Can Sectarianism Explain Soft Power Support in Proxy
Conflicts?
Andreas Instebø Jamne
Master's Thesis
Spring 2021
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University
Supervisor: Magnus Öberg
Acknowledgments
Firstly, I want to say thank you to my supervisor Magnus Öberg who has shared his advice and wise insights into the research process. His input has calmly steered me through moments of concern. Further, I am grateful for Dr Ibrahim Fraihat who took me on board during the pandemic and stimulated my interest in proxy conflicts in the Middle East.
Admittedly, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused challenges of isolation and distress during the work of this thesis. As such, completing this thesis would not have been possible without the vast support from those around me. I want to express my gratitude to Nick and Martin for valuable discussions and detailed feedback, and to Erling for his understanding after our numerous cancelled plans. A big thanks to André, Muyi, Lars, and the rest of the crew for keeping me updated with life in Uppsala whilst my year in exile.
Thank you Silje for your boundless support every single day and for pushing me into pursuing this degree, for that, I am forever grateful. The fact that you still endure my endless talk of war and conflict is simply impressive. Additionally, I want to thank my family, friends, and cat(s) for support during times of isolation.
Lastly, the greatest appreciation goes to my mother, Marianne, for unquestioned support throughout my life. I also hope my father sends his approval from above.
Abstract
Proxy conflict seems to be on the rise as the contemporary form of armed conflict, particularly manifesting itself in the Middle East and North Africa. While proxy conflicts enjoy increased attention in academia, little research has focused on the type of support a sponsor provides to its proxy. This thesis contributes to the literature by asking under what circumstances does sponsor provide soft power support to proxies in proxy conflict? I employ a qualitative most-similar case design of Iran’s support to the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) and its military wing the Badr organization in Iraq, as well as United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) support to General Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in Libya. The theoretical argument posits that mobilized sectarian bonds between sponsor and proxy facilitate a trust that induce the sponsor to provide soft power support in addition to the baseline support of hard power. The empirical findings give mixed support for the argument, as both sponsors provided soft power support, albeit at somewhat various degrees. Notably, Iran mobilized deeper and broader amongst the organizational structure of the proxy and its followers, while UAE arguably only engaged with Haftar as a strong leader but less so with NLA as an organization and its followers. Therefore, there seems to a difference in how the two sponsors penetrated their mobilization of proxies.
Keywords: Sectarianism, proxy conflict, trust, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Libya, soft
Table of contents
1. Introduction ... 7
2. Previous Research... 10
2.1 Proxy Conflict ... 10
2.2 Soft Power Support ... 12
2.3 Sectarianism and Mobilization of Sectarian Bonds ... 13
2.4 The Gap ... 14
3. Dynamics of Proxy War ... 15
3.1 Civil or Proxy? ... 16
3.2 Strategies of Proxy Conflict ... 16
3.3 The Relationship ... 17
4. Theoretical Framework ... 18
4.1 Independent Variable: Mobilized Sectarian Bonds ... 18
4.2 Mechanism: Trust ... 20
4.3 Dependent Variable: Soft Power Support ... 21
4.4 Hypothesis ... 22 5. Research Design ... 22 5.1 Method ... 22 5.2 Case Selection... 23 5.3 Data ... 24 5.4 Case Studies ... 24 5.5 Operationalization ... 25
5.6 Data Collection & Time Horizon ... 30
6. Empirics ... 31
6.1 Case A: Iran – Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution and Badr ... 31
6.2 Case B: United Arab Emirates – General Haftar and the Libyan National Army ... 41
6.2 Summary of Findings ... 49
7. Comparative Analysis ... 50
7.1 Mobilization ... 50
7.2 Soft Power Support ... 51
7.3 Trust ... 53
7.4 Support for Hypothesis ... 55
7.5 Alternative Explanations ... 56
7.6 Modifying Theory ... 57
7.7 Limitations ... 58
8. Concluding remarks ... 59
List of Abbreviations
GNA Government of National Accord GNC General National Congress HoR House of Representatives
IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ISCI Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant LNA Libyan National Army
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization SCIRI Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution UAE United Arab Emirates
UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States of America
List of Figures and Tables
Figure 1. Conceptual framework of proxy-sponsor relations………...12
Figure 2. Theoretical framework……….18
Table 1. Overview of terms………19
Table 2. Framework of most similar case design…..….………..…..…...23
Table 3. Case selection and control variables...………..……..……25
Table 4. Indicators for independent variable……….……..……26
Table 5. Empirical manifestations of soft power support..………..……27
Table 6. Indicators for dependent variable...……….………..……28
Table 7. Indicators for causal mechanism……….………….……….………30
Table 8. Evidence on independent variable case Iran-SCIRI/Badr……….34
Table 9. Evidence on dependent variable case Iran-SCIRI/Badr………38
Table 10. Evidence on causal mechanism case Iran-SCIRI/Badr………40
Table 11. Evidence on independent variable case UAE-Haftar and NLA……...…44
Table 12. Evidence on dependent variable case UAE-Haftar and NLA………...…47
Table 13. Evidence on causal mechanism case UAE-Haftar and NLA………...….49
1. Introduction
“… understanding an external state’s mobilisation of militias is important for the study of international relations as it represents a form of interstate conflict, albeit indirect. Accordingly, in order to understand interstate conflicts,
it is equally important to understand external support for the actors involved”. (Salehyan et al, 2011, p.710)
Contemporary conflict has changed. It has moved away from the model of total war and has embraced asymmetry, low intensity, and anonymity (Rauta, 2014). Out of the “10 conflicts to watch in 2020” list conducted by the International Crisis Group (2020), seven of them are to some degree affected by proxy war dynamics: Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Israel-Iran, Libya, Kashmir, Ukraine, and Yemen. Understood as a conflict where external actors support intermediate domestic actors in a conflict with the intention of targeting a third-party actor, proxy conflict is characterised by an indirect nature. In recent decades, the term ‘proxy conflict’ has received increased attention amongst journalists, policymakers, and academia (Sozer, 2016). While no new phenomenon per se, proxy dynamics has recently been lifted as the contemporary manifestation of armed conflict. According to Moghadam and Wyss (2018), the support of proxies in warfare is so widespread that proxy conflict seems to be the prevalent mode of war in the 21st century. Echoing this, Rauta (2020b) says that in the same way sub-state violence caught the attention of policy-makers post-Cold War, proxy wars are now a core feature of contemporary strategic security environment. Numerous factors incentivise actors to engage an opponent indirectly – through proxy - as opposed to directly. It is less costly, avoids forced escalation, and reduces international sanctions and exclusion through plausible deniability. However, such proxy dynamics are not exclusively associated with violence and war, but also includes components of soft power, that is, the ability to gain influence and power without turning to coercive means. Whereas the literature has explored proxy conflict as a phenomenon, it has less so investigated the determinants for the type of support that a sponsor – the external actor - provides to its proxy. Deriving from this puzzle, I ask the research question under what circumstances does sponsor provide soft power support to proxies in proxy conflict?
Since the topic under scrutiny is armed conflict, the minimum form of support provided to a proxy may be labelled as ‘hard power’, e.g., the provision of arms, intelligence, logistics and such. Hard power holds coercive power in that it forces the opponent to do what it does not want to. Yet, proxy-relationships solely based on sharing a mutual enemy and the willingness to fight this enemy through coercive means are bound to fade as mutual interests are exceeded by self-interest as time passes and the conflict dynamics are altered. Political visions of the future may diverge as soon as the proxy has gained strength, a commitment problem so to speak. Hence, why would a sponsor support its proxy with soft power support, providing the proxy with political capacity and legitimacy, organizational, and communicative support, if historical indicators suggest that the relationship will fade with time?
When a country experiences armed conflict, its ability to exercise power within its borders decreases as institutions weakens and the security apparatus is kept occupied resulting in a power vacuum. A proxy with growing soft power capabilities can attempt to fill this vacuum and subsequently secure a strong position in the long-term political landscape. If a sponsor were to mobilize a link between the groups that would not fade with time, a link that would cement their relationship, this would ease the sponsor’s wariness of supporting its proxy. I argue that some sponsors additionally provide ‘soft power’ support upon identifying a trustable proxy that they can support and develop into an entity with legitimate power along with political, social, and communicative means. The theoretical argument suggests that if the country hosting the proxy war experiences sectarianism and the sponsor and mobilizes its shared sectarian bond with the proxy, this will facilitate a link of trust which could ensure loyalty from the proxy. In other words, external states capitalize on their religiously and ideological appeal by reaching out to communities with which it shares such sectarian identity in societies experiencing armed conflict. If the proxy can acquire political influence in its host country and the sectarian bonds facilitate loyalty and trust towards the sponsor, the latter will have achieved regional influence through soft power and thus without turning to coercion for the same level of influence. Therefore, the contribution of this study is to highlight how sectarianism and proxy conflict are connected, and how states capitalize on their religious appeal in mobilizing foreign proxies.
The suggested hypothesis in this paper is as follows: Mobilized sectarian bonds between a sponsor and proxy in proxy conflict will be positively correlated with the provision of soft-power type of support from the sponsor to the proxy.
I address this query by drawing on a qualitative in-depth approach which allows me to explore the proposed causal mechanism and observe its interaction with mobilized sectarian bonds and soft
power support. To test the hypothesis, I investigate two case studies in a most similar case design, namely Iran’s support to the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) and its military wing the Badr1 organization in Iraq, as well as United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) support to General Haftar
and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in Libya. The unit of analysis is thus the dyadic relationship between sponsor and proxy.
Both UAE and Iran supported their proxies along the soft power spectrum. The variation in soft power support was not distinctively high, but nevertheless fragmented when it comes to the type of soft power provided. Iran provided its sectarian proxy with more extensive political and organizational support, and while UAE also provided broad support to its non-sectarian proxy, this seemed to be less explicit and intense. I, therefore, find mixed support for the hypothesis. Another finding is that Iran mobilized loyalty and trust throughout the proxy’s organization and its followers, while UAE seemed to trust General Haftar as a strongman-leader but had less engagement with the LNA as a whole and its constituents. Therefore, from the cases studied, mobilized sectarian bonds may be argued to facilitate a broader more extensive trust, while non-sectarian bonds may lead to a trust specific to individual leadership. I begin the next section with a clarification on the definition of proxy conflict before I dive into a literature review on soft power support and sectarianism. From thereon I highlight a gap in the literature, followed by an elaboration on various aspects of proxy conflict, as it is crucial to inform the reader of its conceptual nuance.
Thereafter I present the theoretical argument by diving into the proposed causal chain before I discuss the research design. Following this, I present the two empirical case studies. Lastly, I consider the results in light of the empirics and supplement with a note on alternative explanations and additional observations that should be merged into a modified theoretical argument.
2. Previous Research
In this section I will highlight key literature on the topics that constitute this paper. As I ask the question “under what circumstances do sponsors provide soft power support in proxy conflict?”, I will dive into the elements that comprise this query, namely the sponsor, the support, and proxy conflict. In addition, I discuss sectarianism as a concept, as this forms the basis for my independent variable – mobilized sectarian bonds.
2.1 Proxy Conflict
While proxy conflict has received recent increased attention in recent years (Sozer, 2016), it is still a concept and term that is less known and understood amongst students outside this topic. It may therefore be useful to dive into the matter of definition early on. There have been various attempts over time to define proxy conflict as a concept. Generations of proxy conflict research have developed through key paradigms such as the Cold War, the aftermath of 9/11 and the Arab Spring, and lastly through the proxy dynamics of recent civil wars in Syria, Yemen and Libya (Rauta, 2020a). Originating from the Cold-War dynamics, Bar-Siman Tov (1984) emphasised the role of global superpowers substituting direct confrontation with support to regional actors. Deutsch (1964, in Rauta, 2020a) had previously added that the confrontation is fought on the soil of a third country, disguised as a domestic issue of that country and that the outside actors use this country’s manpower, resources and territory to pursue their own foreign policy goals. Mumford (2013) provides a more basic definition of proxy conflict as the “direct engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome”. Contemporary proxy conflict need not include superpowers per se, but the essence is rather that an actor originally outside of a conflict decides to intervene in order to reach a foreign policy goal through an intermediate actor, also known as a proxy. So, whilst Mumford emphasises direct engagement, it is less relevant whether the engagement itself is direct or indirect since the fighting takes place through said intermediate actor. The real target becomes the ultimate goal, while the domestic target becomes the instrumental goal. However, such instrumental and ultimate goals could overlap as the sponsor could aspire to reach both goals. Further, core literature on proxy dynamics tend to refer to proxy war, however, I utilise proxy conflict, as such conflicts could vary from low-intensity armed conflicts to an outright war between states (Abbink, 2003). Hence, proxy dynamics are not restricted to high-intensity wars. In tying these proposed definitions and aspects together, this paper understands proxy conflict along the following characteristics: Proxy conflict requires a minimum of three actors: (1) Outside actor A engaging in a conflict in country B through (2) domestic actor C, which serves as an indirect substitute for gaining foreign policy goals vis-à-vis (3) opposing actor D.
• Outside actor A is termed a sponsor2.
Domestic actor C is termed a proxy. Opposing actor D is termed a target.
• Outside actor A may engage in conflict directly and indirectly.
• The target need not be targeted directly but could be targeted through their sphere of influence or through an additional proxy.
• The end-goal of the proxy may be a means to an end for the sponsor. Therefore, sponsor and proxy may aim for a shared goal, however, such goal could be ultimate for the proxy, but only instrumental for the sponsor which has an ultimate goal of striking the target. • The battlefield is not destined to take place in a certain country, it may be both in the
countries of the sponsor and target, but more often it will be in the country of origin for the proxy, that is, a third-party country.
• The conflict in country B is not a unique product of proxy dynamics, but a civil conflict in its origin. The conflict will follow the UCDP (UCDP, NA) definition of armed conflict, i.e., minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per calendar year.
• The proxy is not the internationally recognized government in its country but could be an opposing self-proclaimed government, militias, rebel groups, and other non-state actors.
2 This thesis limits the sponsors to state-actors only, as a state has arguably more resources it can invest in conflict which should have greater implications, as we know that external support to belligerents in civil wars and political violence will raise the lethality rate, duration, and likelihood of conflict relapse (Moghadam and Wyss, 2020)
Figure 1. Conceptual framework of proxy-sponsor relations
2.2. Soft Power Support
The form of support that a sponsor may provide to its proxy is no stranger to current literature, see for example Juneau 2016; Mumford 2013; Byman 2018; Salehyan 2008; Gause, 2014; Rauta, 2020a, 2020b. However, as discussed, this paper employs the provision of hard power support as a minimum baseline, and thus only investigate the variation in soft power support. Though the label ‘soft power’ in a proxy conflict context is somewhat new, as the literature has suggested various labels in their categorizations of support3. I employ a coercive versus non-coercive category
of hard power and soft power. ‘Hard power’ describes any type of support that is coercive in nature or contributes to a coercive approach. Arguably my categorization is logical considering the theoretical argument of this paper, which will be elaborated in section 4, that sponsor does not necessarily engage proxies in conflict only to win the conflict through the use of violence, but just as much to position themselves for increased political influence in the future. Thus, there is a need
3 See Högbladh, Petterson, and Themnèr, 2011; Erstad, 2018; Forrest 2009 for discussion on various categorizations of support.
Country/
Conflict B
Opposing
actor D
-Target
Domestic
actor C
-Proxy
Outside
actor A
- Sponsor
Goal
Instrumental Ultimate Ultimateto broaden the definition to also include various types of behaviour from the sponsor that are not always constituted as direct support but is an act that nevertheless grants the proxy indirect support. But what does the literature say about the concept of ‘soft power’? Joseph Nye (2017) states that power is the ability to affect others to reach the outcomes one prefers, and this can be accomplished through coercion, payment, or attraction and persuasion. Soft power more specifically refers to the latter means of power, namely, to obtain said preferred outcomes by attraction and persuasion rather than coercion and payment (ibid). The ability to control others is often associated with possession of a certain resource, for example, population, territory, natural resource, and military and economic size (Nye, 1990). While military force remains the ultimate form of power in a self-help system, the use of force has become more costly for modern great powers than it was in earlier times (ibid). Power is not necessarily solely fighting your opponent militarily, as this is less sustainable and internationally accepted. One could argue that contemporary power lies in coping militarily while expanding political legitimacy. A society that experiences proxy conflict is less able to govern itself, opening up a vacuum for sub-state actors to fill. Such actors could seek foreign support to fill this vacuum, and sponsors may provide such sub-state actors with political support to become key players and subsequently have a major role in re-building the war-affected society. For example, militias often provide social services and infrastructure to local populations (Thurber, 2014), and by doing so they can undermine the social contract between the population and the state, which is a core aspect of state legitimacy (Grynkewich, 2008). Indeed, soft power requires a voluntary and positive attitudinal or behaviour change either by the ruling elite or the population in the affected country (Ciftci and Tezcur, 2015).
2.3 Sectarianism and the Mobilization of Sectarian Bonds
This paper employs the mobilization of sectarian bonds between sponsor and proxy as the independent variable. However, for such mobilization to be possible, it is a precondition that the proxy’s context is experiencing sectarianism. Therefore, I now turn to explain what sectarianism is and what the literature says about the sectarian mobilization of proxies.
Sectarianism is a derogatory term used to describe the “other” rather than “us”, a narrative that emphasises the role of religion and sect, rather than for example politics (Dixon, 2018). Sectarianism is thus referring to a society in which religious organizations have split apart into competing fragments in combination with social factors that maintain this separateness of each group (Rosario and Dorsey, 2016). Hence, it is the fragmentation and division of a society that is a key characteristic, even though within each camp or group there may grow social cohesion. It may also be considered as when ethnic or religious identity is politicized, and such sectarian identity
impacts the structure of politics in its context (Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 2012, in ibid).
This thesis will understand sectarianism as a condition in a society where religious identity is divided along a social-religious cleavage and steers the allocation of rights, resources, political opportunities, loyalty, and to some degree security. It is true that a society may be divided by such a cleavage on ethnic or tribal grounds, however, the religious affiliation has an arguably greater potential for transnational mobilization, as religion spans further beyond borders than ethnicity and tribal loyalties do, leaving less room for external actors to mobilize along such ethnic-tribal cleavage. Wood (2014, p.257) agrees to this by stating that “transnational mobilisation of allies is more likely in the case of conflicts along the lines of a religious cleavage than where that cleavage is absent.”. Rabi and Mueller (2018) add that such a cleavage need not be characterised as exclusively extreme theological views to be considered sectarian, but that the cleavage describes distinct religious groups that are internally bound together by bonds of shared historical ‘memories’ and cultural traditions. However, where sectarianism may be considered a condition in society, sectarianization is considered the process both leading up to it and the utilization of it. Sectarianization is the process of pursuing political goals that involve the mobilization of popular sentiments around particular identity markers (Hashemi and Postel, 2017). Mobilization, Tilly and Tarrow (2015) says, is the increase of resources available to an actor for the collective making of claims. This thesis accepts an instrumentalist4 view on sectarianism, in which entrepreneurs
capitalize upon identities to further social and political gains, both domestically and externally. Such entrepreneurs are actors who encourage people to participate in collective action and has an essential role in the mobilization of resources (Della Porta and Diani, 2006), referred to as sectarian entrepreneurs (Mabon, 2019). There may be various reasons for tapping into to such identities, for example, to consolidate political stability, competition over scarce resources, or ultimately survival (Hashemi and Postel, 2017). Al-Rasheed (2017) argues that sectarianism is a modern political phenomenon deriving from ruling elites – entrepreneurs – who invoke and manipulate sectarian identities into securing loyalty from certain groups in the population, all with the intent of consolidating their own rule.
2.4 The Gap
Proxy conflict and sectarianism are often co-observed (Crepy, 2018). A puzzle that seems unanswered in the literature is whether sponsors act differently in sectarian versus non-sectarian
4 See Mabon (2019) and Hinnebusch (2016, in Valbjørn and Hinnebusch, 2019) for an elaborate discussion various schools of thought on sectarianism and mobilization of identities.
proxy conflicts. What leads sponsors in proxy wars to extend support from not only hard-power means but also to provide the support that can be labelled as soft power? Whereas sectarianism may not explain the provision of support itself, it may play a role in deciding when to move beyond the baseline support of hard power to provide soft power type of support that ultimately will strengthen a proxy. Few have examined the role that external powers play in mobilizing proxies. But globalization and technological development has paved the way for political actors to engage in transnational mobilization and to build movements across state boundaries (Erstad, 2018). Moghadam and Wyss (2020) argue that states primarily support their non-state proxies militarily rather than politically. However, current research has failed to explore the determinants for the varying types of support a state can provide to its proxy. The problem that many sponsors faces is what Fox (2019) describes as “Proxy relationships will expire”. Fox suggested that any sponsor must identify its own termination criteria and transition plan for whenever the sponsor and the proxy find themselves in divergent trajectories for the future. Indeed, the sponsor cannot know for certain whether the proxy will take actions that are not consistent with the preferences of the sponsor. One argument is that the initial common interest will fade away as this interest is achieved, leading to self-interest exceeding the common interest (Fox, 2019). Thus, the proxy follows its own strategies, and could in the future turn against the strategic aims of the sponsor whenever their strength and capacity has increased sufficiently. This situation mimics the ‘commitment problem’ (Svensson, 2007) that is often observed in the field of conflict resolution, where one actor cannot be sure whether it can trust its opponent whenever signing a peace agreement or a ceasefire, as the opponent may use the new deal to regain strength only to strike again. Therefore, it is logical that a sponsor in proxy conflict does not want to support its proxy with the means to strengthen its capacity to a degree where it becomes a future potential rival. The sponsor and proxy could share an enemy, but they are not friends for the future. Then, if it is logical to avoid strengthening your proxy for the long haul, why do some sponsors do it anyway? Thus, the observed gap in the literature constitutes of what decides sponsors form of support to its proxies when facing the idea that their partnership is likely to expire at a given time. Based on this gap, this thesis asks the question under what circumstances does sponsors provide soft power support to their proxies in proxy conflict? Before diving into this question, it may be useful to further elaborate on some of the nuances that come with the topic proxy conflict.
3. Dynamics of Proxy War
In this section I will explore the conceptualization of proxy war, clarifying how this paper understand this growing yet not uniquely new notion. Proxy wars share many characteristics with civil war, and a proxy relationship may resemble that of a formal alliance, however, what follows is a discussion on such key aspects of proxy war, arguing for its conceptual distinctiveness.
3.1 Civil or Proxy?
Whereas Deutsch (1964, in Rauta, 2020a) previously stated that proxy war is an international conflict disguised as domestic conflict, such a definition diminishes the role of agency amongst local actors. What may be seen from the outside and inwards as belligerents being puppeteered for the purpose of a regional conflict, may also have a local dynamic that precedes any involvement from outside actors. Gaston and Ollivant (2019) states in their research on proxy conflicts that local actors’ domestic agency often supersedes the idea of external influence when motivating their actions. Therefore, it may be challenging to label whether a conflict is first and foremost a local civil war or a proxy war. It can be argued that empirically both are present. Even though the sponsors and proxies share a goal that overlaps, this does not remove the local agency of the proxies. Said proxies may have their own particular agenda which is deeply embedded in their own domestic contexts (Gause, 2014). A proxy conflict may therefore be described as a conflict where the goals and spheres of involvement of both domestic and external actors overlap, thus a conflict could simultaneously hold characteristics of local civil conflict and proxy conflict dynamics.
3.2 Strategies of Proxy Conflict
Engaging in proxy war is indeed a useful policy option to a state that is “...willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike” (Pope, in Rauta, 2020b). A realist approach to making alliances with a proxy is that states seek to establish or restore a balance of power and constrain threatening states, which may be done by working with the enemy of said threatening states (Waltz, 1979, quoted in Fuhrmann, 2009, p. 188). Engaging in proxy conflict is not necessarily about defeating the enemy per se, but it could also be about managing the enemy. For example, Rauta (2020b, or Mumford 2013??) refers to notions like coercion and coping as features of proxy war. A coercive approach entails forcing the opponent through offensive engagement into abandoning its own goals. Coping is more defensive in that it is a tool of managing an adversary, not necessarily defeat it. Thus, the aspired outcome is not necessarily a clear military win, but rather the prevention of a clear win for the opponent. The rationale for utilizing proxies in a conflict is likely to play a role in what kind of support the sponsor provides for its proxy. A coercive approach might entail a higher volume of
support or more hard power than soft power for instance. Coping with an adversary might indicate a destabilizing approach with less need for providing soft power in order to gain influence when the aim is to cope with the adversary’s influence. Regardless of the strategic rationale, there numerous incentives for the actor to engage in proxy war as opposed to other forms of more direct war. For example, the indirect nature of proxy war allows for ‘plausible deniability’ for the sponsor. Other incentives include reducing domestic audience costs as well as the risk of international sanctions (Moghadam and Wyss, 2020), acceptance amongst the local community through a local proxy, (Byman, 2018), it is financially cheaper than mobilizing a full army, and it allows the parties to test each other’s tolerance without leading to a forced escalation (ibid).
3.3 The Relationship
Most scholars agree that a sponsor-proxy relationship involves an asymmetrical distribution of power between two actors who are connected to each other (Adler, 2002 in Erstad, 2018)5. A
proxy-relationship may find itself along a spectrum where the ‘transactional model’ and the ‘exploitative model’ form the poles (Fox, 2019). The exploitative end of the spectrum consists of a strong sponsor looking for a tool to achieve its foreign policy goals and then employs the proxy which becomes dependent on the sponsor for its survival. The proxy does indeed receive benefits too, however, these are more contingent on acting upon the sponsor’s policy. Many analysts simplistically consider a proxy relationship as one where the proxy simply responds to the sponsor’s commands (Thurber, 2014). However, the transactional model on the other hand is where the proxy’s commitment to the sponsor is based on self-interest rather than survival. The proxy takes the lead, and the sponsor follows – with its support. Such a pragmatic approach is indeed vulnerable to external influence, that is, alternative sponsors that could offer support to the proxy with fewer caveats/contingent factors for providing the support. In such a partnership the sponsor takes a risk, as the relationship may be weakened if the proxy grows strong enough to stand on its own, gains power from other actors than the main sponsor, or meets the goals that it set out for when aligning with the sponsor (Fox, 2019). In other words, the common interest that the sponsor and proxy shared may fade away, and self-interested exceeds this previous common interest.
5 For a discussion on the inclusion/exclusion of state forces’ one-sided support to another state’s forces, see Fox 2019; Rauta 2021; Alaaldin et al 2019.
4. Theoretical Framework
The thesis asks the question under what conditions do sponsors provide soft power support in proxy conflict, and this section will suggest a theoretical argument that addresses this question. The theory posits that mobilized sectarian bonds facilitate a level of trust between the sponsor and the proxy, a trust that enables the sponsor to deem the proxy as a sustainable partner in the long term, and thus the sponsor provides soft power type of support to contribute to the proxy’s development and upscaling.
4.1 Independent Variable: Mobilized Sectarian Bonds
The first step in the causal chain is the sponsor’s mobilization of sectarian bonds with the proxy. Recall that sectarianism as a concept refers to a society where religious organizations split into competing fragments that in combination with other social factors uphold this separateness of each group (Visser, 2005 in Rosario and Dorsey 2016). When such societal cleavage arises, each camp is placed in a position of wanting to maximise its own goals and resources. It is true that there may be a degree of sectarianism and that each camp may still share overarching goals within their political structure, and that such common goals would exceed the sharp division between them. However, recall that this paper explores proxy conflict, and in armed conflict the political structures, distribution of resources, and perception of security are disrupted. Actors in a conflict seek resources, security, and political influence. That is where sectarianization comes in. Sectarian entrepreneurs need not be non-state actors or community leaders e.g., but could also be the state itself, which may feed into sectarian narratives in its society as a survival mechanism in the face of an increasing domestic opposition (Al-Rashidi, 2019). Turning to sectarianism could thus for
Sponsor
mobilize
sectarian
bonds
Proxy loyalty
Trust
Perceived sustainable partnership
Soft power
support
example serves as a counter-revolutionary strategy that exaggerates and politicise religious differences through discourse and practice in the hopes of diminishing the development of ‘national politics’ that crosses sectarian, regional, ideological and tribal boundaries which could have become a perceived threat to the sitting regime (Al-Rasheed, 2011). Such a strategy mimics the logic of the ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect where political leaders benefit from the widespread perception that the country is in times of crisis and subsequently the leader – or regime – receive public support as a way of coping with the threat (Mueller, 1970). Regimes first turn to sectarianization to expand control, and later that sectarian divide leads populations to support the regime belonging to their sect (Hashemi and Postel, 2017).
If we accept the instrumental view, sectarianization takes place through manipulating social and political dynamics with the potential strategic gain for the in-group - the instigator of sectarianization. However, the mere presence of domestic sectarianism in itself is not a convincing factor in explaining why an outside sponsor provides any specific type of support to a proxy. For an external sponsor to utilize this sectarian divide into a useful bond between the sponsor and the proxy, it needs to mobilize upon its sectarian bonds.
Label Description
Sectarianization Process
Sectarianism Condition
Sectarian bonds Dyad
A sectarian bond should be understood as the proxy and the sponsor sharing an affiliation with the same religious group, although it should be noted that there may be multiple levels and sub-sects within the same religious group. To mobilize and appeal to sectarian bonds with a proxy, the sponsor must frame and designate the out-group as an existential threat (Hashemi and Postel, 2017), also known as “othering theology” (Ghobadzdeh and Akbarzadeh, 2015), where public discourse emphasises an exclusivist approach to which group is in the right and who is in the wrong. The designated out-group would then be competing actors that hold a divergent sectarian identity. The sponsor interacts with the proxy in “...mobilizing and manipulating difference for their own interests” (Mabon, 2019). Della Porta and Diani (2006) adds that collective action cannot occur without the presence of a “we” that identifies common characteristics and a specific
solidarity. This produces an identity shift (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015) in which identities from different groups are merged and subsequently facilitate coordinated action. As several scholars have pointed out, sectarian and ideological overlap increases the probability that a proxy will remain loyal to its sponsor (Bapat, 2012; SadeghiBoroujerdi, 2017, in Erstad 2018). A feeling of solidarity and shared identity makes it easier for the involved actors to face risk and uncertainty (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). The sponsor’s ability to face risk and uncertainty towards the proxy may be solved through a sufficient level of trust between them.
4.2 Mechanism: Trust
Mayer and colleagues state that trust is the willingness to be vulnerable to another party based on the expectation that the party will perform the desired action, regardless of the trustor’s ability to monitor that party (Mayer et al, 1995 in Baer and Colquitt, 2018). Trust refers to the attitude which involves a willingness to place the fate of own interests under the control of others (Hoffman, 2002). Thus, trust is a perceived predictable pattern of behaviour between two actors, where one – or several – factors assure each actor that the other will not deviate from this pattern, despite the possibility that other factors may induce such deviation. In other words, a partnership may consistently be stressed from numerous external factors, but one or several key dyadic factors still cement the partnership to be solid and sustainable. Proxy relationships by nature lack such formal and binding commitments that one might find in formal alliances and through multilateral organizations. Therefore, a level of trust is what creates certainty about the proxy’s future behaviour. Ultimately such trust should lead to loyalty towards the sponsor’s interests.
I argue that the mechanism of mobilized sectarian bonds functions as a platform of trust that could facilitate confidence and assurance that the proxy will not turn significantly away from its sponsor’s goals and strategy. Bapat (2012, in Erstad, 2018) agrees, saying that religiously affiliated insurgents might be a more “safe bet” for a sponsor than other groups, as the religious link could increase the group’s loyalty towards the sponsor. Whenever a proxy finds themselves in a domestic conflict, they seek out external actors that may supply them with various modes of support. Recall that proxy relationships are at high risk of expiring as the common interest is exceeded by self-interest over time. In a proxy conflict with shifting loyalties and dynamic interplay of constantly new emerging actors, building a network of sustainable partnerships requires a minimum level of trust between partners. Indeed, by partnering up through the provision of hard power support, a baseline of trust must have been settled, based on shared military strategic goals – a common enemy. I argue though, that the combination of such shared goals with shared mobilized sectarian bonds will facilitate a trust that moves into the long-term sphere. Gause (2014) states that the proxies look
for an ally – a sponsor – whom they share a political or ideological position, which would facilitate a degree of kinship on identity grounds. Thus, the sponsor may utilize this ideology or identity link to consolidate their relations to the proxy. Sociologist Peter Berger argued that sects hold their attractiveness from a “shared meaning system” (1984 in Rosario and Dorsey, 2016). While sects from different political contexts, e.g., different countries, do not necessarily share this meaning system in itself, the transnational sectarian link may be politicized or securitized through, for example, public discourse from state and community leaders, and subsequently, reach potential for mobilization. Thus, a sponsor needs to reach out to the proxy with whom it shares a sectarian bond, and subsequently politicize or securitize its framing of the proxy’s environment. Now if the sponsor can cultivate the shared meaning system – through politicising or securitizing - from not only religious doctrine but also to a political one, it facilitates a strategic-political level of trust between them.
4.3 Dependent Variable: Soft Power Support
The dependent variable and final step in the proposed causal chain is the provision of soft power support. Whenever a society or a state experiences armed conflict, a power vacuum arises, and non-state actors become more important in the country’s domestic power politics (Gause, 2014). Such state weakness allows external actors – sponsors – to support domestic actors – proxies – to fill this vacuum (Crepy, 2017). Grynkewich (2008, p. 353) argue that domestic actors would benefit from establishing a social welfare arm and provide public goods to the local population, as this would challenge the legitimacy of the state and win the support of the population. Gaining such support is essential in civil conflict, as that is a way to ensure continued relevance and influence even after the society transitions into a post-conflict scenario.
If a sponsor supports its proxy into becoming a legitimate entity in its context, an entity that acquires popular legitimacy and acknowledgment from the state, the sponsor will have achieved legitimate influence without turning to coercion for reaching a similar level of influence. However, a proxy that has reached legitimacy and political strength does not necessarily give up its hard power. In the words of the inventor of soft power as a term, Joseph Nye, “Soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power. If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes” (Nye 1990). Although Nye refers to a state and its relations in the international system the similar logic may be applied to a non-state actor in a sub state context. In the words of Juneau (2016), a sponsor with deep ties to a powerful proxy in a country will allow it to position itself as an indispensable player with a say in major decisions. Alternatively, without such ties a sponsor might hold a pragmatic perspective when
selecting which proxies to collaborate with, however, the sponsor does not necessarily favour its chosen proxy as a long-term partner. Perhaps they only share the short-term goal of defeating a mutual enemy. However, while sharing a mutual enemy may indeed be long-lasting in itself, it is less likely to be a foundation for a stable and powerful partnership. In other words, the sponsor supports the proxy with the means to fight the mutual enemy, but it does not support the proxy with the means to expand, develop, and become a major player in the future. Hence, to fully extend its own influence in the long term, the sponsor could tap into the sectarian bonds it shares with its proxy since an effective partnership requires “…transnational ideological and political connections that make clients [proxy] open to a relationship with the patron [sponsor]. Those connections are now more important than conventional military strength in affecting the course of regional politics” (Gause 2014).
To sum up: If we accept the argument that societies affected by sectarianism allow for mobilization of sectarian bonds between proxy and external sponsor, such sectarian bonds could facilitate a level of trust between a sponsor and its proxy. Subsequently, we should also expect that this trust leads the sponsor to deem it’s proxy a sustainable partner for the long term. If a sponsor perceives its proxy as trustworthy it should be willing to provide the proxy with soft-power type of support. The hypothesis which follows is:
H1: Mobilized sectarian bonds between a sponsor and proxy in proxy conflict will be positively correlated with the
provision of soft-power type of support from the sponsor to the proxy.
5. Research Design
This chapter lays out the design for testing my proposed hypothesis. Firstly, I introduce the rationale for the design and case selection. Following this, I discuss the breadth of this paper’s inference before describing the empirical case studies. Further I turn to operationalization of key concepts into potential empirical observations before I end this chapter with a note on sources.
5.1 Method
I employ the method of structured focused comparison (Gerring, 2006) in this paper as a way of exploring the process of how mobilized sectarian bonds affects the provision of soft power support in proxy wars through the mechanism of trust. It is structured in the way that it applies similar and coherent questions and indicators to each case which allows for comparison of the potential correlation between the variables (George and Bennet 2005). It is also focused in that the proposed
indicators targets a specific aspect of the topic under scrutiny, namely soft power support in proxy conflicts, and thus excludes other perhaps interesting but not relevant aspects. Arguably a qualitative in-depth study allows me to explore the broader spectrum of some of the variables in this study. For example, concepts like proxy conflict and sectarianism are relatively fluid and challenging to code dichotomously without diving into the nuances it holds. There is also a pragmatic aspect of justifying the qualitative in-depth approach. Even though proxy conflict has received increased attention in the last decades, there’s still a lack of data on the many various dyadic relationships in the conflicts. Many of proxies are small and there are hardly sufficient data on enough cases to employ a large-N study.
5.2 Case Selection
The Most Similar Case Design
I select my cases on the independent variable, namely the presence or absence of mobilized sectarian bonds between sponsor and proxy. Holding the control variables as constant as empirically possible, this facilitates analysis of whether the independent variable X causes variation in dependent variable Y (Gerring, 2006). It should be noted that there are risks of selection bias (George and Bennet, 2005) in which I, in exploring various cases before deciding on which to study in-depth, could unintentionally acquire information regarding the outcome on the dependent variable. Consequently, I could select cases with a known outcome, and which then supports the proposed hypothesis, yet such support could rather be a result of selection bias. Therefore, I apply the most similar case design, whereas abovementioned, cases are selected based on their comparability and similarity in as many aspects possible except the independent and dependent variable (Gerring, 2006). Thus, when I control for variables potentially affecting the dependent variable, see X2 in table 2, I control for rival explanations on the effect on the dependent variable. Hence, I select the chosen cases based both on control variables and the independent variable which should reduce selection bias.
X1
Independent variable
X2
Control variable Y Dependent variable
CASE A 1 1 ?
CASE B 0 1 ?
Table 2: Framework of most similar case design. Source: Gerring, 2006, p. 132)
5.3 Data
It is necessary to define thepopulation of cases that this paper’s inference may be applied to (Gerring, 2006). The topic under scrutiny is proxy conflicts, which, as outlined in section 2, is the armed conflict per the UCDP definition (NA) where external actors provide instrumental direct or indirect support to the warring parties with the intention of targeting a third-party. The external actor is a state actor, and the warring actor is a non-state actor. Thus, the analysis of this paper should only be applied to cases with such characteristics.
5.4
Case StudiesThis paper compares Iran’s support to the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) and its military wing the Badr Organization, with United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) support to General Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA). Hence, the unit of analysis is the dyadic relationship between sponsor and proxy. These cases are comparable as they both constitute actors and battlefield locations in the Middle East and North Africa region, and they are both ongoing as of May 2021. Additionally, the most similar case design requires any alternative variables to be as similar as possible (Gerring, 2006). While sparse literature specifically addresses what variables would predict the provision of soft power support, I propose some variables that might be logical. For example, it is reasonable to think that one of the reasons why external actors want influence in another country is access to valuable natural resources, thus both cases should have such resources. Further, Alaaldin et al (2019) argue that it is first and foremost the degree to which the country is heavily fractured and volatile that explains the susceptibility to external influence and thus provision of support. The logic is then that the more fragile a society is, the more likely that external actors will intervene. A similar variable may be the strength of institutions in the proxy context. Some proxy conflicts may open up a security vacuum but still have reasonable functional political institutions, thus closing the political sphere of soft power that external actors could tap into. Therefore, the lower the operational capacity of domestic institutions, the higher the probability of soft power support. Lastly, the variable of time passed makes up a challenge. In order to identify cases that are comparable in most aspects and have sufficient data, I was not able to match this variable across the two case studies. In the Iran-SCIRI/Badr case, their relationship started in 1982, although it truly blossomed in 2003. The UAE-NLA case originated around 2014. Juneau (2016) and Fox (2019) touches briefly upon this issue, suggesting that the longer time passes the more likely is it that the sponsor and proxy have developed a relationship and a trust that could result in soft power support. However, the time passed does not exclude mobilized sectarian bonds, and these could also overlap. I address this issue in the analysis section.
Further, the cases are different when it comes to their organizational and bureaucratic capacity. Whereas NLA is a collective of militias run by a charismatic leader partnering up with a self-proclaimed government in the east of Libya, SCIRI in Iraq started out as a group of Iraqi Shia’s in exile in Iran without any formal organisation. The different pre-existing soft power capacities may play a role, but arguably more so for the type of soft power support, not so much about the extent of it. A small group need support to grow and expand, a big group needs support to capitalize on existing power.
In summary, the cases of Iran-SCIRI/Badr and UAE-NLA is not a perfect match in the most similar case design. However, while proxy conflict may be on the rise there are still few conflicts to select cases from, especially considering that such conflicts should be comparable. On the other hand, despite the issue of availability of data and comparable cases, I argue that the main alternative explanations are accounted for with this case selection. Consider table 3 for an overview of the cases and their variables.
Table 3: Case selection and control variables
5.5 Operationalization
It is necessary to operationalize this paper’s key concepts into a set of working indicators that should facilitate the concrete observation of said concepts. Additionally, I provide a set of questions that should guide the empirical analysis of the case studies.
Dyad Area X1 Mobilized sectarian bonds X2 Natural resources X3 Fragile/ Volatile context X4 Strength of domestic institution s X5 Time Y Soft power support Iran –
SCIRI/Badr Iraq Yes Yes High Low Long ?
UAE – Haftar
Independent Variable – Mobilized sectarian bonds.
As per the most similar case design, I code the independent variable as a dichotomous variable (Gerring, 2006). Question 1 seeks to identify public statements and the degree to which the bond is mobilized either in a sectarian or broader strategic frame, where the latter would speak for a more geopolitical and ideological rationale. Indeed, it may be challenging to capture this mobilization as a dichotomous variable, as some sponsor-proxy relationship may share a sectarian identity per se, but there may be conflicting or weak evidence that suggests whether it has been mobilized or not along said sectarian identity. However, the qualitative feature of this research design allows me to explore the nuance and multifaceted aspect of this variable. Question 2 addresses whether the mobilization is characterised by a sort of coordinated action which could indicate that the mobilization goes beyond mere rhetoric. Additionally, question 2 also places the mobilization into a broader strategic framing, to assess whether it is unique to the sectarian narrative or just as much around other strategic goals.
Research Questions Indicators
Is the mobilized bond between a sponsor and proxy along sectarian bonds?
A) Statements from members of proxy or government or military officials from sponsor stating sectarian commonalities.
B) Sponsor describing opposing actors with contrasting sectarian identity along securitizing rhetoric.
To what degree is the bond mobilized?
C) Strategic framing of shared commonalities?6 D) Coordinated action between the sponsor
and proxy, e.g., mutual signalling and parallel making of claims on the same object.7
Table 4: Indicators of independent variable
Dependent Variable – Soft power support
Soft power support is the variable that is expected to vary when sectarian bonds are mobilized by an outside sponsor in proxy conflict. Although at first hand the sectarian link could be believed to result in religious types of soft power support, my theoretical argument suggests that the sectarian
6 The deliberate strategic effort to by an actor to construct a shared understanding of the world that
legitimatise and motivate collective action. Example: Anti-Americanism, Anti-Israelism. (McAdam et. al 1996; Busby, 2007, in Erstad 2018)
link is a mere connector to cultivate a political partnership. Thus, I expect equal probability for the sponsor to provide for example political support as a religious type of support. I do not code this dependent variable dichotomously, but rather as a matter of degree. As soft power support may manifest itself across various subcategories and have different outcomes and aims, it is worthwhile to assess the qualitative nature of the soft power support, e.g., whether certain categories are provided more than others, or if there are many or few types of support. Therefore, a dichotomous variable would fail to account for whether a sponsor provides only one or several types of support across categories, hence I assess it through a degree. Recall that soft power support is the provision of support that entails non-coercive elements of power and influence. In table 5 I list some potential variations in soft power support as proposed from relevant literature.
Form Outcome Type Source
Official
recognition/open about affiliation with proxy
Increase international
legitimacy for proxy Political Byman, 2018
Provide safe haven for
proxy leadership Allows proxy to organize/plan with impunity Organizational/Security (ibid)
Sponsor aligning itself
with dissatisfied actors Sponsor is framed as the champion of the oppressed and marginalized. Proxy seeks sponsor’s protection.
Humanitarian Juneau, 2016
Positioning itself as broker in political processes
Sponsor becomes the go-to
actor. Political Shabani, 2015, in Juneau 2016
Supporting/building
political wings Proxy can join domestic political structure Political/Organizational Juneau 2016
Support administration
and institutions Proxy can create governance structure parallel to sitting government.
Political/Organizational Rauta, 2020
Provision of social services, schooling, food, and medical aid.
Proxy competes with state for social outreach.
Provides basic security and legitimacy among population
Social/
Humanitarian Juneau 2016
Information strategy: Media channels framing issues in ways beneficial to sponsor.
Issue-based uniting of sponsor
and proxy. Communication Gause, 2014
Economic
aid/collaboration Proxy can fund expansion Financial Salehyan, 2008
Supporting parallel security structures and institutions
Proxy can provide security for
constituents. Security Mumford, 2013
Question 1 focuses on the public revelation and recognition of the provision of support itself. Question 2 and 3 targets the nature of the support and places it in context of pre-existing soft power of the proxy. Question 4 addresses the time-issue, whether the support is a one-off provision or if it is long term consistent commitment from the sponsor.
Indicators on dependent variable – Soft power support
Research Questions Indicators
To what extent is the provision of soft power publicly communicated?
A) Public statements from government or military officials.
B) Public statements from members of proxy
Which spheres of influence does the soft power support attempt to address?
C) Is the support categorised as political, humanitarian, communication, or security?
Which soft power capacities does the proxy hold before receiving support from its sponsors
D) Presence of political institutions, social welfare system, political integration in local context, ability to root itself in an area without turning to violence and repression, religious and ideological attraction.
Is the provision of support short-term or long term?
Number of years of consistent provision of support.
Table 6: Indicators on dependent variable
It is worth noting that various proxies may have certain soft power capacities prior to receiving support from their sponsor. Hence, if a proxy holds resources to provide humanitarian assistance to a local population, but not sufficient technical expertise to expand its political structure, it may be more likely that the sponsor supports the latter. However, the sponsor may also add to the pre-existing capacity of the proxy, if that specific capacity holds strategic potential for the sponsor. Therefore, a qualitative assessment that takes local context, degree of state weakness/outreach and prior capacity of a proxy into consideration is justified and will further place the findings in its context. The condition of the context is thus deciding when interpreting the findings. Additionally, some forms of soft power support may not be observable, such as religious and political guidance taking place behind closed doors, which questions the reliability of these indicators.
Causal mechanism - Trust
Trust may be challenging to discern into an empirically observable phenomenon: “Of all the problems facing trust scholarship, measurement issues present the most formidable barriers”
(Hoffman, 2002). To unravel the true level of trust requires insights into the thoughts and motivation behind trustors and trustees. This could be achieved to some degree with an in-depth interview with key actors, however, this is less feasible within the scope of this paper. Therefore, I intend to observe trust in the way cooperation between sponsor and proxy plays out.
To explore and identify the causal mechanism of trust, I partially lean on Hoffman’s (2002) set of indicators for measuring trust. Emphasis is placed on the identification of stated sectarian bonds, the degree to which the trust is regulated or controlled, and the transfer of the capacity to determine political outcomes from sponsor to proxy. According to the latter indicator, the provision of soft power support along political lines, and more so than communicative, humanitarian, and social, will therefore serve as an indicator of trust, as political support has greater potential for a backlash against the sponsor – as per the theoretical argument of increasing political leverage. Thus, political support may weigh more than other types of soft power support in indicating a level of trust. This indicator could be valid in that it captures behavioural indicators of trust, but it is also challenged as trust does not necessarily always manifest itself empirically and may therefore be hidden for the researcher.
Regarding the reliability of the measurement, any public statements could indicate a trust between sponsor and proxy but will add value to the theoretical argument if said statements include their sectarian affiliation. The nature of proxy relationships suggests that public statements will be rare. Therefore, if such public statements are identified, it is likely to be an indication that both actors are willing to signal their partnership to the public. Thus, public statements in proxy contexts weigh more than in regular partnerships and alliances. It should be noted that such public statements need not be official written statements, but could just as be statements from speeches, media interviews, or the like.
Indicators on causal mechanism - Trust
Research Questions Indicators
To what extent is the trust communicated? A) Public statements indicating ambiguity or undisputed trust.
B) Evidence of friendships among leaders
C) Number of statements indicate intensity of trust.
Is the trust derived from the sectarian bonds? D) Public statements stating sectarian affiliation.
To what degree is the trust regulated? E) Monitoring mechanisms in place to oversee the proxy’s activities.
F) Proxy gains full or reduced control to implement the received support
Is the trust multifaceted/crystallized? G) Support is provided either along political, humanitarian, communication, or security lines? Table 7: Indicators of causal mechanism.
5.6. Data collection & Time horizon
I utilize a timeframe spanning from the time when the sponsor mobilized and reaches out to the proxy and until the present time. As discussed, the selected cases studies have vast different measurement points for the independent variable. The issue of different time perspectives will be considered in the analysis section. For the Iran-SCIRI/Badr case, which started in 1982 up until the present day, there are important periods that cannot be excluded without losing analytical value to the case. I turn to multiple secondary sources in investigating the proposed research questions and indicators. I explore the UCDP External Supporter Dataset (Högbladh et al, 2011) to get an overview of the various dyads, types of support, and time perspectives. Additionally, I examine news reports, academic articles, and policy briefs.
Source criticism
Public statements should be considered with scepticism, as there are greater incentives to lie to the public than in private statements (Hoffman, 2002). Thus, public statements indicating motives should be carefully analysed. Further, the disguised nature of proxy relationships suggests that there will be little such public evidence. On the other hand, if such evidence is indeed identified, it goes against such a proxy feature and therefore public statements could potentially hold greater strength as evidence. For the case of UAE-NLA in Libya, since it is a relatively recent and ongoing case, some reliance on media reports is expected. While academia has indeed touched upon the conflict in Libya, few have explored this specific dyad in detail. However, reports from think tanks and policy briefs provide useful data. The Iran-SCIRI/Badr case is to a greater level explored in detail. However, when collecting data, it is important to triangulate the evidence, meaning that multiple sources should indicate the same evidence for it to have a certain value in this thesis (Adcock and Collier, 2001). Moreover, overly reliance on media should be approached with caution as media sources are more prone to cover newsworthy cases only, but if the researcher faces this by including a variety of both local and international news the risk of bias may be reduced (Möller, 2011) I will now turn to the empirical section which is structured followingly: First I present the case of Iran’s support to SCIRI and Badr in Iraq, followed by the United Arab Emirates’ support to General Haftar and the National Libyan Army in Libya. I explore the empirics case-based, meaning I dive into one case and its variables before I turn to the next case and assess the same variables.
6. Empirics
6.1 Case A: Iran – Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) and Badr Organization Background:
Iranian involvement and activities in Iraq predate the conflict dynamics observed in contemporary Iraq, as the root of Iranian relevance goes back to the Iran-Iraq war raging from 1980-1988. In 1982 the war went into its second year of full-fledged fighting, and it was at this point that oppressed Iraqi Shias sought exile in Iran and formed the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) under the direct control of Ayatollah al-Hakim (Isakhan and Mulherin, 2020). Formed as a socio-political movement, SCIRI was trained, financed, and armed by the Iranians to fight the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein (Morris, 2014). Its military wing named Badr Brigade was designed to operate from Iran, carrying out intermediary attacks in Southern Iraq (Counter Extremism, ND). While indeed SCIRI had an Iraqi face – the Badr militias were comprised of Iraqis – the Iranian government was heavily involved in every level of the organization, especially as the Badr was trained, equipped, and even commanded at most senior level by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Thurber, 2014). Though, SCIRI and its Badr Brigade remained in exile in Iran until 2003, following the US invasion of Iraq. When Saddam Hussein was ousted, a political vacuum opened for SCIRI to take advantage of, and SCIRI subsequently relocated to Baghdad swiftly after the invasion. At this point, SCIRI emerged as a significant social and political movement that could fill the vacuum immediately after the toppling of the Baathist regime (Isakhan and Mulherin, 2020). As Ostovar (2018) points out, SCIRI and Badr had a modest impact during their years in exile, but their value “skyrocketed” after they returned to Iraq.
However, the relationship between Iran and the SCIRI and its Badr Brigade would not follow a linear growth without challenges. The following years after the invasion saw SCIRI fragmenting and going in different directions. In 2007 SCIRI rebranded, changing its name from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in an effort to downplay its former embrace of Khomeinist style theocracy of Iran and rather focus more on the Iraqi nationalistic agenda (Ostovar, 2018). In addition, ISCI adopted the Najaf-based Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani as their Marja, embracing his advocacy of a civil government in Iraq following democratic elections, as opposed to Khamenei’s velayet-e faqih (Isakhan and Mulherin, 2020). However, this led to internal tensions regarding the future direction for the organization, with one fraction remaining loyal to Iran, and another fraction consisting of pro-Iraqi nationalists. This schism led to the Badr organization branching off from ISCI in 2012, operating as a political
