Authority Patterns Over Time: a comparison of asymmetric relationships on a local level in India between the 1960s, 1980s and 2010s

Authority Patterns Over Time

- a comparison of asymmetric relationships on a local level

in India between the 1960s, 1980s and 2010s

Matilda Arvids

Bachelor thesis - Political Science C 15hp

Autumn 2020

Department of Government, Uppsala University

Supervisor: Hans Blomkvist

Abstract

This study seeks to investigate how authority patterns have changed over time in the Indian districts Guntur and Krishna, by focusing on authority patterns as social relationships. Previous research on authority patterns often focuses on authority patterns as regime types, describing whether a regime is democratic or autocratic. This study takes a different approach using Harry Eckstein’s definition of authority pattens as a subset of human asymmetric relationships, relationships constructing the hierarchy in society. Social hierarchies guide human behaviour and predicts well-being and even survival, why it is important to understand their nature. In order to answer the research question of this thesis, a qualitative method and a ”strategy of change” (comparison over time) is used. Three points in time are analysed: the 1960s, 1980s and 2010s. In 1961 political scientist Myron Weiner conducted a field study regarding political participation in five Indian districts, and in 1985 the professor of international affairs Atul Kohli redid his study in order to compare local politics over time. The main contribution of this thesis is to pick up where Kohli left off, and once again analyse contemporary local politics in one of the districts and compare the findings to Weiner’s and Kohli’s. This design offers a unique opportunity to compare local Indian politics, and authority patterns, over the course of nearly 60 years. It is shown that authority patterns have changed over time, mostly because of the intertwined process of changing caste dynamics. However, the findings indicate that authority patterns in itself is an ambiguous concept, why future research is needed to get a deeper understanding of the nature of authority patterns.

Table of contents

1. Introduction

3

1.1 Aim and research question 5

2. Previous research and theoretical framework

5

2.1 Previous research on authority patterns 6

2.2 Eckstein’s authority patterns 8

2.3 Summary of Theoretical Framework 12

3. Methodology and research design

13

3.1 Qualitative method 13

3.2 The strategy of change 14

3.3 Selection of cases and material 15

3.5 Operationalisation 16

3.6 Definitions and delimitations 17

4. Results and analysis

18

4.1 1960s - Local bosses and big men 18

4.2 1980s - New social groups entering the political arena 21 4.3 2010s - The lower castes as a political force on their own 23

4.4 Discussion 27

5. Conclusion

30

1. Introduction

With its 1.4 billion citizens, India is the worlds largest democracy. The country became 1

independent from Britain in 1947 and has held (mostly) free and fair elections ever since. 2

Noteworthy is that India has been described as one of the world’s most unlikely democracies, due to

its poverty, economic inequality and extreme ethnic diversity. Throughout the country there is a 3

great variety of regional, linguistic, caste, class, and religious differentiations. These traits are often

considered obstacles for democracy, yet India has been a relativity stable democracy for 70 years. 4

Furthermore, in 1990 India was included in the ”BRICs” - the emerging national economies expected to reach the heights of world economy. In a decade India’s economy surpassed those predictions by becoming one of the countries with the highest economic growth in the world, lifting

millions out of poverty. Together with China, India has been the fastest growing economy in the 5

world in recent years. 6

Contemporary India has an increasing prosperity, yet developmental challenges remain. India is a

society characterised by economic inequality, still partly organised by caste. The remaining 7

divisions of the caste system are being compound by the new income inequalities arising from

India’s economic success. India is one of the most economically unequal countries in the world, 8

with inequality rising sharply for the last three decades. The economic inequality is added to a

society already fractured along the lines of religion, region, gender and caste. The importance of 9

caste today is debated, however it is still present. Caste refers to a hierarchal order of social groups of which one is born into, traditionally determining a substantial part of one’s circumstances of life. The caste hierarchies are eroding, however the higher positions in India are still dominated by higher castes, while the uneducated and poor are mainly lower castes, which illustrate its presence. 10

Landguiden. Indien.

1

Tudor, Maya and Slater, Dan. The Content of Democracy: Nationalist Parties and Inclusive Ideologies in India and Indonesia. In Bermeo, Nancy

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Gina, and Deborah J. Yashar (Eds.). Parties, Movements and Democracy in the Developing World. New York, NY, Cambridge University Press. 2016. p. 28

Encyclopædia Britannica. India.

3

Except for a hiatus between 1975 and 1977, when the Constitution of India was temporarily suspended.

4

LSE IDEAS. India: the next superpower? IDEAS reports - special reports. Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.). LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and

5

Political Science, London, UK. 2012.

BBC News. India no longer world’s fastest-growing economy. BBC. 2019-05-31.

6

Elliott, Carolyn. Political society, civil society, and the state in India. Asian Survey. Vol. 52, nr. 2, 2012: 348-372.

7

LSE IDEAS, 2012. p. 4

8

Oxfam International. India: extreme inequality in numbers. 2020.

9

Nationalencyklopedin. Indien.

Inequalities, economic and social, are a concern in almost all countries around the world. Inequalities create hierarchic orders consisting of asymmetric relationships between people. The

asymmetry means that people vary in their level of power, influence, skill, and dominance. 11

Everyone experience these asymmetric relationships somehow, why it is important to understand their nature. Social hierarchies exist in all societies, but differ between contexts. What they all have in common though, is the power asymmetries between the ”weaker” and the ”stronger” groups,

which are amplified the stronger the hierarchies are. Social hierarchies guide human behaviour 12

and predict well-being, morbidity, and even survival. India is a country characterised by very 13

distinct social hierarchies, why it is a suitable case for studying the phenomena. There have been major shifts in relations of power and authority in many areas of India since independence,

challenging the dominance of high caste and land-holding village lords. In order to analyse these 14

relations this thesis will pick up where professor Atul Kohli left off. In 1985 he re-did a study first done in 1961 in order to compare local Indian politics over time. His work is a perfect starting ground to once again compare local Indian politics over time. This thesis will apply the perspective of authority patterns - politics as asymmetric relationships, or social hierarchies - on the two previously studies done together with a third study done in recent years, enabling a comparison of hierarchies between the 1960s, 1980s and the 2010s.

The first study was done in 1961 by political scientist Myron Weiner. He conducted a field study in five Indian districts on political participation. The purpose of the study was to explain the success of the Indian National Congress Party (the Congress party), which had won every election since India’s independence. Weiner argued that to understand the party, political life must be analysed, resulting in five in-depth case studies based on anthropological data and political development theories. In his conclusion Weiner emphasised the adaptive nature of the Congress party as one of its main characteristics contributing to the success - ”It does not mobilize, it aggregates. It does not

seek to innovate, it seeks to adapt.” 15

Koski, Jessica E. Hongling Xie, and Olson, Ingrid R. Understanding Social Hierarchies: The Neural and Psychological Foundations of Status

11

Perception. Social Neuroscience. Vol. 10, nr. 5, 2015: 527-550.

Toelstede, Björn. Social Hierarchies in Democracies and Authoritarianism: The Balance between Power Asymmetries and Principal-Agent Chains.

12

Rationality and Society. Vol. 32, nr. 3, 2020: 334–366.

Zink, Caroline F. Tong, Yunxia. Chen, Qiang. Bassett, Danielle S. Stein, Jason L. Meyer-Lindenberg, Andreas. Know Your Place: Neural Processing

13

of Social Hierarchy in Humans. Neuron. Vol 58, nr 2, 2008: 273-283.

Boyce, Thomas W. Social stratification, health, and violence in the very young. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Vol. 1036, nr. 1, 2004: 47–68.

Sapolsky, Robert M. Social Status and Health in Humans and Other Animals. Annual Review of Anthropology. Vol. 33, nr. 1, 2004: 393-418. Price, Pamela G. Changing Meanings of Authority in Contemporary Rural India. Qualitative Sociology Vol. 29, nr.3, 20. p. 301

Two decades later Atul Kohli, a professor of international affairs and ex-student of Weiner, revisited the districts Weiner studied in order analyse political change in India between the 1960s and the 1980s. In the 1960s India was considered the great success of developing countries, but in the 1980s India experienced growing challenges to its political stability. The purpose of Kohli’s study was to describe how and explain why India has become difficult to govern. He revisited the district chosen by Weiner and conducted the same study again. Kohli compared his findings with Weiner’s and emphasised the erosion of India’s established patterns of authority as one of the factors contributing

to India’s political instability. This study will explore whether the authority patterns have 16

continued to change or not by studying one of the districts - Guntur. 17

1.1 Aim and research question

The purpose of this study is to build upon the work of Weiner and Kohli, by using Kohli’s findings regarding authority pattens as a starting point. A field study done in recent years, substantially similar to Weiner’s and Kohli’s, will be added to the comparison. This thesis is thereby contributing to the research by designing a study relatively uncommon within political science - the study of a phenomena in the same local context over the course of nearly 60 years. Furthermore, there has been several studies regarding caste, class, ethnicity and religion in India. However, there has not been many studies done on authority patterns as defined in this study. This study is primarily subject to political science, however, defining authority patterns as asymmetric relationships moves this thesis across disciplines such as anthropology and sociology as well. Drawing upon the findings of Weiner and Kohli the research question for this study will be:

-

2. Previous research and theoretical framework

In this chapter the theoretical foundation will be outlined. The previous research mainly consists of the works by Weiner and Kohli, presented when comparing the results. However, to situate the concept of authority patterns within the literature, a short summary of Kohli’s (rather absent) definition of authority patterns will be introduced, followed by a brief presentation of how other

Kohli, Atul. Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1990. p.11

16

Guntur is a rural district located on the southeast coast of India in the state Andhra Pradesh.

scholars have used the concept. The second section provides the theoretical definition of authority patterns by Harry Eckstein, the theoretical framework used in this thesis.

2.1 Previous research on authority patterns

The concept of authority patterns is a central theme throughout Kohli’s book, yet he does not properly define it. He writes about traditional patterns of authority and compares it to ”caste

structure in the village” , he mentions ”the vertical patterns of fealty in India’s civil society” and 18 19

presents one of his main findings as:

”During the 1950s and 1960s, the Congress party had succeeded in penetrating India’s countryside by aligning itself with local ”bosses”. Over the past two decades, however, the power struggles in the countryside have increased, sometimes aimed at political goals, and sometimes economic goals. The subject of contention have been positions of power and status, state-controlled patronage and access to educational institutions, and economic rewards to be deprived from land and wages. As a consequence, the traditional authority patters have been severely challenged.” 20

The aim of Kohli’s study is to chart and explain India’s growing problems of governability, using

the question ”How have authority patterns changed over time?” . In the results Kohli presents 21

findings about the ”political structure of community power” and how it is based on a combination 22

of control over economic resources, traditional high status and the hierarchy of the caste system. A general definition of authority is ”the social relationship where a person or a group has influence over another person or group, and where the influence is perceived as justifiable or legitimate by the

latter”. Consequently, one could assume that Kohli implies that an individual with economic 23

resources, high status and a relatively high ranking in the caste system is someone enjoying a (perceived) legitimate influence over those not holding these privileges, and that is the pattern that has changed between the 1960s and the 1980s.

The concept of authority patterns as expressed by Kohli, together with the dictionary definition of authority, includes contested concepts as ”influence”, ”relations” and ”hierarchy”. Although this study will go into the depths of each and every one of the concepts, authority patterns will be more

Kohli, 1990. p. 4 18 Ibid. p. 6 19 Ibid. p. 14 20 Ibid. p. 13 21 Ibid. 191 22

extensively defined to increase the validity of the study. First however, a short section on how other scholars have used the concept will work as a demonstration on the non-consistent use of both authority and authority patterns, and why a proper definition is necessary in this thesis.

The concept of authority, like other similar contested notions (power, influence, control) has a history of varying definitions. Authority is probably most used as Weber defined it: ”the probability

that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given groups of persons”. 24

Peabody suggested that authority is either 1) the property of a person or office, especially the right to issue orders, 2) a relationship between two offices, one superior and the other subordinate, such that both incumbents perceive the relationship as legitimate, 3) the quality of a communication by

virtue of which it is accepted. 25

While continuing the definition of the concept of authority patterns, the ambiguity persists. Kakar uses authority patterns as the relationships between two individuals, one superior and one subordinate, which is determined by the positions they occupy in the formal hierarchy of a work

organisation, and the interaction patterns in between them. Elbahnasawy et al. use authority 26

patterns to describe forms of government ”[...] democratic reforms that change the authority pattern

from autocracy to democracy[...] ” , and Boese et al. use the concept in a similar way ”[...] we refer 27

to patterns of authority, democracy, regime types [and] institutional configurations

interchangeably.” The concept of authority patterns is often discussed in theories about political 28

(in)stability, whereby ”political institutions perform better if their authority patterns are congruent

with those of social institutions and, importantly, if they are internally consonant” . However, this 29

study is based on Kohli’s understanding of authority patterns, and he focuses on social relations on an individual level, rather than regime types. He describes authority patterns on local level, where the perceived legitimate influence some have over others have changed. One that has done a

substantial work on authority patterns as social relationships is Harry Eckstein. 30

Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organisations. New York: Oxford University Press. 1947. p. 152

24

Peabody, Robert L. "Authority." In D. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan and Free Press. 1968:

25

473-477.

Kakar, Sudhir. Authority Patterns and Subordinate Behavior in Indian Organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly. Vol. 16, nr. 3, 1971. p. 298

26

Elbahnasawy, Nasr G. Ellis, Michael A. and Adom, Assandé Désiré. Political Instability and the Informal Economy. World Development. Vol. 85,

27

2016. p. 31

Boese, Vanessa A., et al. Visualizing Authority Patterns over Space and Time. Series 2020:96. The Varieties of Democracy Institute. Working Paper.

28

Nr. 96, 2020. p. 1

Knutsen, Carl Henrik and Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv. Institutional Characteristics and Regime Survival: Why are Semi-Democracies Less Durable

29

Than Autocracies and Democracies? American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 59, nr. 3, 2015. p. 657

Harry Eckstein, 1924-1999, a prominent and respected social scientist, who made significant substantive as well as methodological contributions

30

2.2 Eckstein’s authority patterns

Eckstein proposes a new approach to the scope of political studies: to equate political analysis with the study of authority patterns. He believes there are two flaws in political science; a too narrow

focus on state-organisations and a too broad focus on all asymmetric human relations. He argues 31

that there has been too much attention on politics as ”governments”, ”state-organisations” and

”political parties” as we know them in the West. He thinks that this rigid way of defining politics 32

is not very fruitful when studying societies that are not Western. However, Eckstein argues that the response to the objection of seeing politics as the study of state-organisations, has been a tendency to define politics in terms social functions rather than social structures. Functionalists believe 33 34

that all aspects of a society - institutions, norms, roles - are important to study. Eckstein argues that the problem with making politics the study of political functions is that it becomes the study of "the whole of social life in all its facets”, and would lead to theories so general they become uninformative. A functional approach to politics broadens the scope of the field at the cost of

eliminating its boundaries almost completely. In other words, Eckstein believes that the scope of 35

politics should be broaden from state-organisations, but not as wide as functionalists suggests.

The argument for broadening the scope of the field of politics is that states are few in number, complex and variable on many dimensions, and to generalise from a small N and a large variance is difficult. The solution is a to find something that exists in state-organisations as well as in other

contexts, replacing the focus on the state to something that applies to all cultures. Functionalists 36

would propose that politics should be the study of asymmetric human relationships, arguing that governments are complexes of hierarchy and rule, consisting of power relations and the control by some over others. This means that someone controls more than he is controlled, and that asymmetry can be found in all human relationships, on all social levels, and in state-organisations. Eckstein’s objection to equating politics with asymmetric relations is that it delimits very little - political scientists are interested in the study of "political" asymmetries, not all social asymmetries. Therefore, Eckstein uses a taxonomy to classify and delimit social relationships into asymmetric political relationships. This method is a systematic use of ”branching”, or progressive

Eckstein, Harry. Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry. The American Political Science Review. Vol. 67, No. 4. 1973. p. 1142

31

Ibid. p. 1143

32

See functionalism and structuralism

33

Eckstein, 1973. p. 1144

34

Ibid. p. 1144

differentiation, where categories are gradually narrowed. An example from biology is the differentiation of lions: organisms-animals-chordates-mammals-carnivora-cats-felis-lions-individuals. Eckstein wants to find the perfect trade-off between homogeneity and extensiveness, using the same method on social relationships.

”For the sake of homogeneity, we do not want to include all asymmetric relations, although we do want political phenomena to be a distinct subset of such relations. For inclusiveness, we do not want the conception to be limited to state-organizations, although we do want such organizations to be a distinct subset of the class.” 37

Eckstein constructs a taxonomy of social relationships where political relations are a subset of asymmetric relations. He defines these asymmetric political relationships as authority patterns - ”a set of asymmetric relations among hierarchically ordered members of a social unit that involves the direction of the unit” . 38

Figure. 1. The place of authority patterns in a taxonomy of social relationships. 39

To illustrate how Eckstein’s taxonomy works one can use ”political party” as an example. A social unit is a collective of individuals (the political party) consisting of asymmetric relationships. Some

Eckstein, 1973. p. 1149 37 Ibid. p. 1153 38 Ibid. p. 1152 39

of these asymmetric relationships are with other social units, perhaps other political parties (between-unit asymmetries). Within the political party (within-in unit asymmetries) the members are hierarchically ordered, some are party leaders and others are party members (between-level asymmetries). The directives between the party leader and the party member (directive relations) are what Eckstein calls authority pattern - ”politics”. The same approach can be used where there are no political parties or state-organisations; a village consists of asymmetric relationships between hierarchically ranked members giving directives - politics. Put differently, Eckstein views politics as something in between the study of state-organisations and the study of social relationships. Eckstein’s case for equating politics with authority patterns provides a concept that is broad enough to serve as a basis for inductive science, yet not too broad to loose subjective interest or makes informative theory unlikely. It also helps highlight the counterparts of state-organisations where such organisations do not exist. Disregarding the study of nongovernmental authority patterns can potentially leave the study of "polities" uninformed by much that can be extremely useful for understanding them.

To study authority patterns certain tools must be developed, starting with a systematic description of them. The core of the authority patterns is the relation among superordinates and subordinates. Asymmetric relationships, by definition, includes superordinates and subordinates, and the interactions between them. Eckstein and Ted R. Gurr developed general dimensions on which authority patterns vary, and this study will use four of them as a hierarchy-parameter:

• Participation: subordinates generally attempt to influence the directive activities of

superordinates, these are acts of participation. 40

• Responsiveness: the complement to participation, the extent to which superordinates are

influenced by subordinates and seek inputs from them. 41

• Compliance: complement to the directive superordinate - the compliant subordinate who behave

according to directives. 42

Eckstein, Harry and Gurr, Ted R. Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry. New York: Wiley. 1975. p. 60

40

Ibid. p. 67

• Distance: the perception of differentials in the general worthiness of superordinates and

subordinates. 43

The dimensions participation, responsiveness, compliance and distance all relate to the superordinate-subordinate relation, where the first three dimensions show the influence relations among them, and the last dimension shows the inequalities among them. By looking for these dimensions in the material it is possible to investigate what hierarchal political relations have looked like in the Guntur district from the 1960s up until now.

Participation refers to when subordinates try to influence the directives of the superordinates. It is essential to understand the Participation dimension to be able to estimate the degrees of asymmetry in the relations between superordinates and subordinates. Asymmetry is inherit in the very definition of subordination - but the degree is not. Therefore, Participation is a continuous

dimension of which social units can experience more or less of. There is a problem in specifying 44

the poles of this continuous spectrum. However, the purpose of this thesis is to compare the degrees of participation, not putting specific values on them.

Responsiveness is the complimentary dimension to Participation. Members of a social unit try to influence the superordinates and the superordinates respond to it. Responsiveness can be seen as the actual effects of Participation and the two dimensions need to be understood together, as less Participation yields less need for Responsiveness. The polars of Responsiveness are autocratic (self-sustained power) and what Eckstein describes as alterocarcy (an antonym for autocracy). In the case of autocracy superordinates ignore any feedback from subordinates and disregard all participation. Alterocracy on the other hand means that superordinates always have the ”public opinion” in mind,

and value the preferences of subordinates as much as their own. 45

Compliance refers to whether subordinates behave according to the directives given by superordinates or not. Superordinates seek to influence the behaviour of subordinates and subordinates comply to a certain degree. Like the other dimensions, subordinates are placed along a continuum of Compliance. There are two kinds of compliance; one can have a general disposition to

Eckstein and Gurr, 1975. p. 81

43

Ibid. p. 61

44

Ibid. p. 67

comply with the superordinate, or one could calculate the costs and benefits of compliant behaviour and then decides to comply. In order to rank a subordinate on the Compliance continuum two polars are created where the highest compliance can be called submissiveness - directives are complied with simply because they were issued by authorities. The lowest level of compliance, total

non-compliance, can be called insubordination. 46

Unlike the ”influence dimensions” described so far, Distance is an inequality dimension. Superordinates are both ”superiors” and ”controllers”, and the influence dimensions tell us to what extent superordinate can control a social unit. The inequality dimensions on the other hand, refer to what extent the superordinate is superior, that is the steepness of the hierarchal order. Distance is the perception of differentials in the general worthiness of superordinates and subordinates. A low level of distance indicates that superordinates and subordinates are equally worthy. Although, one must have in mind that the simple fact that one is subordinated inherently entail a degree of inequality. The highest level of distance is when one group of people are regarded so superior to another group of people that they do not belong on the same scale of worthiness, and simply cannot be compared to one another. An example is the caste system, where in ’’pure” caste system there is an ordinal jump between each caste, making them incommensurable. However, it is possible to rank a caste as

higher or lower in relation to other castes in the system. 47

2.3 Summary of Theoretical Framework

This chapter has provided the theoretical foundation of this thesis. This study is a continuation on the observation that authority patterns have changed in Guntur. Kohli did not define authority patterns why a proper review of the concept was necessary. Previous research on the different uses of authority and authority patterns has been presented. The theoretical framework for this thesis builds upon Harry Eckstein’s case for equating politics with authority patterns. He describes authority patterns as a subset of asymmetrical relationships. The main purpose of this chapter is to theoretically discuss authority patterns in order provide a deeper understanding for authority patterns as a concept. The concept can be broken down into dimensions, where this study will focus on the dimensions participation, responsiveness, compliance and distance.

Eckstein and Gurr, 1975. p. 71

3. Methodology and research design

This chapter presents the methodology interlaced with the methodology criticism. Validity, reliability and operationalisation will also be discussed, followed by a presentation of definitions and delimitations.

3.1 Qualitative method

The thesis re-analyses three studies using a qualitative method. The aim of a qualitative method is to provide a deeper understanding and interpretation of a subject, by asking questions such as what, why and how, rather than the quantitative “how many”. The purpose of this study is to examine how authority patterns have changed over time, making it suitable for a text analysis. Furthermore, authority patterns, as defined in this thesis, has not been excessively studied, why a qualitative method is suitable since it allows for more complex and rich data to be analysed. It also allows the

interpretation to be relatively flexible and permits adaptability to a certain case. This is crucial, as 48

this study applies the theoretical definition of authority patterns on different studies, done in different times dealing with different angles of approaches to local politics. The qualitative method combined with the design of a single case study over time allows for an in-depth examination, increasing the possibilities to perceive shifts in authority pattern practices.

The text material will be searched for meaningful units relevant to the research question. These units are shortened and presented in the analysis while carefully retaining their core. The guiding

principles of analysis will be transparency combined with quotes supporting the interpretations. 49

Analytical tools in the form of questions will be used (presented in the chapter

”operationalisation”). One of the main weaknesses of qualitative research is its (non-)ability to 50

provide generalisable conclusions, as the generalisability often decreases as the number of units of analysis decreases. Nonetheless, the aim of this thesis is not to generalise the results, but to understand the change in asymmetric relationships within the specific context. Scholar have argued

that it is difficult to generalise due to India’s diversity, processes are often highly localised. 51

Ormston Rachel. Spencer, Liz. Barnard, Matt. Snape. Dawn. The Foundations of Qualitative Re- search. In: Ritchie, Jane. Lewis, Jane.

48

McNaughton Nicholls, Carol. Ormston, Rachel. (eds). Qualitative Re- search Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers. 2nd ed. SAGE. 2014. p. 3

Esaiasson, Peter. Gilljam, Mikael. Oscarsson, Henrik. Wängnerud, Lena. Metodpraktikan: Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. 4th

49

edition. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik. 2012. p. 228 Ibid. p. 213

50

Thapar-Björkert, Suruchi, Maiorano, Diego and Blomkvist, Hans. Politics as negotiation: Changing caste norms in rural India. Development and

51

However, to study a single case could deepen the understanding of the general, if the study is closely connected to previous and to the discourse.

Another shortcoming of the qualitative method is the degree of reliability. When interpreting the material, one must be aware of the risk of a subjective interpretation, and prevent that risk with transparency and a systematic proceeding. To strive for neutrality in the gathering, analysis and presentation of data is crucial to avoid a biased result. However, avoiding bias altogether is

impossible, something one must be aware of when using qualitative methods. In this study, the 52

field studies done by Weiner, Kohli and Philip (presented under ”Selection of cases and material”) are the main focus, however, findings from other studies will be presented to support the analysis and balance the risk of biased results.

3.2 The strategy of change

The objective of this thesis is to describe how authority patterns have changed. Descriptive studies are the fundament of other studies - one cannot explain a phenomena without describing it first. A systematic description is fundamental in relation to all other types of studies, such as explanatory

ones. Furthermore, the tendency of using authority patterns in different ways makes a descriptive 53

study even more important, to contribute to the crystallisation of the concept. One way of meaningfully describe a phenomena is to compare it over time - describing change. Esaiasson et al.

call it the strategy of change (”förändringsstrategin”). By applying the same analytical tool 54

(questions asked to the material) to the same sort of texts (analysis of local politics in Guntur/ Krishna), written in different points of time (1960s, 1980s, 2010s) one can make the credible assumption that there has been a change if the answers differ, as the only factor changing is time.

The disadvantage of the strategy is its rather modest conclusions - that something has changed - in comparison to a more dramatic conclusion describing the absolute nature of a phenomena. However, the loss of information is relatively reasonable in comparison with the value of a more confident conclusion. Furthermore, the conclusion from a study describing change over time do present essential information about the phenomena. An obvious advantage of the strategy of change is the decreased requirement for validity. Describing the absolute nature of a phenomena requires a

Ormston et al. 2014. p. 22

52

Teorell, Jan. and Svensson, Torsten. Att fråga och att svara. 1:4 edition. Stockholm: Liber. 2007. p. 23

high degree of agreement between theoretical definition and operational indicators in order for the result to become interesting. When comparing a phenomena over time however, the validity only needs to be moderately high in order for the conclusion to become interesting. If the operational indicator shows change, there has probably been a change in reality as well. That logic is used in this study; the operationalisation of authority patterns might be rather abstract decreasing the validity. However, if the theoretical definition and the operational indicator at least captures authority patterns to some extent, a conclusion regarding a potential change in authority patterns is trustworthy. 55

3.3 Selection of cases and material

The selection of cases in this thesis is limited to the districts Weiner and Kohli visited; Kheda, Guntur, Belgaum, Calcutta and Madurai. Several cases could have been of interest, but an in-depth study of one district is feasible within the framework of a bachelor thesis. Moreover, this thesis was awarded with a Minor Field Study (MFS) scholarship and was designed accordingly. When applying for the scholarship one needed a contact person in the field. The department of government at Uppsala University had an exchange with the department of political science at the University of Hyderabad, and therefore the contact person for the MFS was a professor at the University of Hyderabad. The district closes to Hyderabad is Guntur district, why it was chosen. However, due to the current circumstances regarding Covid-19, the field trip had to be cancelled and the thesis re-designed.

The selection of cases then rested upon the selection of material. When re-designing the study two considerations were in mind; to find a field study substantially similar to Weiner and Kohli’s, but also suitable for answering the research question using text analysis. A field study done by Jessy K. Philip in 2009-2010 met all the criteria, however it was conducted in the neighbouring district to Guntur - the Krishna district. Guntur and Krishna districts have similarities on the most determinant factors. They are geographically close, Guntur have a population of 4 800 000 and Krishna of 4 500 000, they have similar history of election results and similar caste structures. Most importantly; they are both part of the richer Costal Andhra region, giving them similar economies. Based on the similarities between Guntur and Krishna district, together with the fact that the field study met the rest of the criteria, the study by Philip was considered suitable. The fact that Krishna district is

Esaiasson et al. 2012. p. 147

analysed instead of Guntur is a shortcoming of this study. Nonetheless, Guntur and Krishna are both part of the state Andhra Pradesh. A lot of studies divides Andhra Pradesh into rural Andhra and costal Andhra, and examines all the districts within these regions together. Guntur and Krishna are both part of costal Andhra, why they should be relatively interchangeable.

3.5 Operationalisation

The term authority patterns will presumably not be explicitly written in the material, the concept is latent. The first step of the analysis is to distinguish the sections describing the relationships between superordinates and subordinates. The hierarchy itself might not be addressed, yet sentences

such as ”[he] had instructed his workers to support the Swatantra candidate…” points to a person 56

of a high position within the hierarchy, having the power to control the political behaviour of others. The very fact that someone is an employer, higher caste or landlord does imply that the person holds a high position within the hierarchy.

The theoretical definition of authority patterns is ”a set of asymmetric relations among hierarchically ordered members of a social unit that involves the direction of the unit”. If one systematically breaks done the concepts, dimensions can be distinguished. These dimensions will be operationalised through a set of questions. Eckstein and Gurr suggested the question ”In general terms, about how often, if ever, do the subordinate try to influence the superordinates in regard to

how the unit is run?” to measure the participation dimension. The questions of this thesis will 57

draw upon those constructed by Eckstein and Gurr:

-

-

-

-

Participation and responsiveness dimensions may vary quite closely together, because if the

participation is low the superordinates will not have any input to which they might respond. 58

Weiner, 1967. p. 187

56

Eckstein and Gurr, 1975. p. 310

Similarly, the act of non-compliance could be an indirect act of participation, if subordinates try to influence the superordinates by not complying to their directives.

3.6 Definitions and delimitations

This is not a study about caste, but when examining asymmetric relationships on a local level in India, it is impossible to avoid caste relations. Caste is an Indian system of social structure and

ranking of groups. Traditionally caste affiliation determines profession, marriage partner, and a 59

persons place in a hierarchal order. The relations between people of different castes are govern on the notions of pollution and purity, those at the bottom of the hierarchy are regarded to be

permanently polluted, previously known as ”the untouchable caste”. In addition, there is a 60

relationship between caste and socio-economic position. Caste can be understood as a social

institution which legitimates differences in class and power relations. Caste is closely intertwined 61

with class, why class and caste prerequisites tend to reinforce one another. Some scholars argue that

class and caste must be analysed conjointly to understand the nature of social relations in India. 62

The is one of the advantages of using authority patterns as a theoretical framework - it includes both caste and class in the analysis.

Eckstein’s theory divides individuals into two categories: superordinates and subordinates. Put simply, superordinates are in control while subordinates are being controlled. The relations between the two form the core of the authority pattern. For theoretical reasons the societies of Guntur and Krishna are divided into two categories of superordinates and subordinates. The superordinates in this study will include the wealthy, upper, middle or dominant caste, the landlords and the political

representatives. The poor, lower castes (Dalits) , labourers and voters are the subordinates. These 63

are not by any means homogeneous categories. Problems come with the classification, as notice in another field study done in Guntur (among other districts): ”[…] a large farmer who is also the head of the village council could be classified as a ‘politician’, but also as a farmer. Similarly, a former head of the village council who is now a worker […], could be classified as a politician or a

Nationalencyklopedin. Kastväsen.

59

Inkinen, Magdalena. Mobilising the lower castes: The rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party in India. Department of government, Uppsala University.

60

2003. p. 31

Harriss, John. Reflections on caste and class, hierarchy and dominance. Seminar, (633). 2012.

61

Harriss-White, Barbara. India Working: Essays on Society and Economy. Vol. 8, nr. 8.Cambridge University Press. Cambridge: New York.

62

2003;2002.

Guru, Gopal. and Chakravarty, Anuradha. Who are the country’s poor? Social movement politics and Dalit poverty. In Ray, Raka and Fainsod Katzenstein, Mary (eds.). Social movements in India: Poverty, power, and politics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2005: 135-160.

Throughout the three studies, lower castes are referred to as Harijan, lower castes, backward classes/castes, scheduled castes and Dalits. Earlier also

63

beneficiary of social policy programmes.” The difficulties knowing if a labourer is a lower caste 64

or if a landlord also is a political candidate are eliminated when using the dichotomous categories of authority patterns. The importance in this thesis is to distinguish those who can exercise control over others from those who are being controlled, put differently, where benefits of the relationship

are unequally distributed. 65

4. Results and analysis

The analysis will be structured as follows: first, each study, or point in time, will be presented together with relevant information about the context. Comments on the general appearance of authority patterns will be intertwined with the results. Second, a discussion will be held, applying the different dimensions on the results, combined with insights about authority patterns as a theoretical framework.

4.1 1960s - Local bosses and big men

When Weiner visited Guntur, the political arena was dominated by the Congress party ruled by an educated, nationalist elite. The business class and the landed and caste elites were brought into the coalition as well. This ruling elite was perceived as legitimate partly because traditional authority

patterns, such as the caste structure in the villages, were still intact. The main characteristics of the 66

hierarchal relationships - the authority patterns - in the 1960s in Guntur were the omnipresent caste system, and factions consisting of patron-client relationships.

A patron-client relation is an asymmetric relationship between a person of authority, social status or

wealth and another person who benefits from, or is dependent upon, their support. The 67

relationship could involve asymmetric but mutually beneficial transactions associated with free

exchange, or, it could be a power relation based on exploitation and domination of the client. The 68

asymmetry within the relationships is generally based on different access to recourses in a stratified

society. A faction is a group of people within a larger group, which opposes some of the ideas of 69

Thapar-Björkert et al. 2021. p. 7

64

Despite some semantic clumsiness the terms authority patterns, asymmetric relationships and hierarchy will be used interchangeably throughout the

65

thesis

Kohli, 1990. p. 4

66

Encyclopædia Britannica. Clientelism.

67

Murugesan, Anand. Electoral Clientelism and Vote Buying. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.

68

Roniger, Luis. Patron-Client Relations, Social and Anthropological Study of,. Wright, James (ed.). International Encyclopedia of the Social and

the larger group and therefore starts to fights for its own ideas. In Guntur, these factions were units 70

of political action both within parties and villages, and the relationship between the two was often a determinant in voting outcomes - ”the relationship between party faction and village faction is the

single most important variable affecting the outcome of many (but not all) elections” . In other 71

words, these village faction worked as ”vote-banks” for political parties or candidates. Vote-banking, a term first introduced by M. N. Srinivas, is a process wherein hierarchical, caste-influenced patronage ties are used to mobilise votes for a party. This mobilisation is often a reinforcement of the bond between the party and the voters - mediated by the relations of social trust between voters and their patron. The process of winning support for upcoming elections often crystallises parties around patrons. Each patron has a vote-bank which he can place at the disposal

of a party or a political candidate. 72

Thus, the patrons were often faction leaders involved in politics. Many of the conflicts in Guntur date back several generations, and rivalry between factions of landowning families from the same caste and the same village occurs frequently. Connected to these wealthy landholding families are other families, often of a different caste, related to the patron family through networks of economic relationships, such as employment. Patron-client relations bring artisans and agricultural labourers into the faction led by the landowner. The leaders of the faction are typically influential members of a dominant caste. The power these faction leaders had was further strengthen when local governments were given more legal power and larger budgets, concentrating a lot of power in the

hands of politicians, resulting in increased patronage. Factions were likely to fight each other over 73

the control of the local government, and faction leaders consequently behaved like political party bosses. Many landowning families got involved in politics to protect themselves from land reforms,

and their participation further enhanced their influence and power in their community. When 74

Weiner visited the district, the association between a village faction and a party faction was the

determinant of how a substantial part of a village would vote (vote-banking). The patron-client 75

relations, which the factions were build upon, meant that the faction leaders could decide how their faction would vote. Men of higher castes, employers and landlords controlled the political

Collins Dictionary. Faction.

70

Weiner, 1967. p. 134

71

Björkman, Lisa. ”You can’t Buy a Vote": Meanings of Money in a Mumbai Election. American Ethnologist. Vol, 41, nr. 4, 2014. p. 619

72 Weiner, 1967. p. 182 73 Ibid. p. 154 74 Ibid. p. 198 75

behaviour of the people dependent on them. This relationship of dependency illustrates how 76

hierarchal the authority patterns were.

When Weiner visited Guntur district the Congress party dominated the politics. The success of the party Weiner concluded, is partly because of its ability to adapt itself to local power structures. 77

The party recruits from among the influential locals, the patrons, giving them political roles similar to the leader roles within the traditional society. Hence, the Congress party reinforced the hierarchal relationships, giving the ones with influence even more influence. Weiner noted that these influential men used their party influence to strengthen their village ties and use their village ties to

strengthen their party ties. Again, a reinforcement of the established authority patterns at the time - 78

men with influence gained more influence, simply because they had influence in the first place. The characteristic feature of the political, and social, spheres in Guntur during the 60s was the factions led by influential men.

The fact that the state politicians were interested in these faction leaders is an indication of how influential these faction leaders were. The state politicians understood the importance of having

these men on their side, as they could decide how a large part of the village would vote. The 79

voting patterns of labourers and lower castes are another example of the power these men had over the ones dependent on them. Labourers and lower castes usually voted for the Communist party in the national elections, but for the Congress party in the local elections. The reason for this voting behaviour was that local elections were held by a show of hands, and lower castes dependent upon

patronage could not afford to vote against their patrons in open elections. Again, a confirmation 80

of the steepness and strength of hierarchies at that time. However, lower castes started to become increasingly interesting to those involved in politics. Weiner noted a growing responsiveness to the demands of groups previously neglected. Political incentives forced upper-caste men to assist the

lower castes (for whom they had little sympathy for earlier). Even though the lower castes had a 81

long way to go before they had the political influence equivalent to their size, politicians started to

pay more attention to their needs. 82

Weiner, 1967. p. 189 76 Ibid. p. 15 77 Ibid. p. 208 78 Ibid. p. 168 79 Ibid. p. 170 80 Ibid. p. 181 81

When Weiner visited Guntur different processes concentrated a lot of power i the hands of a few influential men. First, the men where of higher caste and wealthy, and created factions consisting of patron-client relationships. Second, these men where involved in politics to increase their influence and protect their interests. Third, the Congress party recognised the power these men had and recruited them into the party, strengthening their influence even further. Based on the nature of the patron-client relationships, there seemed to be a low participation, low responsiveness, high compliance and a big perceived distance between the patron and his clients.

4.2 1980s - New social groups entering the political arena

At the time Weiner visited Guntur, hierarchies in society were strengthened through the Congress party. The party aligned itself with socially powerful local bosses rather than fought against them. This structure of authority was perceived as legitimate, and a network of influential people was created consisting of the landed, the wealthy, the local government leaders and members of the higher castes. In other words, the district was mainly dominated by a political elite. 25 years later, the political scene has changed. The main characteristic of hierarchal political relationships, the authority patterns, in the 1980s was the mobilisation of previously passive social groups.

In his study Kohli focused, among other things, on the changing structures of community power in Guntur. He found that members from the dominate castes and other ”big men” gradually lost their

influence over the political behaviour of lower castes. As mentioned earlier the Congress party 83

was not used to mobilise voters, it simply aggregated support. Its unthreatened position as ”the only

game in town” and the structure of vote banks, enabled the party to focus only on the most 84

influential men of Guntur. The Congress party used the already existing power relations in society for its advantage. A few ”big men” of the dominate community were able to sway the political behaviour of other communities. The structure of community power - a combination of control over economic resources, high caste and a traditional high status - worked as a basis for the party to consolidate its power. The Congress aimed their attention towards influential men and communities, and once they joined the party they used their influence to sway electoral supports towards the Congress. In the 1980s the domination of the established elites in local communities began to be

Kohli, 1990. p. 6

83

Ibid. p. 76

challenged. In Guntur, the capacity of the local higher caste leaders to influence the political behaviour of lower castes had diminished considerably.

Intertwined with the process of the elites’ decreasing influence, was the Congress party’s electoral

decline. The Congress, which had dominated the politics for a long time, faced competition. As 85

this happened, support from previously unmobilised groups suddenly became crucial. Lower 86

castes and other previously neglected communities became of political interest. The higher castes still constituted a large part of the politically influentials, however, numerically the biggest and therefore politically highly significant social groups were the (heterogenous) lower castes. One of the most important changes between the 1960s and the 1980s was that members of the higher castes

could not control the political behaviour of lower castes to the same extent as earlier. As Kohli’s 87

analysis reads ”Below the established elites, the vertical patterns of fealty in India’s civil society have been eroding”. Combined with the fact that the Congress showed interest in them, increasing their political influence, lower castes started to become a political force on their own. These two processes had a equalising effect on the authority patterns, slowly decreasing the subordination of lower castes and other unprivileged groups.

Furthermore, the general process of economic and social change affected the traditional roles within Guntur, increasing the awareness of the hierarchal system. The inequalities, along with the beliefs that legitimised them, started to be questioned. People in lower castes began to challenge what they perceived as an unjust system of exploitation. As a result, lower castes emerged as a new social group entering the political arena with new demands. The lower castes started voting based on their own preferences, and voted for those who promised to incorporate them into the party and to use the

resources controlled by the state to provide direct benefits. In turn, the privileged groups also 88

organised themselves, and conflicts around the traditional cleavages of caste and community

intensified. A demonstration of changing authority patterns was an increased political violence. 89 90

There was specifically one type of violence growing in the 1980s: the violence aimed at lower castes. Landlords were challenged by organisations of labourers, and killings of those who tried to

Kohli, 1990. p. 63 85 Ibid. p. 63 86 Ibid. p. 80 87 Ibid. p. 195 88 Ibid. p. 18 89

organise the labourers and other unprivileged groups became more common. The pattern of 91

violence against lower castes and those trying to organise them, was initiated by the socially powerful or by agents of the state. This illustrates that conflicts arise when established hierarchies are challenged, and how authority patterns effect power struggles.

When Weiner studied the district, factionalism and patronage were the main characteristics of contemporary authority patterns. 25 years later, the political landscape in Guntur had changed, and authority patterns with it. The fact that both the Congress party and the leaders of the factions gradually lost their authority created what Kohli called an authority vacuum. Traditional patterns of authority, where the Congress party together with men positioned at the top of the social hierarchy could govern as they pleased, were eroding. This change in authority patterns further grew due to changes in the social structure - simply the social positioning of members of dominate castes was no longer a guarantee for respect and authority. It had become increasingly difficult for local bosses and other ”big men” to influence the political behaviour of those beneath them. In other words, a member of a higher caste could not expect to convince members of lower castes to vote for him simply by referring to his caste status. In the 1980s, lower castes begun to emerge as a political force on their own. As a result, the political pattern of factions with dominate caste leaders and their

dependent followers eroded. Although authority patterns still were largely defined by the 92

hierarchy of caste system, the dynamic between those positioned high and low in the system begun to alter. The participation, responsiveness, compliance and distance between the two groups were affected by the fact that the lower castes slowly gained more independence, and as a result, more influence. Having greater influence meant that they tried to influence those above them more, therefore increasing the participation. Their influence forced a higher degree on responsiveness, and the independence a lower degree of compliance. Furthermore, the perceived distance probably decreased with changing caste dynamics. The growing influence, together with the fact that lower castes constituted about half the population in Guntur, clearly changed the foundation on which past authority patterns rested upon.

4.3 2010s - The lower castes as a political force on their own

The study by Weiner showed how members of the dominant castes use their authority and power to control local politics. Other studies, such as Frankel and Rao (1989) have reported the same thing,

Kohli, 1990. p. 73

91

Ibid. p. 91

how members of the dominant caste use their influence and authority to control elections and local government. When Kohli studied the area, these authority patterns had started to change, and members of higher castes could not exercise the same control over lower castes. However, when Kohli visited the region caste system was still present, and lower castes were still unable to fully express their demands. Ethnographic studies done in recent years, such as Price (2006) and Manor

(2010), show a clear decline of such practices of caste dominance. In addition, the nature of 93

political competition has been changing over the years as a consequence of changing social and economic systems. The main characteristic of hierarchal political relationships, the authority patterns, in the 2010s is that lower castes are increasingly becoming a political force on their own,

through a steady erosion of caste hierarchies and the dominance associated with them. 94

In 2009-2010, Philip studies a village in the Krishna district and states that interactions between powerful political agents and constituency are no longer on a patron-client basis. The political leaders are no longer seen as distant authorities, rather as service providers. Therefore, the voters

believes they can interact with them on a more equal footing. In contrast with the findings in 95

1960s, there is a rejection of patronage in the formal political sphere. Instead of patronage, relations between elected representatives and electorate are seen as a form of contract. Elections initiate a contract between voter and candidate where the candidate is compared to a shopkeeper: the shopkeeper will not cheat customers excessively, because he needs them to come back. The same reasoning is used in politics: the candidate will not cheat the electorate because he needs their

support for the next round of elections as well. Other scholars have also noticed a decline of 96

hierarchical patronage, which Srinivas described in 1955 as “vote bank”. 97

In the last two decades, work opportunities for labourers belonging to lower castes have increased. A number of scholars have argued that the work opportunities is one contributing factor in reducing

Philip, Jessy K. ’Though he is a landlord, that Sarpanch is my servant!’ Caste and democracy in a village of south India. Contemporary South Asia.

93 Vol. 25, nr. 3, 2017. p. 271 Thapar-Björkert et al. 2021. p. 3 94 Philip, 2017. p. 270 95 Ibid. p. 274 96

Breeding, Mary. The Micro-Politics of Vote Banks in Karnataka. Economic and Political Weekly. Vol. 46, nr. 14, 2011: 71–77.

97

Chandra, Kanchan. Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004 Chatterjee, Partha. Community in the East. Economic and Political Weekly. Vol. 33, nr. 6,1998: 277–282.

the dependency of lower caste labourers on local landlords. This has further enhanced their 98

independence and changed both their and higher castes attitudes towards caste authority. Earlier, 99

the lower castes were expected to be at disposal of landlords simply because of caste norms, while today the relationship is based on economic interdependence. The landowning elite is to some extent forced to accept the demands of the lower castes if they want to maintain their economic

status, which depends on the relations with their workers. An other example of the lower castes 100

independence is their voting pattern. As Weiner identified, landlords typically voted for the Congress party and workers for the Communist party. However, most labourers voted for the Congress party in the (non-anonymous) local elections because they were apprehensive that their employers would see what they voted for. This political trend started to change in the beginning of

2000 as workers began to vote more independently even in local elections. 101

In other words, the traditional authority pattern in change is the landlords’ control over labourers. The younger generation of lower caste workers emphasise they are free individuals who vote in their own interests. The elder generation on the other hand feels an obligation to vote as their

employers wish or to support political leaders for whom they laboured for a long time. This is in 102

accordance with Weiner’s conclusion that political leaders often are faction leaders and landlords as well, having a network of people connected to them through patron-client relationships. The younger generation on the other hand, explained that they vote according to their own decisions and that people have become one unit, implying that there is no distinction between them and those

superordinate to them. Many workers accepted money during elections from their landlord, but 103

still voted for whoever they pleased. The labourers motivated their non-compliance by saying that

”[...] he is not a landlord when he is elected by them” . 104

A small yet important change in authority patterns is how people address each other. In the past, labourers were called by patronising kin names, whereas today they are called by their names. This

Breman, J. Beyond patronage and exploitation: changing agrarian relations in South Gujarat. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. .1993.

98

Gorringe, H. Shifting the “Grindstone of Caste”? Decreasing Dependency among Dalit Labourers in Tamil Nadu. In B. Harriss-White & J. Heyer (Eds.). The Comparative Political Economy of Development: Africa and South Asia. Oxon: Routledge. 2010:248–266.

Djurfeldt, G., Athreya, V., Jayakumar, N., Lindberg, S., Rajagopal, A., & Vidyasagar, R. (2008). Agrarian change and social mobility in Tamil Nadu. Economic and Political Weekly, 50–61.

Philip, 2017. p. 273 99 Thapar-Björkert et al. 2021. p. 4 100 Philip, 2017. p. 273 101 Ibid. p. 275 102 Ibid. p. 274 103 Ibid. p. 278 104

shows a more formal relation of contract, and not just subordination, between employers and employees. This relationship extends into the political sphere, where public servants are seen to be

on a similar contract and are addressed by their names. Similar changes in interaction between 105

upper caste and lower caste, employers and employees, are noted by Thapar-Björkert, Maiorano,

and Blomkvist . When conducting an interview with a lower caste labourer in Guntur district, the 106

authors witnessed how an upper caste landowner came to the labourer's house and asked for a glass

of water. The labourer explained how this is a clear sign of how things have changed. To drink a 107

glass of water was a conscious act done by the landlord as a sign of respect. The fact that the landowner even came to the lower caste labourer’s house is in itself a demonstration of flattened hierarchal relations. Thapar-Björkert et al. concludes that ”What has changed is how this (exploitative and asymmetrical) relationship is experienced in day-to-day interactions with some

visible improvements in favour of the Dalits.” 108

In the 2010s, the younger generation see the political representative as someone who should work for them, not the other way around. The voters are the reason political representatives win elections, and so the politicians are obliged to work for them. Furthermore, labourers of this generation feels they have a right to approach political agents, and believe that when elected, the representatives

should behave as public servants rather than like landlords. Politicians are seen as mediators 109

between state and people, and become like a vendor of good and services. This new way of viewing the representatives has made it more difficult for influential people to gain political support merely through socioeconomic status or patronage. This development in the relationship between elected representatives and people is further demonstrated in the responsiveness of political representatives. In the 1960s they could have the support by lower castes simply by being an upper caste member, a trend Kohli saw changing in the 1980s. In the 2010s political representatives are aware of lower castes’ increasing political power and therefore seek their input - ”[…] could you tell me the

problems faced by the villagers (Dalits) so that I can rectify them?” 110

Philip, 2017. p. 276

105

Thapar-Björkert, et al. 2021. p. 5

106

Due to the earlier practices of untouchability, members of the upper castes never shared food, drinks, china or cutlery with the Dalits

107

Thapar-Björkert et al. 2021. p. 5

108

Philip, 2017. p. 276