Shifting Responsibilities: Constructing Threats and Restricting Autonomy : A Discourse Analysis on the Housing and Settlement of People Seeking Asylum in Sweden

(1)

Linköping university - Department of Culture and Society (IKOS) Master´s Thesis, 30 Credits – MA in Ethnic and Migration Studies (EMS) ISRN: LiU-IKOS/EMS-A--21/05--SE

Shifting Responsibilities: Constructing

Threats and Restricting Autonomy

A Discourse Analysis on the Housing and Settlement

of People Seeking Asylum in Sweden

Julia Harmgardt

(2)

Abstract

Sweden, like Europe, has had an increased influx of people seeking asylum in recent years, instigating restrictive measures within the Swedish asylum regime. Simultaneously as the sustainability of settlement and housing policies for people seeking asylum has been the subject of large political debate, restrictive methods such as a minimum rights approach has been adopted, putting the Swedish asylum regime at the edge of the European Convention. In 2019, 25 years after its implementation, Sweden’s refugee reception system was amended. As of then, people seeking asylum who choose their own housing (EBO) in certain municipalities over assigned housing in accommodation facilities (ABO) are no longer entitled to state subsidies. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s discourse theory and Carol Bacchi’s policy analysis, What’s the

Problem Represented to be, this thesis examines how the political discourse on refugee

reception and EBO settlement has changed from the implementation of the LMA Act in 1994 to its amendment in 2019 by observing how the motifs of the implementation and amendment have been expressed, what underlying presumptions or assumptions such expressions hold, and what effects such discourse has. The study shows a discursive shift represented in the political discourse, portraying EBO settlement as contributing to societal degradation and in need of restrictions through reprisals. The main findings show that the discourse constructs an imagery of people seeking asylum as responsible for, and a threat to, Swedish welfare and societal structure. Moreover, the analysis displays a conceptualization of social sustainability as a matter of meeting the interest of the state, rather than the needs of the individual. In sum the study contributes in part to a deeper understanding of how political discourses shape the knowledge and conceptualization of people seeking asylum, the restrictive trajectory of Swedish asylum policy, and highlights the consequences of restrictive state bureaucracies for people seeking protection within Swedish borders.

Keywords: WPR, discourse theory, policy, refugees, asylum seekers, people seeking asylum, migration, segregation, EBO-legislation, housing, refugee settlement

(3)

Acknowledgements

Attending this master and writing this thesis amid an ongoing pandemic has been challenging, oftentimes lonely. Yet, I’m humbled by the support and encouragement from friends, family, and professors at REMESO who have had faith in me and my colleagues throughout this process, and supported and guided us along the way.

I owe a deep sense of gratitude to Gloria Gemma for her keen interest to help me at any stage of my research, her prompt inspirations, and timely suggestions that have enabled me to enhance my work. A special thanks to my supervisor Kristoffer Jutvik, for your wholehearted engagement, intriguing conversations, and for challenging me throughout this semester. To my friends and family who have showed effortless support – Fanny, Clara, Anna, Mamma, and many more: thank you. And to Olle, whose love and encouragement has been the backbone of my strength. You’re my rock.

Hilarian, Gabriela, and Gloria – this master would not have been the same without you. Thank you for broadening and challenging my perception of knowledge, your tireless support, and burning commitment to this field. You have helped me grow as a scholar and individual. I will forever cherish our friendship.

(4)

List of Abbreviations

ABO – Anläggningsboende [Temporary accommodation facility] AMS – Labour Market Board

CJEU – European Court of Justice

EBO – Eget Boende [Own accommodation] EU – European Union

LMA – Lagen om Mottagande av Asylsökande [Reception of Asylum Seekers and Others Act]

Prop. – Governmental Proposition SEK – Swedish Crown

SFS – Swedish Code of Statutes SIV – Immigration Board

SOU – Statens Offentliga Utredningar [Swedish Government Official Reports] WPR – What is the problem represented to be?

(5)

1 Introduction

For a long time, Sweden has been known internationally as one of the most tolerant, egalitarian, multicultural welfare states of the Global North, offering substantial welfare, citizenship and labour rights to people residing within its borders, including immigrants (Schierup & Ålund, 2011). In the recent decade, Sweden and its neighbouring countries have received an increased number of refugees and immigrants whose presence has raised the level of ethnic, religious, and multicultural diversity in host communities, as well as spurred a political discussion about integration policies and their efficiency. A particular focus has been put on the sustainability of settlement and housing policies, with housing being depicted both as an important part of the prerequisite of refugees’ integration to the labour- and housing market and society in full, as well as hindering refugees from integrating as ethnically segregated areas are seen as giving rise to social exclusion and alienation from the majority society.

As of today, people with foreign origin make up about 20% of the Swedish population (SCB, 2021), putting Sweden amongst the top North Atlantic societies with the most immigrants and inhabitants of recent ‘foreign background’ living within its borders (Schierup & Ålund, 2011, p. 46). As citizenship and integration policies in the European countries have started undergoing considerable changes, researchers have identified a change in policy processes that can be likened to a retreat from multiculturalism towards assimilation (see Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010; Schierup & Ålund, 2011; Abdelhady et al., 2020) with neoliberalist politics emphasising the obligation of adaption and duties of the immigrant, forsaking the idea of integration as a mutual process (Borevi, 2010, p. 19).

Between the years of 1994 and 2019, people seeking asylum had the freedom of choosing between accommodation facilities (ABO) 1 and settling in their own housing (EBO), receiving financial subsidies in terms of daily or special financial allowance regardless of choice. Despite the motivations being different to the point of contradiction, the Swedish refugee reception system has undergone several restrictive changes since 1994 in relation to the housing and settlement of refugees. In 2019, geographical restrictions conditioned with the withdrawal of subsidies when choosing EBO settlement in areas that the government listed as in socioeconomic distress was issued as law. Gradually, this restrictive sentiment has transitioned

1_{People seeking asylum are offered two alternatives in terms of housing during their asylum process: to live in}

the Swedish Migration Agency's accommodation facilities (ABO) or to arrange their own accommodation (EBO), the latter often with family members or acquaintances. ABO accommodation can be located at any facility in the country. The Swedish Migration Agency is obliged to arrange ABO accommodation for all people seeking asylum, including those who have previously chosen EBO (see Esaiasson & Sohlberg, 2018).

(7)

into doctrine with mainstream politicians arguing that the Swedish welfare system is under threat for having let people seeking asylum choose freely where to settle, and that the behaviour and choices of people seeking protection have had serious socio-economic consequences for the Swedish welfare state and community. Using discourse theory, this thesis attempts to address discursive changes regarding refugee and EBO settlement in a manner that invokes a discussion on how people seeking asylum are represented; how representations are related to power and knowledge; and how discourses can (re)produce solipsistic knowledge about migration in general, and about the choices, settlement, and character of people seeking asylum in particular.

1.1 Research Question and Purpose

The purpose of this research is to examine how the political discourse surrounding the Swedish refugee reception system and EBO settlement has changed. Using a comparative approach, I will therefore examine how the political discourse regarding the refugee reception system and EBO settlement has changed from when the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Others Act (SFS 1994:137) was implemented on July 1st, 1994, to when the Act was amended 25 years later November 27th, 2019. I will do so by specifically looking at prop. 1993/94:94 and prop. 2019/20:10 written by governing mainstream political parties at the time, particularly observing how the motifs of the implementation and amendment have been expressed, what underlying presumptions those expressions might hold, and what effects they might have. To give the research focus and direction, the following research questions have been constructed:

- How does prop. 1993/94:94 and 2019/20:10 problematize the Swedish refugee

reception system and EBO settlement?

- How has the political discourse regarding the refugee reception system and EBO

settlement changed from the implementation of the LMA Act in 1994 compared to its amendment in 2019?

- What are the discursive, subjective, and lived effects of the discourse regarding the

(8)

1.2 Limitations

The empirical case of this thesis will be limited to the refugee reception system and EBO settlement, namely propositions 1993/94:94 and 2019/20:10. Identifying 1994 and 2019 as two crucial points in time that can be compared to critical junctures (see Pierson, 2004), I have chosen to limit the scope of the thesis to the forementioned years. The selection of the empirical material thus focuses solely on problematizations of the refugee reception system and EBO legislation of the years 1994 and 2019, instead of the entire political debate regarding refugee and EBO settlement over the time span of 1994–2019. Furthermore, the study focuses solely on Swedish mainstream political parties. By delineating the discourse to mainstream parties, the study contributes to current research that often puts extremist discourses in the limelight. It also addresses a current knowledge gap in the focus on mainstream parties and refugee reception policy by employing an empirical approach which allows comparison of comparable cases (see Jutvik, 2020). With this delimitation, there will be limited space for opinions, proposals, and political debates regarding the refugee reception system and EBO settlement aside from the above-mentioned material. The delimitation of the material, as well as the research questions, instead allows for a comparative approach which revolves around how problem representations of refugee and EBO settlement are formulated, and how this representation has transformed. This will be tackled through a WPR approach, allowing an understanding of the construction of knowledge regarding of people seeking asylum in Swedish immigration and integration policies.

1.3 Thesis Outline

Besides the first and introductionary chapter – which has introduced the thesis subject and its limitations together with the purpose of the study and its research questions, the thesis is structured around five main chapters. These chapters consist of a legislative and literature centred background, a theoretical chapter, a methodological chapter, analysis and findings and a concluding discussion. The background chapter engages in a review of the political and legislative changes that has been made within Swedish integration politics in respect to refugee and EBO settlement during the last decades to establish a common ground for the subsequent inquiry of the implementation and amendment of the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Others Act (SFS 1994:137). The chapter also contains a discussion on previous research conducted

(9)

within related fields of study. The chapter Theoretical Framework and Analytical Approach thereafter presents the theoretical outline of the thesis where some key concepts of Michel Foucault’s discourse theory are presented and explained. This chapter is followed by a presentation of the methodological framework employed in the thesis including the research design, case study, the empirical material used in the main analysis, as well as concluding remarks on reflexivity and positionality. In chapter five, Findings and Analysis, the results are presented in a division of three subcategories: (a) Prop. 1993/94:94, (b) Prop. 2019/20:10, and (c) A Discursive Shift. The final chapter contains a summary and discussion on the findings as well as personal reflections and thoughts concerning the findings, including suggestions for further research.

(10)

2 Legislative Background and Literature Review

2.1 A Restrictive Trajectory

Having previously been an emigrant country, Sweden began to witness an increasing immigration after World War II, transforming itself from “a country of emigration to a country of immigration” (Schierup, Hansen & Castles, 2006, p. 199). Despite not having an official guest worker policy (Skodo, 2018, p. 2), labour migrants started arriving in the 1950’s as the country’s industry and service sector expanded and the demand for workers in the agriculture and domestic sectors increased (Dahlstedt & Neergaard, 2017, p. 259). As such, immigration to Sweden was constituted mainly of labor migrants from European countries until the beginning of the 1980s. As a result, immigration was seen as an economic issue related to the operation of the labour market and thus also handled by the Labour Market Board (AMS) (Haberfeld et al., 2019, p. 5). However, since the mid-1970s, Sweden saw a recession in labour migration following the economic crisis in the early 1970s which was replaced by an upsurge in family reunification and people seeking asylum (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2010; Dahlstedt & Neergaard, 2017), inter alia from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland following the Soviet invasion (Dahlstedt & Neergaard, 2017, p. 259).

In consequence, the Immigration Board (SIV) replaced AMS in managing international migration in 1985 and a new dispersal policy was introduced (Haberfeld et al., 2019) which became known as the “Sweden-wide strategy” or “The Whole-of-Sweden Strategy” (Andersson, 1998; Bevelander, 2010). The reform was introduced as a response to local complaints of high numbers of immigrants that was perceived as “a burden on their local resources” (Haberfeld et al., 2019, p. 5). By giving SIV authority to assign newly arrived refugees to their initial municipality of residence, the government anticipated a faster integration process as well as a reduction of the burden on the public budget of the big cities (Ibid.). Ergo, the policy was designed so that people seeking asylum were unable to freely choose their place of residence but were instead assigned settlement based on agreements between SIV and the municipalities on the number and what types of refugees (ethnic/linguistic origin, families/singles) would be assigned where (Ibid.).

In 1992, the Ministry of Culture was given the task of reviewing the reception of people seeking asylum and refuge. The investigation resulted in the commission report Mottagandet

(11)

av asylsökande och flyktingar (SOU 1992:133)2, concluding that a governmental organization should support the independence of people seeking asylum in a system that allows them to live outside of ABO facilities without losing the right to financial support. To increase the autonomy among people seeking asylum, a recommendation was made suggesting the implementation of specific housing subsidies for refugees arranging their own housing (SOU 1993:133). A year later, in November 1993, despite the “Sweden-wide strategy” having been issued less than a decade earlier, the bourgeois government of The Moderate Party, the Liberal Party (then titled the People’s party), the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats submitted a proposition suggesting changes concerning the reception and settlement of people seeking asylum. The proposition argued that all individuals should be free to choose their own accommodation, and that doing so would not only be cost-efficient, but also increase normalisation in society as well as reduce the risk of passivation and isolation (Prop. 1993/94:94).

The proposition also regulated the right to choose between EBO and ABO accommodation, insisting that regardless of choice, financial aid would be provided. The proposition was issued as legislation in 1994 named Lagen om Mottagande av Asylsökande3 (SFS 1994:137, hereinafter referred to as the LMA Act). The LMA Act was conditioned so that the daily allowance, which is paid at a maximum of SEK 71 per person (Migrationsverket, 2021), was reduced or removed for people seeking asylum who refused to participate in organized activities or complicated the investigation of the asylum case by not clarifying their identity or hiding from the authorities (Prop. 1993/94:94). At its onset, the percentage of people expected to choose the EBO option was low. However, since 1994, more than half of newly arrived refugees and people seeking asylum have chosen EBO settlement over ABO accommodation (Myrberg, 2017, p. 326). Approximately 59% of people seeking asylum that reside within Stockholm County have arranged their own housing, the majority as tenants of a relative or acquaintances (Migrationsverket, 2016). As Sweden reached a highpoint of refugee reception in the mid-90’s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and aftermath of the Yugoslavian wars (Ibid., p. 199), the country saw “a rise of restrictive laws, policies, anti-immigrant parties and xenophobia” (Skodo, 2018, p. 6), which commenced Sweden’s restrictive stand on immigration.

From that moment on, the discussion of refugee settlement and housing for newcomers as problematic has made further headway (Myrberg, 2017, p. 327). As some municipalities

(12)

faced a larger influx of people settling than others, a political debate was instigated where local politicians and municipalities argued that responsibilities and obligations must be taken on a national, regional, local as well as individual level. Consequently, changes were made to the LMA Act. Between the years of 1994 and 2003, people seeking asylum who arranged their own accommodation received the decided housing subsidy of SEK 500 per month for single EBO households and SEK 1,000 per month in total for co-living people seeking asylum or families. In 2003, the subsidy was reduced to SEK 350 and SEK 850 per month respectively (SOU 2003:89), to later be completely removed in March 2005.

Some municipalities, such as Malmö, Gothenburg and Södertälje, which have all received a large amount of EBO settlement, have strongly opposed the EBO legislation in the same manner as in 1985, arguing that it overburdens local resources. In 2004, the former Social Democratic mayor of Malmö, Ilmar Reepalu, openly argued against EBO settlement for being a large component of and contributor to the societal problems the municipality had with housing segregation and integration. Likewise, through political motions and debates, other Social Democratic politicians pointed out what they saw as shortcomings of the legislation. However, the Minister of Integration, Nyamko Sabuni (Liberal), and the Minister of Migration, Tobias Billström (Moderate), publicly objected the local complaints in Dagens Nyheter in 2007, writing that:

Sweden will have a good, functioning reception of refugees. The way forward, however, is not to coerce people to find a home where the state tells them to, not even for a limited period. People must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves where they want to live. The state cannot on its own predict where the individual refugee enjoys the greatest chance of obtaining employment – this is something that the individual together with employment services are better at than the state. (Sabuni & Billström, 2007)4

Despite Sabuni and Billström arguing against changing the legislation in 2007, the debate sustained in the following decade with most parties who voted on behalf of the installation of the EBO legislation in 1994 changing track. In 2019, 25 years after its implementation, seven out of eight parties in parliament voted for an amendment of the LMA Act and reinforcement of a dispersal policy after the presentation of prop. 2019/20:10 based on an agreement between the government – being the Social Democrats and the Green Party, and the Centre and Liberal Party (2019/20: SfU11). The amendment came into force on January 1st_{, 2020, with restrictions}

4_{In Swedish: ”Sverige ska ha ett bra och fungerande flyktingmottagande. Men vägen dit går inte genom att tvinga}

människor att bosätta sig där staten vill även om det skulle röra sig om en begränsad tid. Människor måste ges möjlighet att själva bestämma var de vill leva. Staten kan inte ensam förutse var i landet den enskilde asylsökanden har bäst förutsättningar att få jobb - det är den enskilde tillsammans med arbetsförmedlingar bättre på.”

(13)

of financial support for people seeking asylum taking effect in connection with the listing of 32 geographical areas ‘in socioeconomic distress’5 on July 1st, 2020. As of then, people seeking asylum who choose EBO housing in the listed areas are no longer entitled to their daily or special financial allowance (Migrationsverket, 2020).

5_{The 32 municipalities who are registered as socially and economically vulnerable are Borlänge, Borås, Botkyrka,}

Eskilstuna, Filipstad, Gävle, Gothenburg, Halmstad, Helsingborg, Huddinge, Järfälla, Jönköping, Karlskrona, Katrineholm, Kristianstad, Landskrona, Linköping, Malmö, Motala, Norrköping, Nyköping, Perstorp, Sandviken,

(14)

2.2 Literature Review

In this section, I will present a review of previous research and theoretical discussions that are of relevance for this research and relate to (a) what kind of space and social environments that is created through policies, (b) housing segregation, and (c) how state structures enable punitive financial restrictions. In doing so, I aim to give a broad overview of the complexity of spatial and social politics as well as their connection to refugee settlement policies. As I argue that theory provides a framework for interpreting what we observe and what others tell us, and therefore should not be divided from ethnographic and empirical research, the literature reviewed offers both theory-rich discussions on how social change and spatial change are integral to each other as well as empirical research on subjects such as politics of belonging, integration, and refugee settlement.

2.2.1 Constructing Imaginary ‘Opposites’

While citizenship and ethnicity are concepts that have been discussed in social sciences and migration studies for a long time now (see for example Barth, 1969; Anderson, 1983; Gabbert, 2006; Eriksen, 2010; Puskas & Ålund, 2015), belonging have remained a rather uncharted theoretical term. In the same way as place and space has been used interchangeably, the term belonging has often been used synonymously with citizenship. Besides perceptions about what people and bodies are seen as ‘belonging’ to certain spaces shaping socio-spatial environments, notions of belonging also shapes the political discourse regarding integration to spaces. Within such spaces, ideas regarding the inclusion and exclusion of subjects often stem from the same discourses that generates the notion of who and what an integrational subject is in the first place: a notion that constructs an us-versus-them division with the former seen as better than the latter.

Benedict Anderson, whose work Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and

Spread of Nationalism (2006) can be seen as a cornerstone in studies on the origins of

nationalism and the social construction of communities, defines the nation as an inherently limited and sovereign imagined political community, where members imagine themselves as belonging by virtue of imagined common characteristics (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). Despite it being improbable ever meeting most other imagined members, the imagined conception of the group as a political community tied together by kin is strengthened by discursive emphasis on strong mutual interests, shared heritage, collective responsibility as well as “a deep, horizontal

(15)

comradeship” uniting the nation within its definite and limited spatial borders (Ibid., pp. 6-7). Instead of leaning on the common assumption that nations are an organic formation in human society, Anderson (2006) portrays the nation as a cultural and social construct rooted in the fall of monarchies and empires as well as the expansion of the dominant knowledge production, technology, and capitalism.

With respect to migration studies, other influential works on imagined features belonging and politics of belonging include Yuval-Davis (2006/2011), McClintock (1995) and Hadj Abdou (2017). According to Yuval-Davis (2006), politics of belonging is a practice of demarcation that maintains and constitutes a political, imaginary affiliation dividing the world's population into nations based on notions of "us" and "them" constructed through multiple analytical levels, namely: different social locations that emerge along diverse power axes and social categorizations; individuals’ identifications and emotional attachments; and shared ethical and political value systems (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 204). She differentiates between the feeling of belonging as an emotional attachment and feeling of safety that is only articulated when endangered, and politics of belonging where political initiatives are aimed at constructing the emotional belonging in specific communities (Ibid.).

McClintock (1995) and Hadj Abdou (2017) argue that what constitutes these imagined communities are not imaginings of the mind, but rather “historical practices through which social difference is both invented and performed”, where “nationalism becomes […] radically constitutive of people’s identities through social contests that are frequently violent and always gendered.” (McClintock, 1995, p. 353). Accordingly, while painting a picture of the unfamiliar as threatening in an effort to protect the community, a parallel picture is drawn, successively homogenizing those within the community and subjugating internal differences therewithin such as class, gender, age, and political interests (Hadj Abdou, 2017, p. 87). With belonging being a dynamic process and social locations of belonging multidimensional, Yuval-Davis (2011) emphasises the importance of intersectional approaches when examining belonging and politics of belonging to encompass the multiple axes of difference such as class, race, gender, sexuality, stage in life cycle, and ability (Ibid., p. 6, 200).

Having the concept of politics of belonging in mind but turning the gaze towards housing for people seeking asylum and integration – a bisectional process often argued both enriching and intruding upon the funding of the welfare state and its people, and a process related to both social locations, identification, emotional attachments, and ethical and political values – a better look at the foundation of the diverse emotional belongings and politics of belonging in

(16)

whether immigrants can be a part of receiving communities on the same basis as natives, which touches on issues related to both belonging as well as national character and values (Bakkær Simonsen, 2017, p. 15). The attractiveness of a concept like politics of belonging for studies on integration is thus not only its intersectional consideration of multiple narratives of belonging, but also that it encompasses senses of belonging far beyond those which are tied only to ancestry, truths, and places of origin, while simultaneously highlighting political efforts aimed at constructing emotional belonging from the very outset. In the same vein, the concept is also valuable for this research, as it highlights how politics of belonging affect the national sense of Sweden as a community of imagined affinity and heritage, as well as a political community attempting to protect itself from those who deviate from the homogenized norm.

2.2.2 The Race Space Nexus

As previously illustrated, imagined features of belonging do not only outline who is included in a community, but also who is not. Research conducted within the intersection between migration studies and human geography in Sweden often centres around topics such as housing segregation, urban displacement, and spatial polarization (see for example Listerborn, 2018; Molina, 1997/2000; Mukhtar-Landgren, 2005; Malmberg et al., 2020). According to Molina (1997), housing segregation can be categorized into three different intersecting types: socio-economic, demographic, and ethnic segregation. Studies on housing segregation in Europe list Sweden as one of the countries with the highest rates of ethnic housing segregation (Molina, 2006). As of today, Sweden has an economically and socially segregated housing market which certain groups face far more difficulty entering, making it challenging for people seeking asylum to establish in the housing market on the same terms as residents with larger social networks and stable financial means. Yet, as Molina (1997, p. 8) concur, neither income, education nor occupation can explain the disadvantaged positions foreign-born people have in the Swedish housing market.

Within Neely and Samura’s article Social geographies of race: connecting race and

space (2011), approaches towards spatiality, economic and social reproduction are reviewed.

Departing in critical spacial studies (see for example Harvey, 1973/1989/1996; Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 1993) in which social relations are seen as taking geographical form and social and spatial processes accounted as both connected and constantly interacting with and influencing one another, Neely and Samura (2011, p. 1936) argue that space and race-making is a dialectical process where various agents produce and reproduce racialized spaces. Arguing that

(17)

crucial conceptualizations of space are shared by the primary characteristics of race – with both space and race being contested, fluid and historical, relational, and interactional: infused with difference and inequality – Neely and Samura advocate for a spatial approach when examining issues of race. As they underline, and as visible on both international and national stages (see Galvez et al., 2020; Neuman, 2015; Anderson et al., 2018), the majority of spacial conflicts play out as conflicts along racial lines as well (Neely &Samura, 2011, p. 1941). For example, Neuman’s (2015) study on ethnic segregation in Sweden demonstrates that residential mobility amongst Sweden’s native population increases as immigration levels rise, with native Swedes leaving neighbourhoods in what is referred to as ‘white flight’ when the share of non-European immigrants exceeds what Neuman calls the tipping point of 3-4%.

Research has shown that housing serves as a crucial component to people seeking asylum and new arrivals when it comes to building a sense of safety and belonging after being forced into fugitive status; it being one of the main agents determining both living conditions as well as the establishment in society (see Abramsson et al., 2002; Phillips, 2006; Phillimore & Goodson, 2008). Having a home not only facilitates access to healthcare, education, and work, but also enables the chances of an autonomous and independent life (Phillips, 2006). Important material aspects of the asylum process include those such as a place to sleep, eat, and having a meaningful occupation. Such material conditions, and good subjectively perceived conditions, provide a greater chance at building meaning in life (Esaiasson & Sohlberg, 2018, p. 46).

The National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket) published a report in 2015 listing housing shortage as one of the main barriers in the reception and integration of newly arrived migrants, with the trigger being a high-priced rental market and lack of alternative forms of housing. The report shows that cities that can be seen as engines of growth – such as Stockholm that has an operating and thriving labour market and infra structure (Lucas, 2019), are more attractive and sustainable for new arrivals to settle in compared to sparsely populated rural municipalities where there might a larger supply of housing, as labour market accessibility and larger social networks increase the chance of immigrant establishment (Boverket, 2015). Another report by Boverket on social housing and related psychosocial effects of opportunities for people living in EBO accommodation indicates that people seeking asylum who received a residence permit within the past ten years and lived in EBO accommodations during the asylum period were shown to have a slightly better housing and employment integration than refugees living in ABO accommodation (Boverket, 2008, p. 35). The report also showed that despite the municipalities with the highest number of EBO

(18)

residents being Södertälje and Botkyrka, EBO is not only a metropolitan phenomenon, but rather widespread nationally.

In the examples presented above, space and race can be seen as intertwined. In the same vein, housing segregation closely relates to space and race and constitutes a complex matter touching upon issues of democracy, rights, opportunities, and exclusion. As of today, housing is the second most common complex of problem discussed in Sweden, with every third answer concerning difficulties with housing of some sort (Esaiasson & Sohlberg, 2018, p. 46). How people seeking asylum live, however, is the most publicly discussed material condition (Ibid., p. 47). Despite studies showing that EBO housing benefits people seeking asylum, the most discussed problems associated with EBO is overcrowding, where the common picture of multiple families residing together in apartments made for one is drawn and problematized. Three common statements in the debate on EBO settlement are that EBO contributes to housing segregation by people seeking asylum settling in already immigrant-dense areas; that EBO helps increase social networks for people seeking asylum which provide better conditions for developing connection to Swedish society; and that EBO leads to overcrowding and lower housing standards (Esaiasson & Sohlberg, 2018, p. 47). In relation to the last statement, Esaiasson & Sohlberg (2018) draws a different picture, presenting overcrowding – measured as the number of people you share a bedroom with – as a more common recurrence in ABO accommodation than in EBO housing. Their study shows that every second respondent (54%) residing in ABO accommodation stated that they share a bedroom with three or more people, concurrently as the corresponding figure for EBO respondents was only half as big (27%). Similarly, every fifth EBO respondent (20%) stated that they have their own bedroom, whereas only every twentieth ABO respondent (5%) had the same standard. Their study indicates that on average, people seeking asylum residing in ABO accommodation share a bedroom with one more person than people living in EBO accommodation, with the average value for EBO respondents being 2.6 people per bedroom, and the average value for ABO respondents being 3.7 (Ibid., p. 55).

As previously mentioned, there are studies that demonstrate that there is a complex of problems resulting in ethnic segregation that is not related to the choice of migrants, where segregation has been identified as related to residential mobility amongst Sweden’s native population in terms of ‘white flight’ (see Neuman, 2015). As described by Bråmå (2006), departing from studies on ‘white flight’ as a cause of residential segregation in the US, ethnic housing segregation in Sweden does not only encompass native residents leaving areas where immigrants settle, but also arise out of an avoidance-like behaviour where natives avoid settling

(19)

in residential areas where a high rate of immigrants live. Bråmå’s study of 7900 residential areas illustrates how residential segregation of immigrants increased in many Swedish cities during the 1990s, with almost all larger cities having residential areas where the percentage of native residents has decreased considerably since the mid-19th_{century (Bråmå, 2006). While}

there are many theories as to the cause of both the development and ethnic residential segregation – the most common being discrimination in the housing and labour market, socioeconomic differences, voluntary ethnic clustering, among others, Bråmå concurs that the latter is unlikely in Sweden, as ethnic enclaves dominated by one single ethnic group are highly unusual in the Swedish context (Ibid., p. 1127). Oftentimes, the only shared common trait of inhabitants in segregated areas is their past immigration into Sweden (Ibid.). Unlike Neuman (2015), Bråmå (2006) identifies racial, or ‘white avoidance’, as the biggest contributing factor to segregation in Swedish cities, where native residents, through their mobility behaviour, “contribute to the production and reproduction of immigrant concentration areas both by avoiding immigration into residential areas that are, or are in the process of becoming, concentration areas, and by leaving these kinds of areas” (Ibid., p. 1143).

2.2.3 The Violence of Welfare Bureaucracies

As mentioned in the introduction, citizenship and integration policies in the European countries have undergone considerable changes during the last decades, changes that have been likened to a retreat from multiculturalism to assimilation, as national integration policies demand non-European immigrants to adapt to host societies in an assimilating manner (see Borevi, 2010; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010; Schierup & Ålund, 2011; Abdelhady et al., 2020). According to Borevi (2010), current trends of integration policies in Europe focus on active citizenship based on demands on individuals to fulfil certain duties, as distinguished from having individual rights. “Rather than regarding access to rights as a condition for the fulfilment of certain responsibilities attached to citizenship”, Borevi writes, “the fulfilment of certain duties is defined as a condition for achieving rights” (Ibid., p. 27), demonstrating how a duty-line approach to civic integration has replaced the ideal-typical rights-line that has been previously emphasized in Europe. Up until late 2000’s, Sweden has consistently rejected the idea of tying residency or citizenship to participation in integration programmes or to specific integration achievements (Borevi, 2010) such as language and knowledge tests. A 2010 governmental investigation shows a strong opposition for the subject-matter:

(20)

It is not for the state to lay down conditions for citizenship requiring a passed civic education. Just like a democratic state should do for all other citizens, all citizens should be included generally, blindly and equally, without testing their level of knowledge. Besides, anything else would be a historical breach of the supporting, solidarity-based and inclusive idea underlying the Swedish people’s home and welfare state (SOU 2010:16, p. 25)6

As the quote shows, an enforcement of such duties was still highly contested in 2010. As of 2019, however, the January Agreement between the Social Democratic Party, Green Party, Centre Party, and the Liberals put the implementation of duties on the political agenda (Socialdemokraterna, 2019), in turn performing the historical breach they swore against a decade earlier.

Borevi (2019) questions whether mandatory integration programmes are compatible with the position of civic integration, or whether such programmes inflict a “worst case scenario” of ethnic assimilation and exclusion (Ibid., p. 34). The answer, she writes, lies in how hard the penalties for non-compliance or failure of such programmes are. In some countries, the penalties are financial in the sense that subsidies are discontinued if immigrants avoid participation of language courses or refuse settlement where assigned. In others, future citizenship status is contingent on completing the programmes (Ibid.). This embodies what Borevi & Bengtsson (2014) define as negative and positive freedom as well as negative and

positive rights, a perspective that is useful considering housing and housing policies as well: We define negative freedom as freedom from external restraint, for example by other people, and positive freedom as something like possession of resources to fulfil one’s own potential (cf. Berlin, 1958). In consequence, we see negative rights as others’ obligation of inaction towards the right-holder, and positive rights as a corresponding obligation of action towards the right-holder, for example by the state. (Borevi & Bengtsson, 2014, p. 2600, emphasis in original)

Using ‘autonomy’ as a synonym for negative freedom and ‘needs’ as a synonym to positive freedom, Borevi & Bengtsson (2014) describes tension between choice and need in housing policy than can be translated to negative versus positive freedom and rights (Ibid., p. 2600). Financial penalties for not participating, passing civic education or linguistic demands can therefore be seen as an example of external restraints and obligations towards the state for individuals having a negative freedom that are exposed to negative rights.

6_{In Swedish: ”Det anstår inte staten att villkora medborgarskapet med godkänd utbildning i samhällsorientering.}

Precis som en demokratisk stat bör göra för alla sina andra medborgare inkluderas alla medborgare generellt, blint och jämlikt, utan att deras kunskapsmässiga kvalifikationer först prövas. Något annat vore dessutom ett historiskt brott mot den bärande, solidariskt inkluderande idén bakom folkhemmet och välfärdsstaten.”

(21)

Considering enforced financial penalties and restrictive stipulations, Abdelhady et al. (2020) argues that the current changes in European asylum policies should be addressed as a form of neoliberal bureaucratic violence justified by the widespread discourse of the post-2015 influx of people seeking asylum within European borders as a crisis (Ibid., p.122):

Mainstream media and political discourses of a refugee crisis were left largely uncontested and used to justify restrictive asylum policies (…) Representing the inflow of refugees as an institutional crisis, however, led to a drastic shift in asylum policies, which were tacitly accepted on pragmatic grounds. As contending voices do not question the institutional logic of the crisis, the form of bureaucratic violence that proceeded was also left unchallenged. (Abdelhady, 2020, p. 123).

Abdelhady et al. (2020) define bureaucratic violence as a form of abuse enabled through the state apparatus in which asylum regimes sanction people seeking asylum, in turn producing a social and legal marginalisation of people seeking protection. According to them, the administrative and legal barrier met by people seeking protection in Europe exposes people to a series of physical and psychological threats and retaliations inflicting both suffering and exclusion upon those attempting to access the protection of the welfare state (Abdelhady et al., 2020). As bureaucratic violence is performed and conveyed as protective measures within the host communities, its repercussions for people seeking protection remain concealed in an undisputed discourse portraying the inflow of refugees as a crisis, insinuating that the cause of the crisis is the people seeking protection per se, rather than the inadequacy of the bureaucratic system (Ibid.). In accordance with Abdelhady et al., Khosravi (2007) highlights that the public and political discourse often depicts people seeking asylum as political subjects deserving to be punished for irregularly having crossed international borders (Ibid., p.322). Likewise, as irregular border crossings are discursively described as a “supposed act of violation” of the nation state (De Genova, 2013, p.1182), the violence of the bureaucratic system becomes justifiable.

In a similar analysis to Abdelhady et al.’s, Mayblin (2020) conceptualize punitive financial restriction enabled through state structures and measures as a form of ‘slow violence’ hidden in the common discourse on asylum immigration:

Slow violence may be hardly legible, a single perpetrator hard to identify, but it is […] no less deadly. Impoverishment, as slow violence, gradually degrades bodies and minds quietly, behind closed doors, making it largely invisible to the majority of the population. (Mayblin, 2020, p. 4)

(22)

According to Mayblin, economic rights and human rights are two sides of the same coin, and interdependent parts of positive rights and freedom. Consequently, by having their access to social and human rights conditioned by mandatory integration programmes as well as reduced to a bare minimum, people seeking asylum are left in the “daily harms at the hands of the state” (Mayblin, 2020, p. 107). Mayblin similarly argues that people seeking asylum are situated in a systematic impoverishment, as the financial support given to them is often calculated on the income of citizens living far below the poverty line. In the UK, the figure is determined based on what the poorest ten per cent of British citizens spend on essential living items only (Ibid., p. 2). In Sweden, the daily allowance per adult per day is SEK 71 if the refugee lives in a single household, SEK 61 for co-living refugees or families. In addition to food expenses, the daily allowance is calculated to be sufficient for clothes and shoes, medical care and medicine, dental care, hygiene items, other consumables, and leisure activities (Migrationsverket, 2021). Despite costs of living having gone up since the allowance was decided upon, the sum has remained static. In a nutshell, Mayblin argues that people seeking asylum therefore should be seen as coerced to an existence fraught with poverty and uncertainty far below the common standard, from which they themselves struggle to escape.

Mayblin makes a connection between what she identifies as ‘slow violence’ and biopolitics as identified by Foucault (1978; 1997) and Necropolitics by Mbembe (2003). In The

History of Sexuality (1978), Foucault noted how the positive power over life can become a

deadly form of power, writing that apart from being a “calculated management of life”, biopolitics also embrace the “power to expose a whole population to death” (Ibid., pp. 137, 140). Emphasising how people are eliminated in the name of the protection of a nation, a people or a class, Foucault noted how racism “has become the political tool that enables the biological division of the human species and the justification of the extermination of those considered inferior” (Pele, 2020). Drawing on the Foucauldian “making live, letting die”, Mbembe (2003) adds race as the core layer of oppression in a web of intersecting social categories. He offers a decolonial approach on Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, defining Necropolitics as the ultimate expression of sovereignty that has the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die, where racialized and marginalized groups are exposed to lethal violence, distinguishing racism as the main criteria that allow Necropolitics to be performed and succeed in society.

Mbembe (2003) argues that Necropolitics implies a surveillance on individuals that installs “small doses” of death in the daily existences of racialized people (Ibid., pp. 36, 39) with nobody bearing “the slightest feelings of responsibility or justice towards this sort of life

(23)

or, rather, death.“ (Ibid., p. 37). The ultimate outcome does not always have to be death, Mbembe argues, but rather a long experience of death-in-life where people are exposed to social or civil death but kept alive “in a state of injury” (Ibid., p. 21). Whilst ‘hydraulic racism’ operates on institutional levels, ‘nanoracism’ takes form in everyday relations, stigmatizing, injuring, and humiliating “those not considered to be one of us” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 58). Drawing on these authors, the precarious situation for and restrictive measures against many people seeking asylum in Europe, as well as Sweden, can be described as a Necropolitical experience of exploitation, bureaucratic violence, and exposure to death, or death-in-life, enabled through structural political (in)action and denial of social protection (Davies et al., 2017, p. 1264).

Summary of Reviewed Literature

The authors bring together a diverse range of critical interventions of spatial and racial social processes, integration, refugee settlement policies, belonging and violence included. A common observation in the studies mentioned above is that “social change and spatial change are integral to each other” (Massey, 1994, quoted in Neely & Samura, 2011, p. 1946). Furthermore, the research outlined has shown that belonging is increasingly contested in the discourse on integration, where social processes and social relationships compose racial orders in which spatial orders take shape. Concepts and theories such as politics of belonging and ‘white avoidance’ have illustrated how discursive constructions of integration and immigration can be linked to both social and spatial demarcations led by imagined notions of the ‘other’ and oneself. Moreover, discursive descriptions of people who are not considered normative within certain spaces and environments derive from, as well as produce and reproduce, notions about people as not belonging to those spaces (Hadj Abdou, 2017; Yuval-Davies, 2006).

What has also been addressed is how welfare bureaucracies and Necropolitical policies have generated a systematic and institutional exploitation of racialized migrants that is left unchallenged, exposing people to suffering and distress. Furthermore, as described by Mayblin (2020) and Abdelhady et al. (2020), and complemented by Mbembe (2003), bureaucratic and Necropolitical violence deprives people seeking asylum of the right to improve their social and economic conditions, in turn enhancing an already precarious state of existence. In sum, Mbembe argues that Necropolitical (in)action give rise to an existence fraught with informality, precarity, and justified suffering. Considering the current political, social, and symbolic forms

(24)

Mbembe’s notion of Necropolitics and conceptualization of justified violence offers not only a relevant and interesting heuristic category for contemporary critical thought (Pele, 2020), but also shed light on the racialized violence within the European asylum regime, hence tying into this research as well.

(25)

3 Theoretical Framework and Analytical Approach

In this section the theoretical framework, building upon Michel Foucault’s concepts of power, knowledge, and discourse, is presented. To analyse how the political discourse regarding refugee and EBO settlement has changed and to understand the discourses identified, Bacchi’s WPR methodological approach – which has reliance on Foucault’s notions of power through knowledge, language, and discourse – is adopted and explained in the following chapter. This joint framework enables an understanding for the ideas of power and discourse that are key components in this thesis. The theoretical chapter does not aim to describe Foucault’s notion of power and subjectivity in detail. Rather, it aims to provide a section of concepts, including his notions of power, knowledge, and discourse, that are relevant for this research. Taking departure in an introduction to discourse and ideas of Foucault, I thereafter reflect on (a) the notion of power and knowledge as well as (b) the role of language and discourse in inclusive and exclusive practices.

3.1 Introducing Discourse and Foucault

How do the things people say influence society, and how does society on its part influence people? There are many theories with diverse ontological stances on how discourse influences society and vice versa, ranging from approaches linked to semiotics, such as multimodal discourse approaches, and Marxist critical theories focused on different kinds of knowledge communicated through language. In general, discourse theory centres around the significance of human expression in the form of language. While some are given the strong position and privilege of defining what is true, others are excluded from the conversation. Many poststructuralists, including Foucault, consider language use as the main pool of knowledge in which societal structure is created, reproduced, and reformed (Jörgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 11), particularly emphasizing that the social and its relations are often taken for granted and perceived as self-evident and natural despite its coincidences (Carlbaum, 2012, p.18). Discourse theory centres around questions of power combined with institutional hierarchies, with hierarchies giving rise to domination and resistance regarding who is seen as adequate to speak with authority and who is not.

To put it simply, Foucault was convinced that linguistic communication generates discourses that compose assumptions, beliefs, and ideas in a historically contingent social

(26)

system that produces knowledge and meaning. Denoting that discourse is material in effect, he refers to discourses as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 2002, p. 54), in turn relying on the idea of how language and the way we speak about things influences behaviours and shapes practices which under certain circumstances turn into undisputed ‘truths’ that start to appear normal. Foucault defines discourse as follows:

We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation […]. [Discourse] is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form […] it is, from beginning to end, historical – a fragment of history […] posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality. (Foucault, 1972, quoted in Jörgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 12)

As opposed to depicting knowledge as a unilateral reflection of reality, Foucault understands ‘truth’ as a discursive construction within distinct knowledge systems that produce certain knowledge and meanings that determines what is conceptualized as true or false (Foucault & Ewald, 2008, p. 24; Jörgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 13). Hence, discourse can be depicted as a means of organizing knowledge as truth that structures the constitution of social relations through discursive and collective understandings of the discourse as reality.

3.2 The Interconnection of Power, Knowledge and Discourse

A key concept in Foucault’s genealogical work is the relationship between power and knowledge. According to Foucault, ‘power is everywhere’, dispersed and embodied in discourse, knowledge and ‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault, 1991; Rabinow, 1991). Power as a concept is therefore not only exercised by people or groups by way of ‘sovereign’ acts of domination but is pervasive and dispersed in human behaviour that exists everywhere (Foucault, 1998, p. 63; Foucault & Gordon, 2015, p. 94). This kind of ‘metapower’, or ‘regime of truth’, pervades society in a constant negotiation of accepted forms of knowledge, scientific understandings, and ‘truth’. As power constitutes discourse, knowledge, bodies and subjectivities, Foucault points out that power should not be understood exclusively as oppressive, but as productive as well:

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive

(27)

network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression (Foucault, 1980, quoted in Jörgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 12). In this regard, power provides the conditions of possibility for the social (Jörgensen & Philips, 2002, p.12). Foucault notes that humans should be seen as instruments of power, where power is embedded in the knowledge and norms that make up human lives and is manifested in ‘social realities’, in turn producing social norms and influencing how we are expected to behave (Foucault & Gordon, 2015; Foucault, 1998). Power is everywhere: it is "exercised from innumerable points” and found “in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations" (Foucault, 1980, p. 94). Rejecting the idea that authorities are capable of projecting ‘truths’, Foucault underlines that social systems, institutions and ‘regimes of truth’ both produce and reproduce understandings about who is considered an in- versus outsider:

Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault & Gordon, 2015, p. 94).

Power is therefore, according to Foucault, also a source of social discipline and conformity visible in institutional and administrative systems and social services in welfare states, which compels people to discipline themselves, make certain choices and act in expected ways. Through what Foucault calls ‘bio-power’ – a power constituting the dominant system of social control in modern Western society – social control of the wider population is performed through the subjugation of bodies expected to behave in certain ways. This in turn generates a body of knowledge, or put differently, a ‘discursive practice’, that defines what is normal, abnormal, dangerous, etc. (Foucault, 1991). ‘Docile bodies’ – passive, subjugated, and productive individuals, therefore become used to external regulation that by part “[discipline] the body, optimize its capabilities, extort its forces, increase its usefulness and docility, integrate it into systems of efficient and economic controls" (Foucault, 1980, p. 139).

Another mechanism of disciplinary power is the production of specific kinds of knowledge, such as the knowledge of the human sciences and governmental institutions. Relating to ‘regimes of truth’, universal ‘truth’ and facts, this mechanism of disciplinary power has a major role in the governing practices of modern democracies, constituting the core layer of knowledge in society that provides the basis on which how the societal body perceive things as good, normal, incorrect, and so forth (Foucault, 1977). Through the knowledge of human

(28)

sciences, for example, particular kinds of knowledge are produced and made available to consume, allowing us to govern ourselves and our societies in particular ways when it comes to health, integration, economics, and so forth. Foucault writes: “power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Ibid., p. 27). Considering this, knowledge production influences our behaviour and has a controlling effect on our bodies and minds that makes knowledge inseparable from power.

With respect to Foucault’s notion of knowledge being mutually dependent of power, his idea of power also tightly connects with his conception of discourse, where notions of ‘truths’ are created discursively. Through founding much of his work on observations and analysis of the development and behaviour of Western civilization and identifying the creation of categories of abnormality such as insanity and madness, sexuality, or criminality, Foucault recognised that categories were formed using language and political rhetoric in a process in which a certain discourse and appurtenant production of knowledge is normalized and depicted as true (Sheridan & Foucault, 1995). Jörgensen & Philips (2002) writes:

Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge also has consequences for his conception of truth. Foucault claims that it is not possible to gain access to universal truth since it is impossible to talk from a position outside discourse; there is no escape from representation. ‘Truth effects’ are created within discourses. […] [Foucault] makes a link between truth and power, arguing that ‘truth’ is embedded in, and produced by, systems of power. Because truth is unattainable, it is fruitless to ask whether something is true or false. Instead, the focus should be on how effects of truth are created in discourses. What is to be analysed are the discursive processes through which discourses are constructed in ways that give the impression that they represent true or false pictures of reality. (Jörgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 14)

As indicated, Foucault conveys that there is no such thing as a ‘universal truth’. Instead, he argues that truth claims are sustained by power relations (Jörgensen & Philips, 2002). According to Foucault, power does not only generate our social world, but also constitutes the ways in which the world is talked about (Ibid., p. 14). As mentioned, discourse, like power, is not only a negative instance, but also productive, as it interconnectedly with power and knowledge influences our behaviours and shapes how people make sense of the world, its realities and the scope of what we know. Discourses hence work as a central contribution in producing the subjects we are and the objects we claim to know something about. As a

(29)

corollary, subjects and objects are produced within discourses and positioned through the construction of truth where some are positioned as subjects and some as objects (Jörgensen & Philips, 2002).

In line with this, it is arguable that political discourses shape both politics and the policies that politics produce, as well as affect the subjectivity of the people influenced by them. Following the argument outlined, discourses assist in perpetuating negative, as well as positive, images and conceptions surrounding what and who is deemed normal versus abnormal and how abnormalities can be eliminated (Cuff et al., 2015). As can be seen in discourses regarding immigration and refugee settlement, certain ideas and beliefs arise when normality and the hegemonic expectation of society is challenged. In a Foucauldian perspective, ‘truth’ becomes the mere tool in constructing a social world that upholds and reinforces prevailing power relations, in which the notion of truth governs how people act and think about for example immigrants and people seeking asylum. Language, being the unequivocal tool of discourse, therefore has a central role in inclusive and exclusive practices, generating both conceptualizations of what is seen as true as well as subsequent effects of the application of such ‘truth’.

In her studies on political discourses, Boréus (2021) points out that political rhetoric often differentiates between ‘us’ and ‘them’ when it comes to immigration and integration, frequently portraying immigrants as inferior and threatening to the nation state. Boréus notes that politics have the power of deciding on (a) rules and legislation, (b) their implementation, and (c) discursive conceptualizations, as political rhetoric not only aim to persuade voters to vote for their particular party, but also designates to affect political practice and legislations overall (Ibid., p. 3). Whatever the intentions are, Boréus writes, the effects of political statements often symbolize changes in certain discourses. Correspondingly, as political rhetoric’s influences both conceptions of ‘reality’ as well as have legislative effects, Boréus emphasizes that political discourses are a particularly important subject of research. By shedding light on how behavioural norms are visible in policies and how mechanism of disciplinary power constitutes institutional systems and the societal body, Foucault’s concepts help this research to understand discourses as a representation of human thought. It also highlights how effects of regimes of ‘truth’ are created in discourses in relation to refugee and EBO settlement; how problem representations, assumptions, and silences construct discourse; and how power constitutes knowledge, and vice versa.

(30)

4 Methodology

Building on the theoretical foundation outlined in the previous chapter, this chapter explains the methodological steps and considerations that have been taken to answer the research questions. Conforming with Carlbaum (2012), who has used discourse theory to examine discursive changes in Swedish education-policies and their construction of citizenship, I have adopted a qualitative research approach by Carol Bacchi’s called What’s the problem

represented to be? For the reader to understand the methodological approach from which this

research is conducted, I first (a) set out presenting Bacchi’s discourse analytical research approach. Thereafter, (b) the research design is explained followed by methods for collecting data. The chapter is concluded with a (c) discussion of ethical considerations including positionality and reflectivity.

4.1 What’s the Problem Represented to be?

Carol Bacchi’s policy analysis approach What’s the problem represented to be? (hereinafter referred to as WPR) serves to understand the effects of political problematizations, with the foundation being that the problems formulated in politics do not exist independently as of themselves but are constructed from their proposed solutions. WPR has a critical discourse-analytical approach inspired by Foucault and social constructivist theories, in turn making it a great tool for examining existing perceptions and notions of prevailing political problems as well as the power relations produced or reproduced by these notions (Bergström and Boréus, 2018, p. 271). A point of departure in the WPR-approach is that there is no explicit nor correct way of looking at or dealing with societal problems, as contrasting perceptions exist as a result of them originating from different discourses (Ibid., pp. 271–272). Drawing on Foucault, Bacchi thus argues that a critical analysis is not equivalent to pointing out what is wrong with problem representations. Instead, WPR is about understanding why things are the way they are (Bacchi, 2009, p. 39).

The WPR-approach focuses mainly on policy and policy processes. As I examine the discursive change concerning the refugee reception system and EBO settlement of 1994 and 2019, I have turned to political propositions in which asylum laws are constructed and altered as a line of motifs and actions. As stated by Bacchi, the role of policies in government has a cultural dimension where "the very idea of ‘policy’ becomes a subject of interrogation"

Shifting Responsibilities: Constructing Threats and Restricting Autonomy : A Discourse Analysis on the Housing and Settlement of People Seeking Asylum in Sweden