WikiLeaks CableGate and the Multi-Stakeholder Model of Internet Governance

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Communication for Development (ComDev 09)

Malmö University

WikiLeaks CableGate and the Multi-Stakeholder Model of

Internet Governance

Project work by

Julia Velkova

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Internet is recognised as an alternative media tool that has the potential to stimulate civic cultures, mobilize and sustain civil society networks. It is also perceived as an important tool for social change that offers a powerful communication platform for different social groups to advance their views and ideology online in a significantly less controlled way than it is done through traditional media.

In the end of 2010, the release of U.S. secret diplomatic on the Internet by the non-profit organisation WikiLeaks got an instant global outreach through the Internet and

primarily, through the Wikileaks website – www.wikileaks.org. The immediate reaction to this resulted in governmental pressure on global providers of Internet services to stop servicing the website, thus preventing the global public from accessing the materials.

The project studies the discussion that has arisen in the context of these actions and examines the communication tactics used by civil society and governmental actors in this discussion in order to advance an ideology of the right to communicate, and civil society participation in forming and safeguarding Internet principles. The project looks deeper at ideological, participatory, and developmental issues brought up in the

discussion around the restriction of access to the main Wikileaks website, and how do they relate to eventual processes of social change.

The study is based on Fairclough's framework on critical discourse analysis, and is grounded in the theoretical framework of participation, discourse and ideology.

The main conclusion of the study is that the discussion around the Wikileaks CableGate case has clearly articulated the necessity of common Internet principles and democratic framework built in an inclusive and participatory manner through the active

involvement of civil society actors in order to preserve the core values and enabling potential of Internet as media, and that an effective model for this is the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance.

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ABBREVIATIONS APC Association for Progressive Communications CFR Council on Foreign Relations

ENISA European Network and Information Security Agency

EU European Union

GIPI Global Internet Policy Initiative GNI Global Network Initiative

IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Addresses IG Internet governance

IGC Internet Governance Caucus IGF Internet Governance Forum ISOC Internet Society

NGO Non governmental organisation

NWICO UN New World Information and Communication Order RSF Reporters Without Borders

UN United Nations

WGIG Working Group on Internet Governance WSIS World Summit on Information Society

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTUALISATION

The Internet architecture has been built to reflect the “values of interactivity, openness, egalitarianism, anonymity, cosmopolitanism” (Malcolm, 2008, 16) which have been established in the course of evolution of the Internet. These values have developed without significant governmental regulation, and in a legal vacuum with little

supervision from regulatory agencies (Castells, 2009, 103). The incorporation of these values in its core has enabled the Internet to become a powerful communication platform for different social groups to advance their views and ideology online in a significantly less controlled way than it is done through traditional media. Internet is also recognised as an alternative media tool that has the potential to stimulate civic cultures, mobilize and sustain civil society networks (Bailey et al, 2008, 105) thus becoming an important tool for social change. As Hafez postulates, the Internet is “beyond the reach of authority and has enormous potential to link societies, as opposed to merely politics” eliminating the separation between sender and recipient of

communication and acting across borders (Hafez, 2005, 101).

On 28 November 2010, the non-profit organisation Wikileaks announced the release of more than 250 000 leaked US embassy cables on the Internet, which became known as CableGate (Wikileaks, 2010). The information published was claimed to reveal

confidential communications between 274 U.S. embassies around the world and activities of the U.S. such as “spying on its allies and the UN“, “turning blind eye to corruption”, “backroom deals with supposedly neutral countries;” (Wikileaks, 2010), attributing to CableGate characteristics typical for media politics – to be “spectacular, provide good footage, so that the whole world can see it: like a Hollywood movie ” (Castells, 2009, 139). The dominance of this type of media politics, and politics of scandal connects exposure of corruption to the decline of political trust (Castells, 2009, 289), which in turn opens the path for civil society resistance, and exploration of new models for participation. Whether the Wikileaks claims have any grounds or not, as well as the content of the published materials are not of interest to this study. What is

interesting is to look closer at the immediate reaction to the exposures, resulting in the eventual attempts of certain social groups (governments and private businesses) to try to

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restrict the access to the Wikileaks website www.wikileaks.org in an effort to limit the outreach of the materials. Despite the existing controversy about who has been pushing for these restrictive measures, they created a dialectic between international

organisations, civil society organisations and groups, and governments in regard to freedom of expression online, and the basic principles of how Internet is governed and by whom. This has positioned the discussion around the restriction of access to

www.wikileaks.org in a broader context, in which the event is used as an argument for different social groups to advance a particular ideology – the one of freedom to communicate –, and to legitimise their participation in global decision-making on communication through a multi-stakeholder model. “Multi-stakeholder governance” is understood as a concept that legitimises the participation of non-governmental actors in international institutions (Mueller et.al., 2007, 268), and the discussion around the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org offered a context, in which global social groups could try to re-affirm or challenge the existing power balances between

governments and civil society groups in the discussion about freedom to communicate and Internet governance. Popular fears that have been articulated by civil society organisations in the media are that the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org could impact the way in which Internet space is regulated, lead to legislations which would legitimize governmental censorship practices, and therefore will limit the right of the global civil society1_{to freely communicate (see analysis section). However, in the}

context mentioned above, these fears could also be understood as a framing tactic used by civil society groups to advance their ideology and interests in relation to the role they play in the field of online communication, participation in policy-making and regulation of the Internet.

In this context, I will look closer at the communication techniques used by civil society actors and governments in this discussion and explore how does communication work in order to create more participation opportunities for civil society in the question about Internet principles and governance. This will allow for mapping the social practices and processes articulated in the discussion, and understand their meaning from the

1 When speaking about civil society groups and international NGO's, I will use Keck & Sikkik's understanding about a “global civil society” which includes non-state actors developing and advocating some conception of

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perspective of communication and social change.

Thus, the research question of my project is how the debate around Wikileaks CableGate relates to the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance from a theoretical framework of ideology and participation?

To approach the research question, I will try to answer the following set of sub-questions:

 What are the main discourses and ideology articulated by civil society

organisations and governments in the debate about the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org?

 How do these discourses and ideology influence the possibilities for civil society participation in decision-making through and on Internet-related issues?

 Are there concrete developmental issues that have arisen from the discussion around Wikileaks CableGate, that a multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance can address?

From a communication for development perspective, looking at the question of civil society participation in the global discussion about Internet governance is important, because the Internet as a channel for alternative thought has “unleashed a wide-ranging and globally significant shift in communications... that has led to the empowerment of individuals and nonstate actors on an unprecedented scale” (Deibert et. al., 2010, 3). This empowerment has both enhanced civil society participation in all areas of social life, but also led to attempts of governments to impose regulations on the Internet space in an attempt to control the flows of information. Thus the Internet impacts the relations between civil society with governments through its growth in political and social

significance, which leads to social change - “through technology, regulation, norms, and political calculus – (the Internet) has emerged to shape a new geopolitical information landscape.” (Deibert et. al., 2010, 3). Such a shift in communications suggests a process of renegotiation of power balances around the question of who controls online

communication and the global online information flows. While, traditionally the control of information has been the foundation of state power (Castells, 2009, 320), the

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question of control of Internet globally has only recently emerged. With a stronger participation of civil society actors in this process, a way for social change is opened, allowing for actors who have previously not been able to express their voice to take part in global discussions the international effect of which could shape the local

empowerment possibilities of Internet in a glocalised2_{way. The combined result of}

cultural change in communication and governance processes, along with political change might open the path to social change (Castells, 2009, 300) . Therefore, the study of the question from the theoretical framework participation and ideology is appropriate for putting the discussion in a communication for development3_{perspective, and will}

allow for relating it to Wikileaks CableGate in the context of the issues that it has raised in relation to Internet governance.

My work draws on the border between participatory democracy and communication, converging in the Internet's enabling potential seen through the case of Wikileaks CableGate. I am aware that the study might have at times too strong focus on

governance, but it is anchored in the participatory model and enabling communication potential of Internet, therefore I believe it is relevant for exploring the potential for social change through the debate about Internet governance.

2 Glocalization is understood here as in Kraidy's terms as “a blending of global forces with local elements, adequately accounts for the complexity of global relations in the Information Age” (Kraidy, 2001, 39).

3 Further in my work I prefer to use the term “social change” instead of “development”, as it allows to avoid widely established notions associated with the latter term, such as neo-liberalism or its

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CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

I have limited the theoretical framework in my project to three main areas: the concept of alternative media; the concept of participation through multi-stakeholder cooperation; and discourse, power and ideology with a focus on the ideology of the “right to

communicate”.

RELEVANT RESEARCH

Alternative media

In order to connect the concepts of participation and ideology from a communication for development perspective to the case of Wikileaks CableGate, and in particular to the restrictive measures taken to limit the global access to www.wikileaks.org, it is

necessary to introduce the concept of alternative media. In the current project I look at the Wikileaks website4_{as an example of media used to express alternative discourses}

and require higher accountability by governments through a community way of work. Bailey (2008) suggests four approaches in understanding alternative media. Of

relevance to this study is a mixture of all four, since each of them provides points of entrance to understand the debate around Wikileaks CableGate, and allows for building up the analysis further. The first approach treats alternative media as a medium oriented towards community5_{and participation}6_{. Participation is in turn understood as a process}

in which at least two parties influence each other in making decisions, but the final power to decide rests with one party only (Pateman, 1970, 70). I will elaborate more on this concept in the next section. Bailey develops further the notion that alternative media facilitates and allows the participation of the community in the produced content and in the content-producing organisation (Bailey et. al., 2008, 14). In this approach, the “ordinary people” are given the possibility to have their voices heard and is thus becomes a tool for community empowerment. (Bailey et. al., 2008, 14). The second 4 www.wikileaks.org, which by the time of writing is still resolvable only through its IP address, but not

through a domain name. The existing mirrors of the website are not of relevance to the project. 5 Community is understood as a unit, “actively constructed by its members and those members derive an identity from this construction” (Bailey et. al., 2008, 10)

6 Participation is understood taking the UNESCO definition as “a higher level of public

involvement...in the production process and also in the management and planning of communication systems” (Servaes, 1999, 85)

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approach to alternative media is as an alternative to the traditional media which despite offering a counter-hegemonic discourse, is rather unrepresentative, and is articulated as “unprofessional, inefficient, limited.... and as marginal as some of the societal groups to whom they try to give a voice” (Bailey et. al., 2008, 20). The third approach sees alternative media as part of the civil society, contributing and playing a vital role for democracy. In this sense, Bailey claims that alternative media plays the same role as a civil society organisation. (Bailey et. al., 2008, 24). The fourth approach establishes the connection between community, participation, democracy and media by looking at alternative media in three aspects: “its role at the crossroads of civil society, their elusiveness, and their interconnections and linkages with market and state” (Bailey et. al., 2008, 27). This approach is claimed to allow for mapping the threats to the existence of this type of media, such as for example losing financial or other independence

(Bailey et. al., 2008, 30).

The attempts to restrict www.wikileaks.org after the publication of the alleged

diplomatic cables by Wikileaks, as well as the governmental attempts to exercise power in order to block the financial and operational assets of Wikileaks can be seen as an example of these threats, provoking a discussion between civil society organisations and governments about the freedom of expression online. They form also a case of

alternative media use, in which Castells quoting Downing (2009, 57) suggests that “social actors and individual citizens around the world are using the new capacity of communication networking to advance their projects, to defend their interests, and to assert their values” in an attempt to challenge the existing power balances.

Communicative action is central for the creation of meaning, so when the civil society can provide the content of state action freely through the public media, democracy is ensured (Castells, 2009, 12). Bryan further develops the topic claiming that computer-mediated-communication is claimed to hold “the key to the enhancement of the democratic aspects of the political process and to the creation of new opportunities for citizen participation in the local and national public spheres” (Bryan,1998, 2). The decentralized and relatively unregulated Internet space allows thus to explore the

possibilities for civil society's empowerment through online media, and go a step further – to try to influence in the regulation of the online space giving the question a global

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dimension.

This highlights another quality of alternative media – to allow for “self-management” giving civil society actors “the power of decision making within communication enterprises” and to be “fully involved in the formation of communication policies and plans” (Servaes, 1999, 85). In this sense, alternative media and participation can provide a channel for resisting mainstream discourses at communicative, organisational and political level (Bailey et. al., 2008, 33). In the same time, “fighting a war of position on numerous fronts has left the alternative media movement in a rather problematic, vulnerable and isolated position”(Bailey et. al., 2008, 33) – a problem which Wikileaks also partly shares.

Participation, and the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance Participatory democracy

Castells states that democracy is about a set of processes and procedures, and not about policy (Castells, 2009, 12), and democratic governance is the one that serves the people as opposed to only ruling them (Pateman, 1970). Elaborating on Mill, Klang (2006, 12) suggests that “for an efficient democracy it is not enough government to be structured democratically but even large parts of the social system must be similarly organized” - which is a precondition for achievement of a self-managing society. Already in 1977, UNESCO drafted a normative theory of alternative communication developing the concepts of access, participation and self-management (Vatikiotis, 2005, 7), which has set the grounds for a participatory communication model (Servaes, 1999, 88), stressing the importance on “ the cultural identity of local communities and of democratisation and participation at all levels – international, national, local, and individual.” Klang continues that until now the processes of democracy have been a compromise between theory and technological limitations. (Klang, 2006, 12). With the development of new communication technologies though, and in particular the Internet, more possibilities are created for the civil society to exercise direct participation. As Enzensberger (1974, 97) suggests: “For the first time in history, the media are making possible mass

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are in the hands of the masses themselves”.

This concept of participatory communication is in the core of the discussion about a multi-stakeholder model of governance, which is necessary to present in more detail in order to be able to understand it in the context of Internet governance and to help in the analysis the discussion of governments and civil society actors around the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org.

Multi-stakeholder governance

The idea about a multi-stakeholder model of governance builds upon the earlier idea of the UN New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) which in the 70s-80s of the 20th_{century focused on multiplicity through participatory communication for}

social change, to which a normative approach had been suggested. (Carlsson, 2005, 212). At that time though, the way to ensure the multiplicity was through creating preconditions for new communicative situations, often on a “grass roots” level. (Carlsson, 2005, 212). A definition suggested by Banks (2005, 85) presents the multi-stakeholder process as: “the coming together of different interest groups on an equal footing, to identify problems, define solutions and agree on roles and responsibilities for policy development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation”. The concept of “stakeholders” and “stakes” which has roots in the UN terminology (Mueller et. al., 2007, 268) creates clear relations to neo-liberalism, and as suggested by Charkiewicz (2005, 80), this way of organisation of social actors positions them inside the corporate orbit. Charkiewicz argues further that NGOs that rely on a normative understanding of power are not well equipped to make sense of how power works through discourse, an effect of which is that the neo-liberal governmentality has shifted civil society and the UN together with market and the State (Charkiewicz, 2005, 80). The work of power through discourse is of particular relevance to the project and will be examined in detail further on.

Internet governance and the multi-stakeholder approach

The question about Internet governance has been identified as a priority area during the UN World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) forums in 2003 and 2005, and as a

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result, an international forum was established under the name Internet Governance Forum (IGF). It's task is to “support the United Nations Secretary-General in carrying out the mandate...with regard to convening a new forum for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue”. (IGF, 2010). In this summit it was expressed for the first time the

requirement that Internet governance is conducted on a multi-stakeholder basis, setting a new norm of customary international law (Malcolm, 2008, 322). This is reflected in the following working definition: “Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet” (WGIG, 2005, 11). However, the role granted to the civil society in this decision remains unclear. The Tunis agenda suggests that civil society should continue playing important role at community level (Tunis agenda, 2005), but does not delegate neither rights nor decision-making power to it. On the contrary, governments' role is presented as rights and responsibilities on international Internet-related public policy issues seen as a sovereign right of the States (Tunis agenda, 2005). The struggle of the civil society actors for defending their right to

participate in the process is colourfully described by Mueller: “the status of civil society and private sector participants was a point of tension and instability, and renegotiated at every turn” to the extent that there was a lack of agreement of whether these participants should be allowed to speak (Mueller et.al., 2007, 282). The ambiguity in roles and power delegation, as well as lack of clarity in a process, which otherwise asserts the need of civil society actors in the frame of a multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance creates the preconditions for them to try to draw the borders themselves by using various communication tactics and approaches. A problem of the multi-stakeholer model in the context of Internet governance is that from a development perspective, it has unclear mechanism for stimulating the participation of actors from areas not having access to the Internet. Sylla (2007, 40) develops on that suggesting that if participation in Internet governance is based only on the knowledge of a country about Internet issues, then “the voices of more than 80 percent of the African population will always be translated by representatives who may not be aware of their real problems nor understand the languages spoken by them”. Another problem is that despite the identification of a multi-stakeholder approach as “ the only legitimate way to develop

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the Internet regulatory environment” (Alvand, 2007, 9), the civil society and government interests “stand in conflict, and there is little consensus as to how these global stakeholder coalitions should be built.”(Alvand, 2007, 9). Aspects of this conflict penetrate the discussion around the Wikileaks CableGate case, and are included in the analysis section of the study, and presented in the context of the above framework.

Discourse, power and ideology

At the bottom of the advancement of certain views and ideology lies a process of creation of meaning and representation practices. Therefore, looking at research theory about how meaning is constructed is relevant for understanding the ways different social groups create and advance their positions in the debate about the restriction of

www.wikileaks.org and the multi-stakeholder approach, as well as their relation to broader social practices and process of social change.

Stuart Hall speaks about the importance of a common access to language in order to share meaning and sees language as central to culture and meaning playing, and as a repository of cultural values. (Hall, 1997, 1). This is of particular relevance for

communication that takes place in the media, as it reflects cultural and social processes articulated through specific discourses. Discourse is thus seen as “a system of

representation” (Hall, 1997, 44) that is a result of the combination of language and practice. Discourse allows to establish a connection between the use of language in social life and social structure (Deacon et al, 2007, 151), suggesting the idea that social and cultural reproduction, and change take place in the discursive practice (Jørgensen, 2000, 67). There are four main characteristics that map the discursive field: a critical attitude to an obvious knowledge; historical and cultural specifics; relation between knowledge and social processes; and relation between knowledge and social actions (Jørgensen quoting Burr, 2000, 11). In this sense, discourse is important for analysing both social change and social practices.

According to Foucault quoted by Hall, “nothing has any meaning outside of discourse” (Hall, 1997, 45). In Faucauldian terms, discourse is defined as “speech or writing seen

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from the point of view of the beliefs, values and categories which it embodies” which constitute a way of looking at the world, and a representation of experience (Deacon et. al., 2007, 152). Foucault has further elaborated this concept establishing a connection between knowledge, power and discourse claiming that “knowledge linked to power not only assumes the authority of the truth, but has the power to make itself true” (Hall, 1997, 49). Therefore, establishing regimes of truth in discourse can be used as a tool to advance particular ideology of a social group, making it relevant for studying the discussion around the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org. With relevance to communication processes, Castells defines power as exercised by the construction of meaning in the human mind through processes of communication enacted in

global/social multimedia networks of mass communication, and mass

self-communication (Castells, 2009, 416). In this sense, when speaking about positions or views of certain social groups, the production, dissemination and consumption of these positions can be understood as attempts to influence this process of circulation of power and become an “oppressor” instead of “oppressed”. Further, Foucault has argued that knowledge is not only form of power, but power is implicated in the application of knowledge in different circumstances, thus having the quality to make itself true (Hall, 1997, 48-49). Therefore, according to Foucault, the use of power to present certain knowledge establishes a regime of truth, which exists only in a discursive formation and does not have an absolute character. (Hall, 1997, 49).

While Foucault is concerned primarily of the relations of power and knowledge, rather than on the meaning production, (Deacon et. al., 2007, 152), Fairclough understands discourse as “an attempt to show systematic links between texts, discourse practices, and sociocultural practices” (1995b, 16-17). This understanding has shown an attempt to develop a social analysis of media language and discourse (Deacon et. al., 2007, 156). In the context of my research question, the approach suggested by Fairclough helps to make relations of broader character, and see how the text practice constructs ideology and discourses that ultimately reflect a broader social practice and may indicate change. In terms of the latter, Fairclough works a lot with the concept of interdiscursivity. The definition he suggests is that interdiscursivity “highlights the normal heterogeneity of texts in being constituted by combinations of diverse genres

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and discourses” (Fairclough, 1995a, 95), where genres or orders of discourse are understood as a system, in which “communication events not only reproduce orders of discourse, but also can change them through creative use of language” (Jørgensen, 2000, 76). Therefore, interdiscursivity plays an important role in the analysis of media events, since the discourses produced in them can influence and change dominant opinions or policies, thus creating conditions for shift of powers and social change. This claim is supported by Jørgensen analysing Fairclough's theory who postulates that “high interdiscursivity goes together with change, while lower interdiscursivity tends to reproduce the existing.” (Jørgensen, 2000, 87) and is relevant for the discussion about a multi-stakeholder governance in the context of the event of the publication of US diplomatic cables by Wikileaks. What is more, through high interdiscursivity it is created meaning, which can in turn be mobilized to shift relations of power between different groups in the society. (Jørgensen, 2000, 79). The concept of interdiscursivity is important for building and expressing ideological concerns, since it also represents a concerted effort to probe and pinpoint the ideological dimensions of communication mainly in its intersubjective contexts, and is thus concerned with a dynamic of contingent discourses and contexts. (Orr, 2003, 43).

The right to communicate

Thus, from the perspective of ideology and discourse it is of relevance for the project to briefly present the concept of the right to communicate which would help later in the analysis to discuss the relations of power enforced between civil society actors and governments in the debate around Wikileaks CableGate.

The “right of men to communicate” (D'Arcy, 1969, 14) has formed the foundations of a social movement in the past 35 years, based on ideas about participatory democracy asserting that all citizens should have a communication right in any and every

governance process that affects them (Mueller et. al., 2007, 274). The concept reflects the thought that new technology makes it possible for people to participate interactively in all social processes that affect them (Mueller et. al., 2007, 270). This idea has been an important milestone in the work of the UN MacBride Commission in the 70s and 80s towards NWICO, in which the right to communicate was seen as a solution for

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empowerment of “third world countries”, through which they would develop and strengthen their independence and self-determination (Carlsson, 2005 ,199) and overcome the gap between North and South. Later on it has been developed in WSIS which had the ambition: “to create a more inclusive Information Society and to bridge the digital divide in a North-South perspective”. (Carlsson, 2005, 213). In these contexts, the right to communicate is seen as a “new human right” that expands and supersedes the individual rights of freedom of speech, the press, and assembly

associated with classical liberalism” (Mueller et. al., 2007, 274). In this way, it becomes an important ideology with relevance to social change creating opportunities for civil society groups and advocacy networks to demand higher participation in decision- and policy making on communication issues. It has also the feature to serve as a “broad normative banner and the language of “rights” ...(is used) more as a framing tactic than as something to be taken literally and applied legalistically”, which helps a broad range of movements involved in communication-information policy (Mueller et. al., 2007, 277). This is called by Mueller as a “normative-tactical” view on communication rights used to facilitate “the ongoing development of consensual knowledge among non-state actors about communication policy issues.” due to its own incompleteness it (Mueller et. al., 2007, 277). Such a framework can act as a convergence tool for creating a common voice for civil society actors in legitimizing their role in Internet governance and policy issues, and demand higher participation in policy issues grounding the demands on the ideology of the right to communicate.

In the analysis section of the study I will look in more detail on whether the “normative-tactical” approach was used by the non-governmental actors and governments, and in what way in the discussion around the Wikileaks CableGate case.

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CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGY

The case which forms the core of my analysis is Wikileaks CableGate, and in particular - the attempts of governments and companies to restrict the global access to

www.wikileaks.org after the publication of the US diplomatic cables. The communication event in focus is the discussion between government and

non-governmental actors that have emerged around the legitimacy of these attempts in the context of participation, Internet principles, and the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance.

Case and method

Having defined the Wikileaks CableGate as a starting communication event which contextualizes my study, I will do a critical discourse analysis on a sample of statements produced by civil society groups, key non-governmental actors and governments in the course of the discussion of the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org. In terms of the civil society actors' statements, it was necessary to divide the civil society sector into groups due to the fact that they represent different communities (technical, advocacy, etc.). In the overall selection of statements I have aimed at gathering material which represents the points of view of mainly different groups comprising the civil society sector and governments with an active position on Internet principles, empowerment through participation and the freedom to communicate. The positions of companies or the academic community are not subject of this study.

I have identified as relevant to the research question the positions of civil society actors from the following three major groups: international NGOs and groups active in

advocacy on Internet governance issues (Internet Governance Caucus, Association for Progressive Communications, Global Network Initiative, Internet Society), international NGOs active in advocating the concept about the freedom of communication, that see the communication on the Internet as an aspect of it (PEN International, Article XIX, Reporters Without Borders, Council on Foreign Relations) as well as the hackers community (Anonymous, 2600 Magazine) as representatives of the technical

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community that works with educational and social aspects of the Internet7_{. The}

hacktivist community has a different goal and position on the issues of governance of Internet than the NGOs and advocacy groups, but since hacktivism aims at influencing decisions, opinion, as well as disrupt and undermine political opponents (Dahlgren, 2009, 197), looking at the hacktivist community position on wikileaks.org is important for discussing the relation of the case to the Internet governance process. This selection would allow for a better understanding of the motives and ideological framework driving the civil society actors in taking certain positions on the restriction of access to

www.wikileaks.org and in analysing its relation to the dialogue about a multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance from a communication for social change perspective.

In analysing the governmental positions there is less variety in the documents because most of the governments have focused on commenting the contents of the released materials, while very few produced a statement on the restriction of access to

www.wikileaks.org. Nevertheless, three major governmental actors produced a

statement of relevance to the present study, namely – the US government (analysed here through three statements: one of the White House, and two by the US State Secretary Hilary Clinton), the EU in the face of the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), and the UN in the face of the UN Special Rapporteur on the

Promotion and Protection the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, issued jointly with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression on Human Rights (further abbreviated as UN/IACHR). I look at the latter as a governmental position, because the UN is an intergovernmental

international body, and the Inter-American commission represents the voices of governments of all countries in South and North America. In this way, these three clusters of statements would represent the majority of voices of the European, South and North American Areas. The African and Asian opinions remain unclear, as there were almost no statements publicly available in English, but one was still found and belongs to the prime minister of the Republic of Kenya, Mr. Odinga, which I also consider in my analysis, being aware that it does not represent the opinion of any major 7 A brief description of each organisation is placed in the analysis of the relevant statement. This gives

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African union, but still enriches the empirical data.

Qualitative interviews

The difficulty in finding statements from the Asian and African regions suggests a problem of representation of the global South in the discussion, which I have tried to approach through complementing the empirical material through several qualitative interviews taken with representatives of other regions.

The goal with the interviews was to get a personal and eventually, regional perspective from non-governmental actors that take part in both the discussion about Internet governance, as well as have an opinion on Wikileaks CableGate and relate the discourses mapped in the interviews to the jointly advanced discourse through

statements. The interview material would also allow for grasping attitudes and beliefs that contribute to building an idea of the common ideology shaping of the discourses advanced in the discussion about multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance. This will enrich the empirical material and will contribute to the understanding of how the regional discourses relate to official statements on the CableGate case and Internet governance.

The choice of interviewees was based on their involvement in non-governmental or civil society driven projects or initiatives related to Internet policy and governance formation, at local or international level with focus on non-Western countries. The inclusion of interviewees from Russia, Kyrgyzstan and the Democratic Republic of Congo is an attempt to partly compensate for the lack of public statements on the case in point from these areas and get an additional perspective on it. The rest of the interviewees

participate directly in some of the organisations, whose statements I am analysing, as well as in the debate about multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance, at

international or local level. One interviewee is an exception, M. Mueller, whose position was interesting to see from the point of view of a representative of the IGC, which is a civil society group comprised of participants from all around the world. Therefore it was interesting to explore how does the public statement relate to a personal position of a participant.

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Interviews were made with the following interviewees: Veni Markovski (Internet Society Bulgaria chapter); Milton Mueller (Internet Governance Caucus); Alexey Bebinov (Global Internet Policy Initiative, Kyrgyzstan); Alexey Sidorenko, (Global Voices, RuEcho, Russian Federation); Badouin Schombe, (TIC@FRICA and ICANN At Large member, Democratic Republic of Congo). Interviewees from Brazil and India have also agreed to an interview, but their answers did not come by the time of writing, and therefore are not included.

The interviews were email based. I am aware that this leads to a loss of information, such as voice tone, pauses, emotions and flexibility, which could be of importance for the analysis, but on the other hand this approach is seen as “convenient and cost-effective means for questioning large and/or geographically dispersed populations” (Deacon et. al., 2007, 68). I am not working with large populations, but I am interested in getting replies from geographically dispersed respondents which makes the method a relevant choice. Moreover, non-face-to-face asynchronous online interviews allow the interviewee to have more time for response and eventually provide more thought-out answers.

While I have tried to pick statements and do interviews which would present the visions of a broad variety of civil society actors and governments in relation to the research question, this study does not use quantitative methods, therefore I am aware that it might not be entirely representative. However, since the choice of qualitative methods tend to look at far fewer texts, but more in depth (Davis, 2008, 57), I have put weight on the selection of texts to analyse so that they can help answering the research question, rather than representativeness in terms of quantity of opinions analysed.

Why critical discourse analysis? Argumentation of the method

The research question aims at addressing the debate around the restriction of access to the website www.wikileaks.org that have emerged directly after the CableGate

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possibilities of civil society in Internet governance. The existence of a discussion

suggests the operation of rhetoric between different social groups. Rhetoric is defined as persuasion by any available means (Fairclough, 1995a, 502), and Fairclough suggests that its structure constitutes a frame within which diverse discourses are articulated together in a particular way, within which relations are established (Fairclough, 1995a, 512).

My choice of critical discourse analysis as a particular method to do the discourse analysis is based on the function of this method to work as a “systematic

transdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse and other elements of the social process” (Fairclough, 1995a, 10) which addresses social wrongs and possible ways of mitigating them (Fairclough, 1995a, 11). What is more, the critical discourse analysis presumes that the operation discourses and their ordering is determined by the unequal power relations of social institutions and society (Deacon et. al., 2007, 157), and analyses them with the goal to look at processes of ongoing “social change in direction towards more even power relations in the communication processes and in the society as a whole. “(Jørgensen, 2000, 69).Thus it is a convenient method to look at the ideology and power relations established between civil society organisations and governments in the debate about www.wikileaks.org and analyse them in the broader context of civil society participation in a multi-stakeholder model of Internet

governance. The question about ideology is important in Fairclough's critical discourse analysis, as it is seen as a result of the discourse practices, and leads to the creation and reproduction of asymmetrical power relations between social groups which are seen as ideological effects (Jørgensen, 2000, 69), and discourse analysis is considered “at its best when it turns these ideological strategies inside out” (Deacon et. al. 2007, 158).

Ideology is in the basis of the articulation of certain views and discourses, and in the debate around www.wikileaks.org it is important because the struggles to naturalise dominant opposing discourses tend to make the latter appear as common sense rather than ideology (Deacon et. al., 2007, 158). Therefore, the ideology and combination of orders of discourse allow to map“potential cultural hegemony, with dominant groups struggling to assert an maintain particular structuring within and between them”

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(Fairclough, 1995b, 56). The ultimate benefit from using this method is that it provides a critical approach that is politically engaged in social change. As Jørgensen postulates, the results of this “should be able to be used in the struggle for social change”

(Jørgensen, 2000, 70), which is of importance from a communication for development perspective. Therefore, it will be possible to look at the current power balances between non-governmental actors and states, and how these balances are impacted in the context of the CableGate discussion and its relation to the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance.

When working with texts as empirical material, the linguistic approach might be useful for performing a critical discourse analysis. The latter works with the “linguistic-discursive dimension in social and cultural phenomena and processes of change in the late modernity” (Jørgensen, 2000, 67), in which language becomes both ” a site of and a stake in class struggle” (Deacon et. al. quoting Fairclough, 2007, 157). What is more, texts can communicate about events and processes, and establish and reproduce social relations or construct links with the situations in which they are used (Deacon et. al., 2007, 154). Therefore, the methodological framework suggested by the critical discourse analysis will ultimately allow to map processes of social change that eventually take place in the context of participatory communication in the light of the Wikileaks CableGate case.

The framework of my analysis will follow Fairclough's three-dimensional model of working with critical discourse analysis: text; discursive practice; and social practice, as it is suitable for empirical research about communication and society (Jørgensen, 2000, 74). I will examine how does the discursive practice relate to the discussion about a multi-stakeholder Internet governance and how they are constructed by the different actors in the discussion.

I approach the case with restriction of the access to www.wikileaks.org as a place of conflict of cultural and political power between the governmental and

non-governmental actors. Since the institutional framework of Internet governance is still not entirely set, and the scope of influence of each actor in the multi-stakeholder model

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is still to be precisely defined, it is a matter of advancement of particular discourses and ideologies of different social groups in order to attain legitimacy and try to draw the borders in advance setting the stage. Given this setting, the critical discourse analysis will also help to better understand the specifics of the ideology which frames the discourses of the non-governmental and governmental actors in my case of point. It will allow for capturing changing media practices and therefore reflect social and cultural changes, as well as shifting chain or choice relations. (Fairclough, 1995b, 66).

Limitations of the method

Despite the strength of critical discourse analysis to study change, ideology and

relations between social groups through discourses, the method has some disadvantages that should be taken into account. At first place, it assumes that aside from the existence of discourses, there are social practices or events of non-discursive character that also influences the studied social practice and change. However, it is very difficult to draw the line between discursive and non-discursive and to say where is the edge between the two to determine the dialectics (Jørgensen, 2000, 93). This is of particular difficulty in my current study since the discussion that I analyse is of high-degree of complexity, which makes it difficult to clearly say which practices are not discursive. Another weakness of the method is that while putting a strong value on the discourse practices, it underestimates the possibilities of people to control the use of their language

(Jørgensen, 2000, 94). It is also important to be aware of the differences in interpreting power relations, which according to Fairclough are productive leading to change, while for, for example van Dijk they are abuse. (Jørgensen, 2000, 95). Another critique is that Fairclough's approach builds upon a combination of discourse theories, based on Foucault, Gramsci, Althusser, Habermas, and Giddens which poses the question if any discourse theory is valid and applicable to the critical discourse analysis (Jørgensen, 2000, 93).

From a broader perspective, there are general limitations of discourse analysis. One should be aware it “does not explain the world, it helps us to understand parts of it” (Barker, 2008, 163). Therefore, assuming the trustworthiness of the results produced through discourse analysis is subject of dispute, since they might also simply reflect the

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researcher's own discourse. To partly solve this problem, Barker (2008, 163) suggests the importance of the reliability of the studied sample, using it more as a “corpus” rather than a sample. Another problem is the difficulty for analysis to check this method (Barker, 2008, 165), which given the large volume of analysed material limits the possibility to present the variety of contexts of use of the discourses due to for example, time and volume limitations. Thirdly, text and discourse analyses lead to making claims about things beyond themselves (Barker, 2008, 166). This is a problem especially in critical discourse analysis where texts and discourses are seen as a broader social

practice, the choice of which is though left on the researcher, and the characteristics that are attributed to the studied empirical material. Therefore, there is a risk of implying qualities that might not belong to them. The only suggestion that Barker (2008, 167) presents for tackling these problems is to keep awareness and be honest about the boundaries and limitations, to which I try to adhere.

Here is the place to admit, that since the publication of cables through Wikileaks website is a rather recent event, the study made here has taken into account only publicly available statements, most of them published between December 2010 and March 2011. Therefore, the study does not have the ambition to reflect long-term effects or complete representativeness of the results, but rather aims at giving a picture of some immediate issues brought up in the context of participatory communication in creating rules and principles of Internet governance.

My position in the research

As an answer to some of the problems by using this method, it is important to clarify my own discourse when approaching the research question. I have been working for more than 7 years as part of the Bulgarian chapter of Internet Society, the latter being one of the major global NGOs “dedicated to ensuring the open development, evolution and use of the Internet for the benefit of people throughout the world.” (ISOC, 2010) and being present through a statement in my analysis. Moreover, in January-February 2011 I took part in an online group on Internet Governance 4 Development suggesting questions to be brought up in the upcoming global meeting of the Internet Governance Forum in Nairobi in September 2011. These affiliations put the challenge to not take a

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side in the analysis of the civil society organisations' discourses by taking certain positions for granted, which as Jørgensen suggests (Jørgensen, 2000, 28) makes certain discourses hard to be seen as such. As a solution to that, Jørgensen advices to get a distant position in the analysis and constantly evaluate how does the researcher relate to the discourses that are being analysed (Jørgensen, 2000, 29). I have tried to keep to this principle in the course of my analysis, as well as in the choice of methodology for approaching the question.

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CHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS

In the course of analysis I have identified four main themes that penetrate my empirical material, and establish links between the case with restriction of access to

www.wikileaks.org and the concept of a multi-stakeholder Internet governance from the perspective of participatory communication and social change. These themes are: (1) Hegemonic relations and representation; (2) Neo-liberalism vs net neutrality; (3) Disruptive practices vs cyber-security; (4) Development issues and the democratic dimension of the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance.

The presentation of each of the themes below follows Fairclough's three-dimensional model to do critical discourse analysis of looking at discourse practice, text/linguistic practice, and social practices. Since some of the texts are distinguished by high interdiscursivity and intertextuality, they touch upon more than one of the themes. Therefore, in each section I have used only the relevant for the topic texts.

THEME 1. Hegemonic relations and representation

In this section I look at the texts subject to my analysis from the perspective of ideologies and power relations established in the context of the discussion about the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org. In this theme I argue that while advancing their agendas and ideology, the civil society actors use the discussion in order to challenge the hegemony of power established by governments by contrasting the discourse of human rights and full freedom of communication online to the

governmental discourse of security to ensure their right to participatory communication.

Discursive practice

The statement of the Internet Governance Caucus (IGC) is an example of a transparent and collective production of a public position, which has been developed using a publicly available online collaborative tool8_{. It has been done in a manner in which}

8 A track of the comments and the person suggesting them is still kept and publicly available at:

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every participant in the IGC could contribute to the discussion seeking consensus in the published statement. From the track of changes available online it can be seen how the statement has gradually changed focus from a rather emotional to a moderate and politically oriented message published as a reaction to the restriction of access to

www.wikileaks.org. The IGC position advocates for a discourse that builds upon the need of a common dialogue related to Internet principles and governance – a discourse which dominates most of the analysed statements, and supports Drake's appeal (2004, 38) for securing Internet's future as an open and vibrant global medium through engagement, exertion of soft power, and building a lasting and widely supported

consensus through collective problem solving. IGC's statement is distinguished by high grade of interdiscursivity featuring a broad range of discourses – political, globalization, and narrative used in an intertextual way. The narrative discourse creates a premise to introduce an advocacy-analytical discourse that argues for “necessary policies” - an approach used to advance a legitimation strategy (Fairclough, 1995a, 249) – in the concrete case the legitimation of the presence of IGC in the international discussion of Internet governance. This use implies that the targeted recipient of the statement are governments.

Similar approach is used by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), in which

recontextualisation is realised in the gradual move from a combination of narrative-analytical discourse to advocacy-political in the course of the text (“This is the first time we have seen...”, “We point out that in France in the United States, it is up to the courts, not politicians, to decide whether or not a website should be closed” ). Even media discourse is present (“...any restriction ...will affect the entire press”, “playing a useful role by making them available to journalists”) concluding with the assertive ahistorical ideological construction “Reporters Without Borders...has always defended online freedom and the principle of “Net neutrality””. Other civil society actors, such as the Association for Progressive Communicaitons (APC), put emphasis on the analytical and human rights discourse in order to frame and establish a connection between Wikileaks and its own agenda and ideology, built around securing the freedom of Internet and fight against corruption. The text uses narrative, personal, corporate, advocacy, human rights and political discourses in a combination which supports the ideology of the “freedom

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to communicate”, and suggests solutions to challenges in front of the online civil society presented as caused by governments. In this way, it assumes a position of an actor that sets the agenda for empowering and representing citizens online and that has a guardian role of the Internet freedom protecting the society from global governmental censorship.

Such censorship, framed within a security discourse advances restrictive dominant governmental practices that aim at overriding the discourse of openness and freedom of the Internet space. The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) claims that “The freedom the internet allows in moving between jurisdictions and technologies makes cyber security an asymmetric challenge....it is a challenge which must be met through global cooperation to strengthen all aspects of cyber security” (ENISA, 2010). The repetitive presentation of the Wikileaks CableGate case as a “challenge” is a way to justify the necessity of the ENISA and EU work towards cyber security and while highlighting the need for global cooperation to face it, the omission of civil society actors in the whole statement suggests that its role is perceived as a disruptive actor threatening the hegemony of power and governance, against which measures should be taken. This tactic is articulated also in the statement of the White House on Wikileaks (White House, 2010.), as well as in Hilary Clinton's – On Internet Rights and Wrongs (Clinton, 2011), in which the discussion is shifted from freedom of information to the intensive articulation of a discourse about endangering the lives of people, and the role of governments, in particular the U.S., in protecting the world from a broad range of threats (Clinton, 2011). The Kenyan prime minister follows similar line of argumentation, articulating though discourses in a more colloquial, personal, but also political way. The recipient of the text is the Kenyan population, who might react negatively to information leaked from Wikileaks, while in the same time, it acts as a stand for democracy and human right values.

These discourses are exploited by the civil society organisations that support the ideology of the right to communicate to advocate for the need of safeguarding the openness and freedom of Internet as a media from governmental intervention. An example is the Internet Society (ISOC), which through advocacy and expert discourses

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advances the civil society position of openness of online communication above all contrasting it to the governmental discourse anchored in security. ISOC concludes with a partly colloquial (“entities that acted maliciously to take it off the air ”), and partly advocacy-technical discourse (“Until and unless appropriate laws are brought...technical solutions should be sought to ...”) emphasising on the legal framework behind the management of Internet resources internationally, thus implying the absence of such with an international scope of action. Article XIX continues this line defending the media liberty and freedom of speech online through advocacy, analytical and narrative discourses, advancing the idea of higher civil society participation in governance, and giving citizens a voice. Here the participatory and democratic discourses are articulated by building upon the traditional democratic values of the West through representation techniques such as contrasts, and questioning the legitimacy of governmental actions.

A slightly different approach is used by PEN International (PEN), which while sharing the ideology of the right to communicate through an advocacy and media discourse, articulates social and personal discourses which are not present in the statements of the civil society actors working in the field of Internet principles and governance, but are closer to the political strategies and discourses structure. The personal-communication discourse has a legitimizing function for introducing PEN's ideology.

A common pattern for the texts is the relatively high interdiscursivity level in both civil society actors' statements and the governmental ones, which hints eventual processes of social change, in which power balances and dominant discourses related to the Internet freedoms and the online social order are challenged.

Text

In the IGC statement, the focus on governments as recipients of the text is indicated through the replacement of “scandalous” with “sad”, “unjust” with “arbitrary”, “global and political communities” with “governments” which speaks about adjustment of the language to fit the targeted recipient of the message. The text is structured around the use of the case with restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org as a reason to bring up a

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discussion that advances IGC's ideology. The ideological framework is presented by the contrast between the way in which Internet was before - “a model of decentralised, voluntary self-governance”, into which “self-regulated domain, governments have since stepped” (IGC, 2010). The latter indicates a forceful and unwanted intrusion in the existing online social order created with low governmental intervention. By articulating this opinion, IGC establishes a link to its own self-election to represent the civil society voice in the discussion about Internet principles and policy formulation.

This link is confirmed in the interview with Mueller (2011), who through categorically modal phrasing affirms IGC's role to converge the civil society positions related to policy and advocacy, presenting it as a fact, and not as a goal as articulated in the IGC statement. The latter is supported also in the future-oriented statement that articulates a political discourse: “There would have to be a process of consensual development and ratification, using an institutional venue such as the IGF.” (Mueller, 2011) The implicit attribution of institutional quality to the IGF while it has a time limited mandate, as well as lack of decision-making power suggests the importance of the IGF forum for the advancement of both the IGC ideology and the civil society groups represented in it. (Mueller, 2011). This assumption is supported by a paragraph in the statement abundant in negations that aim to de-legitimise the regime of truth of the opponents of this vision. The negations build transitively upon each other introduced by the truism about

“Internet's inherently trans-border architecture”, and then adding “uncoordinated”, “rarely adequate”, “do not represent”, “not democratically”, “less legitimate”, “against” to construct a picture which underlines the lack of a democratic approach, and

disagreement with unilateral government decisions over Internet principles. To suggest measures against these governmental “failures”, IGC establishes a regime of truth that determines the direction of the conversation through advocacy discourse: “What is needed is a framework of principles for Internet governance, which would guide all stakeholders in dealing with trans/border issues...”. Mentioning “all stakeholders” creates a relation of equality between the different actors involved in the IG process in an inclusive way, and is an example of how semiotics works to construct a process of change in an impersonal and ahistorical way (Fairclough, 1995a, 247). The regime of truth of the IGC ideology and claim of a role in the process is strengthened by the use of

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low modality constructions such as “it so happens” and “something like this” opening up for dialogue to find a common solution.

APC takes another approach to challenge the governmental hegemony in the context of the Wikileaks events. It takes advantage of the flexible use of the human rights

discourse to help advance the ideology of communication rights and challenge the hegemonic domination of governments by renegotiating meaning. The link between the importance of Internet, and human rights discourse is presented with the highly

assertive modal statement: “using internet is vital to the realisation of human rights” which is further framed and connected to Wikileaks' “vital role in aiding the fight against corruption in governments and corporations”, working with transitivity to relate events to processes. Having established this connection, APC articulates a strong politically framed discourse with high degree of modality to advance APC's agenda: “The internet must be protected” and “organisations, communities and individuals should be free”. This is important, because as both Mueller (2011) and Sidorenko (2011) suggest in the interviews, the only way for civil society actors to hold governments accountable is through “pressure from global public opinion, other governments, and from pressure from their own citizens”. Therefore, the APC assertive affirmation has a politically-ideological purpose – to advance the role of APC in the discussion about Internet governance, and create a regime of truth in which it sets the agenda of what actions related to the Internet should be done as to guarantee the freedoms of civil society online. This assumption is further asserted with the categorical modality in the conclusion “A stand for Wikileaks is a stand for freedom of expression” - a truism which leaves no room for objection articulating both ideological considerations and advocacy discourse that works on common-sense assumptions (Deacon et. al. quoting Fairclough, 2007, 158).

Similar approach is used by RSF, which advances its ideology with the categorical and ahistorical statement “any restriction (on Wikileaks)...will affect the entire press”. This assertive generalisation works for establishing a hegemony of power of the RSF over activities and discourses articulated by other social groups against its own ideology framed by the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org. It also helps for reaching

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broader recipients and raise awareness, the importance of which is indicated by Sidorenko: “organizations like RSF can help a lot in raising awareness about such issues.” (Sidorenko, 2011).

ISOC takes a different linguistic approach and uses partly colloquial discourse and clichés such as to make a website “infamous through international press coverage and political intrigue”. Thus, ISOC assumes the responsibility to work against the political intrigue and the media in defending citizens rights online, implying the connection between media and politics and establishing a regime of truth in which Internet is seen as an alternative to subjective press coverage and the political intrigue. This

responsibility is based in ISOC's ideology articulated through a narrative discourse in the categorical modal statement - “free expression and non-discrimination are essential to preserve the openness and utility of the Internet”. In this manner the focus is put on the processes forming the current Internet principles and not the agents, underlining the need of dialogue between of civil society and governments in forming these principles. This assumption is supported by the emphasis on “cooperation” as a feature of the Internet in the statement. In terms of representation, ISOC uses flexibly the pronoun “we” to first speak with the voice of the civil society, but later “we” changes to takes the meaning of “ISOC”, thus transitively establishing ISOC's role as a representative of the civil society voice. A feature of the statement is that it mentions Wikileaks only 3 times, mostly towards the end, while an impersonal non nominal phrasing such as “a website” is preferred. This indicates the use of framing to assert ISOC's role of a guardian of Internet freedom, for which role the restriction of access to wikileaks.org act as a legitimizing agent.

Another tactic used to challenge the governmental hegemony of truth in the case of wikileaks.org restriction is through stereotypes, such as PEN does. The work of stereotypes is relevant in application of ethnocentrism and suggests the existence of gross inequalities of power (Hall, 1997, 258-259). Thus, when PEN builds upon

ideologically grounded stereotypes (“healthy societies”, “rights of citizens”) it suggests both the presence of power imbalances, and an attempt to present an ideal model of society, grounded in the principles that PEN stands for. In this way, PEN's position can

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be understood as a way to struggle for hegemony in Gramsci sense (Hall, 1997, 259) through arguing for higher participation, getting a voice and representation on issues related to freedom of expression online. The statement is characterized with categorical modality and truisms, such as “Wikileaks is doing what the media has historically done” and the use of authoritative phrasing such as “marks a significant turning point”, and a look in the future expressed in categorical future tense “will inevitably lead”. In this way it is constructed a highly intertextual text suggesting possibilities for social change anchored around the ideology of the right to communicate online and the existing inequalities of power.

Yet another approach for influencing the power balances in the discussion is to discredit and diminish the authority of the dominating forces, which is used by Article XIX. It builds upon semiotical and linguistic constructions such as calling “foolish”,

“irrational”, “counterproductive”, and “overbroad” the act of restriction of access to

www.wikileaks.org suggesting governmental incompetence and lack of understanding of the principle of work of the Internet. Similarly to PEN, Article XIX uses a framing strategy to present the case as a violation of human rights law, enforced with a strong metaphor: “Bookstores and libraries are not closed and burned to the ground based on the publication of a single or multiple books”.

The same discrediting approach is used in Kenyan prime minister's statement on

Wikileaks where he reduces the information in the cables to “gossip and rumours” in an attempt to diminish its significance. The US government also builds its position on this strategy, which is seen in the expressions: “we anticipate”, “field reporting...is candid and often incomplete”, “not an expression of policy” followed by the projected threats “could compromise”, “can deeply impact”, “put at risk”, “may also include” (White House, 2010), aiming to reduce the degree of truth and weight of statements, in order to regain its discredited authority. A notable feature of the US government discourse is the reassertion of power through paternalistic discourse elaborated Clinton's speech on Internet Rights and Wrongs (Clinton, 2011.), where she states that “to maintain an Internet that delivers the greatest possible benefits to the world, we need to have a serious conversation about the principles that guide us.” She uses her role of a woman

WikiLeaks CableGate and the Multi-Stakeholder Model of Internet Governance

Communication for Development (ComDev 09)

Malmö University