EU as Global Actor/ A Response to Syrian Crisis

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EU as Global Actor

A Response to the Syrian Crisis

Bachelor Level Thesis Malmö University Supervisor:Vasileois Petsinis

Word Count: 10,727

Spring Semester 2012 Vivek Noel Dinker Munigala

840211-5375 2012-09-20

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Abstract:

The most happening in today’s world is the issue of global warming and the Arab spring. They both are matters of concern and the term globalization explains their complication. A lot of aspects in this world are inter-connected, starting from events of climate change to events of the Arab spring they all require an international response. The happenings in the Arab spring have jeopardized the common values, mutual interests and the democratic values the world is building upon. It is a huge hit to the modern society with so many existing

organizations, institutions and rule of law that are contradicting these events. In consideration with these events, this paper will concentrate on EU and its institutional capability in

resolving the issues of Arab spring. Regardless, that these events have a global influence. EU’s response will be reflected considering its interests in the region and geo-political

location. The interpretation will have emphasis on preliminary and present EU-Syria relations in co-ordination with theory and policy conditions. The theory used in this regard will be Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) and the policy conditions that would be referred to is Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

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Index

Index ... 3

1. Demystifying the Arab Spring (Introduction) ... 4

1.1Problem Formulation ... 5 1.2Research Questions ... 5 1.3 Limitations ... 6 2. Methodology ... 7 2.1 Ontology ... 7 2.2 Epistemology ... 7 2.3 Deductive Approach ... 8

2.4 Qualitative Case Study ... 9

3. Background ... 10

3.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism ... 10

3.2 Syria ... 12

3.3 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). ... 13

4. Analysis ... 16

4.1 What are the different patterns of decision-making in the EU influencing Syrian Situation? ... 16

4.2 How do these patterns of decision-making affect EU’s role as a global actor? ... 22

4.3 Why are there contradicting forces for EU in representing itself as a United Front? 29 5. Conclusion ... 32

6. Reflections ... 33

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1. Demystifying the Arab Spring (Introduction)

The Arab spring is in the light of the world, a major eruption that has kick started a revolution among the Arab countries that have faced political distress. A long time suffering by the citizens of some of the countries has finally reached its end. Considering, Tunisia as an initial example (Blight, Pulham, and Torpey 2012) and the countries that followed it. In this case there was certain pattern that followed, revolutions in these countries demanded change of government or the person in rule. Thereby, creating disturbance in the public sphere and raising momentum for a civil war.

When these revolutions started a lot of humanitarian related issues were affected and the whole idea of social norms disappeared. More importantly, these nations that have had these revolutions as a preliminary condition accepted the essentiality United Nations represents. But that soon has changed considering the political reaction towards the crisis driven states and considering the conflicts between the supporters and the rebels. In addition these conflicts faced a certain imbalance with the government using military intervention to calm them. Thereby, meaning improper use of force resulting in violation of democratic values of the international community.

Having this kind of background information, it is therefore interesting to see from a geographical point of view. On, How EU reacts to these happenings in the Middle East (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:184). Contextually, there can be considerate amount of research done that refers to EU as a global actor in this concern. (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:164). But, as a pre-known outcome, it can be said that EU was not able to represent itself as a united front. Regardless of the fact that EU already has active cooperation with these nations through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (European Commission 2010). Through ENP, EU has developed and enhanced relationship that is based on respecting mutual interests and

respecting concerns of peace, security. Furthermore, ENP has done a favour in emancipating relations with its neighbours but matters of security at about now have been jeopardized considering the functioning of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (European Commission 2010). In spite of EU emancipation of developing relations that is based on a normative dimension (Manners 2002:238).

In consideration with both policy tools of ENP, CFSP and due to their propensity of covering broad aspects and many countries; Syria would be taken as a case.

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Arab spring (Blight, Pulham, and Torpey 2012). It is also vital, as the disturbances in other countries have somehow reached an end. But in Syria’s they don’t seem to, considering the duration and the still persisting struggle that initiated on March 15th _{2011(The New York}

times 2012).

Having this emphasis on the occurring events and considering the requirement for EU to act, it is therefore interesting to see EU’s response in this regard. The reasons seem to be the united representation of the EU. And due to this major setback this paper will involve in a theoretical explanation of the contributing reasons. Theoretical explanation in this regard refers to Moravcsik and his work on preferences and power. Moravcsik in his work on preferences and power have been extensively discussed The Liberalist framework and its implications on international character. In addition Liberal Intergovernmentalism explains the EU’s character in specific.

Following the introduction the next sub-section will lay emphasis on the problem formulation in its generality and following it would be a sub-section laying emphasis on different research questions reflecting the problem formulation.

1.1Problem Formulation

The problem formulation in this section has been formulated to a broader extent due to essentiality of providing examples and the necessary discussions the analysis requires. How is the CFSP able to affect the Arab spring?

This question is significant due to EU perceived interests in its neighbours that refer to peace and security. It vital for EU’s as it believes secure neighbours make secure borders (Shulman 2004:1-2). It is also vital, as EU’s persisting interests involve a lot of development

programmes in the region and funding in regard. As a preliminary measure to develop

relations these funds were targeted towards improving standards and helping them establish a sustaining society. Finally, all these characteristics imply EU’s intention for prospering security.

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questions that simplify and determine the factors that need to be analysed;

What are the different patterns of decision-making in the EU influencing Syrian situation? How do these patterns of decision-making affect EU’s role as a global actor?

Why are there contradicting forces for EU in representing itself as a united front?

By answering these questions it is possible to have a profound approach on what EU enacts through policy coordination and in understanding the flaws behind EU’s representation as a global actor.

As, these questions emancipate aspects of policy provisions and applicable coherency. These questions also set out EU’s capability if states don’t keep the agreements.

Finally, all these procedures determine EU’s capability and external dimension in terms of foreign policy.

1.3 Limitations

The limitations for this research are set forth due to vulnerability and the possibility for the discussion to elaborate in a broader sense. Thereby I would lay down the conditions for this research, the research would be in relevance to EU functioning as a global actor and this would be concerning to Syria. However, there would be examples of other states taken up in the discussion but they wouldn’t have the same positioning as Syria does in this research. There would be an internal dimension referring to EU member states (where there

functionality as one) and an external dimension (where EU member states inadequate functionality).

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2. Methodology

In this research the method chosen is a case study. Case study as a method gives the researcher the possibility to analyse different required elements. The elements accordingly are as follows;

a) Firstly, EU perceived interests that are based on maintaining peace and security (Manners 2002:238). Contrary to these interests is the recent Syrian behaviour. Accordingly the methodological stand point would be contemplating EU’s efficiency in reacting towards Syria.

b) Secondly, it would be to analyse the EU’s internal factors that didn’t relatively contribute for EU to function as one. Due to which actors being the member states and their behaviour would be analysed (Biscop, Balfour, and Emerson 2012:3).

2.1 Ontology

Organization and culture can be seen as one form of approach to understand the ontological stand point. This sought of stand point exists due to the relativity between organization and culture. From a research point of view the organizational requirements are fulfilled by EU and the cultural dimension by the revolutions.

This sought of understanding can be seen from a constructivist (Bryman 2008:20) ontological position where the happenings are determined from the external factors of social interaction. It is also a weak stand point on behalf of the EU, as its intention and the relation that was based on mutual respect towards a value-based community is jeopardized (Bryman 2008:18). EU in this regard starts with emphasis on social order (normative dimension) and it expects it to respect these values. In order to strengthen this position, there are certain benchmarks set by the EU. Therefore referring to EU as an actor that constraints force that acts and inhibits its actors.

2.2 Epistemology

The epistemological stance that I intend to choose is Interpretivism (Bryman 2008:15) as it questions the study of social reality and happening. Interpretivism and constructivism are

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world views.

Proponents of these approaches share the goal of understanding the complex world we inhabit. This desire is variously spoken of as an abiding concern for the life world, for a point of view, for understanding meaning, for grasping the actor’s definition of a situation, for Verstehen(Bryman 2008:17). The world of lived reality and situation-specific meanings that constitute the general object of investigation is thought to be constructed by social actors. Many of the ideas in these approaches stem from the German intellectual tradition of hermeneutics (Bryman 2008:16) and the Verstehen tradition in sociology, from

phenomenology, and from critiques of positivism in the social sciences. Interpretivists reject the notions of theory-neutral observations and the idea of universal laws as in science. Therefore Theory in this paradigm takes on a stronger perspective.

Knowledge consists of these constructions where there is a relative consensus among those competent to interpret the substance of the construction. Multiple ‘knowledge’s’ can thereby coexist when equally competent interpreters disagree.

2.3 Deductive Approach

“Deductive reasoning works from the more general to the more specific. Sometimes this is informally called a "top-down" approach. We might begin with thinking up a theory about our topic of interest. We then narrow that down into more

specific hypotheses that we can test. We narrow down even further when we

collect observations to address the hypotheses. This ultimately leads us to be able to test the hypotheses with specific data -- a confirmation (or not) of our original theories” (William 2006:1).

This research involves in emancipating deductive reasoning as the theory and outcome is pre-known. Moreover, a very broad topic of interest has been narrowed down to specifics. The choice of data also contributes as the functioning factors are appropriately chosen for the research. In consideration with the chosen method and data selected the research would be conducted as follows;

In this paper the research conducted is a top down process as the EU has to change his behaviour or act in terms of its external actors. External actors refer to its neighbours that have not met the conditions of the agreement. For EU to act in this case can’t be seen as

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the future. So, here in this case it can be seen as a “bottom up” (Richardson 2006:55) regardless that a deductive reasoning contributes for a “top down” approach.

Another aspect to the deductive approach is the question of validity and the truth of universal statements that are based on experience, such as the hypotheses and the use of theory in empirical evidence. As many people believe that the truth of these universal statements is ‘know by experience’. Yet is clear that an account of an experience – of an observation or the result of an experiment – can in the first place be only a singular statement that we know its truth from experience usually means that the truth of this universal statement can somehow be reduced to the truth of singular ones, and that these singular ones are known by experience to be true; which amounts to saying that the universal statement is based on deductive inference and refers to logic of consequence. Logic of consequence creates a certain degree of consent over the possible outcome and confirms it (McKeon 2010:1-4).

Due to the methodological background, it is possible to interpret the data available in a periodical manner and conformation. This can be attained by taking the events into account that are happening in the Arab spring, that demand a regime change and that inhibit a consequence. These events also indicate the process that is involved and the experience we get through these events is true knowledge. But a methodological standpoint requires an adequate theory for deductive reasoning to function properly. Liberal Intergovernmentalism as a theory has been chosen where it as mentioned before tends to answer the requirements the method avails. The different dimensions needed, being nation states in power, failed EU representation as a united front.

2.4 Qualitative Case Study

Deriving from the ontological and epistemological stand points the suitable approach would be Deductive. A successful qualitative case study (Bryman 2008:22) can be done in

consideration with the methodological choice and profound analytical tools can be used to analyse the various aspects and now referring to EU’s intervention in the conflict eluded countries; conflict that is based on social behaviour and reaction.

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3. Background

Following the sub-section of qualitative case study, this part of the paper will involve in laying the background for the research being the theory, some facts about Syria and finally about the CFSP.

3.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

“The European Community (EC) can be seen as the most successful example of institutionalized international policy co-ordination in the modern world. Starting with its initiation from the Treaty of Rome to the Maastricht, the EC has developed through the process of intergovernmental bargains” (Moravcsik 1993: 473)

An intergovernmental bargain is that determines preferences and power in the EU. As there is no proper platform found to see EU as a supranational authority. According to Moravcsik, the intergovernmental regime is designed to manage economic interdependence through policy-coordination and policy policy-coordination is set forth under intergovernmental negotiations (preferences).

At the core of Intergovernmentalism they are three elements; the assumption of rational state

behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation and an Intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation.

Rational State Behaviour

Under this element; a general framework for analysis is present within which a cost and benefit of economic interdependence are the primary determinants of national preferences. This element is often faced by relative intensity of national preferences, existence of

alternative coalitions. That in return gives an opportunity for an intergovernmental analyst of the resolution of distributional conflicts among governments (Moravcsik 1993: 481)

In distributional conflicts governments with preferences often intend to maximize their utility. Maximizing utility according to the Intergovernmentalist s follows model of rational state behaviour. Model of rational state is deprived of domestically-constrained preferences implying international conflict and co-operation. These preferences are accountable of two stages; firstly governments define a set of interests. Secondly, these interests are bargained among themselves before they are actually considered to be interests (Moravcsik 1993:481).

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co-operation (demand and supply). These interests deprived internally identify the benefits of policy-coordination (demand) (Moravcsik 1993:481).

This combination of demand and supply on the basis of preferences and, strategic opportunities shapes the foreign policy behaviour of states.

National Preference Formation

The element of national preference formation is derived from liberal assumptions. It basically focusses on state-society relations in shaping national preferences. It is assumed that state priorities and policies are determined by politicians that are heads of the national government. They are known to embed in domestic and transnational civil society where they receive constrains regarding their identities and purposes. Therefore the important attribute of national preference formation is the identity of important societal groups, nature of their interests and finally their influence on domestic policy (Moravcsik 1993:483).

Yet another attribute under the preference formation is interdependence, externalities and

co-operation. Under this attribute the argument is economically driven where interdependency is

on the basis of ‘international policy externalities’. International policy externalities arise when policies of one government can create costs and benefits for politically significant social groups outside its national jurisdiction. Here the achievements of domestic interests are comprised of foreign counter parts (Moravcsik 1993:485).

However, national governments possess the capability of influencing domestic policy outcomes and to achieve goals. This is seen when policy coordination affects international policy externalities negatively (Moravcsik 1993:485).

Yet another attribute under the preference formation is the distributional consequences of

policy co-ordination. Even when agreements can be mutually benefitted governments often

have different preferences concerning the distribution of the benefits in accordance with terms of co-operation. It is interpreted that costs and benefits of policy co-ordination are often unevenly distributed among nations resulting in a conflict between winners and losers of international and, domestic conflict. The conflict is so drastic that they undermine the harmony of interests. Harmony of interests is mostly driven endogenously, where societal groups influence an international negotiation. And in case of powerful societal groups the

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(Moravcsik 1993:487).

In accordance with the EU there is a need for dominant groups in different countries that share the same preferences as of EU. However, there is no clear line and understanding on who is the deciding body. As the behaviour of countries are unexplainable due to lack of clarity and transparency.

Having this background information it can be said that the bargaining options that LI suggests are very much based on preferences of member states.

Following this section of the theory the next sub-section will lay emphasis on presenting some facts about Syria.

3.2 Syria

As mentioned before Syria has not kept the agreements made with EU. Thereby, this part of the paper will involve in explaining the factors that have influenced EU’s interests. In terms of Syria it can be said that the tensions started pretty late and still persists.

The initial disturbance that took initiation on 19th March 2011 was due to human rights violations by government authorities which received protests in the form of a rally by pro-government protesters. This rally was a consequence of long suffering Syrian people were facing and to distort the situation even more the security forces killed four civilians. In this regard President Assad assured to bring the culprits to justice, However that didn’t happen. Considering this reaction from government authorities and security forces goes back to 2004. From 2004 in conflicts between security forces and Syrian Kurds 25 people were killed and, some 100 were injured (The Guardian 2011).

On the 23rd _{March 2011 the injustice by the security forces continues as they kill six civilians}

in a mosque. These killings are committed due to people revolting for political freedom and to end corruption (The Guardian 2011).

In accordance with the killings on 24th _{March mass Syrian protesters marched towards the}

cemetery that resulted in security forces opening fire resulting in killing 34 protesters (The Guardian 2011). Following these dates there were constant protests and they were constant killings contributing in relatively different numbers.

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(Marsh, Chulov, and Finn 2011).

In this regard, Assad on 30th _{March blames “foreign conspirators and satellite television}

channels for two weeks of widespread unrest that has challenged his regime” (The Guardian 2011).

Following which, there is a great amount of denial by Assad regarding the seriousity of the situation and the constant try by the international community to stop this violence is overlooked. As Assad intends to stay in rule and disregards all democratic procedures. Considering these events and some facts it can be said that Syria doesn’t lie in the best interest of either the EU or the international community. It is also interesting to see the minimum and limited voice of the EU in this regard. Following this section the next sub-section will present some requirements of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

3.3 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

CFSP will play a prominent role in this paper, as its requirements, procedures and structure refers to the theory. CFSP as a part of the foreign policy was put in place to address the security issues and to answer the externalities. CFSP mostly explains the EU’s intentions as a global actor.

In order to elaborate more on the CFSP this part of the paper will lay emphasis on short

history of its establishment, its policy instruments and procedures that explain its success and

distress.

CFSP as a part of its initiation has faced a lot of challenges and distress. And yet after so many years of its establishment it still lacks coherency and transparency in the course of its implementation.

Historical Background

After the initiation of The Treaty of Rome, concerns towards addressing foreign policy were not preceded. However the importance soon after was acknowledged and EU’s external relations laid a base for the community to enter into association agreements with third parties. This act increased the influence of EU representing itself as an international actor in the absence of a formal foreign policy.

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to contentious discussion. In this process and in the wake of 1990 from the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) conclusions, foreign policy conditions were laid down and were going to be signed in 1991 and were intended to come into force in 1993. The considerations that were made in forming the policy conditions were coherency(Bretherton, Vogler 2012:175), assured strategic direction and assured access to policy instruments(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:167). The provisions that were stated at this time were;

− _{“to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence of the Union} in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter,

− To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, − _{To preserve peace and strengthen international security….} − _{To promote international cooperation,}

− To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:167)

However, a major part of these provisions needed some serious consensus (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:187);

- Common Positions: adopted by consensus and binding to all member states. - Common strategies: adopted by consensus and binding to all member states.

- Joint actions: adopted under qualified majority voting in the council of ministers after prior unanimous agreement in the European council (Staab 2008:132).

The requirements stated are quite similar to the guiding principles of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). As these guiding principles drive the Union to protect itself from the external influences, and to develop, where appropriate, a foreign policy posture distinct from that of the USA(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:167).

After the end of the Cold War, introducing CFSP was done by the Treaty of the European Union in 1993 in regard of showing a strategic direction for external policy. In this regard, the challenges met by the CFSP changed with time considering the 9/11 attacks. After this

incident terrorism was included in the security strategy. And under the 2003 European Security Strategy it was underlined that A Secure Europe in a Better World was seen as a

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and elaborate its work with the United Nations. These goals however didn’t serve as a strategic direction, due to which external activities under the Cooperation and Association Agreements comprised ‘good governance, human rights and other obligations (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:167).

Establishment of the CFSP

Within the framework of the TEU’s and in concern with the European Council produced ‘general political guidelines ‘for the Union that determined five initial priority areas for CFSP action.

1. Relations with Central and East European Countries. 2. Support for the Middle East Peace Process.

3. Conflict resolution.

4. Humanitarian relief efforts in former Yugoslavia.

5. Support for democratic process in South Africa and Russia.

In regard with these principles there can be tremendous amount of examples considered in explaining the success and distress of conflict resolution by the EU. But in this paper and in accordance with its requirements the aspects such as ‘support for the middle east process’, and ‘conflict resolution’(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:184)will be emphasized. As these aspects remain the most relevant to this paper, regardless that the other three priorities of the CFSP remain questionable.

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4. Analysis

The analysis chapter is divided into three different parts basing on the three research questions.

Every sub-chapter in the analysis will start by presenting the question and will follow on by answering.

4.1 What are the different patterns of decision-making in the EU influencing Syrian Situation?

It is vital to mention that the decision making patterns of the EU rely on the three pillars. The three pillars determine the power politics of the EU and CFSP. Because of the CFSP being placed under the 2nd _{pillar, all the decisions pertaining CFSP are based on IGC’S. Due to}

which there is a tremendous amount of friction between member states and EU institutions (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:174). If at all the CFSP was placed under the 1st _{pillar being the}

supranational way of decision making, EU might not have faced as many problems in

representing itself as a united front. As, these decisions would receive a unanimity dimension. This lack of credibility over EU’s decision making can be understood by the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI).

LI explains the flexibility member states possess in affecting a decision and that can in return contribute for a lame representation of the EU. It is a disappointing outcome considering EU interests are based on strategic partnership with its neighbours. Accordingly EU’s was not able to act efficiently in the Syrian issue, as its members represented inactive participation. This sought of inactive participation is a consequence of intergovernmental style of decision-making.

A furthermore explanation of decision making patterns can be given by discussing the liberal Intergovernmentalist framework that emphasizes Qualified Majority Voting (Bretherton, Vogler 2012:169).

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Liberal Theories Intergovernmentalist Theories

(International demand (International supply

for outcomes) of outcomes)

NATIONAL configuration

PREFERENCE of state INTERSTATE OUTCOMES

FORMATION preferences NEGOTIATION

---

(Moravcsik 1993:482)

Liberal Theories

Liberal theory in its generality demands an outcome from the states. As the participants are interconnected through the international community, thereby a conflict as of today need countries to act as one (Syria).Usually the expected responses are universally mutual and speaks of equal participation and As the international community is bound through institutions and agreements.

Expectation to react to a crisis according to the liberalist framework puts EU in an

uncomfortable position and questions EU’s capability, and representation. Thus, influencing EU’s global role and decision making capability.

Underlying societal factors: pressure from domestic societal actors as represented in political institutions Underlying political factors: intensity of national preferences; alternative coalitions; available issue linkages

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EU’s position which is in similar with the present Syrian crisis. (Chari, Cavatorta 2009:25-27).

According to Moravcsik the decision-making process with influence from national-preference affects the rational state behaviour of the EU (Moravcsik 1993:483-485). In correlation to this, there is a lack of policy tools for the CFSP that inhibit coherency (Chari, Cavatorta 2009:25-27).

Regardless of high end integration between member states that contribute in trans-border flow of goods and services (Moravcsik 1993:485); it is important to mention that there is extended need for collaboration; more importantly a need to avail reputation for EU’s institutional framework in spite of conflict between preferences and power.

Liberalism and State-Society Relations

The element of national preference relies on state-society relations in shaping national preferences. The assumption is “private individuals and voluntary associations with

autonomous interests, interacting in civil society, are the most fundamental actors in politics” (Moravcsik 1993:483).Thereby meaning that the demand is from outside. In order to react to an outward response EU in many occasions has worked along with the UN. This response by the EU to attend crisis alongside with the UN increases its reputation. An example as such to explain EU’s role as a global actor is the rebuilding of Iraq. In alignment with these actions, EU has been widely involved in Syria with over 50 projects that involved development aid and 210 euros in grants and loans on yearly basis (EU-Syrian Relations). The ability for EU to incorporate to such an extent is due to geographical location and due to these decisions being placed under the 1st _{pillar. The placement under the 1}st _{pillar ordains a certain degree of}

unanimity, Whereas CFSP placement under the 2nd _{pillar requires consent from the member}

states (Bretherton, Vogler 2012:175).

National preferences of Syria have a played a prominent role in enriching itself with what EU has to offer. However, this doesn’t entitle Syria to be in a dominant position as this element demands for an outcome from both ends. And outcome from both ends in this regard is seen as dissatisfactory, as Syria responds by denial and EU with lack of united representation. Regardless, EU possessing a dominant position in terms of involvement (development programmes) within Syria in comparison with the international community.

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decisions pertaining CFSP were placed under the 1st _{pillar, EU would have had a better}

opportunity of reacting to crisis prone regions. Just like in the case of development

programmes where EU’s extensive participation is seen, but due to CFSP being placed under the 2nd _{pillar which being LI way of decision making; member states are able to prioritize}

their preferences (Moravcsik 1993:473-519).

When the initial sanctions were imposed on Syria, member states had the flexibility of deciding on how to act. Due to which there was incomplete representation of the union, as some of the member states didn’t respond as a member of the EU. The recent sanctions that were imposed on the 24th _{July 2012 show a much better representation of the EU. As these}

sanctions include a major decision and a modification in the CFSP by the “Council

2012/420/CFSP; that emphasized the enforcement of the EU’s existing arms embargo against Syria”. This by all means explicitly requires active participation from the member states. (Mancuso, Kraemer, Caspary, and Kapeliou 2012:1-3) (Blockmans 2012:2). Under this change in the CFSP, the member states are expected to check all to and fro flights into Syria in their respective countries. This response by the EU increases EU’s reputation and fulfils the liberal demand for an outcome.

Intergovernmentalist Theories

Intergovernmentalist tends to analyse the EC as a result of strategies pursued on the basis of rational behaviour of governments. This sought of behaviour is heavily based on preferences and power (Moravcsik 1993:496).

The major agenda-setting and decision making in this regard can be consistently explained in terms of interstate bargaining. More explicitly, it is where decisions are made with

co-ordination and distributional consequences that are heavily based on a bargaining game (Sebenius, 1991; Krasner, 1991).

Having this short background about the decision making that is influenced by bargaining power. There is a possibility for in text explanation by taking Syria as a case and having an assumption of member states behaviour in this regard.

As mentioned before national preferences play a prominent role in defining bargaining power for potentially viable agreements, due to which one or more participants are benefited. As these agreements have distributional consequences, this is where negotiation plays a

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one being ‘creating’ the other ‘claiming’. There can also be problems of co-ordination and bargaining aspects of strategic interaction (1986). As of now and considering the Syrian case there had been problems of consistency and this is very behavioural. As Strategic

intervention by EU didn’t yield results considering the present events.

Regardless of the fact negotiation creates a common ground for interactions, it comes with “excessive costs of identifying, negotiating and enforcing bargains” (Moravcsik 1993:497) which might in return obstruct co-operation. Furthermore strategic behaviour has a character that often keeps the governments in secrecy of beneficial exchanges that might result in being expensive or impossible. In accordance with EU’s enforcement over arms embargo and monitoring over Syria is cost thriving. However, it might be unclear on what the costs might be. The relative costs that continue in this regard would be in the form of refugee camps, rehabilitation centres and the acceptance of immigration. Due to these reasons the challenges are upraised to whole new level, which the member states might not be interested. As EU as whole doesn’t share the same interests.

Bargaining Power as a Mode of Decision

Bargaining power is deeply comprised of distributional outcomes that can further be related to Syria. as they improvise the possibility for “alternative policies and coalitions, the level and symmetry of information, the extent of communication, the sequence of moves, the

institutional setting, the potential for strategic misrepresentation of interests, the possibility of making credible commitments, the importance of reputation, the cost-effectiveness of threats and side-payments, and the relative preferences, risk-acceptance, expectations, impatience and skill of the negotiating parties”(Raiffa 1982;Harsanyi 1977).

Having these attributes it is extremely unpredictable on how member states might act and in order to see these attributes either positive or negative is questionable. As these greatly affect the EU decision making and often can be seen as priorities set by member states.

The three assumptions that make the EU decision making even harder are as follows;

• _{Intergovernmental co-operation is voluntary, as they won’t face any military coercion} or economic sanctions if they don’t intend to co-operate. As a preference

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redundant in the Union.

• _{The need for action by member states is often benefited as they have wide}

information in the form of pros and cons regarding the situation. If at all they intend to participate it would be based on low cost-effectiveness.

• Transaction costs of intergovernmental bargaining are low for a certain period. Due to which member states can propose numerous offers and at the same time reject at a very low cost.

In order for the EU institutions to attain flexibility in taking and acting in terms of situation where EU’s reputation is questioned. Either it should emancipate its power factors or provide member states with better policy options that would encourage them to involve.

With this sought of flexibility available for member states and the presence of CFSP under the second pillar; being an intergovernmental style. It all comes to a voluntary participation that deliberately reduces EU’s regional (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:181) presence.

As mentioned before the presence of alternatives is crucial if EU wants its member states to embrace change and in the bargaining process they are three likely determinants of interstate bargaining power.

• Unilateral policy alternatives (‘threats of non-agreement’). • Alternative coalitions (‘threats of exclusion’).

• _{The potential for compromise and linkage ((Moravcsik 1993:499).}

In order to falsify these determinants the EU institutions should possess alternatives. That would provide the institutions which much better leverage of attaining legitimacy.

Finally, the decision-making in accordance with Syria faces a lot of endogenous factors that limit EU’s influence due to the policy provisions and power dimension of the CFSP being intergovernmental. Moreover preference by member states does to wide extent reduce EU’s expendability.

After this following section on different patterns affecting EU decision making on the Syrian issue.

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4.2 How do these patterns of decision-making affect EU’s role as a global actor?

“First of all, it seems plausible to define modes of governance in a policy-specific and a time-dynamic perspective. The CFSP has its own rules and traditions in decision-making, and has developed forms and modes of governance which are typical for its path of institutional and procedural evolution; this path is clearly distinct from the developments observed in the classical community areas of legislation” (Diedrichs 2011:171).

As mentioned before there is lack of coordination between the three pillars and it influences decision-making tremendously. If the decisions comprising the CFSP are made solely by the European Commission (EC) it might increase EU’s efficiency. But this is not the case as the other two pillars are mostly intergovernmental. There is moderate amount of friction between these pillars that result in inefficient functioning of EU representation (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:168).

Up to date the success of the CFSP can be seen as delusional. Thereby it reflects the singular character of the Union, whose member states are sceptic of their role in the politically sensitive areas of foreign and security policy.

Differences in member states and foreign policy priorities reflect a variety of factors, including pre-existing bilateral ties (or antipathies), geographical location and extent of support for a policy stance distinct from that of the USA. Successive enlargements of the EU have tended to exacerbate these differences. Divisions have also long persisted over

approaches to decision-making, broadly speaking large member states prefer

intergovernmental methods and smaller member states advocate a ‘community’ method. Here, a still unresolved central issue has been the extent to which the European Commission, with its responsibility for the economic instruments of policy, should be actively involved in decision-making(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:162).

In the establishment of CFSP problems consistency is of crucial importance considering the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, this invasion didn’t disrupt the usual functioning of the Union and the Union functioned as it should. But it lacked collaboration in addressing security issues from the time of discussions about foreign policy started.

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argued by the Intergovernmentalist that the commission involvement should be limited and the foreign policy should have an intergovernmental standpoint. The attributes of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and its tool of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:169).Thereby, it can be said that a successful functioning of the CFSP didn’t achieve its high ends. The reason for this as mentioned before is the factor of coherency (Bretherton, Vogler 2012:175). As coherency refers to problems of endemic nature and policy conditions for CFSP in this regard need to be improved. Regardless of improving the policy conditions CFSP showed dissatisfaction in practice. This sought of disappointment according to Bretherton; Vogler is due to the theoretical questions that rose over the years (1999:162). In this regard, there has been growing number of scholarly contributions on EU’s foreign

political system and a very limited representation of the CFSP. Thereby it has been difficult to understand the European foreign policy and the factors that inhibit its involvement (Diedrichs 2011:149). And as a contradiction to involvement a major characteristic that was in place from the beginning was the behaviour of national actors that had the possibility of involving partly and or in independent sectors(Ginsberg 2001:32).

The extensive institutional framework EU possesses was not able to answer these setbacks and even the supranational governance in addressing the security and defence matters were seen as unsatisfying (Diedrichs 2011:150).

But in a thrive to find a solution, discussions took place quite frequently, but results were hard to be seen instead the term ‘flexibility’ was referred to in a multiple occasions(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:169). In some cases institutional and procedural patterns were reviewed beyond the notion of Intergovernmentalism (Diedrichs 2011:150).But this revival didn’t attain successful results as the notion of unanimity seemed impossible. The CFSP still remains a national interest and is dominated by bargaining mode of decision-making. Accordingly, it can also be said that ‘European Foreign Policy’ is a consequence of turned down federalist aspirations (Diedrichs 2011:151). So the only optimism relies on the functioning of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) with emphasis on the present Syrian crisis (Diedrichs 2011:151).

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dense and intensive interaction within the European Communities” (Diedrichs 2011:151).

• _{“The interest of key member states in using the EC to develop a more global role} between the superpowers and in this way to enhance national influence via Brussels” (Diedrichs 2011:151).

Well these can be only seen as desirable goals as the EU still lacks the integrity of

representing itself as one voice and as a ‘strong political identity’(Diedrichs 2011:155). And yet again this sought of distress leads to the decision-making capability of the EU.

The agreements that were made in the initial stages of establishment of the CFSP were entirely based on Intergovernmentalism(Diedrichs 2011:157).

It is to say that the decision-making procedures and mode of governance are not coherent. It is also important to be aware that EU’s lack of representation is very endemic. And the EU’s governance in this regard relies on member states approval that actually reflects a “degree of collegiality, informal practice and confidentiality” (Diedrichs 2011:158).

After underlining that EU lacks coherency (Bretherton, Vogler 2012:175) between decision-making and governance. It directs us towards the cause, regardless of possessing a high representative for the CFSP and common strategies as a new instrument in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). The CFSP led to a perfection of a “rationalized Intergovernmentalism” that seemed to improve the mechanism of the CFSP” (Diedrichs 2011:158).

Due to which it can be said that CFSP largely relies on a theoretical standpoint. Furthermore the theoretical standpoint of LI seems to continue and seems to influence the decisions of EPC in the future (Pijpers, 1990). In addition other factors that influence EPC decisions such as legalization, institutionalization and Europeanization wouldn’t be discussed. In

consideration with these factors it can be said that decisions pertaining Syria are endogenous and not exogenous.

Thereby Underlining that endogenous factors as such show weak representation of the EU and vulnerability of its institutions (Diedrichs 2011:168).

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Soft inter- crisis Afghanistan

Governmentalism Balkans Iraq Syria 1973 1980 1989 Nice 2004 2012 Source: (Diedrichs 2011:169) Amsterdam 2002 2006

Figure 1.1CFSP in a theoretical perspective

This graph by Wessel’s is known as the ratchet fusion of the CFSP and it tries to show the security decisions in terms of hard and soft intergovernmentalism referring to a ‘Punctuated Equilibrium’. The hard and soft intergovernmentalism as per the graph represents hard and weak representation of the Union in matters of the CFSP.

The orange dots as per the graph determine the CFSP placement in the issues of crisis management (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:199). Discussions pertaining crises usually start at an intermediate level but seem to deprive when there is a need to act. This is also what the orange dots determine. This sought of behaviour can be seen since 1973 and in order to complement this behaviour treaty provisions were introduced; but didn’t seem to help.

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(decisions) (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:175) were always depriving in a downward direction and in a very soft inter-governmentalism manner.

Regardless, that EU from initial stages has developed mechanisms to address crisis issues (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:199,205) necessary improvement hasn’t been seen in the areas of foreign policy.

In consideration with the past events Syria has been strategically placed in the graph. From an EU perspective the decision that was made by the “Council 2012/420/CFSP (Blockmans 2012:2), the enforcement of the EU’s existing arms embargo against Syria was further strengthened” has strategically pushed the CFSP to a supranational level as shown in the graph. Regardless of CFSP being a complete intergovernmental policy area, “the daily political and institutional reality of the CFSP is open to innovation ‘beyond

intergovernmentalism’ (Diedrichs 2011:172). This innovation is not relatively new but since the 1990’s the CFSP is accustomed to diversity and is visible in the legal acts.

As the loose conducting of intergovernmental form of cooperation to more consistent binding forms is what EU seeks to find (Diedrichs 2011:170) and thereby knows the importance of governance that requires CFSP decisions taken at dense levels of foreign policy activity (Diedrichs 2011:170).

But in order to contribute for this requirement, debates on the EU constitution have unveiled further institutional and procedural reform concerning CFSP; that were taken up in the Lisbon Treaty. The changes according to Wessel’s (2004) came into force after the initiation of Lisbon Treaty;

• Legal densification of the CFSP;

• _{“Greater consistency between EC and CFSP by opening the possibility of resort to the} EC in the case of economic sanctions as a result of foreign policy decisions”;

• Potential for flexibility in the CFSP;

• _{“A differentiation of procedures and mechanisms for decision-making” (Diedrichs} 2011:171).

However, these changes can be still seen doubtful as the position of intergovernmentalism still remains strong. And the possible solution seems to be increasing connections between EC

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2011:171).

EU as a Global Actor - a perceived Identity

Regardless of so many years of establishment, EU still is a political system under construction with constantly evolving internal institutions and practices (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:37). EU institutions resemble European Identity and the strategic partnership it intends to avail. However strategic partnership with Syria didn’t exemplify EU’s identity as the violence persists.

However, in order to reclaim its identity EU has contributed over 90 million euros as humanitarian fund from the European Commission and more than 27 million euros from its member states. It is a disappointing and cost thriving factor; but it resembles EU’s strategic environment in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf (Blockmans 2012:1).

The post- Assad decisions taken that concern EU’s identity are;

• “an embargo on exporting arms and equipment for internal repression to Syria(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:168);

• A ban on exports of key equipment and technology to the Syrian oil and gas sectors; • _{A ban on participation in the construction of new power plants in Syria;}

• A ban on exports of equipment and software intended for use in the monitoring of internet and telephone communications by the Syrian regime;

• _{A ban on providing grants, loans, export credit insurance, technical assistance,}

insurance and reinsurance for exports of arms and of equipment for internal repression to Syria;

• A ban on trade of gold, precious metals and diamonds with Syrian public bodies and the central bank;

• A freeze on 52 entities ‘assets held within the EU, including the Syrian central bank, while ensuring that legitimate trade can continue under strict conditions;

• _{An asset freeze and a visa ban on 155 persons associated with the regime and/or} responsible for violent repression or human rights abuses; and

• A prohibition on access to EU airports for cargo flights operated by Syrian carriers, with the exception of mixed passenger and cargo flights” (Blockmans 2012:2).

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review and reform its policies; in order to provide “effective humanitarian, political or military strategy towards Syria on its own and in consideration with Syria’s neighbouring countries” (Blockmans 2012:4). However, to be optimistic EU is better placed geopolitical and due to continued relations with Middle Eastern countries on a day-to-day basis, it has an advantage of dealing with the situation efficiently. But as a starting point EU should revive its security strategy(European Council 2003:8) for a wider middle east(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:181), such a plan would fetch great efforts in emphasizing European Security Strategy and Union’s ‘External Action’(Blockmans 2012:4;Bretherton, Vogler 2006:177).

Finally, there is proper reconciliation and plans in place that can increase EU’s reputation on a global scale but a huge problem is with the endemic factors of influence such as coherency between the three pillars, consensus among the member states; most importantly the theoretical role.

From here the paper will involve in exemplifying the last concrete findings on the critical contradictions EU faces.

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4.3 Why are there contradicting forces for EU in representing itself as a United Front?

In this part of the paper, factors in the establishment of the CFSP will be underlined that have an impact on EU’s representation as a united front. As mentioned before, it is the security issue that keeps EU in an uncomfortable position in comparison with the other already integrated areas of the Union. It is therefore questionable on why EU that is known for its institutional establishment has credibility issues in terms of security.

The factors could be EU’s capability, the operational structure of CFSP. But these factors can only be better understood with the use of theory.

EU’s Capability

The establishment of mechanisms to counter crisis has given EU certain credibility. These mechanisms include military expertise initiating in 1999 with Javier Solana as the new high representative of the CFSP defining the military role of the Union. It was an incredible start as it was addressing the global crisis management that includes military and civil assets. In the course of its establishment the union didn’t face any barriers and approval was shown from its member states (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:199). Perhaps, it was the hard power member states were interested (Treverton 2006:40). However, there is lack of information to determine the actual reason. But due to being able to establish military assistance in approval with member states, it can be said that member states behaviour is unpredictable and there is lack of loyalty. It is therefore frustrating in not being able to get a clear distinction between cooperation and non-cooperation. As EU member states show consent over areas of trade and other matters. Therefore it is also difficult to comprehend where CFSP faces a problem.

Another determining factor resembling EU’s capability is the project with its neighbours through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:174).The intention behind involving in these projects is to attain a ‘Secure Europe’ from an institutional point of view. This is to say, that the interests of EU institutions and member states differ. This is also to say that intergovernmental character of the CFSP remained strong as member’s states still possess the capability to contradict institutional decisions.

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and for chairing with the EC for policy prioritization and initiation.

The Presidency is also responsible for all intergovernmental CFSP/ESDP bodies, with the exception of the military committee. Regardless of possessing the structural advantages of this role, the Presidency ability to influence a decision remain vague. As it can also be influenced by the smaller member states decisions in terms of a possible crisis. Another disadvantage is the short term office of six months that sometimes results in prioritizing regional issues. Not a satisfactory notion from a member states perspective (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:171). In terms of security issues they seem to be a lot of prioritization involved that undermines issues of member states concern. The Presidency inability to solve issues also makes the member states to pursue the conflict by themselves, not a very complimentary sign (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:171). As the ability to offer support to issues remain central to a successful presidency. This is to say, that CFSP position is pretty fluid among the member states.

In addition, the council meets the Presidency twice during its terms during which it

expertise’s its ‘guiding role’ in restricting operations concerning member states where they are seen to be consistent(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:171). This measure by the council sets the priorities for the CFSP. In the context of the guiding principles established by the European Council, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) constitutes the next level of CFSP decision-making. This formation was persistent due to other concerns of external relations meetings that seemed to enhance the efficiency of decision-making and the coherency of policy. Despite the limited use of ‘Foreign Affairs Council’ by the member states, creation of the GAERC represents a forward step in EU foreign policy-making. Matters concerning security have different variations the Council can at times involve Member State Foreign Ministers or Ministers of Defence depending upon the items on the agenda. Regardless of the fact that the CFSP depends on intergovernmental mode of decision-making, the Council should avoid involving member states if possible. This is to say, that EU pertained goals can be better achieved of being a global actor. At the same time, it would be complimentary to say that EU is a United Front.

So far we have seen the role of the Council and other organization in matters of the CFSP, now the concentration diverts towards to lower levels policy process that are conducted by Political and Security Committee(PSC) (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:172)with Brussels-based

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the CFSP. As the PSC submits reports on proposals to the Council, it is later revived by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) that is comprised of member states ambassadors. As a starting point COREPER deals with issues pertaining pillar I but at the same time is responsible for all material discussed by the Council. This can be source of friction as the COREPER representatives are concerned with the increasing influence of PSC (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:172). This sought of friction between PSC and COREPER can contribute to effective discussions between PSC and the Council at the same time create contradictions.

Considering all these levels of power dynamics in the functioning of CFSP, one thing is set out clear. That member states influence decisions at various levels. Thereby, it is also understandable that COREPER (pillar I) is worried with the increasing influence of the PSC (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:172). As mentioned earlier in the analysis it is a matter of endemic factors that don’t contribute for a united front.

After this analysis section the following part will involve in emphasizing reflections from a global point of view.

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5. Conclusion

The findings in this paper imply that the EU faced problems are very endemic and are due to lack of coherency. As a starting point, EU doesn’t need to work on its security strategy but instead should work on general functioning of the union. It should emancipate the factors of coherency, co-ordination, collaboration and most importantly transparency.

But before emancipating these factors it should focus on establishing better policy instruments for its member states where they are able to show certain degree of loyalty and respect to the EU institutions. EU as a starting point shouldn’t focus on powering its institutions, but should create common grounds for negotiations that determine EU’s responsibility of the union in providing and establishing a flourishing cooperation. It should also try to create a certain level of security to its member states so that they value the essence of EU identity and its

representation.

When all these factors are in place EU should then start reviving the available documentation referring to the three pillars of the union and their functionality.

It is to say that EU has itself complicated the procedures with its institutions and member states. There was no consideration for details of coherency, national preference and state-society relations. But with consideration to these factors a lot of things within the union can be reformed like for instance in this regard the security issue. In addition the EU will gain the leverage of uncomplicated decision making modes and all the different dense levels of negotiation will be erased. Moreover, this would save a lot of time and would result in effective representation of the union.

Regardless, the implications of this paper underline the complications and difficulties EU possess at the moment.

Finally, once EU deals with its endemic problems, it wouldn’t face any contradictions in representing itself as a global actor and as a united front.

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6. Reflections

EU in comparison with the international community is better positioned to intervene in Syria and definitely has better possibilities. As a starting point it has imposed unprecedented sanctions but its role doesn’t come complimentary as the US is playing an equal role in conflict resolution. As a matter of fact, the US is the only country that is able to intervene militarily in any part of the world and EU is far from achieving this position (Blockmans 2012:1, 3).

However, it is essential for the EU to show a certain degree of optimism that can be built upon a new European Security Strategy (ESS). Would revising the existing document will be enough as member states hardly refer to it; the answer is ‘relevance requires revision’ (Biscop 2012:1). EU as of now faces other problems such as financial and economic crisis; at this point revision might be questionable. Regardless, the scarcer the resources are the more important the strategy. And as a helping tool why not consolidate the European External Action Service (EEAS) that remains questionable too as EEAS hasn’t been put into action considering the purpose of its creation.

In the state of modifying ESS, Sweden and Finland proposed a review that was not greatly appreciated; as the notion of ‘intellectual weight doesn’t equal political power seemed to persists’. From an international perspective US strategically shifted towards Asia-Pacific referring to a major geopolitical change availing as competitor and implying power over security issues. And does the EU have a strategy to cope with it seems to be questionable (Biscop 2012:2).

This all needs reforming the European strategy and considerate factors would be on not to write it but written by who. And there is definitely an urgent need for it, as the Arab spring is happening in spite of EU’s presence and this calls for a serious need of reforming the ESS. As leverage starts with legitimacy and public opinion through the region sees EU as a status quo power (Biscop 2012:2).

From a regional perspective the extent of cooperation within each regime is a sensitive one, as a lot of things can’t be necessarily foreseen. It is thereby a hard to comprehend on what things to consider, for instance;

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• _{Promotion of sectarianism;}

• Working with existing regimes without consolidating their more authoritarian traits and in persuading them towards transition with causing chaos.

• Being able to involve outside actors in regional arrangements than just supporting one; in order to avoid regional hegemony (Biscop 2012:2).

The EU in order to improvise these elements doesn’t necessarily need to start from scratch as it potentially possesses “substance to partnership, in the economic, social, political, and security field. Large-scale infrastructure projects, e.g. in the energy and transport sector; university scholarships; training and educating armed forces, police and judiciary; deploying in theatre to help neighbours secure their borders and combat security challenges emanating from within the region and further south. These are just few examples of real engagement” (Biscop 2012:3).

Unlike US, the EU can’t concentrate in projects in the Middle Eastern region as it is well embedded in bringing a change in its surrounding regions. However it lacks the financial thrust to do so and as its strategic partnership with its neighbours is seen to be unstable. In order to reconcile this situation it should concentrate on its periphery that would result in making it a peripheral power (Biscop 2012:3). Furthermore, Washington expects the EU to act efficiently in this regard and attain peace & security. It is not illogical as the US in other terms asking for European strategic autonomy. If the EU seems to be helpless in this regard, US will pertain to remain a European power. As no country of Europe is capable of

generating such capabilities on its own and the only possible solution is too sound as one; and yet again this calls for a united front.

From the NATO perspective, the Europeans are seen as internally divided and for NATO to rely on EU; it needs to reinforce itself (Biscop 2012:3). In order to that it has start with its European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) that just seems to stand as a pillar in NATO’s observation. With the entire crisis at the same time a pressure is averted towards EU strategic engagement and in case of no response; there is huge chance of EU foreign policy inevitably losing out. Another disappointing feature is the geopolitical implications due to which the prestige, legitimacy and attractiveness of the EU is being greatly damaged.

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and its capability to take resolute action. It also creates a loss of soft power and hard power; as its relative position in the world continues to decline (Biscop 2012:4).

Therefore it is vital for EU to concentrate on long term interests instead of short term. As the room for the long terms interests have the tendency to promote European ideology. Most importantly to come up with a new strategic course in the “priority areas of external action where member states agree and there is an added value in ‘Collective Action’: Broader neighbourhood, strategic partnerships, the multilateral architecture; and the EU’s role as a security provider” and to be one of the poles of the multipolar world (Biscop 2012:6).

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