An inevitable self-destruction? : A qualitative study on how liberal thinkers explain the crisis of the liberal international order

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An inevitable self-destruction?

A qualitative study on how liberal thinkers explain the crisis of the liberal

international order

Nabil Shiltagh

Thesis, 30 ECTS (hp)

Political Science with a focus on Crisis Management and Security Master’s Programme in Politics and War

Autumn 2020

Supervisor: Ronnie Hjorth Word count: 15 750 

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Abstract

With the aim of contributing to the recent debate on the fate of the liberal international order, this thesis has examined how prominent advocates of the liberal international order explain its contemporary state of crisis. Taking a point of departure in John Mearsheimer’s critical argument of three essential flaws in the liberal order, I have expanded these flaws into three theoretical areas. These theoretical areas highlight fundamental components in the liberal international order that, according to Mearsheimer, endogenously undermine the liberal international order which will eventually lead to its demise. These theoretical areas are the expansion of the liberal order, resistance in liberal democracies and the threat of China. Analyzing the ideas of liberal advocates within these theoretical areas, I have found that they have offered strong arguments on why the liberal international order will not perish. Although the liberal advocates see a crisis of governance and legitimacy in the liberal order, they believe that the order’s beneficial and robustious architecture constrain states from abandoning the international institutions of the liberal international order. However, drawing on previous research, I have discussed the plausible possibility and consequences of an increasingly powerful China rising within the order. I have concluded that the liberal advocates have not satisfactorily explained this threat of China to the contemporary U.S-led liberal order.

Keywords: Liberal International Order, Liberalism, Idea analysis, Academic debate, Mearsheimer,

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1 Introduction

For the last couple of years, the liberal international order led by the United States has arguably declined into a state of crisis. The liberal international order can be understood as a “political formation in which settled rules and arrangements exist between states to guide their interaction” (Ikenberry 2011: 36). It is specifically a type of liberal hegemonic order where the United States dominates the formation of rules and arrangements based on liberal principles, such as “economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity.” (Ikenberry 2018a: 7) Several recent political developments in the world have begun to seriously challenge the liberal ideas and architecture that the order is based upon. Among these political developments are Brexit, U.S. president Donald Trump, increasing right-wing populism in Europe, leaders and parties adopting an illiberal vision (e.g. Hungary’s PM Viktor Orbán and Poland’s Law and Justice Party), the rise of China (Beauchamp 2019), intensified geopolitical competition between strong states (Wright 2018), and the announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization (Ortagus 2020).

As the liberal international order struggles in the face of its challenges, so do its advocates in the academic sphere. A debate among international relations scholars on the vulnerable survival of the liberal order has seriously challenged the credibility of liberal thinkers. According to a survey in 2017 by the journal Foreign Affairs, 25 out of 32 experts in international relations believed with a high level of confidence that the liberal international order is in grave danger (Foreign Affairs 2017). Critics of the continued existence of the liberal order have offered strong arguments in which the liberal thinkers must respond to. In his highly influential essay “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order” (2019), the prominent realist John Mearsheimer interestingly argues that the liberal international order was bound to fail from the start, considering it contained three essential flaws. First, intervening in the politics of other states inevitably creates resistance, either as nationalism or as a balance of power politics. Second, prioritizing international institutions over domestic questions creates issues which undermines the order at its core. Third, the hyperglobalization of the liberal order has created political and economic consequences among liberal states, as well as helped evolve China into a powerful state which threatens the unipolarity on which the order is dependent on (2019: 30-31).

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Several liberal thinkers have engaged in a defensive manner to the liberal international order (e.g. G. John Ikenberry, Daniel Deudney, Joseph Nye, Robert O. Keohane and Jeff D. Colgan). In this thesis I will engage within the context of this theoretical debate by highlighting the perspective of liberal theorists in order to analyze how they explain and relate to the crisis of the liberal international order. My point of departure is the three flaws of Mearsheimer (2019), which will be expanded into three distinct theoretical areas. These theoretical areas will help shed light on fundamental components of the liberal order which, according to Mearsheimer (2019), endogenously undermine the liberal international order itself. Hence, I am interested in how liberal theorists attend to these areas, because I argue that these areas - which are based on Mearsheimer’s (2019) three flaws in the liberal order - boldly challenge the idea of a continued liberal international order.

Considering that the theoretical debate on this subject is very recent in time, there is a strong incentive to study this issue now. Moreover, albeit the fate of the liberal order is difficult to anticipate, I argue there are at least two significant reasons which make this problem both societal and academically important to look at. The first reason related to states’ policy-making behavior, and the other to the academic rivalry between the two largest theoretical paradigms: liberalism and realism.

The first reason is that studies on international relations, and especially the sub-field security studies, provide knowledge and perspectives relevant to policy makers. In turn, the knowledge that is produced in certain countries, especially in the United States, often mirrors the foreign objectives of the state (Tickner - Blaney 2012: 4 & 59). Therefore, as is argued by Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver, this significantly “influences the way our discipline sees the world and also how it contributes to policy making and thereby to the world’s very shape.” (2009: 5) Steven Ratuva exemplifies this argument by noting the “[...] neoconservative hawkish stance of the United States” (2016: 214), which was based on the thoughts of neorealism and neoliberalism. Specifically within the context of the international liberal order, liberal theorists have influenced policy-makers to pursue a certain liberal path which included the building of international institutions to promote cooperation (Colgan - Keohane 2017: 38). Hence, the liberal explanations on the crisis of this order can, to a large extent, influence and help us understand the foreign policy-making behavior of liberal states and its struggles.

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The second reason concerns the recognition and credibility that is attached to the liberal paradigm. As one of the most dominant paradigms in the world (Smith 2000: 380; Powell 1994: 313) it is in a constant political battle for recognition and credibility in order to withhold and improve its position among other theoretical paradigms (Zhang - Kristensen 2017: 454). Liberal theorists would therefore want to defend their paradigm when it is challenged by academic opponents, in order to keep their strength in the academic field. The fate of the liberal paradigm is thus strongly bound to the debate on the liberal order crisis. Failing to respond to critical arguments, such as realists like Mearsheimer, could result in serious consequences for the paradigm. For instance, Ole Wæver argues that liberalism was transformed into a new version (neoliberalism) as a result of the debate with realism in the 1980s (1996: 164). In the same manner, the liberal paradigm may be forced to further develop its theoretical assumptions in order to better explain challenging phenomena in the world, leaving behind traditional ideas that have previously defined the liberal paradigm.

1.1 Aim and research question

I argue that studying the explanations of liberal theorists helps us appreciate and assess the strength of their response to the critics, as well as their estimation of the liberal order crisis in a better way. This gives us a better grasp of the crisis of the liberal order, and how it is specifically understood by its advocates. As many recent challenges to the liberal international order reflect those consequences of Mearsheimer’s three flaws in the contemporary order (e.g. increasing illiberal forces in liberal democracies and a more powerful China), his strong arguments become both important and relevant to look at. This put liberal theorists in the academic spotlight who must be able to provide convincing answers. This is a crucial moment for the liberal paradigm, as well as its advocates. Failing to address and defend the challenges of the liberal order in a sophisticated and sufficient manner may result in a lack of credibility, both by policy-makers and other academics. The rival paradigm realism or other competing theoretical perspectives could become dominant, and influence its ideas on policy makers who would engage in a different, perhaps more dangerous, perception of the world. With this problem in regard, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the

debate on the liberal international order by forming a deeper understanding of how liberal theorists in the United States explain the contemporary (2017-2020) crisis of the liberal international order.

In order to form a deeper understanding of how liberal theorists explain the crisis of the liberal international order, I will expand the three flaws of Mearsheimer into three theoretical areas which

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will guide the analysis. These are (1) the expansion of the liberal order, (2) resistance in liberal democracies and (3) the threat of China. This leads me to formulate the following research question:

• Within the context of the crisis of the liberal international order, how do liberal theorists explain the expansion of the liberal order, resistance in liberal democracies and the threat of China?

My contribution to the debate on the liberal international order will therefore take place within these three theoretical areas. By examining how liberal theorists explain these theoretical areas, I can assess the strengths and weaknesses of their explanations and thus tell something about the liberal defense of the liberal international order in a focused and detailed manner. My assessment of the liberal explanations within these three theoretical areas can be seen as a contributive argument to the debate on the liberal international order. Hence, this thesis will mean a contribution to the debate on the liberal international order in the form of an argument (i.e assessment of the liberal explanations) as well as a deeper understanding of the liberal defense. In broad terms, it can be understood as an extension of previous research, which I first and foremost build on liberal theorists engaged in this debate and Mearsheimer (2019). Inevitably, this contribution will also affect the credibility of liberal thinkers. Assessing the liberal explanations as strong can increase their credibility, while assessing the liberal explanations as weak can decrease their credibility. Consequently, as I have argued before, this can mean consequences for liberal thinkers’ influence on policy-makers and other academics.

1.2 Limitations

In this thesis, the contemporary crisis of the liberal international order is timely defined from 2017 to 2020. The prominent neoliberal theorist G. John Ikenberry (2011: xii) means that the crisis started with the George W. Bush administration, while Beauchamp (2019) states that the crisis actually started in 2016 (and can be traced back to the 9/11 attacks). However, most of the theoretical articles on the international liberal order crisis emerged in 2017 (see e.g. Ikenberry 2017; Görlach - Fukuyama 2017; Nye 2017). It can thus be assumed that the actual theoretical debate regarding this crisis started from 2017. However, the beginning (and definition) of the liberal order crisis is contested, but since I analyze the material of liberal theorists involved in this debate, such a definition is argued to be fruitful. This means that I will look at how liberal theorists have  

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responded to the three theoretical areas which have been based on Mearsheimer’s (2019) three flaws before and after they were written.

Furthermore, I will only look at liberal theorists in the United States. Although Holsti (1985: 103) mentions a British-American intellectual condominium, several political scientists specifically distinguish the United States as a dominant hegemony of international relations knowledge production (Wæver 1998; Tickner - Blaney 2012; Zhang - Kristensen 2017). Since I aim to contribute to the liberal order debate, which is a part of the international relations knowledge production, by limiting the thesis in this way I can show how the most prominent advocates (in the United States) explain the crisis of the liberal order. I will refer to these prominent advocates of the liberal international order as liberal- advocates, thinkers or theorists.

1.3 Concept definitions

The purpose of this section is to explain and clarify central concepts that appear in the thesis.

1.3.1 International institutions

International institutions are effectively interconnected systems of implicit or explicit rules and arrangements that regulate the behavior of states in areas where their national interests overlap with each other (Ericson 2014: 74-75). International institutions can be formal intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization. International institutions can also be in the form of an international regime which is a network of institutions in a specific area of issue (Nau 2018: 60).

1.3.2 Orders

Both Mearsheimer (2019: 9) and Ikenberry (2011: 36) define an order as an organized political formation of institutions that help govern its member states’ interaction. In the words of Ikenberry, an order can take many shapes. It can vary in its scope (global or regional/bounded), be more or less institutionalized (formal or informal rules) and built around agreed-upon institutions (i.e. more or less loosely rule-based) (2011: 47). Most importantly, the order can be established in three different ways depending on the underlying source. If the order is based on command, it is hierarchical and dominated by one leading state. If the order is based on balance, an equilibrium of power among the most powerful states balance the order, meaning that no state leads the order itself (ibid.: 14).  

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Lastly, if the order is based on consent, it is “organized around agreed-upon rules and institutions that allocate rights and limits on the exercise of power. Frameworks of rules and arrangements are constructed that provide authoritative arrangements for international relations.” (ibid.: 15)

1.3.3 The liberal paradigm

Similar to Barry Buzan (1996: 55-56), I define the liberal paradigm as a large collection of liberal perspectives by both traditional liberal theorists and neoliberal ones. This enables a more comprehensive view of liberal explanations of the order, since it is possible to analyze a wider selection of material that is not limited to only certain strands. Furthermore, the theoretical paradigms in which political scientists engage themselves within are understood as social and intellectual networks with leaders, followers and opponents. The many paradigms interact with each other through various types of exchanges, e.g. conferences, workshops and academic articles (Zhang - Kristensen 2017: 446-447).

1.4 The liberal international order debate

A survey by Foreign Affairs, one of the leading American journals on international relations and U.S. foreign policy, asked 32 experts in 2017 on their take on the future of the liberal international order. To the statement “The postwar liberal international order is in grave danger” the experts would point out their level of agreement as well as their confidence level to the statement. 25 of the experts agreed with the statement with a high or very high level of confidence, four remained neutral with a medium level of confidence, while only three experts disagreed with the statement being fairly confident. (Foreign Affairs 2017)

This survey shows us that a majority of international relations experts believed that the liberal international order is in grave danger. Mearsheimer is no exception. According to him, it was by 2019 “clear that the liberal international order was in deep trouble. Indeed, that order was destined to fail from the start, as it contained the seeds of its own destruction.” (2019: 7) In a similar argumentative thought, Graham T. Allison also questions the strength and survival of the liberal order. According to Allison, the global peace that has followed the order was not a result of its success, but rather a product of the balance of power from the Cold War era. Furthermore, the United States has never primarily engaged itself in the promotion of international institutions of the liberal order, but has rather involved itself internationally to promote liberal democracy within its  

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own borders. Allison means that liberal advocates have failed to acknowledge this fact, and inaccurately still argue for the United States to engage itself in the liberal order by clinging to an “imaged past in which the United States molded the world in its image” (Allison 2018: 124). Lastly, both Allison and Mearsheimer criticize the liberal advocates’ faulty argument of Trump as the main threat to the liberal order (Mearsheimer 2019: 7; Allison 2018: 124), as well as the liberal advocates failure to account for the threat of China (2019: 31; 2018: 128).

Michael Mastanduno (2019: 52) follows the realist view on the threat of China, arguing that there are two imminent problems with China in the existing liberal order. The first problem is that China will aim to change the order to suit its own interests, and not “simply pick and choose among the existing order’s features, because some of those features will frustrate its preferences.” (ibid.) The second problem concerns the question if power can be constrained and socialized by the liberal order. As the United States has abandoned its hope of transforming China into a genuine stakeholder in the order, it will begin to increasingly challenge China both geopolitically and economically. According to realists, this will constitute a balance of power politics, which will create tensions and complicate the cooperative institutions that the liberal order is largely based upon. Therefore, the question of whether the liberal order can constrain an escalation of power politics becomes an important question to liberal theorists.

Similar arguments about the threat of China to the liberal international order are stated by Christopher Layne (2018), as well as Naná de Graaff and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn (2018). Layne means that an increasing powerful China will “seek to recast the world order in a way that not only advances its interests but also acknowledges both its enhanced power and its claims to status and prestige equal to those of the declining hegemon.” (2018: 109) The declining hegemon that Layne speaks of is, naturally, the United States. Graaff and Apeldoorn make out three scenarios about China’s fate with the liberal international order. The first scenario, which is based on realist thoughts, is a conflict between China and the United States. China’s emerging global power will threaten the position of the United States as a hegemon. The second scenario is that China will continue to be integrated in the liberal international order, strengthening its relations with the United States (2018: 114). The last scenario is that “the United States and China would each maintain their own distinct political and economic system, both systems being - in different ways - part of and compatible with a capitalist and globally interlinked world economy.” (ibid.: 115)

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John M. Owen does not necessarily believe that a balance of power politics or conflict between the United States and China will need to happen to end this liberal order. Rather, “a power transition without war can cause an order to atrophy, particularly when the rising power has a fundamentally different political system than the status quo power.” (2019: 59) Therefore, a gradual shift of power within the liberal order, in the words of Owen, can constitute the end of the liberal order as we know it today.

Reminding us of Mearsheimer’s second flaw in the liberal international order, Beate Jahn states that the liberal internationalist agenda of spreading liberal democracy around the world paradoxically undermines liberal principles in the domestic sphere (2018: 44). Specifically it is the contradictory behavior of the United States to violate rules of engagement in the liberal international order, whilst at the same time pursuing a liberal agenda at home. Jahn states that these “differential principles governing domestic and international politics were justified through nationalist, racist, developmentalist ideologies that asserted the superiority over foreign populations.” (ibid. 59)

Doug Stokes (2018) takes a more defensive stance to the liberal international order. Instead of fearing a dangerous threat from China, he identifies rising inequalities within the West, especially the United States, as a result of the “specific kind of neo-liberal global economy” (ibid.: 135) that has come together with the liberal order. However, this does not mean that the U.S.-led order is in any critical danger. Its power as a liberal hegemony still remains superior to any other state in several important areas, such as in security and economic areas. The United States has no real interest in divorcing its powerful hegemonic position in these areas, and thus - despite the threat of Trump who is undermining this international engagement - “American elites will seek to ‘snap back’ to the status quo ante, given the goods the United States still derives from its hegemony.” (ibid: 134)

Much of the debate on the liberal order revolves around difficult challenges that can mean the end of the order as we know it today. Evidently, the survey by Foreign Affairs indicates that a strong majority seriously question the continued survival of the liberal order. This constitutes a difficult challenge to the advocates of the liberal order, who seemingly are in the minority.

Along with all these academic scholars, I aim to contribute to this debate on the crisis of the liberal international order. I will look at what explanations that have been offered by liberal theorists,  

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instead of examining the crisis directly as many scholars have done before me. I argue that this different approach is scientifically important since it can help us appreciate and assess the strength of the liberal theorists’ response to their many critics, with regard to the crisis of the liberal international order. In light of the majority who believe that the order is in grave danger, it becomes even more important to thoroughly study the liberal response. It will be especially interesting to discuss and assess the liberal response to the challenge of a rising China, which many scholars apparently note as the most serious threat to the contemporary U.S.-led liberal order.

1.5 Disposition

The thesis proceeds as follows. In the next chapter, the theoretical areas which are based on Mearsheimer’s three flaws will be elaborated and presented. Chapter 3 will include a motivation and discussion of methodological tools that will be used to answer the research question. Chapter 4 consists of the analysis of the primary material, i.e. analysing how liberal theorists explain and relate to the three theoretical areas. The results of the analysis will be discussed together with the previous research in chapter 5. Lastly, conclusions and suggestions for further research will be presented.

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2 Theoretical areas

The theoretical areas are based on the three flaws in the liberal order argued by Mearsheimer (2019). These will function as theoretical lenses which highlight important and difficult areas in the liberal order which, I argue, the liberal theorists must attend to. This does not mean that I analyze the liberal response from a realist perspective, but rather that these theoretical areas allow me to thoroughly engage in relevant components of the liberal order debate in an innovative manner.

I mean that it is especially interesting to take a point of departure in Mearsheimer’s three flaws in the liberal international order. Basically, the general argument of Mearsheimer is that “liberal international order was doomed to collapse, because the key policies on which it rested are deeply flawed.” (2019: 8) This implies that the recent challenges to liberal order (e.g. Brexit, Trump, rise of China) are merely consequences of deeper flaws in the architecture of the liberal international order led by the United States. Thus, by constructing theoretical areas based on these three flaws I can limit my focus to fundamental components of the liberal order that, according to Mearsheimer, will result with the endogenous suicide of the liberal international order we know of today.

In the following three sections I will present the flaws in the liberal international order by Mearsheimer (2019), and with the help of these flaws construct three distinct theoretical areas. These theoretical areas will thereafter be used to guide the analysis. Specifically, I will look at how liberal theorists explain these three areas which challenge the idea of a continued liberal order.

2.1 The expansion of the liberal order

The first essential flaw in the liberal international order argued by Mearsheimer is the extremely difficult interventionist agenda of spreading liberal democracy around the world, which is an important building block in the liberal order’s architecture. Such an agenda is, however, doomed to be met nationalistic resistance and interventionist scepticism in other countries. Since there is no universal consensus on an ideal political system, states adopting other systems (e.g. China and Russia’s authoritarian system) will resist such liberal interventionism which in turn worsen the relations between the states. (2019: 30-32)

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It should therefore not come as a surprise that several states have deliberately resisted the liberal interventionism of the U.S.-led liberal order, both in Eastern Europe but also in the case of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea (although it is not definitive if North Korea operates within this order). In other words, nation-states “do not want other nation-states telling them how they should order their political system.” (Mearsheimer 2019: 32) Furthermore, China and Russia have actively resisted the expansion of the liberal order to hinder the United States to dominate completely in economic, political and military terms (ibid.: 33) The international institutions that make up the liberal order cannot constrain these states to act as they please, since they are merely tools of strong and powerful states (ibid.: 11).

This flaw concerns how states subject to the liberal goal of spreading democracy react when faced with forces of liberal internationalism. Therefore, this theoretical area will be called the expansion

of the liberal order, and will regard how liberal theorists explain how non-western states perceive

and benefit from the global-reaching system of the liberal order.

2.2 Resistance in liberal democracies

The second essential flaw brought forward by Mearsheimer is that the “liberal order’s tendency to privilege international institutions over domestic considerations [...] has had toxic political effects inside the leading liberal states themselves, including the U.S. unipole.” (2019: 8) The argument is that the liberal institutions that the order is build upon consumes and controls the decision-making power of the nation-states who are part of it. This will inevitably result in issues related to state sovereignty and self-determination, which foster the growth of nationalism. This can evidently be seen in both Europe (consider Brexit) and in the United States (Trump’s illiberal and anti-institutional platform) (ibid.: 34-35). Nationalism is the “most powerful ideology on the planet” and therefore it “trumps liberalism whenever the two clash, thus undermining the order at its core” (ibid.: 8).

Another related issue is that the liberal international order clashes with the national identity of western states. The international institutions of the liberal order is a global and interconnected architecture which cannot be united with the nationalist belief of individual nation-states with their own cultures. The identity of nation-states is fundamental in order for their survival when threatened by the “other” (Mearsheimer 2019: 36). 

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This flaw can be broadly translated into the area of resistance in liberal democracies, looking at how liberal theorists explain threatening forces to the liberal international order from within liberal democracies.

2.3 The threat of China

The last essential flaw mentioned by Mearsheimer is the problem of hyperglobalization, which created two fundamental problems. The first is economic and political consequences inside liberal democracies. However, since this problem very much reminds us of the second essential flaw of resistance in the liberal democracies, it is more interesting to focus on the second fundamental consequence of hyperglobalization. As the hyperglobalized economy evolved, it “helped fuel the rise of China, which, along with Russia’s revival, eventually undermined unipolarity, an essential condition for creating a liberal international order.” (2019: 31)

The U.S.-led liberal order has unwittingly helped China grow more powerful, both in economic and military calculations. The rise of China, followed by the revival of Russian power, implies an end to unipolarity which is an essential condition for the contemporary liberal international order (Mearsheimer 2019: 42). If the system is bipolar or multipolar, the international order will be realist because of the engagement of security competition and balance of power politics among the strongest states. However, if China or Russia would become the sole hegemonic pole, the international order would be agnostic: an international order that is not based on a universalistic ideology and therefore does not attempt to spread ideological or political values to other states (ibid.: 12-15). Therefore, according to Mearsheimer, the increasing power of China threatens the unipolarity which the liberal order is based on.

The third analytical area will therefore be about the rise of the threat of China, who can seriously undermine the liberal international order and the unipolarity of the United States which is a fundamental criterion to the order.

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3 Method

This chapter will explain the methodological approach that will be used to answer the research question. It will first explain an interpretivist research design and its distinguished criteria, which will be followed by an explanation of the material, and lastly the specific methodological tools that are used to analyze the material.

3.1 Interpretivist research design

This thesis is inspired by an interpretivist research design. This means an ontological aspect of a multi-perceived reality as socially and intersubjectively constructed, in contrast to the positivist view of a singular truth. In terms of epistemology, this implies an effort to understand reality as a construction of human perspective (Schwartz-Shea - Yanow 2012: 4 & 80). This is an essential point of departure, considering that I place myself in the perspective of liberal theorists to understand their construction of reality. This reflects a constructivist-interpretivist methodology of forming an understanding that is generated through the meeting of the researcher and the thing being researched (ibid.: 4). Gaining an understanding, which is the aim of this thesis, is more explicitly an interpretivist goal, which can be compared to the rather opposite neo-positivist goal of explaining (ibid.: 4, 23). The aim of understanding implies a focus on meaning-making: “it seeks knowledge about how human beings, scholars included, make individual and collective sense of their particular worlds.” (ibid.: 46, my emphasis) This means that the methodological focus of this study is on how liberal theorists make collective sense of the liberal international order. Important to reiterate, this intersubjective view of liberal thinking is only one of many possible views of the world. However, it is within this particular view of the social world, as Hollis puts it (1994: 16), that is of interest.

3.1.1 Methodological criteria

The methodological criteria of an interpretivist research differs in comparison to the positivist. Here, it becomes important to achieve a sufficient level of reflexivity, referring to the researcher’s engagement, characteristics and circumstances that might have an effect on all phases of the research process. This is an essential part of interpretivist research since the thing being researched and the researcher cannot be separated, but are instead rather intertwined (Schwartz-Shea - Yanow 2012: 100). The perspective on research as value-laden can be derived from the question of  

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normativity in the philosophy of the social sciences, i.e., since (political) science is value-laden, there can be no thorough objective research (Risjord 2014: 7). This thesis does not oppose this statement, and aims at displaying a high level of reflexivity. Since research is conducted in a subjective manner, it is important to display a level of trustworthiness, which is another criterion of interpretivist research (Schwartz-Shea - Yanow 2012: 113).

To achieve these aims, it is necessary to explain the stance of the researcher. Assuming subjectivity as inevitable in research, there is a risk of exaggerating the results in order to produce interesting conclusions. This is mainly due to the fact that this thesis aims to contribute to the debate on the international liberal order with something innovative and exciting. This certainly influences the research conducted in this thesis. Another important point is that I as a researcher share many fundamental liberal values, which may imply a certain bias in favor of the liberal theorists. However, these self-reflecting points are taken into consideration in the process of the research.

3.2 Material

The material in this thesis can be structured into two broad categories: primary material and secondary material. The first refers to the material that is to be analyzed in the next chapter, i.e. the material by predominant liberal theorists on the crisis of the liberal international order. The latter refers to all the other material used in this thesis that is processed and interpreted. Both of these kinds of material have been obtained through a filter that is based on four methodological principles: authenticity, contemporaneity, tendency, and independency. These four principles for obtaining trustworthy material are deemed both necessary and sufficient (Esaiasson et al. 2017: 288-296; Teorell - Svensson 2007: 105-106). However, the fourth principle of independency must be given extra attention. Reiterating an interpretivist approach that research is subjective and value-laden, to conduct or obtain truly independent research does not reflect an interpretivist view. Instead, it is possible to reformulate the principle to “dependency”, meaning an awareness of how the material is dependent on the subjectivity (e.g. values) of the authors. Therefore, the approach to the material (or data) is not to obtain a certain objectivity, but rather to view it as generated within the framework of this thesis and used as evidence to sufficiently answer the research question. The material obtained is not simply reproduced in the thesis, but rather interpreted and used for a specific reason (Schwartz-Shea - Yanow 2012: 79-80).

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The primary material, consisting of political articles, has been obtained by scanning through various American academic journals (e.g. Foreign Affairs, International Affairs, Ethics & International

Affairs), using keywords such as liberal order, liberal international order, international order, world order. Three filters have been applied when determining what articles are deemed relevant: (1)

Liberal political scientists located in (2) the United States who (3) write about the liberal international order. These filters have limited the primary material to eight articles, written by five predominant liberal theorists. These are (1) G. John Ikenberry (see Ikenberry 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2020), (2) Daniel Deudney together with Ikenberry (see Deudney - Ikenberry 2018), (3) Joseph Nye (see Nye 2017, 2019), and lastly (4 & 5) Robert O. Keohane and Jeff D. Colgan (see Colgan - Keohane 2017). Furthermore, it has been ensured that the five theorists are both liberal and located in the U.S. For instance, Jahn (2013: 29) states that Deudney and Ikenberry both share liberal assumptions, and Powell (1994: 327) that Keohane applies a neoliberal approach.

Lastly, it must be mentioned that these five liberal theorists are not assumed to represent all predominant liberal theorists in the United States, nor the whole liberal paradigm in itself. There are quite certainly other liberal theorists who have engaged in the liberal order debate, who have been unwittingly excluded. However, I argue that these five liberal theorists together can provide a good understanding and indication of how liberal theorists explain the liberal international order. As is argued by Esaiasson et al. (2017: 212), meaning is intersubjective and shared by many actors. Consequently, a certain interpretation and understanding of the world is constructed by a common language of concepts. Hence, in this thesis, this language is the liberal language.

3.3 The study of ideas

This thesis aims to understand how liberal theorists in the United States explain the crisis of the liberal international order, with a focus on three distinct theoretical areas. Given that liberal theorists explain phenomena from their theoretical perspectives, which can be seen as ideas on the nature of international relations, a fruitful way of action is to adopt an idea analysis. This approach enables me to form a deeper understanding of what explanatory ideas that constitute the liberal theorists’ understanding of the liberal international order.

Göran Bergström and Per-Anders Svärd (2018: 134) define an idea as a construction of thought which include thoughts on what makes up social phenomena and events, normative political  

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convictions on how things should be, and means to achieve a certain goal. An idea analysis can process these thoughts in three distinctive ways, depending on the aim of the research. More specifically, Ludvig Beckman (2005: 12-14) presents three different approaches to an idea analysis. The first is a substantive idea analysis which treats political messages as a collection of arguments, where the intent is to test and criticize the durability and validity of the arguments. The second is a functional idea analysis that lays its point of departure on the relation between the message and the motive (or other underlying reasons), where the focus is to analyze the origin of the ideas, their distribution or their consequences. The third one, which best reflects the aim of this thesis, instead has a descriptive aim. The descriptive idea analysis wants to account for the ideas and study how these can be interpreted in order to clarify their content. By using the descriptive idea analysis it is possible to thoroughly clarify the content of the ideas that lie behind the explanations, which in turn creates a better understanding of the liberal explanations. Fortunately, all the approaches are united by common assumptions which reflect those of an interpretivist research design. Namely that humans are meanings-making beings who use language to give meaning to their existence, communicate and cooperate. In order to understand humans and their world it is necessary to look at how they make sense of their particular worlds (Bergström - Svärd 2018: 139).

Important to note, an idea analysis is part of the methodological category qualitative textual

analysis which focuses its attention at meaning and meaning-making processes (Esaiasson et al.

2017: 211). This strongly reflects the interpretivist view on conducting research. However, the idea analysis does not stand alone in this category. Framing analysis, narrative analysis and discourse analysis, to name a few methods, are also part of this category. Simplifying, the first method looks at how wording of messages affect perceptions of a certain situation, the second is similar but focuses more on actors who produce the messages, while the last is interested in discursive processes and often explores power relations (Haste et al. 2018: 310). Having considered these three methods as well, I have concluded that these methods will not sufficiently help me answer my research question in a satisfying manner. Instead, I find the idea analysis a more attractive method to answer my research question.

Furthermore, the descriptive idea analysis seeks, as the name indicates, to describe the ideas that are studied. This does not mean summarizing the material, but rather to show something new about the material that is not evident by itself (Beckman 2005: 49). For instance, it can be to highlight ambiguities in the material, bring forward latent messages or make a new interpretation of the

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material. In other words, a descriptive idea analysis presumes an interpretation of the material, where the role of the researcher is to recreate the idea world that lies behind the material. In accordance with interpretivist research, the descriptive idea analysis rejects objective interpretation of the material: this method always includes a degree of argumentation of why a material should be interpreted in a certain way (Bergström - Svärd 2018: 140-141).

Within the descriptive idea analysis, both Esaiasson et al. (2017: 224-225) and Beckman (2005: 18) make a distinction between an idea centered analysis and an actor centered one. This regards whether the focus should be on the ideas in the text or the actors who have produced the ideas. Although this thesis is interested in both, the main focus is rather on the ideas of the liberal theorists, rather than the theorists themselves. However, as Esaiasson et al. (2017: 225) mentions, even a focus on the ideas implies attention given to their authors and the context of which the ideas are sprung.

3.4 Analytical framework

Although the descriptive idea analysis has been explained, this is not enough. Beckman (2005: 20-28) states that some sorts of categories are necessary to guide the analysis. These categories can, in methodological terms, be seen as part of an analytical scheme. These function as guidelines that demonstrate what will be studied before the analysis has started, which presumes a systematic approach to organize and interpret the material in order to gain a deep and comprehensive understanding. Esaiasson et al. (2017: 214-217) means that the systematic approach seeks to make visible meaning in a thematic and systematic manner. The point is to elucidate the idea structure by highlighting essential aspects of the material.

The analytical scheme is based on the expansion of Mearsheimer’s flaws in the liberal order into three theoretical areas. It must be made clear, however, what phenomena that will fall within each and every area. In methodological terms, this concerns the operationalization of the theoretical areas. In order to be transparent in my analysis I will, influenced by the focus-points of Mearsheimer (2019), show what kind of explanations that I will look for in the primary material in each and every theoretical area. This analytical scheme has been constructed after a careful reading of the primary material in order to identify explanations on phenomena that are existent in and representative of the material. This also contributes to a more transparent analysis. As Beckman

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(2005: 20-23) states, it is necessary to decide what is to be searched for before the analysis begins. If not, the analysis could (and probably would) be steered completely by the researcher’s subjective perceptions and convictions. By clarifying what is relevant before the analysis, it is at least given how the question could have been answered, regardless if there are answers or not to the question.

3.5 Interpretation of the material

The previous sections in this chapter have shown what methodological tools will be used to analyze the material. In order to achieve a transparent and trustworthy analysis, however, it must be clearly understood how I categorize and interpret the material using these tools.

First, I categorize the primary material into six sub-areas of the three theoretical areas in a separate document using the analytical scheme above. I translate the explanations on phenomena in each theoretical area into questions that I systematically ask to the primary material. For instance, in the first theoretical area, “The expansion of the liberal order”, I ask the following questions to the primary material: (1) How do non-western states perceive the liberal order, and (2) how do they benefit from it? The answers to each question will be sorted in a sub-area, in order to help structure the analysis. By doing so, I can make sure that the categorization of the material accurately reflects the analytical scheme.

Second, I interpret the material by carefully reading all of the text in each of the sub-areas. This in order to identify the general content of ideas that lies behind the explanations, which will help me

Theoretical areas What explanations on phenomena will I look for?

1. The expansion of the liberal order I will look for explanations on how non-western states (1) perceive and (2) benefit from the liberal order.

2. Resistance in liberal democracies I will look for explanations on (1) the rise of populism and nationalism in liberal

democracies, and (2) the lost sense of community among western states.

3. The threat of China I will look for explanations on (1) the rising power of China, (2) and its relation with the liberal order.

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recreate an idea world that is representative of all the text in each sub-area. This approach lets me bring forward latent messages and arguments in the text. From here, I can sort out passages of text and quotes that reflect the general idea in the text, which will be used in the analysis to strengthen the trustworthiness and transparency of my interpretation (Esaiasson et al. 2017: 232). If there is more than one different idea that is dominant in one sub-area, both will be presented and discussed.

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4 Analysis

In this chapter I analyze the primary material of eight articles on the crisis of the liberal international order written by the liberal theorists G. John Ikenberry, Daniel Deudney, Joseph Nye, Robert O. Keohane and Jeff D. Colgan. The analysis chapter is divided in the six sub-areas, two sub-areas under each theoretical area. Naturally, not every author will be used in each sub-area: the categorization is based on the relevance of the text to the sub-area and not on the equal inclusion of every author. I will aim to interpret generously, meaning that I support my interpretations with quotes and passages of text. In the beginning of each sub-area I will conclude the main idea. Important to reiterate, in the analysis I will bring forward the general content of ideas by the liberal thinkers. This means that I place myself in the position of liberal thinkers and show how they explain the theoretical areas.

4.1 The expansion of the liberal order

4.1.1 Non-western states’ perception of the liberal order

Ikenberry explains that non-western states perceive the liberal international order as a system where non-western states can influence other states. Non-western states do not oppose the liberal international order, but rather integrate in it to compete over the decision-making power, which is measured by the influence over the existing institutions in the system. The problem of non-western states’ perception of the liberal order is, in other words, a problem - not of the intrusiveness of the sovereignty of non-western states but - over who will decide what. The order has been expanded from its original regional form covering only western states to include nearly all states which has resulted in differentiating forces not agreeing over the authority of it. Ikenberry sums this up as a ”crisis of authority” (Ikenberry 2018a: 10).

The problem, which is that of the decision-making power, is traced back to the Cold War. During this bipolar world where the United States and Soviet Union were competing for power, they both engaged in integrating their allies in their respective borders: one based on liberal values and the other one on communism. With the fall of the Soviet Union, ”the American-led liberal international order became the only surviving framework for order, and a growing number and diversity of states began to be integrated into it.” (Ikenberry 2018a: 18) The non-western states, who were not necessarily liberal democracies, started to enjoy and take part in the institutions in the liberal order.

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This, however, created differences among the member states of the order. As Ikenberry illustrates it, it started to look more like a shopping mall where states chose some institutions but ignored other responsibilities that came with it, rather than an exclusive club with rules of entrance. Many states started to cooperate with each other within the order in an opportunistic manner: i.e., on an ad hoc basis (Ikenberry 2020: 139).

This shift from the western exclusivity to the inclusion of non-western states (many more powerful than before), altered the architecture of the order but did, importantly, not erode it. It went from being more hierarchical with clear rules for cooperation to being less organized around a hegemonic state (the United States) and less rule-based (Ikenberry 2018a: 12).

This implies an idea of the complexity of decision-making authority within the system. As the order expanded to include more states, its liberal values from which it is based on, still lingered on. This created an opinion of difference among the many states, since some have adopted the liberal democracy agenda while others have not - despite communicating and cooperating within the same system. Simultaneously, this was further complicated by the rising power of the non-western states, who started to seek more power (in terms of influence within the institutions). As these states grew more powerful while enjoying their inclusion in the liberal international order, they began to demand more influence which in turn declined the hierarchical relationship in the order: challenging the hegemonic position of the United States. The old members, United States, Europe and Japan, on the other hand, still battle for their influence (Ikenberry 2018a: 18). Therefore, this can be viewed as a competition for influence from two opposite sides: the western-based members versus the new non-western members.

Furthermore, new complex challenges in the world require a good level of cooperation among the states, both western and non-western states. However, with the difference of opinions together with the struggle for authority, this only further complicated the relations between the states. Ikenberry (2018a: 19) explains it as an era which

brought into play new and complex global issues, such as climate change, terroris and weapons proliferation, and the growing challenges of interdependence. These are particularly hard issues on which to reach agreement among states coming from very different regions, with similarly different political orientations and levels of development. As a result, the challenges to multicooperation have grown. At the

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core of these challenges has been the problem of authority and governance. Who pays, who adjusts, who leads?

There are, to sum up, three difficult challenges related to the non-western perception of the liberal order. The first is the problem of authority, where states - who have increased in power - now seek to influence the institutions of the order. China is the most evident example. This reflects a transition from the previous agreement of the U.S.-led order to a more loosely-based and less hierarchical order. The second concerns the problem of differencing opinions: there are many states with various, often opposing, political orientations within the system. This complicates the relationships between the states, and not least the cooperation, since the states cannot agree on fundamental solutions that are influenced by their political systems. Lastly, new complex challenges, such as climate change and terrorism (and most recently, COVID-19), which affect all states put high demands on the multicooperation of the states which only make it harder to reach multilateral solutions.

These three challenges have begun to transform the liberal international order, and certainly constitute challenges which must be attended to. However, these do not imply hostility among non-western states towards the order itself, but rather a perception to challenge the current non-western governance of it.

4.1.2 The beneficial inclusion of non-western states in the liberal order

Deudney and Ikenberry (2018: 26) point out that non-western states enjoy inclusion in the liberal order since it both provides a rules-based system which offers - to some extent - protection and equal treatment, more or less regardless of the position of power the state is in. Furthermore, this system is beneficial since it does not require a certain ideology, liberalism in this instance, in order to enjoy the system. This easy access to the order, which benefits and protects weaker states against stronger and provides a rules-based system, makes it attractive to most, if not all, non-western countries.

According to Deudney and Ikenberry (2018: 19) there are no demands set for non-western states to adopt a liberal orientation to be included in the liberal order. The order is rather based on a wide set of institutions which are more Westphalian, ”designed merely to solve problems of sovereign states” (ibid: 19), than liberal. It would be inaccurate therefore to believe that the liberal

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international order is solely based on liberal values, even though liberalism certainly has influenced the existence of the order. Interesting enough, states - whether liberal or not - engage in institutions which can be seen as both Westphalian and liberal in order to solve global problems. For instance, the United Nations ”enshrines the principle of state sovereignty” (ibid.). The UN, as an intergovernmental institution, was created not only by liberal democracies after World War II and includes today nearly all states, regardless of their political orientation. Cooperation does not, therefore, necessarily require the same political orientation, and can be separated from ideological matters. This benefits all non-western countries who can enter the system and enjoy its institutions while at the same time pursue their own ideological and political agenda.

Moreover, the liberal international order benefits both strong and weak non-western states. Strong states, such as China and Russia, have to a large degree built their strength within this order and are very much dependent on it. This order creates possibilities for them to pursue their economic, technologic and investment strategies (Ikenberry 2018a: 25). Weaker non-western states, on the other hand, enjoy a ”multilateral system of rules and institutions” which ”offers rising states some measure of protection and equal treatment.” (ibid.: 26) This protection is especially important against powerful states, who can, and may, take advantage of weaker states. By investing themselves in this way, they can play by the rules that have been laid out in the order. And even if these rules may sometimes be biased in favor of stronger states, discriminating or marginalizing, they still offer some sort of protection against political domination.

The idea of an easy entrance to the order as well as its protection is not argued to be flawless nor utopian. It does, however, unite countries of different political and ideological orientations in an institutionalized and cooperative manner. The powerful non-western states would not want to abandon their already deep involvement within the order, risking their position to their competitors or other rising states. The weaker non-western states benefit from this order by having their sovereignty institutionalized in intergovernmental organizations, and enjoying the protection of institutionalized rules which to some extent offer them equal treatment among other more powerful states.

According to this idea, the alternative would be to operate outside this system which would result in a decline of power, problems with cooperation, lack of protection on sovereignty issues, to name a few problems. This is not an attractive alternative to non-western states, powerful or not. Thus, the

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idea of a strong commitment to the order informs us that there are no strong incentives by non-western states to abandon the liberal order. Although it may not be perfection, the benefits of inclusion within the order surely outweigh the disadvantages of not being in it.

4.2 Resistance in liberal democracies

4.2.1 The rise of populism and nationalism

The general idea by the liberal theorists is that although the increase of populism and nationalism certainly undermine liberal values in liberal democracies (and therefore the liberal order itself), this does not imply a fundamental threat to the order. The rise of populism, i.e. the ”faith in strong leaders and a dislike of limits on sovereignty and of powerful institutions” (Colgan - Keohane 2017: 36) and its variant of nationalism have constituted a decline in trust to the institutions of the liberal order. These challenges to the liberal order from within the liberal democracies themselves are an effect of a failed social contract that have benefited some people more than others (ibid.: 37). Trump and Brexit are, therefore, symptoms and not causes of this failed social contract. It would, however, be a mistake to exaggerate the long-term consequences of this phenomenon: the majority of the population in liberal democracies still believe in the institutions of the liberal order (Nye 2017: 15).

In the same way as the liberal order is threatened by exogenous forces, it is also undermined by endogenous ones in the form of populism and nationalism. This has resulted in the British decision to leave the European Union, a golden child of the international liberal order. At the same time ”liberal democracy itself appears to be in retreat, as varieties of ”new authoritarianism” rise to new salience in countries such as Hungary, Poland, the Philippines and Turkey. Across the liberal democratic world, populist, nationalist and xenophobic strands of backlash politics have proliferated.” (Ikenberry 2018a: 7) Not least, the hegemony of the liberal order, the United States, has elected a president in 2016 who deliberately and systematically undermines the values of the liberal order. Trump’s ”America first” slogan signals a clear commitment to abandon the U.S. involvement in the international institutions that have long defined the U.S.-led liberal order. Trump is, nonetheless, only a factor of a wider crisis in liberal democracies (Ikenberry 2017: 1-2).

Illiberal phenomena such as Brexit and Trump are, however, effects of a deeper issue rather than causes to the endogenous crisis: the causes of the rising populism and nationalism in western democracies lies in economic and cultural factors (Nye 2019: 76). First, the international liberal

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order came to benefit one part of the population in western democracies more than others. This separated those who were left behind from those who benefited greatly from the order, creating polarization within liberal democracies: one side who favors liberal institutions and another who revolt against it. As Colgan and Keohane put it, ”[t]he Brexit and Trump phenomena reflect a breakdown in the social contract at the core of liberal democracy: those who do well in a market-based society promise to make sure that those disadvantaged by market forces do not fall too far behind. But fall behind they have.” (2017: 37)

The responsibility for this problem lies partly with the policy-makers who favored a liberal internationalist agenda, and partly with its academic advocates. Both of them failed to account for the exclusion of a large portion of the population in the development of international institutions. For instance, the World Trade Organization did not sufficiently account for the consequences of an open globalization trade for traditional workers, who have been negatively affected by such institutions (Colgan - Keohane 2017: 38).

The other contribution to the rise of populism and nationalism is the centralization of authority which implies a shift of power to abstract and far-away institutions, such as the United Nations, European Union and the World Bank. Although this is necessary to foster and facilitate cooperation to solve shared problems among the world’s states in a multilateral manner, this is perceived - by many of those who adopt a populist and nationalist agenda - as ”foreign forces are controlling their lives. Since these multilateral institutions are distant and undemocratic - despite their rhetoric - the result is public alienation.” (Colgan - Keohane 2017: 39)

In other words, two factors have contributed to the failed social contract between liberal democracies and a large portion of their population. The first is the exclusion and ignorance of their needs, which has instead benefited others more greatly. This inequality has contributed to a discontent which is directed at the abstract institutions which are seen to be responsible for this. Instead, leaders who oppose such ”foreign forces”, such as Trump, receive wide support. Such leaders unsurprisingly dedicate their time to undermine liberal institutions which have been the foundation of the country for decades.

Although this certainly constitutes endogenous challenges to the liberal international order, this threat should not be exaggerated. While Trump is deliberately trying to undermine the values of the

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liberal international order, he is nonetheless operating within its system. In that light, he has ironically pursued actions which can be argued to be in line with the liberal order. For instance, he has sanctioned Russia for its interventionism in Eastern Europe, as well as focused largely to combat the increasing influence of China (Deudney - Ikenberry 2018: 21). Furthermore, billions of people are deeply integrated into the institutions of the liberal order, a number far larger than its populist and nationalist respectives (ibid.: 18). The failed contract, therefore, which has resulted in a rise of populism and nationalism, doubtlessly implies a backlash in the liberal democracies, which in turn affect the liberal international order. However, this consequence is not an issue which can be seen to overturn the whole order.

4.2.2 The lost sense of community among western states

Before the end of the Cold War, the liberal order was not international but bounded to the western democracies. It was largely a community of security services from the threat of the Soviet Union and its allies, which united the western liberal democracies and created a sense of social community, i.e. an identity. However, with the end of the Cold War and the expansion of the liberal order, other countries entered this order - transforming it to an international order -, which in turn decreased the sense of a community among the western states (Ikenberry 2018a: 10). Due to this, many western states started to feel detached from the community and questioned its necessity and value.

During the Cold War, the bounded liberal order in the West provided a sense of a security community against the threat of the Soviet Union. In addition, it was a platform for economic and social advancement with fostered stability among the western states. With the end of the Cold War, the bounded order expanded to become international: including non-western countries and other questions far from security issues (Ikenberry 2018a: 20). The sense of a security community among western states declined, and the international liberal order became a platform for all countries. The identity of western countries became the identity of nearly all countries. In other words, ”the disappearance of the Soviets undermined social cohesion and a common sense of purpose.” (Colgan - Keohane 2017: 38)

This reflects an idea of the fundamental necessity of a shared security agenda, which creates a common sense of community. One example is NATO, which institutionalizes the security community of European states. As Trump signaled to abandon the U.S. commitment to it, this

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would - in the sense of this idea - only further separate the western countries in the transatlantic relationship. The bounded liberal order during the Cold War was in a large sense quite similar to NATO, as it united the western countries in the face of common security issues. Interestingly, the UN can in many aspects be seen as the equivalent of NATO but on an international level, considering that it discusses issues of international security. Therefore, it unites all of its member countries in a common security community. However, the large and important difference is that the liberal order during the Cold War was more exclusive in the manner that it was directly directed at the threat of a common enemy: the Soviet Union.

In other words, the lost sense of community among western states is a result of the expansion of the liberal order. This made the old western members question the necessity of its membership, as the threat of the Soviet Union had disappeared. The purpose of a security community was no longer evident. The need for a common enemy, in which the states can unite against, is thus essential for the increased sense of a community.

4.3 The threat of China

4.3.1 The rising power of China

As many observers have feared the end of the U.S.-led liberal order due to the rising power of China, liberal theorists question this conclusion. Although the liberal theorists do not deny the increasing power of China, they do argue that the Chinese power is exaggerated and misunderstood among the observers. China is in many aspects weaker than the United States, and the conventional argument of its increase in power does only highlight one of many dimensions of power.

First and foremost, the definition of power must be understood in order to examine the rising power of China. Nye defines power as ”the ability to affect others to get what you want” which has three dimensions: ”coercion, payment and attraction.” (2019: 73) This is of utmost importance, since the general argument among many observers on the increasing power of China only focuses on economic power, which is ”just part of the geopolitical equation” (ibid.). In this aspect of power, China is doubtlessly increasing in size. However, it is still behind the United States: an increase in economic power does not necessarily imply that China has surpassed the United States, only that is getting stronger (ibid.).

An inevitable self-destruction? : A qualitative study on how liberal thinkers explain the crisis of the liberal international order