Talsinki
Tatu-Matti Pekkarinen
European Studies Bachelor 15 ECTS Spring Semester 2019Abstract
Finland and Estonia, the two peripheral states of the European Union’s north-eastern corner have steadily converged since the fall of the Soviet Union, both bilaterally and in a multilateral
European context. The co-operation is significant and covers multiple sectors of society. Now the two countries have set out on a project to join their two capitals by building a fixed link under the Gulf of Finland forming the symbolic twin-capital of Talsinki. This case-study sets out to analyse what motivations there are in creation of the twin-capital, and what relevance does the fixed link have on the regionalization process.
The qualitative analysis of policy and spatial-economic documentation triangulated with media sources shows that the incentives are mainly economic, and the process is mainly driven by state- and regional level politicians motivated by regional development. The study also indicates that the rising influence of China and other global actors has an effect on the regional politics of peripheral Europe.
Keywords: Regionalization, Estonia, Finland, Cross-border cooperation, Megaproject,
Index
1. Introduction
1.1. Aim, rationale & objective 1.2. Research questions 2. Research Methods
2.1. Qualitative research 2.2. Case-study as method 2.3. Case study design
2.4. Material and data collection 2.4.1. Spatial-economic material 2.4.2. Policy material
2.4.3. News material 3. Theoretical framework
3.1. Cross-Border Co-operation level 3.2. Analytical Spatial Axis
3.3. Sociocultural Incentives 3.4. Political Incentives
3.5. Spatial & Economic Incentives 3.6. Security Incentives
4. Case Description
4.1. History of cross-border relations and current developments 4.2. The Two Tunnels
4.3. Previous literature and the Öresund comparison 5. Data & Analysis
5.1. Talsinki cross-border region and twin-capital concept 5.2. Proposed Helsinki-Tallinn tunnel
6. Discussion 7. Conclusion
1. Introduction
Helsinki and Tallinn, the capitals of Finland and Estonia are situated on the opposite sides of the Gulf of Finland in North-Eastern Europe. Roughly 80 kilometers apart, the two capitals are among the closest of European capitals. (Vienna and Bratislava being the closest.) The two 1 capitals are not only close in proximity, but they are also close linguistically, culturally and historically. Finland and Estonia are both one of the three Finno-Ugric states of the European Union and they are close trading partners , yet they are often grouped in various different ways. 2 3 Finland sits in the Nordic council and is often grouped together with the other Nordic states of Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. Finland is considered as a northern European country 4 5 while Estonia is often associated with the Baltic states of Latvia and Lithuania and is often identified either as a Northern European country, or as an Eastern European Country. During the 6 Cold War Estonia was part of the ‘Iron Curtain’ of USSR’s satellite states, which significantly limited economic development and political co-operation until the late years of the 20th century. Both Finland and Estonia can be considered peripheral EU member states . Economic 7 8
co-operation is significant especially between the two capital regions of Helsinki-Uusimaa in Finland and Harju county in Estonia, and the volume of people traveling between the two
1 City of Helsinki, “Kaksoiskaupunkikehityksen tarkastelua tilastotietojen valossa”, Helsinki, 2018.
Available from: https://www.hel.fi/hel2/tietokeskus/julkaisut/pdf/18_08_30_Helsinki_Tallinna.pdf (Accessed 24.05.2019)
2 U, Korkut. “Eager, Pragmatic or Reluctant: Can common Finno-Ugric ethnic and linguistic links
substantiate intra-EU CFSP co-operation?” ,CASE, Warsaw, 2008. Available from: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/91701/21351204_sa367.pdf (Accessed 24.05.2019)
3 Finnish Customs, “Suomen ja Viron välinen kauppa”, Helsinki, 2016. Available from:
https://tulli.fi/documents/2912305/3331101/Suomen+ja+Viron+v%C3%A4linen+kauppa/ea8bc05a-b759-4 09a-acfb-5de098c8cda6/Suomen+ja+Viron+v%C3%A4linen+kauppa.pdf?version=1.1 (Accessed
24.05.2019)
4 Nordic Council, “Facts about the Nordic countries”, [website] Available from:
https://www.norden.org/en/information/facts-about-nordic-countries (Accessed 24.05.2019)
5 EurLex, “EuroVoc thesaurus”, [website], 2019, Available from:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/browse/eurovoc.html (Accessed 24.05.2019)
6 CIA: The World Factbook, “Europe: Estonia”, [website], 2019, Available from:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/en.html (Accessed 24.05.2019)
7
European Union
8ESPON, “TRACC Transport Accessibility at Regional/Local Scale and Patterns in Europe: Part
G Finland” AND “Part F Baltic States”, 2015, Luxembourg, Available from:
capitals has been growing steadily for the past decade . Since 2017 Helsinki has been the most 9 active passenger port in the world and the two regions are looking for further convergence 10 through building a fixed link between the two capitals in the form of a tunnel railway crossing 11 the gulf.
Upon completion the tunnel would be the longest underwater tunnel in the world, costing approximately 13-20m euros and take well over 12 a decade to complete, making it a significant global megaproject. The cost of the tunnel is significant in comparison to the Finnish and Estonian populations and economies, and
external funding is needed in order for the project to be feasible. This physical and symbolic
connection between the two cities would create a twin-capital and cross-border region of
“Talsinki”. The fixed link also holds wider strategic significance and interest on a global scale. The building of the Rail Baltica railway network is estimated to start in late 2019,
connecting the three Baltic states (and potentially Finland) to central Europe.
9 FinEst Link Project, “Helsinki-Tallinn Transport Link Feasibility Study – Final report”, Tallinn, 2018.
Available from:
http://www.finestlink.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/FinEst-link-REPORT-FINAL-7.2.2018.pdf (Accessed 24.05.2019)
10 Port of Helsinki, “Annual Report 2018”, [website], Available from:
https://vuosikertomus2018.portofhelsinki.fi/en/sea-travel-remained-busy/, (Accessed 24.05.2019) nb! Cruise passengers excluded.
11 A permanent transport link, esp a bridge, between two geographical areas separated by water 12 FinEst Link Project, “Helsinki-Tallinn Transport Link Feasibility Study – Final report”, Tallinn, 2018.
Available from:
http://www.finestlink.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/FinEst-link-REPORT-FINAL-7.2.2018.pdf (Accessed 24.05.2019)
Meanwhile with the potential and significance of the Northeast Passage , the 13 considerably shorter sea-route to East-Asia from North-Western Europe is becoming more apparent and the ‘Arctic Corridor’ project seeks to link the Finnish railways to the Arctic sea 14 via Sweden, Norway and/or Russia to make use of the opening of the Northeastern sea route. 15 See Fig. 1 for the potential railway connection if Rail Baltica, Helsinki-Tallinn fixed link and Arctic corridor projects are realized.
The European Union is relevant to the aforementioned projects, as the wider European integration presents the wider context in which the Finno-Estonian convergence is taking place in, while the peripheral nature of the two states depicts the unique security context in which the potential security threats are closer than the allies these states are seeking to integrate with.
This thesis will seek to identify and analyse the cultural, spatial-economic, political and security incentives for further co-operation and integration in the Talsinki region. A holistic qualitative case study of the Talsinki convergence will be conducted through which the three of the incentives are analysed, and all four presented and discussed.
1.1. Aim, rationale & objective
The aim of this thesis is to study a cross-border regionalization project in the periphery of the European Union.
Most cross-border regionalization projects have taken place in the ‘centre’ of the European Union in the so called ‘Blue Banana’ (Fra. Banane bleue) a continuous urban area spanning multiple states between central United Kingdom and Northern Italy. The choice of the 16 peripheral case creates knowledge on the incentives that make the peripheral member states seek convergence in both cross-border and global contexts. The case also illustrates the importance of
13 K. Pletcher, “Northeast Passage”, [website], 2019,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Northeast-Passage, (Accessed 24.05.2019).
14 Arctic Corridor Project, “ARCTIC RAILWAY ROVANIEMI-KIRKENES”, 2018,
https://arcticcorridor.fi/wp-content/uploads/jkrautatie4scr2eng.pdf (Accessed 24.05.2019).
15 Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency, “Jäämeren rataselvitys”, 2018,
https://julkaisut.vayla.fi/pdf8/lr_2018_jaameren_rataselvitys_web.pdf (Accessed 24.05.2019).
the EU to show inclusiveness of all of its members no matter the size of the member states population, economy or their geographical location.
The realities of states in peripheral EU are in many ways different from those of the central member states. For example, Greece portrays a different economic and fiscal reality, while Poland and Hungary hold onto a contrasting political conduct. The smallness of the Baltic states make them heavily dependent on their surroundings, while the security realities of
non-NATO countries such as Finland and Sweden differ greatly from those participating in the 17 North Atlantic military alliance.
The research objective of the thesis is to find out ‘what are the motivations behind the creation of the Talsinki region’ in North-Eastern Europe. It also seeks to find what significance the proposed fixed link has on the regionalization project.
1.3. Research questions
This thesis sets out to answer two questions. First, “How are the benefits for further convergence in the Talsinki region presented by various actors?” seeks to identify the various actors involved in the regionalization process, and their motivations for participating actively or inactively in the convergence process of the two peripheral states, both in a case-specific regional development perspective, but also in a wider european and global contexts.
The second research question is related to the proposed fixed link. “Why is a fixed link megaproject being planned between the two capitals?” seeks to find the meaning and the significance of the megaproject tunnel fixed link to the regionalization process.
2. Research Methods
2.1 Qualitative Research
A holistic case study with descriptive, qualitative analysis is conducted in order to explain the incentives for the creation of the cross-border region, while realist and constructivist approaches create the basis for the epistemological base of this thesis. It is perhaps unlikely that this thesis will be able to give a definitive answer to the research questions laid out above, especially due to the ongoing nature of the regionalization process of Talsinki, but a a post-positivist attitude will perhaps make this thesis worthwhile. As Patton put it “it is possible, using empirical evidence, to distinguish between more and less plausible claims” . 18
The choice of using qualitative research is in its ability to explain unique situations in relation to their contexts : “Qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, 19 attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them”. The process of deepening cross-border convergence between two countries is not a 20 simple phenomena, and its impacts, whether they are imagined or factual, might vary from one individual and group to the next. This is why qualitative research is likely to be the best suited research method in approaching the wide breadth of interactions and variables that take place in the regionalization process of Talsinki. Also due to the multidisciplinary approach required to understand the motivations that drive the regionalization process, a descriptive approach is likely to convey the findings in a way that is better elaborated and understandable, than some numbers and graphs. 21
18 M.Q. Patton, “Qualitative research and evaluation methods 4th ed.”, 2015, Thousand Oaks, San
Francisco, Sage pg.106
19 M.Q. Patton, “Quality in qualitative research: Methodological principles and recent developments”,
1985, Chicago. pg.1
20N.K. Denzin, & Y.S. Lincoln, “Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials 4th ed.”, 2013, Thousand
Oaks, San Francisco, Sage. pg.3
21 S.B. Merriam and E.J. Tisdell, “Qualitative research: a guide to design an implementation 4th ed.”,
2.2. Case study as method
Conducting a case study is arduous, challenging and often done poorly, but this daunting 22 challenge is attempted and is perhaps necessary in order to gain understanding of such a multifaceted topic as a regionalization process between two capitals of two smaller, peripheral northern European states.
The multidisciplinary approach and the range of perspectives of a case study creates a wide and cohesive; yet likely not complete accounting on the likely incentives of why the Talsinki region is being formed. This case study is relying on the theoretical propositions of the political, cultural and spatial-economic incentives presented in the theoretical framework as the main strategy to guide the research process.
2.3. Case Study Design
This case study analyses the micro-level cross-border convergence processes and the effects of the establishment of the proposed fixed link connection to the region, while presenting the wider macro-level context in which the regionalization of Talsinki takes place in. The main analysis, and the focus of this thesis is on the micro-level perspective, where the main actors are; city, regional and state level governments; companies and their representatives; regional
intergovernmental organisations. However, the macro-level perspective is also relevant and is presented as the context in which the micro-level integration takes place in. The wider European integration and globalization are phenomena actively present on the macro-level. The main actors on the macro-level are supranational and international organizations, military alliances, but also individual states with the ability to act and exert influence on a global scale. These macro-level actors act as the enablers, supporters and partners and/or contesters, rivals and threats to the peripheral regionalization process.
To answer the research questions the cross-border convergence will be approached through qualitative content analysis. The empirical evidence or material will consist of public
policy documents on the cross-border relations, spatial-economic documents and media publications related to the cross-border twin-city and tunnel megaproject planning.
The main analysis will be on the policy and spatial-economic documents, and the findings are then contrasted to the media sources. The media sources will not be used as part of the analysis, but the media sources are an important triangulation point for the political and economic material, as the media critically scrutinizes the propositions and estimates made by the politicians and consultants. The media publications also represent the public opinion on the regionalization processes and the fixed link megaproject.
Data will be gathered from the policy and spatial-economic material based on two main topics, divided into three sub-topics each. The sub-topics portray the various micro-level variables that the regionalization is likely to affect. Further sub-topics, if identified, will be presented in the discussion.
1) Talsinki cross-border region and twin-capital concept a) Demographics
b) Co-operation and competitiveness c) Culture and language
2) Proposed Helsinki-Tallinn tunnel a) Impacts on mobility and traffic
b) Impacts on labour market and economy c) Tourism and global visibility
A matrix with the above topics will be created, and the data placed on the matrix. The data from the material is contrasted to each other to see if the estimates from the politicians match to those from the consultants, and then triangulated with the public debate (media sources). When
interpreting the findings or data the main criteria of interpretation is done through the theoretical framework and the placement of the findings onto the analytical spatial axis. The main analysis 23
will be conducted using the socio-cultural, spatial-economic and political incentives outlined in the theoretical framework. An overview of the media coverage based on a weighted scoring of 24 the newspaper articles is also presented. The findings will then be discussed further in the discussion chapter, where the fourth incentive of the theoretical framework: security, will be discussed along with the public debate narratives identified in the media sources.
The hypothesis is that the openly stated incentives will mostly be found on the micro-level of analysis, as the material focuses mainly on micro-level issues. That is to say that the gains and potentials for the creation of a cross-border region, twin-city and/or a megaproject tunnel are presented in a way that the cities, regions, as well as the states of Estonia and Finland are to gain from furthering the cross-border convergence and regionalization processes. The macro-level gains and incentives are likely to be left into the margins, if mentioned at all, yet underlying linkages to the macro-level, the European Union and “Europeanization” are likely to be identified from the analysis. Due to the delicate nature of international security, the security aspect is likely to be marginal in the material analysed, yet it is expected to be widely present in the public debate on the regionalization process, and especially potential impacts of the fixed link megaproject.
The strength of this research design is the multidisciplinary theoretical approach and the
triangulation of the policy-makers (politicians), experts (consultants & statistical sources) and the public (media and the inhabitants) on the micro-level of analysis in the Talsinki region. The macro-level and the observance security related incentives will be considerably more limited and speculative in nature, compared to the micro-level of analysis of the socio-cultural, political and spatial-economic incentives.
One definite weakness is the contemporary, ongoing nature of the studied process, which limits the analysis and material to what has been created and published thus far. The results of this thesis are also predictive in nature, as significant changes could happen both in the micro- &
macro- level political climates and megaproject planning before the vision of the Talsinki region is a more widely recognized imagined space and regional entity.
There is a certain presupposition in the writing of this thesis. Both Finland and Estonia are full European Union member states, and are part of the Eurozone and the Schengen Area. Enjoying the “Four freedoms” of the EU single market. The free movement of goods, capital, services, and labour. Thus, the level of integration between Finland and Estonia is high by default. This thesis focuses on the convergence that is not part of, and happens on top of, or in addition to the
European Single Market integration as a voluntary convergence between the two observed states and their sub-state actors. 25
2.4. Material
The material will consist of public policy documents, spatial-economic documents and media sources related to the twin-city and tunnel megaprojects. Due to lack of proficiency over the Estonian language, the materials are limited to English and Finnish languages. The materials will be coded with “P” for Policy documents or “R” for Spatial-Economic Reports in the footnotes, and due to the frequent referencing to the analysed documents in the analysis, the footnote references for the analysed materials are abbreviated to the codes and titles.
The policy documents outline the incentives of politicians and their constituencies, but also outline the cultural setting in which Finno-Estonian relations are held at. The policy documents will be used first to evaluate the existing level of cross-border co-operation that exists between Finland and Estonia. 26
The spatial-economic documents include feasibility estimates ordered by state and sub-state actors on the tunnel megaproject created by a wide range of consultants. These
25The ‘Sub-’ prefix will be used to indicate various sub-units and entities within larger units. (i.e. regional
governments, city governments can be referred to as sub-states in contrast to sovereign state entities they are part of)
documents present the spatial-economic interests of state and sub-state actors, as well as other economic stakeholders, such as companies and investors.
The third set of material is newspaper articles and radio coverage on the topic of the twin-city creation and the megaproject tunnel. The media and public debate also indirectly portray the contemporary cultural setting in which the convergence takes place in and the public perception of inter-state relations between Finland and Estonia. The free media is also
considerably less cautious in voicing security related concerns in comparison to the official discourse and thus acts as a fruitful source for the discussion on the security incentives.
2.4.1 Policy material
1) Two policy documents, the first “Opportunities for Cooperation between Estonia and Finland 2008” (P1) published by the Finnish Prime Minister’s Office is a document outlining 55-ideas “on how Estonia and Finland could meet the challenges presented by globalisation while taking account of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy objectives” . The documents administration was appointed 27 by the prime ministers of Finland and Estonia. The more specific topics include: “energy, the Gulf of Finland, transportation, internal security, defence, information society, labour, social welfare and health care, tourism, culture, film and radio and television broadcasting. The report also outlines a vision of the Estonian-Finnish relations in 2030” 28
The second “Decisions of the joint session of the government of the republic of Estonia and the government of the republic of Finland” (P2) is a policy document published May 2018 29 in celebration of the 100th jubilee of the two states. The document proclaims the four wider 30 topic areas agreed upon in the meeting: “Physical Connections”, “Digital Collaboration”,
27 Prime Minister's Office “Opportunities for Cooperation between Estonia and Finland 2008”, 2008, pg.3
Available from: www.vnk.fi /julkaisut (Accessed 24.05.2019)
28 Ibid.
29“DECISIONS OF THE JOINT SESSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND”, 2018, Tallinn, Download:
https://www.valitsus.ee/sites/default/files/7.5.2018_decisions_est-fin-eng.pdf
30 Embassy of Estonia: Helsinki, “Estonia and Finland”, [Website], 2019,
“Cultural, Language and Educational Bridges”, “Building Sustainable Growth Together in the European Union.”31
Both of the policy documents are collaborative documents between the states or state sub-states of Finland and Estonia and represent the official state interests of the two states, but also their commitment to their respective constituencies.
2) Three websites; The two embassy websites of Finland in Tallinn (P3) and Estonia in 32
Helsinki (P4) that describe various common projects and state-level initiatives between the two 33 states. The third is the website of the city of Helsinki, outlining the cross-border Helsinki-Tallinn co-operation between sub-state actors. (P5) 34
2.4.2. Spatial-Economic material
Four feasibility reports related to the megaproject fixed link tunnel are used as part of the spatial-economic material.
The first report is a “Pre-feasibility study of Helsinki-Tallinn fixed link” (R1) published in February 2015 by a joint venture between the Harju County Government, the cities of Tallinn and Helsinki and three consultant companies from both Finland and Estonia. This report has been funded by the The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, or EUSBSR which is a macro-regional strategy -entity supported by the INTERREG -programme, the EU Regional Development Fund and the European Commission. 35
31“DECISIONS OF THE JOINT SESSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND”, 2018, Tallinn, Download: https://www.valitsus.ee/sites/default/files/7.5.2018_decisions_est-fin-eng.pdf
32 Embassy of Estonia: Helsinki, “Estonia and Finland”, [Website], 2019,
https://helsinki.mfa.ee/en/estonia-and-finland/history-of-diplomatic-relations/ (Accessed 24.05.2019)
33 Embassy of Finland, Tallinn, “Suomi ja Viro”, [Website], 2019,
https://finlandabroad.fi/web/est/kahdenvaliset-suhteet, (Accessed 24.05.2019)
34 City of Helsinki, “Helsinki-Tallinna yhteistyö”, [Website], 2019,
ttps://www.hel.fi/helsinki/fi/kaupunki-ja-hallinto/yritykset/kilpailukyvyn-kehittaminen/kansainvalinen/helsinki -tallinna/, (Accessed 24.05.2019)
35 EUSBSR, “EUSBSR in a nutshell”, [website], 2019, Available from:
The second report is the final report of the feasibility study “Finest Link - Helsinki
Tallinn Transport Link” (R2) published in February 2018 by a joint consortium between city and regional governments, government agencies and a number of consulting agencies from both Finland and Estonia as well as a International Advisory Board consisting of experts from various European institutions and benchmarked projects. The research has been funded by the Regional 36 Development Fund of the European Union and the INTERREG: Central Baltic -program.
The third report “Proposal for a Helsinki-Tallinn tunnel project” (R3) published in May 2018 is the reporting of a study conducted by Atso Andersén Economics Oy , a consulting 37 company based in Espoo, Finland. The study was commissioned and published by the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications and it focuses on the wider impacts of the fixed link.
The fourth report “Helsinki – Tallinn tunnel task force: report of the main findings” (R4) published in May 2018 by the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications is the
reporting of a task force consisting of both Finnish and Estonian authors formed to be
responsible of examining further development of the megaproject tunnel after the publication of the “Finest Link” report three months before. The report also recognizes the findings of R3.
The most recent report on the fixed link “Railway tunnel between Finland and Estonia” published in December 2018 by the Finest Bay Area Development Oy was omitted from this study. The reasoning is that the environmental impact assessment programme report focused solely on the impacts of the building and operating of the tunnel on the environment, and was thus only marginally relevant to the scope of this thesis.
The overall reliability of the analysed materials is good, and due to their collaborative nature ought to present the interests of both Finland and Estonia. Apart from the third report all of the used documents are joint ventures published by, or commissioned by the public sectors of both Finland and Estonia. The first two of the reports can be linked to the ‘Finest Link’ -project 38 the megaproject planned with, and funded primarily with funds from the public sectors of
Finland and Estonia as well as EU programmes. A competing project of the ‘FinEst Bay Area Development project’ funded by private ventures and international investors has also been
36 Other (mega)projects that the fixed link can be compared to.
37 Also known by Ad Economics. See: https://adeconomics.squarespace.com/
developed. The author takes no stance on the two competing projects, but is generally 39 enthusiastic about the prospect of a fixed link.
2.4.3. News material
A set of 48 articles and two radio interviews were collected. The chosen media sources are 40 from two different news medias: The first is YLE the state-owned public broadcasting 41 company, and the flagship public broadcaster in Finland. Second, Helsingin Sanomat , the 42 largest subscription newspaper in Finland and the Nordic countries. Helsingin Sanomat is an unaffiliated newspaper acting under Sanoma Corporation, but it has been commented to being affiliated with both the Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP) and the Centre Party 43 (Keskusta) in the past. These two medias were chosen on the basis of their reliability, the 44 similarity of the two papers when it comes to readership, and perceived quality of press. Finland is known for its high ranking considering the freedom of press, currently holding the second position on the World Press Freedom Index. Overall the reliability and trustworthiness of the 45 two medias as a source are good and fabricated news are unlikely to be met. The YLE articles, 46 interviews were chosen with the following search terms: Helsinki-Tallinna-rautatietunneli (Eng. Helsinki-Tallinn railway tunnel), Junatunneli (Eng. Railway tunnel), Viro (Eng. Estonia), Tallinna (Eng. Tallinn), Peter Vesterbacka , Liikenne ja Kuljetus (Eng. Traffic and 47
transportation) and Rail Baltica. The HS articles were chosen with the following search terms: Tallinna (Eng. Tallinn), Liikenne (Eng. Traffic), Kiina (Eng. China) and Vesterbacka. Except for
39 See chapter 4.2. for descriptions of the two projects. 40 See Appendix 1.
41 Yleisradio : Eng. Finnish Broadcasting Company 42 HS
43 J. Holmberg, “Etusivun politiikkaa”, 2004, University of Jyväksylä Available from:
https://jyx.jyu.fi/bitstream/handle/123456789/13406/9513920380.pdf?se (Accessed 24.05.2019)
44 P. Vasala, “Onko Hesari kepulainen?”, Mediaviikko, 2011, Available from:
http://mediaviikko.fi/kategoriat/paakirjoitukset/uutinen/onko-hesari-kepulainen.html(Accessed 24.05.2019)
45 Reporters without Borders, “Finland”, 2019, https://rsf.org/en/finland, (Accessed 24.05.2019) 46 K. Karppinen, H. Nieminen and A. L. Markkanen, “Finland: High Professional Ethos in a Small,
Concentrated Media Market.” In J. Trappel, H. Nieminen & L. Nord (eds.): The Media for Democracy Monitor: A Cross National Study of Leading News Media, 2011, Göteborg: Nordicom. Available from:https://blogs.helsinki.fi/kekarppi/files/2014/01/05FINLANDkorr1.pdf(Accessed 24.05.2019)
some of the subscription-only HS articles the articles are free for all readers without the need of a paid subscription. Analysis will be narrowed only to written text, excluding infographs and side notes.
One YLE article on the topic of the British-French channel tunnel with the search term Junatunneli (Eng. Railway tunnel) was discarded as irrelevant. YLE publishes daily summary articles of the daily news. These articles have been discarded due to them not bringing anything new to the discussion, simply summarizing the original articles. Three HS articles were
discarded on the basis of being either out of the context of this thesis, or re-publishment of a previous article already analysed.
In total 28 articles from HS and 20 articles from YLE were used as the basis of the analysis. The articles were collected from the period between 1.1.2018 and 11.05.2019. The beginning of 2018 was chosen as the starting point, as the publishing of the final report of Finest Link- project spurred the public debate on the twin-city and megaproject topics. The ending point was chosen conservatively for the completion of this thesis to be plausible for to date 24.05.2019.
The two radio interviews are from from YLE. The first radio-interview from YLE: “Is the Tallinn-tunnel utopist?” published 31.12.2018 with two rock and tunnel construction experts 48 Mr. Pekka Särkkä and Mr. Janne Lehto gives an expert perspective to the ongoing debate. The second radio interview “Is the Tallinn-tunnel a sane investment or splurging?” published 49 12.03.2019 between the chairman of the Helsinki-Uusimaa regional council Mr. Markku
Markkula and the chairman of the Helsinki City Council Mr. Otso Kivekäs gives insight into the debate between the regional policy makers perceptions of the megaproject.
48 Original title in Finnish, Author’s translation. 49 Original title in Finnish, Author’s translation.
3. Theoretical framework
Realist and constructivist approaches are used to create the epistemological basis for the theoretical framework, while a wide multidisciplinary approach is used in order to find the motivations behind the creation of a cross-border region. We start by defining the most fundamental terms and concepts;
Keating defines a region as an “intermediate territorial level” somewhere between a locality and a state, but notes that some regions can indeed be larger than individual states. Regions can also be defined by fixed physical aspects, like environmental or climate factors, while from an economic point of view they could be identified through production patterns and market flows. More constructivist approaches might define regions through social interactions, such as common identities of politicians and citizens . De Sousa defines a cross-border region 50 as: “A special area of fluxes and exchanges of social, cultural, economic and political nature, a space where the development of multiple activities takes place and where the type and intensity of transactions have evolved in time.” In other words, cross-border regions are important sites 51 for international co-operation and integration, but also physical and symbolic segregation and conflict between two or more border regions, between two or more states. 52
While the meanings are interconnected, it is important that we draw a distinction between concepts of cross-border co-operation and integration. Cross-border integration, and in the context of this thesis specifically EU integration happens between European members states on the macro-level of analysis. It is described as “a (irreversible) political process between member states” which involves the abdication of national sovereignty in order to achieve common goals by pooling national sovereignty to a supranational entity, such as the European Union. While it 53
50 M. Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe, UK, Edgar Eldar Publishing Ltd, 1998, pg. 9 51 L. De Sousa. ‘Understanding European Cross-border Cooperation: A Framework for Analysis’,
European Integration, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2013.
52 In the context of this thesis a state is defined as the sovereign legal entity, that encompasses the
highest authority within its borders. This is to contrast it from a nation, which can be a sub-unit of peoples within a state, or multiple states.
53 L. De Sousa. ‘Understanding European Cross-border Cooperation: A Framework for Analysis’,
has proven extremely arduous, Brexit stands as a contemporary testament to the reversibility of the integration process. Cross-border co-operation also happens between two or more states or 54 sub-units within those states (i.e. regional governments, cities, autonomous regions etc.) but on the micro-level of analysis. The purpose of co-operation is to act in unison in order to achieve a mutual objective or benefit, such as improvement of neighbouring relations, solving shared issues or managing resources between the regions without ceding national sovereignty a external supranational entity. Co-operation, unlike integration between states can happen without the European Union, yet it can and often is supported by various EU support structures especially 55 when the co-operation takes place between two EU member states.
Cross-border convergence is used to indicate a general convergence between two or more states or regions that can include CBC, integration or both.
3.1 Cross-Border Co-operation level
The main structure of the theoretical framework is inspired by De Sousa’s (2013) analytical framework on European cross-border cooperation, yet it is expanded both in depth and width 56 in order to produce a more cohesive and in-depth case study. De Sousa describes four analytical levels dependent on the shared commitment between the two (sub-)states within the cross-border region. When assessing a region this ‘CBC level’ will give a neutral indication of the current state of co-operation in a given region. It is important to note that the levels are not exclusive of each other.
1. Awareness raising CBC
The first, and least committed level of co-operation involves much of the symbolic,
demonstrative and ceremonial actions of CBC. Described through actions like town-twinning, bilateral visitations and cultural associations.
2. Mutual aid CBC
54 Henceforth “CBC”
55 L. De Sousa. ‘Understanding European Cross-border Cooperation: A Framework for Analysis’,
European Integration, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2013, pg. 679
The second level revolves around co-operation during natural crises and large scale emergencies. (i.e. floods or forest fires) It may take form in of an indefinite agreement, or be arranged on a 57 case to case basis.
3. Functional CBC
On this level permanent, often resource heavy structures are set up between two regions. This can take form through common infrastructural projects, undertakings to control pollution, cross-border crime or some wide environmental project. From the third level onwards various global actors (i.e. EU institutions) are often significantly involved through projects and funding.
4. Common management of public resources/services
On the fourth and final level requires a level of integration in form of policy harmonization in order to take effect, yet as it happens without ceding national sovereignty to any supranational entity outside the two participating states it cannot be defined as cross-border integration. On the fourth level the two regions manage resources (e.g. taxes, institutional- and natural resources) in a joint manner.
The main contribution from De Sousa to this thesis are his definitions of the “drivers” of cross-border co-operation. He argues that “geographical, economic, cultural/identity and political factors” act as the main drivers, or in other words motivations for CBC. These drivers present 58 the multidisciplinary theoretical setting through which a region is analysed. The economic and geographical categories have been merged into one to give a spatial-economic perspective to the incentives that further the development of the region, while a new fourth category of security based incentives has been added to better emphasize the realities and the needs of peripheral EU countries.
The priority and prerequisites between the incentives are contested and for the purpose 59 of this thesis the incentives are presented as embedded units of analysis in a thematic manner. Correlations are drawn between the various incentives in the analytical and discursive chapters
57 While unspecified by De Sousa, for this thesis we make the assumption that this can involve a level of
humanitarian aid during a conflict with a third state, but not direct participation in inter- or trans-state conflicts. Definitions of which can be found at https://www.osce.org/cio/80530?download=true
58 Nb! later presented as ‘incentives’
of this thesis, but the incentives should all be considered as separate, independent analytical perspectives.
Using De Sousa’s descriptions of CBC levels we are able to assess the level of
pre-existing convergence taking place in a cross-border region, while the expanded incentives will help us analyse and explain the motivations that have lead to this point and the impact of an infrastructural megaproject, whether they hold the potential for further convergence between states and their sub-units or if they pose hindrances or obstacles to the regionalization process.
3.2. Analytical Spatial Axis
In order to identify the source of the incentives and motivations, and to place the goals and interests of various stakeholders onto a spatial scale, an analytical tool of ‘analytical spatial axis’ is used. This four-directional axis has two distinct scales, the micro-macro scale that enables the zooming in-and-out between the micro-regional regionalization processes, and the
macro-regional processes. The second scale holds the centre-periphery distinction, which enables the estimation of impacts of various policies and incentives on various distances from the core to the outskirts of the region. These two axes form the “Analytical Spatial Axis”, See figure 2. The EU is included in the axis in various forms, but it could be applied on other supranational organizations or other polarities as well.
The macro-level holds various international organizations as actors, such as the EU, NATO and the UN but also individual states, especially if they are acting and are able to spread 60 their influence on the “world stage” . The objectives of the actors on the macro-end of the scale 61 are often far-reaching and grand in magnitude, often affecting millions of lives over decades or even centuries.
On the micro-macro scale, in the micro end of the scale sovereign states are the highest level of actors, while various sub-units of states, such as regional and city governments, NGO’s and even private individuals act as the main actors. The objectives on the micro-level are often more limited in scale and scope compared to the macro-level objectives. They might involve the
60 United Nations
development of housing opportunities within a city, or the development of bilateral cross-border relations on a sub-state level.
As Finland and Estonia are both EU member states, the EU presents the ‘centre’ on the centre-periphery axis. This axis portrays the different realities the member states face depending on their distance from the ‘centre’ and outlines creates the various settings in which they must act in, such as long distances between population centers, and the international security atmosphere.
3.3. Sociocultural Incentives
An important departure point when analysing the sociocultural incentives for the creation of cross-border regions is that borders between states are porous, social constructions. It should be 62 noted, that despite intensive CBC and macro-level EU integration the symbolic borders between states are unlikely to disappear. Similar cultures create shared perceptions of social reality 63 64 and thus create a similar cultural-cognitive conception of institutions. This creates a setting 65 where culturally similar states, nations and cultures are more likely to co-operate in a
cross-border setting, and the sociocultural likeness makes the co-operation more likely to be functional. Cultural likeness is likely to reflect on social relationships, and which can be 66 analysed through social capital theory. The presence of persistent and continuous formal and 67 informal processes of co-operation networks are analysed through a bottom-up , people oriented 68 approach where various cognitive and structural forms of social capital (i.e. opinion, trust, 69 identity and language) are taken into account and the interpersonal relations. These factors 70 form the grassroot CBC of people living in the region.
The idea of citizenship of residency, and the potential creation of such an identity is used as an analytical tool. Citizenship of residency describes a reconstitution of a citizenship from the
62 A. Paasi, “Boundaries as social processes: Territoriality in a world of flows”. Geopolitics Vol. 3. No. 1,
1998, pg. 69-88.
63 L., De Sousa. ‘Understanding European Cross-border Cooperation: A Framework for Analysis’,
European Integration, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2013, pg. 669-687.
64R.E. Lewitt, and W.R, Scott, “Institutional challenges and solutions for global megaprojects’, in B.
Flyvbjerg, (ed.), The Oxford handbook of megaproject management, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, pg. 102.
65 Ibid., pg. 96-117.
66 L., De Sousa. ‘Understanding European Cross-border Cooperation: A Framework for Analysis’,
European Integration, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2013, pg. 669-687.
67 R.S., Burt, “Structural holes versus network closure as social capital”, 2008. In N. Lin, K. Cook, and
R.S. Burt, (ed.), Social capital: theory and research, New York : Aldine de Gruyter, pg. 36-56.
68 T., González-Gómez, “Estonia-southern Finland cross-border region: What kind of cross-border
integration is taking place? an analysis from experts in cross-border cooperation”, Trames, vol. 20 no.22 (2), 2018. pg. 185-209
69 H., Van Houtum, “An overview of European geographical research on borders and border regions”,
Journal of Borderlands Studies, vol. 15, no.1, 2000, pg. 57-83.
70 T., González-Gómez, “Estonia-southern Finland cross-border region: What kind of cross-border
integration is taking place? an analysis from experts in cross-border cooperation”, Trames, vol. 20 no.22 (2), 2018. pg. 185-209
national context into the locality (i.e. City-based), region (i.e. Bavarian identity) or even to transnational entities (i.e. European identity). 71
Historical timelines and developments also have weight in cross-border interactions . 72 The Finno-Ugric cultures are perceived and analysed through a post-soviet geopolitical context, which reflects on their self-perception of smallness as a defining cultural element, albeit this 73 smallness is also an economic, political and security related reality for the majority of the Finno-Ugric nations. The vulnerability of the Finno-Ugric linguistic traditions, and cultural protectionism are also relevant, especially towards the predominance of English and Russian languages. The persistence of national and local identities are likely to undermine the
cross-border cooperation and potential integration and will affect the perception of concepts 74 such as “europeanness”, “regions” and “euroregions” in the local population. 75
On the macro-level of analysis the European Union is seeking to spread shared European values and ideals into its peripheries. The support of further convergence between member states is in 76 fact part of EU’s “European identity project” where through regions, euroregions, networks and 77 “spatial politics” (see Political incentives) the EU is trying to integrate, or ‘pull’ the peripheries 78 closer to its core as a security strategy. In addition to this realist security strategy, the EU also 79
71 S. Benhabib, “Twilight of sovereignty or the emergence of cosmopolitan norms? Rethinking citizenship
in volatile times”, Citizenship studies, 2007, vol. 11, no. 1, pg. 19-36.
72 L., De Sousa. ‘Understanding European Cross-border Cooperation: A Framework for Analysis’,
European Integration, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2013, pg. 669-687.
73 K.D., Brown, “Transnational vitality of the Finno-Ugric identity in Estonia: The role of education and
advocacy in a new geopolitical context”, International Perspectives on Education and Society, Vol. 14, 2010, pg. 271-296.
74 T., González-Gómez, “Estonia-southern Finland cross-border region: What kind of cross-border
integration is taking place? an analysis from experts in cross-border cooperation”, Trames, vol. 20 no.22 (2), 2018. pg. 185-209
75 A., Paasi, “Europe as a social process and discourse: consideration of place, boundaries and identity”,
European Urban and Regional Studies, vol. 8, no.1, 2001, pg. 7-28.
76 J.W., Scott, “A networked space of meaning? Spatial politics as geostrategies of European Integration”,
Space and Polity, vol. 6, no. 2, 2002, pg. 147-167.
77 Cf. K. Raik, 2014 and G.B. Prato 2014.
78 J.W., Scott, “A networked space of meaning? Spatial politics as geostrategies of European Integration”,
Space and Polity, vol. 6, no. 2, 2002, pg. 147-167.
79O., Wæver, “The EU as a security actor: Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on
post-sovereign security orders”, in Kelstrup et al. (ed.), International relations theory and politics of
European Integration: Power, Security and Community, 2000, pg. 169-200. Available from: EBSCOhost (Accessed 24.05.2019)
employs a more soft strategy based on symbolism, where through flags, maps and other symbolism the EU is trying to reinforce a sense of belonging between the member states and a sense of distinction from its peripheral members towards the non-EU neighbours. 80
3.4 Political Incentives
In the political context it is crucial to understand that good logic in creation of cross-border convergence is not sufficient in realizing CBC. Good political relations, persistent actors and continuous political commitment are required between the two states or sub-units in order for CBC to emerge, while lack of commitment will significantly hinder the development of CBC. 81 82 The political incentives for CBC are top-down approaches and the political incentives are 83 arguably the prerequisite for any other type of co-operation to take place. Economic incentives 84 and wider access to local resources act as important drivers for the local politicians’ to further 85 CBC and the development of the region often leads to increasing power claims by the regional politicians’ . These regional politicians’ remain dependent of their constituencies which means 86 that the region will require various compensation instruments for balanced regional development to take place on both sides of the border.
Cross-institutional diversity poses a hindrance to CBC and the “power play” that happens 87 between them constrains both the actors and the actions that political institutions are capable to
80J.W., Scott, “A networked space of meaning? Spatial politics as geostrategies of European Integration”,
Space and Polity, vol. 6, no. 2, 2002, pg. 147-167.
81 L. De Sousa. ‘Understanding European Cross-border Cooperation: A Framework for Analysis’,
European Integration, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2013.
82 G.B. Prato, “From nation-states to European integration; Ideological constructions of border
co-operation” in A. Paasi et al., The New European Frontiers : Social and Spatial (Re)integration Issues in Multicultural and Border Regions, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, pg. 24-42.
83 P. Pasi, “Euroregions as micro-models of European integration” in J. Langer, (ed.), Euroregions - The
Alps-Adriatic context, 2007, Frankfurt am Main, p. 76
84 M. Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe, UK, Edgar Eldar Publishing Ltd, 1998, pg.
182-183
85 J.W., Scott, “A networked space of meaning? Spatial politics as geostrategies of European Integration”,
Space and Polity, vol. 6, no. 2, 2002, pg. 147-167.
86 L. De Sousa. ‘Understanding European Cross-border Cooperation: A Framework for Analysis’,
European Integration, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2013.
make in a co-operative setting. There is also a contemporary trend where many diplomats ‘role 88 play’ the elation of constructivists integrative ideals, but in reality act and believe more in the harsher realist setting. 89
There have been claims that on the various macro-level development projects there is a heavy bias towards core European nations (e.g. ESDP, VASAB 1997-1999) 90
On the macro-level, a macro-regionalization process has taken place globally since year 1989 91 and the end of the cold-war two years later. The EU is one of these macro-regions and has been both widening with four territorial expansions since the end of the cold war, but also deepening through a “Unitarian European Project” . Through spatial politics and various projects and 92 institutions (i.e. INTERREG, CoR, EGTC, AEBR, TEN, TEN-T, ESDB, EEAS) the EU seeks to integrate the post-socialist states of Eastern-Europe with Western-Europe and create composite supranational polity to increase its influence as a global actor. This new political framework 93 can be perceived through the gradual europeanization of domestic policies in the European states (not just EU member states) and multi-level governance, where the EU affects directly on the regional scale by interacting with the local and regional governments This 94 “reterritorialisation” affects on all levels, upwards towards international organisations, below with regions and cities and a parallel space with nations, regions and communities. 95
88 R.E. Lewitt, and W.R, Scott, “Institutional challenges and solutions for global megaprojects’, in B.
Flyvbjerg, (ed.), The Oxford handbook of megaproject management, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, pg. 96-117.
89 K. Raik, “Renaissance of realism, a new stage of Europeanization, or both? Estonia, Finland and EU
foreign policy”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 50, no. 4, 2014, pg. 440-456.
90 J.W., Scott, “A networked space of meaning? Spatial politics as geostrategies of European Integration”,
Space and Polity, vol. 6, no. 2, 2002, pg. 147-167.
91 Ibid.
92 G.B. Prato, “From nation-states to European integration; Ideological constructions of border
co-operation” in A. Paasi et al., The New European Frontiers : Social and Spatial (Re)integration Issues in Multicultural and Border Regions, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, pg. 24-42.
93 J.W., Scott, “A networked space of meaning? Spatial politics as geostrategies of European Integration”,
Space and Polity, vol. 6, no. 2, 2002, pg. 147-167.
94 Ibid.
95 N. Brenner, “Globalization as reterritorialization: the rescaling of urban governance in the European
3.5. Spatial-Economic Incentives
A functional logic for de-bordering needs to exist in order for further CBC to develop (e.g. 96 economic opportunities, environmental issues, geographical bottlenecks.) Many cross-border regions and sub-units are fund-driven, meaning that the CBC is solely motivated through the instrumental acquisition of EU funds without so much focusing on the constructivist ideals of 97 cross-border integration. Agglomeration through high-level CBC would in most cases be 98 beneficial, as in most sub-units services are duplicated and run parallel on both sides of the border. It would also help commuting individuals through easing of public bureaucracy, such as taxes. 99
Lack of financial autonomy on the local or regional level, and the CBC dependency on EU funds often delimits the CBC to the first symbolic levels of co-operation, and often leads to inefficient parallel services being produced on both sides of the border. 100
There is much competition between regions in Europe, and the cross-border regions are no different. The attraction of inhabitants, companies and tourists are critical for the local economies. This is why emphasis is put on place marketing and branding of regions . 101
The following ‘shapes’ are used in order to portray the imagined spaces of a cross-border region:
1. Territorial shapes. Defined by the geographical uniqueness of the region.
2. Symbolic shapes. Defined by various visible aspects of the region, such as maps, flags and popular landmarks.
96 M. Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe, UK, Edgar Eldar Publishing Ltd, 1998, pg. 181 97 L. De Sousa. ‘Understanding European Cross-border Cooperation: A Framework for Analysis’,
European Integration, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2013.
98 O. Heddebaut, “The Euroregion from 1991 to 2010”, in O. Kramsch and B. Hooper,(eds.), 2004,
London, Routledge, pg. 84
99 Y. Lind, “Crossing a border - A comparative tax law study on consequences of cross-border working in
the Öresund and Meuse-Rhine regions”, 2017, Jure, Stockholm.
100 L., De Sousa. ‘Understanding European Cross-border Cooperation: A Framework for Analysis’,
European Integration, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2013, pg. 669-687.
101 G.J. Hospers, “Borders, bridges and branding: The transformation of the Øresund region into an
3. Institutional shapes. Defined by the regions administrative and educative bodies, regional development agencies and other institutions.
4. Socio-cultural identity to the area. Defined by local practices, identity and global reputation of the region. 102
These shapes help to explain how a region is known and how a region seeks to be known in the world at large.
For the private individuals the most fundamental criteria for inhabiting a cross-border region is securing a livelihood, that is finding and being able to work. It is also a prerequisite for cross-border migration and it can help the individual socially, as most CBC relationships are 103 working relationships. Good language skills and social integration can further help the 104 individual accessing local resources. New Economic Geography is used to map out the 105 106 opportunities, and estimate the impacts of the regionalization process, and especially the establishment of the fixed link and the integration of the regional labour market. 107
Should it be built, the tunnel would be a megaproject, or as it crosses national borders and
includes multiple national and supranational organizations a “Global Megaproject” . One of the 108 seminal authors of megaprojects Bent Flyvbjerg defines megaprojects as “ … large-scale,
complex ventures that typically cost $1 billion or more, take many years to develop and build,
102 A., Paasi, “Europe as a social process and discourse: consideration of place, boundaries and identity”,
European Urban and Regional Studies, vol. 8, no.1, 2001, pg. 7-28.
103M. L. Jakobson et. al. “The emergence of Estonian-Finnish Transnational space” in P. Pitkänen, A.
Icduygu and D. Sert, (eds.), Migration and transformation: multi-level analysis of migrant transnationalism, 2012, New York, London, Springer.
104 T., González-Gómez, “Estonia-southern Finland cross-border region: What kind of cross-border
integration is taking place? an analysis from experts in cross-border cooperation”, Trames, vol. 20 no.22 (2), 2018. pg. 185-209
105 Ibid.
106 A. Ascani, R. Crescenzi and S. Iammarino, “New Economic Geography and Economic Integration: A
review”, SEARCH, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012.
107 T.R. Lakshmanan, “The broader economic consequences of transport infrastructure investments”,
Journal of Transport Geography, 2010, Vol. 19, no. 2011, pg. 1-12.
108 R.E. Lewitt, and W.R, Scott, “Institutional challenges and solutions for global megaprojects’, in B.
Flyvbjerg, (ed.), The Oxford handbook of megaproject management, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, pg. 96-117.
invoke multiple public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people.” 109
The four ‘sublimes’ of megaproject development will be used to assess the megaproject; 1) Technological sublime - Which entails the rapture engineers gain from creating
megaprojects that can be described with superlatives. 110
2) Political sublime - The incentive for politicians to be initiating megaprojects, gaining prestige for being the forerunners of such grand scale projects.
3) Economic sublime - The motives for employers and employees alike from the estimates of wider impacts on the economy.
4) Aesthetic sublime - The design and outwards appeal of megaprojects and their infrastructure.
These sublimes often lead to a level of ignorance or foolhardiness among those deciding on a megaproject, and often results in significant cost overruns and delays in the schedule of the project. 111
The four sublimes are critically contrasted through evaluating the potential to 1) Sustain and create local employment 2) Creation of domestic inputs 3) Decreasing production costs leading to increased productivity and competitiveness 4) Higher-quality services leading to consumer benefits and 5) Environmentally friendly infrastructure leading to a smaller climate impact. 112
109 B. Flyvbjerg, (ed.), The Oxford handbook of megaproject management, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2017, pg. 6
110 K.T.Frick, “The cost of the technological sublime: Daring ingenuity and the new San
Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge”, in B. Flyvbjerg, (ed.), The Oxford handbook of megaproject management, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, pg. 7
111 B. Flyvbjerg, (ed.), The Oxford handbook of megaproject management, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2017, pg. 7-8.
3.6. Security Incentives
Europe has transformed from a fragmented multiple-central security setting, where the great powers were competing for hegemony into a core-oriented integrative security setting lead by 113 the supranational EU and NATO. Lacking functional joint armed forces, the creation and 114 spreading of the multifaceted european identity is a central element in the EU security context alongside a wide participation in the NATO alliance. Common identity creates solidarity, which in turn can take multiple forms of aid in times of crisis. Interestingly the security identity of 115 the central EU member states is created towards its own, internal violent past, not towards any of the other macro-level regions or powers, which is almost exclusively the case in the EU
peripheries bordering Russia. Military service through conscription acts as mechanisms of identity reconstruction and reinforcement in the region for a security identity based on the 116 perception of a Russian security threat. 117
The European Union’s security strategy is threefold, where the first two are pre-emptive non-military strategies;
1. EU keeping the core of the union intact and as a singular. 118
2. EU using economic power and its “magnetism” the EU is able to exert silent discipline power towards Eastern European countries and keep them from radicalizing.
The third, so far most uncommon strategy is a reactive military strategy; 3. EU would acting as an intervening power.
113 E.g. France, Russia, Germany and the United Kingdom.
114 O. Wæver, “The EU as a security actor: Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on
post-sovereign security orders”, in Kelstrup et al. (ed.), International relations theory and politics of
European Integration: Power, Security and Community, 2000, pg. 169-200. Available from: EBSCOhost (Accessed 24.05.2019).
115 Raik, K., “Renaissance of realism, a new stage of Europeanization, or both? Estonia, Finland and EU
foreign policy”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 50, no. 4, 2014, pg. 440-456.
116 R. Wong, and C. Hill, “National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization”, 2011, New
York, Routledge.
117 K. Raik, “Renaissance of realism, a new stage of Europeanization, or both? Estonia, Finland and EU
foreign policy”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 50, no. 4, 2014, pg. 440-456.
The security realities between countries belonging to the EU, NATO, both or neither are very different, and need to be carefully addressed in the context of the incentives for cross-border convergence. There is a conflict of interests, or implementation between the small peripheral EU states. While a more concrete security clause between the member states would be completely rational for the peripheral member states, it would be unlikely to fit centre-european political discourse well. 119
An important aspect of EU security is its foreign policy, and in the context towards Russia and the arctic areas. New, peripheral and small states often support the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), even if it is in conflict with their own interests of having more intergovernmental decision making in relation to foreign policy. This is because the CFSP still 120 holds instrumental value for the smaller member states.
1. The EU institutions work as a tool for the smaller states to gain some level of control of the larger core EU states.
2. The EU’s foreign policy acts as a power multiplier for the smaller states, otherwise limited in the potency of their foreign policies.
3. The joint foreign policies are cost-efficient to the smaller states, which generally have much smaller budgets for handling foreign affairs.
Megaprojects are a suitable stage or platform for power-politics. Especially in the peripheral state context the megaprojects are too expensive to be carried out by solely the public-sector, and most megaprojects rely on external private funding on some level. External private funding opens the third-party influence to the project and its results, and if the goals of the external parties do not coincide, the megaproject is likely to face some challenges if pervasive parties seek to influence the direction. 121
119 O. Wæver, “The EU as a security actor: Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign
security orders”, in Kelstrup et al. (ed.), International relations theory and politics of European Integration:
Power, Security and Community, 2000, pg. 169-200. Available from: EBSCOhost (Accessed 24.05.2019)
120 R. Balfour & K. Raik, (ed.), “The European External Action Service and National Diplomacies”. EPC
issue paper. No. 73, March. 2013, Brussels, European Policy Centre.
121 S.R. Clegg et. al., “Power and sensemaking in megaprojects”, in B. Flyvbjerg, (ed.), The Oxford
4. Case description
The regionalization of Talsinki was chosen as the case due to its contemporary and ongoing process, the peripheral geographical location and the Finno-Ugric cultural setting in which the regionalization takes place in. Never before has such extensive convergence happened on the outskirts of the European Union during the Union’s existence, in addition the considerable cost projections of the fixed link is almost disproportionate to the size of the populations and
economies of Estonia and Finland, raising the question whether it can be justified by economic means.
4.1. History of cross-border relations and the fixed link
Ideas for Finnish-Estonian integration have existed since the 1920’s after the two states had gained their independence in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Russian empire. At the time, even a personal union between the two states was endorsed by the first Estonian president Konstantin Päts. The soviet occupation of the Baltic states, the second world war and the cold 122 war that followed severed the majority of official ties between the two countries until the
dissolution of the USSR and the re-establishment of relations in August 1991. Grassroot-level co-operation through the agreement of spiritual co-operation signed in 1937 persisted over the conflict years. It was the only document that was not dismantled during the soviet regime. 123 This co-operation took the form of cultural associations, and cultural exchange between the kindred nations, and acted as a ‘window to the west’ to the Estonians during the soviet regime.124 The restoration of the Estonian state in 1991 is by some considered a similar event to the Finnish, as the fall of the Berlin wall is to many central European states. Since 1991 the cross-border 125 co-operation has been ever more active, and as of 2004 bilateral relations between Estonia and
122 S. Zetterberg, “Uusi Viron historia”, Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, 2017, pg. 208. 123
Suvisäätiö, “Suomalais-virolaisen kulttuurisäätiön uutiskirje 1”, [website], Available from: https://suvi-saatio.fi/ajankohtaista.php?act=show&id=4 (Accessed 24.05.2019)
124 P3: “Suomi ja Viro”
125 Helsingin Sanomat (Editorial),”Viro ja Suomi ovat yhä läheisemmät”, 2018, HS, Available from:
