The Security, Migration and Development nexus in Agadez, Niger : An actor-based re-evaluation of its eality

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ISRN: LiU-IKOS/EMS-A--20/01--SE

The Security, Migration and

Development nexus in

Agadez, Niger

– An actor-based re-evaluation of its reality

Fega Francis Ikpogwi

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Acknowledgements

I am earnestly grateful to God for the gift of life. I expressed my sincere gratitude to my honorable supervisor, Branka Likic-Brboric, for her patience and encouragement that makes my dream comes true. I am also grateful to Professor Stephan Jonsson, the director of studies for his co-coordinative acumen.

I also express my gratitude to Dr. Xolani Tshabalala, who encouraged me to finish this Thesis when my economic desire overshadowed my academic goal.

I thank my wife, Jennifer Ekhosuehi for her endurable support and understanding throughout my studies and all my brothers and sisters.

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Abbreviations

ADB: African Development Bank

AU: African Union

ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. EU: The European Union

EUTF EU Trust Fund for Africa GA General Assembly

G5: the Group of Five Sahel Nations. HDP, Human Development Report.

IOM: the International Organization for Migration. IPCC: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. LDPs: Local Development Plans

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization TOR: the Term of Reference.

TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. USA: United State of America

USAA: United Nation Office of Special Adviser on Africa USAID: the United States Agency for International Development. UNDP: the United Nations Development Program.

UN: the United Nations.

UNEP: the UN Environmental Program

UNISS: the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel.

UNOWAS: the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel. VEOs: Violent Extremist Organizations.

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Abstract

This thesis re-evaluates the connections between security, migration and development in the Sahel region. Using Agadez as the point of departure and focus, the thesis examines the role played by local, regional as well as international actors to critique how the three concepts are not just understood on the global level, but also how they are applied at the local level where they are relevant. An actor-based perspective is important because it helps to demonstrate that the nexus between security, migration and development is above all an issue of

international politics more than it is of practical needs affecting local people, in this case, of the Sahel region. In this regard, the thesis theoretically anchors itself on the idea of political realism as advanced by Hans Morgenthau, which suggests that only the interests of the most powerful political actors will be reflected in any contexts where weaker and stronger actors interact. From this perspective, the thesis argues that the nexus between security, migration and development plays out in the Sahel in ways that serve strong actors such as France, the European Union, and the United States of America at the expense of weaker actors such as Niger, the G5, ECOWAS, and the local communities themselves.

Analytically, the thesis uses the concept of human security to push the above point even further. It argues that from the perspective of human security, it is clear that the actors involved in the Sahel, including humanitarian actors such as the United Nations and the International Organisation for Migration, are seldom primarily focused on the concerns of both the local communities and migrants in Agadez. By mainly concerning themselves with stopping South-North migration, as well as limiting their focus to ‘security’ and

‘development’ issues in transit countries such as Niger and Mali, the main actors in the Sahel commit a dual travesty on migrants and their communities, including those they transit through. Empirically, they turn a blind eye on the actual causes and consequences of

migration and various forms of security deficiencies not just in Agadez, but in the migration source countries in the rest of West Africa. The thesis demonstrates why even the

development strategies imposed on Agadez and surrounding areas fail because they miss this larger point.

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ISRN: LiU-ISV/EMS-A--XX/XX--SE

Chapter 1. 1.0 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

In central Niger lies the historic trade town of Agadez. People have met and traded there from the early times. Today, Agadez has critical connection to European Union (EU) and global foreign policies on West African migration. Niger, where Agadez is located, is also the largest per capita recipient of EU aid in Africa. Politicians from everywhere care about Niger now because of this migration to Europe, this is, South-North migration. Europeans

especially posture on Niger as an example of everything that is going wrong about African migration to Europe. As a result, a lot of policies are focused on Agadez and the Niger as the point where the problems can be corrected. South-North migration policies have also affected development and security in Agadez and the Sahel.

In this research, a lot of present-day African migrants cross through Niger to Libya. They are hoping for success across the deadly Mediterranean and into Europe, after crossing through Agadez and in the Sahel. The Sahel is a region of five core countries - Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad - where even the Tuareg people also suffer oppression especially from the Mali and Niger governments. By offering a case study of Agadez as one place where the migration, development and security nexus has unfolded behind the

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examining the main actors at the central action of African migration to Europe. These include the government of Niger, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), France, the Group of Five Sahel nations (G5), and the European Union (EU). Other

connected but relatively peripheral actors include the United States of America (USA), the United Nations (UN) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

From a human security perspective, this thesis re-evaluates blind approaches to the nexus of migration, development and security that assume migrants and local communities to be unimportant for interventions on African migration to Europe. If migrants and the local community are very visible for transit migration in Agadez and the Sahel, it is a critical question why international actors ignore them. Migrants and the general Sahel is the object of worldwide intervention, as if they have no voice or mind to speak for what goes on in Niger and other communities of the region. European and other entities speak of reducing the number of dead Africans in the Sahara Desert, in Libya and the sea, but they are only trying to stop Africans from entering Europe. The dead vindicate and embolden their aims. The preservation of African migrants should conflagrate all migration, security and development initiatives. None of what we hear about Agadez puts migrants in the front. But they are always the primary object of intervention. Everyone speaking on migration from African to Europe looks on EU, France, the UN, and others and how they approach the ‘problem’ of migration.

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Figure 1. Agadez

Whether any migrants or Nigeriens can speak about their experience is a secondary task, and in that way one can see that the migration, development and security initiatives in Agadez do not respond to why migration takes place. For perspective, most smuggling vehicles are grounded. New initiatives are from elsewhere. And hence some people call Agadez a smuggling town. This is because the transport that migrant passing through the town needs help which sound too foreign and unwanted for people far away from Agadez. But to my view, the idea of Agadez as a smuggling town speaks to chaos happening in the world beyond Niger rather that what is going on in Agadez in relation to migration. Smugglers often respond to business elsewhere. Agadez and its smugglers register an example of how

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people speak of migration, development and security in line with outside international agendas that desire to set the world according to what they want rather than what the local people see, think and experience. This is why it is often said today that the borders of Europe extend as far south as Agadez. Agadez has become one spot where the border of Europe crosses. Today, Niger receives the largest European Union Aid, ostensibly for development and aid across the Sahel (Aljazeera, 2019). The migration, security and development nexus in Agadez says that international organizations have a landing ground from where they may define African issues despite the general sentiment of the greater region. This thesis addresses this misnomer.

1.2 Human Security in the Sahel

The absence of local migration voices in Agadez, the Niger and the Sahel, rather than the presence of state actors and international policies, says that no one cares enough about the migrants passing through, only the road-blocks that can stop them. Agadez is a town of traders, but today key actors are suspicious of those that pass through the town. Their policies intervene in the Sahel, but show significant resistance to the human dynamics of the region. This issue of Agadez frames a human security perspective into migration challenges in Niger.

As a concept, “human security places local individuals and communities at the ‘center of analysis.’ Consequently, it considers a broad range of conditions which threaten survival, livelihood and dignity, and identifies the threshold below which human life is intolerably threatened.” (OCHA, 2009, 7). Further, the concept of human security deals with a wider conception of insecurities that affect economic, food, health, environmental, personal,

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community and political security. In the Agadez town, only political security is important, and the Niamey government allows the EU to dictate what happens there.

This thesis asks if there is another way to frame the links between security, migration and development in the Agadez region of Niger. “If human security emphasizes the

interconnectedness of both threats and responses when addressing [the] insecurities of mobility,” then “threats within a given country or area can spread into a wider region and have negative externalities for regional and international security.” (OCHA, 2009, 7). The death of migrants in the Sahara is connected to the policies that governments in Brussels discuss on Africa. As Human and Security in Theory and Practice says, “this interdependence has important implications for policy-making as it implies that human insecurities cannot be tackled in isolation through fragmented stand-alone responses” (ibid, p.8). Why are African migrant not present in the policies coming from Brussels?

While studies of human security suggest that the concept involves comprehensive approaches that emphasize the value of cooperative and multisectoral initiatives that pay attention to the goals of those dealing with security, development and human rights, why do those multi-sectorial initiatives exclude African migrants, who are the material manifestation of African migration to Europe? Human security takes context as its starting point, and from there agrees that the actors in that context can bring outcomes to any initiatives that respect their views. But there is no respect for African migrants in Agadez or anywhere across the Sahel.

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1.3 The Sahel and migration from West Africa

The unique characteristics that define the Sahel necessitate a reexamination of the particular connections between migration, security and development in the region. While a lot has been written about the relationship between the three, this re-examination searches for missing discussions on the issue. As Raineri and Rossi (2017) have stated, “the Sehalian region provides a particularly relevant case study because it combines significant international migratory flows, new and traditional expressions of widespread insecurity, and major challenges in promoting development in a region lying at the very bottom of the Human Development Index” (Raineri and Rossi 2017, p.13). By focusing on the strategic town of Agadez, a human security approach to this re-examination argues that there is a need to consider how the three concepts are framed, and from this consideration, which other players should be part of the discussion on issues affecting the Sahel.

The region commonly known as the Sahel makes up a long belt across the African continent on the southern part of the Sahara Desert. The region covers some 4,500 kilometers from Senegal through Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, and blends into the less arid Sudanese-Sahel belt to its southern edge (Aning and Amedzrator 2014: 59). It is bordered by the Mediterranean Arab countries to the north and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. As the example of Agadez illustrates, the Sahel is historically a transitional zone, having had deep-rooted commercial, cultural and political connections that criss-cross the Sahara Desert.

A significant feature of these connections is the trans-Saharan trade. Alcaro and Pirozzi (2014) have written that prior to their decline in the 1900s following the introduction of the railway transportation system, trans-Saharan trade networks in the area were long controlled

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by Berber nomads, the Tuareg, who negotiated alliances with other traders and used their economic and political superiority to navigate their way through trade routes in order to sell and exchange goods, and sometimes raid neighboring communities. This is why today, the movement of people across Agadez and the region should not be seen as odd, and so much effort is concentrated to try and stop it. Right from inception, the Sahel is important for having been the first area used for agriculture in Africa. However, add Alcaro and Pirozzi (2014), because of the harsh climatic conditions, the Sahelians highly see migration as the primary strategy or ways for community dwellers as a perfect and indisputable way to cope with food and environmental instability ranging from uncertainty in agricultural output, famine, climate change and both legal and human insecurity.

In the 17th and 18th centuries, it was home to a number of Sahelian kingdoms, some of which were highly mobile in lifestyle. During the colonization of the continent, the region became an essential part of the slave trade, and the French took control of the region as part of the French West Africa. The east of the region was annexed by Egypt and remained under the Islamic rule. After the partition of Africa, particular regions of the Sahel became part of the country as we know them today.

Although these problems face the Sahel, the reason why the region is actually in the media and political spotlight is West African migration passing through the desert via Niger to the north. This migration is recorded at five people that leave West Africa for every 1000 that stay (Carbone, 2017), even if the five are not all looking for a way into Europe. Long term trends also show that this migration is declining (Carbone, 2017). But the facts do not matter for a region that is itself unstable, and where a lot of people appear in the front of camera either drowning in Mediterranean boats or saying that they want to cross to Europe.

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In the meantime, Europe is spending more than one hundred million Euros “to strengthen development and security initiatives in the Sahel”, on top of “reinforcing state presence in Fragile areas” of the region (European Commission, 2019). Development and security come to the Sahel only after African migrants start dying at the sea. Development, migration and security are raised by this debate because they have been tied together. Two issues come up from this connection. Most migrants do not originate in the Sahel, but in West Africa. So, the aid to Niger and other Sahel countries is misplaced. Secondly, Development and Security are here to stop migration that is already taking place. There are no questions about how it started in West African states. Development aid assumes that migrants leave because they are poor. But research shows that it is not the poorest that leave, but the most economically able (Carbone, 2017).

The question that can be asked is whether development and security can be assumed to be enough to stop African migration. Follow up questions must address how development and security, and even migration are understood in the policy arena on Global responses to Migration in West Africa. Agadez offers a reference point because it is where most West African migrants pass, and Niger is one of the G5 countries. In the following section, I state the problems of the Sahel in a concrete way.

1.4 A fragile and insecure Sahel

A human security approach to the challenges in the Sahel is rooted in a difficult history of the region. The Sahel is consistently affected by droughts and famine, and has in the last 50 years

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become known across the world for the sheer numbers of lives that have been lost to these natural calamities. While already dependent on food aid, the region faces a renewed threat of instability arising from the insecurities associated with disturbances in the countries north of the Sahara, such an in Libya. Zoubir (20017) reports that the Sahel, according to a senior Algerian official, has been referred to as the “couloir de tous les dangers,” or “the corridor of all dangers”, He claims that the “Sahel features all the ills of underdevelopment, but it also suffers from the fragility of states, ethnic conflicts, the presence of violent extremist

organizations (VEOs), and trafficking” (Zoubir, 2017: 134).

Grant (2017) points that the United Nations Security Council has described the Sahel as an “arc of instability” This is because the region is populated by democratically unstable states with economies that are underperforming. The nature of challenges the region faces are, to paraphrase Grant (2017, 130 – 132) a combination of violent militancy, illicit trade networks and environmental degradation that give rise to general food insecurity. Widespread poverty together with environmental and security pressures are pushing people out, joining persons from sub-Saharan Africa in search of better opportunities in Europe. Grant (above) writes that among the Western powers, France has traditionally played a more significant role in Sahelian Africa. Having colonized most of North and West Africa in the mid-nineteenth century, he continues, the country remains an important military, economic and political actor in the region long after the 1960s following African independence. The main point of current French presence is a liaison with African governments that align to French plans and the defense of French economic situation, which banks on access to important resources such as uranium in Niger. In this statement, it is obvious that world interest in the Sahel and Niger is only really in the interest of those external powers. Little has to do with Nigeriens or even the migrants passing through.

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According to the Trayo Ali (2018), the Sahel security crisis originating from the “old-fashioned political order and risky arrangements of the region”, now not only ignites a deeper and wider self-destructive spiral, but is also having a far-reaching impact that affect Africa’s system of security, with knock-on effects in Europe. Countering the effects of these challenges of security requires, says Ali (above), among other efforts, a new approach that must involve creating a new conceptual frame for systems of “good-governance” that teach popular participation as central to the structural reformation of the security sector (including army, police, intelligence services, and other security apparatuses), bringing in structural improvements to the concept of “partnership with international community” and reviewing and establishing school curricular especially in more susceptible countries like the Sudan and Nigeria in ways that allow the advancement of religious tolerance to reverse the extremist outcomes of radicalism, extremism and terrorism.

The above paraphrase speaks to some of the aims of this thesis, which is to ask how current approaches to migration, security and development have been framed, and to point out that there is no popular participation in these initiatives. Only elite programmes, designed from elsewhere have largely been pursued so far. As Ali (2018: online) continues to put it, “the need for such structural paradigm shift is now more important than ever because the geopolitical position of the Sahel—which functions as a spinal cord controlling the region’s nervous system—is sending injury signals that could cause a virtual paralysis of continental security, or even its total collapse”.

Scholars speak of the Sahel as a region with multiple drivers of conflict (Davitti and Ursu, 2018). Threats to the region’s stability emanate from different sources and take various forms. Radical armed and separatist groups, on top of cross border smuggling and trafficking

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networks, are thought to add to the challenges posed by extreme poverty and underdevelopment, rampant climate change and weak governance. The emerging instability occurs in the aftermath of a challenging postcolonial legacy. Davitti and Ursu echo other voices when they say that Sahelian territorial borders were set in place, just like in most African regions, to accommodate the needs of colonizers as opposed to the “social and ethnic cohesion or the needs of the peoples concerned”.

The current borders of Mali, Niger, Libya, Chad and Sudan separate clans and ethnic groups which by and large contributed to the development of networks that are now an important source of economic opportunities, including cross border migrant smuggling. It is with this in mind that the Sahel is increasingly viewed “through the prisms of violence, cross-border illicit flows, and limited statehood” (Davitti and Ursu, 2018: 1).

1.5 Brief Overview of the Main Actors in Niger and the Sahel 1.5.1 The Niger

A World Bank review of the Niger paints a country with one of the highest population growth rates in the world (3.9% annual growth rate), even in the face of political instability, chronic food insecurity, and recurrent droughts, floods, and locust infestations. The review further states that although the political climate is currently stable, the security situation in parts of the country is under direct threat from Boko Haram and other Jihadists. The European Union partly finances efforts to repel these threats. The World Bank overview suggests that the United States and France are also involved in combating insecurity and hunger in Niger and the Sahel.

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Niger ranks poorly in the United Nations human development index (the second poorest country in the world). The country also hosts many refugees from neighboring countries, including facing other humanitarian needs. Apart from this, Niger has long been a transit point for migration from West Africa. Aljazeera reports that the traffic reached a peak in 2015/16, when the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that 330, 000 people ‘followed the desert routes north’. The growth was partly linked to the instability in Libya in the days of the Arab Spring, which “opened up new routes and border crossings and made it easier for people traffickers to operate in the security vacuum, but it also flourished because it generated significant income and employment for northern Niger and its largest city, Agadez.” (Aljazeera, January 2019, online).

Concerned about the numbers of people seeking to reach its shores, the EU soon became involved in Niger. It requested the Nigerien government to criminalize smuggling, thus set up laws to arrest smugglers, and eventually brought down the numbers of people crossing

through Agadez from 24,000 to about 5,500 a month (ibid). To compensate for lost revenues, the EU is now pouring hundreds of millions of Euros in development aid into Niger, although difficulties remain with regard to the uptake of such initiatives, in a country where smuggling has gone underground and youth unemployment remains high. Aljazeera (ibid) concludes that the Niger and Agadez may be paying a high price for EU’s anti-immigration policies.

1.5.2 France

French conquest of Niger took place in 1898, and lasted more than 60 years. France has sought to maintain strong relations with Niger after independence in 1960, based mainly on the Niger’s uranium exports to the former colonizer. In the present, a new challenge has

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added a fresh dimension to French presence in the Niger, that of the rush to Europe by African migrants after the death of Gadaffi of Libya. In the last few years, France has been very active in trying to push the southern border of Europe even further south of Libya (Virginie Guiraudon, The Conversation, May 2018, online). In this way, France has pushed ahead with what it has called Hotspots in the Sahel, centred in the town of Agadez and elsewhere in Chad.

Hotspots are said to be a way to “sort out potential refugees and “economic migrants” and select the happy few who would be allowed to come to France to apply for asylum” (Guiraudon, 2018). In this push to establish deserving migrants from those seen as bogus, France shows a serious lack of concern for the freedom of movement for Africans, for the self-rule of African states, as well as for the Africa-based understandings of migration and its dynamics. Often under the guise of donor funding and similar initiatives, France’s role in African migration, just like that of many other major international actors, shows why a human security perspective is missing, and needed, to understand security, migration and development in the Sahel.

1.5.3 ECOWAS

Following the instability and migrants related upheaval that is montaging the peace and security in the region, different actors both local, states, regional and international actors came to the scene trying to put efforts together to curb the trend that is/has constitute global threat. The The Commission of the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS) protocol of May 1979 on free movement of persons and the right of residence and establishment formalized the free movement of ECOWAS citizens within member

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countries and has been acclaimed as a trend-setter in migration policy development and management (Adepoju. 2007). Community citizens in possession of valid travel

documentation can enter member states without a visa for up to 90 days (ECOWAS, 1999; 2004), though member states may refuse admission to would-be immigrants deemed

‘inadmissible’ under their laws. The second phase (right of residence), which came into force in July 1986, and the revised treaty of 1992 affirmed the right of Community citizens to enter and reside in other member states. ECOWAS passports are to progressively replace national passports over a transitional period of ten years.

ECOWAS, together with regional and international partners, have underscored their determination to confront issues of poverty, food insecurity, climate change, terrorism, and trafficking in the Sahel. They aim to achieve this by aligning their strategies and improving coordination as they implement their programmes. This represented the main

recommendation from a high level meeting of regional organizations on the Sahel, held in Abuja, Nigeria on 18th_{September, 2018 (MENA Report, 2018). The meeting, organized in} partnership with the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), suggested that advocacy policies be employed to aid the collection of resources from regional and international organizations to aid joint programs and projects in the region. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, General Francis Behanzin, speaking on behalf of the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Jean-Claude Kassi Brou, has come on record saying that security in the Sahel, if viewed together with socio-economic challenges that are partly a result of poverty, poor infrastructure and climate change, threaten the peace both in the Sahel and beyond (MENA Report, 2018).

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In addition, a new Sahel Strategy for ECOWAS (2020-2025) was being mooted as at February 2019 (ECOWAS, 2019). The Commissioner for Macroeconomic Policy and Economic Research, Dr. Kofi Konadu Apraku, has stated that the strategy will furnish clear objectives and pave the way for comprehensive programmes aimed at guaranteeing

ECOWAS’ development by providing improved security and stability, as well as enhancing the standard of living of the communities in the Sahel region. The Commissioner stated further that this had become needed especially because the Sahel faces development

challenges among which are climate change and poor infrastructure, which result in chronic drought, unreliable rainfall and a recurrent food crisis (ECOWAS 2019).

1.5.4 The European Union (EU)

Interest in the Sahel by the EU is not recent, and such interest has in the postcolonial era manifested in various efforts aimed at securitizing the region. (Davitti and Ursu, 2018: 1). With recent instability, however, reliance on such interventions has grown. And since the European Agenda on Migration was launched in May 2015, there has been a convergence, state Davitti and Ursu (2018), of long-standing geopolitical interests and an increasing EU fixation with the recent refugee ‘crisis’. This alignment between geopolitics and migration has often been addressed in the context of humanitarianism, which has also been conflated with a securitization understanding of both the refugees themselves and of any attempts at reversing migratory flows. There is a confusion of terms in reference to migrants, since they appear in EU debates as either a threat, as needing salvation and protection, or as a justification for the militarization of sections of the Sahel and other countries from which migrants originate (Davitti and Ursu, 2018: 1).

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Davitti and Ursu (2018) continue to state that the European Union presence in the Sahel region of Sub-Saharan Africa is not a new phenomenon but “old wine in a new calabash”. The say that in the last two decades, there has been bilateral and multilateral approach employed by the EU to curb the degree of instability in the region through intelligence for coordinated capacity building, training, the intensification of police action and the implementation of law. They conclude that the securitization of the Sahel by the EU is strongly linked with the fundamental aim or objective of curbing migrants flows via the Sahel to the European shore. They see the EU as worried that the instability in the Sahel region threatens the security and stability of Europe.

1.5.5 The G5

The G5 was created in February 2014 by five countries most affected by jihadist violence in the Sahel; Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso (Lebovich 2018: 4). It was backed with political, financial, and technical support from France and the EU (ibid.). With its headquarters in Mauritania, the organization’s members see the initiative as rooted in their common history, demographics, and geography, including their shared security and socio-economic challenges (ibid.). “The decision to create a Sahel focused framework also was explicitly intended to circumvent the politics and rivalries of the Maghreb, according to a French diplomat involved with the organization” (Zoubir, 2017:7). Nonetheless, the G5 Sahel efforts are counterpoised against Morocco-Algeria tensions—given their influence on the Sahel through their bilateral relationships—as well as Algerian displeasure at what is partly a French-led initiative. An irony of the G5’s mission is its double emphasis on security and development, which has become fashionable as a combined approach to counter-insurgency strategies, but was long, ignored in development circles, and only recently embraced by the

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EU. The G5 looks in this way like an EU security initiative, partly dressed with development discourse as a disguise.

Shortly after its founding, G5 Permanent Secretary El Hajj Najim Mohamed described it as “an economically integrated, socially prosperous, culturally rich space, where security and peace reign, founded on the rule of law, good governance and democracy…” (Lebovich 2018: 4). In practice, G5 efforts to date have primarily focused on military and security coordination, matching the counter-terrorism priorities of its international partners. The G5’s drift from economic and development cooperation, writes Lebovich (2018:5), “risks losing momentum for broader measures to address the social, environmental, and economic challenges that underpin sustained stability and security”. Maybe that momentum was already missing from the start.

1.5.6 The United States of America

The United States of America is relatively less involved in security efforts in the Sahel (Faleg, 2018: 50). Its policy in the region focuses mostly on capacity building, comparable in approach to that of the EU, which seeks to lay favorable military education and training ground on which African security forces can take full responsibility and deal with their own crises to enhance the global peace initiative.

Faleg (2018) further writes that many in the US wish that Europe should lead in formulating policy on issues related to the Sahel, which Europe considers its own ‘backyard’.

Nevertheless, the US is compelled to not ignore the region entirely, increasing security and military assistance to counter the threat of terrorism emanating from West Africa. In this

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view, US military presence is increasing in the Sahel, part of which includes US-French cooperation on boosting military capabilities in several Sahelian countries. Nevertheless, Faleg (2018) notes that the US prefers bilateral as well as unilateral involvement in the region, as opposed to multilateral ones.

The United States has given less consistent attention to the Sahel and Horn of Africa and— unlike the European Union—has not laid out in a single document a strategy for either region. Historically, the United States has viewed the Sahel as peripheral to national interests. Instead, its policy tools in the region have largely been directed toward providing humanitarian assistance to the needy. This remains the case despite growing anxiety over the security situation, and there is little appetite for active engagement and few available resources to make a large impact. The most important policy initiative, the Department of State-led Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and its military component, Operation Juniper Shield, is tasked with tackling radicalism and its root causes across ten countries. But its modest budget of approximately a hundred million dollars in 2012 puts these grand ambitions into perspective. (Downie, 2014: 46).

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a U.S. Government (USG) program developed to defeat terrorist organizations in the Sahel (TSCTP, 2010). It aims to achieve this by “strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security forces, promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, and reinforcing bilateral military ties with the United States” (ibid: online). Its overall objectives are to strengthen the capacities of indigenous governments in the so-called Pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso and Niger, as well as Nigeria and Senegal) to address the threat posed by terrorism in the region.

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Also, the partnership will broker collaboration between countries of the Pan -Sahel and partners in the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) in dismantling terrorist organizations.

1.5.7 The United Nations (UN)

The UN Support Plan for the Sahel, targeting Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal, aims to increase efforts to deliver greater “shared prosperity and lasting peace in the region” (UN, 2018). The Support Plan, which covers the period between 2018-2030, will guide the implementation of set goals to meet the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union Agenda 2063. The UN informs that The Support Plan is not a new strategy; but rather a tool to cultivate consistency and harmonization for better effectiveness and the delivery of results under the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) framework, which is the focal point of an international effort in the Sahel, and is in line with Resolution 2391 (2017) of the Security Council. The Plan also seeks to mobilize public resources and attract private funds in the 10 Sahel countries to bolster ongoing efforts and plans by states, global and regional organizations, as well other partners. Built around the six priority areas, Support Plan focuses on; cross-border cooperation, prevention and sustaining peace, inclusive growth, climate action, renewable energy, and women and youth empowerment (UN, 2018).

Furthermore, with the aim of ensuring peace and stability in the Sahel the United Nations came out with- Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which is the other core security provider, tasked with overseeing the political process in Mali and carrying out several of security-related assignments. Furthermore, from a political standpoint, the regional institutional framework for coordination and cooperation in development and

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security affairs (including counterterrorism) is provided by the G5 Sahel, formed in February 2014 and whose headquarters are in Nouakchott, Mauritania. The G5 deployed a joint security force (Force conjointe du G5 Sahel, FC-G5S) in June 2017 to address terrorism and the challenges posed by transnational organized crime in the region, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution 2359 (United Nations, 2017); and recently by the Alliance for the Sahel, established in July 2017 (Conseil des Ministres franco-allemand, 2017) as a joint initiative of the EU, France and Germany, in cooperation with the World Bank, the African Development Bank (ADB) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to enhance the development of the region Venturi(2017: 42).

1.6 Problem statement

Agadez is strategically located at the crossroads of trade routes passing through Niger, from Nigeria to Algeria on one hand, and from Bukina Faso to Libya and Chad on the other hand. It is a gateway into the Sahel and the Sahara. The region, right from inception has a record of irregular migration, population displacement because of its’ geographical landscape. The inhabitants of the Sahel mostly relied on forest and its ecosystem for livelihood as both their agricultural and economic activities depends on vegetation. A region that experiences a number of challenges from food insecurity and terrorist-related security threats to the negative impacts of climate change, the Sahel has the potential to prosper through a realignment of focus to sustainable development based on human security. The UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for the Sahel, Ibrahim Thiaw, has said that as the sub-region teeters on the brink, securing peace demands addressing the sources of instability.

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A purely security approach will not suffice. Strong development initiatives are needed to kick-start economies, lift standards of living and offer hope to young people. Thiaw suggested further that solutions needed to be drawn from local, national and regional stakeholders, with assistance from external partners. “Perceptions of the region must also change”, he said, “with more focus placed on assets and potential in such areas as solar energy and wind power. Progress will also depend on good governance and a “rethink” of the way the United Nations operates on the ground” (United Nations, 2018).

In this regard, this thesis will focus on how current approaches to regional instability, with regard to migration, development and security, are framed. Using the concept of human security, the thesis will evaluate attempts to address the challenges of the region. It will specifically focus on how important actors talk about these challenges, and how they have been attempting to fix them.

1.7 Purpose and Aim

In this thesis, I will be using content analysis to unravel the way in which the security, migration and development nexus is constructed and addressed in the Sahel. I will

extensively rely on secondary materials as my evidence base in unfolding the reality and the consequence of the nexus tenable in the Sahel region of Sub-Saharan Africa. The

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and how they understand the security migration and development problems in the region without considering what the local people, and especially migrants think.

The underlying aim of this thesis is to dissect the fundamental ways associated with the framing of the three basic concepts that form the basis of this research- security, migration and development problem. Because of how the concepts are framed, the local problems are not understood from their roots, and the local people excluded from participating in the solutions. It is because of this that it becomes obvious that the global interest in Agadez is about preventing migrants from reaching Western countries, and not about the Sahel itself

1.8 Research Questions

As a research topic with conceptual, geographical and political interest, many questions will come into play but amongst all I will focus on the below questions.

How are the main actors shaping our understanding of the connection between security, migration and development in Agadez and the Sahel?

How does the concept of human security enhance our understanding of the security, migration and development nexus?

What are the connections between the international migration crisis and migration through Agadez?

1.9 Structure of the Thesis

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This thesis is sub-divided into 4 chapters. Chapter one, deals with brief introduction of the topic on research. The context of the research is spelled out. The aims, purpose and argument of the thesis are also given. The thesis argues that by re-evaluating the ways in which the migration, security and development nexus is framed in the Sahel, it can be shown that interventions in the region do not serve the people of the region as their primary aim. Chapter 2 deals with both the theoretical and conceptual foundations of the thesis. Chapter 3 of the research deals with how important actors in the Sahel speak about the three issues outlined in the thesis. Using a human security perspective, the thesis can show that their efforts are located in the Sahel, but serve the interests of other regions. Chapter 4 is the conclusion. It will sum up the argument by reflecting on two documentaries on African Migration to Europe. One is called: Niger's Agadez: Pearl of the Sahara turned migrant hub, from France24 (December 2017), and the other is Niger: Europe Migration, from Aljazeera (January 2019). These reflections will show that the voices of both migrants and the local people, who are the target of global interventions, are missing in the debate. This is not a mistake, since they are not seen as desirable participants, but objects of intervention.

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Chapter 2. 2.0 A Review of Concepts and Theoretical Considerations

2.1 Introduction

The concept of human security can be connected, through Hans Morgenthau’s political realism, to contestations of dominant ideas on power as not just a dominant goal in

international politics, but also as the definition of international interest in terms of that power. Hans Morgenthau is of the view that international politics in general is a representation of intensities of power struggle among actors (Morgenthau, 1948). Today, the politics of power is not bounded to only the nation-state, but as well as organizations, group of people that generates enormous influences on states. Realism can be defined as a concept of traditional political analysis; it is mostly concerned with the imperatives of the state as a political actor to pursue their national interest (Burchill, 2013). Additionally, realism maintains the view that states are motivated by interest, thus protecting their political interests and territorial integrity.

In this thesis the concept of power is identifiably very relevant to map out the diminishing contingencies of state failure in the Sahel region, and its connection to the management of human mobility through foreign interests. According to Morgenthau, realism is not a set of presumptuous assertion or concert conclusions, but realism seeks to promote opportunity to assess the state, the rise or fall of state power. In relation to the chaotic situation of the Sahelian

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regions solely because of the absence of state controls over the vast majority of the region, state failure becomes imminent.

2.2 Morgenthau’s realism and the Sahel situation

Morgenthau (1978: 4 – 15) gave six principles for state power which have come to define his main thesis on political realism. He proposed, firstly, that the objective laws that govern politics work in a similar way to those that govern society, that is, they are grounded in human nature. If the goal of politics is to change society for the better, then it is imperative to make sense of the particular laws that direct the lives of that society. The establishment of these laws in as much as imperfect it can be, these laws are bound to experience some form of failure at one point in time. Morgenthau however put faith in the objectivity of these laws of politics, so much so that, he felt it possible to that politics could develop along a rational theory that reflected these objective laws. Political realism was realist precisely because it could reflect these imperfections and biases of society. Such realism, he went further, could help in distinguishing between truth and opinion in politics, that is, where truth is objective and rational, and can be both backed by evidence and clarified with reason. If realism consist of asserting and giving meaning to political actions, Morgenthau’s assertion is that it is therefore possible to determine from the actions of politicians and their attendant consequences the underlying objectives of those actions, so that rationally speaking, action and consequence shape the theoretical meaning to the facts of international politics.

Morgenthau built to this first principle the idea that forms is second, and that was the notion that political action defines political interest, which in turn driven by, or is defined as, power. The second principle sets politics apart as a standalone sphere of action, to be understood as

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separate from other spheres of life, such as economics (where interest can be defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, religion, etc. Morgenthau believed that that in the absence of such an understanding of politics operating at different levels, a theory of politics would be difficult to propose. This, he believed, would then present difficulties in making distinctions between what was political and what was not, or in organizing the political sphere systematically. Interest defined as power thus compelled the student of politics to rationally approach his subject, forcing him or her to think theoretically about political action. For the actors themselves, interest as power allows for logical self-restraint in deeds and generates that overwhelming stability in foreign policy which gives American, British, or Russian foreign policy it’s understandable, lucid continuum, more or less coherent with itself, notwithstanding the different intentions, inclinations, and philosophical and ethical merits.

The third principle proposed that the notion interest defined as power should be seen as an objective category that carries universal validity, although such universality should not be seen to imbue the concept with a fixed meaning. Morgenthau understood the essence of politics – its substance – to transcend circumstances of time and place. Power may include anything that determines and sustains control — thus power has to do with all social interactions geared towards that end, from brute force to the most refined psychological relations. Thus, political realism is not under the illusion that the present circumstances in which nations function, with their severe unpredictability and the enduring menace of full-scale violence cannot be altered. In support of this principle, one of Morgenthau’s more quotable quotes was that “the balance of power is indeed a perennial element of all pluralistic societies” (Morgenthau. 1978). Realism also shares with thought of politics evolving to fit into a changing world, where Morgenthau foresaw nation-states being replaced by larger units or nations that reflected that he saw as the “technical potentialities and the moral requirements of the contemporary world”.

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The fourth principle emphasis the moral significance of political action, that is to say, it interrelates moral authority and its demands for a successful political action. Realism argues that general moral values are not applicable to the actions of states as theoretical collective ideas, but must be intermediated through the actual realities of time and place. Realism, therefore, reflects sobriety –weighing the possible outcomes of various political choices – to be the ultimate goal of politics.

The fifth principle is concern with, the rejection of realism to establish the ethical ambitions of a given state in line with the universe’s overarching moral laws. This principle it separates between truth and opinion — thus to say, all nations are enticed – with only a few having adamantly resisted the temptation – to dress their own specific ambitions and deed in the moral cloak of the universe. Morgenthau here suggested that political actors can judge other nations in relative terms, in comparison to how they see themselves. This way, actors are persuaded to shape their own policy course with respect and in alignment to the policies of other nations or actors, while mindful of their own interests. Such a course would reflect, in his view, restraint in moral judgment.

The sixth principle has to do with the position of political realism in a broader field of thought. At an abstract level, a political realist seeks to protect the self-sufficiency of the sphere of politics, just as others do with economics, law, and the like. Such self-sufficiency is confined to approaching politics as interest defined as power. For him, the most important question that a politician should address relates to how a nation is impacted by a specific policy. Thus, it is at this point that political realism disagrees with the "legalistic-moralistic approach" to

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international politics — that is, this matter cannot be challenged as mere invention of the mind, but strikes at the very heart of the debate.

From this theoretical perspective, the overarching premise is to connect the concept of realism to the current condition that has characterized the Sahel regions of Africa. The bone of contention has to do with failure of states within this region, the incapacities of their governments to deal with the multiple challenges affecting it. The failure of the state in providing or meeting the needs of it people is important to stress, because several of these contingencies of challenges pose as security threats to people of these region, and as a result, the only recourse will be their relocation to where placed where needs will be met. Challenges such as, poor infrastructure, poor socio-economic conditions, food security, climate change, coupled terrorism and extremist insurgency are evident of the current impasse. In Morgenthau’s view, state interest is paramount and a unique feature of governments. Therefore, the power of state are most focused towards its interest; citing an example from structural realist conceptions, it problematize the idea of state interest, “it is almost impossible to discern another state’s intentions with a high degree of certainty— unlike military capabilities, intentions cannot be empirically verified, intentions are in the minds of decision-makers and they are especially difficult to discern” (Mearsheimer, 2006; p?). One can further argue that, “policy-makers disclose their intentions in speeches and policy documents, which can be assessed— however, the problem with that argument is policy-makers sometimes lie about or conceal their true intentions; but even if one could determine another state’s intentions today, there is no way to determine its future intentions” (Mearsheimer, 2006).

The deficiencies and the absence of such power that address interests adequately will lead to the intervention of other actors to pursue their interest by introducing a measure of solutions to

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these challenges. The question that is yet to be answered is what are these interests? In as much as the controls of national borders are important, the efforts to address the challenges I.e. the root causes of migration are also an important aspect of the amalgamation of corporation in dealing with the issue. It’s is also worth mentioning the anarchical state of world politics, the lack of a centralized governments, gives room for these intervention corporations. Thus to say, the state of anarchy gives way to rather a hierarchical posture of the political system.

Most states in the Sahel often lacks the military capabilities to deal with the current insurgencies, on the other hand climate condition have not done any good to crop production and agriculture in general, which has been a major occupation for inhabitants. The capabilities of states can vary, hence the need for corporation. However, such cooperation follows a view of politics and of political knowledge that is imposed by the powerful. In the next section, this thesis will problematize how the powerful frame political knowledge. It will do this by evaluating the main concepts this thesis uses; migration security and development. Such an evaluation seeks to demonstrate how the powerful rule world politics.

2.3 Migration

As mentioned previously, security, migration and development can be used as key concepts in defining the geopolitical conditions of the Sahel region. For the sake of clarity and endurable understanding of the degree of intersection between these concepts, it is highly imperative for a reader of this thesis to be acquainted with the concepts to foster their ability to get the clue surrounding the research for peaceful and coherent co-existence amongst parties. First of all we make input for the concept of migration.

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Since the beginning of this century, migration has for a variety of interrelated reasons become prominent in international economic management and trade relations. The phenomenon of migration is not new to the human species. The necessity to flee war and persecution or the wish to pursue fresh and improved life prospects elsewhere has forever meant that people will migrate. Marks (2009) writes that since 1945, migration has steadily become a global phenomenon, connecting all regions of the world. Improvements in technology have lessened the difficulty to move between countries and thus many states have witnessed an increase in the numbers of their population that are foreign-born. “As societies are becoming increasingly diverse, with a rising number of people holding loyalty to more than one state, and as states strive to retain control over migratory flows across their borders, issues of migration and their impact on nation state sovereignty gain political salience” (Mark, 2009). The reason that migration is to be tied to state sovereignty suggests that the way is it now understood is directly connected with western forms of social organization.

The fundamental human rights of migrants, especially of the vulnerable – women, children and undocumented migrants – are increasingly critical aspects in the discourse on international migration. The challenge now is to make increasing globalization work to maximize the opportunities of migration and minimize its drawbacks (Adepoju, 2008). Migration is a hotly debated issue. Often talked of in terms of the movement of people from one country or region to another for economic, political or cultural reasons, migration has direct consequences for both sending and receiving countries. In their countries of origin, migrants contribute through investment, remittances and cross-border trade and other transfers. Where they migrate to, they fill important gaps in the labor market.

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Migration – “the crossing of the boundary of a political or administrative unit for a certain minimum period of time (UNESCO, 2019) – covers human mobility such as the movement of refugees, persons displaced by natural or man-made disasters, as well as so-called economic migrants. Distinctions are sometimes made between internal migrations; people who move from one part (a province, district or municipality) of a country to another, and international migration, people who move temporarily or permanently between nation-state territories. The UNESCO definition further suggests that two forms of mobility can be excluded from this broad definition of migration. On one hand, movement which does not result in any changes in social membership ties and is thus of little inconsequence for both the individual and the society both where that individual originates and where he ends up, such as tourism, is not counted as migration. On the other hand, UNESCO has suggested that “a relocation in which the individuals or the groups concerned are purely passive objects rather than active agents of the movement, such as organized transfer of refugees from states of origins to a safe haven, should not be counted as migration (UNESCO, 2019). According to The World Migration Report of 2018, migration signals the movement of a person or a group, either across the territorial borders of a country or within. This should be seen as movement of people, whatever its distance and duration, form and reasons and it comprises different kinds of migrants according to internationally recognized definitions, for example, refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and people moving for other reasons, such as love, family reunification.

Regarding the second form relocation, the regions of the world that are relatively rich, which are also the focus of most of human movement, extend the rights of movement to their citizens. In Europe, for instance, citizens move relatively easily not just within Europe, but also all over the world. In the global political hierarchy, they are framed as relatively risk-free, and benefit the regions they travel to. Poorer regions are framed as producing risky movement and

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burdensome migrants, whose movement can be restricted. Although the concept of migration is universally discussed as meaning the same thing, it is applied according to an unequal global structure. This is why in the Sahel; migrants are seldom even mentioned directly or as a people in their own right. They are an entity that can be managed, an object of (external) intervention.

2.4 Security

Secondly on the concept of security, it is equally an essentially contested concept. Definitions range from the traditional state-centric interpretation of a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur; through systemic concepts implying both coercive means to check an aggressor and all manner of persuasion, bolstered by the prospect of mutually-shared benefits, to

transform hostility into cooperation; to the consideration of insecurity or vulnerabilities, both internal and external, that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures. “The contradiction between state and systemic security is exposed by the concept of relative certainty of victory if one goes to war in the former, and the collective security principle and rationale of relative certainty of defeat of an aggressor in the latter” (Holliday and Howe, 2011: 17). Nevertheless, over the past half a century international conflict analysis and security studies have become acknowledged and institutionalized by the academic

mainstream (Holliday and Howe, 2011).

There is no doubt that security is one of the most important concepts in International Relations, since it is related to the safety of states and their citizens and their very survival. However, defining security is not an easy matter, since the term has had many different meanings to different people in different places and different times over the course of human history. The

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obvious consequence is that there are many different ways to think about security. Actually, there has been a never-ending debate on its nature and dimension, since there is not a broad consensus on its meaning.

2.4.1 Human security

For the purpose of this research, emphasis will be laid on human security as it akin to the nexus in the Sahel reality check. The concept of human security first appeared in the Human Development Report (HDR) in 1994 (Gomez and Gasper, 2017). A number of scholars then took up the idea and built on it, even introducing it to discussions that took place within United Nations, Gomez and Gasper (2017) write that it was in 2012 that the UN General Assembly (GA) adopted a common definition of the concept. The concept widens the space with regard to analysis of security and policy by expanding from mere territorial security to embrace the security of people. A resolution from the 2012 general Assembly thus emphasizes the role of “member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to survival, livelihood and dignity of their people” (Gomez & Gasper, 2017).

A comprehensive understanding of the broader concept of security firmly appreciates that human security – understood as the protection and empowerment of people at the individual and community levels – is vital to overall security at both national and international levels. Many issues, such as regional instability, terrorist attacks, inter-ethnic conflicts, poverty and disease, structure the meaning and substance of security. African countries have gone through enormous disturbances in recent decades, including violent internal conflicts. These circumstances have had an impact in exposing inadequacies of the concept of security that State-centric. They instead emphasize the significance of overlaps between development, security and human rights, and they highlight the necessity to recognize and confront more

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fully the diversity of challenges pertinent to the root origins of conflict, its prevention and peace building (OSAA, 2005).

The OECD Development Assistance Commission (DAC) notes that security is

‘increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing’.

This broader view of human security has many adherents, particularly as it acknowledges the interrelatedness of such societal threats.

According to former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, it is the “protection of communities and individuals from internal violence” that is of paramount importance. Others have advocated for an even wider understanding of the concept, to move beyond mere protection from violence to include security from hunger, disease and natural disasters as well as from economic vulnerability and threats to human dignity (Smith,2009). Human security, especially through its connection to human development, necessitates an exploration of its connection to migration in the Sahel. This is vastly different from the security initiatives the major actors in the Sahel are focused on, which is mainly framed as counter-terrorism. Nevertheless, this approach is to security is also consistent with the approach to migration, which excludes the active agency of migrants themselves. In the same way, security is conceived and imposed from outside the Sahel, and as a solution, is likely to miss the local human security needs of the region.

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2.5 Development

Thirdly on development, this is a word that often carries positive connotations. It is often used to suggest that things are improving or have improved, whether it’s pertaining to people’s achievement, personality, business, technology, establishments and others. According to Amitabh Shukla (2011), the idea of development, which means “unfolding”, was first heard during the year 1756. By 1885, it related to properties, and carried the notion of “bringing out and introducing the dormant potentials”, that is, to make use of assets that have been left untouched in order to make them useful. By 1902, the word development meant “the state of economic progress”. Thus, it is easy to see that this is a word that always denotes optimism and certainty.

The word development is so easy on the tongue that even famous individuals like Albert Einstein, Mahatma Gandhi, and Barack Obama have used it as part of their eulogies. However, as Shukla (2017) has noted, it is difficult to conceive of development without movement. Implicit in the idea of development, he contends, is that idea that a shift, or change, occurs. With technology, for instance, it is now easy to communicate across the board locally or with other parts of the world using a variety of methods. This is how developments in technology have had a bearing on migration, or mobility (Shukla, 2017).

Development as a concept is also contested from its conception, planning and implementation, which shows a little bit how the relationships developed through these stages can become highly political. Development can sometimes be seen as a neutral concept, ideal for use only by technocrats. I reality, it is always mobilized by politicians and administrators to clarify

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different plans and practices at various levels of operation and institutional interaction. In some ways development has become indispensable for public life, and everybody strives to bring it to life in relation to their own context. This is an important point to make, since this thesis is arguing that local actors should understand for themselves what it means and should themselves bring it to life in their own communities. This is the reflection made by Danda (2017) regarding the Niger, where he points out that development, if properly interpreted, should never be imposed – much less, implemented – from the outside. He further argues that such a conception of development has been guiding Niger since 2004, when local development plans (LDPs) were set in place as a tool for the management of the country’s local development (Danda, 2017: 41). “The sole aim of development,” writes Danda (2017: 45), “is the improvement of living conditions for people in a country with the help of internal and external resources” (Danda 2017: 45). It is doubtful to what degree the Sahel could refuse the help of outside actors, as poor a region as it is. On the other hand, it is important for regions such as the Sahel, and Niger in particular, to find its own ways of developing its own people and communities in a way that best benefits them.

2.6 Conclusion

Following Morgenthau’s ideas of political realism as the pursuit of power, it is clear that the migration, security and development nexus in the Sahel, which is driven significantly by the interests of regional and international actors, represent an extension of the influence of global actors in the region, directly or indirectly. Using a human security perspective, migration, security and development interconnect in a way that seems to still not reflect a focus on the poor people of Niger and the Sahel. This comes through in the framing of migration, security

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and development discourse on the Sahel, as well as the lack of the local people who for the most part appear as the object of external interventions in the region.

This next chapter will focus on this external framing of the security, migration and development debate in the region. It will expose its lack of interest in the people of the Sahel, and its focus on solving European problems externally. In the process the chapter will show how the local voices of the people of the Sahel are missing. These missing voices, who should be the direct beneficiaries of the different initiatives on the region, are also poor and in immediate need. That they are missing in the debate suggests that these interventions are not about them, but more about the pursuit of power and the interests of global actors.

The Security, Migration and Development nexus in Agadez, Niger : An actor-based re-evaluation of its eality