6.1 Human rights monitoring
6.1.1 While freedom of press and speech is limited31 32 a number of local and international organisations monitor the general human rights situation in the DRC. Freedom House noted in its report covering 2018 that: ‘Thousands of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are active in the country, but many face violence and other obstacles to their work.’33
6.1.2 The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) noted in August 2019:
‘Congolese civil society is comprised of a range of actors on the local,
regional, and national levels. Most civil society organizations (CSOs) seek to advance the social and economic development of their communities, often through the provision of goods and services for the public interest. The individuals who participate in CSOs come from a variety of ethnic, religious, political and national movements and include workers, students, women, and entrepreneurs… Civil society today continues to operate in a complex social, economic, cultural, and political environment and struggles to ward off
manipulation by various political forces, including the governing majority on the one side and the opposing minority on the other. The government has increasingly cracked down on criticism, including through the forced
"disappearance" of journalists, and blocked opposition protests. The public authorities justify these crackdowns as necessary to preserve "public order".
One consequence of these government actions has been that Congolese civil society has become increasingly divided into two political camps: some CSOs are aligned with opposition political parties that want political change through new elections, while other CSOs support existing political parties.’34 6.1.3 The USSD report for 2018 observed that:
‘Elements of the [state security forces] SSF continued to kill, harass, beat, intimidate, and arbitrarily arrest and detain domestic human rights advocates and domestic NGO workers, particularly when the NGOs reported on or supported victims of abuses by the SSF or reported on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the east. In 2016 the government declined to renew the work permit of a Human Rights Watch researcher and revoked the visa of Congo Research Group director Jason Stearns, officially for reasons of
“undesirability.” During the year the government declined to issue or renew visas for some international journalists and researchers. Representatives from the Ministry of Justice and the ANR met with domestic NGOs and sometimes responded to their inquiries.
‘… The government cooperated at times with investigations by the United Nations and other international bodies but was not consistent in doing so.’35
31 FH, Freedom in the World 2019 - DRC, undated 2019, url.
32 USSD, DRC human rights report 2018 (section 2a), March 2019, url.
33 FH, Freedom in the World 2019 - DRC, undated 2019, url.
34 ICNL, DRC, updated August 2019, url.
35 USSD, DRC human rights report 2018 (section 5), March 2019, url.
6.1.4 The UN Mission to the DRC (MONUSCO) operates a Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) which is ‘comprised of the MONUSCO Human Rights Division (HRD) and the former Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in the DRC’. The UNJHRO is mandated to, amongst other things, promote and protect human rights, and investigate human rights violations. It is headquatered in Kinshasa, with 13 field offices and 6 sub-offices36.
6.1.5 The EASO response of July 2019, containing information from a variety of sources submitted by EU member states, noted:
‘Some of the most relevant local organisations in DRC working on the protection of human rights include:
‘Alliance pour l’Universalité des Droits Fondamentaux (AUDF)
‘Association Africaine de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (ASADHO)
‘Association Congolaise pour l'Accès à la Justice (ACAJ)
‘Fonds pour les Femmes Congolaises (FFC)
‘Promotion de la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme (PDUDH)
‘Voix des Sans Voix (VSV)
‘Action des chrétiens pour l’abolition de la torture au Congo (ACAT Congo)
‘The United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) has the mandate to monitor the human rights situation in the DRC and assist the state to respond to human rights violations.[…] As part of UNJHRO, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) is the UN agency with the mandate to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilisation and peace
consolidation efforts.
‘Concerning the monitoring of returnees in particular, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has deployed the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) in seven provinces of the DRC (Kasaï, Kasaï Central, Kasaï Oriental, Lomami, Sankuru, South Kivu, Tanganyika), in order to collect up-to-date information on internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees, and support humanitarian response.’37
6.1.6 The Second Secretary Political (SSP) at the British Embassy (BE),
Kinshasa, when asked about the Embassy’s contact with groups montoring human rights generally and returns in particular in September 2019,
observed that
‘The BE is in contact with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), but in these meetings it has not discussed returns nor have the IOM raised returns as an issue of concern.
‘[On the subject of contact with other organisations monitoring returns, the SSP noted… ] contact with the Bill Clinton Foundation for Peace (BCFP)
36 MONUSCO, human rights, undated, url.
37 EASO, Response, 3 July 2019, url
was made for the first time in three years, as far as the SSP was aware, this week [mid September 2019] (at the suggestion of the Home Office).
‘However, the Embassy is in active contact with a range of other actors that monitor human rights via regular meetings providing updates on the human rights situation e.g. monthly briefings run by the UNJRO which bring together a range of actors including local NGOs, international NGOs, and western Embassies.
‘The BE has bi-weekly meetings with the western Embassies to discuss human rights, law and order, and democracy.
‘On the reliability of NGOs, the SSP considered that this could be a “mixed bag”. There is a tendency for an NGO to tell you what it thinks you want to hear and accordingly it can exaggerate making it tricky to get to the bottom of an issue. Information from NGOs often needs to be treated with a “pinch of salt”. Given the size of the country, NGOs based in different areas will often give different answers based on prevailing local conditions making
“country-wide” assessments difficult and often inaccurate.
‘The SSP was not familiar with the BCFP – had no previous dealings with the organisation. Nor was he aware of the BCFP being mentioned in discussions with other western Embassies. The chair of BCFP is however known to the Vice-Consul as they have met in the course of their work (though not for some years).’38
Back to Contents 6.2 Monitoring of returns
6.2.1 The UK’s then immigration minister, Caroline Nokes, explained in a
response of February 2018 to a parliamentary question regarding returns to Sudan but applicable to the DRC and elsewhere, that the Home Office does not undertake post-return monitoring as a matter of principle because
• returns only take place when it is safe to do so, on a case-by-case basis
• the individuals returned are foreign nationals who have been found not to need protection, so it would be inappropriate for the UK to assume
ongoing responsibility for them
• the act of monitoring itself may bring the returnee to the attention of the authorities of the country of orgin and, by doing so, may put the returnee at risk39 40.
6.2.2 The same parliamentary response stated where specific allegations are made to the UK government that a returnee has experienced ill-treatment on or after return, these will be investigated by the Home Office and Foreign Office (FCO)41.
38 British Embassy, Note of interview, 13 September 2019, Annex L
39 Home Office, Immigration Minister’s written response (165448), 27 July 2018, url.
40 Home Office, Immigration Minister’s written response (127780), 8 February 2018, url.
41 Home Office, Immigration Minister’s written response (127780), 8 February 2018, url.
6.2.3 The CGRS EASO response of February 2018 cited a UNHCR-Belgian official who observed that there is no organisation that systematically monitors returns to the DRC42.
6.2.4 The Second Secretary Political (SSP) at the British Embassy (BE) in Kinshasa observed in September 2019 that the BE
‘… is aware of returns in that the [British Embassy-based migration delivery assistant] MDA facilitates the redocumentation process for potential
returnees. However, officials from the BE do not attend the airport when the individuals are returned. There would be logistical difficulties in attending returns and BE staff do not have routine airside access at the airport, nor in ordinary situations would they. Without such a pass, BE staff would not be present at immigration control, rather they would attend the airport and wait at the arrivals area – physically outside the airport.
‘The SSP was not aware during his time in Kinshasa of any attempts by a returnee’s escorts to contact the BE during the return.
‘There was not follow-up monitoring of returnees (for the reasons above). In addition, the returnees are third country nationals in their home country, it would be inappropriate for the UK government to monitor them once in the DRC. There would also be logistical issues: Kinshasa is a city of between 11-16 million people and the DRC itself is the size of Western Europe.
Should an individual not wish to make themselves known to the BE, it would be impossible to track them down.’43
6.2.5 The DRC NGO, Voix de sans of Voix, contacted by the Foreign Office in June 2019, stated that it did monitor returns in the period 2007 – 2009 but did not indicate that it continued to do so. The organisation, however, when asked about other organisations that monitors, suggested that the
International Organisation for Migration may monitor returns44. 6.2.6 Another Kinshasa-based NGO, Les Amis de Nelson Mandela pour le
Defense des Droits Humains (AMNDH), stated that it monitored returns ‘but not like it used to be in the past because we noticed that there is halt since the new regime [post Janaury 2019] took over.’ Such monitoring appeared contingent on being informed of a return: ‘When we have been informed on time, we go to the airport to observe how returnees are being handled.
Sometimes we do inform migration services, some other times we do it in a clandestine way but in collaboration with family members of the subject.’ On being asked whether it was aware of the other organisations that monitored returns, the response was that the following orgnanisations did monitor returns: ‘Vois sans voix, [o]ther youth movements: LUCHA, FILIMBI,
International organisations‘. However, no further details were provided about the nature and extent of this monitoring process undertaken by AMNDH or other organisations45.
42 CGRS, Query response, 28 February 2018, Annex A
43 British Embassy, Note of interview, 13 September 2019, Annex L
44 VSV, Response to British Embassy query, July 2019, Annex I
45 AMNDH, Response to British Embassy query, July 2019, Annex J
6.2.7 The DRC-NGO, the Bill Clinton Foundation for Peace, stated that it has been monitoring returns from the UK since 200046. See subsection Information provided by the Bill Clinton Foundation for Peace / ‘Cases of return from the UK’ below for more information.
6.2.8 The IOM reported in August 2019 that it observes the arrival of its caseload of facilitated returns, meeting returnees at the immigration control desk at N’djili airport in Kinshasa47.
Back to Contents 6.3 Accessibility of the British Embassy
6.3.1 The SSP at the British Embassy (BE) in Kinshasa observed in September 2019 that:
‘… the BE is [open] to DRC nationals, NGOs, etc, the SSP considered the BE was open to meet people. People – DRC nationals and British Citizens – come to the Embassy all the time. If it is a consular matter, the guards will refer the case to one of the diplomatic staff. However, if told someone was at risk, the BE would also assist.
‘The diplomatic staff’s email addresses are widely circulated and there is a general BE email address, with the in-box regularly monitored by staff, in addition to a telephone switchboard. Individuals will frequently contact either the switchboard or generic email inbox and be referred to the appropriate member of staff for a response.
‘The SSP was not aware that the Embassy had been contacted by a
returnee, NGO or other persons about a returns issue during his time at post [since May 2018].
‘The SSP was asked about the case of the DRC returnee who was allegedly taken to the BE in August 2012 (as mentioned in the report, Unsafe Return 3 – case study 2). The SSP was not aware of the incident and stated that he could not comment on the practice of the guards in 2012 but he was
surprised that the incident had not been reported to the diplomatic staff and assistance provided had it occurred. However, without details of the incident – factors such as which entrance to the Embassy the individual was taken, when it took place (if it was at night then most the diplomatic staff would not be at the Embassy though some staff would be available in emergencies) – it would be difficult to determine what might have happened.’48
Back to Contents Section 7 updated: 18 November 2019