On deliberation as education Tomas Englund
(NERA, Örebro: Philosophy of education 2006) tomas.englund@pi.oru.se
Introduction
The concept of deliberation has undergone a tremendous expansion in use within the social sciences in recent decades. The main reason for this is the growing use of the concept of deliberative democracy within the political sciences; another, perhaps more profound, is the renaissance of classical pragmatism and the use of this specific concept within current pragmatism, especially by Jürgen Habermas (1996) and Seyla Benhabib (1996), who both draw attention to the need for mutual communication and deliberation on
alternative possible courses of action. Within education, I and others have made use of the concept of deliberation, and I have proposed (Englund 2000 and Englund forthcoming) deliberative communication as a model whereby schools can develop a democratic deliberative attitude and a judgemental capacity among students.1
An underlying assumption for this proposal is that education always has moral implications or, more precisely, that different ways of teaching and
communicating between teachers and students shape different conditions for the development of students’ moral reasoning etc. This does not imply that different models automatically lead to different consequences, but that there always is a moral dimension of teaching at hand, a moral dimension that reflects how
complex issues are treated in the classroom, both substantively and relationally. My basic idea in proposing deliberative, meaning-creating communication as an educational idea(l) is that I look upon deliberation as a way of developing the (students’) capacity to make moral judgements and thereby contributing to the development of their political autonomy and of a deliberative attitude. At the same time I would argue that displacing the inner activities of schools in the direction of (more) deliberation also implies a higher quality of learning. In that respect the proposal can also be seen as a parallel to the sociocultural
perspective on learning, with its emphasis on the need for more mutual communication, but in the case of my proposal, using deliberative communication also for the formation of judgemental ability.
1 Primary sources of inspiration are John Dewey and Jürgen Habermas. I distinguish five characteristics of
deliberative communication: (a) different views are confronted with one another and arguments for these different views are given time and space and are articulated and presented, (b) there is tolerance and respect for the concrete other and participants learn to listen to the other person’s argument, (c) elements of collective will formation are present, i.e. an endeavour to reach consensus or at least temporary agreements and/or to draw attention to differences, (d) authorities/traditional views (represented, for example, by parents and tradition) can be questioned and there are opportunities to challenge one’s own tradition, and (e) there is scope for students to communicate and deliberate without teacher control, i.e. for argumentative discussions between students with the aim of solving problems or shedding light on them from different points of view(cf. Englund 2000 and Englund forthcoming).
In this contribution I intend, as a kind of introduction, (1) to show how the concept of deliberation and arguments in favour of a conversational and deliberative view of education were used within the classical analytical philosophy of education to understand the moral dimension of education.
Secondly (2) I will try to put the case for deliberation as education by discussing the question of the rationality of education, drawing attention to communicative rationality as one starting point for understanding moral education in terms of deliberation, and comparing this approach with current discussions of moral education as conversation. My preliminary conclusion is that a strengthening of the deliberative character of education is desirable and in the final (3) part of my paper I will try to critically deliberate upon this goal in relation to the
commonest critiques of deliberation as education. (1)
On the concept of deliberation in the analytical philosophy of education
The (primarily English) analytical philosophy of education of the 1960s and 1970s (Paul Hirst, Richard Peters etc.) can be seen as “epistemologically
foundational: as the judge of matters of value and meaning, and the arbiter of
appropriate theory for explaining human behaviour in the educational sphere” (Blake et al. 2002 p. 3). An outstanding example of this epistemological character of the analytical philosophy of education is the forms of knowledge elaborated by Paul Hirst (1974), which perhaps can be seen as the most
prominent example, understood as education strictly grounded in the structure of propositional knowledge and used as categories for understanding the human meaning systems that are transmitted in education (Soltis 1984).
A timely critique of the analytical philosophy of education was an objection that was in fact raised to Hirst’s epistemological thesis, namely “that education is fundamentally not an epistemological but an ethical and political enterprise” (Schilling 1986, p. 12). However, it is worth noting that the concepts of ethics, conversation and deliberation also are used in the classical analytical philosophy of education of the 1970s. Richard Peters (1973) does not make explicit use of the concept of deliberation, but in an analysis of processes leading to the development of an educated man he underlines that “the question is whether explicit learning situations are sufficient to bring about this integrated outlook. The classical way of ensuring this, surely, has not been courses but
conversation” (Peters 1973, p. 21). In the kind of conversation Peters is sketching out, “the point is to create a common world to which all bring their distinctive contributions. By participating in such a shared experience much is learnt, though no one sets out to teach anyone anything. And one of the things
that is learnt is to see the world from the viewpoint of another whose perspective is very different. To be able to take an active part in real conversation is, of course, an achievement” (Peters 1973 p. 21).
Another analytical philosopher of education, Israel Scheffler (1973a), concludes – after summarizing three philosophical models for teaching, the impression model, the insight model and the rule model – that while the first two are cognitively related it is only the third that deals with processes of deliberation and judgement. This model also “presupposes general and impartial principles governing the assessment of reasons bearing on the issues” (Scheffler 1973a, p. 133).
In another work, Scheffler (1973b) views moral education as having two major objectives: inculcating minimum standards of decent conduct and developing rationality in moral deliberation and judgement. The latter was to be achieved by engaging students in discussions of moral issues in such a way that they came to appreciate and follow standards of rational deliberation and judgement,
standards that Scheffler explicates primarily in terms of impartiality.
But should deliberation as used within the analytical philosophy of education be understood within an overall epistemological realm, or is that realm transcended by deliberation? To answer that question we may need to look more deeply into how the concepts of epistemology, conversation and deliberation are used within that tradition, an issue we must leave for now. However, what these examples from the analytical philosophy of education demonstrate is an interest in moral education through conversation and deliberation, and I would suggest that we can take the issue of moral education further by questioning the rationale of education.
(2)
Education and rationalities
Institutionalized socialization – what we generally call education, teaching and learning – presupposes, according to the socio-history that has created it,
teachers, learners and other specific categories such as classes and curricula. Hamilton (1989) also argues that there is a close relationship between changing conceptions and assumptions, e.g. about the individual and the state, and
changing pedagogical discursive practices. However, the shaping and
institutional framing of education and teaching over the years and in different contexts are seen by many as the persistence of a once-given pattern. Utterances and analyses stressing this continuity are numerous. On top of that it is obvious that the past decades have seen a gradual restoration of traditional education.
The dominant rationality aimed for is an instrumental one (with traces of a value rationality of a religious character).
My position is that it is both possible and appropriate to go beyond this view and, instead, stress possible and potential differences in the education and teaching process from both a historical and a qualitative viewpoint. However, I do not think that these differences are primarily a matter of teaching methods or of how schooling is organized, but rather of different rationalities, different meaning-creating contexts based in different choices of content with which teaching can be arranged.
A central point of reference for an alternative to the technological and instrumental rationale for education is John Dewey’s view of education as communication (Dewey 1916), and his analysis of the basic elements of communication and of the preconditions for communication as criteria for democracy as a life form. Dewey took the view that democracy was an
expression of a society imprinted by mutual communication and consequently a pluralist life form. The democracy criteria related to communication which he put forward (Dewey 1916), stressing free and open communication between and within groups, provide important guidance for the development of criteria for my idea of deliberative communication in schools. As Dewey elaborates in his
Human Nature and Conduct (1922), moral considerations are intrinsic to the
process of deliberation when we seek the best of a number of alternative courses of action. It is also from Dewey, but now from his The Public and its Problems (Dewey 1927), that I look upon education as a possible way for the public to define itself through deliberation (cf. Englund 1996, Ljunggren 1996).
In another style of language, Jürgen Habermas develops, in a succession of works during the 1980s and 1990s, the need for a communicative rationality, stressing space and procedures for a rational discourse on different questions. Habermas’ theory of communicative action (1984, 1987), related to moral consciousness (1990) and further developed into a model for deliberative
democracy (Habermas 1996), places the realization of deliberative policy in the institutionalization of procedures, where an intersubjectivity on a higher level is expected to emerge. This theory, which is related to a specific conceptual frame of reference, is used to develop a perspective on the role of institutionalized socialization as a place for deliberative communication (Englund 2000 and Englund forthcoming).
In the model for deliberative communication in schools that I have proposed (cf. note 1), which is a social construction inspired by Dewey and Habermas, but at the same time a model that stands on its own, I will use critical discussions of the theory on communicative action developed by Habermas as a way of
clarifying the model of deliberative communication. Jürgen Habermas’ ideal or “formal conversation” model as the centre of his discourse ethics can be seen as one way to fulfil the deliberative idea as a rationale. As we know, Habermas’ early development of this model made use of Kohlberg’s description of moral reasoning.
Nel Noddings’ discussion of Habermas’ conversation model is to be found in her Educating Moral People (Noddings 2002), in which she examines how moral education might be infused throughout the curriculum through
conversation: “An education rich in conversation clearly goes well beyond information processing and the accumulation of facts” (Noddings 2002, p. 146). Among other things, Noddings explores a range of possible uses of conversation in moral education, and it is my view that, in spite of her critique of Habermas, she shows the need for conversation as (moral) education, even if she prefers what she calls ordinary conversation (Noddings 1994/2002).
In her critique of Habermas, Nel Noddings (1994/2002) points out that participants in Habermas’, as she terms it, formal conversation must have special qualities: “They must be capable of logical reasoning, and they must be reflective enough to reject conversational moves to destroy the process” (pp. 118–119). It is a highly idealized conversation that Habermas is proposing, Nodding underlines, and there is an emphasis more on the “generalized other” than on a concrete other (cf. Benhabib 1987). Thirdly, Noddings argues that even under ideal conditions there is rarely agreement about what constitutes the force of the better argument. To that I would like to say that Noddings draws attention to obvious problems, but I also note that, in the same text, she stresses that “it seems reasonable to help students learn how to conduct ideal
conversations” (Noddings 1994/2002, p. 122). From that it also follows, at least for me, that the Habermasian idea of an ideal conversation and its validity
claims of rightness, appropriateness and comprehensibility ought, in my view, to be seen as goals to strive for, but not necessarily as elements that are built into every conversation. In everyday life in the classroom you, as a teacher, have to accept and be ready to participate in an ordinary conversation, but you can always “help students learn how to conduct ideal conversations”.
Another critique against Habermas is that levelled by Richard Rorty (2000), who wants to take us a step further regarding what is or should be seen as the
distinctively human capacity: “abandoning the logocentric idea that knowledge is the distinctively human capacity would leave room for the idea that
democratic citizenship is better suited for that role. The latter is what we human
beings should take most pride in, should make central to our self-image” (Rorty 2000, p. 3). The context for this critique is a general philosophical discussion between the two, albeit one with specific and obvious rhetorical qualities.
Without going into all the points discussed by Habermas, Rorty and others, it is possible to exemplify the discussion with reference to the central question put by Habermas (2000, p. 34) to Rorty, namely whether the pragmatic turn requires an anti-realist understanding of knowledge. In this respect, Habermas quotes Hilary Putnam: “Elements of what we call ‘language’ or ‘mind’ penetrate so deeply into what we call ‘reality’ that the very project of representing ourselves as being ‘mappers’ of something ‘language-independent’ is fatally compromised from the start” (Habermas 2000, p. 36, referring to Putnam 1990, p. 28). As Habermas notes, Rorty agrees with Putnam on these lines (Rorty 1993, p. 443), but he has something other than Putnam’s internal realism in mind. While the internal realism developed by Putnam “stresses that the conditions for the
objectivity of knowledge can be analyzed only in connection with the conditions for the intersubjectivity of a mutual understanding” (Habermas 2000, p. 36), Rorty’s view, “being in touch with reality”, has, according to Habermas, to be translated into a jargon of “being in touch with a human community” in such a way “that the realist intuition, to which mentalism wanted to do justice with its Mirror of Nature and its correspondence between representation and represented object, disappears completely” (Habermas 2000, p. 36).
Habermas underlines that, with the pragmatic turn, the epistemic authority of the first person singular is displaced by the first person plural, “by the ‘we’ of a communication community in front of which every person justifies her views. However, it is only the empiricist interpretation of this new authority that leads Rorty to equate ‘knowledge’ with what is accepted as ‘rational’ according to the standards of our respective communities” (Habermas 2000, p. 36). As Habermas sees it, Rorty, the nominalist, stands in the empiricist tradition and refers
epistemic authority to the received social practices of “our” respective communities.
Habermas agrees with Rorty that contextualism is a necessary consequence of a fully executed linguistic turn – a pragmatic turn? – in one respect, but not in another: “contextualism designates a problem that can occur only when we reckon on a reason embodied in linguistic practices. But he is wrong to see contextualism at the same time as the solution to the problem” (Habermas 2000, p. 37).
So what we have here is a model (inspired by Habermas) that may be criticized for logocentrism and a (too) formalistic character (to the extent the model follows Habermas). However, I consider it possible to integrate these two kinds of criticism in relation to what we are talking about here, namely deliberative communication in schools. The emphasis on logocentrism is part of the school tradition of mediating knowledge, but following the model of deliberative
communication there is an emphasis on pointing out different views and to allow room for pluralism and thereby “leave room for the idea of democratic
citizenship”, and concerning formalism I think one can repeat the point that there is also a need to help students learn how to conduct ideal conversations.
Preliminary conclusion: Deliberation as a concept for a deepening of
democracy, and in particular its potential to change the meaning, the rationale, of education
As has been shown, I would say that there is some support from the philosophy of education and from moral educators for the development of a communicative rationality in education and for deliberation as a way of elaborating it. However, this rationale is of course at odds with the historically and currently dominant instrumental and technological rationale of schooling, a rationale that stresses the persistence of teacher recitation and the learning of established knowledge, which is tested in different ways and evaluated by grades and so on.
Crucial to whether or not we will have a deliberative school in the future is a future general discussion of the inner work of schools and of how the
preconditions for it are determined – is it possible that the educational
researchers’ pleas for communication will be heeded, or will the strong, still dominant, technological rationale be sustained?2
The model of deliberative communication as a way of learning and developing judgemental ability may also seem an (overly) abstract and philosophical (?) alternative to the traditional way of looking at the tasks of schools. And finally, even if it is understandable, will it be a recipe for success?
At this point it is perhaps appropriate to mention the more general perspective of deliberative democracy to which the model of deliberative communication refers and has received substantial inspiration: “A democratic system is deliberative to the extent that the decisions it reaches reflect open discussion among the
participants, with people ready to listen to the views and consider the interests of others, and modify their own opinions accordingly” (Miller 2000, p. 3).
2 What we have learnt from recent research on learning is that mutual communication is effective, that pupils
learn – create meanings – when they communicate with their teachers and with each other. To me, meaning-creating deliberative communication in schools implies two mutually integrated dimensions, learning and capacity to make judgements (formation of judgemental ability). Needless to say, however, the international pressure for schooling via test procedures (TIMMS, PISA etc.) is very authoritative and leaves little scope for anything other than traditional schooling.
Deliberation – mutual and carefully balanced consideration of different alternatives – is in the current literature of political and social science closely coupled to democracy as communication, and hence to a specific way of understanding how democracy can and should be elaborated, i.e. deliberative democracy as a normative political project of a specific communicative
character. The fundamental idea of deliberative democracy as a supplement to the majority principle, based on simple voting between alternatives, is that the legitimacy of democracy will be strengthened if different views and perspectives are communicated and discussed in detail (i.e. deliberated upon) by all the different parties and participants involved, and that the different proposed decisions should be carefully motivated. In the deliberation process, the participants involved should reach agreement on what the issue is, what the parties do not agree upon, what the alternative decisions are and what kind of procedure there is to make a decision. Deliberative democracy also implies that the decisions made are to be seen as temporary and that consensus and non-consensus are present at the same time, in that temporarily made decisions are respected and obeyed, while different views are also respected.
The use of the concept deliberative without that of democracy does not imply that the direction of democracy is neglected, but there is an important difference between deliberative communication and deliberative democracy. In the latter constellation, a close relationship to one or other formal democratic decision-making process is central, whereas deliberative communication does not presuppose this closeness. The second key difference is that deliberative democracy implies in principle (if not in reality) equal citizens, while the participants in deliberative communication in the classroom are teachers and students, i.e. individuals with differing knowledge and experience and
differences in authority, formal as well as real, deliberating within a what could be called a ‘weak public’, but still a specific institution situated in a field of force related to an ongoing struggle between different social forces.
(3) Responses to criticism of the idea of deliberation
There are many kinds of criticism of deliberation to be found, and I have already touched upon some of them. The commonest critique is that the preconditions for deliberation are often unequal, and that this inequality might even be strengthened in the deliberative process, in which the most articulate take the stage and others become quiet. Another critique is that deliberation supports a “Western” pattern of behaviour and is not attractive to different groups in a multicultural society.
Is deliberative communication in schools a possible way of treating cultural differences? This is of course a huge problem which primarily challenges the professionalism of the teacher in terms of his/her judgemental capacity. In almost all cases it is the teacher who has to make professional judgements about the possibility and suitability of initiating, authorizing and conducting (or
continuing) deliberative communication, and if necessary about bringing it to an end if it seems to be unsuccessful or has been pursued as far as it can. The
students are very important team workers, as both actively talking and actively listening participants, but it is the professional teacher who has the crucial role with regard to the direction, possible continuation and conclusion of deliberative communication.
An initial answer to the first mentioned criticisms is that equal preconditions for all involved in deliberation can never be attained, but have to be seen as an aspiration and a goal to strive for. But is even the goal of deliberation ineffective and perhaps misguided? No, I do not think so, even if situations can easily be found in which deliberation has not succeeded.
Attempts to practise deliberative communication are often looked upon by critics as a form of communication devised by an elite and run in a way similar to a university seminar. Deliberation, they argue, thus excludes “weaker” groups from the democratic process. However, this critique can fall back on those who advance it, because it is a question of how every single possible (deliberative) situation is created and run and how, within this situation, power is constituted. It is also in relation to this kind of critique – with obvious inherent differences in power and authority between teacher and students – that I have tried to analyse and develop the preconditions for deliberative communication within schools, even if there is an open and clear gap between teacher and student. I have in this case also especially emphasized the need of developing opportunities for
deliberative communication in the absence of a teacher (cf. point e in note 1). Other kinds of critique have its basis in a realistic conception of democracy, which implies that people in general will not develop their interest in public affairs. However, that is what deliberation is also partly about, namely
developing new forms to tackle this kind of problem. At the same time, it is of course rather obvious that deliberative ideas are in danger of being out of step with a general trend in society whereby political questions are vulgarized and values based in a possessive individualism are put centre stage. But even with that view of societal developments I think we can see the deliberative model as a long-term perspective in which education is a crucial factor.
And let us not confuse deliberative processes with participative democracy, which sees participation in itself as most important. Deliberative attitudes and
judgemental capacities will be developed when individuals are given the chance and the opportunity to cultivate their communicative rights, and that is why we finally have to go back to educational institutions.
In the model of deliberative communication that I have proposed, I have stressed the crucial role of the teacher when it comes to handling deliberative
communication. It needs to be underlined that deliberative communication is a risky business and that the project can fail. One of its central preconditions, that everyone involved in it should be equal and equivalent, is very hard to achieve and sustain. But how are we then to respond to the automatic criticism – that deliberative communication will find it difficult to fulfil this precondition of equality? Should we not try to develop this kind of communication?
I do not believe that we should give up the normative ideal of deliberative communication. In this respect I would like to refer to a political philosopher who advocates the need for normative analyses, even if a priori conditions may be seen as imperfect in relation to specific ideals. I find this view especially important in relation to the common critique and rejection of normative analyses, since
the fact that a normative model does not correspond to reality is no reason to dismiss it, for the need for normativity arises precisely because humans measure the reality they inhabit in the light of principles and promises that transcend this reality (Benhabib 2002, p. 134).
Seyla Benhabib has also tried to establish the idea of deliberation and
deliberative democracy as a question concerning the legitimacy of democracy: I will argue that legitimacy in complex democratic societies must be thought to result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all about matters of common concern. Thus a public sphere of deliberation about matters of mutual concern is essential to the legitimacy of democratic institutions (Benhabib 1996, p. 68).
It is also within a perspective of legitimacy that the model of deliberation can be seen as a long-term project which is concerned with breaking down selfishness, misuse of formal authority and private egoistic aspirations in favour of
deliberation for the public interest – a project which has to count on difficulties and resistance.
Benhabib, Seyla (1987): The generalized and the concrete other. In Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell eds: Feminism as Critique: Essays on the Politics of Gender in
Late-capitalist Societies. Cambridge: Polity press.
Benhabib, Seyla (1996): Toward a deliberative model of democratic legitimacy. In Seyla Benhabib ed: Democracy and Difference. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political pp. 67-94. Princeton: Princeton University press.
Benhabib, Seyls (2002): The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in The Global Era. Princeton: Princeton University press.
Blake, Nigel; Smeyers, Paul; Smith, Richard & Standish, Paul (2002): Introduction. In Blake, Nigel; Smeyers, Paul; Smith, Richard & Standish, Paul eds.: The Blackwell guide to
Philosophy of Education pp.1-17. Oxford: Blackwell.
Dewey, John (1916/1985a): Democracy and education. In Jo Ann Boydston ed.: John Dewey.
The Middle Works 1899-1924, Volume 9. Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois
University press.
Dewey, John (1922/1985b): Human nature and conduct. In Jo Ann Boydston ed.: John
Dewey. The Middle Works 1899-1924, Volume 14. Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern
Illinois University press.
Dewey, John (1927/1988): The public and its problems. In Jo Ann Boydston ed.: John
Dewey. The Later Works 1925-1953, Volume 2 pp. 235-372. Carbondale & Edwardsville:
Southern Illinois University press.
Englund, Tomas (1996): The public and the text. Journal of Curriculum Studies
28 (1) 1-35.
Englund, Tomas (2000): Deliberativa samtal som värdegrund – Historiska perspektiv och
aktuella förutsättningar [Deliberative communication as constitutive values – historical
perspectives and current conditions]. Stockholm: Skolverket
Englund, Tomas (forthcoming): Deliberative communication – a pragmatist proposal. Journal
of Curriculum Studies
Habermas, Jürgen (1984): Theory of Communicative Action I. Boston: Beacon press. Habermas, Jürgen (1987): Theory of Communicative Action II. Boston: Beacon press. Habermas, Jürgen (1990): Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge: Polity press.
Habermas, Jürgen (1996): Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT press.
Habermas, Jürgen (2000): Richard Rorty’s pragmatic turn. In Robert Brandom ed. : Rorty and
Hamilton, David (1989): Towards a Theory of Schooling. Lewes: Falmer press: Deakin Studies in Education Series 4.
Hirst, Paul (1974): Knowledge and the Curriculum: A Collection of Philosophical Papers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Ljunggren, Carsten (1996): Medborgarpubliken och det offentliga rummet. Om utbildning,
medier och demokrati [The public and its need to define itself. On education, the media and
democracy]. Uppsala: Uppsala Studies in Education 68.
Miller, David (2000): Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity press. Noddings, Nel (2002): Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character
Education. New York: Teachers College press.
Noddings, Nel (1994/2002) Conversation as moral education. In Noddings, Nel: Educating
Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education. New York: Teachers College
press pp. 118-130.
Noddings, Nel (1999/2002): Stories and conversation in schools. In Noddings, Nel:
Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education. New York: Teachers
College press pp. 131-147.
Peters, Richard (1973): What is an educational process? In Peters, Richard ed. The Concept of
Education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul pp. 1-23.
Putnam, Hilary (1990):
Rorty, Richard (1993): Putnam and the relativist menace. Journal of Philosophy 90. From Rorty, Richard (1998): Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers, pp. 43-62. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.
Scheffler, Israel (1973a): Philosophical models of teaching. ? In Peters, Richard ed. The
Concept of Education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul pp. 120-134.
Scheffler, Israel (1973b): Reason and Teaching. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Soltis, Jonas (1984): On the nature of educational research. Educational Researcher 13 pp. 5-10.
