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Problems due to involvement or membership of OLF, ONLF or PG7

3.2 Ethnic groups

3.2.4 Problems due to involvement or membership of OLF, ONLF or PG7

After taking office as Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed invited the illegal opposition parties living abroad to return to Ethiopia so that they could legally take part in the political spectrum. When the OLF returned to Ethiopia on 15 September 2018, millions of people came to Meskel Square in Addis Ababa to celebrate. In December 2019, the party was officially registered as a political party in Ethiopia.553 Several sources reported that with the appointment of Abiy Ahmed there seemed to be a break with the previous rulers because he had expressed his wish to allow different political opinions.554

As already mentioned in section 1.1, expectations have been toned down and hopes have turned to disappointment for many. Like its predecessor, Abiy Ahmed's

government is reportedly engaging in the intimidation, detention and murder of OLF supporters or people with alleged links to the organisation.555 In the weeks following the return of the OLF, the military leader of the OLF, Gamachu Ayana, was arrested, along with other leaders and supporters of the organisation.556 According to USDoS, Addis Ababa police arrested 1,204 youths suspected of participating in the deadly riots that followed the OLF's return in September 2018.557

The UK Foreign Office wrote in its July 2020 country of origin information report that experiences with arrests varied from region to region. A source said that the

Tigrayan authorities had been looking after their own affairs and that the federal government did not interfere too much in that region until the TPLF attacked part of the federal army, the Northern Command, in early November 2020 (see also section 1.1.2.1). There was little interaction between the federal government and the Tigray regional government. But the federal government is active in Amhara and in

Oromia. Mass arrests are taking place in both regions. In Amhara, the authorities are selective about whom they arrest: mainly influential people such as journalists

551 Confidential source, 19 November 2020; confidential source, 17 September 2020.

552 Confidential source, 28 August 2020.

553 AP News, Ethiopian rebel group accuses government of airstrikes, 18 January 2019.

554 DIS, Country of Origin Information, Ethiopia: Political situation and treatment of opposition, page 10, September 2018.

555 Ethiopia Insight, Amid blackout, western Oromia plunges deeper into chaos and confusion, 14 February 2020; AI, Beyond Law Enforcement, Human Rights Violations by Ethiopian Security Forces in Amhara and Oromia, 29 May 2020.

556 Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note, Ethiopia: Opposition to the government, page 95, July 2020;

Ethiopia Insight, Amid blackout, western Oromia plunges deeper into chaos and confusion, 14 February 2020;

Oromo Press, @Oromo Press, 27 December 2019: twitter.com/oromopress/status/1210586722314194944.

557 USDoS, Ethiopia 2019 Human Rights Report, page 8, 11 March 2020.

and activists have been arrested. The situation in Oromia is different, according to the report (see also sections 3.3.9 and 3.4.1).558

On a mission to Ethiopia in September 2019, the UK Foreign Office team heard from a representative of the opposition party OFC that Oromo were being arrested on the basis of their ethnic origin and that every dissident noise could be linked to the OLF.

Another source said that before Abiy took office, arbitrary arrests of Oromo

associated with the OLF were definitely common practice. However, this source did not address the situation after Abiy took office, according to the report from the UK Foreign Office.559

Several confidential sources believe that the situation has deteriorated recently and that practices such as the arbitrary arrest of (alleged) supporters of the OLF are again the rule rather than the exception. Some of them note that these practices are regionally determined. In Addis Ababa, this will happen less quickly than in areas such as the Guji and Wollega zones, for example, where OLA/Shene is conducting an armed struggle against the Ethiopian authorities.560 On the other hand, one

confidential source says that the federal government is inviting everyone to

participate in political dialogue and is advocating a democratic Ethiopia. The source says he knows many members of the OLF who can organise political activities undisturbed. If you oppose peacefully, then you have nothing to fear from the government, according to the source.561

In early 2019, the OLF declared on its website that the ruling party EPRDF was still trying to suppress any noise other than the official government noise with the detention of OLF leaders and mass arrests of alleged OLF supporters.562 According to Addis Standard, the Ethiopian authorities were arresting people who had

participated in peaceful activities by the OLF. It was also reported that OLA fighters who had voluntarily surrendered their weapons and intended to integrate into the Oromia Regional State Police had been arrested and taken to detention centres.563 In a conversation with UK Home Office employees, journalist William Davison said that the government could cite alleged ties to OLA or Shene in order to arrest someone perceived as a threat.564

Estimates of the number of detainees in Oromia vary widely; it is not clear exactly during which periods the arrests took place.565 In March 2019, more than 1,000 people had been arrested for alleged links to the OLF, according to Ethiopia

Insight.566 A year later, in February 2020, the same news channel cited sources who spoke of the arrest of between 5,000 and 10,000 (alleged) members of the OLF since July 2019. The youngest detainee known to Ethiopia Insight was 13 years old and the oldest 76. The detainees included students, farmers, civil servants, religious leaders and Abbaa Gadaas (members of the Oromo elder council).567 Many of those

558 Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note, Ethiopia: Opposition to the government, page 42, July 2020.

559 Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note, Ethiopia: Opposition to the government, page 83, July 2020.

560 AI, Beyond Law Enforcement, Human Rights Violations by Ethiopian Security Forces in Amhara and Oromia, 29 May 2020; Ethiopia Insight, Amid blackout, western Oromia plunges deeper into chaos and confusion, 14 February 2020

561 Confidential source, 15 September 2020.

562 OLF Website, The Intimidation and Imprisonment of the OLF officials and its members by the Ethiopian government must stop immediately, 19 January 2019.

563 Addis Standard, Failed Politics and Deception: Behind the Crisis in western and southern Oromia, 20 March 2020.

564 Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note, Ethiopia: Opposition to the government, page 96, July 2020.

565 Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note, Ethiopia: Opposition to the government, page 102, July 2020.

566 Ethiopia Insight, OLF integration underway yet tensions remain, 1 March 2019.

567 Ethiopia Insight, Amid blackout, western Oromia plunges deeper into chaos and confusion, 14 February 2020

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arrested in these mass arrests were detained for months with no access to any form of legal assistance, according to Amnesty International.568

In an article, The Economist wrote about the double risk that residents run in areas where armed conflict was taking place. Local farmers, even though they were doing their jobs, could be seen by OLA/Shene fighters as government informers, while the military could accuse them of passing information on to the ‘guerrillas’.569

Confidential sources report that local people are victims of violence on the part of both the Ethiopian authorities and the OLA/Shene. Opinions are divided about the extent to which both parties are committing violence against the local population.570 ONLF

Several sources said that the reintegration of ex-ONLF fighters had worked out better than that of their OLF colleagues. The ONLF also reportedly had more room to manoeuvre than their Oromo counterparts. In some cases, this is attributed to the smaller size and smaller constituency of the ONLF compared to the OLF. This would greatly reduce the threat posed to the current government by the ONLF. The new president of the Somali Regional State, Mustafa Muhummed Omer, who says he is very committed to human rights, is also said to have contributed to the reintegration of the ONLF in the political spectrum.571

The UK Home Office report stated that sources, including Hassan Moalin, a leading member of the ONLF, believed that the ONLF could generally function without undue difficulty. The party was able to set up offices in the SRS with the support of the regional government. Despite the arrest of some ONLF members at local level, the situation, while not entirely secure, was much better than under the previous administration, Home Office sources said in September 2019.572

In October 2020, the SRS regional police arrested at least three senior members of the ONLF. ONLF Chairman Abdirahman Mahdi told Addis Standard that the regional government was using tactics such as intimidation and threats to provoke the ONLF and try to force the organisation to break the peace agreement. According to the regional authorities, the arrests were made to maintain the rule of law. The ONLF chairman said that the authorities regarded his party as a threat and therefore arrested members of the party for alleged disturbances and vandalism.573

On the other hand, the ONLF sits on the joint council of political parties and deputy chair of the ONLF, Hassan Moalin, said in late October 2020 that he believed the Ethiopian National Electoral Council was doing everything in its power to ensure that the upcoming elections were open and fair.574 However, Somali radio station Radio Risala reported in late January 2021 that ONLF offices running the election campaign had been closed in more than ten villages. A precise reason was not given by the radio station.575

PG7

568 AI, Beyond Law Enforcement, Human Rights Violations by Ethiopian Security Forces in Amhara and Oromia, 29 May 2020

569 The Economist, Onslaught in Oromia, A hidden war threatens Ethiopia’s transition to democracy, 19 March 2020.

570 Confidential source, 21 October 2020.

571 Confidential source, 17 August 2020; Reuters, Ethiopian who demanded justice now has half a year to deliver it, 28 January 2020.

572 Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note, Ethiopia: Opposition to the government, page 102, July 2020.

573 Addis Standard, Ethiopia's Somali state police arrest opposition leaders, 21 October 2020.

574 Ethiopia PR Observer, Joint Council of Political Parties Commends Preparation of NEBE for General Election, 23 October 2020.

575 BBC Monitoring (Radio Risala), Ethiopia's Somali region closes former rebel group offices, 27 January 2021.

PG7 has disbanded and merged into the political party E-ZEMA. There is no information to indicate that members of PG7 or people associated with the party encountered problems with the authorities during the reporting period (see also section 1.1.1). Since the outbreak of violence between the Tigray region and the federal government, the party has expressed support for Abiy Ahmed.576