Post-Cold War Coup d’état
Identifying Conditions using Systematic
Operationalized Comparison
Bachelor Thesis in Political Science Author: Stephanie Toro Tutor: Prof. Benny Hjern Jönköping May, 2010
Bachelor Thesis in Political Science
Title: Post-Cold War Coup d’état: Identifying Conditions using Systematic Operationalized Comparison
Author: Stephanie Toro
Tutor: Benny Hjern
Date: 2010-05-18
Subject terms: MDSD, systems analysis, comparative analysis, coup d’état
Abstract
This study combines qualitative and quantitative procedures in order to make possible a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) analysis which systematically compares two countries in order to identify factors which play a role in coup d’état occurrences after the Cold War. By developing a systems framework that lays the ground for subsequent analysis, an encompassing view of the potential underlying conditions of the coup occurrence are taken into account. This systems framework is subsequently operationalized for a sample of 35 countries which all experienced coup d’état between 1990 and 2010. In order to use MDSD, the most different countries are identified using Boolean distances. Ethiopia and Honduras were found to be the most different and were compared and contrasted according to the systems framework. The study concludes that for coup occurrences in Honduras and Ethiopia, the lack of an external national threat, secularizing tendencies, and past coup occurrences played a major role. Democratizing tendencies after the coups in both countries were a vital signal that the influence of global democratic norms does create incentives for countries to hold elections after a coup. Interestingly, the political system of the country and demographic factors such as ethnicity, religion and language did not appear as important for the coup outcome in these countries.
Table of Contents
1
Introduction ... 1
2
Research Design and Methodological Choices ... 3
2.1 Knowledge ... 3
2.2 Empirics ... 4
2.3 Operationalization ... 5
3
The Systems Framework ... 8
3.1 Systems Theory in Comparative Studies ... 8
3.2 Components of the System ... 11
4
Most Different Systems Design ... 15
4.1 Operationalization of the Data Set... 15
4.2 Creating Distance Matrices ... 16
4.3 Visualizations of Dissimilarity ... 19
4.4 Selecting the Most Different Cases ... 22
5
Comparative Analysis ... 23
5.1 The Honduran Coup ... 23
5.2 The Ethiopian Coup ... 23
5.3 Differences ... 24 5.4 Similarities ... 27
6
Concluding Remarks ... 32
6.1 Summary of Results ... 32 6.2 Methodological Aim ... 33References ... 35
Figures
Figure 2.1 Research Design... 7
Figure 3.1 Basic System Model ... 10
Figure 4.1 Dissimilarities at Level 0 ... 20
Figure 4.2 Dissimilarities at Level 1 ... 20
Figure 4.3 Dissimilarities at Level 2 ... 21
Figure 4.4 Dissimilarities at Level 3 ... 22
Tables
Table 4.1 Category Numbering for System Framework ... 16Table 4.2 Boolean Distances ... 18
Table 4.3 Levels of Difference... 18
Table 5.1 Differences between Honduras and Ethiopia ... 24
Appendices
Appendix A: Table of System Categories, Variables, & Operationalization . 42 Appendix B: Boolean Data ... 54Appendix C: Boolean Distances ... 57
1
Introduction
During the Cold War, many western powers had an ambiguous role in the coup plots of other countries, sometimes assisting and sometimes intervening and hindering them, and other times, doing nothing. During the Cold War period between 1960 and 1980, coup d’état was relatively prominent, but has been declining since the end of the Cold War. In a globalized world, states are putting pressure on other states to adopt democratic ideals and practices. There is an international pressure on democratic rule and systematic sanctions applied to those countries that do not follow the democratic norms. For countries dependent on aid, this is also more often tied to maintaining government stability.
These changes in the international society, coupled with the increasing influence of international norms in states may have changed some underlying conditions that give rise to coup d’état. Goemans and Marinov (2008) conclude that “the type of conditions that give rise to coups post-1991 will be different from the conditions that caused coups in the earlier period” (27).
Thus the first aim of this study is to identify factors which play a role in coup occurrences between 1990 and 2010.
Many papers discussing coup occurrences analyze them for a particular country which does give insight and proper attention to historical circumstances; however, by using a more systematic approach, it is possible to identify certain variables or areas which should be more closely considered when identifying the risk of coup in countries in today’s society.
Thus the second aim of this study is to combine qualitative and quantitative methods in such a way that it becomes meaningful to use Most Different Systems Design (MDSD), which systematically compares two countries, in order to identify the aforementioned factors.
The first section of this paper outlines the methodological approach of the study, describing the empirics and operationalization procedure. The second section lays the ground for the subsequent analysis by developing a systems framework in which to inductively investigate underlying conditions of the coup phenomenon. It systematically identifies variables which fall into the system. The fourth section describes how the
system categories and variables are operationalized and subsequently booleanized in order to be able to perform the MDSD. Distance matrices and visualizations of Boolean distance are used in order to identify the most different countries. In the fifth section the two most different cases are compared and contrasted in order to identify variables and conditions that could be of importance for the coup outcome. The last section offers concluding remarks on the study.
2
Research Design and Methodological Choices
This section details the methodological considerations of the paper beginning with a brief philosophical discussion, continuing with empirics, and ending with the operationalization procedure.
2.1
Knowledge
This study departs from a realist and post-modernist view of science, maintaining the existence of an independent reality and the fallibility of observations of it. However, in observing reality, distinction between brute facts and social facts must be made. Social and institutional facts are social concepts and differ from ‘brute facts’ that are natural concepts which exist without humans thinking about them, such as mountains. Social concepts need some form of self-referentiality in order to exist, meaning that the approach ‘we’ have towards the phenomenon under study is a part of the phenomenon itself. Brute facts form the base on which institutional facts exists. Institutional facts cannot exist by themselves; instead they exist within a systematic relationship among other institutional facts.
In Searle (1995) the following logical rule “X counts as Y in C” is used to explain the creation of institutional facts. “X” is a brute fact and is “counted as” which is a collective intentionality or a continuous agreement or acceptance from ‘us’ that “Y” has a new status which brings with it new functions in context “C”. The assignment of the new function to “Y”, which could not be performed solely by the physical nature of “X”, leads to the creation of an institutional fact. An example is explained with money: pieces of paper count as money in our society. Bits of paper could under no circumstances serve the function as a medium of exchange without the continuous collective intentionality that money has a new status and that the government declares it valuable. However, such a system could not exist, without the existence of several other institutional facts such as a system of exchange and a system of ownership with society (Searle, 1995).
In relation to the study at hand, collective intentionality plays a large role in what is and what is not considered to be a coup d’état. Whether a coup is declared depends largely on the reactions of the international community, just as with the creation of new states. Formal recognition from other parties is required before the event is classified as such.
The interlocking institutional reality that needs to be in place in order for an event to be able to be considered a coup would be a system of authority and power in a society and a system of formal rules which enact an executive leader of a geographical region. The geographical region would need a symbolic territorial system in which the inhabitants within this territory are part of a country. The inhabitants would also participate in a unique social and political system with its own unique systematic relationships among institutional facts. Intrinsic to this study is the belief that the coup d’état are systematically related to various extra-societal and intra-societal characteristics and not simply random, unpredictable events.
2.2
Empirics
Using the Archigos dataset on leaders developed by Gleditsch and Goemans (2009) coup d’état occurrences between 1990 and 2004 could be identified and revealed a total of 31 countries. However, since the data set only included leader changes up until 2004, additional coups d’état occurring up until February, 2010 had to be manually inserted. The data from Archigos identifies the effective leader of the country, which in most cases is uncontroversial to identify, but in a small amount of cases can be difficult due to the fact that some countries have multiple heads of state. Irregular removal in the Archigos dataset is identified when “the leader was removed in contravention of explicit rules and established conventions” (Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009:7). This includes both military coups, civilian coups, and even coups orchestrated by another country, but carried out by domestic forces. Therefore additional exit code criteria is specified in the Archigos dataset which leads the coup definition to include only irregular exits where power is taken by domestic rebel forces (with or without foreign support), domestic military actors (with or without foreign support), and power struggles within the military which are characterized by threat or use of force. Irregular exit instances not included in the coup definition according to the Archigos dataset are exits due to domestic popular protest (with or without foreign support), assassinations by unsupported individuals, or the threat or use of foreign force. Additional coup data for events occurring between 2004 and present is therefore gathered from Marshall and Marshall (2009) among others, and according to the same criteria, that the coup is “a seizure of executive authority through the threat or use of force” and yields an additional four countries to be included in the dataset, leading to a total of 35 countries (Goemans & Marinov, 2008: 13).
2.3
Operationalization
By systematically matching the countries with coup outcome, the most different ones can be selected where the similarities between the cases could account for the shared outcome. This procedure is known as Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) and its greatest advantage when cases are matched according to the principles of this methodology is its ability to exclude certain variables from the analysis, and point to others of importance (Anckar, 2006).
“The alternative design, which seeks maximal heterogeneity in the sample of systems, is based on a belief that in spite of intersystemic differentiation, the populations will differ with regard to only a limited number of variables or relationships” (Preworksi & Teune, 1970: 39).
In order to identify the most different countries for subsequent comparison, operationalized procedures developed by Berg-Schlosser and De Meur (1994a; 1994b; 1996; 1997) serve as a guide. In comparative studies, there are usually a small number of cases, but a potentially unlimited number of variables to consider. In order to systematically derive the cases for comparison according to MDSD, the complexity of the variables to be considered needs to be reduced without losing too much information. By creating a comprehensive systems model which includes several subsystem categories filled up with variables according to theory, the full complexity of possible interactions between variables are included. In this way, the author is able to identify a multitude of social facts, such as norms, values, and social structures that are part of the political system and potentially affect the coup outcome. This process included gathering information on the 35 countries with a coup occurrence after 1990 for ultimately 58 different variables. This ardous undertaking has provided the author with a considerable database of information that can be used for further studies.
Subsequently, this identifies the most different countries to be considered for analysis and will allow for an analysis of potential coup determinants in the post-Cold War scenario. The point is not to identify a single causal factor that leads up to the coup phenomena, rather it is important to reduce the complexity of potential causal factors and interactions in order to be able to focus on certain categories or key variables. Then with this insight, it will be possible to attempt a once again qualitative explanation. It
should be noted that due to the nature of the data being related only to countries with coup outcome, correlation testing of the independent variables is not possible.
By using MDSD the sample of countries which are the focus of the study naturally include those with the occurrence of coup d’état since when this methodology is used at a systemic level the dependent variable must be constant (Anckar, 2006). However, this does have certain implications for the study. According to Belkin and Schofer (2003) “coup risk is a function of deep structural attributes of government, society, political culture, and state-society relations” (594-595). High coup risk can therefore be an attribute both in countries that experience coup, as well as countries that do not, since some countries may employ regime coup-proofing strategies that prevent such events from occurring. So although the focus of this paper also lies on the underlying factors that predispose regimes to coup vulnerability, the sample of countries included in the paper reflect countries that most likely had low or ineffective regime coup-proofing1. Although we draw much information from previous studies on coup d’état, this study aims to find out if the fundamental causes from previous works on coup d’état have significantly changed if the sample is based on the occurrence of coup d’état after 1990 due to the changing external environment. Although United States (US) foreign policy towards coup for example, started to shift during the 1980s along with globalization, the end of the Cold War is still the best proxy for the shift that occurred in Western attitudes towards the coup d’état (Goemans and Marinov, 2008).
Hence the methodology for the paper can be illustrated in Figure 2.1 with the shape of an hourglass. The paper begins with a qualitative standpoint. Creating a systems framework that is as inclusive as possible in terms of informed variables allows the study to take a very broad perspective of the system in which the coups occur and the different areas that may affect this outcome.
1 See Belkin and Schofer (2003) for a more detailed account of conceptualizing regime vulnerability in
Figure 2.1 Research Design
As the study moves from Section 3 to Section 4, down the hourglass, the shape gets slimmer illustrating the operationalization of the different components of the systems framework. In order to put a value on many of the concepts that are discussed, suitable proxies have to be used. The slimmest point in the hourglass illustrates the Booleanization of the variables, in which a lot of detailed information gets lost due to values being represented only as zeros and ones. However, we can accept this loss of information at this stage in order to make the subsequent process of identifying the most different countries possible. After the countries have been identified, they are compared and contrasted and the potentially important variables for the coup outcome are taken into account. Once the most different countries are narrowed down, it is possible to move towards the bottom of the hourglass with an ever more encompassing and qualitative view of the cases selected. In this way, this study aims to be able to identify significant variables which serve as conditions for the coup outcome in these countries.
Qualitative: Section 3 Systems Framework Quantitative: Section 4 Operationalization Qualitative: Section 5 Comparative Analysis
3
The Systems Framework
This section details the systems theory approach, creates a basic system model to be used for analysis, and fills in the system with relevant variables for a discussion of the coup outcome.
3.1
Systems Theory in Comparative Studies
In comparative studies, there are usually a small number of cases, but a potentially unlimited number of variables to consider. In order to systematically derive the cases for comparison according to MDSD, the complexity of the variables under consideration needs to be reduced without losing too much information. By creating an inclusive systems model which includes several subsystem categories filled up with variables according to theory, a range of possible factors can emerge.
Stability “in a wider system theoretical sense means a dynamic balance that is distinguished by a synchronous course of structural and cultural changes that are adjusted to each other” (Schlosser & Siegler, 1990:22). Change occurs continuously within the system; however there is no abrupt change in the fundamentals of the system. Thus the problem for any observer is to identify whether a change “remains within the framework of the elements that constitute the system, or whether it has already begun to go beyond the system” (Schlosser & Siegler, 1990:22). The discussion in this thesis remains on political instability which could give rise to coups.
With the help of an explicit systems model, filled in with relevant conceptual considerations, a framework can be created to take into account several different aspects which may affect the occurrence of coups. The coup outcome present in the sample of countries included in this study is due both to background causes, which include structural factors that change slowly over time, as well as triggering causes or proximate causes, which are short-lived and may provide opportunity for coup plotters to take action (Belkin and Schofer, 2003). In the following systems framework, both structural and triggering causes are included, but not specifically distinguished. The systems framework aims to create a holistic view of the fundamental causes of coup d’état in the post-Cold War scenario and therefore this distinction is not made.
In Easton’s (1965) book entitled “A Framework for Political Analysis” he develops a coherent framework for the analysis of political life. The general premises on which his model is based are the following:
1. “System. It is useful to view political life as a system of behavior.
2. Environment. A system is distinguishable from the environment in which it exists and is open to influences from it.
3. Response. Variations in the structures and processes within a system may usefully be interpreted as constructive or positive alternative efforts by members of a system to regulate or cope with stress flowing from environmental as well as internal sources.
4. Feedback. The capacity of a system to persist in the face of stress is a function of the presence and nature of the information and other influences that return to its actors and decision-makers” (Easton, 1965: 24-25).
Although boundaries of systems are not necessarily spatial in nature and that just because a geopolitical boundary ends, the interaction of social systems does not; for the purposes of this study, the unit of the analysis is the state. There is an infinite number of variables in both the extra-societal environment (the International Society) and the intra-societal environment (the state) which could impact the political system and the processes therein, and for each one of these variables and processes a partial theory needs to explain the effect on the political system.
“…systems analysis directs our attention toward the processes that all types of political systems share and that make it possible for them to cope, however successfully, with stresses that threaten to destroy the capacity of a society to sustain any political system at all” (Easton, 1965: 79).
Based on Easton’s (1965) description of the total environment of a political system, along with the more detailed components of the political structures in Almond and Powell’s (1996) book, and being guided by the practical implementation of Berg-Schlosser and De Meur (1994a; 1994b), the following basic systems model, illustrated in Figure 3.1 and described below, was produced.
Structures
The system model seeks out the holistic view of society and views it as a system of inputs and outputs, where the inputs go through the political system and create outputs which then alter the state of the system as a whole, which then affects subsequent inputs. The stability of the system lies in its ability to cope with the changing outputs and adjust. According to Easton, when examining the political system
into account the inputs that affect it, which come in the form of demands supports of the political system.
of claims to resources within the system, social services, and enablement to participation in the political system, whereas supports come in various forms such as paying taxes supporting and also participating in the political system. These supports and demands enter into the political system which is the centralized political structure of the state. This regulatory body processes these inputs through a series of institutional structures and decides upon the distribution of resources.
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Political
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Output
Structures
Social
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Figure 3.1 Basic System Model
m model seeks out the holistic view of society and views it as a system of inputs and outputs, where the inputs go through the political system and create outputs which then alter the state of the system as a whole, which then affects subsequent e stability of the system lies in its ability to cope with the changing outputs and adjust. According to Easton, when examining the political system we
into account the inputs that affect it, which come in the form of demands
the political system. Demands are placed on the political system in the form of claims to resources within the system, social services, and enablement to participation in the political system, whereas supports come in various forms such as porting and also participating in the political system. These supports and demands enter into the political system which is the centralized political structure of the state. This regulatory body processes these inputs through a series of institutional
ctures and decides upon the distribution of resources. The outputs are
International System
International System
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of the decisions made by the central governing body, which may include social services, legislation, or other symbolic output. This affects both the international system and the social system, and of course translates back into inputs that reflect on the decision-making by the central governing body. The stability of the system therefore depends on this feedback loop; a central part of any self-sustaining system. In this way, the system can adapt in response to challenges and retain stability regularity in the political process. The international system is comprised of the international political system and the international social system (economic and social structures). Of particular importance in this system model is the impact of the international system on the processes that occur within the intra-societal environment, and also how decisions made within this environment transfer to the international system. As mentioned above, Goemans and Marinov (2008) discuss the declining longevity of coup regimes in the post-Cold War scenario and argue that this is due to increasing international pressure on democratization.
The social system according to Easton (1965) is comprised of the cultural system, the social structure, economic system, demographic system, and any other subsystems of importance, in this case being the history and political traditions of the nation. This is where issues such as ethnicities within the state come into play as well as economic and cultural aspects. Almond and Powell (1996) argue that the most important aspect of political culture is legitimacy of the government (44).
Although not presented in Figure 3.1, the ecological system of the intra-societal environment also is taken into account, referring to the physical resources and geography of the territory in which the state is found.
In order to be able to analyze a system model of this kind, theoretically valuable variables had to be filled into the different aspects of the system. A full list of the variables under consideration, sources, and their operationalization can be found in Appendix A. The categories and variables are discussed below.
3.2
Components of the System
The international system portion of the simplified systems framework presented above consists of the international political system and international social system, including economic, cultural, and social aspects of the international society. Included in the
international political system categorization are variables such as membership in international political organizations and regional political organizations. Also included is the continuing or historic presence of foreign troops in the country, as well as if there exists an external threat to the country. The international social system is comprised of variables such as trends in secularizations, democratization, and social globalization. Important also is the integration of the country into a regional political framework. Economic variables include aid dependency and the degree of world market integration. Shifting the focus to the intra-societal environment, the first system of importance is the ecological system, which is not specifically illustrated in Figure 3.1, but may have an impact on the political system of the country. Specifically, access to natural resources, a border with access to water, and the size of the territory are included since being a landlocked or island nation, for example, can have certain economic and political consequences for a country.
The social system portion of the systems model is comprised of several different areas as mentioned above: social and cultural system, economic system, demographics, and history and political traditions. The variables included in the cultural system are national identity to see if the country has an overall national identity and community systems in order to see if the country has a presence of a strong religious, regional, or ethnic sub-group. Other variables discussed are egalitarianism and the perception of violence within the society. Within the social structure, income inequality, social mobilization, and domestic pressure are considered most relevant for this study, seeing as how income inequality can fuel social discontent and generate instability.
The economic sub-system of the social system includes wealth as a variables since according to Janowitz (1964) this can both be a cause of and a deterrent to coups; more specifically in poor countries coup risk goes up whereas in wealthy countries it goes down. Landregan and Poole (1990) on the other hand speculate that there is a coup inhibiting effect of income increases. Others argue that economic modernization without political development of a proper institutional structure can be destabilizing, or that economic growth solidifies legitimacy of the regime. Other important variables included are literacy and urbanization, as well as export structure since a lack of diversification in exports according to O’Kane (1981, 1987) can give rise to economic instability and thus regime instability.
Demographics of the country are included in order to get an idea of the ethnic, religious, and regional cleavages and diversity that exist within the state. It is also interesting to note whether there exists an overarching structure that can bridge these cleavages. The next sub-system discusses historical factors that can play a role for coup occurrences. Having been a colony or not can play a role in the social system of the country, past coups are almost always an indication that the likelihood of more coups is much higher, and having lost in war is according to Bueno de Mesquita, Siversion, and Woller (1992), highly destabilizing for regimes. The political traditions are particularly important in the social system and determinants for the types of inputs that go into the political system. The strength of civil society is discussed since a strong civil society tends to deter the military from coup activity. A legitimate regime is also less likely to be overthrown by coup. Other political tradition variables included are political information, participation, and tolerance, as well as the dominant pattern of conflict resolution (consensual or conflictual).
According to Almond and Powell (1996) preindustrial societies have fewer associational groups and instead military groups and corporations tend to play a prominent role in the input structures. In authoritarian regimes, institutional groups play a large role due to prohibition of the existence of other groups. Of importance are rural interest groups and small commercial interest groups, which are forms of non-associational interest groups, trade unions and employer organizations which constitute associational type of interest groups. Additionally, social movements of a more recent origin could constitute anomic groups, unless particularly efficiently planned and organized, while social mobilization and domestic pressure can express lack of support for military rule. Armed militias and rebel groups also constitute a considerable threat to a regime and are a type of input structure. The characteristics of these input structures may include type and fragmentation of the party system and level of organized internal conflict.
The political system, or central political structure, variables must include the type of political system, type of electoral system, the vertical separation of powers, the horizontal separation of powers, the stability of the government, as well as the political role of the military.
Output structures in the system include the repressive apparatus seeing as how military characteristics are very important in the discussion of coup activity. Therefore variables such as military size, capability and sophistication of the military, and arms transfer are included. Also discussed is a variable on the bureaucratic output structure, the social security structure, and civil and political rights. Rule of law is included as a variable since the lack of rule of law may lead to lack of legitimacy and consequently lack of political stability. Corruption may be a motivational coup factor as well as an after effect of coup behavior.
The full list of variables, in each section of the simplified systems framework presented above can be found in Appendix A. The variables are categorized, given sources for their inclusion in the model, and also an explanation of their operationalization is given. Including these theoretically derived variables and also basic structural factors is done in an effort to have a more encompassing view of the possible variables that affect the coup outcome.
4
Most Different Systems Design
In this section, the systems framework is operationalized and subsequently booleanized in order to create distance matrices for all the countries in the sample. The dissimilarities are visualized and the most contrasting countries are chosen for further comparison.
4.1
Operationalization of the Data Set
In order to test the different variables filled into the system model, suitable proxies had to be found from various different sources, discussed below. The main sources used were the International Country Risk Guide, KOF Index of Globalization, Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, the Global Peace Index, Freedom House rights ratings, World Governance Indicators, the Center for Systemic Peace Index, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and many different economic and institutional measures from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
A full list of all the sources for the different variables can be found in Appendix A. During the operationalization, certain variables had to be excluded because of the lack of comparative indices or in the case of an immeasurable variable, lack of time to consult expert opinion/research material. The following variables were excluded: national identity, community system, social mobilization, regional cleavages, overarching structure, civil society, political information, and fragmentation of the party system.
Additionally, those variables which did not vary at all with the outcome, i.e. were the same for all countries, were removed. This only occurred with the variable for membership in an international economic organization. In Table 4.1 we can clearly see the number of operationalized categories and their respective numbering which is used for the booleanization and interpretation of the data.
Category System Framework 1 International System
2 Ecological System
3 Social and Cultural System
4 Economic System
5 Demographics
6 Historical and Political Traditions
7 Input Structures
8 Political System
9 Output Structures
Table 4.1 Category Numbering for System Framework
4.2
Creating Distance Matrices
Given the system framework created in the section three, Boolean comparison will allow a simplification of the complexity of the data, in a manner that is systematic. This can aid in addressing complex empirical phenomena and finding the most different countries (Romme, 1995). Boolean values are binary, usually zeros and ones, but are also related to concepts such as true and false. Some of the variables were already indicated by zeros and ones, such as the presence of natural resources or the membership in a regional political organization. The rest of the variables were dichotomized by testing whether a country’s score is above or below the mean score of the sample. A value of one will be assigned if the country exhibits the characteristic being measured by the variable as indicated by their score in the variable relative to the scores of the other countries in the sample. If the country lacks the characteristic in question based on their relative position to the mean score, then they will receive a zero for that variable. See Appendix A for the variable name and the booleanization procedure for each specific variable.
When dealing with data concerning developing countries, we can always have doubts about the reliability of the collected data, even from governing agencies. Therefore the booleanization of the data does not so much represent loss of information as such, but rather represents an estimation of the relative position of one country in relation to the
other countries being compared, based on the collected data. The booleanized data can be found in Appendix B.
In order to identify the similarities and differences between the countries the booleanized values are used to compute Boolean distances. Since we continue using Boolean values in later calculations, the difference between the countries will again be expressed as a Boolean value where one means that there exists a difference between two countries and zero means that there is no difference. For example, within the first category, International System, the first variable is external threat. Algeria has a value of zero for this variable, meaning they lack an external threat. Azerbaijan has a value of one for this variable meaning that they do have an external threat. If the countries have different values for the variable in question, then the Boolean distance is equal to one, meaning we can count one difference between them. If there is no difference then the Boolean distance is zero. In case any data is missing, we automatically assume the difference to be zero.
To proceed further and identify similarities and difference between the countries in a manageable way, a distance matrix had to be created which counts the number of differences in each category of the system framework created in Section 3. Each variable is given equal weight within its own category; however the sum for the category as a whole is taken to be analyzed at the subsequent level. Thus each category retains its qualitative importance from the systems model. These sums are placed in a distance matrix which displays how many variables received a Boolean distance of one for each of the nine categories. See Appendix C for the distance matrix. An example of this calculation for the can be found in Table 4.2 where ܦ is equal to the distance
between country X and Y for category i. For each category sum of the distances for each variable within the category and between each of the countries is considered and then listed vertically by category.
ܦଵ ܦଶ ܦଷ ܦସ ܦହ ܦ ܦ ܦ଼ ܦଽ
Table 4.2 Boolean Distances
Then in order to identify which countries were the most different, the sums of the differences for all the categories needed to be analyzed further. For each category, the maximum distance that appeared for all countries in that particular category was labeled as level zero.
Category Number of Variables in the Category
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Threshold Level 1 10 8 7 6 5* 5 2 4 4 3 2* - 2 3 4 4 3 2* - 2 4 5 5 4 3 - 2.5 5 5 5 4 3 - 2.5 6 6 6 5 4 3* 3 7 9 9 8 7 6* 4.5 8 6 6 5 4 3* 3 9 9 9 8 7 6* 4.5
Table 4.3 Levels of Difference
As can be seen in Table 4.3, Level 0 includes the maximum difference that exists between two countries. Each subsequent level is equal to the maximum value minus one until that number reaches the threshold value between difference and similarity. Having a Level 1 difference therefore means having one difference less than the maximum number required for Level 0. This threshold value is simply the total number of variables in the category divided by two. When the category reaches its threshold value, this value is marked with an asterisk. For category two and three, the asterisk is placed on level two, meaning that no level three values are provided since the threshold value between difference and similarity has already been reached. The distance matrix in Appendix C is color coded as to identify which level of difference the value in each category possesses.
4.3
Visualizations of Dissimilarity
With the help of the distance matrix, the countries that have differences between each other in many of the categories can be identified. By counting the number of marked categories, a list of countries with as much as eight categorical differences between them could be created. Although this is the maximum number of categories in which two countries differ from one another, we also want to be able to take into account the degree of differences and therefore also create illustrations that include countries with seven total category differences between them.
The process of illustrating the differences between countries helps to reveal differences in diverse ways. Constructing the dissimilarity figures level by level allows us to see the configurations of countries which at each level meet the qualification of having the most difference between them, within each category. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the countries which are different in eight categories are marked with a solid line, whereas the countries which are different in seven categories are marked with dotted lines. The numbers indicate in which categories these differences occur. Figure 4.1 represents those differences which are the strongest, i.e. at level zero where the countries approach the maximum difference in each category for which they are different. Ethiopia and Honduras have eight total categorical differences between them and this is represented by the solid line. They have level zero differences between them for both category 5 and 8, meaning that in these categories they exhibit the maximum number of variable differences. Ethiopia also has a level zero difference with Guatemala, although as indicated by the dotted line, the total categorical difference between them is seven. Turkey is different from both the Central African Republic and Chad at level zero for category five. Once again as indicated by the dotted lines, the total categorical difference between the countries is seven.
Figure 4.1 Dissimilarities at Level 0
The next figure, Figure 4.2, presents the differences that exist between countries at level one. This means that the categories which are marked in the figure have a difference level of one minus the maximum amount of difference within each category. Refer to Table 4.3 in order to see what the level one requirement is for each category.
Figure 4.2 Dissimilarities at Level 1
Although no differences between Honduras and Chad or Turkey and the Democratic Republic of Congo existed at level zero, these differences occur at level one and the subsequent level and therefore these relationships are included. The solid line still indicates that the Honduras and Ethiopia as well as Honduras and Chad have eight total differences between each other. Honduras and Ethiopia have level one differences between them for three categories as do Honduras and Chad. Ethiopia and Guatemala also have three categorical differences at level one between them. Turkey has level one
Central African Republic 3, 5, 7 4 5, 6 2, 4, 8 D.R. Congo Honduras Guatemala Turkey Chad Ethiopia 5, 6 2, 4, 7 5 5 Honduras Guatemala Turkey Chad Ethiopia Central African Republic 5 5, 8
differences with the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and Chad. With the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, these differences occur in two categories, namely category five and six. With Chad there is only one categorical difference at this level and it occurs in category four.
As the figures move towards representing level three and level four, the requirement of difference within categories is relaxed and usually means that a greater number of categories can be taken into account. Figure 4.3 below, presents this trend:
Figure 4.3 Dissimilarities at Level 2
Notable in this Figure 4.3 is that the Democratic Republic of Congo and Turkey have level two differences in five of the nine total categories. Honduras and Chad have four categorical differences at this level. The differences are more diffuse, but concern a greater number of dimensions. This trend should continue to level three, however, at this level, some categories have already reached the threshold level between similarity and difference (see Table 4.3). For category two and three, for example, the threshold value was reached at level two and therefore these categories do not appear at level three. Additionally, at this level no differences are found between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Turkey and therefore this relationship no longer appears. Turkey still has two categorical differences each with Central African Republic and Chad though, while the rest of the countries only have one category difference between them at this level. Central African Republic 2, 4, 8, 9 2, 3, 6 1, 3, 4, 8, 9 6, 9 D.R. Congo Honduras Guatemala Turkey Chad Ethiopia 3, 4, 6 3, 6
Figure 4.4 Dissimilarities at Level 3
4.4
Selecting the Most Different Cases
The relationship that stands out the most in terms of having differences at all levels as well as having the most total differences is that between Honduras and Ethiopia. Honduras and Chad also have differences in eight different categories, however, these differences start occurring at level one, indicating that the there are no categories for which they exhibit differences that contain the maximum number of differences (see Table 4.3). Turkey has seven categorical differences with Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Chad. The relationship between Democratic Republic of Congo and Turkey, however, is only visible at level one and two. Between Central African Republic and Turkey, and Chad and Turkey, there are differences at every level. Ethiopia and Guatemala have in total seven categorical differences and also have differences at every level of difference within categories. The most striking pair is Honduras and Ethiopia that meets the criteria of the maximum number of categorical differences, as well as differences at every level within categories. This indicates that they are the most different pair.
1 Honduras Guatemala Turkey Chad Ethiopia Central African Republic 1, 9 1,9 9 7
5
Comparative Analysis
In this section a brief introduction to the coup occurrences in Honduras and Ethiopia is given and then the differences and similarities between the cases are presented, although the similarities constitute the principal focus of the analysis.
5.1
The Honduran Coup
The president of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, was forcibly removed from office on June 28th, 2009 when military woke him up and escorted him to a plane headed to Costa Rica for exile. The head of Congress, Roberto Micheletti was sworn in the very same day. Zelaya had been planning on holding a non-binding survey to see if the people were for or against altering the constitution of the country. An altering of the constitution to change the presidency term-limit would have been unconstitutional. The opposition claims that Zelaya was trying to hold on to his power for longer, while Zelaya refutes and says that it would have been impossible for him to take part in any changes of the term-limit since his time in office would have been over in January.
What can be factually concluded is that a coup d’état took place, removing Zelaya from office. In the aftermath of the coup there have been reports of human rights abuses on the civilian population of Honduras by police and military. The international community has been quick to condemn the coup. Elections were held on November 29, 2009, where Porfirio Lobo, from the conservative party, was elected as the new president. The issue of whether to legitimize and accept the results from these elections has been a heated issue. Many South American countries have condemned the election as illegal since it took place under the rule of the interim government without the reinstatement of Zelaya. Other countries, including the US, have suggested that acceptance of the elections is a step forward in the resolution of the conflict.
5.2
The Ethiopian Coup
Two leaders were removed from power in Ethiopia in 1991. The first was the removal of President Mengistu Haile Mariam who effectively ruled the country as a dictator between 1977 and 1991. He was removed by domestic rebel forces with foreign support in 1991. He was one of the most brutal dictators the continent has seen. During this time the regime systematically killed scores of people in what is called the Ethiopian Red Terror. He has been subsequently tried in absentia of genocide and has been convicted
and sentenced to death; he is, however, living in Zimbabwe which has refused to extradite him. Shortly after Mengistu fled the country, the Vice President Lieut. Gen. Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan was also removed by the rebel forces (Goemans, et al., 2009). The domestic rebel forces that finally removed Mengistu were a coalition of several groups and eventually formed the party that still rules in Ethiopia today, Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The US arranged the conferences in which the Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front (EPLF), the Oromo Peoples’ Liberation Front (OLF), and the Tigrayan Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) all convened to discuss the eventual formation of a transitional government after Mengistu was ousted and also deciding on the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia (Woodward, 2006).
5.3
Differences
By using MDSD we can take into account the most different countries with the same outcome and conclude that the shared outcome is not a function of the differences between them. Hence, the similarities between the countries may have some explanatory power in the outcome that both countries experienced. The similarities and differences are detailed in Appendix D and described below. Table 5.1 gives an overview of the differences within the system categories.
Category Category Name Differences Level
1 International System 4 -
2 Ecological System 3 1
3 Cultural and Social System 2 2
4 Economic System 4 1
5 Demographics 5 0
6 Historical and Political Traditions 4 2
7 Input Structures 8 1
8 Political System 6 0
9 Output Structures 6 3
Table 5.1 Differences between Honduras and Ethiopia
In the first category, the International System, Ethiopia and Honduras differed when it came to the presence of foreign troops between 1990 and 2010. Ethiopia has had a presence of either NATO or UN troops, or both at some point during these years, whereas Honduras has not. Regarding social globalization, Honduras did score above the mean score for all countries included in the sample, indicating that compared to
these other countries, Honduras has a higher degree of social globalization. This measure includes data on personal contact, information flows, and cultural proximity (Dreher, 2006). These two countries also had differing degrees of regional integration, where Ethiopia does have membership in at least one regional organization, whereas Honduras does not. Their respective levels of economic globalization or world market integration also differed. Honduras scored above the mean value for economic globalization, which includes actual economic flows as well as restrictions that exist on these flows (Dreher, 2006). So although the two countries did not have a strong overall difference in this category, which is comprised of ten different variables, they did differ in a total of four of these ten variables.
In category two, the ecological system, the countries varied according to 3 of the four possible variables within the category. The countries do not share the same natural resource distribution, marine border, or a similar territory size. Therefore these variables can reasonably be excluded as to not have an effect on the coup outcome. Within the cultural and social system, category three, there are a total of four variables and Honduras and Ethiopia differ in two of these four variables, namely income inequality and gender equality. Ethiopia has a comparably lower income inequality than Honduras, but has comparatively less gender equality.
Within the economic sphere, category four, the countries differ according to wealth, poverty levels, literacy, and urbanization. Demographically, Honduras and Ethiopia are different for all five variables in category five. These include ethnic cleavages, linguistic cleavages, and religious cleavages, all of which Ethiopia has, but not Honduras. Additionally, Honduras has a dominant ethnic population and a lower population. Regarding historical and political traditions, out of a total of six variables in this category, Honduras and Ethiopia exhibited differences within four. Honduras has a colonial history, whereas Ethiopia does not. The Center for Systemic Peace legitimacy score from 2008 indicates that Honduras has a comparatively more legitimate regime than Ethiopia. They also differ in terms of the voice and accountability indicator from World Governance Indicators which represents political participation and political tolerance by measuring how much citizens participate in the political process and what political freedoms they have (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Massimo, 2009). Ethiopia has a political participation and tolerance that lies below the mean score for all the countries
in the sample. Honduras, however, has more violent crime than Ethiopia and this is used as a proxy of the dominant pattern of conflict resolution and whether it is consensual or conflictual. Regardless, these variables are difference between the countries and based on the methodology will not help to explain the coup outcome that both countries endured.
Continuing with the input structures, category seven, the two countries exhibited differences in eight out of the nine variables included in the category. Honduras has rural interest groups, small commercial interest groups, trade unions, and employee organizations whereas Ethiopia does not have a significant presence of any of these input structures. Ethiopia does have at least one social movement of a more recent origin, i.e. the Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front (EPPF) whereas Honduras does not. Honduras has domestic pressure organizations or interest groups, whereas Ethiopia has armed militias and rebels. Ethiopia has a degree of internal conflict that is higher than the mean for the sample, whereas Honduras does not.
In the political system, category eight, Ethiopia and Honduras differ in every variable. They have a different political system, electoral system, vertical separation of powers, horizontal separation of powers, and government stability. Ethiopia for example, does not have an electoral democracy, proportional representation, vertical separation of powers, but it does have a federal system and thus horizontal separation of powers. Ethiopia does not have the same government stability rating as Honduras from the World Governance Indicators rating of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (World Bank, 2009). They do, however, have a higher risk of involvement of the military in politics according to the International Country Risk Guide rating (PRS Group, Inc., 2005).
Regarding output structures, category nine, there are nine different variables to take into account. Honduras and Ethiopia differ in military size, military capability and sophistication, and arms transfer, illustrating that these difference cannot account for their shared outcome. They also differ in terms of their respective social security systems, civil rights score, and political rights score. Honduras scored above the mean value for civil and political rights for the sample, while Ethiopia scored below (see Appendix D for the full comparison between Ethiopia and Honduras).
5.4
Similarities
After putting the countries side by side to distinguish the differences, we can begin to dig more deeply into the similarities that exist. By analyzing the similarities between Honduras and Ethiopia, it can be determined what variables are of particular importance for the coup outcome that both countries experienced after the end of the Cold War. The countries exhibit similarities in 16 out of the total 58 variables included in the study.
The International Political System
The category in which the countries are the most similar is category one, the international system. Both countries have a lower risk of an external threat as measured by the International Country Risk Guide index of external conflict, which measures war, cross border conflict, and external pressure. The author used the 2005 rating since it was the latest available rating. According to Desch (1999) institutions, such as military institutions, will unify against a nation-state threat, having a positive effect on civil-military relations since when threats are internal, civil-military attention is direct internally and could mean conflict over internal control. When there is a domestic threat, the state is divided and the military is more likely to intervene in politics (Desch, 1999). Both Ethiopia and Honduras share the similarity in that relative to the other countries in the sample they have a lower risk of external threats. This should according to Desch (1999) mean that it should be harder for civilians to control the military since there is not an external threat on which to focus.
Both countries are politically globalized compared to the other counties in the sample according to the KOF Index of Globalization, specifically the Political Globalization Measure. Scoring higher in this index means a higher degree of political globalization including embassies in the country, membership in international organizations, participation in the UN Security Council missions, and participation in international treaties (Dreher, 2006). Membership in international organizations potentially could lead to dissemination of international democratic norms according to Easton (1965). Additionally, both countries are similar in the fact that they are both members in a regional political association. These international ties to overarching political structures would usually have an inhibiting effect on coup occurrences, or at least are associated with a reduced risk of state collapse (Goldstone, 2001). In this case, however, both Honduras and Ethiopia faced coup occurrence. In the case of Ethiopia, coalition of rebel
forces, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) ousted Mengistu with some US involvement (Woodward, 2006). It was this move that brought Ethiopia closer to the rest of the world in terms of political globalization. So although the propensity for coups should be lower, it can be seen that Ethiopia whose coup was in the beginning of the period under study, was heavily influenced by US involvement that stressed a path to democratization (Woodward, 2006). In Honduras, the coup against Zelaya brought an end to their membership in the Organization of American States, but international condemnation of the coup led to swift democratic elections by the interim government.
The International Social System
The countries are also similar in that they both have secularizing tendencies. Secularizing influences tend to disrupt traditional ways of life and encourages political participation (Almond & Powell, 1996). Brisset (2006) claims that in Ethiopia the elite learned from the West that secularization along with modernization was the only way to develop. This brought along a retreat from the cultural values that existed and instead involved the adoption or forced adoption of socialist, Marxist-Leninist ideals with the Mengistu and the Derg regime. In Honduras under Zelaya, women’s rights and sexual diversity was furthered, however, the opposition and the Catholic and Evangelical church officials were very much against these reforms. The clash between Zelaya’s reforms in this and other areas and the opposition were very great. The generals who performed the coup, along with Congress, the Supreme Court, and religious leaders were all in disagreement with Zelaya’s political directions, which not only had secularizing tendencies, but also moved closer to Chavez in Venezuela (Silva, 2009). According to the International Country Risk Guide democratic accountability index from 2005, both Honduras and Ethiopia score above the mean indicating that the governments in both countries are more responsive to the demands of the people than other countries in the sample. They both score fours on a six point scale, indicating that democratization has to a certain degree reached both countries and will weaken the legitimacy of non-democratic forms of government (Levine (2004); Hagopian & Mainwaring (2004). This democratizing norm may not mean that the country won’t experience a coup, however, it may be an indication that in the event of a coup a return to democratic rule would follow. Regarding Honduras, this seems to be the case, since
elections were held five months after Zelaya was removed from office. In the case of Ethiopia, the coup was also followed by democratization, influenced by the US among others, following the rule of Mengistu and the communist military junta for 17 years. Contrary to theory, both countries do not exhibit aid dependence as measured by net official development assistance received (% of GNI) average between years 1990 and 2008. Their figures fall below the mean for the sample of countries. International aid may have contingencies on democratic elections which may reduce incentives for coup plotters, however coup plotters may have other incentives which we could perhaps speculate upon, but would be beyond the scope of this study to consider.
The Ecological System
In category two, the ecological system, the countries only share the similarity in that they both have at least one border to land. Seeing as how Ethiopia is a landlocked country, this may have proved an interesting independent variable; however, based on the fact that Honduras is not, it leaves this variable to be considered as not impacting the coup outcome.
The Cultural and Social System
Within the cultural and social system, Ethiopia and Honduras share a comparatively high rating for the equity of public resource use from the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment indicators. Although public resource distribution may be equal, it does not mean that the country has overall income equality. Honduras has a Gini coefficient that is higher than the mean for the countries, whereas Ethiopia’s is below the mean for the sample. In Honduras, having equity in public resources may not mean much when the income inequality as well as poverty levels are incredibly high (as much as 59% of the population lives below the poverty line as of 2008). In Ethiopia, the income inequality as well as the overall level of poverty is lower (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010). The two countries also share a lower index of perceptions of criminality in society. The perceptions of criminality in society relates to the existence or absence of peace. The low perception of criminality relative to other countries in the sample means that the levels of safety and security in a society are higher, and is one measure of negative peace (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2009). Since threat or use of violence is a requirement of the definition of a coup, low
perceptions of criminality in society does not mean violence within the society does not exist. Rather it is an indication that violence or the threat of violence is perpetrated by a smaller group in society or is in general more infrequent.
The Economic System
Within category four, the economic system, the countries share a diversification in exports, having exports in at least two different industries. According to O’Kane (1981, 1987) global fluctuations can be disruptive to the economic system if a country is dependent on one good, or type of goods, for export and can lead to destabilization of the regime. In the case of Honduras and Ethiopia, this is not the case since both countries have sufficiently diversified exports. A disrupted economic system was not the primary motive for the coup agents in these cases.
The Historical and Political Traditions
Category six, involving the historical and political traditions of the country, reveals that the countries share two characteristics. Ethiopia and Honduras are similar in the fact that neither of the countries has been defeated in war since 1990. Bueno de Mesquita, Siversion, and Woller (1992) discuss the fact that countries involved in war and that are defeated are ex-post punished for their military defeats. This would however not apply to Honduras and Ethiopia. There is strong empirical and theoretical evidence that the likelihood of coup occurrences is higher with a previous successful coup in the country’s history (Hibbs, 1973; Landregan & Poole, 1990; Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller, 1992; O'Kane, 1993; Cheibub, 2006).
The Input Structures
Regarding input structures, category seven, the countries only share one similarity. Both Honduras and Ethiopia have a multiparty system and Jackman (1978) argues that this can lead to coups, particularly when a dominant ethnic group exists. Honduras has a dominant ethnic group as well as higher levels of political participation and tolerance, whereas Ethiopia on the other hand does not. The coup outcome for both countries would indicate that multipartyism in conjunction with a dominant ethnic group and higher levels of participation is destabilizing and can give rise to coups, as well as multipartyism in combination with ethnic diversity and lower participation can also give rise to coup outcomes. When multipartyism is combined with higher levels of
