The Mediatization of EU-China Relations

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The Mediatization of EU-China Relations

Elin Apelgren

Master’s Thesis Uppsala University

Supervisor: Karin Leijon Department of Government

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Abstract

Previous research has described EU foreign policy as becoming mediatized, referring to a process where the communication of politics is being adjusted to changes in the media landscape. When more information is available to the citizens through a variety of media, political actors have to compete for the citizens’ attention. Political actors are then using ‘media logic’, using tactics such as storytelling, simplifying and emphasising conflicts and differences, at the expense of ‘political logic’. Political logic represents the use of traditional political values, institutions and consensus-building. The EU’s communications about China can be seen as a disputed case, as a use of media logic could be helpful in uniting the member states in a common strategy towards China, as this has been a challenge for the EU. It could also, however, be avoided by the EU, as it could lead to the EU harming their relationship with China, as well as the economic interests of the member states. The results show that between the years 2016-2020, media logic is increasingly used, as well as becoming more polarising and visualising with time. This could be a result of the EU-China relationship becoming strained by China’s human rights abuses, but also be a part of a communication strategy where the EU attempts to unite the member states, as well as gain legitimacy for its foreign policy.

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1. Introduction

In April 2020, the European External Action Service (EEAS) wrote a report about foreign disinformation campaigns, allegedly created by Russia and China. The report was leaked to and published by the news media outlet Politico (2020). Later, the EEAS decided to officially release the same document. It quickly drew attention, as it was a different version than the one that had been published before (Buzzfeed News, 2020). The EEAS, an institution created to help

strengthen the European Union’s (EU) foreign, security and diplomatic policy (EEAS, 2019a), were then accused of downplaying the role of China’s involvement, and softening their criticism of the Chinese government. The Communist Party of China (CPC) had supposedly threatened repercussions if they were pointed out as a source of disinformation (The New York Times, 2020). The EEAS’ High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, later denied the allegations of being affected by the CPC. He also emphasised that these kinds of leaks risks undermining the EEAS’ credibility (The Guardian, 2020). The discussions around the leaked document highlighted some of the difficulties for the EU in its dealings with China. The EU is faced not only with China’s attempts to influence European politics, but also the balancing act between valuing the EU-China partnership, and standing up to the values that the EU claims to represent.

Since Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, the Chinese government has become more

self-confident, assertive, authoritarian and aggressive, both in domestic and foreign politics (Zheng & Weng, 2016; Almén, 2020). This has led to uncertainty among democratic states of the best way to respond. The EU handling difficult foreign policy issues has been described as a convenient way for the member states to ‘outsource’ their criticism of China, and avoid souring their bilateral relationships. It is also described as the most efficient way for the, in comparison, small European states to gain leverage against China (Rühlig, 2018). Still, uniting the EU member states in a China strategy has proven difficult. Mattlin (2012) describes a ‘divide and conquer’-esque style, where China has offered advantageous economic deals to the countries that were perceived as less concerned with human rights. Recent examples of trading a united EU front for economic gains include Greece’s veto vote against criticising China’s human rights abuses in the UN Human Rights Council (The Guardian, 2017), and Hungary blocking the EU’s criticism of China’s aggressions in the South China Sea (Reuters, 2016; Rühlig et al., 2018).

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Greece and Hungary are not alone in prioritising their economic interests over promoting political values – when acting in their own interest, it is a prioritisation that the member states often make (Rühlig, 2018). Still, there might be growing public support for a united China strategy. In the aftermath of the Covid-19 outbreak, surveys of advanced European economies showed a trend of increased general negative perceptions of China, as well as a lack of trust in Xi Jinping’s ability to handle world affairs (Pew Research Center, 2020).

The EEAS is steered by the strategic foreign policy document European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), which was published in 2016. The EUGS document is guiding all of the EU’s foreign policy, including its relationship to China. Previous research has argued that the EUGS is an example of how the EU has become more mediatised (Hedling, 2018; Brommesson & Ekengren, 2019). Mediatisation refers to a process where the media landscape has changed to the point where political actors have to compete for the citizens’ attention. This, in turn, changes the way that political actors communicate their policy, as well as the means they use to communicate with (_{Michailidou & Trenz, 2013). This shift has been summarized into the concept of an} increasing ‘media logic’.

A use of media logic can lead to actors becoming more open and public with their intended policy, as well as changing the language they use to do so. The way politics is described becomes simplified, with the use of different storytelling techniques in order to catch the receiver’s attention. These changes have been linked to positive, democratic changes, as they would lead to more transparency, and information that reaches more people, allowing them to form opinions on the policy (Trenz, 2008). However, they can also lead to excessive polarising of political actors. This is because media logic also can be identified as one-sided descriptions of actors or events, use of stereotypes, as well as using a narrative of good guys and bad guys, or winners and losers. Instead of leading to transparency, this would make issues one-sided, and the political agenda steered by what can be framed as attention-catching or sensationalist

(Strömbäck, 2008). A use of ‘political logic’, on the other hand, is where decisions are made on the basis of consensus-building, ideology, institutions and shared principles, which is values that politics traditionally has been associated with (Brommesson & Ekengren, 2017).

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As media logic has been identified in the EUGS, the EEAS could be expected to continue the same communication reasoning when addressing EU-China relations. However, how the media logic is used in the implementation of the EUGS is not specified. In previous research, there are different indicators on what to expect, that might lead to different conclusions on whether the use of media logic should be expected in the EU’s communication about its relationship with China. For one, the receivers of official communications, according to the EEAS itself, includes

interested citizens. However, to a large extent, it also includes other Brussels officials, as well as political leaders in the member states (Hedling, 2018). These communications can, in other words, be seen as attempts to unite the member states behind a common strategy. It might be considered helpful to focus on the differences between the EU and China, or to make one-sided descriptions of their issues, to make the member states agree on the way forward.

The shared norms and values of the EU has been described as a tool for legitimacy to the member states (Manners, 2002), and China does stand out by promoting very different values than the EU does. Using media logic to add weight to criticism of the CPC would also be in line with the ‘outsourcing’ tactics of the member states, providing a way for the member states to avoid critiquing China themselves (Rühlig, 2018). On the other hand, this could act as a polarising force against China. Member states that value their economic ties to China might disagree with a polarised narrative. The use of media logic could have a more negative impact on the relationship between the EU and China than a balanced description would have. While the EU wants to promote its values, including human rights, economic interests are also vital. Therefore, it is not certain what to expect from the EU’s China strategy after the release of the EUGS in 2016.

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2. Research Question

The purpose of this study is to research the use of media logic and political logic in a disputed foreign policy context. This will be done by analysing the EU’s official communications of foreign policy when addressing China. The time frame is from the year that the EUGS was released, and forward, between the years 2016 and 2020. This is as previous research has argued that media logic is used at the expense of political logic in the EUGS, a document that is guiding the EU’s foreign policy. When it comes to the case of EU-China relations, however, there are factors speaking both in favour of, and against, the use of media logic. Therefore, this study can expand the knowledge of when media logic and political logic is used by the EU, and in what way. It can also provide insight on how democratic countries and institutions deal with China being both an important economic partner, as well as an authoritarian state. It is built on the texts published by the EU on their official website that address China. The question that will be answered follows:

Are media logic and political logic used in the EU’s official communications about China between the years 2016-2020, and in what way?

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3. Previous Research

Here, I will present previous research on the EU’s foreign policy and relationship with China. First is the developments that led up to the EUGS being created, which is the document that guides the EU’s strategy on China. Then, I will account for the EU-China relationship, and how the EU’s narrative has changed.

3.1. The EU’s Identity Crisis

According to previous research, there has been a shift in the world order (Chen, 2016; Chang & Pieke, 2018; Tocci, 2017; Michalski & Nilsson, 2019; Fägersten, 2019). What has been called the ‘liberal world order’ developed after the Second World War, and led to the world becoming more open, both economically and politically. The US led the way in spreading democratic values, but the EU is argued to have had a strong position in this world order. It was expanding by adding more member states, as well as becoming more integrated, through projects such as the common currency of the Euro (Fägersten, 2019).

In 2008, the economic crisis, followed by the Eurozone crisis, became the starting point for what Fägersten (2019) calls a “crisis upon decline” (p. 23). This refers to the simultaneous internal and external crises that undermined the EU’s previous position in the world. Internally, the EU started to face increasing security threats posed by terrorism, as well as conflicts among member states caused by the refugee crisis in 2015. The trend of a growing populism and nationalism, and the increased questioning within the member states of the utility of the EU project, manifested in the UK’s vote to leave the EU in 2016. The EU also had to address the issue of political leaders in certain member states that had started to show non-democratic tendencies. Externally, the global power had started shifting towards the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries, as they grew both economically and militarily (Chen, 2016; Tocci, 2017; Bakardjieva Engelbrekt et al., 2019). The conflicts in the EU’s close geographical area fuelled this sense of crisis as well, including the Russian annexation of Crimea (Tocci, 2017). In other words, these crises led to the EU losing their strong position, now facing threats to its very existence.

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Tocci (2017), who was involved in the drafting of the 2016 Global Strategy (EUGS), describes what these changes in the world order meant for the EU’s foreign policy strategy. The first strategic foreign policy document created, the European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003, was constructed by an EU that, according to its opening statement, “has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free” (Council of the European Union, 2003, p. 27). Still, the strategy was

according to Tocci (2017) an attempt to create a common narrative for the member states on the EU’s key issues – at the time, this evolved around the conflict of its position in relation to the US, as a result of the US invading Iraq. In 2016, the EUGS was created as a response to the changes in the EU’s position in the world. The outdated ESS was not the main reason for creating a new strategy – the crises called for an attempt to unify the Union by “forging a new narrative” (Tocci, 2017, p. 489).

What role does the EEAS play in the EU’s foreign policy narrative? The member states have the mandate to make foreign policy decisions for the EU by unanimous vote in the European

Council (Rühlig, 2018). This often results in divisions and inefficiency, which creates a need for the EEAS. The EEAS was established on behalf of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, although not operational until 2011, and is led by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission (HRVP). It was created to improve the

effectiveness and coherence of EU foreign policy through a centralised diplomatic service. The EEAS is an independent institution, although with the additional assignment of assisting the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission (Juncos & Pomorska, 2015). In other words, the coherence and effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy is within the EEAS’ mandate, in addition to steering and coordinating foreign policy (EEAS, 2019b).

3.2. The EU-China Relationship

Michalski & Nilsson (2019) describe this shift in the world order as well, and how it affected the EU’s strategy when dealing with China. To act as a normative power was, according to the authors, a way to create a common identity within the EU. In the absence of a coherent foreign policy that the member states could all agree on, agreeing on these norms became a way for the EU to let the member states execute their foreign policy in their own interest. The EU’s newly initiated relationship with China in 1995 was seen as a way for Europe to really emphasise their

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normative position and lead the way on issues such as transitioning to a democratic political system, respecting human rights and governing by the rule of law.

According to Michalski & Nilsson (2019), the shift in the world order was more detrimental to the EU than to the US, as its lack of military means made it more dependent on the recognition of others. Other nations became less accepting of the EU’s attempts at normative influence. In relation to China, the authors point to an abrupt halt to bilateral relations as the EU in 2008 criticised China for their actions in Tibet, which was followed by several member states, as well as the European Parliament, arranging meetings with the Dalai Lama. The CPC responded by suspending the EU-China yearly summit, cancelling a visit to France and even, for some time, calling off their diplomatic relations with Denmark. This strong reaction was followed by a ‘new phase’ in EU-China relations. A 2016 document made to complement the Global Strategy, called ‘Elements for a new EU Strategy on China’, exemplified the new phase as “principled, practical and pragmatic, staying true to its interests and values [...] with the constructive management of differences” (p. 444). This focus on what is practical and pragmatic is seen by Michalski & Nilsson (2019) as a big leap away from Europe as a normative power. Any criticism of China that the EU might have had became limited to the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue, where both sides could express their concerns over their idea of human rights breaches. That way, discussions of human rights were reserved to these meetings, and did not need to be brought up in other circumstances, such as when negotiating trade deals. Michalski & Nilsson (2019) conclude that the EU was misjudging how the changes in the world order would affect its normative position towards China. Once the diplomatic crisis challenged the EU’s role position, there was no other way but to adjust their strategy – not giving up their identity of norms and values, but to “no longer project these upon China” (p. 446).

According to Chang & Pieke (2018), the Chinese official perception of the EU has changed dramatically since the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The EU is not seen as being able to deal with the struggles that they have been presented with. The increasing divisions between the member states, the legitimacy deficit in the eyes of its citizens, and the inefficiency of the institutions prevent the EU from making necessary changes and reforms. This has caused the CPC to focus more on some member states than others. A format that is seen as the primary

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example of this is the ‘16+1’ group, now called ‘17+1’, where 17 states, among them several EU member states, have enhanced their cooperation and investments in their bilateral partnerships with China. According to Mattlin (2012), China is no stranger to using a strategy of ‘divide and conquer’ when dealing with the EU, which would cause the economic benefits given to certain member states to fraction the EU’s united response to the CPC. Still, China argues that its interest in the region is not the source of the divisions between the member states – that is a result of the EU’s own shortcomings. When it comes to the EU’s normative ambitions, Chang & Pieke (2018) argue that China never was receptive to the “Eurocentric values that [the EU] considers to be universal” (p. 321). Now, in addition, the EU lacks the political and economic power to legitimise their claims.

When analysing the EU’s China strategy, there are different ways of seeing the EU in relation to its member states. Foreign policy issues are often argued to be of intergovernmental nature, where the member states are regarded as the most important actors. As mentioned before, foreign policy decisions are taken by unanimous voting in the European Council (Rühlig, 2018).

According to Rühlig (2018), when weighing political values against economic interests, states are inclined to prioritise economic interests. In light of this, the strategy on an EU level and on a member state level would most likely prioritise the same thing – European economic interests. Still, as mentioned before, the EU wants to promote unity among the member states, and referring to their shared values has united the member states with a common identity before. Member states have also seen the EU as a way to ‘outsource’ their criticism of China, and in that way, avoid harming their bilateral relationship. Therefore, the EU is put before the challenge of balancing these two functions of promoting the economic interests of the Union, and standing for shared European values in contrast to China.

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4. Theory

Here, I will describe the theory of mediatisation, how the concept has changed over time, and how it is applicable to the EU’s foreign policy. Starting with a general overview, I will then discuss what effect media logic and political logic might have on politics, as well as how the theory can be adjusted to fit into the context of EU-China relations.

4.1. Mediatisation Theory

Since the 1980’s, politics have been described as becoming increasingly mediatised – a process where politics is influenced and shaped by media communication. As political actors want their message spread through the media to the citizens, this will make them adjust their message to the media’s demands, in order to receive more media coverage (Hjarvard, 2012). This process is argued to be an essential process of modernity, to be compared to globalisation or urbanisation (Hjarvard, 2012; Krotz, 2017), as it “creates new conditions for the basic human activity of communication” (Krotz, 2017, p. 113). The concept of ‘media’ used to refer to traditional news media, and ‘mediatisation’ the effect it had on political actors and institutions (Trenz, 2008). As new media formats were created, these could shift the focus of the theory, as the concept of mediatisation emphasises the role of communication. Media today, in a political context, refers to anything that can communicate a message from political actors to the citizens. Therefore, the concept of ‘media’ here refers to “means or channels of communication in society” (Hedling 2018, p. 45), and not solely to news media.

As new media formats have created new channels of communication between politicians and the public, the demand for transparency has grown bigger. If politics used to be described as affected by the media, the media logic is now increasingly argued to be internalised by political actors. This internalisation can be seen as either forced upon political actors, or as something being deliberately used by political actors to gain more influence, as the actors themselves have greater control of the narrative regarding their political actions. Most likely, media logic is used both intentionally and not (Brommesson & Ekengren, 2017; Hedling, 2018).

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4.2. Media Logic and Political Logic

Mediatisation is described by Brommesson & Ekengren (2017) as a process where media logic gains influence over the political agenda, where political logic used to be more prevalent. Media logic is based on a communication tradition from traditional media and news. According to Strömbäck (2008), media logic is the leverage of news values and storytelling, with the purpose of capturing the public’s attention. It is based on “intensive, polarised and sensationalist ideas” (Brommesson & Ekengren, 2017, p. 27), or “_{simplification, polarization, intensification,} personification, [...] visualization and stereotypization, and the framing of politics as a strategic game or ‘horse race’” (Strömbäck 2008, p. 233)_{. As Strömbäck (2008) explains, an emphasis on} conflicts and personalities are storytelling techniques that the media would prefer to use, as it catches the receiver’s attention. Political actors would, adhering to the media logic, try to meet what they interpret as the media’s demands (Brommesson & Ekengren, 2017). The degree of mediatisation is assumed to be shaped by the interests, needs and strategies of political actors, and is expected to vary across time, actors, and political institutions (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). Media logic has in previous research been seen as an ideal type on the opposite spectrum of political logic. Political logic is derived from what is traditionally associated with political institutions, where decisions are motivated by using ideology and values. Influence can be gained by emphasising shared principles and consensus-oriented communication (Brommesson & Ekengren, 2017). The concept of political logic has been criticised for being underdeveloped and vague. Landerer (2013) argues that political logic should not be seen as everything that media logic is not – instead, the intention behind the concepts should be differentiated. _{There are} two driving forces behind each logic – a normative one, where the actor is driven by making substantial changes or democratic ideals, or a commercial one, where the actor’s self-interest leads to making decisions on the basis of possible gains, such as being re-elected. According to Landerer, although a political actor might be driven by normative ideals, the commercial logic can help them realise their agenda.

Hedling (2018) argues that while media logic and political logic are recognised by distinguished characteristics, they are also integrated and ‘blend together’. According to Hedling, ‘blending’ the two logics happens in three different stages. In the first phase, political actors adapt to media

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logic by attempting to improve their visibility and reach – an example is political actors using social media. In the second phase, amalgamation, the political actor and media logic merge together as the political actor is able to consciously use the opportunities presented by the media in a strategic way. The final phase, consolidation, refers to the unconscious use of media logic in the “formulation, practice and communication of politics” (p. 78). Intention is an important factor to consider when looking at the way that communication is used. Not all communications are made with the same aim in mind, by political actors that have the ability to or are interested in using communication in a strategic way.

4.3. Implications of Mediatisation

Trenz (2008) argues that traditional media can have a democratic enhancing function, or an undesired effect on democracy. Media can take on an active role by having journalists acting as the ‘watchdogs’ of democracy, enabling transparency. This can be expressed as revealing power abuse amongst politicians, or as presenting different views on issues to enable citizens forming their own opinions. This would also work the other way around, as the media can amplify the voices of the people and make political actors aware of what issues are important to the public. Meanwhile, how politics is communicated might have undesired outcomes for democracy as well. Media often aims to entertain, rather than providing citizens with unbiased information. This would make the information that reaches the citizens biased by what can be told in a sensationalist way. Similarly, news media has been shown to systematically select incidents that are perceived as negative to report on. Framing politics as a game of winners and losers, scandals and self-interested actors could lead to mistrust among citizens. Another aspect is how those with the highest ‘media competence’ will be able to receive the most attention from citizens.

Therefore, citizens will not always be presented with information from many different points of view.

According to Michailidou & Trenz (2013), the new mediatised political climate can be explained through Manin’s (1997) concept of ‘audience democracy’. This refers to the idea that politics has transitioned from representative democracy, as political parties and the parliament no longer are the main arenas for setting the political agenda. Instead, the political debate is increasingly carried out in the public sphere. As information distribution is increasingly out of the political

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actors’ and journalists’ hands, they now have to compete for the citizen’s attention. This is done in an arena that is constantly changing, making it seem chaotic and unpredictable. As a result, both the means that political actors use to communicate with their audience, as well as the way they are communicating their message, have changed. It has caused a general professionalisation of political communication and led to a rise in the concept of political marketing. This change has been argued to force political actors to be more public and open when presenting their political agenda. Again, this could be a positive democratic development, leading to more informed citizens who are able to form opinions on European politics. According to the reasoning of Michailidou & Trenz (2013), the possible democratic and non-democratic effects that Trenz (2008) describes would still hold, with the difference being that instead of only being driven by journalists that want to sell news, the changes are driven by the variety of media outlets that compete for citizens’ attention.

4.4. Mediatisation in EU Foreign Policy

The mediatisation framework has been applied to the ESS and the EUGS by Brommesson & Ekengren (2019), in order to research whether the change in the EU's place in a shifting world order, resulted in an increased mediatisation of the foreign policy. They argue that since the EU has a legitimacy deficit, and difficulties getting the European citizens involved in EU politics through traditional means, it is likely that media logic would be used by the EU. The level of mediatisation is expected to vary over time and in different cases. In the EU foreign policy case, expected examples of media logic are according to the authors “_{painting simple stories about} one-dimensional threats to the EU, communicating lively descriptions of other actors who stand for something radically different from the EU and – by doing so – portraying the struggle over political influence and economic benefits as a competition among the strong actors of the world” (p. 199).

The mediatisation of the EEAS has been analysed by Hedling (2018) as well. In the EUGS, strategic communication is argued to be an important tool for connecting foreign policy to the EU citizens and partners. Communicating the EU’s foriegn policy work was seen as a way to not only restore its image, but also to work with image over time as to address the issue of lack of a united European identity. According to interviews conducted by Hedling (2018), the HRVP of

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the EEAS between 2014-2019, Federica Mogherini, caused what was called ‘the Mogherini effect’ to the strategic communication. This was because of a strengthened narrative – making the communicated policy coherent and more forcefully worded, as well as more visible and compatible for the media. Mogherini was, in addition, praised for her personal involvement in producing social media content. Through the use of social media, the attention from the news media increased. Still, despite this shift in strategy, the EU’s communication efforts were still deemed somewhat incoherent and “at the experimental stage” (p. 200). Adding to the EEAS’ shift in communications strategy as a result of ‘the Mogherini effect’ (Hedling, 2018), the election of Donald Trump as the US president in 2016 might have caused a shift in how politics is communicated as well. The debate around whether or not the media is providing ‘fake’ or extremely biased news, as well as the president’s frequent use of social media, can be seen as yet another shift in a development where politics adhering to media logic becomes more common (Brommesson & Ekengren, 2019).

Hedling (2018) recognised plenty of media logic buzzwords used in interviews with EEAS employees. A communication strategy mentioned was ‘positive narrative projection’ – described as a way to show the world the good work that the EU does. In order to successfully convey this, the message had to be simplified. Quotes such as “[...] communication is now competition, you have to add that competitive edge” as well as “moving from a message centered communication to audience centered communication” (p. 203) show the recent changes in the strategy. In addition to simplification, there was a clear use of polarisation, where the EU was portrayed as a force of good, against the evils of terrorism, economic downturn, and war. There were, in other words, a deliberate use of storytelling techniques to communicate the EU’s achievements. For whom does the EEAS communicate their strategies? The EU does account for both its member states and its citizens. According to Hedling (2018), the EU’s recent communication strategy has been improved as a direct response to its lack of legitimacy to its citizens, in an attempt to gain the people’s approval. Still, the HRVP is appointed by the European Council, and the other officials are transferred from different EU and member state institutions (EEAS, 2020). This does not mean that the communication of the EEAS is not directed at the EU citizens – only that there is no reelection to consider, which could make the EEAS less susceptible to media

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logic.

Mogherini did, according to interviews conducted by Hedling (2018), argue that simplifying messages was not only done with the EU citizens in mind. “The leaders of the EU don’t even know what we are doing, we have to educate them on EU foreign policy” (p. 211) is a quote by Mogherini, recollected by a strategic communications officer, that shows that the intended audience of the communication efforts also included political leaders. According to one digital strategist, the EU communication has three main audiences – stakeholders, meaning the member states and other partners, the ‘Brussels bubble’ or high-level internal communication, and the interested citizens. They argue that there is no point in trying to reach a new audience, or

engaging initially uninterested citizens. The different online forums that the EU is active on also serve different interests. Twitter and the content on the official website are argued to reach mostly elite audiences and journalists, while the Facebook audience is more broad, and

Instagram posts are directed at the ‘young people’. However, I observed that a great deal of the posts on different platforms are links to the EEAS’ official website. Therefore, all of these audiences might be reached by what is posted there.

4.5. Differences in Conceptions Between the EU and China

Previous research has discussed what media logic and political logic might look like in an EU foreign policy context. However, in this study, a framework that can detect political logic in an EU-China context needs to be specified. In order to operationalise political logic, I will discuss what kind of values and institutions these two actors prioritise. I will then discuss how the differences in conceptions of the same values and institutions might affect the EU’s communications when addressing China, as well as their relationship as a whole.

It was as the EU still held their stronger position in the world that Ian Manners (2002) developed the concept of a ‘Normative Power Europe’. Manners argues that the way that the European identity shapes others in an international context makes it a foreign policy normative power. The EU is seen as a different and new kind of political actor, one that relies on the promotion of norms in order to legitimise itself to its citizens. This means that the driving force is not material gains, as its normative agenda can be economically costly and risks damaging its relations to

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other countries. The norms in question are in accordance with the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which has made them sometimes mentioned as ‘universal norms and principles’, although by Manners still admitting that we ought to be critical of their “application and

indivisibility” (p. 241). These include five ‘core’ norms – peace, liberty, human rights,

democracy and rule of law. He also suggests four ‘minor’ norms, that have been derived from the EU’s actions and priorities – social solidarity, good governance, anti-discrimination and

sustainable development.

The concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ was, according to Tocci (2017), reflected in the ESS from 2003 as a kind of ‘EU-centrism’, where the EU would promote and extend its norms and values to the world. In contrast to this, the EUGS reflected an identity crisis and self-questioning, where the EU itself was seen as being under threat. The EU also admitted to there being many ways to building a prosperous society. In an attempt to avoid putting interests and values against each other, maintaining its values were presented as part of the EU’s interests. When addressing the international system, the EU is now to be guided by ‘principled pragmatism’. According to Tocci (2017), principled means that the EU should not fall for any ‘cultural relativism’ – it should still stand for its own values. Pragmatism should, according to Tocci, be interpreted as a way of seeing the world for how it is, and not as an instruction on “how to face up to it” (p. 499). To the CPC, human rights come with socio-economic development and stability, and are

interpreted differently, depending on cultural background, and the values that one actor chooses to prioritise over others (Chang & Pieke, 2018). The CPC has been known for following the ‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’ – non-aggression, not interfering in the affairs of others, respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as working for equality and mutual benefits between actors (Finamore, 2017; Ai & Song, 2019). These were first formulated in the trade agreement between Chinese leader Zhou Enlai and his Indian counterpart Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954, and have been used by the CPC since (Finamore, 2017).

Out of these principles, sovereignty is greatly emphasised by the CPC (Pan, 2010). Pan (2010) argues that China and the EU interpret the concept of sovereignty differently. To the CPC, sovereignty requires that other countries do not interfere with China’s internal affairs, and allow

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China to make decisions independently. The EU, according to Pan (2010), interprets sovereignty as conditional on the responsibilities of a country, such as protecting the human rights, security and economic safety of its citizens. These responsibilities require allowing international scrutiny, which puts the EU’s view in direct contrast to China’s conception of sovereignty, something that has had a negative impact on their cooperation in the past.

Michalski & Nilsson (2019) argue that China has, instead of adhering to the principle of

multilateralism, promoted a system where the focus is on sovereignty and the balance of power. Multilateralism as defined by Ruggie (1992) is a process of coordination after certain principles of conduct, where three states or more are involved. The principles of conduct “specify

appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence” (p. 571).

Multilateralism is in other words a process that allows states to work together (Scott, 2013), but it could also be put into contrast to a system where the strongest actor can act on its own interests (Michalski & Nilsson, 2019).

According to Finamore (2017), the concept of multilateralism started to be used by the CPC under Hu Jintao’s leadership in the 2000’s. Since then, it has been used in an instrumental or a tactical way, and as a diplomatic tool in international arenas, but carefully restricted as to not override state sovereignty. The EU, in contrast, uses it normatively, as something it wants to promote and the international system should strive for.

Multipolarity, on the other hand, describes a structure of several actors where power is

distributed unequally, where strategist actors find different ways to accumulate power and shift the balance of power. The concept of multipolarity has often been used by the CPC, as China’s rise to being a global power was described as a rebalancing of the multipolar world order (Scott, 2013). Meanwhile, the concept of multipolarity is mostly used by the EU when referring to other actors, such as China, and seen as a contributing factor to competition between states, whereas multilateralism promotes cooperation (Finamore, 2017).

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5. Method

In this section, I will present and motivate the choice of method and material used in this study. I will also operationalise the theory in order to apply it to the material.

5.1. Choice of Method

The method here needs to be applicable to answer the question of whether media logic and political logic is used between 2016-2020, and in what way. Therefore, it should incorporate the different aspects of media and political logic in a systematic way, and enable comparison over time. Since mediatisation theory is about communication, and as the EEAS’ public

communications are almost always published in text in addition to other media, using text analysis is a way to incorporate the most relevant material for answering the question. The characteristics of the two logics are detectable by analysing what is explicitly written, and not what the meaning behind the formulations might be. I will use content analysis to answer the question of if, and in what way, media and political logic are used in EU’s communications regarding China.

Bergström & Boréus (2017) describe content analysis as a method where the material is sorted by coding and categorising, followed by then describing the contents of those categories. There is sometimes a division into quantitative and qualitative content analysis, where quantitative refers to including measuring into the analysis, as the frequency in the texts of something determined by theory beforehand will enable comparisons over time and over different units. Meanwhile, a qualitative content analysis can refer to an analysis where nothing is measured in quantity, and where the text is coded into categories inductively as it is read. In this study, the frequency of the arguments matter, which would make it quantitative. Still, the coding will need interpreting the content, and will require a more thorough analysis as well, in order to see the differences and varieties in each category.

A systematic comparison of frequency in categories, and over time, puts the most emphasis on how often something is mentioned, as well as how it is expressed – it can, however, also matter in what context something is communicated. The contexts of the communications are excluded

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here. However, it gives the advantage of being able to include a large amount of material. In a content analysis, the material can be analysed by how much space they take up in total, or by frequency. In this case, it does not matter how long each description is, but rather that they exist at all. Therefore, the descriptions showing signs of media logic or political logic will be counted by frequency.

There is interpretation involved when dividing the material into the categories, which always risks leading to biased or inconsistent coding. Some mistakes can be expected when coding large materials, but there are precautions to take to avoid them. In this case, I am alone in coding, which erases the risk of interpreting the categories in different ways. The most efficient way of avoiding an inconsistent coding is to have the categories clearly defined, as well as clearly distinguished from one another. Analysing a large amount of material might also lessen the weight of potential non-systematic mistakes (Esaiasson et al., 2017). In this case, a sentence might have one part that belongs to one category, and another that belongs to another category. Although this could be interpreted as the author emphasising one part more than the other when reading the sentence in its context, they will both be counted. This will also make the sentence being counted more than once – however, it is not the same parts of the sentence that belong to the same category.

5.2. Material Presentation

In order to assess any use of media logic or political logic in the EEAS’ communications, all material published on the EEAS official website that mentions China is included. Only the parts of each text that address China are included in the material. The reason for only including the website material is that the use of other media, such as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram, for the most part only quotes and links to the material published on the website. Analysing the

differences in content directed at certain audiences, as Hedling (2018) found that the EEAS is doing on different platforms, is therefore outside the scope of this study. Some statements included are made by representatives of the European Council, such as Donald Tusk, or the European Commission, such as Ursula von der Leyen. As they have been published by the EEAS, they are here considered as part of their communication.

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The collected material has been divided into three categories – the first one being statements, speeches or blog posts made by an EU representative, such as Federica Mogherini or Josep Borrell. Federica Mogherini was the_{HRVP between 2014-2019, and Josep Borrell took over the} role in late 2019. The second category is documents, and the third other EEAS statements or press releases. This divide was done to take into account the differences that might be prevalent in different kinds of communications, such as speeches or official documents. However, the different categories are not presented in the results, in order to keep the presentation simple. It is more likely that media logic will be found in speeches, and that political logic will be found in official documents, due to the nature of these publications. In speeches, the actor has more leeway to express themselves as they want to, whereas the expectations on official documents are that they will be written in a standardised language form, avoiding colloquial expressions. Therefore, the frequency of one kind of text a certain year might skew the results. However, to give more speeches is also a communication choice. The choice to start a blog, as Josep Borrell did, can be considered a sign of media logic in itself. The media that the political actor uses can be seen as a part of political marketing (Michailidou & Trenz, 2013), and a blog is a media that will enable more leeway in expressions. There were two official documents released each year mentioning China, except for during 2018 and 2020, when there were no documents released. This might have had an effect on the end results, resulting in somewhat less political logic those two years. The different texts vary greatly in length, as some include only a few sentences that refer to China, and some are several pages. In total, the material consists of 153 articles and documents.

5.3. Operationalisation

Media logic in a political setting has been described as using storytelling techniques in order to catch the attention of the intended audience. This includes polarisation, simplification of complex ideas, visualisation, intensification, stereotypization, sensationalization, as well as framing politics as a strategic game, or their actors as winners or losers (Strömbäck, 2008)_. Meanwhile, political logic has been described as using traditional political tools as a way to promote politics. These would be ideology, shared principles and values – _{things that point to a} focus on the EU’s core beliefs and institutions (Brommesson & Ekengren, 2017).

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When analysing the material to find cases of media logic and political logic, these will be presented by unit of analysis, and will be divided by year. In each document, there might be several uses of both media logic and political logic, or there may be none. It is also important to note that an absence of media logic will not be counted as political logic, and vice versa. There can be descriptions that do not belong to any of the categories. The previous operationalization of media logic may need to be diversified in cases such as this one, as it is not clear what variations there are to each instance of the different logics. Therefore, I have added to the categories inductively, based on what is found in the material.

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Table 1._{Signs of media logic.}

Media logic

1. Emphasis on differences in actors, polarization of actors.

2. Narrative of politics as a game or a competition, framing political actors as ‘good guys and bad guys’ or as ‘winners and losers’.

3. Emphasis on the actions of individuals.

4. Storytelling techniques such as… A. Anecdotes.

B. Visualization, illustrative adjectives, and other expressive language that can be assumed to generate strong feelings in the reader, stereotypes.

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Table 2._{Signs of political logic.}

Table 1 and 2 are based on the research by Strömbäck (2008) and Brommesson & Ekengren (2017, 2019).

Some of these categories do not appear mutually exclusive – for example, a polarised narrative can exist independently of a narrative of politics as a competition, but describing politics as a competition should also be considered a polarised narrative. Still, these are based on different criteria that will allow them to be sorted as different categories. I will present these below, as well as what to expect in the texts based on previous research and operationalizations.

5.3.1. Media Logic

In an EU context, media logic has been exemplified as “_{painting simple stories about}

one-dimensional threats to the EU, communicating lively descriptions of other actors who stand for something radically different from the EU and – by doing so – portraying the struggle over political influence and economic benefits as a competition among the strong actors of the world”

Political logic

1. Emphasis on similarities in actors. 2. Compromising with or helping other

actors.

3. Seeing both sides of actors or events. 4. Emphasis on actor’s ideologies, their

values and shared principles.

5. Emphasis on political institutions, such as multilateralism or multipolarity. 6. Emphasis on ‘Chinese’ values and

principles.

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(Brommesson & Ekengren, 2019, p. 199)_{The latter part can be seen as part of the first two rows} in the media logic table. Brommesson & Ekengren (2019) found these categories in the EUGS as a “[...] description of European identity that is set in contrast to terrorism, organized crime and failed states” and “[...] European identity [...] in contrast to those who do not support these values” (p. 212). As China is an authoritarian state that promotes values that are very different from the EU’s, and as the CPC does commit human rights atrocities, it is expected that these will be mentioned by the EU. Therefore, an emphasis on differences is here specified as mentioning China in contrast to the EU as an actor. In other words, I will consider anything set in contrast to the EU itself as a possible emphasis on differences in actors. When it comes to describing politics as a game or a competition, this category will include descriptions where the EU is portrayed as the ‘good guys’ in contrast to China’s ‘bad’ behaviour. Media logic can also be expressed by emphasising the actions of individuals, for example, as Hedling (2018) argues, in order to invoke empathic emotions. In this case, it is more likely that individual political leaders will be pointed out as the actors responsible for policy, as a way of simplifying politics, as opposed to decisions being made by political institutions or parties.

One-sided descriptions of events or actors, like simplifications of issues that are complex, are both difficult to single out. Brommesson & Ekengren (2019) argue that this can be seen as “_{painting simple stories about one-dimensional threats to the EU” (p. 199). To include}

simplification in the analysis, however, would require that I had insight in all issues described, and be able to judge if a more complex description would have been possible. As this would be very difficult to do, I have decided to not include this aspect into the operationalisation.

Similarly, to be able to point out one-sided descriptions in the material, I would need to know that seeing ‘both sides’ is possible in each case.

Storytelling techniques will be assessed as anecdotes, or as visualisation. Brommesson & Ekengren (2017) coded the latter aspect by asking the question “are adjectives or illustrative descriptions used that can be assumed to generate feelings of ‘outrage, identification, empathy caring, sympathy or compassion’?” (p. 72). Although it will be difficult in this case to judge how any reader might feel reading an illustrative description, there might be cases where certain language is used for the emotional effect it could have on the readers. I will code any description

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that uses any expressive language as a storytelling technique. Previous research has also included ‘stereotypization’ of actors. In this case, it is difficult to predict what stereotypes about China could be used by the EU, and differentiate these from statements based on facts. Stereotypes could be used to paint a vivid, or simplified, picture of the other actor. I assume that it could be another use of illustrative language, and it is included in this category. Anecdotes are here defined as short stories with the purpose of being amusing, interesting, inspirational or cautionary, and often told in relation to the person telling it.

5.3.2. Political Logic

In an EU foreign policy context, political logic could present as actors “describing_the importance of the institutions for creating political meaning, the value system that is the

foundation of the EU’s existence, and the multilateral processes that contribute to changing the conditions for exercising influence and engaging in trade” (Brommesson & Ekengren, 2017, p. 199). Brommesson & Ekengren (2017) argue that political logic is on the opposite end of media logic. Therefore, in order to assess to what degree the EU foreign policy is polarised,

emphasising differences in actors, and framing politics as a game or competition, I have created three aspects of ‘consensus-sharing’ politics. These are emphasising similarities in actors, emphasising compromises and seeing both sides of actors and events.

In addition, _{there will always be a ‘Chinese perspective’ to the story. Instead of attempting to} include ‘simplified’ descriptions, I have included _{when the EU has attempted to show that they} take the Chinese perspective into consideration. Since the material often addresses single issues and problems that the EU has in its relations with China, it is not likely that ‘both sides’ can always be present. However, it is still worth noting when the ‘other side’ is taken into

consideration, as this would point out that the EU has gone out of their way to show that they are aware of the Chinese perspective. Therefore, I will include this as an indicator of the absence of media logic, counted as political logic.

When it comes to political logic, I will include both values that the CPC is known for

prioritising, as well as the values emphasised by the EU. I argue that the EU emphasising the values that CPC stands for can be seen as the EU going out of their way to meet their other part,

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and changing the way they communicate as a way of accommodating China, making it part of the political logic framework. These are based on the research by Ai & Song (2019), who emphasise the ‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’ – non-aggression, not interfering in the affairs of others, respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, working for equality and mutual benefits between actors, often called ‘win-win’ situations. I have also included the use of the term ‘reciprocity’ into this category. As ‘win-win’ refers to mutual benefits, and reciprocity refers to mutual obligations, I consider them close enough to be in the same category. The EU values have been identified by Manners (2002) as peace, liberty, human rights,

democracy and rule of law, as well as social solidarity, good governance, anti-discrimination and sustainable development. An emphasis on political institutions will most likely be evolving around multilateralism or multipolarity, but other possible institutions are included here as well. There is also an added category for ‘arguments for member state unity’, which refers to any reference that the EEAS might make to the member states acting together in relation to China, as this too is an emphasis on political institutions in order to create consensus-oriented politics. Looking at the signs of the different logics, media logic can be interpreted as signs of a conflict, and political logic as signs of cooperation. Conflicts are bound to happen in politics, and

naturally, polarisation and an emphasis on the actors’ differences will follow. Does this framework capture communication efforts, and not just variations in conflicts? Although the conflicts in the relationship between the EU and China will fluctuate, they are still economically integrated to the point where the EU needs to choose their words carefully. Therefore, it is likely that the two logics will be used together, which creates the need to analyse in what way the different logics are used, and if the statements are showing signs of media logic, and not just conflict.

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6. Results

First, I will present the quantitative part of the results, which will demonstrate variations in usage of media logic and political logic over time. It will also provide an overview of the differences in the use of different categories. Then, I will present the variations in the different categories over time, supported by quotes from the material, in order to show the variation in how the different logics are expressed.

Below is the amount of media logic and political logic found in the material, divided by year of publication. The amount of arguments in each category found in the documents is presented within brackets. All the signs of political and media logic are counted by year, and presented at the end of this table. The share of the total amount of arguments from the same year, including both political and media logic, is shown in percentage. This makes percentage points a useful point of reference in this comparison over time, in addition to the amount within the brackets.

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Table 3._{Media logic results, sorted by year.} Media logic 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Emphasis on differences in actors, polarization of actors. 4,98% (11) 3,80% (7) 5,50% (12) 9,62% (28) 16,06% (53) Narrative of politics as a game or a competition, framing political actors as ‘good guys and bad guys’ or as ‘winners and losers’.

0,00% (0) 0,54% (1) 2,29% (5) 6,53% (19) 7,88% (26) Mention individuals. 0,45% (1) 2,17% (4) 2,29% (5) 1,72% (5) 1,82% (6) Storytelling techniques such as anecdotes. 0,90% (2) 0,00% (0) 0,46% (1) 1,37% (4) 5,15% (17) Storytelling techniques such as expressive language. 0,45% (1) 1,63% (3) 2,75% (6) 1,37% (4) 9,39% (31)

Total share of media logic. 6,79% (15) 8,15% (15) 13,30% (29) 20,62% (60) 40,30% (133)

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Table 4._{Political logic results, sorted by year.} Political logic 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Emphasis on similarities in actors. 12,67% (28) 10,33% (19) 5,96% (13) 3,09% (9) 1,82% (6) Compromise, cooperation or help between actors.

17,65% (39) 29,35% (54) 30,28% (66) 22,68% (66) 13,33% (44)

Seeing both sides of actors or events. 1,81% (4) 3,26% (6) 4,59% (10) 4,81% (14) 3,03% (10) Emphasis on actor’s ideologies, their values and shared principles. 32,13% (71) 28,26% (52) 25,23% (55) 31,27% (91) 20,30% (67) Emphasis on political institutions, such as multilateralism. 12,67% (28) 8,15% (15) 10,09% (22) 6,53% (19) 8,79% (29)

‘Chinese’ values and principles. 12,67% (28) 11,96% (22) 10,09% (22) 8,59% (25) 9,70% (32)

Arguments for member state unity. 3,62% (8) 0,54% (1) 0,46% (1) 2,41% (7) 2,73% (9)

Total share of political logic. 93,21% (206) 91,85% (169) 86,70% (189) 79,38% (231) 59,70% (197) Total arguments, media

logic and political logic.

100% (221) 100% (184) 100% (218) 100% (291) 100% (330)

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Figure 1._{The amount of media logic and political logic in percentage, sorted by year.}

The results show that there has been an increase in media logic each year. The largest increase of media logic was between the years 2019 and 2020, where the amount grew by 19,68%. Still, it is the political logic that dominates the EEAS’ communications during this time period.

Below, the different types of media and political logic are presented by category. In order to give a better overview and show how the argumentation has changed over time, these are presented within the time brackets of 2016-2018, and 2019-2020. The time divisions have been made based on the results, as there is a bigger shift in the use of media logic between the years 2018-2019. The later time period included both Federica Mogherini and Josep Borrell as HRVP. This division in presentation can give an overview of the way that the communications changed as media logic became more commonly used.

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6.1. Media Logic

Emphasis on differences in actors and polarization of actors, 2016-2018.

The EU emphasises being a different kind of actor by mentioning itself in contrast to China each year, with a constant slight increase. In 2016, these descriptions took up 5% of the total

arguments. The following quote has been counted as both media logic, and as political logic. “The EU should also continue to urge China to release political prisoners, ensure fair trial, and fulfil its international commitments in terms of protecting the rights of people belonging to minorities, not least in Tibet and Xinjiang.” _{EEAS, Elements for a new EU strategy on China, 2016 A}.

The emphasis on the actors in contrast to each other, such as the EU urging China to act in a certain way, is seen as bringing attention to their differences. The political logic is here mentioning ‘European’ values, such as human rights. In 2017, the amount of instances of emphasising differences were 4%, which increased to 5,5% in 2018. The differences continued to be centered around human rights issues.However, the EU often avoids to describe China in contrast to themselves, by instead referring to the United Nations to set the international standard for human rights, or simply urging China to abide by their own laws. In 2018, the actors’

difficulties to agree on certain issues were addressed by the EU in a more direct way, but still with an emphasis on the need for EU and China’s continued cooperation in order to solve these challenges, such as in the quote below.

“The European Union and China are two of the great powers of the world of today. We do not always see eye-to-eye; on the contrary, we have some fundamental disagreements that are very evident. But as two global powers, we both understand that our cooperation is essential to address the main challenges we face.”_{Federica Mogherini, 2018 A}.

Emphasis on differences in actors and polarization of actors, 2019-2020.

In 2019 and 2020, the amount of descriptions emphasising the differences between the EU and China increased. In 2019, the EU starts to call China a ‘systemic rival’, as the two actors promote different models of governance. This in itself is an emphasis on the actors’ differences, which stands for a part of the increase of these arguments. The majority of these arguments continue to mention human rights differences. The EU defined their position in contrast not only to China,

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but also the rest of the world, in a more direct way than it had before. Here, not only does the EU emphasise that human rights are seen as equal to economic interest, but they argue that the EU is the only actor to prioritise human rights in this way.

“The summit was devoted to our bilateral relations, as well as to global economic governance. But during our talks, we did not forget about human rights. As I have stressed many times before, human rights are – from our, European point of view – as important as economic interests.” _{Donald Tusk, 2019 A}.

“Our best tool is to keep engaging with China on human rights in a respectful but extremely clear manner. No other global power is doing this in the world today. The global trend on human rights is not

encouraging at all. I believe this is exactly one more reason for us not to give up. We cannot afford, as Europeans, to stop engaging. We will continue to advocate for the respect of human rights, be it in China or all around the world.” _{Federica Mogherini, 2019 B}.

In 2019, Josep Borell takes over the position of High Representative from Federica Mogherini. Borrell’s blog posts stand for an increase in media logic in 2020. China is then, for the first time, explicitly described as different from the EU in terms of values and political regime, such as in the quote below.

“For its part, modern China was built on values and a political regime that are very different. And contrary to what many, particularly in Europe, had hoped, the economic development of China and the growth of its middle class has not resulted in a marked evolution towards democracy, with respect for individual rights, civil society and freedom to dissent. The idea of ‘convergence through trade’ has disappeared.” _{Josep Borrell, blogpost, 2020 A}.

Although the two actors’ differences are increasingly emphasised in a more direct way, and that their continued cooperation is important, the EU attempts to avoid describing the EU-China relationship in a simplified way. This points to an intentional non-use of media logic in this category. Still, it is important to keep in mind Landerer’s (2013) criticism of mediatisation theory – everything that is not media logic should not be labelled as political logic. It also shows a use of Tocci’s (2017) interpretation of ‘principled pragmatism’ – describing the relationship for what it is, while maintaining the values that the EU stands for.

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Narrative of politics as a game or a competition, framing political actors as ‘good guys and bad guys’ or as ‘winners and losers’, 2016-2018.

There were no cases of describing politics in terms of ‘good guys and bad guys’ in 2016. In 2018, this narrative started to become more prevalent, as the EU strongly called out the Chinese government for their human rights abuses. This indirectly portrayed the EU as ‘good guys’ while China were acting as the ‘bad guys’ for committing human rights abuses. These issues include the oppression of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang, as well as the illegal detention of Swedish citizen Gui Minhai and Canadian citizens Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. The CPC’s discrimination against non-Chinese companies operating in the country also led to China being singelled out as potential ‘bad guys’. These were, however, all motivated by China’s actions, and not emphasised as being China’s fixed role in world politics. There were no explicit mentions of politics as a game or a competition.

Narrative of politics as a game or a competition, framing political actors as ‘good guys and bad guys’ or as ‘winners and losers’, 2019-2020.

Describing politics in terms of a competition or a game increased significantly during the time period 2019-2020, compared to the years before. Like in the previous time period, 2016-2018, these included statements where the EU calls out the CPC for committing human rights abuses, indirectly describing China as ‘bad guys’. It also includes repeated descriptions of China as a ‘systemic competitor’, in addition to being a strategic partner, while referring to the lack of market reciprocity. In the quotes below, it is apparent that although China is explicitly described as a competitor, there is an equal emphasis on EU-China cooperation.

“The EU and China are strategic markets for each other, trading on average over EUR 1 billion a day. China’s growing domestic market and economic weight create important opportunities. China has also increasingly become a strategic competitor for the EU while failing to reciprocate market access and maintain a level playing field. China’s growing economic weight increases the risk for the global economy of negative spill-overs from distortions in China’s economic system and from possible sudden economic downturn. The EU’s approach to China should therefore take account of the evolving nature of the Chinese economy.” _{EEAS, EU-China – A Strategic Outlook, 2019 C}.

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“China is simultaneously a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner, with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance. The EU will use links across different policy areas and sectors to exert more leverage for its objectives. Both, the EU and its Member States can achieve their aims concerning China only in full unity.” _Federica

Mogherini, 2019 D.

This again shows that the EU tries to avoid simplified descriptions of their relationship with China, by arguing that there are different aspects to take into account. Considering this context, it could have not been counted as media logic, and instead be seen as non-use of media logic. Still, this would require weighing the values of not simplifying, and an emphasis on politics as a competition, against each other. Federica Mogherini also addresses the member states, arguing that unity is the only way for the EU to reach their goals. In 2020, the position of seeing China as a systemic rival and competitor is further emphasised, and it is stated that this dimension of the relationship is increasing.

“On the other hand, it is clear also that [China] is a systemic rival and this dimension of our relationship is there, it is even increasing. It is a competitor, yes. It is a competitor, a partner, an ally, a rival. Everything at the same time. So it is a complex relationship that cannot be reduced to a single dimension.”_Josep

Borrell, 2020 B.

“For me it is clear that it is not enough for Europe to define itself solely as a soft power. We have to be realistic and recognise the world as it is, including the inherently competitive nature of the international system. I have said several times that we need to learn to speak the language of power. But clearly we are still in this process, while others have no difficulty in doing so: the US and China for sure but also Russia and Turkey. They think and act in terms of what some call ‘statecraft’: using all levers of national power in an integrated way to advance their interests.” _{Josep Borrell, blogpost, 2020 D}.

Below, Borrell argues that the EU needs more than soft power in order to handle the challenges that they face. In 2020, there are also several descriptions of a ‘battle of narratives’ around the Coronavirus pandemic. The EU needs to participate in this battle, and one way to do this is to be successful in handling the pandemic, and thereby showing their strength to the rest of the world.

The Mediatization of EU-China Relations