Perception of Russia's soft power and influence in the Baltic States

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Citation for the original published paper (version of record):

Simons, G. (2014)

Perception of Russia's soft power and influence in the Baltic States.

Public Relations Review

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.10.019

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ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Public

Relations

Review

Perception

of

Russia’s

soft

power

and

influence

in

the

Baltic

States

Greg

Simons

∗

UppsalaCentreforRussianandEurasianStudies,Box514,SE75120Uppsala,Sweden

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t

i

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Articlehistory: Received7August2014

Receivedinrevisedform24October2014 Accepted30October2014 Keywords: Russia Softpower Influence BalticStates Perception Coercion

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Thispaperseekstoexploreandanalysethedifferentmeansandmechanismsofinfluence employedbyRussiaonthethreeBalticStates(Estonia,LatviaandLithuania).Byinfluence, itmeanstheattempttotryandgetanothercountrytobehaveinamannerthatbenefits theinfluencer’spolicyand/orinterests.Assuch,thiscanentailexertingoneoftwoforms ofpower,hardorsoft(asdefinedbyNye,2004)tobringaboutthecompliance.Thecurrent paperrestrictsitsfocustothosemechanismsrelatedtoshapingopinionandperception, suchaspublicdiplomacy(initsvariousforms).

Tobeginwiththepapershalldefinethevariousconceptsused–influence,powerand publicdiplomacy.ItshallthenshifttothedifferentRussianinstitutionsthathavebeen createdtoshapeandmanageinfluence,suchasRusskyMirorRossotrudnichestvo.Plus therearethoseotherelementsthatexistintheregion–RussiancompatriotsandRussian languagemedia(bothlocalandexternaltotheBalticStates).Thenthepapershalldealwith relationsbetweenRussiaandtheBalticStates,withafocusuponrecenthistory.Sources shallnotbelimitedtoacademicliteratureandmassmediaresources,butwillalsoinclude interviewsforan‘insider’perspectiveontheissue.Theresponsesshallbeusedtoaddress thefollowingquestion:HowdopeopleintheBalticStatesperceiveRussiansoftpowerand influence?

1. Introduction

Giventhevariousupheavalsthatarecurrentlyandsimultaneouslyoccurringaroundtheworlditmaybepossibleto overlooksomeofthemorediscreetandindirectmeansofgainingforeignpolicygoalsandinterests.However,theissue ofsoftpowerandinfluenceininternationalrelationsisahottopicanditsinterestandrelevanceisfarfromdecreasing. Howdoesonecountryinfluenceanotherthroughtheuseofpublicdiplomacyandsoftpower?Thevariousmechanismsand structuresthatarecreatedandemployedtobringaboutinfluencemaybedevelopedoveralongperiodoftime.Therealso needstobealignmentbetweenwordsanddeeds,plusasustainedandconsistenteffortifthereistobeachanceofsuccess. ThispaperconcernsthedifferentmeansandmechanismsthatRussiaemploysinitsefforttotryandinfluence develop-mentsandeventsintheBalticStates(Estonia,LatviaandLithuania).ThesecountriesprovideRussianpublicdiplomacyand influenceeffortswithasignificantchallenge,notleastbyheldstereotypesandperceptions,andtheveryeffortsthatare employed.Theorientationoftheworkisthatitistakenfromtheperspectiveofhowtheactionsandactivitiesofofficial Rus-siangovernmentalandbureaucraticstructuresarereceivedandinterpretedbyEstonians,LatviansandLithuanians.There

∗ Tel.:+46702759940.

E-mailaddress:Greg.simons@ucrs.uu.se http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.10.019

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isafocusonthepublic’sunderstanding,ratherthanafocusonthepoliticalelite.ThepoliticalelitehaveaclearWestern orientedfocusinpolicy,suchasmembershiptoNATO,theEUandadoptingtheEuro.Qualitativeresearchwasconducted withresidentsoftheBalticStatesinthespringof2014,whichgeneratedsomeinterestingindicativefindings.Therefore, whatdotheresponsesindicateaboutthenatureofRussiansoftpowerandinfluenceintheBalticStates?

Afirststepistodiscussandexplainthetermspublicdiplomacy,softpowerandpersuasion.Theseareallintegralconcepts thatareused,thereforetheymustbedefined.Therealsoneedstobeanexplanationastohowthesedifferentconcepts interactwitheachother.HowRussiaengagesinpublicdiplomacyandinfluenceisthenextsubjectmatter.Recently,Russia hasinvestedmuchtimeandeffortinincreasingitspublicdiplomacyprogrammesandcapacity.Ashortsectionthenfollows, onthestateofrelationsbetweenRussiaandtheBalticStates,whichisintendedtogivecontexttoanswersinthefollowing section.Thefollowingsectionprovidesdetailsofresponsesreceivedbytheauthortoqualitativeresearchthatwasconducted amongEstonians,LatviansandLithuanianstogainaninsightintohowRussiaandRussiansareperceived,andtoidentify thepositiveandnegativeattributesthatareassociatedwiththeirneighbour.Thesurveyworkisintendedasafirststeptoa largermorecomprehensivefollowupatalaterstage,whichmeansthattheresultsarenottobeviewedfromtheperspective asbeinggeneralisations,butpossibleindicationsthatshouldbeinvestigatedfurther..

2. Publicdiplomacy,softpowerandpersuasion

ThetermPublicDiplomacy(PD)isamuchcontestedandattimesmisunderstoodtermandpractice.Althoughthere issomemeasureofagreementonwhatconstitutesitscoreactivities(Paul,2011).Inaddition,itisunderstoodasbeing atwo-wayand interactiveformofcommunication(Jowett&O’Donnell,2012: p.288).PDisaformofgovernmentto people(G2P)communicationandthereforediffersfromtraditionaldiplomacythatisaformofgovernmenttogovernment communication.“Publicdiplomacycomprisestheeffortsofgovernmentsfromonenationtosendmessagesdirectlytothe “people”inanothercountryandispartofsoftpower”(Coombs&Holladay,2010:p.299).Thisisaconstantlyevolving formofcommunicationandinteraction,whichrespondstochangesinthepolitical,socialandtechnologicalenvironment (Hocking,2005).Onepossibleconcisedefinitionisasfollows.

Publicdiplomacy[...]dealswiththeinfluenceofpublicattitudesontheformationandexecutionofforeignpolicies. Itencompassesdimensionsofinternationalrelationsbeyondtraditionaldiplomacy;thecultivationbygovernments ofpublicopinioninothercountries;theinteractionofprivategroupsandinterestsinonecountrywithanother;the reportingofforeignaffairsanditsimpactonpolicy;communicationbetweenthosewhosejobiscommunication,as diplomatsandforeigncorrespondents;andtheprocessofinterculturalcommunications(Jowett&O’Donnell,2012: p.287).

TherearemanydifferentpartsandcomponentsofPD,whichisseenintheabovementionedquote.However,itisnot onlyaboutinformingforeignpublics,butitisalsoaboutinfluencingtheminamannerthatbenefitstheforeignpolicyand interestsofthecountrycommunicatingthemessage(Farwell,2012:pp.47–53;Snow,2006:p.227).Aspecificmethodis embarkedupon,toinfluencetheforeignpublics,butthereareusuallysomeboundaries.Theaboveisashortsummaryof the‘word’aspectsofPD,nowtoturntothe‘deeds’part.

PDprogrammesandmeansintermsofphysicaldeedsarewideandvariedinpracticeandincludedifferentoptions. VariousactivitiesassociatedwithPDincludes:educationalexchangesandprogrammesforscholarsandstudents,language andculturetraining/education,visitorprogrammes,culturalexchangesandevents,radioandTVbroadcasting.Elements associatedwiththeseactivitiesareadvocacy,listening,cultureandexchangediplomacy,andinternationalbroadcasting (Paul,2011:p.35;Jowett&O’Donnell,2012:pp.287–288).ThereareatotalofthreedifferentaspectsassociatedwithPD: •“Information:informationmanagementanddistributionwithanemphasisonshort-termeventsorcrises;

•Influence:longertermpersuasioncampaignsaimingtoeffectattitudinalchangeamongstatargetpopulation(sometimes referredtoas“movingtheneedle”);and

•Engagement:buildingrelationships,alsooverthelongterm,tocultivatetrustandmutualunderstandingbetweenpeoples (betheygroups,organisations,nations,etc.)”(Paul,2011:pp.43–44).

PDcantakealotoftimeandefforttocreateadesiredeffectuponthetargetedaudience,itisaboutcreatinginteraction andrelationshipsthroughcommunication.Itisalsodonewithaparticularpurposeinmind,toassistwiththerealisationof foreignpolicygoals.Thisfactcanbehedgedinpolitephrasesandrhetoricthatbothpartiesgetsomethingfromthemutual interaction.PDisalsolinkedtothenotionofpower,namelysoftpower,althoughsoftpowerandPDisnotthesamething. Thisisameansoftryingtocultivateandprojectsoftpower(Hayden,2012).Thisbegsthequestion,whatispowerwithin thecontextofPDandinternationalrelations?

Therearetwoalternativewaysofwieldingpower–throughfearandcoercionorthroughattractionandco-opting.One needstobearinmindthat“poweralwaysdependsonthecontextinwhichtherelationshipexists.”Ifobjectivesseemto belegitimateandjust,othersmaywillinglyassistwithouttheuseofcoercionorinducements(Nye,2004:p.2).Inorderto proceed,thereneedstobeanunderstandingofpowerandhowitisrelatedtoPD.

PDisameansofpromotingacountry’ssoftpower.Atitscore,softpoweris“theabilitytoaffectotherstoobtainthe outcomesonewantsthroughattractionratherthancoercionorpayment.”Eachcountry’ssoftpowerisconnectedtoits

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resourcesofculture,valuesandpolicies(Nye,2008:p.94).Ifacountryislikedandadmired,itismorelikelytobemimicked orcopied.Thereforethepowerofattractionisthebasisforsoftpower,whichisusedtoshapethepreferencesofothers.Nancy Snowidentifiesseveraldimensionsthatcancreateasoftpoweradvantageforacountry.Theseare“whencultureandideas matchprevailingglobalnorms,whenanationhasgreateraccesstomultiplecommunicationchannelsthatcaninfluence howissuesareframedinglobalnewsmedia,andwhenacountry’scredibilityisenhancedbydomesticandinternational behaviour”(2009:p.4).Nye(2008:p.102)notesthat“policiesthatappearasnarrowlyself-servingorarrogantlypresented arelikelytoprohibitratherthanproducesoftpower.

GiventhecurrentcrowdedmarketplaceinthePDenvironment,publicscanbeoverwhelmedbythedelugeofinformation thatconfrontsthem.Thiscreatesasituationwherefocusbecomesacrucialcomponent.Assuch,theroleofkeyinfluencers, suchaseditors,isingreatdemand.Thisisbecausetheybecomeasourceofpowerbytheirabilitytofocusaudienceattention. Thecredibilityofthesepeopleandthosethattheyrepresentmustbeintactasthisisanimportantsourceofsoftpower. “Politicshasbecomeacontestofcompetitivecredibility”(Nye,2008:p.100).Communicatingtoascepticalaudienceis verydifficult,anditisnotmerelyamatterofincreasingthebudgetandincreasingtheamountofcommunicationtogetthe desiredmessageacross(Melissen,2005:p.7).AninterestingandimportantpointmadebyNye(2008:p.106)isthat“itis sometimesdomesticallydifficultforthegovernmenttosupportpresentationofviewsthatarecriticalofitsownpolicies. Yetsuchcriticismisoftenthemosteffectivewayofestablishingcredibility.”Wheninformationisplentifulandavailable, credibilityisthemechanismthatenablestheconversionofculturalresourcesintothesoftpowerofattractiontoacountry, theirpoliticsandvalues.

Contextexertsastronginfluenceonthesuccessorfailureofsoftpower,specificconditionsandcircumstancesofthe exactmomentintimeandspaceaffecttheoutcome(Rugh,2009:p.6).Anaudience-centredapproachisneededwhen communicatingbecausecredibilityisverymuchintheeyeofthebeholder.PDmustbeflexibleandnotaonesizefitsall approachascredibilityisverydynamic.Itisalsosituationspecificandculturebound.Thismeansthatcredibilityisa multi-dimensionalconstructthatconsistsofexpertise,trustworthinessandgoodwill,allthreeneedstobeengagedsimultaneously (Gass&Seiter,2009:p.162).Oneoftheassumptionsheldbypolicymakersisthatsomepublicswouldcometoseethings ‘ourway’iftheyonlyhadaccesstothe‘right’information.However,preachingtoaforeignpublicbyagovernmentis rarelyapathtosuccess.Oneofthefundamentalissuesthatneedtobetakenintoaccountistheinformationfiltersusedby people.“Butallinformationgoesthroughculturalfilters,anddeclamatorystatementsarerarelyheardasintended.Telling isfarlessinfluentialthanactionsandsymbolsthatshowaswellastell”(Nye,2008:p.103).Anotherconsiderationis thatthegovernmentisnotthesolemessengerrelayinginformationandimpressionsaboutacountry,itissomethingalso done(consciouslyandsub-consciously)byindividualcitizens(suchastourists)andorganisations(suchascorporations).If contradictionsappearwithgovernmentledcommunications,itcouldcreateasenseofmessagedissonance.

Asstatedearlier,PDisaformofcommunicationthatgetsitsmessageacrossbybothwordanddeed.Thiscommunication ismeanttopersuadeapointofvieworforthetargetaudiencetoadoptaparticulardesiredbehaviourinavoluntarymanner. “Theprocessofpersuasionisaninteractiveoneinwhichtherecipientforeseesthefulfilmentofapersonalorsocietalneed oradesireifthepersuasivepurposeisadopted.”Theprocesscanalsoberegardedasbeenreciprocalandtransactionalwhere boththemessengerandrecipienthavetheirneeds,goalsordesiressatisfied(Jowett&O’Donnell,2012:p.33).Persuasion canevokethreedifferentresponses–responseshaping,responsereinforcingandresponsechanging(Jowett&O’Donnell,2012: pp.33–34).Persuasionistheprocessthatcanultimatelyleadtotheendresult,whichisinfluence.

RobertA.Dahldefinesinfluenceas“arelationamonghumanactorssuchthatthewants,desires,preferences,orintentions ofoneormoreactorsaffecttheactions,orpredispositionstoact,ofoneormoreactorsinadirectionconsistentwith–and notcontraryto–thewants,preferences,orintentionsoftheinfluence-wielder(s)”(Dahl&Stinebrickner,2003:p.17).Then henarrowsdownthedifferentwaysofunderstandinginfluence,wherethenotionsofdistribution,gradation,scopeand domaincanserveasguidestotheobservationandanalysisofinfluence.Influenceisoftenunderstoodasa“causalconnection betweenanactor’spreferenceonanoutcomeandmaybealsotheformoftheoutcome”(Nagel,1975:pp.29and55).

Thusfartherehasbeenlittleconnectionmadebetweensoftpower,influence,andpropagandawithpublicrelations. Therearevariousinterconnectionsbetweenthesedifferentconceptsandpractices.Asaninitialpointofdepartureonthis road,adefinitionofpublicrelationsneedstobegiven–intermsofwhatitisandwhatitseekstoachieve.Thefollowing definitionsareprovidedforthispurpose.

Publicrelationsisthemanagementfunctionthatestablishesandmaintainsmutuallybeneficialrelationshipsbetween anorganisationandthepublicsonwhomitssuccessorfailuredepends(Cutlip,Center,&Broom,2000:p.6). Amorecontemporarydefinitionofpublicrelationslinkstoamuchmorefunctionalunderstandingofthepractice.

Inbasicdescriptivefunctionalterms,publicrelationsinvolvesthecommunicationandexchangeofideaseitherin responseto,ortofacilitatechange.Itentailsargumentandcasemaking.Itisthusintrinsicallyconnectedtopolicy initiatives,theirpromotionandresponsestothesebyorganisationalactorsandtheirrepresentatives(L’Etang,2011: p.18).

Nowtheconnectionsbetweenthesedifferentformsofcommunicationcanbemoreeasilyfound.Forexample,creating andmaintainingmutuallybeneficialrelationshipsbetweenmessengerandreceiverisinvolvedinsoftpowerandpublic relationsinordertoincreasethechancesofinfluencethatwouldbenefitthecommunicator.Thesearebothactiveand

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engagedformsofcommunicationbetweentheparties.Propagandadiffersinsofarasthereislessfeedbackandinteractivity intheprocess,itdoeshowever,seektoinfluencethroughamorepassiveformofcommunicationrelationshipbetween messengerandreceiver.Inallcasesthereisanattempttocreateanemotionalbondbetweenthemessengerandreceiver assuchabondislikelytocreatethecontextforcreatingopinionandspurringaction(forexampleattractionoravoidance). 3. Russia’smeansandprogrammesofinfluenceandsoftpower

TheRussianapproachtosoftpowerandpublicdiplomacydiffersaccordingtothetargetaudiencethatisbeinginteracted with.Thereareseeminglytwobroadapproachestothenatureofthecommunicationandthegeneratedrelationship(Saari, 2014;Simons,2014).Oneisrelatedtotherelationship,communicationandexpectationswithcountriesinpost-Sovietspace, thoseex-Sovietrepublicsthatarenowindependentstates.Itisassumedthattheseweaker(especiallyinaneconomicsense) countriesshould‘naturally’gravitateandbedrawntothestrongerRussianstate.Thesharedhistoricalexperience,culture, languageandsoforthofthesecountrieswithRussiamerelyaddtotheconvictionofthisbelief(Cameron&Orenstein,2012; Trenin,2009).BeyondtheCommonwealthofIndependentStates,Russiaattemptstoprojectitsattractiveelements,such assport,education,artsandculture.Therehasbeenamoveawayfromanideologicalbasisofpublicdiplomacytoamuch morepragmaticandpolicy/goalorientedapproach.

IntermsofRussia’sabilitytoconductitself(effectively,intermsofachievinggoalsandobjectives)ontheinternational stagerequiresengaginginofferingcompetitiveattractiveideastotheworld.IgorJurgensseesthatgloballeadershiprequires “amoralauthority,theappealofsuccessstoriesofthecountryasawholeoritsseparatenationalandtransnationalprojects.” Andthatthisleadershipisnotderivedfromthepotentialofmilitarypowerthatispossessedbyacountry.1 _The_initial

obstacletoachievingthissuccessistoformulatenationalvaluesandidealsthatarecredibleandcanbecommunicated. AccordingtoJurgens,Russiahasnotyetbeenabletoformulateitsvalueideaatthisstage.Oneofthesuggestedvaluesisto re-formulateahistoricalidea,whichwasRussiaactingasashieldbetweentheMongolsandEurope.Inthecontemporary contexttoreshapethisvaluetoRussiaactingasaculturalandtransportbridgebetweenEastandWest.

OtherideasonRussia’schallengesandopportunitieshavealsobeenexpressed.Onthe28thofOctober2011,thequestion ofhowRussiacancreateamorepositiveimageinthelocalmediawasdiscussedbytheBalticForumofCompatriotsinthe RussiantownofPushkinintheLeningradregion.Thegeneralbeliefseemstolieinaninformationwarthatisbeingwaged betweenRussiaandtheWest,whichistherootofRussia’simageproblems.Oneofthespeakers,ModestKolerov(currently editoroftheportalRegnum,andformerlyheadoftheDepartmentforInterregionalandCulturalRelationsWithForeign CountriesinthePresidentialAdministration),statedthattheblameshouldnotbeplacedonmassmediaoutletsintheBaltic States.

ThemainsourceofinformationonRussia,especiallythenegativemythsaboutthestateofmodernsocietyinRussia, claimsaboutthetotaldominanceofcriminality,politicalandmediarestrictions,ideologicalcontrol,thefactorof generalnegativitytowardtheSovietUnionaretheRussianmedia,particularlythefederaltelevisionchannelsand tabloids.2

Thisobservationtakesnoteoftheneedtobemindfulofwhatisappearinginthedomesticmedia,whichmaypotentially ‘contaminate’thenationalimageabroad.Inthisregard,therootofthisparticularproblemisfoundwithinthedomesticmedia systemandtransmittedtotheoutsideworld.Anumberofotherproblemswereidentifiedtoo.Kolerovnotedanumberof weaknessesintheRussianlanguagemediaoutletsintheBalticStates.Theseincludedalackofpersonnel,financialdifficulties, anditisaclosedmediaspace.Byclosedmediaspace,thisreferstotheRussianlanguagepressbeingisolatedandshutoff fromtheircolleaguesandinformationappearingintheEstonian,LatvianandLithuanianmedia.Additionally,thelackof specialistsinRussiawithknowledgeofEstonian,LatvianandLithuanianlanguagehasaneffectofamplifyingtheproblem oflackofknowledgeandcommunication.3_These_identified_problems_illustrate_the_need_to_understand_the_culture_and

languageofyourtargetaudiencesinordertoeffectivelycommunicatetoandinfluencethem.

Anumberofstepsandinnovationshavebeentakentotryand shapeandcreate Russiansoft powerandinfluence moreeffectively.Anumberofthesehaveastrongphysicalaswellasonlinepresence.TheAlexanderGorchakovPublic DiplomacyFoundation(http://gorchakovfund.ru/),whichhasinformationonitswebsiteinRussianonly,setsoutitsmission andpurpose.Itprovides“anintegratedsupportfordomesticcivilsocietyinstitutions.Togetherwecanachievethesynergy, activelyworkingonacommongoal:thecreationoftheworldpublicthecorrectpresentationofRussiaandournational culturalvalues.”4_It_appears_as_though_the_primary_role_for_this_organisation_is_to_perform_an_organising_and_coordinating

bodyforotherNGOsworkinginthesphereofinternationalrelations.Partofthegivenmissionstatementincludes“[...]the

1 _Jurgens,_I.,_Tough_call_“soft_power”,_{“Russisikaya}_Newspaper”_–_Federal_Edition_No.₅₅₈₃_(207),_{http://www.rg.ru/2011/09/16/yurgens.html}_,₁₆_September

2011(accessed7November2011).

2

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(Informationwarwithourselves),DzD.ee, http://www.dzd.ee/624820/informacionnye-vojny-s-samimi-soboj/,7November2011(accessed11November2011).

3 _Ibid.

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e(Aboutthe Founda-tion),GorchakovPublicDiplomacyFoundation,http://gorchakovfund.ru/about/(accessed26January2013).

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Foundation’smissionistopromotethedevelopmentofpublicdiplomacy,aswellastofacilitatethecreationofafavourable forRussia,social,politicalandbusinessenvironmentabroad.”5_The_above_mentioned_organisation_is_intended_to_create_an

interactivedialoguewithdifferentforeigntargetgroups,andtoformarelationshipwiththeminordertobeabletoinfluence opinionsandperceptionsconcerningRussia.ThissuggeststhatNewPublicDiplomacyisbecomingthepreferredmethod, whichisfacilitatedwiththerelationshipmarketingapproach.

TheGorchakovFoundationdoesrunanumberofspecialprogrammes,suchastheBalticDialogue(forRussianspeaking youthfromtheBalticStates)andtheCaucasusDialogue.In2014theBalticDialoguewasrunforthethirdtime.According toinformationontheBalticDialoguepage,itincludesgatheringyouthfromRussia,Estonia,LatviaandLithuaniatolisten tolecturesgivenbyRussianandBalticexpertsoncertainthemesrevolvingaround“youth”and“civilsociety.”Theformat appearstobeanexerciseofrelationshipbuildingthroughthephysicalinteractionoftheparticipantsandorganisers.

RusskiyMirfoundation(http://www.russkiymir.ru/en/)wasestablishedbyPutinin2007andisanagencytaskedwith increasingRussia’ssoftpowerbase.Accordingtoinformationonthewebsite,itsmissionis“topromoteunderstandingand peaceintheworldbysupporting,enhancingandencouragingtheappreciationofRussianlanguage,heritageandculture. RusskiyMirpromotestheteachingoftheRussianlanguagewithinRussiaandabroad–bothtonewlearnersofthelanguage andtothosewhoalreadyknowandloveRussianandwishtorecaptureormaintaintheirfluency.RusskiyMirbringsRussia’s richhistorytolife,andshowcasesvibrantexamplesofRussianartandculturearoundtheworld.RusskiyMirreconnects theRussiancommunityabroadwiththeirhomeland,forgingnewandstrongerlinksthroughculturalandsocialprograms, exchangesandassistanceinrelocation.”Thereforeitisnotonlyaboutinfluencingforeignaudiences,butalsoconcerns interactingwithRussiancompatriotcommunities.ThepublicdiplomacyagencyRossotrudnichestvo(http://rs.gov.ru/)was createdin2008viaapresidentialdecree.Accordingtomaterialonthewebsiteoftheagency,“Rossotrudnichestvo imple-mentsprojectsaimedatstrengtheninginternationalties,closercooperationinthehumanitariansphereandtheformation ofapositiveimageofRussiaabroad.Ongoingactivitieshelptoovercomeculturalbarriers,negativestereotypesandother obstaclestothedevelopmentofinternationalcooperation.”Bothoftheseorganisationshaveaphysicalpresencearound theworld,andaregearedtowardspromotingaspectsofRussiansoftpowerthroughculturalaspectsand‘humanitarian cooperation.’6

Anothernon-profitorganisation,whichwasfoundedin2008,istheHistoricalMemoryFoundation.Thedirectorofthe organisationisahistorianbythenameofAlexanderDyukov.Accordingtotheorganisation’swebsite,itsobjectivesare“to provideassistanceforunbiasedscientificresearchesofrelevantissuesofRussianandEasternEuropeanhistoryofthe20th century.”ThereisalsoalistofsomeofthedifferentactivitiesthatHistoricalMemoryFoundationengagesin.

•TopicalsubjectresearchofRussianandEasternEuropeanhistoryofthe20thcentury;

•TopicalsubjectfurtheranceofresearchesofRussianandEasternEuropeanhistoryofthe20thcenturyandtheir publica-tions;

•Conductofscienceconferencesandroundtables;

•MassmediapresentationofresearchresultsofrelevantissuesofRussianandEasternEuropeanhistoryofthe20thcentury.7

Theseactivitiesdemonstratethattheorganisationseekstotryandinfluencethenarrativeonarelativelynarrowset ofissuesandtopicsrelatedtohistoricalmatters,throughproducingreadingmaterialandthroughorganisingface-to-face interactions.Thematerialonthewebsiteisavailableintwolanguages,RussianandEnglish.Although,thereisalotof informationmissingintheEnglishlanguageversion,suchasthenamesoftheBoardofTrusteesandthosewhoworkatthe Foundation,whichappearintheRussianlanguageversion.Anothersignificantdifferencebetweenthetwoversionswasthe presenceofaRedStarsymbolontheRussianlanguagesite,whichwasabsentonthemuchmoreneutral(objective)looking visualsoftheEnglishlanguageversion.Theinformationfromthewebsite,whichisgivenabove,hintsthattheorganisation attemptstosegmentitstargetedpublicsonatleasttwodifferentlevels–internationalanddomestic.

4. RussianrelationswiththeBalticStates

ThissectionisnotintendedasadetailedstudyofrelationsbetweenRussiaandtheBalticStatesoverthecenturiesof interactionsbetweenthem,butaquickoverviewofrelationsinthepost-Sovietperiodinordertogivecontextandmeaningto someoftheanswersprovidedbyrespondentsinthequalitativeresearch.Havingsaidthat,theunderstandingandperception ofhistoryplaysanimportantintherelationsbetweenRussiaandtheBalticStates.Thereisalsothequestionofidentity, whichinanumberofregardsistiedtotheaspectofrecenthistory.

TheBalticStatesareaninterestingcaseinthestudyofRussiansoftpowerandinfluenceforanumberofreasons,among them,intheRussianperceptiontheyliesomewherebetweenthetwodistinctlinesofRussianpublicdiplomacy(Sleivyte,

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(MissionandObjectives),GorchakovPublicDiplomacyFoundation,http://gorchakovfund.ru/about/mission/(accessed26 January2013).

6_Humanitarian_cooperation_in_this_sense_of_the_word_includes_scientific_and_educational_{collaboration}_between_the_Russian_organisation_and_the_recipient.

Forexample,avisacanbeissuedfreeofchargeiftheinvitationisissuedbyaneducationalorganisationunderthehumanitariancategory.

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2008:35).Ontheonehand,theywereoncepartoftheSovietUnion,havingbeenforciblyincorporatedin1940andagainafter WorldWarTwo.ButallthreeBalticStatesareintegratedintotheWesternsphere,beingfullmembersofboththeEuropean UnionandNATO.FromtheperspectiveofgovernmentsoftheBalticStates,therearetwopossiblesetsofrisksemanating fromRussia.Firstly,foundinthecontextofthestateinadirectcontextthreateningtheirterritorialintegrityorindependence, suchasthecaseinJune1940withtheinvocationofthemutualdefencetreatythatleadtolossofindependence.Asecond contextisanindirectone,wheretheBalticStatesaresubvertedfromwithin,suchasthemobilisationofRussiancompatriots thatareresidentthere.

Whenindependencewasregainedin1991,theBalticStateswentthroughaverydifficultperiodofrelationswithRussia. RussiantroopsremainedstationedontheterritoryoftheBalticStatesforsomeyears,areminderofthelegacyoftheSoviet Union.PoliticaldiscourseonnationalidentityinRussianpoliticaldiscoursewashighlysecuritised,whichaddedtotensions, especiallyregardingtheattitudetowardstheBalticStatesasbeingabastionofanti-Russianness(Morozov,2004).TheBaltic StatessoughtmembershipandintegrationintoWesternclubs,suchastheEuropeanUnionandNATO,asasafeguardagainst anypossiblethreatsinthefuturefromRussia.Movestojoin,especiallyNATO,causedRussiatoreactandopposeoratleast attemptingtogainsomeleverageintheprocess(Kramer,2002).TheentryofEstonia,LatviaandLithuaniaintotheEUand NATOin2004seemstohavebroughtsomemeasureofsecurityguaranteeforthepoliticalleadershipofthecountriesfrom possibledirectactionbyRussia.ToinfluencedecisionmakingintheBalticStates,Russiadoesstilluseeconomictools,such asthoserelatingtoenergysuppliesandtheimpositionoftargetedtradeembargoes(Grigas,2012;Sleivyte,2008).However, someinternalquestionsneedtobeaddressedaswell.

History,andthememoriesassociatedwithrecentepisodesinhistoryplayanimportantpartinperception,opinionand relationsamongthedifferentgroupsintheregion(atstateandgovernmentallevelandatthelevelofdifferentethnicities). Thiswaswitnessedinthe60thanniversaryofvictoryintheGreatPatrioticWarcelebrationsinMoscowon9May2005, whenPresidentPutininvitedtheleadersofthethreeBalticRepublicstoattend.OnlytheLatvianPresident,Vaira Vike-Freibergaacceptedtheinvitation.TheLithuanianPresident,ValdasAdamkusremarkedthattheyhadonlytradedHitlerfor Stalin(Onken,2007).Thisdemonstratesthelargegulfintheperceptionandinterpretationofthisevent.ToRussiansitisa sourceofprideandpatriotismandcelebratedashavingliberatedterritoriesfromfascism,tothetitularpeoplesoftheBaltic Statesitmarksthe‘trading’ofonerepressiveregimeforanother.Thereisaninabilitytorecognise,letaloneunderstand eachother’spointofview.EventsthatoccurredduringandimmediatelyafterWWIIexertedasignificantimpactuponthe political,ethnic,culturalandeconomiclandscape.

Significantchangestothedemographicsituation,especiallyinEstoniaandLatviaoccurredinthewakeoftheevents aftertheWWII.8_This_occurred_through_the_deportation_of_citizens_to_the_far_reaches_of_the_Soviet_Union_and_the

importa-tionofSovietcitizensintotheBalticStatesduringtheindustrialisationprocess(Peters,1994).Subsequently,theRussian governmenthasusedtheissueofprotectingminorityrightsintheBalticStates(namelyRussianspeakers)topressurethe EstonianandLatviangovernments(Adrey,2005;Peters,1994).OneoftheissuesthathavebeenchampionedbytheRussian governmentinEstoniaandLatviahasbeenthequestionofRussianlanguageteachingintheschoolsystem.Thephasingout ofRussianlanguageteachinginEstonianschoolscausedanumberofprotestsandreactions.Oneofthereactionswasto createapressuregroup,anNGOcalledRussianSchoolofEstonia.Itlobbiedbaseduponnotionsofcompliancewithnational andinternationallegislation.9_A_similar_situation_occurred_in_Latvia,_and_the_use_of_photo_opportunity_moments_were_used

tohighlighttheplightofRussianlanguageschoolsinLatvia.

Historyhasbeenformingpersonalconnectionsandmeanstoprojectsoftpowerandinfluence.Oneofthoseconnectionsis theaccumulationofcommercialassetsinthehandsofRussianbusinessmen(frombothanethnicandcitizenaspect)aswell aspersonalconnectionsbetweenvariouselites.Itrepresentsanopportunitytobenefit,fromassociationsandinteractions withthosebusinessgroupings.Sporthasalsofeaturedasamechanismofinfluence,suchasthecreationoftheContinental HockeyLeague,whichcompeteswithNHL.RussianhighcultureisalsovaluedintheBalticStates,whichcancarryRussian valuesandnorms.GrigasnotesthatthecurrentsoftpowerandinfluenceowesasmuchtotheTsaristandSovietlegaciesas itdoestothecurrentRussianefforts(2012:22).Thereareanumberofotherinternalfactorsthatareacauseforconcern amongthepoliticaleliteintheBalticStates.

OneofthecausesforconcernbythegovernmentsofEstonia,LatviaandLithuaniahasbeenthefundingofdifferent activi-tiesthatcouldincreaseRussianinfluenceintheregion.ThisincludesgivingadvicetoandthefundingofNGOs,championing therightsofcompatriots,politicalpartiesandmediaoutlets(Grigas,2012;Saari,2014).Thereareapproximately300,000 RussianslivinginEstonia,whichisabout25percentofthepopulation.Insomeareastheyconstituteamajority,suchas Narva,wheretheyaccountfor97percentandTallinnwhereonefigureputsthelevelof“non-Estonians”at66percent.10_In

8 _Smirnov,_V.,_Russia’s_“Soft_Power”_in_the_Baltic,_Russian_{International}_Affairs_Council,_{http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id}_4=367#top_,₄_May₂₀₁₂

(accessed7February2014).

9 _Strnad, _V., _The _{Russian-Estonian} _Debate: _The _Language _of _Instruction _for _Schools _in _Estonia, _Cultural _Diplomacy _and _Human _Rights, _http://

culturaldiplomacyandhumanrights.wordpress.com/2013/08/07/estonia-versus-russia-the-language-of-instruction-in-schools/,7August2013(accessed7 February2014).

10 _Strnad, _V., _The _{Russian-Estonian} _Debate: _The _Language _of _Instruction _for _Schools _in _Estonia, _Cultural _Diplomacy _and _Human _Rights, _http://

culturaldiplomacyandhumanrights.wordpress.com/2013/08/07/estonia-versus-russia-the-language-of-instruction-in-schools/,7August2013(accessed7 February2014).

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Latvia“Russianspeakers”constitute44percentofthepopulation,andsome300,000areclassifiedasbeing“non-citizens.”11

LithuaniadoesnotfaceasimilarsituationwithregardstothedemographicsituationasRussiansconstituteaverysmall minorityandthereisno“non-citizen”category.

AcaseconcerningforeignNGOs,fundingandpoliticalpartiesoccurredinEstoniain2010.On16December2010,the MayorofTallinnEdgarSavisaar,wasaccusedofbeinganagentofRussianinfluence.SavisaarwasalsoleaderoftheCentre Party,thelargestofthepoliticalopposition.CentrePartyreceivedfundsfromanNGO,whichhastiestoVladimirYakunin, aninfluentialpoliticalfigureinRussiaandheadoftheRailways.ThiscausedtheEstonianSecurityPolice(KaPo)todeclare SavisaarasanagentofRussianinfluenceandathreattoEstoniansecurityinalettertotheEstoniangovernment.12_This

representsamoresubtleandcovertapproachtoinfluence,whereasignificantnumberofthepopulationarewaryand suspiciousofRussiangovernmentintentions.

AnacademicfromKaliningradcharacterisedRussia’sattemptsatsoftpowerintheBalticashaving“beendiscreteand non-systematicand,frankly,inefficient.ThatsaiditdoesnotmeanthatRussiashouldgiveuptheseattempts.Viceversa, despitethefactthatbilateralformatofinteractionwillnotbebringingresultsforRussiaforalongtimetocomethisarea, forallthedifficultiesRussiafacesinimplementingitsactionplansintheBalticsegmentofthepost-Sovietspace,should beprioritisedinpursuingRussianforeign,cultural,scientificandeducationalpolicies.”13_This_reality,_combined_with_the

isolationofsomesegmentsofthepopulationinEstoniaandLatvia,hascausedaresponseinLatviarecently.

ThedailynewspaperDienarananexposeonasecretgovernmentstudythatwasdesignedtogaugeandunderstand attitudesoftheRussianspeakingsegmentofthepopulation.ThepresssecretaryoftheLatvianPrimeMinister,Dzeina Tamulevica,remarkedthat“theoutcomeofthestudyisdirectlyrelatedtointernationalsecurity.However,thegovernment admitsthatapartofthefindingscouldbemadepublic”seefootnote11.Thisdemonstratesjusthowpoliticallysensitiveand prioritisedtheissuehasbecome.Insomemanner,itrepresentsadistinctsenseofinsecuritybytheLatvianauthoritiesofa segmentofitspopulation.Withthetheoretical,conceptualandacademicfoundationsnowinplace,howdoestheperception ofpublicsinEstonia,LatviaandLithuaniacompare?

5. Identifyingaspectsforfutureresearch

Duringthespringof2014qualitativeresearchwascarriedoutviaemailwithEstonian,LatvianandLithuanian respon-dents.Itwasemailedtofriendsandacquaintances,whichinturnemailedittotheircontactsandnetworks.Inthiswayit washopedtogetagreaterlevelofobjectivityandhonestyfromtherespondentsastheyreceivedtherequestfromsomeone thattheypersonallyknow.

Sixoftheresponses(fourfromEstoniaandtwofromLithuania)werereceivedaftertheRussianannexationofCrimeaon 18March2014.Thisprovidesacoincidentalopportunitytoseeifthereisanysignificantchangeintheresponsesthanprior tothisevent(owingtothreatperception).TheresearchwasconductedinEnglishlanguageonly,whichmeansthereisabias thatisintroducedtothepopulationsample,namelythatthosewhorespondedpossessedsufficienteducationinEnglish languageinordertobeabletoparticipate.Respondentsareanonymousandareassignedidentifyingcodestoprotecttheir identities.Thesystemisasfollows:LatvianrespondentsareassignedLVforthecountryandnumbersfrom1to25forthe individualrespondent,EstoniaasEEand1–7,andLithuaniaLTand1–3.WhenquotingthefourthEstonianrespondent,the identifierusedshallbeEE4,forexample.

Theresultsofthisqualitativeresearcharetobeviewedasafirststepinbuildingamethodologicalprogrammetogenerate resultstobetterunderstandhowsoftpowerandinfluenceinteractsandfunctions.Thisparticularprojectwasunfunded andthereforetheoptionslimitedingainingasignificantquantityofresponses.Itisintendedthatresearchfundingshall besoughttofollowuptheindicativeresultsofthesurveyconductedforthispaper.Thereforethispaperisintendedasan exploratoryresearchpapertoidentifythedifferentaspectsthatmayaffectsoftpowerandinfluenceinordertoconducta second(moreextensive)roundofsurveysandfieldwork,whichismuchmorepreciseandtargetedintermsofthequestions asked.

Qualitativeresearchwasintendedtoteaseoutresearchareasthatcouldbemorethoroughlyaddressedinfollow-up research.Atotaloffivedifferentareasweretentativelyexplored.Thefirstareainvolvedaskingrespondents“arethere anypositiveattributesassociatedwithRussia?”Seeannexoneforalistoftheresponses.Thisintendedtoidentifypossible sourcesofRussiansoftpowerintheBalticStates.Themostcommonlygivenanswersincluded:culture(includingarts,movies andliterature),ordinaryRussians(i.e.notthestateorofficials–hospitable,friendlyandgoodsenseofhumour),business opportunities,highqualityeducation,science/technologyandscientists,Russiangoods,cuisineandsometraditions.

Therewereanumberofuniqueanswersgivenbyvariousrespondents.LV24named“militaryhistory(Russianbefore Soviets)”,LV22stated“anti-gaylaw,whereitisaboutsavingchildrenfromgaypropaganda,”LV22alsomentionedtheRussian

11_Latvia_Commissions_Secret_Study_on_Attitudes_of_Russian_Speakers,_RIA_Novosti,

http://en.ria.ru/world/20140515/189843000/Latvia-Commissions-Secret-Study-on-Attitudes-of-Russian-Speakers.html,15May2014(accessed15May2014).

12_Chausovsky,_E.,_Dispatch:_A_Case_Study_of_Russian_Influence_in_the_Baltics,_Stratfor,

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101227-dispatch-case-study-russian-influence-baltics#axzz36V4bO8Ym,27December2010(accessed7February2014).

13_Smirnov,_V.,_Russia’s_“Soft_Power”_in_the_Baltic,_Russian_{International}_Affairs_Council,_{http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id}_4=367#top_,₄_May₂₀₁₂

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companyITERA’ssponsorshipoftheicehockeyteamRigaDinamoasbeingpositive,LV3mentioned“bigcountry,strong army”andgoodathletes,EE2andEE3mentionedRussiantourists,EE3alsomentionedthesigningoftheborderagreement betweenRussiaandEstonia,LV18“RussiasupportstheirpeopleoutsideRussia,especiallyinpost-Sovietcountries,”LV11(a non-citizen)mentionedRussia’sroleasacounter-balancetotheUnitedStatesininternationalpolitics,EE5(post-Crimea) addedthattherewasstillsomesignoffreedomofspeechandpluralismofopinioninRussia(onblogosphereandsocial networks)andthattheGULAGsystemhasnotbeenrestored,andEE7(post-Crimea)observedthatRussian“womendress upveryluxuriously(muchmorethanEstonianwomen).”

TheseobservationstendtosupportNye’s(2008)understandingofsoftpowerasemanatingfromacountry’scultureand values.AnumberoftheidentifiedaspectsalsoagreewiththefindingsandobservationsofGrigas(2012)–suchassportand highculture.ThenextquestionwasdesignedtoidentifythoseattributesandaspectsthattendtohinderorundoRussian softpower.

Asecondareatobeexploredwaswhenrespondentswereasked“arethereanynegativeattributesassociatedwith Russia?”Pleaserefertoannextwoforacompletelistoftheresponsesreceived.Thiswasintendedtoidentifypossible sourcesthatdetractedfromanypossiblesoftpower.Anumberofthewrittenresponsesareworthquoting,togiveagreater senseofcontextandmeaningtotheabove.LT3(Post-Crimea)statedthatRussiawas“perceivedasamilitarythreat,maybe notareliabletradingpartner.”EE1wrotethat“thenegativeattributesassociatedwithRussiaarethesameastheones evidentinthecurrentUkrainecrisis.Expansionistforeignpolicy,useofemotionsofRussianslivingabroadforRussia’s foreignpolicygoals.”LV13replied“Ihatetosay,butRussiahasalwaysbeendominantinrelationswiththeBalticStates. Incasesomecooperationgoeswrong,Russiahasalreadynotonceimplementedshort-termimportembargoesondifferent kindsofgoods,inamannerworseningorevendestroyingsomespecificbusinessareas(e.g.milkimportsfromLithuania).” InaresponsefromLV21,“RussianswantedtoopenRussianschoolshereinLatvia.ThatmeansLatviansocietywouldbe dividedintwoparts,RussiansandLatvians.Andbothofthepartswouldhavedifferenteducationandeducationprinciples, andthatiswrong.”LV14madementionofhistoricalissues–“thehistoryisobviouslynotverypositive,meaningalltheharm thathasbeencausedduringthewarandoccupationyears(deportations,executions,suppressionoftheLatvianpeople,etc.). ThisisthemainnegativeconnotationwhenitcomestothinkingaboutRussia.”LV2named“psychologicalheritage–still wefeeltheinfluenceofSoviettimeoccupation.”EE6(Post-Crimea)listed“dependencyonthepowerandinabilitytothink withoutit,differentunderstandingsofhistory,fearpolitics,compatriotsprotection.”

AlotofthenegativeaspectsandattributesareofteninsomewaytiedtotheRussianstateintermsofpersonalities,policy andhistory.ThesearetheprimarycausesthatinhibitRussiansoftpowerfromdevelopingorgrowing.Thiswasparticularly evidentindescriptionsfromrespondentsaboutthearrogant,aggressive,overbearingoruncaringattitudedisplayedby Russianofficialsandpoliticianstowards,especially,smallercountries(suchastheBalticStates).Lowclass/cultureRussians receivedagreatdealofattentioninnegativeassociationsasdidthehighcultureRussiansinquestionfourforpositive associations.Melissen(2005)describedthedifficultiesfacedbygovernmentstryingtocommunicatetoscepticalaudiences, whichissomethingthatisnoteasilyresolved.Nye(2008)encapsulatespartofthisproblemwithinthenotionofcompetitive credibilityaspectstopolitics.Otheractorsthataremorecrediblehavetheabilitytoout-communicateandinfluencepublics. Thesuccessorfailureofsoftpowerisalsolinkedtocredibilityandcontext.Theaspectofcontextreferstotheconditionsand circumstancesatamomentintime(Rugh,2009)andcredibilityonlyoccurswhenexpertise,trustworthinessandgoodwill arealignedsimultaneously(Gass&Seiter,2009).

TheremarksfromareasoneandtwoseemtosubstantiatethefindingsofSommerfeldtandTaylorwhonote“asscholars andpractitionerswemustseethatourownrelationshipsareinorderbeforewecanturntosolvingtheproblemsinthe environment”(2011:p.205).ItisalsoinkeepingwithNye,whereacountry’sdomesticpolicyalsoexertsaninfluenceupon itsabilitytoconductforeignpolicyandcommunication.Theinferenceisadeficitinthedevelopmentofsocialcapitalin Russia,whichnotonlyinfluencesdomesticrelationships,butalsoexternalrelationshipstoo.

Thethirdareawasexploredwiththequestion“doyouknowofanymechanismsormeanswherebyRussiaseeksto influenceyourcountry?ItseekstoidentifythedifferentleversandmechanismsusedbyRussiatoinfluencedecisionmaking andpublicopinionintheBalticStatesasunderstoodfromtheperspectiveofthelocalpopulation.Gotoannexthreefora completelistofresponses.

EE4(Post-Crimea)noted“youthcampsfinancedbyMoscowCityGovernmentinMoscovia,1stBalticChannelTV,handing out“greypassports”toRussiansinEstonia(thatallowsvisafreetraveltoRussia).”EE3observedthat“thereisalsonotable influenceontheCentrePartyofEstoniabytheRussianFederation,bothmoralandfinancial(forexamplethePatriarchof RussiametonlywiththeleaderoftheCentrePartybeforeelections,givingthesigntotheRussophonevotersonthelocal electioninOctober2013inTallinnandEasternEstonia).”EE1confirmedtheCentrePartyconnection–“thepoliticalparty KeskerakondanditsleaderEdgarSavisaarhasbeenoneofthecentralinstrumentsforRussia’spoliticalinterestsinEstonia. ThispartyalsohasacooperationagreementwithPutin’sUnitedRussiaparty.”LV4saidthat“theywanttoopeninLatvia Russianspeakingschools,theyalreadyboughtalotofLatvianlandandtheyhavetakenagreatdealofoureconomy.”LT1 mentioned“allkindsofsportandcultureevents(thebestexamplesVTBbasketballleagueandlotsofconcertsofvarious Russianpopmusicstars).”LV11thoughtthatthe“primarymeansofinfluenceisRussia’smedia.LocalRussianmediais quitelackingthereforeLatvianRussianshavenochoicebuttowatchnon-localRussianTV-newsorreadnon-localRussian internet-basednews.Evenmore,IthinkthatatleastsomelocalRussianmediagetsomeofitsinformationfrompublicsources inRussia,whichonlystrengthenstheinfluence.SoeveninadvertentlyRussia’sownpropagandahasagreatinfluenceon Russian-speakingLatvians.And,ofcourse,someofthepropagandaisaimedatRussianslivingabroad.”LV19notesthat

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“oneofthemechanismswherebyRussiainfluencesourcountryisbyfinancialsupportinourpolitics.Thereareoneortwo politicalpartiesthatgettheirfinancialfundsfromRussia,soinaway,thosepoliticalpartiesaredependentonRussia.Russia caninfluencetheirmotifsandtheirmainideas.”

TheleversandmechanismsofinfluencethatareexploitedbyRussiafallintothetwodifferentcategoriesofpowernoted byNye(2004)–hardpowerthroughcoercionandsoftpowerthroughattraction.Themechanismsusedappeartobeaimed atinfluencingresponses,asoutlinedbyJowettandO’Donnell(2012)–responseshaping,responsereinforcingandresponse changing.Inaddition,asnotedbyL’Etang(2011),thecommunicationandinteractionisbasedaroundthecontextofpolicy initiativesthatintendtorespondtoorenablechange.ThesearedirectedatdifferentaudiencesintheBalticStates.The softpowerseemstobemorereadilydirectedattheRussianspeakingresidents(massmedia,education,culture,Russian languageandcompatriotissues),andaspectsofharderuseofpowerdirectedagainstthestate(tradesanctions,political pressureanddiplomaticpressure).Thereisalsoovertandcovertuseofinfluence–tradesanctionsversusthesponsoringof politicalpartiesandculturalevents,forexample.

Onthefourtharea,respondentswereasked“howdoyoucharacteriserelationsbetweenRussiaandyourcountry?” Theoreticallytheanswerstothisquestionshouldberelatedandlinkedtotheprecedingquestionsonperceivedpositiveand negativeattributesofRussia,andthemechanismsofinfluencethatareexercisedintherespondents’country.Seeannex fourforthelistofresponsesreceived.

Therewereanumberofinterestinganswersthathighlightsomemoreaspectstothereplies.LV2“Overalltheyaregood. Evenmore–thegovernmenthasbetterrelationswithRussianpoliticiansthanwithlocalpeople–localinhabitants.Inmass mediatherearemuchmorenegativenewsoninternalissuesthanonrelationsbetweenLVandRUS.”LT2(Post-Crimea)“I thinkRussiadoesn’tseeLithuaniaasarealpartnerinpoliticsandbusiness.LithuaniaonhersidecanseeRussiastillasan enemyanddanger.”LT1“Coldpeace,withanelementofeconomicwars.”EE5(Post-Crimea)“Anythingelsebutwarm.No officialstatevisithastakenplacelately,althoughthiscouldbeapolitewayofcommunicationbetweenneighbours.Quitea pitybecauseitlooksliketherearegoodpersonalcontactswithpeoplefromRussiaingeneralandhavebeenontheincrease inthelast years(growingnumberoftouristsfromRussiainEstoniaandamorepositiveattitudetowardsthem).”EE2 “Relationsarenotgood,buttheyarenotverybadeither.Russiaisapowerfulandleadingcountry,soholdingarelationship isdifficult.”EE1“Iwouldcharacterisetherelationsas‘normal’.However,theserelationsmaychangesuddenly,andthereare sometensions.”LV19“IwouldcharacterisetherelationsbetweenRussiaandLatviaasstronglyassociated.Mostlybecause ithasn’tbeenlongagowhenLatviawasaSovietcountry.”LV11“I’dsaytherearedouble:attheonehandthereisastrong movementforapartnerlikerelationwithRussia,attheotherhandthemajorityofofficialstriestocounterthisasmuchas possible.Sothereisasituationwhenofficialstanceiscoldandtense,butamongthepopulaceandbusinessestherearemany tiestoRussia.”Theanswerswerequitewideandvariedonthisquestion,therewasalsoadistinctiondrawn,onanumberof occasions,betweenofficial-levelandpopulation-levelrelationships.ThecharacterisationofrelationsbetweenRussiaand theBalticStatesbytherespondentsisareflection,tosomeextent,ofthelevelofinfluence.DahlandStinebrickner(2003)

definesthisinfluenceasbeingshapedbyaninfluencewielder’sintentions,wantsorpreferencesbeingconsideredasbeing in-lineorcontrarytothoseheldbythepublics.

Thenrespondentswereaskedtoaccountforwhythesespecificrelationshavedeveloped.Thisisintendedtolinkthose positiveornegativeattributesandthecurrentperceivedstateofrelationsbetweenthecountries.Refertoannexfiveforthe responses.Intermsofhistory,thegreatestmentionwasmadeofthe1940occupation,muchmoresothantheeventsthat followedthedefeatofNaziGermanyin1945.Someselectedquotesfromtherespondentsshallgivefurthermeaningand contexttotheabovementioneddata.EE4(Post-Crimea)mentioned“history–EstoniafeelsthreatenedbyRussiaandthe riseofnostalgiafortheSovietUnioninRussia.”LV20noted“duetothehistoryandspeculationsregarding(im)possibilityof repeatedRussianoccupation.”LV8stated“sinceglobalpoliticshasbecomeincreasinglyaboutbusinessgainandlessabout principlesandmoralstandardsthatfuelsRussia’sarrogance.”LV15said“itisalegacyofthelongyearsofSovietspheresof influence.”LV7observedthat“RussiaandRussiansalwaysneedmuchmorethantheyhave,muchmorethantheycanafford. Geographicallyweareneighbours.”EE6(Post-Crimea)wrote“thefactthatEstonia(ns)is/areterrifiedfortheirsurvival,and thattheyhaveadailyreminderofhowclosetheycameintheformoftheSovietmigrantsinEstonia,alsodoesnothelp therelationship.”EE5(Post-Crimea)statedthat“noonecanmakefriendswithabully.Russiashoulddrawbackfromits ambitionsofbeingasuperpowerandsincerelyadmittherightofself-determinationofotherstates.”Thereisasenseof insecurityintheBalticStates,whichseemstohavebeenrootedintherecenthistoricalpast(particularlinkstotheeventsof 1940).ButthereisanotherelementofthisinthecurrentsettingthatisderivedfromRussia’sforeignrelationswithformer territoriesand(internaltoRussia)thegrowingsenseofnostalgiaorpositivereflectionontheSovietpast.

Wangidentifiedanumberofkeypointsinpublicdiplomacythatrequiredfurtherresearch.Thefirstpointisthat “man-agingnationalreputationisnotjustaboutprojectingacertainnationalimagebutrathernegotiatingunderstandingwith foreignpublics.”Thiscommunicationisdrivenbychangingeventsininternationalrelations.Secondly,buildingrelations betweenagovernmentandforeignpublicsnotonlyinvolvesarationalandlogicalaspect,butalsoanemotionallevel.The emotionallevelofrelationshipbuildingrequiresfurtherresearch.Thirdly,concernsthenatureofcommunication,themode ofcommunication(forexampleviamassmediaorsocialmedia)andnatureofcommunication(one-wayordialogic).Which variantorcombinationprovestobemoreeffective?Afinalpointconcernsthecommunicator.“Thecredibilityandefficacy ofthegovernmentasaprimarycommunicator,isnowoftensuspected,becausepeopletendtoperceivecommunicationby aforeigngovernmentaspropaganda”(Wang,2006,p.94).Thisimpliestheneedtocommunicateandinteractindirectly. Whatotherorganisationsorindividualsareused,andaretheymoreeffective?

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Thefinalrequestposedinthequalitativeresearchwas“pleasefeelfreetogiveanyotherinformationherethatyoufeel mayberelevanttothestudy.”Thiswascompletelyopenanduptotherespondenttodecidewhat,ifanything,couldbe added.Someselectedquotesshallbeusedtoillustratesomeoftheanswersgiven.LV6saidthat“Latviahasnostrategy toimproverelationswithRussia.”LV17stated“Ibelievethatatthemomentwedonotneedtoworryaboutthestatus ofourrelationshipwithRussia,becauseweareamemberofNATOandwecanfeelsafe.Inmyopinion,inthenextfew years,ourrelationshipwillnotchange.”LV8notesthat“myguessisthattheworldisviewingRussiathroughtwolenses, fearandgain.”EE6(Post-Crimea)wrotethat“beforelastweek,theEstoniangovernmentwasonlyusingsoftpowerwhen tryingtocompetewithRussia.Nowitisshownthatitmightnotbeenough,andhasoptedforahardliner’stactic.”LV11 (self-identifiedasaRussiannon-citizen)statedthat“IdonotsupportmostoftheRussian-rightsinitiativesinLatviaasI findtheminconsideratetowardsthestilltenserelationsbetweenLatviansandRussians.”EE7(Post-Crimea)mentionedan articleinEstoniannewspaperaboutRussianthinkingbyAntsLaaneots“ourtroublehereinEstonia,andWesternEurope isthatpeople,includingpoliticians,theyoungergenerationdoesnotknowandcannotunderstandtheRussianmentality specificity.SpeakingofRussianmentalitypillars,thenintheWestdonotgettounderstandthebigRussianswherepower ismoreimportantthanhiswelfare.”

Theanswers givenwerequitevaried,butsometrendsarediscernible.Firstly,relationsarenotexpectedtochange significantlyinthenearfuturebetweenRussiaandtheBalticStates(aformoftensestability).Secondly,thereisatenseand simmeringelement(especiallyinEstoniaandLatvia)betweenthetitularnationalitiesandtheSoviet-eramigrants,which providesasourceoftensionontheonehandandapossibilitytoigniteormobilisedifferentgroupsbyunscrupulouspolitical actorsontheotherhand.Theanswersgivenbythepost-Crimeanannexationrespondentsdidnotdiffermarkedlyfromthe otherresponses,insteadthisactionwasusedasafurtherjustificationandconsolidationofanumberofnegativepre-existing attitudesandopinionsconcerningRussiaandRussians.

6. Futureresearch

Thisinitialstepintheresearchidentifiedanumberofsoftpowerandinfluenceaspectsthatneedtobefollowedup, investigatedandanalysedinmuchmoredetail.Inafollowupitwouldbenecessarytofocusmoreclearlyonthepossible trendsandaspectsindicatedinthisstudy.TherewouldalsoneedtobeatranslationofanyquestionnairesintoEstonian, Latvian,LithuanianandRussian.Theuseoffocusgroupsshouldalsobestronglyconsidered.Thesemeasureswouldwidenthe availablenumberofrespondentsbypermittingdifferentsocio-economicandlanguagepublicstoparticipateintheresearch. Onemoreissuethatneedstobeaddressedisgeneratingamuchlargerandmorerepresentative(andevenlyproportioned) samplefromacrossthethreeBalticStates.

Thequalitativeresearchofthispaperhasidentifiedseveralsubjectareasthatneedtobefurtheraddressed.

•WhatistheroleofRussiancitizensandtheRussianinformationspaceinaffectingthelevelofsoftpowerand/orinfluence intheBalticStates?

•IsthereanysignificantdifferenceinthelevelofRussiansoftpowerandinfluencebetweendifferentsocio-economicand ethnic/languagegroups?

•WhatarethemosteffectiveleversofRussiansoftpowerandinfluence? •WhicharethegreatestdetractorsofRussiansoftpowerandinfluence?

•WhatistheexactnatureandextentofRussianpowerandinfluenceintheBalticStates?

Oneofthecriticisms,intermsofshortcomings,ofevaluatingsuchcommunicativepracticesassoftpowerandpublic diplomacyisthatacademicresearch(currently)tendstotryandimposean‘ideal’modeloverwhatisactuallydonein ordertogaugethesuccessorfailure.However,thisignorestheaspectsofnationalprioritiesandinterests,whichmaynot be‘logical’inthisregard.Thereforethepragmaticdriversactuallydefiningtheproblemofinfluenceismissed(Pamment, 2014).ThemorecomprehensivestudywouldseektoshedlightandunderstandthenatureandscaleofRussianinfluencein theBalticStatesthroughitscommunicationandinteractionpractices.

7. Conclusions

Intheintroduction,thefollowingquestionwasasked,whatdotheresponsesfromthequalitativeresearchindicateabout thenatureofRussiansoftpowerandinfluenceintheBalticStates?Inordertoanswerthisquestion,someotherissuesneed tobeaddressedfirst.ThefirstisthemannerinwhichRussiaconductsPDandrelationsinandwiththethreecountries. ThispresentsanumberofproblemsastheyhavebeenformerlyRussianandSovietterritories,whichgeneratesonetype ofattitude,whichisinterpretedasbeingarrogantoroverbearing.However,allthreecountriesareintheEUandNATO, whichnecessitatesadifferentunderstandingandapproach(onemorenuancedandincludingthepropagationofsoftpower elements).IthasbeennotedbyobserversthatRussia’sactivitydoesnotseemtobeverywellcoordinatedandsomewhat inefficient.ThiswasbackedbyaremarkfromLT1whonotedanabsenceofaKremlin“masterplan.”Thissituationcreatesa greaterchanceoflackofconsistencyinthecommunicationeffortsandseemstoindicatethatthefocusmaybemoreupon tacticalandoperationallevelpragmaticandpolicyobjectives.

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TheofficialRussianeffortsatpublicdiplomacy,softpoweraccumulationandinfluencedifferineffectivenessanda numberofproblematicissuestotheapproachhavebeennoted.Oneoftheseproblemswasevennotedbyanofficial,Modest Kolerov,criticisingtheeffortsofinfluenceasbeingcounter-productivebyRussianlanguagemassmediathatwasinundated withnegativecontent.Hesawtwoseparatemediaspheres,whichlackedanykindofmeaningfulinteraction(aprerequisite torelationshipbuildingandleadingtopossibleinfluence).Havingsaidthis,anumberofrespondentsmadeacleardistinction betweenthe“Power”(thehierarchyofpolitical,administrativeandotherstructuresthatdirectandruleRussia)and‘the average’Russian.Therewasaclearlevelofsuspicionandmistrustdemonstratedbytheresponses.

RussiansoftpowerelementsdoexistintheBalticStates,whicharerelatedtotheprimarythemesthatareoften commu-nicatedinpublicdiplomacyprogrammes–culture,arts,educationandsport.Thereisalsoanappreciationofthe‘positive’ aspectsofRussianpeople(welcoming,hospitable,etc.),andofthebenefitsofRussiantourism.Inthisregard,Russianpeople seemtobeanunratedasset.Therewasalsosomementionofcommontraditionsandvalues,suchastherespondentthat identifiedtheRussiangaypropagandalawasbeingpositive.Othermorepragmaticissuesalsofeatured,suchascommercial opportunities.

Theseelementswere,however,severelytemperedbyaspectsthatworkedagainstthesoftpowerpotential.Thebiggest issuebeingrecenthistory,andespeciallythatoftheoccupations(1940generatingagreaterresponse),andhowtheseare representedbythedifferentsides.TheRussiannarrativeofvictoryinthefightagainstfascismin1945doesnotresonatewith manyofthetitularpeoplesastheyseeonerepressiveregimebeingreplacedbyanother.Divisiveaspectsconcerningthe presenceofRussiancompatriots(especiallyinEstoniaandLatvia),andtheprotectionoftheirrights,plusthepromotionof Russianlanguageareseenaskeepingawedgeinsocietyandasbeingaleverofpossibleexternalinfluence.Anotherthornin thesideofrelationsis,theattimes,demonstrationsofpowerorstrengthonanindividualaswellasastatelevel–‘aggressive’ and‘arrogant’RussianpeopleandwheneconomicsanctionsorembargoesareappliedbyRussianauthorities.Thelastpoint tobegleanedisthattheperceivedlowerlivingstandardsinRussiaalsonegativelyinfluencesoftpowerprojections.These observationsonsoftpowerelementsanddetractorsfitwithNye’sunderstandingoftheroleplayedbyculture,valuesand policies.

Thisleavestheissueoftheleversofinfluenceandpersuasiontodiscuss.Theseseemtoexistonanumberofdifferent meansandlevels,physicalandpsychological.AnumberofnewPDinitiativesareveryinteractiveinnature,yetalsonarrowly focussed(onRussianspeakers),suchastheGorchakovFoundation’sBalticDialogueprogramme.Tradesanctionsareone pragmaticmeansofapplyingpressureontheBalticStates,toaspecificareaorsector/industry.Thisincludes,asnotedby GrigasandSleivyte,thesupplyofenergy.AttemptsbyRussiatosupportormobilisethecompatriotcommunityaswellas supportingpoliticalpartiesisalsoaconcern.Theloyaltyofthecommunityisattimescalledintoquestion,whichhasaneffect ofmakingRussianclaimslookmorelegitimateaswellasisolatingthisgroupevenmore(theyturntonewsandinformation fromRussiaasbeingaprimarysourceofnewsandinformation,forexample).Themechanismsofpersuasionandinfluence seemtobeaimedatresponseshapingand/orresponsechangingamongthedecisionmakersintheBalticStates.However, itseemsthattheresultisoftenreinforcingnegativeopinionsandattitudestowardsRussia,withthisparticularpattern remainingfortheimmediateforeseeablefuture.

Acknowledgement

TheauthorwouldliketothankLarsNicanderfromtheSwedishNationalDefenceCollegeandSergeiSamoilenkofrom GeorgeMasonUniversityfortheirreflections.AgreatdealofgratitudeisowedtoBruceNewmanfromDePaulUniversity forhisconsiderablehelpinpolishingthetext.

Annexes. Respondentanswers

Annex1. ArethereanypositiveattributesassociatedwithRussia?

Attribute Numberoftimesmentioned

Cultureandarts 19

Sport 4

Scienceandtechnology 3

Well-knownpublicfigures 2

Russianpeople 10

Tourists 2

Values/norms 4

Business/commerce 9

Highqualityeducation 2

Food/traditions 5

Military 2

Internationalrole 3

Country 6

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Annex2. ArethereanynegativeattributesassociatedwithRussia?

Attribute Numberoftimesmentioned

Russianpoliticsandpoliticians 17

Russianpeople 17

Historyandoccupation 13

UseofRussianlanguageandcompatriotsissues 9 Lackofhumanrightsandfreedomofspeech 8

Corruptionandcrime 5

LowqualityoflifeinRussia 6

Russification 4

Militarythreat 4

Imperialism 3

Negativepropaganda 3

Visaissuesandforeignpolicy 2

Russianovert/covertfinancingofBalticorganisations 1

Annex3. DoyouknowofanymechanismsormeanswherebyRussiaseekstoinfluenceyourcountry?

Mechanism/means Numberoftimesmentioned

Tradesanctionsandeconomiclevers(includingbuyingrealestateandbusinesses) 17

Fundingresearch,organisationsandevents 16

Massmedia,propagandaandmisinformation 15

Sports,cultureandeducation(includingexchangesandfunding) 15

Politicalpressure 12

Useofcompatriots 9

Diplomacy(includingpublicdiplomacy,brandingandshowofmilitaryforce) 8

Religion 4

Tradepotential 1

Annex4. HowdoyoucharacteriserelationsbetweenRussiaandyourcountry?

Stateofrelations Numberoftimesmentioned

Bad 7 Tense 7 Changingrelationship 5 Complicated 4 Functional 4 Cool 2 Good 2 Stronglyassociated 2

Notgoodnotbad 2

Normal 1

Annex5. Inyouropinion,pleaseaccountforwhythesespecificrelationshavedeveloped

Reasonsforrelations Numberoftimesmentioned

History(occupation,deportations,interpretationsofhistory) 26

Russianpoliticalinterestsandzoneofinterest 9

Russianarroganceoraggression(notconversantwiththelocallanguage,attitudetowardsformerterritories) 8

Tradeandcommerce 5

Presenceofcompatriots 4

Possibilityoffutureattack/occupation 4

Mutualpoliticalantagonism 2

Culturaldifferences 1

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Perception of Russia&apos;s soft power and influence in the Baltic States