Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, I have discussed the theoretical building blocks that align with my research questions which revolve around policy formulation, implementation and motivations. This chapter has focused on the following concepts: 1. institutional logics, 2. bounded rationality, 3. street level bureaucracy, 4. the principal-agent model, 5. historical institutionalism and 6.

drivers of international STI cooperation.

The theoretical building blocks enrich our understanding of a complex phenomenon such as internationalization of science, technology and innovation.

Internationalization which is part of research and innovation policy has emerged as a tool to strengthen science and technology capabilities of countries through international STI cooperation or through scientific mobility. As such, internationalization highlights relations among countries. Thus, internationalization as a tool and an element in research and innovation policy emphasizes relationships among the individuals that fund, design and participate in science, technology and innovation. The selected building blocks provides us with lenses through which we can view internationalization as a practice, as a tool and as an evolving phenomenon in R&I policy.

The theoretical building blocks presented here are different but their different focus share a common characteristic. All of six building blocks are oriented toward the understanding of the internationalization of science, technology and innovation and STI cooperation as actor-driven practices. These theoretical concepts are in some ways interconnected and given that this study revolves

around rationales, implementation of decisions and interpretations of internationalization, all six are relevant and useful.

The institutional logics concept is utilized as a tool for understanding and analyzing actors’ motivations for designing STI programs and how the logic of the government and of research practitioners may differ and overlap. For instance, policy actors may either steer decision making processes in a preferred direction or their actions may be consistent with their agency’s objectives. The latter implies that individuals might be influenced by the broader institutional logics of their organizations. The historical institutionalism literature highlights not only historical perspectives but also the role of institutions and how the behavior and actions of actors are shaped by the institutions in which they are part. The intent here is not to apply institutionalist perspective in order to highlight the central role of institutions as I take it for granted that they matter too. Institutions can determine policy processes and outcomes by influencing policy actors’ behaviors, intentions and actions. After all, “an institution can only exist if people have particular and related beliefs and mental attitudes (Hodgson 2006, p. 4; Searle, 2005). An institutionalist perspective is adopted because it sheds light on behaviors, intentions, ambitions and motivations of different actors. Therefore, by applying a historical institutional approach, the purpose is to examine policy actors and academic practitioners and companies as catalyzers of internationalization but also as actors shaped by the logics of their educational and governmental institutions. These logics often reflect dualism:

the logic of competition, normally seen in the business arena and the logic of cooperation in research. Certainly, competition is also a feature of academic life.

The bounded rationality concept is adopted here not to demonstrate relational processes as the principal-agent model but to demonstrate the limitations of actions instead of the expansion of actions. The concept brings attention to the deviations from rationalist assumptions in the policy making context. It is not so uncommon that a number of factors might hinder individuals’ actions when trying to act rationally. Limited access to information can impact individuals’

actions or/and decisions. Additional factors hindering rational choices might include time pressure or the need to quickly respond to domestic or international circumstances. Given the above-mentioned factors, policy actors might employ policy solutions that are satisfactory only instead of optimal.

When constrained by multiple factors, actors might change their implementation strategy and make a decision or design a program based on pragmatism and objectivity. In this context, different logics (e.g. the logic of

allocating funding to particular programs) and implementation styles and approaches (e.g. pragmatism, objectivity) might influence the design of programs in science, technology and innovation and internationalization.

Government officers are faced with multiple challenges in the policy arena. One challenge is to mediate between external pressures/international trends and internal demands to abide by certain logics of individuals’ institutions as for example the continuity of traditional policy decision models. Adding to this complexity, funding agency officers, who at times act as street level bureaucrats, bridge different interests and goals (e.g. the government and researchers). They also coordinate, manage and design government programs that promote science, technology development and innovation.

The principal-agent model is utilized in this context because it sheds light on the complex relationships and interactions that characterize the context of some of the STI cooperation programs I examine. Scholarly studies on the principal-agent relation focus on the issues emerging from contractual agreements and social exchange between principal and agent. This thesis does not focus on the formal and contractual agreements among participants. Instead, I use the principal-agent model to highlight the opposite.

Finally, this chapter aims to examine the interplay between the macro level (ministries), the locus of policy making, with tendencies at the meso (funding agencies) and micro levels (research organizations and companies). This interplay is one of the core elements in my analysis. Furthermore, it is in the meso level, where molded by sense making, influenced by institutional logics and bounded by multiple factors, that implementing actors, who are also agents from the perspective of the P-A model, interpret and implement political goals and serve as experts. These implementing actors, who at times act as street-level bureaucrats, exercise power and freedom to act. However, this freedom is not absolute because these actors are constrained by the responsibilities entrusted to them and by the resources available to them which often limit their actions.

Furthermore, the two levels – macro and meso – coexist and are embedded in relative institutional stability. However, eventually external forces break the continuation of established structures. Thus, personal and political interests, the need for change, policy experimentation and global events steer policy actors in different directions. Timing and immediate responses to national and international events influence the actions of policy actors. As street-level

bureaucrats, from the agent side of the principal-agent relation, funders have the choice, the ability and the possibility of altering the implementation of decisions or the design of programs on the basis of their expertise, beliefs, interests and pragmatic behavior. The need to fulfill policy goals is an example of a practical and pragmatic decision. The nostalgic view of street level bureaucrats as individuals who merely act in accordance with top-down instructions seems far-fetched.

As Hall points out, some institutions and actors may facilitate rather than hinder policy change. And while we tend to think of institutions as stable and resistant to change, institutions can also encourage innovation (Steinmo et al., 1992).

This innovation can also take place in policy making, what I refer to as policy experimentation. Also, although policies tend to be ‘sticky’ and durable, they are not immune to global trends, to pressures from different actors in society, to political interests and to economic goals. This thesis emphasizes the possibility of choices actors have when designing and launching new international or domestic initiatives. These choices are also affected by the same institutions of which these actors are part.

Table 2 Summary of theoretical concepts

Theoretical concepts Description Practical application

Institutional Logics A framework to gain a better understanding of how organizations and individuals act within the policy process (Friedland & Alford, 1991;

Thornton, 2002).

To gain a better understanding of actors in their institutions and how their logics and motivations are related.

Bounded Rationality Multiple factors bound individuals’ decisions: time constraints, limited information and interpretation of data (Simon, 1947; 1979).

Sheds light on individuals’

behavior and actions (e.g.

satisfactory solutions to policy issues instead of optimal).

Street level bureaucracy Street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010) are not only tasked with implementing public policy, they shape it as front-line actors who deliver services to the public.

Aids in the understanding of alignment of policy goals and implementation of decisions with practices at the “street level,”

where policies are implemented and research is carried out.

Principal-Agent A relationship based on a social exchange between two parties (Braun, 1993; Braun & Guston, 2003).

Interaction based on the expectation of mutual benefits and incentives; The concept sheds light on the issue of dependency-driven behavior and how this behavior drives governments’

rationales to promote STI cooperation.

Historical Institutionalism Steinmo et al. (1992) argue that institutions can influence the formation of preferences by political actors – endogeneity of preferences.

Historical institutionalism provides insights to the question of policy preferences and factors shaping policy outcomes. New national and international circumstances can influence processes rooted in conventional beliefs.

Drivers of STI internationalization

It encompasses different rationales for promoting international activities in science, technology and innovation.

STI internationalization is often coupled with other goals (e.g.

economic and political). Science and technology agreements are forged to improve diplomatic relations.