The UN in Mali, a consolidating or fragmenting actor?

Linköping University | Department for Economic and Industrial Development Master´s thesis, 30 credits | Master Program in Political Science Spring 2020 | LIU-IEI-A—20/03470--SE

The UN in Mali, a consolidating or

fragmenting actor?

Thim Hansen

Word Count: 24 980

Tutor, Mikael Blomdahl Examinator, Khalid Khayati

Linköping University SE-581 83 Linköping, Sweden

ii

Abstract

This thesis focus on the UN-led peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and how the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have undertaken this in its resolutions. The importance to study this subject and statebuilding efforts, such as MINUSMA, are due to that a failed statebuilding may result in potential international consequences. This is the case in Mali where terror- and criminal organizations now roam free in large parts of the country where these organizations may plan their operations, including international terror attacks. Therefore, this study will research how the UNSC have positioned itself in regard to the potential explanations to the outcomes of statebuilding, the statebuilder´s dilemma and dividing structures. To conduct the analysis of the resolutions, a qualitative document analysis has been conducted. For understanding the context in Mali and the aftermath of the resolutions, secondary data analysis has been used. The conclusions for this thesis are that the UNSC have taken a middle way in the context of the statebuilder´s dilemma and dividing structures, but that the UNSC also show a great loyalty towards the Malian state, and not vice versa as the dilemma debates. The objective is to shine light on the UN peacekeeping missions in an attempt to influence on how they are carried out since an improvement is needed.

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to say thank you to my friends and family that have always supported me. Mom, Dad, Mormor, Morfar, my sister Zarah, brother in-law Buster but also Kamil, Ramtin, Felix and everybody else that have helped me becoming the person I am today. Further, I would like to give a specific thank you to Biniam and Alexander whom gave well needed insights during the writing of this thesis. The same goes for my wonderful father in-law, Jørn (Pai Lindo). Also, a big thank you for my tutor Michael Blomquist who have given important comments on this thesis which have developed me as a researcher. Por último, um grande obrigado para minha favorite nordestina Maria Carine Araujo Da Silva Breinholt Frandsen, também concheido como nena ou minha futura esposa. Te amo e beijos.

1.

INTRODUCTION ... 1

1.1

R

ESEARCH

P

ROBLEM

... 2

1.2

T

HE

P

URPOSE OF THE

S

TUDY

... 5

1.3

P

REVIOUS RESEARCH

... 6

2.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 11

2.1

D

AVID

L

AKE

&

T

HE

S

TATE

B

UILDER

´

S

D

ILEMMA

... 11

2.2

F

RANZ

F

ANNON

&

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IVIDING

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TRUCTURES

... 18

2.3

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PERATIONALIZATION

... 22

3.

METHOD ... 25

3.1

C

ASE

S

ELECTION

... 25

3.2

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ETHOD

S

ELECTION

... 27

3.3

M

ETHOD TRIANGULATION

... 28

3.4

Q

UALITATIVE

D

OCUMENT

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NALYSIS

... 28

3.5

Q

UANTITATIVE

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ECONDARY

A

NALYSIS

... 32

3.6

D

ELIMITATIONS

... 33

3.7

A

NALYSIS SCHEME

... 34

3.8

W

EAKNESSES OF THE METHOD

... 34

4

BACKGROUND SETTING OF MALI ... 36

5

ANALYSIS ... 40

5.1

R

ESOLUTION

2100

(25

TH OF

A

PRIL

2013) ... 40

5.2

R

ESOLUTION

2164

(25

TH OF

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UNE

2014) ... 43

5.3

R

ESOLUTION

2227

(29

TH OF

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UNE

2015) ... 46

5.4

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ESOLUTION

2295

(29

TH OF

J

UNE

2016) ... 48

5.5

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ESOLUTION

2364

(29

TH OF

J

UNE

2017) ... 51

5.6

R

ESOLUTION

2374

(5

TH OF

S

EPTEMBER

2017)... 54

5.7

R

ESOLUTION

2423

(3

RD OF

J

ULY

2018) ... 57

5.8

R

ESOLUTION

2480

(2

ND OF

J

ULY

2019) ... 60

6

CONCLUSIONS ... 64

6.1

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ONCLUDING DISCUSSION

... 66

1. Introduction

After the independence in 1960 from the colonial power, France, Mali became a one-party state. However, in 1991 Mali became increasingly democratic after the election of President Alpha Oumar Konaré and his party Adéma. In 1992 the new constitution of Mali was signed and implemented, declaring the nation as secular and democratic1. Later, during the 1990´s a

stabilization process between the Tuareg minority and the Malian government began which was largely supported by the majority of the nation and later resulted in the symbolic burning of weapons, and rebels were integrated into the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF)2.

In 1997 there was a clear drop of democracy in Mali3 and many opposition politicians did not

recognize the election held as fair and democratic, still, President Konaré continued his presidency4.

Meanwhile, in Algeria, the group Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) started to emerge in 1998 with the ambition of expanding throughout the Sahara Desert and in the Sahel region, creating an Islamic state5. Even though the potential influence of GSPC, Mali was a fairly

stable nation6.

In 2002, the former military leader Amadou Toumani Touré was elected to the become Mali´s new president. During the rule of President Touré, more specifically in 2006, GSPC swore its allegiance to Al-Qaida, and later, in 2007, the organization became Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). After the fall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, 2011, many Tuaregs who had fought by his side returned to Mali and joined the rebel groups, declaring the independence of the northern region of the country named by them as Azawad7.

Now, the Malian government had two insurgencies within its territory, the Tuaregs and AQIM. The attacks by these groups from the North, in 2011, were successful and government forces were pushed back further into the south of Mali. As a result of these military losses and the inability to

1 Mali Constitution, 1992, Article 25 2 Landguiden, Mali; Modern Historia

3 V-Dem, Country; Mali, Indicator; Deliberative Democracy Index 4 Landguiden, Mali; Modern Historia

5 European Council on Foreign Relations, Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel 6 V-Dem, Country; Mali, Indicator; Freedom House: Status

handle the insurgencies by President Touré, another military coup d’état then occurred. However, after international pressure, it turned into the transitional government of President Dioncounda Traoré8. Nevertheless, the military losses for the Malian government continued and religious

extremist groups like AQIM and Ansar Dine imposed strict Islamic law in some regions.

Later, France and ECOWAS militarily intervened in Mali, combating the rebels and extremists from the north. The United Nations later took over the ECOWAS operation named AFISMA, creating the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA through resolution 2100 in 2013.

Despite the UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, and several other military operations in Mali the state of the nation have not improved, but rather instead worsened9. Therefore, will this thesis

will focus on the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali due to it does not exclusively focus on political and institutional development in Mali.

1.1 Research Problem

The conflict in Mali that erupted in 2011 continues still to this day despite the multiple

interventions in the nation for creating stability and peace. On the 25th April 2013, the UN Security Council proposed and approved resolution 2100 authorizing a takeover of the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mission, AFISMA. As a result of this, the UNSC became an external actor whom conducted statebuilding operations in Mali which contained efforts of stabilizing the nation of Mali after jihadist organization together with the minority, Tuaregs, rebelled against the Malian state which has since continued to divide the nation10. This UN

peacekeeping mission has had insufficient result so far and have further extended the regional and tribal tensions in the nation. An aspect that is discussed by Franz Fannon regarding external actors conducting statebuilding missions11. Since its beginning, the UN peacekeeping force of MINUSMA

has suffered 208 fatalities which is the fifth-highest mortality count of all 69 UN peacekeeping missions through history12. Besides the UN Peacekeeping personnel, but also the civilian

8 Landguiden, Mali; Modern Historia

9 Human Rights Watch, Mali: Events of 2019, 2020

10 Chauzal, Grégory & Van Damme, Thibualt. 2015, p. 30 & Nadin, Peter. 29/07/2013 11 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 112–115

community has been attacked continuously in the country by opposing forces to the regime. Reports show that only in 2019 it was over 400 civilian causalities and over 85 000 were displaced13.

Although, there have been eight resolutions from the UN Security Council regarding MINUSMA, the UN peacekeeping mission has clearly not succeeded with its expectations of the peacekeeping mission. For the element of sovereignty, several armed groups have progressively established themselves in the northern parts of the country and the UN Force Commander Dennis Gyllensporre sees MINUSMA as a difficult mission with too many fatalities14. Moreover, the implications of

other parts of the world, especially northern Africa and Europe is something that Force Commander Gyllensporre sees as an additional incentive for the MINUSMA mission15. A belief that is shared

with David A. Lake for the consequences of ineffective statebuilding, that it may create territory for international terror organizations to roam free16.

Despite the deficient result of the peacekeeping mission, the United Nations must still be seen as a statebuilder in Mali as an outcome of its efforts in transforming both the security and the political predicaments in the nation17. Therefore, will this study aim at identifying different factors within the

resolutions concerning the peacekeeping mission through the theoretical framework which will be a symbiosis of the statebuilder´s dilemma and dividing structures.

The statebuilder´s dilemma is a phenomenon that is present in all external intervention for statebuilding efforts18. The dilemma demonstrates itself as the choice for the external actor in

establishing a state that either has its loyalty to the statebuilder or a state which has the legitimacy of the people19. This judgment then has further implications for the future of the nation, for either

positive or negative ramifications. David A. Lake sees the negative consequences as potentially dangerous for international security with terror organizations roaming freely in ungoverned space20 as in the case of Mali. Further, it also debates the political process in the nation and the

external actor´s efforts for a stabilized political process in containing these potential security threats,

13 Human Rights Watch, Mali: Events of 2019, 2020

14 Gyllensporre, Dennis. interviewed by Malor, Ben. Time: 2:10-2:25 15 Gyllensporre, Dennis. interviewed by Malor, Ben. Time: sec 40-1:07 16 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 2

17Lake A. David., 2016, p. 2–8 18Lake A. David., 2016, p. 1 19 Lake A. David., 2016, p. 2 20 Ibid

something that is a priority in the relevant UNSC resolutions. Nonetheless, this has still shown as insufficient within the context of MINUSMA and Mali.

Four important aspects of the statebuilder´s dilemma will be analyzed in this thesis to understand how the UNSC have positioned itself in the statebuilder´s dilemma. These are methods to

re-establish the legitimacy of the state, common circumstantial interests, common ideological interests

and predictability of the political process. By analyzing these aspects of the statebuilder´s dilemma, this study will be able to establish where the UNSC have positioned itself in the dilemma. Thus, will the framework explain both the implicit and explicit structures of the resolutions. In doing so the efforts of creating stable institutions, regaining state authority and legitimacy, as well as the common interests between the UNSC and the Malian population, will be detected.

Franz Fannon see similar aspects of external actors statebuilding efforts in nations and gives a potential explanation for the problem. The structure of the nation, political, cultural, and

geographical such, may be factors that instead of having the result of unifying the nation, it may divide it further. Divisions like this are prevalent between the southern and northern parts of Mali that will be explained subsequently in the chapter Background Setting of Mali. A more divided nation may result in a failed statebuilding and therefore the consequence of posing a threat to international security. Further, Fannon indicates that an external actor is of risk to “import” a model of how a nation should be according to its ideals. This may often oppose the wants and needs of the nation itself. David Lake gives a modern example of the, namely the US statebuilding in Iraq after 2003. Lake argues that is arrogant of western nations to assume that all nation wants a western oriented governance21. Showing a direct clash between the external actor and the people’s

ambitions.

Hence, this study will investigate how the United Nations Security Council has located itself in the question of the statebuilder´s dilemma in choosing a strategy that will create either a loyal or legitimate state in regard to the Malians will. Further, it will also attempt to discover dividing structures in the UNSC resolutions concerning the MINUSMA peacekeeping efforts that may be the cause of an intensified conflict. Thereof, will the theoretical framework for this thesis help explain the structures of the MINUSMA resolutions for the reason of seeing potential explanations as to why the statebuilding in Mali has not had the expected result yet so far.

Hereof, will this research stem from two research questions. The first focus on the statebuilder´s, hence, the question of how has the UNSC has positioned itself and the statebuilder´s dilemma in

regard to the Malians interests and priorities. While the second research question give its attention

to potential dividing structures, therefore, if there are any elements in the resolutions that may

either expand or create dividing structures in Mali.

1.2 The Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the situation in Mali and the UN-led MINUSMA operation in the nation through the perspective of the statebuilder´s dilemma and dividing structures as

possible explanations for the failed statebuilding. It aims to examine the MINUSMA and the UNSC resolutions to comprehend the implementation of them, resulting in the failed efforts of stabilizing Mali. In other words, the empirical motive for the study is to provide more knowledge to potential reasons behind diminished results of external statebuilding within the context of the statebuilder´s dilemma and dividing structures. It will also attempt to indicate if the UNSC have had the ambition of importing a ideal state model to Mali in its statebuilding efforts.

A more theoretical purpose is to draw more attention to the theories of the statebuilder´s dilemma and dividing structures as potential explanations to a more troubled or beneficial statebuilding. The reason for this, especially with the statebuilder´s dilemma, is that it provides different insight to failed statebuilding then the typical explanation of a liberal approach to statebuilding being the foremost explanation for failure. Further, it will also suggest more critical thinking of the theories itself. That there is a balanced pathway for an external actor in statebuilding, instead of choosing one of the two absolute strategies between legitimacy and loyalty that were referred to earlier. This is something that is often the situation in external intervention, even if it not the most adequate strategy argued by Lake.

Disregarding the balance within the statebuilding strategies, this study will also argue that at times an external intervention is needed for stabilizing nations. David A. Lake and Franz Fannon see that the development of nations as an organic process, best proceeded without interference22. While the

case of Mali shows that external intervention may at times be the best of two worse choices. Therefore, this study will use the theoretical framework for the explanation of the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission, and as potential explanations for its unsuccessful development. Although, it

will also focus on a theoretical growth that is showing there is a balanced path of statebuilding, no matter the end result of this.

1.3 Previous research

In the study Justifying Interventions in Africa, Nina Wilén examined the relationship between three factors that is highly relevant for weaker states, namely sovereignty, stability, and intervention. Wilén sees the rule of non-intervention as weakened in the context of domestic conflicts, where not only the UN is an actor but also other regions such as arisen in securing stability23. The author

highlights two positions on the issue of external intervention, the one of intervention as a means to peace, order, and “global” values and the one-off seeing intervention as a imperialistic or neo-colonialist strategy24. Wilén identifies the UN as an actor who seeks to develop the local

participation and positions itself against the thought of neo-imperialism25. It is an early conclusion,

in the cases of the study, that intervention is an appropriate method to stabilized weaker states26.

The primary aim of the study was to explore the perception of sovereignty, both empirical and theoretical, and the justification of the intervention of intervention in three nations, Burundi, Liberia, and the Congo27. Secondly, Wilén had the ambition of clarifying the terms of local

ownership and capacity-building, in parallel to creating a theoretical framework of justifying intervention28.

Regarding the empirical findings, Wilén discovered an existing lack of insight into the meaning of sovereignty for peacekeepers29. It was always showed that the ambition for higher local

participation in the peacekeeping efforts through local ownership and capacity-building was inferior and Wilén sees them as “… rhetorical legitimizers...”30. The time period was also an important factor for

the peacekeeping missions since the UN was focused on more urgent missions, parallel with this was the lacking operational definitions of an issue. Wilén concludes that this may not only be the cases of Burundi, Liberia, and the Congo but may also be a general conclusion of peacekeeping

23 Wilén, Nina. 2012, p. 1 24 Wilén, Nina. 2012, p. 2 25 Ibid 26 Wilén, Nina. 2012, p. 3 27 Ibid 28 Wilén, Nina. 2012, p. 3–4 29 Wilén, Nina. 2012, p. 182 30 Wilén, Nina. 2012, p. 183

missions31. Another empirical result, discovering the consequences of the intervention was that it

was not always successful for the nations but the external actor that was ECOWAS became strengthened and seen as the foremost interventionist and protector of peace in the region32. The

theoretical findings of Wiléns study were first that the interventions were legitimized by being portrayed as an act of solidarity with the people of the nation. The reason for this was that the state had lost the monopoly of violence and therefore could not protect its citizens, which in the end weakened the sovereignty of the state33. Another theoretical discovery was that the newly

established governments of the countries were strongly dependent on the external actor is continuing its rule and reinforce the sovereignty of the states34.

David Williams carried out a study of the paradigm of the ideas concerning international

development which outlined in the book International Development and Global Politics. There were three aims with this study, firstly it was to explain the changes in development from westernized states, organizations, and development agencies.

Secondly, to use these changes in discovering more general shifts in the international order. Lastly, and thirdly was the ambition of examining the effect of changes in the international order has had on developing countries35. In the earlier era of the sovereign order in the international community,

modernization theory was the dominant force in developing work together with a Kenyanism approach36. The later stage of international development was minted by a more neo-liberalistic

ideology and the international community was dominated by a liberal order. Modernization theory and liberal theory are what also dominate the statebuilding process which will be discussed further for the theoretical framework and David Lakes theory of the statebuilder´s dilemma.

The conclusions of Williams's study are that the ideas of development go hand in hand with the dogmatic regime of the international order, therefore with a liberal order, there is a liberal

perspective on development, etc37. Williams also sees an increasing criticism of neoliberalism after

the unanticipated consequences and a normative change of actor’s conduct is too early to

31 Wilén, Nina. 2012, p. 184 32 Wilén, Nina. 2012, p. 186 33 Wilén, Nina. 2012, p. 186–187 34 Williams, David. 2011, p. 12–15 35 Williams, David. 2011, p. 40–55 36 Williams, David. 2011, p. 187 37 Williams, David. 2011, p. 190

determine38. A World Bank report which concluded that the means the underdeveloped society is

given has more efficiency than steering towards a certain goal that is preferred by the external actor39. Williams also highlights the more positive outcome of the reports, such as having policy

flexibility, important components of success, and more implicit governance by the external actor40.

But also, as a more general conclusion, Williams sees the future for the international order and development is uncertain considering the different tensions that exist41 .

Jacques L. Koko & Essoh J. M. C. Essis performed a study, Determinants of Success in UN Peacekeeping Operations, and referred the fundamental understanding of peacekeeping to John Galtung. Galtung himself was of the perspective of peacekeeping being a military intervention in conflict to create a political reconciliation between the parties42. The aim for Koko´s and Essis study was following,

pinpoint explaining factors of the peacekeeping missions, asses the importance of explaining factors, and deducting material into proposals for the future, both for academia and policies43. The

hypothesis was that a successful result was due to four general sections, 1. Resources invested in the operation, 2. The time period of the conflict and of the peacekeeping preparations, 3. The amount of support from the UN Security Council, 4. What type of conflict is it44?

The prevailing conclusion of the study was that UN Peacekeeping missions had a success rate of 54%, which Koko and Essis see as higher than the general thought of peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, the leading method of studying success is through statistical analysis comparing a larger number of cases. Besides this, the conclusion was that the result of the operation is the cause of variables of the conflict and how the UN construct and resolved the mission45.

Berit Bliesemann de Guevara who has written the introduction chapter of Statebuilding and State-Formation: The Political Sociology of Intervention, expresses statebuilding as a western method of providing its institutions with what is seen as a failed state46. Often there is a simplified view on

statebuilding, that it is enough with a “we can do it” mentality, but Bliesemann de Guevara argues 38 Williams, David. 2011, p. 191

39 Williams, David. 2011, p. 191–192 40 Williams, David. 2011, p. 187–189 41 Williams, David. 2011, p. 190–191

42 Koko L. Jacques & Essis J.M.C. Essoh. 2012, p. 12 43 Koko L. Jacques & Essis J.M.C. Essoh. 2012, p. 15 44 Koko L. Jacques & Essis J.M.C. Essoh. 2012, p. 16 45 Koko L. Jacques & Essis J.M.C. Essoh. 2012, p. 16 46 Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit. 2012, p. 1

that reality is constating to this idea47. The main purpose of the study was to seek the conditions and

limitations to statebuilding within a theoretical framework of political sociology. This framework would also include the idea of longue dureé which is described as the long-term statebuilding and how it´s formulated in shorter political ambitions48. The study, which was performed in cooperation

with multiple other researchers, discusses findings from communities once torn by conflict in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Further, the international community, external intervention, and domestic statebuilding are debated.

In the chapter of conclusions, which is written by John Heathershaw, the main feature is the

difficulty of seeing state formation as a direct correlation between the ambitions of an external actor and domestic forces inside the nation49. Furthermore, the paradox of statebuilding is highlighted,

this paradox is that to preserve national sovereignty, there is a need to break the sovereignty from an external actor, and to integrate two ideas which are incompatible50. Heathershaw also presents the

thought of statebuilding by external actors as a neo-colonialist process, this due to the indirect rule of the external actor imposed on the nation51. This perspective of external statebuilding is

something that will be brought up under the theoretical framework and the ideas of Franz Fannon. But it is highlighted that external intervention may be a result of a more solidarity and humanistic approach in protecting the people and stabilizing the nation, for both good and for bad52.

Further, in discussing the state formation and the effect that external intervention could have on this, a general conclusion of seeing it as a negative is presented. The reasons for this are that external intervention distances the state from its people and the possibility of creating a healing nation53. Lastly, it is concluded that states are never in itself finalized but instead always

progressing and transforming.

In modern times, after the cold war, states have instead transformed into maintaining or developing two important characteristics, namely globalization and the effect of the state54. Regarding

47 Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit. 2012, p. 1–2 48 Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit. 2012, p. 2 49 Heathersaw, John. 2012, p. 246 50 Heathersaw, John. 2012, p. 249 51 Ibid 52 Heathersaw, John. 2012, p. 249–250 53 Heathersaw, John. 2012, p. 250–252 54 Heathersaw, John. 2012, p. 254–255

globalization, the statebuilding is considered a greater international matter and international actors become heavily involved. While for the effect of the state, here Heathershaw discusses the issue of external actors seeing fragmented nations as unified and not being able to distinguish the

differences within a nation, primally cultural such55.

2. Theoretical Framework

For this study the theoretical framework will consist of two theories, the statebuilder´s dilemma and dividing structures, that has its origin in structure-agency theory, or as Colin Hay characterize it, context and conduct56. The basic element of theories like this is to analyze the linkage between the

actor and the setting of the actions, to see how the behavior has been affected by, and affect the context57. The theoretical framework for this thesis will take a stance within the ideas of

structure-agency and see the context as being shaped by the actor. This is one of two approaches within this concept of theory, the other one sees the actor as less autonomous and more restricted by the environment.

Shortly, since the theory of dividing structures will analyze the United Nations Security Council´s resolutions for the MINUSMA mission and how these have transpired, it is explicit that the actor is the focal point and how the environment has been affected by this. Here, it shall be added that the influence of the context will be mostly excluded for this study, however, in reality, it is not impossible for the surroundings to have an abundant impact on the behavior of the actor.

The reasoning of choosing this theoretical framework is that this study aims at bringing less ideologically anchored explanations. As mentioned before, most studies concerning statebuilding debate the liberal statebuilding that has occurred since the end of the Cold War. This study instead attempts to find more explanations, than just ideological, to the process of statebuilding even if the aspect of ideology is also included in the statebuilder´s dilemma and dividing structures. By doing this, the study may find different insight to how an external actor operates for its statebuilding mission and how this may either contradict or combine with the interests of the nation. Thereof, understanding if the UNSC tries an imported state method or in fact operates to fulfill the Malian people’s aspirations.

2.1 David Lake & The State Builder´s Dilemma

David A. Lake discusses the building of a nation from external actors and the importance of

creating a state that is seen as legitimate by its people for long-term stable governance58. However,

problems occur since the external actor must calculate the cost for creating a legitimate state in

56 Hay, Colin. 2002, p. 89 57 Ibid

relation to its expenses such as human lives and its own interests. This is where the statebuilder´s dilemma emerges59. The dilemma between legitimacy and loyalty in statebuilding, has two focal

pillars. First, the state is to be revered as legitimate by its people. Second, the statebuilder wishes for a state that is loyal to the statebuilder and its interest60.

If the statebuilder chooses loyalty over legitimacy, then five challenges occur. Firstly, the leader appointed is of greater risk of the undemocratic ruling. Although, this can be solved by providing aid to antagonists to gain support. Secondly, if the people´s support for the leader is limited, the probability of only aiding his or her supporters is higher. Lake sees this as crony capitalism. Thirdly, if there is a higher priority of loyalty, the shorter the list will be of potential leaders. This will result in hardship for the statebuilder controlling the leader since the knowledge about the statebuilder being highly dependent on him or her. Fourthly, potential replacements for the current loyal leader will be severely limited and the statebuilder will most likely be forced to continue choosing an authoritative leader. Lastly, and fifthly, the people and opponents of the leader will be hostile towards the statebuilder since it has protected and sponsored the people’s oppressors61.

This begs the question of why statebuilder choose a loyal leader that does not have legitimacy. The answer to this is the simple rationale by the statebuilder that was mentioned earlier. Lake indicates a realist view that no state is a Samaritan. That the public opinion in numerous nations, expect

something in return of sending its troops to a foreign nation62. This enhances the statebuilder’s

dilemma further, since the people of these nations want something in return for its money and blood, therefore, the incentive to install a loyal leader is strengthened. The external actor calculates wins against losses, if a loyal state is beneficial to a greater extent, the higher is the probability of inaugurating a loyal leader. If this differs from people’s desires, the state will be recognized as illegitimate.

To solve this dilemma, the statebuilder will, most of the time, support a potential government that is a middle ground between its policy preference and the peoples63. Democracy is often seen as the

best way to choose a leader in the western world, and therefore the new state is preferred to be democratic as well. But Lake is critical of this perspective on statebuilding. Instead, the new state

59 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 2 60 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 69 61 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 72–76 62 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 6 63 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 72

should be chosen on another number of factors such as popular support and cultural traditions, therefore local factors. Despite this, Lake indicates that this not make statebuilding conflicting with democracy, if democracy and a democratic leader are the most efficient for fulfilling the mission, then so be it64.

In a modern context, the need to intervene in failed states is often to be the ungoverned territory where international terror organizations roam free, as is the case in Mali65. For this reason, external

intervention and statebuilding have become the foremost action in creating stable and effective governance to prevent ungoverned territory, thereof restraining these universal threats66. Since the

state is considered as failed, it does not have the capacity for an internal statebuilding, thus, external actors and the international community play a significant role in statebuilding. Although, this creates a dispute concerning sovereignty.

The definition of sovereignty has its origin in the Westphalian perspective in Lake´s book. Within it exist two assumptions. One, the regime is the final decisionmaker of the people and land within a decided territory. Two, the regime is something that cannot be split between other actors67.

However, the late UN general secretary Kofi Annan concluded that international intervention for humanitarian causes should be accepted by states. Further as intervention for these reasons may be in common interest with the state, therefore a collective interest68.

Here, the sovereignty paradox appears. To preserve a consolidated state with full sovereignty, the international community must first break that state´s sovereignty69. No matter the intention for the

intervention, even for collective interest, the statebuilder is still limited Lake argues70. However, no

statebuilder wants to be seen as imperialistic and therefore conducts the statebuilding under a determined timeframe71. For UN statebuilding operations, these usually have to be authorized by

the Security Council every 6 months72. However, in most cases the MINUSMA peacekeeping

mission have had a new resolution every 12 months.

64 Lake A. David. p. 72

65 Gyllensporre, Dennis. Interviewed by Malor, Ben-. UN Radio, 2019, Sec 40-1:07 66 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 2–3

67 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 54

68 Annan, Kofi. 1999, Two concepts of sovereignty 69 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 5

70 Lake A. David. p. 5 71 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 64

Furthermore, debating the future role of the statebuilder, while Fannon argues that it is an obstacle for true liberation that the former colonial power, here the external actor, assures the new state that it will remain as a guardian. Lake tries to see it from a more positive perspective while avoiding an imperialistic ambition. The argument is that if the statebuilder guarantees its support of the

government and the role as a sponsor of it, this toughens the possibility of opposition groups to successfully achieve a coup d’état. By setting no time limit for this sponsorship, the uncertainty decreases and gives incentives for investments73. Once the investments start coming into the state,

the statebuilder can embrace a more covert role, although still being seen as a guardian of the new state. Lake highlights yet another ironic point within statebuilding regarding this subject. The more assurance to the new state from the statebuilder, the more immediate the success of the statebuilding will be. On the other hand, if the statebuilder decides to leave the project promptly, the higher is the likelihood of it failing74.

Instead, Lake sees the recipe for a successful statebuilding, as the international community creating incentives for the domestic actors to find a solution for the troubles, and to produce adequate governance of the nation75. Yet, since the state is failed, the domestic actors have a reluctancy of

investing in its nation. Therefore, the statebuilder must assist in the creation of new institutions of governance. These institutions are meant to create stability for the nation and thereof, generating more investments. This stability for institutions is essential for a successful statebuilding, if the stability does not exist then the problem of cycling may develop. Cycling is the issue of institutional policies gets uprooted when the majority change due to different interests76.

Instead, stable institutions create a clear structure which will make the nation stabilize by creating rules of the agenda-setting, that will generate political predictability77. Subsequently, the

investments into the nation will increase and the state will more accessible satisfy the people’s needs, thus creating legitimacy. William Riker also concluded that the case may also be in the opposite direction, that if there is no stable policy program, this may also affect institutions by creating uncertainty and unpredictability78.

73 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 48–49 74 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 48–49 75 Lake A. David. p. 7 76 Arrow J. Kenneth 1950, p. 328–346 77 Shepsle, Kenneth. 1979, p. 56 78 Riker, William. 1980, p. 432–446

Furthermore, each individual within the nation possesses a minimum of two different types of interests. The first Lake sees as ideological interest which includes vales and attitudes against politics, economy, and society in general. While the second is the circumstantial interest which changes as a result of the social order. In addition, the legitimacy of the state is based on the ideological interest of its citizens, if the state ideology collides with the individual’s ideology the legitimacy of the state may erode79. Consequently, we can see the importance of establishing a

social order which is seen as legitimate by the people through the majority’s ideological

interest. The ideological interest has its basis in the cultural setting of the nation, in the Western hemisphere, this can be compared to the political left to right scale but may also be religion or other more philosophical thoughts. Ideological interests follow the individual throughout its life and is an evolving element for the person. These ideological changes also interact with and may alter, an individual´s circumstantial interests. Although a change within the circumstantial interest is fairly easy compared to the ideological interest of a person80. As shortly described, the circumstantial

interest may be something that is socially constructed but not explicit nor clear. The difference is that while ideological interests rarely change, circumstantial interests does due to the social order that the individual locates itself in81.

However, no matter how strong the state is, it is not possible to rule its people by the simple method of violence. Instead, there is to be quasi-voluntary compliance as Margaret Levi argues82. The

meaning of this is that the behavior of the people is voluntary because he or she chooses to comply, but when the individual does not comply sanctions will be taken against the person in question83.

Accordingly, a mix between the Hobbesian methods of the state to enforce compliance and the norms of complying84. Further, on the subject of a monopoly of violence, Barbara Walter highlights

a problem with internal conflicts and if there is no clear winner. This phenomenon is defined as “the critical barrier to civil war settlement”, this means that the hardship of restoring monopoly of

violence when there is no clear winner85. Lake mentions this challenge in the context of peace

agreements, if one actor is weakened by the agreement then the stronger actor may take advantage

79 Lake A. David, 2016, p. 28 80 Lake A. David, 2016, p. 27 81 Lake A. David, 2016, p. 28 82 Levi, Margaret. 1988, p. 48–70 83 Levi, Margaret. 1988, p. 52 84 Levi, Margaret. 1988, p. 50–52 85 Lake A. David, 2016, p. 38

of the situation to gain greater power, this makes the weaker actor not being willy into

implementing the peace agreement86. Furthermore, there is a clear mistrust between actors in peace

agreements if no backing force gives guarantees of safety or institutional coordination’s87.

Considering the emphasis that tribes and clans can have, Lake declares these as private authorities within the nation. However, Lake does not only include tribes and clans as private authorities but all organizations that challenge the state for support from the people which also can be

criminal/terrorist organizations. These gains backing when the state cannot provide necessary assistance for the community88. Nonetheless, these organizations are severely partisan, if they are

connected to a specific group, they are also rejected by other groups. Moreover, Lake highlights that extremists may act differently since they instead attempt to pull the communities within the state apart and in that way accumulate support89. In the worst scenario for the state, the safety of its

people cannot be guaranteed which will further motivate individuals to unite with private authorities90.

As mentioned at the beginning of the description of this theory, failed states, where private actors can roam free, is today seen as a major problem for international security. Lake concludes that these private authorities with violent ambitions who have the possibility of roaming freely become one of the biggest security threats that the international community face today91. It is when the state

becomes failed that it cannot uphold its responsibilities to its citizens and therefore violent private authorities may attract more support as a substitute actor to the state. In the case of Mali, we can see private authorities as Islamic extremist groups or nationalistic organizations. This is when the international community must act, to rebuild the failed states and suppress the violent actors.

The deteriorating commonality between groups in society will have escalated during the conflict which, and once again hardens the work for the statebuilder for two reasons. Firstly, the difficulty of turning over the legitimacy from the private authority to the state will be grave. The followers of the certain private authority must be convinced that following the state and its social order will be more beneficial than staying with the private authority. Secondly, the difficulty of persuading the

86 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 38 87 Walter, Barbara. 1997, p. 360–361 88 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 36 89 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 37 90 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 37 91 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 59

private authorities to set aside their ambitions of having a leadership position and acting in its interest for the sake of the nation92.

Concerning a more in-depth description of legitimacy, Lake sees it as the collective acceptance from the people of the rule of the regime93. Quasi-voluntary compliance has great emphasis in this

regard. Disregarded from the compliance of the people, the monopoly of legitimate violence is also debated by Lake. The important aspect is not only the creation of the monopoly but also to conceive it as collectively acceptable94.

Additionally, regarding failed states four essential disputes involved. Since the state is not stable, there is lacking investments which is the first problem. Secondly, the distrust and the inability of the political- and legal systems dissolve, creating a vacuum. Thirdly, the extant social divisions that were present ahead of the failed state has expanded due to the violence. Fourthly, the existing challenges of political leadership cannot merge the parallel communities and create an extensive coalition for his or her campaign. To have a successful statebuilding, and the creation of a

consolidated state, the statebuilder must find a solution for all these problems. But not only that, the statebuilder needs to implement it on all four problems at once95

A solution to the problem with sovereignty is suggested by Lake, the international community could return to the thought of effective sovereignty and thereafter stress its authority to intervene with structural reform necessary in future potential failed states. By doing this, military intervention, or failed states would be reduced. However, seeing the international community would most likely by rejected many national leaders which Lake also mentions96. As long as sovereignty is seen as it is

today, and no change arrives, the statebuilder´s dilemma will forever be present.

How the different statebuilders reason concerning this dilemma, Lake sees as difficult to generalize, and instead it has to been seen through the empirics of the situations97. There is also no certain level

92 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 41 93 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 23–24 94 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 25–26 95 Lake A. David. p. 37 96 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 67–68 97 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 77

of legitimacy or power that the state must attain to be seen as successful or not. Lake sees success in statebuilding as a relative term98.

2.2 Franz Fannon & Dividing Structures

Franz Fannon primarily focuses on colonialism and the fight against this, but for this thesis, the focus will be the division and aftermath of statebuilding by an external actor. Therefore, some parts of Fannon´s book The Wretched of the Earth will be somewhat excluded in this chapter. Further, what Fannon chooses to see as the settler, will instead be seen as an external actor in statebuilding. Also, the people of the nation are defined as natives by Fannon, but they will instead be referred to as the people of the nation. Further, while Fannon chooses to see this as post-colonial structures, I intend to only see them as dividing structures in the nation. Thereof, I do not aim to declare any actor as an imperialistic nor colonial power.

Fannon describes the colonized world as two different societies within the nation, the statebuilder´s society, and the people´s society. Often, this can also be seen as the contrast between urban areas and rural areas99. Thereof, it may also be seen in the communities where the statebuilder´s is of a

modern world while the peoples are less such100. There is also a difference between how the

statebuilder conducts itself in the nation, and in its home country. In the statebuilder´s

home-country people are differed by norms and values in society, while there is a more explicit method in the nation where the statebuilder tries to transform the people101. Even within the nation, there is a

clear distinction between the statebuilder and the people. The reasoning of an external actors’ perspective is that the mindset of the people is troubled, hence the need for an external actors’ involvement102. This is just an illustration of how an external actor may justify the need for an

intervention, that the nation is not functioning due to irrational behavior.

Fannon, sees the domestic political elite as loyalists to the statebuilder. Moreover, Fannon proclaims the new political structure is a heritage from the statebuilder, this political structure contains similar ideals and norms of the statebuilder, and the divisions of the nation will continue

98 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 26 99 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 38 100 Fannon, Franz.1961, p. 39 101 Ibid

even after the external actor have left the nation103. Therefore, will statebuilding always fail when

an external actor, or its followers in the nation, are involved in the political process.

Moreover, will this failed case of domestic statebuilding conducted by the new political elite, risk leaving a void of national culture and identity which will result in a greater tribal community and divisions in the nation104. Additionally, this lack of national identity, culture and conciseness will

lead further internal racism in the country, equated to the tribalism that has been mentioned before105. This is also an example we can see in Mali with the Tuareg revolt in 2012, which

ultimately lead to the UN lead military intervention MINUSMA which is the subject of this study. The rationale of the uprising was the discontent against the Malian state due to the feeling of being marginalized by the government106. A solution for this problem is foremost education and

involvement of the people. Fannon argues that greater involvement of the people, will strive the nation forward107. In gaining legitimacy from the people, the ruling political leaders will have to

answer to the need of seeing the promotion and preservation of the national identity as a high-level priority issue. Doing this will help unifying and rehabilitating the nation from its history.

Concerning the external actor, it aims to disrupt the norm and system of preference in the people´s mind with the help of violence, by doing this the statebuilder will create a structure that is more beneficial for it108. To show its superiority, the statebuilder must not only psychically limit the

people but also normative. This dissociates the statebuilder from the people morally, and the portraying of the people as bad and irrational assists the statebuilder in justifying the operation109.

Edward Said sees history from the perspective of the observer, therefore, can the external actor easier legitimize its strategy for the statebuilding110. As a potential result of this, the UN and its

Security Council may shape the resolutions and mandates for MINUSMA in relation to their history that is not compatible with the Malian history. Thereof, creating a dividing structure. Said defines it as the statebuilder believe there is a thought of a two-way understanding from the external actor.

103 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 39 104 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 147–148 105 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 157

106 Lins de Alburquerque, Adriana. 2014, p. 9–10 107 Fannon, Franz. 1961 p. 190

108 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 39 109 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 42 110 Said, Edward. 1978, p. 32

That the statebuilder knows the nation, and the nation knows the statebuilder, consequently the statebuilder knows that the nation cannot self-govern, hence imposing its rule of the nation111.

These dividing structures, and the external actor whom expands these, might create the general thought of the people showing support for one and another in opposition to the statebuilder, however, the reality is different. Fannon claims that the external actor has created a state of mind within the people of hostile actions. In other words, there will be conflicts within the domestic community also112. A symptom of this is the separation between state and private authorities that

were discussed during the statebuilder´s dilemma. Tribal feuds will grow in importance for the people, and old feuds will come back to life. This behavior further entails the statebuilder to believe that the people are irrational individuals who fit the argument of the statebuilder being needed.

This is a factor that is discussed by Edward Said, that an external actor is believed to be foremost actor of setting the interests of the nation since the nation cannot self-govern113. By this thought, it

would be uncomplicated for the statebuilder prioritizing the interests of the nation, although according to its self-interests. Fannon gives the argument that statebuilders throughout history kept the ambition of eroding the national identity and culture of the native. All for the sake of replacing it with its own preferred identity and culture114. The new political elite, that is the domestic

bourgeoise class, creates the nation´s new governmental institutions but nonetheless, the divisions between the people resides as a result of the continued influence of the external actor.

After the statebuilding process, the difficulty of uniting the nation is profound and the foremost fragmentation is that of the urban and rural communities. The political parties, which are primarily based in urban areas, are incapable to intertwine with the rural area and decides for military usage in an attempt to demonstrate its governance115. This will further lead to increasing civil conflicts, a

divided society based on tribalism and regionalism which will only grow of importance116. The

parting between the two societies becomes greater and the mistrust grows between the communities. It’s not only urban-rural relations that will be difficult but also tribes, or regions are influenced

111 Said, Edward. 197, p. 34 112 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 54 113 Said, Edward. 1978, p. 34–35 114 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 212 115 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 108–112 116 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 112–115

which risks the erosion of the national unification. For the case of Mali this is seen my religious and nationalistic ambitions that put the people against each other.

In trying to constrain the opposition from gaining support, the government will try to implement some sort of nation-wide social program. The ambition of this is to turn around the unhealthy state of the nation, into a healthy one and to grow support in opposition areas. But this social program, despite its friendly goal, will be neglected by the opposition and its supporters. The reason for this is the existing separation between the two parties, and attempted peace and solidarity program will only render in failure due to this and therefore the ineffectiveness in the implementation process117.

There will be a natural suspicion to the external actors’ citizens from the nation´s people. The world's standpoints towards the nation are often formed by the statebuilders media. The reports of the liberated nation being in a downwards spiral since independency is a presumption by the people. As a result of this, there is a negative approach towards the statebuilder and its ambitions, even if its purpose is samaritan118. Concerning the international community, Fannon is strongly pessimistic

towards its prospect to the idea of intervention. The incidents in Sétif 1945, Madagascar 1947, and Kenya 1952, all with several tens and hundred thousand dead merely got any international attention, which highlights the international community´s neglect of certain statebuilders oppression119. In

modern times we can see failed peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. Despite this, the capitalist and the liberal world community are threatened by the ideas and values of certain domestic elements and thereof have motives for continuing intervention120.

Subsequently, the probability of the Malian people seeing the operation as damaging instead of stimulating the ideas of peace and stability is high. Another dimension of the suspiciousness against the international community is the motivation for the implementation of an external actor´s wanted structure in the nation. Said refers to the British colonial emperor, Evelyn Baring, who wanted an Egypt with whatever described as universal values instead of a narrow nationalism121. These

universal values were, however, vastly influenced by external actors’ values. Consequently, rejecting the imposed values of the statebuilder can be seen as a rejection of universal values since these are often related, in a modern context this can be seen as liberalism as an example.

117 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 123 118 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 76–77 119 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 78 120 Fannon, Franz. 1961, p. 80 121 Said, Edward. 1980, p. 37

2.3 Operationalization

2.3.1 The statebuilder´s dilemma

The statebuilder´s dilemma will be seen as the positing of the United Nations between establishing a government legitimate by the Malian people, or a government loyal to the values of the

organization. This is just in line with the theory itself and the data will be analyzed to discover if there are any explicit, or implicit statements in the concerning resolutions by the UNSC to discover its stance in the dilemma. Statebuilding for a legitimate government will be seen as the United Nations showing predictability and continuation of the political process and having the ambition of creating common circumstantial and ideological interest with the Malian people. However, a loyalist stance will be seen as going against a long-term stability process and constantly changing policies and viewpoints for the mission. But also going against the ideological and circumstantial interest of the Malian people. Furthermore, how the organization addresses the challenges with private authorities in the nation will also be analyzed. The reason for this is to discover if there is a pragmatic perspective of improving relations and transferring these private authorities’ legitimacy to the government. All in all, the wants of the Malian people are the main deciding factor if the United Nations acts towards legitimacy or loyalty.

The first analyzing indicator of methods to re-establish legitimacy will focus on both how the UNSC aim´s means to militarily reinstall the Malian state as the solely legitimate actor of rule in the nation. Further, it will also analyze the methods of increasing the domestic investments for the government. This will be seen through statements regarding inclusion and expansion of

MINUSMA´s mandate in both facilitating institutional development for all groups in society and expanding the military presence to deter the terrorism threat.

For the more diplomatic and political strategy, the indicator of predictability of the political process will discuss how the different resolutions view institution-building and thereof, creating stability in the nation. Also, here, the ambition of raising investments into the state for stabilizing institutions and, thereof, reduce the risk of cycling will be seen as a process, for creating

predictability of the Malian political process. For the predictability of the UNSC, this will be seen in the in the position of its policies but also its commitment to these. If the UNSC reiterates the same statements and do not mention a defined time limit for MINSUMA, this will be seen as a higher level of predictability.

The changes of ideological interests may be seen in religion or nationalism since these two factors are the leading reasons for the conflict in Mali. Aspects of nationalism is primarily the divide between the southern and northern regions of Mali. This can be seen in the Tuareg rebellion which was a starting event for the conflict since they went independent for Azawad, which is the northern region for these groups. Ideological interest will also be seen in the element of religion which is of outmost importance for the majority of Malians, this will be demonstrated in the chapter

background setting of Mali. The factor of democracy will also be included within the analysis of the

ideological interests. This will be more of an overall perspective on democracy, if both the Malian people and the UNSC are supporters of a democratic ruling in Mali or not.

Further, the circumstantial interest will be analyzed for the stance in the ideological interest but also norms of the society, domestic actors may have the same ideological interest but different

circumstantial interest. In Mali, an example of this is the majority of Malians support a

democratically elected leader122, although there is resistance against liberal policies for increased

equality closely connected democratic values123.

Furthermore, it will also include the V-Dem indicators of Freedom of Discussion. These indicators have been chosen to maintain a background setting to compare the resolutions with. Freedom of Discussion debates the level of interference from the people and government in political discussion in homes and public spaces. Thereof, it indicates the level of acceptance from the people against different political opinions. Regarding the ideological and circumstantial interests, it is essential to have a background setting to analyze if the UN resolutions contain similarities, thus will freedom of discussion, and reported norms and values by the Malians be compared to the UN resolutions. Therefore, four elements of the statebuilder´s dilemma will be analyzed systematically in comparison to the resolution. To understand the Malian context better, the chapter Background

Setting of Mali will give the pre-knowledge that will be needed to understand these factors and

already existing dividing structures in the nation.

2.3.2 Dividing structures

The dividing structure will be seen through how the United Nations conducts its strategy and statements for the resolutions concerning the MINUSMA mission. These divisions can be physical,

122 Pew Research Center, 2013, p. 60 123 Lebovich, Adam. 2019

such as to support certain regions, minorities, tribes. The dividing structures may also be political, cultural, or normative. These structures may take the shape in democracy, human rights, a certain type of rule of law or anything else that is not grounded in the Malian community. The political indicator will include aspects such as norms, values, preferred governance mechanism, and of course ideology. What is important to highlight is the approach towards violent extremist

organizations. Even if these actors may act with violent intent of furthering dividing the nation, it will not help the peace process if the UNSC presents them as purely evil. This may instead divide the nation further and escalate the conflict.

3. Method

This thesis will take an abductive approach to the United Nations peacekeeping, and statebuilding, mission in Mali. By doing this, the researcher is enabled to switch easier between a theoretical- and empirical perspective. Further, this will facilitate the possibility of extending the spectrum of empirical and theoretical approaches to the research problem124. Since this thesis is studying the

UNSC resolutions in Mali with relations to the theoretical framework, and aim of developing the used theories, it is, therefore, rational to use an abductive approach.

The theoretical framework will be used in trying to understand how the United Nations as acted as an external actor intervening in the Malian conflict in regard to this dilemma. Further, the theory of postcolonial structures produced by Franz Fannon will also be used in analyzing dividing structures for the MINUSMA resolutions.

3.1 Case Selection

The selection of the case being studied is due to the need for further analyzing the statebuilding projects conducted by external actors. David Lakes concludes the majority of statebuilding efforts as failed, which further advances the nation into a deeper dimension of state failure125. Therefore, is

it necessary to further research possible strategies that have resulted in failure, by doing this it is then feasible to exclude these unsuccessful approaches to statebuilding.

The UNSC is the foremost external actor in statebuilding in modern history, either directly involved or by sanctioning statebuilding by another actor. As a result of this, it is very relevant to study one of these political and security projects by the organization Likewise, it is an international

organization with a great majority of the nations in the world being members. Therefore, the UN is most likely seen as a legitimate organization, and the organization itself sees its peacekeeping as one of the most effective tools available to guide member-states from conflict to peace126.

The motivation for choosing the peacekeeping mission in Mali is that MINUSMA currently is an ongoing mission by the United Nations as well as it may be seen, as somewhat as a fiasco so far due to the escalated violence in the nation. Therefore, it is of great interest to examine the most

124 Alvehus, Johan. 2013, p. 109–110 125 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 3

significant external statebuilder in its failures, to identify risks within the mission. By highlighting these threats within the mandates of the peacekeeping mission, policy reforms may take place that will enhance the success rate of statebuilding and bolster international security.

Further, George and Bennet identify a high risk of selection bias, meaning that the researcher might choose the case after its known outcome, thereof having a preliminary conclusion in mind before the study begins127. Another risk is that the theoretical framework does not explain the case128. In

excluding selection bias, the case of MINUSMA has been chosen on the grounds of it being an occurring peacekeeping mission with frail results so far, in addition to the conflict and power vacuum affecting not only the region but the world129. Also, David A. Lake sees the statebuilder´s

dilemma as a phenomenon in all external interventions in conflict130.

From a theoretical perspective, any external statebuilding could be chosen. However, as explained earlier, the case of MINUSMA was selected as a result of the empirical interest for the potential international ramifications as well as it is an ongoing UN peacekeeping mission. The case of Mali was first seen as a test case which was strongly compatible with the theoretical framework.

The aspiration for this thesis is also to contribute directly to the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission for a more prosperous future for the United Nations Security Council and Mali. Further, Mali already contains certain elements that is to be found in the theoretical framework such as dividing structures and is a direct statebuilding effort by the UNSC. At first, the statebuilding in Afghanistan were of interest for this study, however, since the International Security Assistance Force were not directed by the UN, this potential case was rejected. Thereafter, Mali was seen as a test case for the theoretical framework as George and Bennet argues131. Similarities between the empirical case of

Mali and MINUSMA and the theoretical framework were profound and therefore Mali was accepted as the case for being studied further.

127 George L. Alexander & Bennet, Andrew. 2005, p. 31 128 Ibid

129 Gyllensporre, Dennis. Interviewed by Malor, Ben. Time: 40-1:15 130 Lake A. David. 2016, p. 1

3.2 Method Selection

The motivation for choosing to conduct this research as a qualitative case study is due to the studying of a specific factor in a historical event132 which in this case is the resolutions of the

MINUSMA mission. Further, George and Bennet describe a case study as a method when the statistical analysis and other formal models are not seen as an option for the study133. For the

approach of analyzing the mandates and UNSC resolutions for the peacekeeping operation in Mali, only quantitative methods or statistics are not seen as a valid methodology.

For an abductive approach, a case study is the most beneficial way of locating and analyzing theoretical elements and factors of context134. Bill Gillham addresses the importance of qualitative

studies, meaning that facts do not speak for themselves and therefore an interpretation and explanation of them is necessary135.

Since a post-colonial theory will be used, and as I have mentioned before, seeing any actor as a post-colonial power will not be the aim of this study. Instead, I will refer to Gillham who spoke of the linkage between rationality and behavior. Gillham saw this as two different aspects in analysis, what people do, and what they believe in with sincerity136 .

The selection of the peacekeeping mission in Mali is to be seen as an exemplifying case137. The aim

is to examine and find the substance of a mundane situation since MINUSMA is one of 69

peacekeeping missions conducted by the UN it can be seen as a normal mission. The current results of MINUSMA have not been as fortunate as it was anticipated, and instead, the conflict has

worsened if the number of civilian deaths is analyzed138. The Force Commander of the MINUSMA

operation, Dennis Gyllensporre sees it as an intensive challenge for the United Nations with possible consequences to other regions in the world139. Therefore, the general efforts of the

peacekeeping mission in Mali are a normal situation for the United Nations but it also creates interest since the mission so far had a less positive outcome.

132 George L. Alexander &. Bennet, Andrew. 2005, p. 24 133 George L. Alexander &. Bennet, Andrew. 2005, p. 25 134 George L. Alexander &. Bennet, Andrew. 2005, p. 26 135 Gillham, Bill. 2000, p. 10

136 Gillham, Bill. 2000, p. 14 137 Ibid

138 Dufka, Corine. 2019

3.3 Method triangulation

For this study, a method triangulation has been implemented where the working of qualitative document analysis and quantitative secondary analysis have been intertwined. Bill Gillham sees the handling of multiple sources of data, both qualitative and quantitative as adequate for a case study, citing that “…all evidence is of some value.” and “Reality (and the truth) is not tidy.”140. Method

triangulation is the usage of more than one method in producing analysis and thereafter a conclusion141. By combining the quantitative and qualitative data, it will be possible to see the

probable response to a change in either category of the material. If the mandates and reports

(qualitative data) change, the response might be seen in causalities or attacks against the UN forces (quantitative data), or vice versa. Furthermore, by using method triangulations the material can be crosschecked to enhance the analysis of this dissertation, likewise, it will contain a higher value of validity142.

Although triangulation has its advantages, it also has its disadvantages. One of these is insecurity about a perfect correlation between the two types of methods or material143. This may also be the

case in this study since the statebuilding efforts in Mali is many more than just MINUSMA, and the number of actors is more than just the United Nations. As a result of this, it can be difficult to determine if it is MINUSMA that creates a certain response from opposing groups.

3.4 Qualitative Document Analysis

Since this research do not an include infiltrating an organization and observations, the analysis of documents available for the public will be the primary source of material. Bryman defines this as public-domain documents144. These materials will have to be analyzed initially through John Scotts

four criteria’s, 1. Authenticity, 2. Credibility, 3. Representativeness, 4. Meaning145. Bryman

identifies credibility and representativeness as the foremost issues regarding document analysis,

140 Gillham, Bill. 2000, p. 10 141 Bryman, Alan. 2012, p. 392 142 Bryman, Alan. 2012, p. 633 143 Bryman, Alan. p. 635–636 144 Bryman, Alan. 2012, p. 550 145 Bryman, Alan. 2012, p. 544