Social protection networks and (lack of) support to specific groups

Hoehne, who lived several years in the region, including Hargeisa, mentioned that generally, society in Hargeisa is clan-based. The dominant groups all belong to the Isaaq clan-family. The dominant groups in Hargeisa are Habar Awal towards the north and the west of the city, Habar Jeclo to the northeast, Habar Yonis towards the west and Idagalle (also Aidagalle) and Arab towards the south and south-east of the city. Some neighbourhoods of Hargeisa are dominated by one clan or sub -clan;

others are ‘mixed’ (particularly the centre and neighbourhoods close to it, like ‘Statehouse’). Certainly, also non-Isaaq live, work and have property in Hargeisa (please see also section 3.1.1 Demographics and clan composition). Since the city is the capital of Somaliland, members from all groups represented in government have a residence in the city. Businessmen from all over Somaliland are

870 Osman, A. A., telephone interview, 12 July 2021

871 Osman, A. A., telephone interview, 12 July 2021

872 Yusuf, A. S., telephone interview, 12 July 2021. Abdullahi Said Yusuf is a driver from outside of Hargeisa.

873 World Bank (The), New World Bank GDP and Poverty Estimates for Somaliland, 29 January 2014, ; World Bank (The) and IFC, Doing Business in Hargeisa 2012, 2012, url, p. 1; see also Hammond, L., Family Ties: Remittances and Livelihoods Support in Puntland and Somaliland, FSNAU, 5 June 2013, url, p. 12

874 Cardiff University, The Informal Economy in Civil War: Hargeisa – Somaliland, 2017, url, p. 4

875 Guardian (The), Aid agencies can be harmful, says Somaliland tycoon,9 April 2021, url

active in Hargeisa. Also IDPs from the region and from southern Somalia reside in Hargeisa. However, the strongest and most influential group are Isaaq.⁸⁷⁶

3.4.1 Clan-based protection

A local source in Hargeisa mentioned that the city has become peaceful over the past 20 years.

Government institution are firmly established, the police is working effectively, and also the court system is well-established.⁸⁷⁷ If a person has a conflict or a problem in Hargeisa, he or she can go to the police. If there are credible allegations that a crime has happened, the police start investigations and if evidence was found, the matter is handed over to the courts. Simultaneously, family elders still play a role. In case of theft, injury or even a killing, they can step in and start negotiations abo ut compensation. If an agreement is reached between the elders of the perpetrator and the ones of the victim, the case is normally dropped by the police and/or the court and a compensation is paid to the family of the victim, which is notified officially by the local government (at least if the parties involved wish that). If a killing was intentional, the state does usually not accept to drop the case. In case of murder, normally a mandatory prison sentence of around 10 years is issued. The source added that inside Hargeisa, clan protection is not necessary, unless a person is involved in an active conflict and thus is a potential target in a revenge attack. Members of different patrilineal descent groups can go about their business, own property, buy land etc. without disturbance by others on clan basis.⁸⁷⁸ Another local source emphasised that generally, security in the city was stable. Even those from non-Isaaq groups feel secure in everyday life in Hargeisa. However, in conflict situations, clan-belonging usually becomes important. If a member from a group whose ‘clan-homeland’ (Somali: degaan) is in Hargeisa, clashes with a person who is an incomer originating from, e.g., the far east or far west of Somaliland, the local person has an advantage. He or she may have acquaintances and relatives in the police, in court or in other relevant positions. The source added that government institutions in Hargeisa do often not work effectively and they are also not neutral. Particularly courts were frequently prone to bribery and corruption. Additionally, and as a second way to defend one’s position in a conflict situation, a member of a subaltern group would have to mobilise his/her elders to support him/her. Yet, also in regulation procedures under customary law (Somali: xeer), the local groups in Hargeisa would still have an advantage over others.⁸⁷⁹ This is in accordance with the findings of Schlee, who mentioned in his discussion of conflict settlement among Somalis under customary law that ‘the outcome is largely determined by the differential in bargaining power.’⁸⁸⁰

3.4.2 Returnees, vulnerable groups

Regarding IDPs in Hargeisa, a local source mentioned that they live in several locations, one camp is in ‘Statehouse’ area. Many IDPs are from the region (Somaliland). Many are impoverished country-side dwellers/nomads who are Isaaq or from another dominant group in Somaliland. They get free space or housing; their survival is guaranteed by relatives who pay for food etc. or through donations from international or local NGOs. Some IDPs are from southern Somalia. They are dependent on humanitarian aid. Some also can work as construction workers, as watchmen or cleaners. In case of

876 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 12. July 2021

877 Osman, A. A., telephone interview, 12 July 2021

878 Osman, A. A., telephone interview, 12 July 2021

879 Yusuf, A. S., telephone interview, 12 July 2021

880 Schlee, G., Customary law and the joys of statelessness:idealised traditions versus Somali realities, 2013, url, p. 263

conflict, also these vulnerable groups form ‘defence units’ (Somali: gashambuur). They try to mobilise their own elders to negotiate with the elders of the other conflict party.⁸⁸¹

The same source adds that IDPs in Hargeisa are sometimes accused by the majority population to be behind crimes.⁸⁸² A recent example is reported with regard to refugees in Hargeisa who belong to the Oromo group. In July 2021, they demonstrated in the city, ‘saying that they were afraid to be deported [back to Ethiopia] because of rumours accusing Oromo to have abducted children from houses [in Hargeisa].’⁸⁸³ For more information on IDPs in Hargeisa, please see sections 3.1.2 Humanitarian situation overview, 3.2.3 Accessing and settling in the city and 3.3.2 Housing and shelter.

Returnees from the diaspora generally connect with their local relatives (predominantly from the Isaaq clan-family) to get re-integrated into the local society. Hoehne observed that also diaspora Somalis who have been away for decades, e.g. in Europe or North America, normally retain ties to their patrilineal descent groups and some (distanced) relatives on the ground. Upon return to Hargeisa, these relatives would prepare the ground and assist the returnee in the first weeks or even months to establish herself/himself. However, if a returnee would be problem-loaden, e.g. mentally ill, a drug addict or ‘penniless’, kinship solidarity could be short-lived. Some relatives might offer a place to stay and some food, but eventually, it is expected that returnees fend for themselves. Those returnees persistently violating basic cultural or religious norms are not tolerated; they have to reform themselves, otherwise they are excluded from family solidarity. Furthermore, those who have lived abroad, especially in the ‘global north’, for a longer time are expected to bring back economic and other resources and invest back home. Those who cannot do so are looked down upon and mocked by local relatives and others.⁸⁸⁴

Vulnerable groups in Hargeisa are, besides IDPs, minority groups. Minorities residing in Hargeisa are mainly occupational minorities belonging to the Gabooye collective (consisting of Madhibaan and Muse Diriye) and also Yibir and Tumal (for more information on this groups, please see section 4.1 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Targeted profiles). They are marginalised regarding access to education and political and economic resources.⁸⁸⁵

881 Yusuf, A. S., telephone interview, 12 July 2021

882 Yusuf, A. S., telephone interview, 12 July 2021

883 VOA Somali, Itoobiyaanka ku nool Hargeysa oo maanta dibad-bax dhigay [Ethiopians living in Hargeysa made a demonstration today], 11 July 2021, url

884 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 12. July 2021

885 Vitturini, E., The Gaboye of Somaliland: transformations and historical continuities of the labour exploitation and marginalisation of hereditary groups of occupational specialists, 2020, p. 474; Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia: Clans und Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, url, pp. 14-17