K/ML) play a leading role. During the 1998-2003 war, this predominantly Nande group, led by former rebel leader Mbusa Nyamwisi and supported by Uganda, controlled parts of North Kivu and Ituri. Some of its members are still based in Uganda, in plain view of the authorities, and maintain contact with armed groups active in North Kivu and Ituri. Tshisekedi’s election and the return of Nyamwisi to the DRC after years of exile in Uganda have improved relations with Kinshasa, but some former RCD-K/ML rebels nevertheless express their disappointment with the new government. Opponents of Kabila, these former rebels believe that the former president’s clan still dominates the power structure. Nyamwisi left the country once again when he realised, contrary to what he had hoped, that he would not obtain a position in the Tshisekedi government.

According to Congolese security services and representatives of armed groups based in Uganda, some members of the former M23 rebel movement established in Uganda are also involved in the Ituri attacks. In December 2017, when that violence flared up, armed elements – identified by Congolese authorities as ex-M23 members – allegedly infiltrated Walendu-Bindi (Irumu territory in Ituri) from the Kamango region in North Kivu via Tchabi, on the border of the two provinces. The movement of former M23 members across the Ugandan border into Aru and Djugu territories in Ituri in 2018 was confirmed by Congolese security officials, who also apprehended certain ex-M23 members as they infiltrated the Berunda forest in Ituri. The interrogations reportedly confirmed the existence of a recruitment network for former M23 members in Uganda.

At the same time, Rwandan intelligence services have accused Uganda of stoking violence in Ituri as part of a larger destabilisation plan that would affect North Kivu and ultimately Rwanda’s security. Kampala has always denied these allegations, while it accuses Kigali of supporting the ADF in North Kivu, an accusation which Rwanda also rejects. While it is difficult at this stage to determine the scale of recruitment and exfiltration operations of former rebels toward Ituri, at the local level, certain political leaders and members of civil society remain convinced that links exist between the violence in Ituri and the involvement of external actors.³¹⁹

Already in its earlier report of January 2020 the International Crisis Group stated:

Intensifying hostility among states in the Great Lakes threatens a return to the regional wars that tore that region apart in previous decades. Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, accuses Burundi and Uganda of backing Rwandan rebels active in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North and South Kivu provinces and threatens to retaliate for those groups’ attacks on his country. In turn, Burundi and Uganda assert that Rwanda supports Burundian and Ugandan rebels in the DRC. At the same time, the DRC’s new president, Félix Tshisekedi, has floated plans to invite Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda to conduct joint military operations with DRC

318 UN Security Council, Implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, 29 September 2020, paras. 8, 10 and 11

319 International Crisis Group, DR Congo: Ending the Cycle of Violence in Ituri, 15 July 2020

troops against insurgents sheltering in his country, a risky policy that could fuel proxy conflicts.³²⁰

Covering the period 16 September 2020 to 15 March 2021 a UN Secretary-General report stated:

In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, foreign and local armed groups remained active, with a surge in attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in North Kivu province, mainly in Rwenzori Sector, east of Beni town and near the border with Uganda. Between 16 September [2020] and 15 March [2021], attacks carried out by alleged ADF elements resulted in the killing of over 400 civilians. Efforts to prosecute suspects in attacks against civilians were partly undermined by the escape of 1,335 inmates, including ADF members, during an attack on Kangwayi Prison in Beni by suspected ADF elements on 20 October [2020]. While military operations conducted by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) in 2019 dispersed ADF fighters and dislodged them from their traditional stronghold in Mbau, Kamango and Eringeti, the group remains a significant threat […]

FARDC continued its operations against Rwandan armed groups operating in Congolese territory. On 23 and 24 October [2020], FARDC clashed with the Rwandan armed group Conseil national de la résistance pour la Démocratie and its Mai-Mai allies, killing 27 combatants and capturing arms and ammunition. Meanwhile, the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) were reportedly able to consolidate their recruitment and training activities, with reports of military training for new recruits taking place in southern Lubero and Rutshuru territories. Illicit economic activities by various armed groups also remained a key driving factor of conflict. […]

In South Kivu, FARDC operations against the Burundian armed groups Forces nationales de libération (FNL) and RED-Tabara resulted in the killing of at least 27 FNL fighters in Homba, in the Fizi, and Uvira territories, between 23 and 26 October [2020]. From 22 to 24 November [2020], FARDC reportedly seized the FNL headquarters in South Kivu. Several elements of the RED-Tabara were reported to have relocated from their original strongholds in Fizi and Uvira to Kalehe territory […]

In response to the midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo released on 23 December (S/2020/1283), which alleged incursions by Rwanda Defence Force into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Government of Rwanda issued a press release on 8 January, denying joint operations with FARDC and stating that military cooperation between the two countries was currently limited to the sharing of intelligence on armed groups […]

During the reporting period attacks were also perpetrated by the Lord’s Resistance Army in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 19 October, 27 November and 20 December [2020], which resulted in killings and abductions of civilians. Lord’s Resistance Army combatants also abducted 13 civilians near Obo, Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, in the Central African Republic, on 28 September [2020].³²¹