Russian Power Projection and Power Ministries
A Study on Russian Power Ministry Influence
1 CONTENTS 1. Introduction ... 2 2. Aim ... 3 3. Research questions ... 3 4. Study outline ... 4 5. Definitions ... 4 6. Background ... 7 7. Case descriptions ... 10 8. Theory ... 16 9. Method ... 22 10. Choice of Method ... 23 11. Operationalization ... 24 12. Sources ... 28 13. Selection ... 32 14. Limitations ... 33 15. Assumptions ... 33 16. Previous research ... 34 17. Evidence ... 35
18. Summary for crisis score ... 44
19. Actor activity ... 45
20. Analysis ... 50
21. Conclusion ... 54
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1. Introduction
Russian foreign policy has had a large effect on societies throughout much of modern history. During
the Superpower era of the 20th century, Russia, as the dominant region within the Soviet Union,
wielded huge influence around the world. This influence came in the form of military, political, cultural, and economic power. At its height, the Soviet Union would control governments in many countries. The 1970’s, however, saw increasing stagnation in the Soviet economy, and by the end of the 80’s it had started to lose control over its former zone of influence. As the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia lost much of its former glory. What followed where ten years of economic chaos and mismanagement, civil war in its northern Caucasus republics, and overall decay.
In 2000, the incumbent Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, became President. He was replacing the first democratically elected, and long serving (and frequently inebriated) leader, Boris Yeltsin. This change in leadership would lead to what might be called a paradigm shift in Russian politics. Within Russia, this led to, amongst other things, a more centralized government. Russian foreign policy changed considerably. From being fairly invisible on the international arena during the 90’s, Russia has increasingly adopted a confrontational foreign policy. This has been buoyed by high gas prices, which have allowed increased spending on military and energy infrastructure, the two main avenues of Russian foreign policy. What is more, low investments in energy diversification in Eastern Europe have led to a dependency on Russian energy in this region, ensuring Russian influence here. Finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in large Russian minority groups in the newly established republics. Apart from possible future irredentist problems, these minorities represent an opportunity for Russia to exercise its influence.
The newfound energy-wealth has allowed Russia to be more pro-active in its dealings with other states. This increased activity can, for example, be seen in that Russian Security Council vetoes in the noughties have increased several times as compared to the nineties. Other examples showing a more active foreign policy includes being able to restrict energy-supplies to Western Europe to put pressure on gas-transit states, and sending troops into other sovereign states.
This study will aim to examine the intra-state actors that decide these foreign policies, and more specifically, these intra-state (or subdivisional) actors at times of crisis.
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As we shall see, though centralized, the Russian state is made up of several different actors. These actors, which include amongst others the President and Prime Minister, will compete for influence in deciding governmental policies. Examining historically which actors generate the most influence at certain periods of bilateral relations crises may allow for future forecasts. Knowing which actor to address could allow for focused lobbying in order to lessen negative externalities as a result of crisis. Being able to do such forecasts would be of general relevance to the non-scientific community.
There are several theories which assume government output as being the result of organizational activity. As this study examines this very activity in relation to crises, the academic relevance would be to in a way test these theories. What is more, the results of this study may lay the foundation for future research into correlations between Russian governmental organizations and Russian foreign policy.
2. Aim
The purpose of this study is to examine the Russian foreign-policymaking actors in times of bilateral relations crises. Russia has a number of hard power resources available when dealing with other states. With increasing gas wealth, we can expect to see Russia use more power projection in the future. It this therefore imperative that we identify which actors within the Russian state that can and do have an effect on foreign policy. By looking at which intra-state actor (defined as power ministry later on) is most active during certain bilateral relations crises, one should be able to deduce the prime actors in Russian foreign policy. As will be explained later, it is assumed that such crises allow for actors to ‘expand their territory’, thus being a good opportunity to examine these actors. By examining actor activity during crises, one will be able to analyze influence during these crises.
As this is an extensive examination of Russian foreign policy actors, the actual study will be front-heavy. The evidence, as well as the analysis, will largely be presented in tables and diagrams. Consequently, it is imperative that the Method chapter clearly explains what is going on.
3. Research questions
In order to study the relationship between actors (power ministry) and foreign policy at times of crises, this study will be divided up into three parts. These parts are reflected in the following three research questions.
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The first research question is: Which hard power factors were present in the crisis?
This will allow for classifying the various crises according to how much power Russia could project.
The second research question is: How active was each power ministry during the crisis? This will identify actor activity during each crisis.
The third research question is: Is there a correlation between crises where hard power factors were present and certain power ministries?
4. Study outline
The outline of this study has been designed as follows. As we have seen, the study begins with an Introduction. The introduction chapter is followed by a section establishing the Aim of the study, closely followed by a section outlining the actual Research questions. The Definitions section contains definitions of key words and concepts used by this study. The Background section describes the different power ministries studied, and leads into the Case descriptions chapter. The Case descriptions chapter looks at and describes the different crises cases used by the study. The Theory chapter will describe the theory behind the processes, thus attempting to give an understanding of why the chosen method should be valid. The Method chapter gives a short description of the method used, as well as a discussion on other possible methods. What follows is the Operationalization section. Here the operationalization of the study is described in detail. The Sources section contains a discussion on the sources used. This is followed by the Selection chapter, which discusses the inclusion of the different crises. The Limitations chapter discusses the study delineation. The Assumptions section outlines the assumptions made by the study. This is followed by the Previous research section, which looks at previous research done within the context of this study. The Evidence chapter presents the evidence, both for the Crises Scores and the Actor Activity. The analysis section analyzes the information, and presents it in circle diagrams. Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the study.
5. Definitions
In this chapter we will give the definitions for the different words and concepts used throughout this study.
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Crisis – Crisis may be defined in several ways. The Oxford Dictionary defines crisis as a time of intense
difficulty or danger. This is clearly too broad a definition for this study as it would include
The crisis definition as defined by Rosenthal et al1 is that of situations when central decision makers
believe that:
1. Considerable properties and values are threatened 2. There is limited time available
3. The situation is characterized by considerable uncertainty
This definition is much more precise, and as we shall see later, better describes the types of crises used by the study.
Bilateral relations crisis – A relations crisis as defined above, involving two states. An example of a
bilateral relations crisis could be the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which had the immediate effect of chilling India-Pakistan relations.
Crisis Score –Russia has bilateral agreements and relations with almost all states2. With countless
environmental factors affecting bilateral relations, bilateral relations crises involving Russia and other countries will therefore undoubtedly be different. In order to scientifically categorize these varied crises, this study will examine the presence of hard power factors. The crisis score is calculated through toting up the occurrence of three different hard power factors. These factors are military presence, energy shut-off, and economic sanctions. The reasoning behind this will be further detailed in the Method chapter.
Hard Power – Hard power is defined by Nye as being the ability to get others to do what they
otherwise would not do through threat of punishment or promise of reward3. This study will refer to
the term hard power both as a concept and as a collective term for the three foreign policy tools as identified in the Theory chapter.
1 Rosenthal et al. p.10
2 http://www.russianembassy.net/ 3 Keohane & Nye p.220
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Power ministry – Russian media often refer to the concept “power ministry” (silovye ministerstva).
Though largely undefined, the term refers to institutions and actors within Russia that are of critical
importance politically4. One early attempt at defining this has been to use it as a term for Russian
ministries and authorities that were concerned with ensuring internal and external security5. Bettina
Renz has since further defined power ministries as those ministries which maintain troops:
“Force structures are defined as ministries and other institutions within the federal system of
executive power that have under their command uniformed personnel and/or command of their own
militarized or armed formations6.”
Using this definition would reduce the meaning of power ministry to essentially those which control security in Russia. As this study will examine those actors which are most active during bilateral relations crises, they must have an element of foreign policy competence. This foreign policy competence means that they should be able to influence a bilateral relations crisis. Consequently, studying power ministries which lack foreign policy competence will be unnecessary. As many of the power ministries as defined by Renz miss this competence (i.e. the State Courier Service of the Russian Federation), the number of ministries of interest to this study shrinks.
Carolina Vendil Pallin defines power ministry as those ministries directly under the president. As the leadership of many of these ministries is directly appointed by the president, it follows that power is highly centralized. This could suggest that Russian ministry outputs would, by and large, be syncretic with those of the Russian president. In other words, as the Russian president would likely only appoint likeminded leaders for the ministries, their influence within their respective ministry would
ensure little friction with presidential policy. However, Allison and Zelikow’s second model7, where
governmental action is seen as organizational output, suggests that government policy will not necessarily be shaped by a monolithic Leviathan. This will be further detailed in the Theory chapter.
One dilemma with Carolina Vendil Pallin’s definition, as regards this study, is the problem of measuring activity. As will be explained later on in the Method chapter, this study will examine public statements, in that actor activity will be assumed to be reflected in the number of public statements.
4 Vendil Palin p.55 5 Ibid. p.56 6 Renz p.561
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As some power ministries will not make public statements (i.e. the Main Intelligence Administration) they will not be researchable within the context of this study. It should be noted however that these power ministries carry more of a support role to the others (again, the Main Intelligence Administration) and therefore would likely be of marginal interest to this study.
Based on the above discussion, this study will use the following definition for power ministry: A Russian state organization with foreign policy competence, and has the capability, and a history of, of making public statements. This narrows down the list of power ministries to the following ten:
The Presidency
The Prime Minister
Foreign Ministry
The Duma (Lower House)
The Federation Council (Upper House)
The Finance Ministry
The Energy Ministry
The Defense Ministry
The Emergency Situations Ministry
The FSB (Federal Security Service)
Throughout this study, these power ministries will be referred to as either power ministry or actor.
6. Background
This chapter will flesh out the background. It describes the different power ministries examined in the study.
As we saw in the introduction, Russian foreign policy has become much more active in the last decade. As gas-wealth has allowed Russian power to expand, other factors are encroaching on what is considered Russia’s near-abroad. EU membership for the Baltic States means that Russia now has a border with The European Union. The EU’s Eastern Dimension, as expressed in the European Neighborhood Policy, calls for increased influence in this very area. NATO expansion has also been a cause for concern, with missile shields being seen as a direct threat.
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This chapter will attempt to flesh out the power ministries. Counter to established norms, the cases will first be introduced here, and not in the Sources chapter. This is because the case descriptions can also be seen as part of the background. The reasoning behind the selection of these cases will still be found in the Sources chapter however.
These power ministries used are described as follows.
The President is the Russian head of state and shall determine the guidelines of the internal and foreign policies of the state. The president shall represent the Russian Federation within the country
and in international relations.8.
The Prime Minister (Chairman of the Government) is appointed by the president, with the consent of the Duma. The Prime Minister shall determine the guidelines of the activities of the Government of
the Russian Federation and organize its work9.
The Foreign Ministry (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is main ministry responsible for foreign affairs.
The Federal Assembly consists of two chambers. The State Duma is the lower house of the Russian Federation. It consists of 450 members, and among other responsibilities consent to the
appointment of the Prime Minister (effectively the government)10. The majority party in the State
Duma throughout the time period studied has been the United Russia party, which has been aligned with Putin.
The Federation Council represents the upper house of the Russian Federation. There are 166 senators. The Federation Council jurisdiction includes amongst others approving border changes and deciding on the possibility of using military forces abroad.
In the context of this study, Duma and Federation Council statements will only be considered when done in an official capacity (i.e. individual senatorial statements will be ignored)
The Finance Ministry is responsible for financial policy.
8 Russian Constitution Article 80 9 Ibid. Article 113
9 The Energy Ministry is responsible for energy policy
The Defense Ministry’s objectives are to deter the military and political threats to the security of Russia; support the economic and political interests of Russia; mounting other-than-war enforcement
operations; and using military force11.
The Emergency Situations Ministry manages civil emergencies and disasters.
The FSB (Federal Security Service) is concerned with counter-espionage12 and intelligence
gathering13. It can be considered the main successor to the KGB14.
11 The Russian Ministry of Defense organizational mission 12 Vendil Pallin p.118
13 Ibid. p.121 14 Ibid. p.113
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7. Case descriptions
The following short descriptions are presented in order to ensure that the reader obtains a general idea of what each crisis was about. As stated, this section can also be considered as belonging to the Selection chapter.
Ukraine 2004 – Orange Revolution
The Orange Revolution in Ukraine caused a shift in focus for Ukrainian foreign relations away from
Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States towards the West15. With western Ukraine
being more pro-Europe and eastern Ukraine being pro-Russia, the internal Ukrainian discourse on
which side to approach economically and politically can be quite heated16.
For Russia, Ukraine is seen as being within its region of influence, and it is also seen essentially as a buffer against NATO and EU influence. Many Ukrainians are also ethnically Russian. By losing political influence in Ukraine, Russia would risk eventually having NATO on its doorstep.
The following description of the crisis is derived from a chronology of the Orange Revolution by Joerg
Forbrig and Robin Shepherd, for the German Marshall Fund17. By 2004 the presidential election in
Ukraine was promising to become the most contested election in over a decade. The main actors involved in the election were Leonid Kuchma, the incumbent Ukrainian president who was retiring, Viktor Yanukovych, Kuchma’s anointed heir, and Viktor Yushchenko, the main opposition candidate. Leonid Kuchma had spent much of his administration ensuring friendly relations with Russia, and Yanukovych, an ethnic Russian, promised to follow that policy. This led in large part to president Putin officially declaring his support for Yanukovych. The amicable relationship between Putin, Kuchma, and Yanukovych could be seen in the latter two frequently travelling to Russia, and also being invited to celebrate Putin’s birthday. Viktor Yushchenko’s party, on the other hand, promised closer relations with the EU and the US.
On September 5, 2004, less than two months before the election, opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko is poisoned by dioxin. October 31 sees the first round in the presidential election.
15 Forbrig & Shepherd p.11 16 Ibid. p.19
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Neither candidate manages to exceed the 50 percent threshold required to win. The Organization for Security and Cooperation states its concern over the conduct of the first-round voting. The
second-round voting is held one month later, on November 21, amid talk of massive irregularities18.
Nevertheless, Putin hails Yanukovych as the victor. Three days later, Yanukovych is declared the winner by the electoral commission. Yushchenko submits a formal protest to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, large numbers of protestors are beginning to gather in the capital. By November 29, Kuchma acknowledges the need for new elections. This view is in time also shared by Putin. On December 3 the Supreme Court states that the elections are null and void, and sets the new election date on December 26. This time around, Putin does not lend his support to any candidate. The election rerun sees Yushchenko winning with 51.99 percent of the vote, as opposed to Yanukovych’s 44.2 percent. Yushchenko is sworn in as president on January 23, 2005.
Lithuania 2006 – Druzhba shut-off
Lithuania is a NATO member, and with Russian opposition to NATO expansion this has ensured that
relations with Lithuania have at times been testy19. The Lithuanian Mažeikiai refinery in Lithuania was
established in the 60’s as the only oil refinery in the Baltics. This refinery was historically fed through the Druzhba pipeline, which transported oil from Central Asia and the Urals, through Russia, to
COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) members in Europe20. In 1999, the refinery was
privatized, and ownership was transferred to an American company, the Williams Companies. The
Russian petroleum company Yukos later purchased a majority stake in the refinery21. In 2003 Yukos
faced claims of tax-fraud and was forced to sell off much of its assets to attempt to avoid bankruptcy.
This meant that the Mažeikiai refinery was put up for sale again22. This time the potential buyers
included Russian government, through a state-owned company. Russia had earlier begun to purchase energy infrastructure in Eastern Europe, and the Lithuanian government deemed it imprudent to allow such critical infrastructure in the hands of Russia. This, in part, led to the Mažeikiai refinery
instead being sold to a Polish company, PKN Orlen. The deal was finalized in June 200623. One month
later, on July 29, 2006, Russia announced that the Druzhba-pipeline leading to Lithuania had ruptured, and that it had to be closed down for repairs. This would cut supply of 324,000 barrels per
18
Åslund & McFaul p.223
19 de Haas p.53
20 ORLEN Lietuva Company History 21 Ibid.
22 STRATFOR, Punishing the Baltics with a Broken Pipeline 23 Ibid.
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day. Oil would now be transported by sea instead24. This meant higher costs for the refinery, and so
lowers profitability for PKN Orlen, and in the end higher energy costs in Lithuania.
Belarus 2007 – Energy dispute
Russian-Belarusian relations have been close since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a country which borders Russia, and where the majority of people speak Russian, ties to Russia have remained fixed. The 2007 energy dispute between Belarus and Russia had its roots in the Russian post-Soviet energy policy. By supplying gas and oil below market price, Russia has ensured the loyalty of CIS-members. Those countries receiving the subsidized energy have been able to maintain industries and low heating costs. The difference in gas costs between Western and Eastern Europe could be quite considerable. The Belarusian gas price in 2006 was less than US$50 per 1000 cubic meters, whereas
the European market price was US$230 per 1000 cubic meters25. This price discrepancy allowed for
Belarus to resell Russian-subsidized refined gas and oil products to Europe, and keep the margin, in effect becoming a considerable money maker for the state. By December 2006, Russia had started complaining about the situation, claiming that Russia was losing billions every year due to Belarusian
re-exports26. As such Russia stated it would begin drastically increasing the price starting 200727. In
the beginning of January 2007, Belarus rejected the price increase, claiming that it would start charging a transit fee for gas headed for western markets. This fee, according to Belarus, would come in the form of siphoned off oil. By January 8, Russia had cut off oil supplies to Belarus, effectively
reducing supply to the rest of the European markets too28. This led the following day to Belarus
sending a delegation to Russia to negotiate a solution to the problem. By January 10 the Belarus government abandoned the transfer fees, and the next day gas transports were resumed. A week later, Putin claimed that “Russia would use markets, and not politics, as the basis for its relations with
all countries”29.
24
STRATFOR, Punishing the Baltics with a Broken Pipeline
25 RIA Novosti 2006-11-03 26 RFE-RL 2006-12-15 27 RIA Novosti 2006-11-03 28 RFE-RL 2007-01-07 29 RFE-RL 2007-01-18
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Estonia 2007 – Bronze Night
Estonian-Russian relations have been tense since Estonia’s independence. Estonian NATO membership has moved the western alliance’s borders very close to Russia’s second largest city, St Petersburg. Many Estonians consider the annexation of the Baltics by the Soviet Union during World War Two an occupation. Within Estonia, people with Russian ethnicity make up over 25 percent, thus being a large minority. Stringent language requirements for citizenship have had the effect of precluding many from the Russian minority of getting Estonian citizenship, essentially confining
Russian Estonians to the status of second class citizens30. For this minority, clearing away Soviet
symbols have been seen as an attack on their history. This is also the view of Russians in Russia proper, who consider removal of Soviet and World War Two symbols revisionist. The Bronze statue in
Tallinn was a war memorial, which had been built over the graves of a number of unknown soldiers31.
Plans on moving this Soviet-era bronze statue located in central Tallinn had existed since independence, however it was not until 2006 that these plans started to become reality. Demonstrations began being held by the members of the Russian minority to block the relocation of the statue to a nearby military cemetery. These demonstrations were noticed by the Russian state,
who officially sided with the minority32. In early 2007 the Estonian Parliament, the Riigikogu, passed a
law allowing for the reburial of World War Two soldiers, thus clearing the way for moving the
statue33. On April 26 that year, Estonian authorities cordoned off the area surrounding the statue.
This had the effect of leading to large numbers of people turning up to protest the relocation, and by that night several riots had broken out. On the following morning of April 27, the bronze statue was moved, and by now there were also large demonstrations outside the Estonian embassy in
Moscow34. The Russian response to the relocation was that of fury, with Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov claiming that this constituted an “inhuman action”, and warning that Moscow would
“take serious steps” against Estonia35. The Federal Council, Russia’s upper house, wanted Putin to
sever diplomatic relations with Estonia36.
30
RFE-RL 2007-05-08
31
Ibid.
32 Country Report: Estonia 2007 p.1 33 Ibid. p.1
34 RFE-RL 2007-04-27 35 Ibid.
36
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Estonian government websites were by now beginning to be targeted by coordinated cyber attacks, effectively shutting down government services in the highly connected country. The following days would remain tense, and on April 30, the Russian State Duma sent a fact-finding delegation to
Estonia37. The chairman of this delegation also called on the Estonian government to resign38. As the
statue was removed to its new location, the demonstrations were slowly beginning to evaporate, and by May 9, had largely disappeared.
UK 2007 – Litvinenko
Alexander Litvinenko was an ex-KBG and FSB agent who had sought asylum in the United Kingdom. In November 2006, he became ill with radiological symptoms. As it turned out, he appeared to have been poisoned earlier that day when meeting two other ex-KGB agents, Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitry
Kovtun39. When Litvinenko died later that month a murder investigation was initiated. The British
police identify Lugovoi as the man poisoning Litvinenko and begin calling for his extradition from
Russia. Russian authorities, however, decided not to extradite Lugovoi40. This would eventually lead
to the expulsion of four Russian diplomats from the UK on July 1741. This had the natural effect of
causing a diplomatic crisis between the two countries. Although Lugovoi was never extradited, the actual crisis would slowly die down over the next couple of months.
Georgia 2008 – War
During the Soviet Union, the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic administered areas in the north of Georgia by the name of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast (South Ossetia) and the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Abkhazia). Though under Georgian administration, all these
areas, including Georgia, were tightly controlled by the central Soviet leadership in Moscow42.
As the Soviet Union collapsed, these regions came under nominally Georgian control43. As the
majority ethnic groups do not consider themselves Georgian, war broke out in the early 90’s between South Ossetia and Georgia. This led to a cease-fire in 1992 which left control of South 37 RFE-RL 2007-05-01 38 Ibid. 39 RIA Novosti 2007-07-21 40 RIA Novosti 2007-07-24 41 Ibid. 42 Hewitt p.183 43 Ibid. p.188
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Ossetia in the hands of an unrecognized Russian-backed government. In order to ensure the peace,
Russian peacekeepers were permitted to be in the area44. Nevertheless, these areas would still see
minor skirmishes throughout the 90’ and 00’s, and would represent some of the frozen conflicts left
in the wake of the Soviet Union45.
By 2008, the Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvilli had stated interest in joining NATO, and also
finding support for that idea in the US administration46. This would several years later be confirmed
by Russian president Medvedev as constituting a considerable potential threat towards Russia47. By
that summer, US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice would visit Tbilisi. As both sides were amassing troops near the border, she would state that Russian behavior toward Georgia had “aggravated
tension” and urged both sides to show restraint48. On the night of August 7, 2008, Georgia sent
troops into South Ossetia, in order to reclaim the region49. After a successful initial Georgian
advance, Russian troops with support from South Ossetian elements would reverse the situation. By
August 9, the Georgian president accused Russia of launching “a full-scale invasion”50. It was
reported that Russian airplanes were bombing Black Sea target, and that Abkhazian troops, supported by the Russian military, were advancing.
The following day the EU and the US demanded a stop to hostilities, and by August 12 Russian
president Medvedev ordered a stop to the fighting51. A Western-proposed six Point peace plan was
agreed upon. Smaller skirmishes did however still continue to break out, and there were reports of looting. As the fighting died down, Georgia had suffered a heavy blow, with Russian troops reaching as far as Gori, halfway through the country. Georgian military bases were occupied and emptied of equipment, and a pipeline transporting Azerbaijani oil through the country was damaged. On August 17, Russian troops began to withdraw.
44 Hewitt p.190 45 Ibid. 46 RFE-RL 2008-05-10 47 RIA Novosti 2011-11-21 48 Ibid. 49 RFE-RL 2008-08--08 50 RFE-RL 2008-08-09 51 RFE-RL 2008-08-12
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Ukraine 2009 – Gas-dispute
As with the energy dispute with Belarus in 2007, the 2009 Ukrainian gas dispute had its roots in post-Soviet energy policy. Subsidized Russian energy was seen as giving Russia an advantage in its relations with Ukraine. Failing to come to an price agreement before the contract ran out, meant
that on January 1 2009, Russia shut off supplies52. This meant that countries further down the
pipeline were effectively without gas too53. After several weeks of active diplomacy, energy supplies
were restored on January 1854. As the 2004 Orange Revolution had replaced a pro-Russian
government with a pro-Western one, this may have been a highly visible attempt at punishing a state that was being intransigent.
Tajikistan 2011 – Pilot-row
The 2011 Tajikistan pilot row began as two pilots, one Russian and the other Estonian, en route to Russia from Afghanistan, were ordered to land in Tajikistan. Once there they were arrested by the
authorities and charged with smuggling55. On November 8 2011, they were sentenced to 10 and a
half years in prison56. This was immediately protested by Russian authorities. As pressure mounted
between Russia and Tajikistan, Russia began to expel Tajiki migrant workers57. As remittances from
Russia represents a large part of the Tajiki economy, the authorities there began to cave, and on
November 22 the Russian and Estonian pilots were freed58.
8. Theory
This chapter will look at the theory behind the policy processes. As mentioned before, this study is divided into three parts. The first part of the study will classify each crisis. There are many different factors available for research when classifying crises, ranging from, amongst others, calculating human and economic costs, to geographic locations, and to whether they were man-made or natural crises. As this study will examine bilateral relations crises, many of these factors are rendered inadequate. For example, short of war, the human costs will in most cases be absent or negligible. 52 de Haas p.129 53 Ibid. p.128 54 Ibid. p.129 55 RFE-RL 2011-11-09 56 Ibid. 57 RIA Novosti 2011-11-15 58 RIA Novosti 2011-11-22
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In international relations, power is an often reoccurring term. As Keohane and Nye explain “power
can be conceived in terms of control over outcomes”59. Power can generally be seen as the ability of
an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do. This suggests that bilateral crises are generally resolved in favor of the more powerful part, as the stronger part would be able to force the weaker one to accept conditions and demands they would otherwise not agree to. As Russia dominates most of its neighbors in terms of economic and demographic size, as well as militarily, the power relation between Russia and other states can be of interest when classifying crises. Joseph Nye has classified power into hard power and soft power. Hard power, according to
Nye, “can rest on inducements ‘carrots’ or threats ‘sticks’”60. This means that hard power generally
refers to economic, military and diplomatic factors. Soft power, on the other hand, refers to indirect inducement factors. Essentially, one may say that it refers to the ability to influence behavior through a non-coercive, and in many cases non-active, approach.
Wilson and Popescu have identified the following Russian hard and soft powers61:
Table 1 Table 2
Russian hard power is mostly based on “19th century paradigms”62, that is, military presence,
managed instability, and economic coercion. As Wilson and Popescu note, the first two factors, Russian military power and managed instability, have ensured a number of foreign policy goals. The
2008 South Ossetia conflict effectively stopped Georgia from becoming a NATO member63, and
Armenian dependency on Russian support in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has had the effect of
59
Keohane & Nye p.10
60 Nye p.5 61
Wilson & Popescu pp.319-323
62
Ibid. p.321
63 RIA Novosti 2011-11-21
SOFT POWER
Russian Orthodox Church Historical links Media influence Russia-supported NGOs Russia-supported political parties
Cultural foundations Visa-free travel
Access to relatively open labor market Authoritarian public goods (i.e. law and order)
HARD POWER
Military presence Managed instability Economic coercion
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making Armenia a de facto Russian economic satellite64. Other regions where Russia manages
instability include Transnistria and the Crimean peninsula, and to a lesser degree the Baltic States.
The third hard factor identified is economic coercion. As Wilson and Popescu explain, recent years have seen Russia increasingly use this hard power tool in its international relations. This type of hard power is mainly expressed through gas deliveries (e.g. prices and supply stops), though other types of
economic sanctions, such as the Russian ban on Georgian wines and water, have also occurred65.
Initially in the 90’s as the Soviet Union collapsed, policymakers hoped that by keeping low gas prices,
they would be able to keep the regional economies integrated66. This policy has had the further
effect of retaining Russian influence in the region. Basically, in return for providing cheap energy Russia has received goodwill, political power, and economic stability. However, with the election of Putin as Russian President in 2000, this policy has gradually changed. The new approach has been to gradually hike gas prices for Eastern European and CIS states to levels seen in Western Europe. According to Wilson and Popescu, high energy prices have generally been used as an instrument to
punish ‘unfriendly’ states67. They also note that as Russia “pushed for higher prices, it also offered the
target countries a political way out: either by ceding energy infrastructure or by fulfilling
non-economic Russian objectives”68. On the other hand, as Larsson observes, states which maintained
friendly relations with Russia were often allowed to keep subsidized gas prices69. Taking this policy to
its extreme, Russia has completely cut off energy supplies on occasion. As gas storage facilities in Eastern Europe have been less than optimal, this has had the rather immediate effect of shutting down industries and heating in the targeted country.
Russian soft power factors, as can be seen from the above table, are in many cases inherited from earlier regimes. The Russian Orthodox Church can trace its roots to over a thousand years back, and its influence has been spread through conquest, migration, and proselytizing. Russia’s historical links with many of its neighbors similarly have their roots in conquest and migration. Due to these historical facts, the Russian language enjoys a kind of lingua franca within the Russian near-abroad. This enables Russian media to have a high degree of influence in these areas.
64 Wilson & Popescu p.322
65 RIA Novosti 2006-05-06 66
Wilson & Popescu p.322
67 Ibid. p.322 68 Ibid. p.323 69 Larsson p.79
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With Russian gas-wealth, Russia has also established pro-Russia NGO’s, and directly or indirectly supported political parties. When compared to the hard power factors however, evaluating these soft powers and putting a definite value on them may be difficult as their effectiveness is hard to gauge. Going back to hard power, according to the Rational Actor framework developed by Allison, one may assume that if “a nation performed a particular action, that action must have been selected
as the value-maximizing means for achieving the actor’s objectives”70. This suggests that Russia has
used its hard power intentionally to influence crisis resolutions in its favor
Figure 1
As mentioned earlier, the notion that more powerful states are likelier to benefit from bilateral relations crises than weaker ones allows for the idea that there is a relationship between the amount of power used during a crisis (and as the Rational Actor Model quote
above shows, power, if used, is likely always used intentionally) and the outcome of a crisis. In other words this means that the more power is applied, the likelier the outcome will be beneficial. The figure above illustrates the concept with hard power.
Classifying each crisis through the presence of different Russian power tools, will therefore indicate how Russia intended the crisis outcome to end. The more power factors Russia employs, the more it needs the crisis outcome to be beneficial. Soft power is difficult to quantify, whereas hard power can relatively easily be quantified. By nature of their practicality, this study will therefore make use of the hard power factors. Thus, by looking at the presence of hard power factors, one may be able to classify a crisis. As we saw in the Definitions chapter, this crisis classification will be in the form of a Crisis Score.
The second part of this study examines the power ministries influencing Russian governmental policy. As governmental policy will affect the use of hard power, this will allow for an analysis of which actors are publically most or least active during the differently classified crises.
70 Allison & Zelikow p.24
Conflict resolution Hard Power 1
Hard Power 3 Hard Power 2
20 Coalition A Coalition B Strategy A1 Strategy B1 Decisions by Governmental Authorities
Institutional Rules, Resource allocation and Appointments
Policy outputs Advocacy Coalition Framework Governmental policies can generally be seen as the result of politicking between actors. This public policy process has been the focus of many studies, and as a result there are several models. Sabatier
identifies71 these models as:
1. The Stages Heuristic
2. Institutional Rational Choice 3. Multiple-Streams
4. Punctuated-Equilibrium Framework 5. Advocacy Coalition Framework 6. Policy Diffusion Framework 7. Funnel of Causality
Figure 2
These theories have in common in that they identify actors as influencing government policy. As an example we can look at
Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework72.
Of interest in this theory are the actor coalitions, and their effects on governmental decisions. Basically, what this theory states is that actors will group into coalitions with likeminded actors, and develop a joint strategy. These strategies will be the framework for government decisions. These
decisions are then tempered by institutional rules, resource allocation, and appointments, to produce policy outputs. The figure to the right is a simplified illustration of the process. When applied to this study, the idea of coalition can be simplified to that of actor (or power ministry). Introducing elements of Allison and Zelikow’s Organizational Behavior Model, where a state consists of organizations, allows for
looking at the motivation behind creating the strategies. The power ministries can be seen as essentially subdivisions within the Russian state. These numerous subdivisions within the state, such as the foreign ministry and defense ministry, will have different organizational missions, and thus
different operational objectives, special capabilities, and organizational cultures73. These will impact
71 Sabatier pp.6-10
72 Ibid. p.191
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on the sub divisional perspectives of crises. As an example, in the US, the State Department, due to its nature, is more likely to see the solution to a particular international crisis as being diplomacy, whereas the Department of Defense, on the other hand, may favor a military approach. These different organizational characteristics will have an impact on each actor’s strategy as they try to influence government decisions. But why would a power ministry want to influence government decisions?
According to Allison and Zelikow, organizations want to be healthy, and “most organizations define
the central goal of ‘health’ as synonymous with autonomy”74. A goal for these organizations,
therefore, is to expand in terms of budget, personnel, and responsibilities75. By positioning
themselves as highly visible organizations during certain crises, this can be interpreted as making a land grab and wanting to have more influence in the resolution of the crisis. If an organization shows itself competent in an area, this could eventually lead to expanded responsibility, which in turn could eventually lead to increased autonomy. In short, the actors have imperialist tendencies and want to grow, a sort of Nietzschean will to power. They grow through accumulating more responsibilities. And they accumulate more responsibilities through showing that they have the competence in these new areas. Times of crisis tend to be good opportunities to show competence. Depending on the crisis, different power ministries may want to show their competence. By adapting the Advocacy Coalition Framework, and instead of using advocacy coalitions as actors simplify it to simply organizations as actors (as per the Organizational Behavior Model) we get a slightly different model.
Figure 3 In this model as seen below, different actors, or organizations, are distinguished with different organizational
objectives, capabilities, competence, standard operating procedures, and programs and repertoires. These differences will color their view of the situation, as defined by the Crisis Score. Being imperialistic, they will want to grow. By showing activity and attempting to influence governmental decisions during times of crisis (with each crisis classified in this model through the crisis score), they will attempt to show they are competent in dealing with these situations. In short, what this model
74 Allison & Zelikow p. 181 75 Ibid. Crisis Score Actor A Actor B Actor C Actor D Policy outpu ts Decisions by Governmental Authorities Crisis outcome
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suggests is that the decisions by governmental authorities are a result of actors competing for influence.
9. Method
This section will describe the method used in order to study the Russian power ministries and their power projection. Initially, this study attempted to examine actor activity in relation to crisis outcomes. The outcomes would be measured on a positive and negative scale as seen from Russia. Positive outcomes for Russia could be identified as those where Russia did not punish the opposing state. If Russia was happy with the outcome, it would not feel the need to punish the opponent. Vice versa, negative outcomes for Russia would be identified if Russia did in fact feel the need to punish the opposing state. These punishments would come in the form of hard power. For instance, if Russia felt a crisis outcome was bad and wanted to punish a state, they could turn off the gas tap, implement economic sanctions, or send troops to or near the opponent. By measuring the difference in troop levels or economic trade before and after a crisis, we could easily see if a state was being punished.
As it turns out, Russia withdrew from the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty in 2007, and therefore stopped reporting troop levels. As no open source indexes Russian troop levels and locations frequently enough that it would be possible to compare these levels before and after crises, measuring this hard power became impractical. As one of the three Russian hard power factors was rendered uncollectable, the feasibility of classifying crises in accordance with their outcomes was abandoned. Instead of probing crisis outcomes, it was decided that this study examines the actual presence of hard power factors, and use this presence to classify each crisis accordingly. The assumption here is that if Russia has a hard power conduit in a country, then Russia will always actively use that hard power.
To repeat from the Research Questions section, the research questions are:
Which hard power factors were present in the crisis?
How active was each power ministry during the crisis?
Is there a correlation between crises where hard power factors were present and certain
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10.
Choice of Method
This study will use an extensive approach in order to examine these research questions. As extensive methods are useful in identifying possible correlations between variables, and with this study ultimately interested in looking at possible correlations between Crisis Score and power ministries, this method should be the most practical. Quantitative data relatively easily can be gathered from open source sources.
Further quantitative approaches for studying the relationship between hard power and power ministries might be to do organizational structure analyzes. Here one would look at the individuals employed within the different power ministries and their relationships with key individuals in the Russian government (in this case likely limited to Putin).
Using a qualitative approach to examine the correlation between crises and power ministries may be possible too. In this case, one would have to focus on one or two typical cases, such as an energy crisis. The cases chosen would then be classified (i.e. energy crisis), and each power ministry analyzed. This intensive approach would theoretically allow for a much deeper analysis of the power ministries as compared to the method as chosen by this study. However, it would require much more detailed information from each power ministry. This is essentially the method’s main Achilles’ heel, in that much of the required information for a qualitative study is confidential, or at least not accessible. Without access to actual power ministry reasoning, the validity of the study would suffer. Another qualitative method that would counter this problem would be to interview power ministry members in order to identify power ministry activity. Assuming access to unbiased and central individuals, such a study would likely be highly reliable. It would also likely be highly expensive and time consuming.
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11.
Operationalization
Part one
The first part of the study will examine and classify each crisis.
The dependent variable in this study will be the Crisis Scores. These will be coded in an interval scale ranging from zero to three. 0 (zero) will denote a crisis where Russia lacks any form of hard power. 1 (one) will indicate a crisis where one hard power factor is present. 2 (two) means two hard power factors were present, and 3 (three) means all three hard powers as identified by Wilson and Popescu were present. The following table demonstrates how the Crisis Score data will be set up. A low score would imply that Russia will not get its will through, whereas a higher score would imply that it would.
Table 3
CRISIS Military presence Energy cut-off Trade sanctions Crisis Score
Crisis A X 1
Crisis B 0
Crisis C X X 2
The following hard powers will be examined:
Military presence will be calculated through the presence of significant Russian military capabilities in the host country at the time of the crisis. These could take the form of already established military bases or other more ad-hoc presence. The key word here is significant, in that presence must be enough to be able to constitute a possible threat. If there is a military presence this will be coded as an X on the Crisis Score table, and if not then the box will remain empty.
The energy cut-off variable will be calculated through examining whether Russia cut of energy supplies during the crisis. If Russia did cut off energy supplies during a crisis, that will be recorded as an X in the table. If it did not cut off supplies, the box will be empty,
If a trade sanction is instituted during or in the aftermath of a crisis, this will be interpreted as a punishment. If a previously instituted trade sanction is withdrawn after a crisis, this will be interpreted as a reward. For the sanction to be an effective punishment it should hurt, and for it to
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hurt it should show up in the trade statistics. If exports of goods to Russia the year after the crisis are shown to have fallen significantly enough to show a dip, then that will be assumed as Russia restricting trade with the state, which in other words would be a trade sanction. If trade has fallen that will be recorded as an X in the Crisis Score table, and if trade has not been affected negatively then the box will be empty.
For this study, each hard power is assumed to be equally effective, and will not be weighted against the others. Once the crises has been examined and recorded on the Crisis Score table, the presence of each hard power will be tallied up for every crisis, as seen in the column to the right.
Part two
Once the crises have been identified and classified according to their Crisis Score, we will look at how active each Russian power ministry is in each crisis. These will be the independent variables in the study. As detailed in the Theory chapter, organizations compete for influence. They do this by highlighting their competence, and one way of making oneself noticed is through public statements. Within the framework of this study, actor activity is assumed to be reflected in public statements, with a high number of public statements being indicative of high activity, and low numbers suggesting low activity. Consequently, by tallying up each statement per power ministry, one would get an indication of how involved they are in the policy process of that particular crisis. Once gathered, the data will be put in a data matrix as presented below:
Table 4 CRISIS A Power ministry (a) Power ministry (b) Power ministry (c) Etc… Nov 11 0 0 0 Nov 12 0 1 1 Nov 13 1 0 0 Nov 14 0 1 0 Total 1 2 1
To repeat from the Definitions chapter, the power ministries used in this study will be: the President; the Prime Minister; the Foreign Ministry; the State Duma; the Federation Council; the Finance
26
Ministry; the Energy Ministry; the Ministry for Emergency Situations; and the Federal Security Service.
The study will consider statements starting one month prior to the central crisis date(s), and end one month after the immediate crisis has ended. This will mean that the statement table will be rather extensive, and not very accessible. In order to present the statement data in a relatively organized fashion the data will be put into timeline diagrams. These diagrams will present the time period examined on the X-axis, with statements by power ministries presented as peaks on the Y-axis. The following diagram illustrates the presentation. In the following example, we see that Power Ministry A made a statement on July 7, and Power Ministry B made statements between July 16 and 18.
Figure 4 A bar chart would arguably be better suited to present the data; however, due to the relatively large
time scale examined per crisis, the bars would be too thin to distinguish.
Part three
As noted, these diagrams simply present the statement data. The actual statement tables can be found in Appendix B. In order to analyze the total power ministry activity for a given crisis, each actor statement is added up respectively. This frequency table gives the total actor activity per crisis (using the above example Power Ministry A would have made a total of three statements, and Power Ministry B a total of seven). Having done this, we can begin analyzing actor activity for every Crisis Score. This will be done through calculating mean percentage values per actor for every Crisis Score Again using the previous example, we see that Power Ministry A made three statements and Power Ministry B made seven statements. This translates to an actor activity of 30 % for Power Ministry A, and 70 % for Power Ministry B in that particular crisis. As each crisis is unique, calculating these actor activity percentages for every crisis will get a range of different values for every actor.
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We then organize these crises actor activities in accordance with the Crisis Scores. This will give actor activity in correlation with hard power (with a low Crisis Score corresponding to fewer hard power factors present). The following two tables show an example of actor activity values. As they will be grouped in accordance with the Crisis Score, there will be a separate table with different crises for every Crisis Score (Crisis Score 0 through 3).
Table 5 Table 6
Having done this, we can easily analyze which actor or actors are most active during certain crises, and, conversely, absent in others. The best method of visually presenting these results will be through simple circle diagrams. Using the mean values from the example tables above, we get the following diagrams:
Figure 5 Figure 6
What these diagrams tell us is that during bilateral relations crises where Russia has relatively few hard power tools present, Power Ministry B dominates the agenda. In crises where Russia would be able to use more hard power, Power Ministry A dominates.
Crisis Score 2
Power Ministry A Power Ministry B
Crisis C 60 % 20 %
Crisis D 80 % 30 %
Mean Value 70 % 25 %
Crisis Score 1
Power Ministry A Power Ministry B
Crisis A 30 % 70 %
Crisis B 50 % 60 %
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12.
Sources
This section contains a discussion on the sources used. There are five criteria which need to be
fulfilled in order for a source to be reliable76. The first criterion is concerned with authenticity. What
this means is that the source must not be fabricated. This can be a problem in older historical sources, as well as after sources written after conflicts (“history is written by the victors”, as Winston Churchill aptly put it). As Teorell and Svensson point out, data from authoritarian countries may
suffer from a lack of authenticity77. It is imperative for any study that the source is authentic. The
second criterion deals with the contemporaneousness of the source to the event. Simply put, the longer the time between an event and its reporting, the more likely that people involved would forget details. With regards to this criterion, the earlier the reporting of an event, the better. The third criterion focuses on centrality, or how distant the source is from an event. The big question here is whether the source is a primary source or secondary source. Generally, primary sources should be better than secondary sources. The fourth criterion is concerned with tendentiousness, or whether a source favors a particular point of view. Bias can lead distorted event reports. For this criterion to be fulfilled, tendentious sources should be kept to a minimum. The fifth and final criterion looks at dependence. A good source should be independent of other sources, and should not rely on other sources.
Part one
There are five criteria which need to be fulfilled in order for a source to be reliable78. The first
criterion is concerned with authenticity. What this means is that the source must not be fabricated. This can be a problem in older historical sources, as well as after sources written after conflicts (“history is written by the victors”, as Winston Churchill aptly put it). As Teorell and Svensson point
out, data from authoritarian countries may suffer from a lack of authenticity79. It is imperative for
any study that the source is authentic. The second criterion deals with the contemporaneousness of the source to the event. Simply put, the longer the time between an event and its reporting, the more likely that people involved would forget details. With regards to this criterion, the earlier the reporting of an event, the better. The third criterion focuses on centrality, or how distant the source is from an event. The big question here is whether the source is a primary source or secondary source. Generally, primary sources should be better than secondary sources. The fourth criterion is
76 Teorell & Svensson pp.104-106 77 Ibid. p.104
78 Ibid. pp.104-106 79 Ibid. p.104
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concerned with tendentiousness, or whether a source favors a particular point of view. Bias can lead distorted event reports. For this criterion to be fulfilled, tendentious sources should be kept to a minimum. The fifth and final criterion looks at dependence. A good source should be independent of other sources, and should not rely on other sources.
For the first part of the study, classifying the various crises, a number of sources have been used.
Military presence
With regards to the Russian military presence source, ideally one would use a source released by the Russian Ministry of Defense. As this information is of strategic importance, it is largely classified. Instead, this study will employ a secondary source for this information. This data for Russian military bases abroad has been collected and assembled by Dr. Margerete Klein of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). Dr. Margerete Klein is a researcher at SWP Russian Federation/CIS Division. The research paper, ‘Russia’s Military Capabilities – “Great Power”
Ambitions and Reality’ from 2009, examines Russian military expansion since Putin’s second term as
president 2004-2008. Of interest to this study is table 6 in that paper. This table presents Russian military facilities and bases abroad. This information is compiled from data by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and several news outlets. The table itself can be found in Appendix A. As regards authenticity, this study has been published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. This organization frequently reports to the German Bundestag and the German Federal Government. Due to its high profile, this organization likely cannot afford to publish unauthentic reports. The study was released in 2009, and as such should sufficiently fulfill the contemporaneousness criterion. Ideally however, the data should have covered each year from 2004 to 2011 (the sample range of this study). The author of the report has not physically travelled to the Russian military bases. This may have a negative effect on the centrality criterion, as her reporting from other sources may include faulty data. Looking at the tendentiousness criterion, the information gathered from the report only pertains to reporting actual military presence; the risk of tendentious tendencies on behalf of Dr. Klein should therefore be minimized. As Dr. Klein uses other sources to gather her information, the dependence criterion will be negatively affected. Overall, the source should prove valid.
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Energy cut-off
This data will be gathered through news agency reports of Russia shutting off energy supplies. As completely shutting down energy-supplies to a country is a fairly big step, it is assumed by this study that such actions would be reported. The news agencies used will be Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, and RIA Novosti. By using two independent news agencies as a source, this study ensures that the risk of reports of pipeline shut-offs being missed are minimized. The news agency source criteria discussion will be found further down
Sanctions
By using economic sanctions, states wish to express their dissatisfaction with an opposing part, and influence change. Therefore it stands to reason that economic sanctions are implemented in a way as to hurt the economy of the opposing country. Such sanctions should therefore turn up in the export data of the targeted country. This study will look at the export of goods from each examined state to Russia. The data will be collected from each country’s statistical agency. As these trade statistics are, amongst other things, used to control import and export duties, it is of high importance for the states that these figures are authentic. The export data collected will be for the year prior to the crisis, the crisis year, and the year after the crisis. As the information will be sourced directly from that year, the contemporaneousness criterion is fulfilled. Furthermore, as these data sets are self-reported, they will also fulfill the centrality criterion. For tendentiousness, there is a small risk that the data may be distorted in order to gain trade advantages vis-à-vis Russia. However, Russia would likely corroborate this data with their import data to minimize unfair competition (i.e. dumping). The export data depends on the national customs agencies fulfilling its task. This may potentially have a negative effect on the dependence criterion. In the case of Tajikistan, their statistical agency seems to have been defunded in 2008. Therefore, their data has been collected from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As the data needed for Tajikistan extends into 2012, the study will use the IMF estimate for 2012. One may argue that the IMF might prove an even less tendentious source than the national statistical agencies; however it would lose on the centrality criterion.
Once collected, the data will be put into diagrams in order to show the trend lines. If the trend line is positive (increases for every year) then the assumption will be that Russia did not implement any economic sanctions. The data can be found in Appendix A
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Part two
The second part of the study, analyzing actor activity, requires collecting public statements.
The data for actor activity will be gathered as public statements from Radio Free Europe- Radio Liberty (RFE-RL), and RIA Novosti. These two sources publish reports in English, making it possible to examine power ministry statements. By using two sources, one can cross-reference data to ensure no statements are missed.
RFE-RL was initially established in 1953 by the US to contest Soviet propaganda in Russia. Since then it has expanded to serve regions such as the Middle East, and South East Asia. It is funded by the US
Congress, and it has local news bureaus in 20 regions, amongst them Russia80. This Russian news
bureau presence should allow for increased reliability when reporting on public statements. RIA Novosti was established in 1991 by the decree of Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. Its initial mission was to “To provide information support for the USSR’s state domestic and foreign policies and
proceeding from the interests of the democratization of the mass media”81. As a Russian state-owned
news organization, it is highly likely to publish governmental actor statements. As news agencies, it is their task to ensure that their information is authentic. This should provide for the authenticity criterion. The news reports used in this study all stem from the day or days when the statements were made, which means that the contemporaneousness of the sources are good. As these agencies maintain news bureaus in Moscow, their centrality is relatively good. By using two news agencies which are funded by two historically diametrically opposed states, overall tendentious effects should be minimized. As there generally should not be any middle-man sourcing when reporting on power ministry statements, the dependence criterion should also be fulfilled.
Ideally, statements should be gathered directly from the power ministries (such as through news archives on official websites). Not all power ministries examined have news archives stretching back to 2004 though, and those that do have them do not necessarily have them in English. As machine translation (i.e. Google Translate) has not yet reached the level where translations are consistently accurate, this study has elected not to gather the statements directly from the actors. Other relevant news agencies could include Interfax and general news outlets. By adding these sources one would likely further minimize the possibility of missing statements. It is however assumed by this study that
80 RFE-RL FAQ 81 RIA Novosti About
