Med hänsyn till vårt urval kan vi inte dra några generella slutsatser för hela populationen.
Studien undersöker endast övergångseffekten till följd av IFRS 9 och vi kan därför inte
uttala oss om huruvida IFRS 9 leder till en bättre redovisning eller inte. Övergången
förändrar inte tillgångarnas ekonomiska underliggande värde, utan endast redovisningen.
Därav hade det varit intressant att undersöka om ECL metoden bidrar till en bättre
uppskattning av kreditförluster samt om opportunistisk beteende förekommer i större eller
mindre utsträckning under IFRS 9 än IAS 39. Ett annat uppslag är att undersöka hur
införandet av IFRS 9 påverkar onoterade banker eller huruvida nationell kontext påverkar
övergångseffekten.
Referenser
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ändring av förordning (EU) nr 648/2012 (EUT L 176/1, 27.6.2013, s. 64)
EUROPAPARLAMENTETS OCH RÅDETS DIREKTIV 2013/36/EU av den 26 juni
2013 om behörighet att utöva verksamhet i kreditinstitut och om tillsyn av kreditinstitut
och värdepappersföretag, om ändring av direktiv 2002/87/EG och om upphävande av
direktiv 2006/48/EG och 2006/49/EG (EUT L 176/338, 27.6.2013)
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L345, ss. 27-33. Bryssel: Europeiska Unionen. Tillgänglig:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/SV/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2017:345:FULL&from=EN
[Hämtad 2018-04-04]
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i
Bilaga 1.
Index Variabel Förklaring
Audit Index by Barth m.fl. (2006). Range 0-7. Questions: Is an external audit a compulsory obligation for banks? Are specific requirements for the extent or nature of the audit spelled out? Are auditors licensed or certified? Do supervisors get a copy of the auditor's report? Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? Yes = 1 and No = 0
Capital Index by Barth m.fl. (2006). Range 0-7. Questions: Is this ratio risk weighted in line with the Basle guidelines? Yes = 1 and No = 0. Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of an individual bank's credit risk? Yes= 1 and No = 0. Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? Yes= 1 and No = 0. What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of Capital? (answer < 0,75 = 1). Market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? Yes= 1 and No = 0. Unrealized losses in securities portfolios? Unrealized foreign exchange losses? Yes= 1 and No = 0.
Official Index by Barth m.fl. (2006). Range 0-27. Questions: Are the sources of funds to be used as Capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? Yes=1, No =0. Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of Capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities? Yes=0, No =1. Can initial disbursement of Capital be done with borrowed funds? Yes=0, No =1. Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? Yes=1, No =0. Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? Yes=1, No =0. Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to distribute: Dividends? Yes=1, No =0. Bonuses? Yes=1, No =0. Management fees? Yes=1, No =0. Who can legally declare - such that this declaration supersedes some of the rights of shareholders - that a bank is insolvent: Bank supervisors? Yes=1, No =0. Deposit insurance agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. Bank restructuring or Asset Management Agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. According to the Banking Law, who has authority to intervene - that is, suspend some or all ownership rights - a problem bank: Bank supervisor? Yes=1, No =0. Deposit insurance agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. Bank restructuring or Asset Management Agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency supersede shareholder rights: Bank supervisor? Yes=1, No =0. Deposit insurance agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. Bank restructuring or Asset Management Agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency - Remove and replace management: Bank supervisor? Yes=1, No =0. Deposit insurance agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. Bank restructuring or Asset Management Agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency - Remove and replace directors: Bank supervisor? Yes=1, No =0. Deposit insurance agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. Bank restructuring or Asset Management Agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency: Forbear certain prudential regulations: Bank supervisor? Yes=1, No =0. Bank restructuring or Asset Management Agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. Deposit insurance agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency: Insure liabilities beyond any explicit deposit insurance scheme: Bank supervisor? Yes=1, No =0. Deposit insurance agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. Bank restructuring or Asset Management Agency? Yes=0,5, No =0. Are auditors licensed or certified? Yes=1, No =0. Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? Yes=1, No =0. Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? Yes=1, No =0. Has legal action been taken against an auditor in the last 5 years? Yes=1, No =0. Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? Yes=1, No =0.
ii
Index för Tillsyn
Land Official Audit Capital Tillsyn
Belgien 12 7 4 23 Bulgarien 14 7 4 25 Cypern 9 5 4 18 Danmark 10 7 7 24 Estland 17 7 1 25 Finland 7 6 4 17 Frankrike 8 7 2 17 Grekland 14 7 3 24 Irland 14 6 3 23 Italien 10 5 3 18 Kroatien 16 7 2 25 Liechtenstein 13 7 7 27 Litauen 13,5 5 4 22,5 Malta 18 6 3 27 Nederländerna 8 7 3 18 Norge 10 7 3 20 Polen 11 6 5 22 Portugal 16 7 5 28 Rumänien 12 5 1 18 Schweiz 17 7 4 28 Slovakien 17 7 5 29 Spanien 14 5 7 26 Storbritannien 14 7 5 26 Sverige 10 6 2 18 Tjeckien 11 5 5 21 Tyskland 12 6 5 23 Ungern 17,5 7 2 26,5 Österrike 17 7 6 30