De-escalation amid a Total War? : An interpretivist-constructivist analysis of Finland's involvement (or lack thereof) in the Siege of Leningrad and Murmansk during the Continuation War 1941-1944

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De-escalation amid a Total War?

An interpretivist-constructivist analysis of Finland´s involvement (or lack

thereof) in the Siege of Leningrad and Murmansk during the Continuation War

1941-1944

Margarita Sallinen

Thesis, 15 ECTS (hp) War Studies

Master’s Programme in Politics and War Spring 2020

Supervisor: Ilmari Käihkö Word count: 15940

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Abstract

At the beginning of the Continuation War in 1941, Finnish and German troops commenced a gradual escalation which resulted in swift successive victories against the Soviets. Yet, Finland´s Field

Marshal Mannerheim unexpectedly turned his back on military rationality at Leningrad and Murmansk despite his knowledge of how vitally strategic the locations were to the Soviet war effort. Leningrad was encircled by German and Finnish forces and a successful siege was achievable, yet Mannerheim abruptly discontinued the offensive and chose to assume a stale war lasting until 1944. Likewise, Mannerheim withheld his troops from cutting off Murmansk Railway. These events beckon important inquiries regarding Mannerheim´s decision to de-escalate during successful offensives in a total war and presents a conundrum that few have to date examined holistically. As such, this thesis offers an alternative perspective to the current rational explanations of Finnish warfare in the Continuation War. This thesis discusses specific social processes of Finnish society that rationalist explanations overlook and applies the theory of constructivism to identify that normative factors can complement the

prevailing rationalist explanations. This thesis further identifies how the social concepts of identity, shared culture and knowledge, and the norms of the Finnish people, and its leadership, contributed to Mannerheim’s decision to disregard military rationality and de-escalate. Lastly, this thesis determines that norms and ideas matter in war studies and future research should incorporate an interpretivist approach which contemplates social constructions and norms as alternative explanations in complex, multi-casual social phenomena like war.

Key words: Constructivism, Continuation War, de-escalation, escalation, Finland, interpretivism, Mannerheim, total war

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Acknowledgements

I wish to express my utmost gratitude to my supervisor Associate Professor Ilmari Käihkö for the time he gave me during the planning and writing of this thesis. Without his patience, guidance and encouragement this thesis would not have been accomplished.

I also wish to extend my heartfelt gratitude to my supportive and loving fiancé, Michael Daw, for always standing by my side.

Finally, I want to dedicate this thesis in honour of my late father, Tauno Sallinen who was born in Finland. Dad, this is for you.

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1. Introduction

Finland fought as co-belligerent with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union shortly after the Continuation War broke out on 22 June 1941. What began as a German invasion of the Soviet Union – dubbed Operation Barbarossa – saw its forces pursue two major objectives: (1) occupy and demolish Leningrad, and (2); cut off the Murmansk Railway and isolate the port city which possessed great symbolic and strategic importance to the Soviets (Forczyk, 2009, p. 91; Lunde, 2011, p. 62). However, when the Nazis advanced towards Leningrad, Finland’s Field Marshal Mannerheim ordered Finnish troops to cease their attack, thereby removing them from directly participating in the Siege of Leningrad. The decision was made to neither bomb Leningrad nor cut off the Murmansk Railway. Once the Finnish troops had reclaimed the territory lost to the Soviets during the Winter War – the Winter War was fought 15 months prior to the Continuation War commencing – Finland’s participation as

co-belligerents with Nazi Germany slowly preceded to a “dead end” in 1941-1942. Over the next one and a half to two years, Finland’s military refrained from engaging in an offensive

strategy and did little to assist the German forces’ attack on the strategically important locations of Leningrad and Murmansk (Ekberg, 2000, p. 27). This gives rise to a theoretical puzzle as what started as a successful military operation that followed progressive escalation, culminated in a sudden de-escalation by Finland’s military leadership. This was despite military rationality – based on logic and rational thought – suggesting that the Finnish forces would have enjoyed two successful offensives. To explain this puzzle, several concepts must be clarified: World War II was a “total war” – a concept with many definitions. Total war is defined in this thesis as “a theoretical concept, implying the use of all available resources and weapons in war, and the elimination of all distinctions between military and civilian targets” (Luttwak, 1991, p. 625). Additionally, the concept of escalation assumes wars experience “escalation” – defined in this thesis as “an increase in the scope of a given conflict” (Freedman, 1987, p. 109). Critically, a total war expects total escalation, which does not appear to hold true in Finland’s case. Researchers have attempted to provide rational

explanations revealing why the Finnish forces discontinued both offensives (Lunde, 2011, p. 70). Rationalism suggests that humans act in material self-interest and relies on material factors in its analysis for its explanations – such as fire power, tactics, numerical superiority etc over ideational (Agius, 2019, p. 75). This thesis argues that Mannerheim´s decision making cannot be explained through rationalism and material factors alone. Additionally, this thesis argues that a greater appreciation of these events is discovered when incorporating

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normativity and ideational factors in compliance with interpretivism and constructivism, which complement leading explanations. Can underlying non-rational reasons help explain Finland’s decision to de-escalate an event which was fought as part of a “total war”?

1.1. Research question

The Second World War is traditionally viewed as a total war. Yet, the Finnish leadership’s decision to forego from participating in the Siege of Leningrad as co-belligerents with Nazi Germany, and to abstain from cutting off the Murmansk Railway, seems to challenge this notion. The exact research question is as follows: How can normative explanations help explain why the Finnish forces did not continue their military escalation upon reaching Leningrad and Murmansk, despite possessing the military prerequisites necessary to

succeed? This thesis will seek to delve deeply into Finland’s role in the Continuation War and attempt to understand why Mannerheim chose not to pursue an offensive war as

co-belligerents with Nazi Germany upon reaching Leningrad and Murmansk in 1941. The main actor studied is Finland, it´s leadership and society, within the time frame of the Continuation War from 1941 to 1944. To further clarify the research question, the scope of this thesis will be briefly discussed. Regarding empirics, this thesis will not cover the Soviet’s or Nazi Germany’s point of view. However, Germany’s war aims, demands and its agreement as co-belligerents with Finland will be presented to assist the reader to understand Finland and Germany’s relationship, and the context in which Finland was operating militarily. Regarding theory, it is not this thesis’ aim to present competing viewpoints on the existing rational assumptions. Instead, the purpose for choosing constructivism is to provide a complementary perspective to the rationalist explanations already in existence (Tannenwald, 1999, p. 435). Additionally, it is not this thesis’ intention to argue against existing explanations for Finland’s decision-making at the time. Further, this thesis assumes Mannerheim decided to de-escalate and acknowledges it is the author´s interpretation of the solution. Last, this thesis

acknowledges the issues that arise from using words such as “Finland” and the “Finns” or “Finnish society” etc, and that it points to an assumption of a unitary state/society.

Accordingly, the author of this thesis recognises the problem of condensing a whole society into “one” being. However, due to the limited scope of this thesis, this wordage has been adopted in several parts for convenience.

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1.2. Previous research

Extensive research already exists on the Second World War, especially regarding the ideologies of, and the countries they “belonged to” like Nazi Germany and Stalin´s Russia. Despite Finland playing a pivotal role during World War II, most research concerns the Winter War. In contrast, the Continuation War – which proceeded across a greater portion of WWII than the Winter War – and Finland’s participation in it has received significantly less attention (Lunde,2011, p 2). The scarce research that does concern Finland´s role in the Continuation War, largely contemplates the traditional material factors in rationalist theory. Some English examples include, first, Lunde (2011) who primarily focuses on logistical issues and material factors such as fire power, manpower, Finland’s economy, and the army´s rational choices and strategic calculations. Second, Jowett (2006) provides an interesting reading about the organization, tactics and weapons used between 1939-1945. Third, Mann (2002) has written about the difficulties of conducting warfare in the Arctic due to the terrain and environmental conditions, which the Finnish and German forces contended with. Fourth, Krosby (1968) has written about the Continuation War and German, Finnish and Soviet relations. Krosby also writes about the importance of the Petsamo nickel mines and its economic importance to all actors involved. Lastly, Vehviläinen (2002) has written comprehensively about Finland and greatly focuses on Finland’s political affairs and its foreign policy for the war. In addition to English sources, Erfurth (1950) has published a comprehensive book about the Continuation War in German called “Der Finnishe Krieg”. Furthermore, the memoirs of Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim (referred to simply as Mannerheim in this thesis henceforth), the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces during the Continuation War, is published in various languages including Finnish, Swedish and English (Lunde, 2011, p. 4). More will be mentioned about the memoirs in 3.4.

Constructivism, as explained below in 2.2., is not a consistent theory. One explanation for this is that there are many ways to contemplate identity and previous research on

constructivism was conducted by authors with different understandings of social relations and identity. Furthermore, theoretical research on constructivism already exists but not in

compliance with Finland and its role in the Continuation War. Erik Ringmar is one author who strongly advocates constructivism and the importance of identity. Ringmar (1996) writes about the importance of identity as a factor in choosing to go to war, which the author of this thesis argues is important for historical studies and will be used in this thesis. Ringmar, however, criticises rational explanations and argues that the reasons to act for the sake of

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identity is more fundamental than interest, for example, which is a rational explanation. As mentioned in 1.1., this thesis does not seek to compete or create any tension between rational and constructivist explanations. It is not this thesis; goal to cause any polarization between these views but rather exhibit complementary perspectives since they are built on different epistemological assumptions. Furthermore, there are many published works on constructivism by leading scholar Alexander Wendt. Wendtian constructivism has likely contributed to the greatest number of debates about state identity and change, and the meaning of anarchy in international relations – Wendt contends anarchy is not a natural feature and suggests that it is “what states make of it” (Agius, 2019, p. 88; Wendt, 1992).

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2. Theory

At the heart of any research is a theory. A theory provides the foundation for analysis and interpretation of results and must therefore be carefully and appropriately chosen. In the following section, this thesis will highlight two theories used. Constructivism and its limitations will be discussed first. Escalation Theory and total war will then be presented.

2.1. Constructivism

The research question in this thesis will be approached through the lens of a social science theory called constructivism. Constructivism can be used to describe both a methodology and a theory. This thesis differentiates between these two meanings and employs constructivism as its theoretical approach (Lamont, 2015, p. p.168-169). Constructivism has taken much inspiration from sociology and offers an alternative school of thought to rational theory. The term constructivism was created in 1989 by Nicholas Onuf and emphasizes the importance of seeing the world as social rather than material, which is fundamental to the traditional and dominant rational theory (Agius, 2019, p. 75). In contrast to constructivism, rationalist theory suggests knowledge is based on logic and reason, and in war studies is often associated with the two century-old writings of military theorist Carl von Clausewitz and his understanding of war as a rational phenomenon and as a tool to pursue political goals (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 83). From this, several observations can be made. Constructivism does not disregard rationalism completely but considers it incomplete since ideas and norms are necessary to produce meaning for a state’s logic in its pursuits (Zrn & Checkel, 2005, p. 1064). Therefore, this thesis argues that constructivism and normative factors should be implemented in the case of Finland in the Continuation War since it provides important insights that rationalism fail to acknowledge (Tannenwald, 1999, p. 435).

Since the late 1980s, constructivism’s influence as an alternative approach to rationalism in international relations and politics has grown significantly (Agius, 2019, pp. 74-75). When applied in the context of international relation studies, constructivism is often associated with political scientist Alexander Wendt. Wendt has provided important work on the meaning of anarchy from a constructivist point of view in international relations. Constructivism

emphasizes understanding the world from the “inside”, since ideational and normative factors (together with material factors), shape society; humans understand the world through

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that material forces must be understood through the social concepts that define their meaning for human life”. To further explain the complex nature of constructivism, three key principles will be presented. Thereafter, three key concepts will be attached to the principles for

clarification.

2.1.1. Key principles of constructivism

First, human knowledge is constructed rather than given/derived externally. Constructivism argues that knowledge exists in the human mind and the human world is an artifice rather than naturally given (Agius, 2019, p. 75, 79). This means that humans constantly learn from new experiences and construct new knowledge, and their perception of the world is based on precious knowledge and reflection from new knowledge. People use intuition and past experiences to make sense of their current experiences. Second, knowledge is socially constructed, meaning experience and knowledge come from interaction with other people (Agius, 2019, p. 78). Third, identities are open to revision and change since ideas and norms can change (Agius, 2019, p. 76, 83). Critically, the identities of states and other actors are not fixed under constructivist theory. Constructivism contends that “[i]dentities may be hard to change, but they are not carved in stone” (Wendt, 1999, p. 21). In other words, constructivism not only shapes, but can also reshape socially constructed reality and norms.

2.1.2. Key concepts of constructivism

Constructivism focuses on the meaning behind social interactions and the importance of three key concepts: identity, shared culture and norms (Agius, 2019, p. 77. These three concepts will direct this thesis’ analysis to study the world and how the Finnish people and state attached meaning to it. Identity conveys who the actors are and in turn, what interests they have, and these interests inform the actions they choose to take. It argues that shared beliefs and ideas construct identity through historical processes, and that interests are therefore guided by identity and can change over time (Agius, 2019, p. 78). This contrasts with rationalist theory, which claims that a state’s interests and identity is assumed or given and therefore cannot change. In disagreement, constructivism contends that international relations and politics ought to be studied through a deep understanding of the actors and how they operate since identity does not simply occur. Since identities cannot simply exist, they are formed through collective ideas and culture. Therefore, much of constructivism’s focus is on intersubjectivity – the shared understandings or “collective memories” of the society – and emphasizes the importance of relational and social aspects since meanings come from

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interaction. This contrasts with the rational approach which argues that one thing impacts the other and is called cause and effect, or causality (Agius, 2019, p. 78, 79; Hurd, 2009, p. 3). Lastly, constructivism emphasizes the importance of norms in shaping an identity, since it is the collective ideas that produce norms. Norms can define actors and their identities by constituting part of them and are called constitutive norms. Norms can also serve as a standard for actors to know how to behave appropriately and are known as regulatory norms (Agius, 2019, p. 80).

Constructivism is an appropriate theory to use for this thesis since the author desires to understand to what degree underlying non-rational dimensions including identity, culture and norms did affect Mannerheim´s decision to de-escalate the offensives at Leningrad and Murmansk.

2.2. Limitations – constructivism

One limitation of constructivism is that it relies on the author’s interpretation of the studied actors and their observations of their experiences in the war. This can impact the research due to (unintended) biases. Additionally, rationalist scholars criticize constructivist theory for failing to be empirically observable and / or tested since concepts such as values and norms cannot be “seen” (Agius, 2019, p. 87). Constructivist critics also argue that it cannot be said with total certainty what norms are present, i.e., how can one be certain that norms, and which norms specifically, affect different actors and their behaviour? A further limitation of

constructivism is that it is not considered a uniform theory due to its diverse views on social relations, which has given rise to much debate (Agius, 2019, p. 87). Constructivism is divided into various approaches that differ significantly and have received different labels from different authors. For example, conventional constructivism (or modern constructivism) differs from critical constructivism (or radical constructivism). Conventional constructivism accepts neo-positivist explanations of phenomena to a degree, such as that state identity is given. Conventional constructivism views constructivism “as a bridge between rationalist and reflectivist approaches enabling both to benefit from the insights of another” (Agius, 2019, p. 85). Reflectivism is an umbrella term for theories opposing rationalism (Lamont, 2015, p. 170). In contrast, critical constructivists argue this notion cannot be realised since it is contradictory and problematic (Agius, 2019, p. 87). Another limitation of constructivism is the criticism that it is not a theory but rather an “approach”. Constructivism has been applied in some research as a methodology rather than as a theory. Due to the confusion stemming

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from the diverse use of constructivism, the author wants to reiterate that constructivism is the theory in this thesis.

2.3. Escalation and Total War

The theory of escalation is largely influenced by Clausewitz. In his book “On War”, Clausewitz suggested that escalation in war is a natural tendency. Escalation theory is largely under-investigated with most contemporary research focusing on material factors and the Great Powers (Freedman, 1987, p. 130; Ångström, 2015, p. 3). This is unsurprising since a large volume of escalation studies have emerged about the dynamics of the Cold War and thus possess a Nuclear bias and refer to escalation as the transformation of limited nuclear war to a total nuclear war (Freedman, 1987, p. 146). Further, Clausewitz identifies the

important and related concept of de-escalation. He explains that de-escalation is caused by the dynamics of “friction” – unforeseen events in warfare and politics. These frictions are

explained using material factors. De-escalation possess a Great Power and Nuclear bias too and refers to controlling and limiting intensity in a conflict, especially in nuclear warfare since a full-blown nuclear war would end in disaster (Freedman, 1987, pp. 126-133, 143). Most contemporary research concerning escalation and de-escalation focuses on material factors, with few exceptions. One exception is Howard (1979, p. 14) who stresses the importance of morality and norms in de-escalation theory.

Research in escalation is biased towards Great Powers and is therefore interesting to apply in this thesis since its case study concerns a small state, Finland. Additionally, it seems that current theories lack complete legitimacy and fail to complete the puzzle of Mannerheim’s decisions to de-escalate during the Continuation War. Thus, the inadequacies of the current research stress the uniqueness of this thesis’ aim; Finland is not considered a Great Power and its de-escalation occurred prior to the threat of Nuclear Weapons

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3. Methodological considerations

The following section will address the methodological considerations of this thesis. This includes philosophical beliefs about the nature of the world, how it is made up and how it shapes research. It concerns the choice of methodology and the questions of ontology and epistemology. This section will also address the limitations of the chosen methodology – interpretivism.

3.1. Interpretivism

The methodology chosen for this thesis is compliant with the research paradigm interpretivism. The knowledge comes “from within” meaning it aims to understand “the subjective character of the social world” (Risjord, 2014, p. 44). Schwartz-Shea, (2012, p. 2) explains that interpretivism “focuses on specific, situated meanings and meaning-making practices of actors in a given context”. The epistemological assumption – how one constitutes knowledge and how it is justified – in interpretivism is that knowledge is socially constructed (Risjord, 2014, p. 6). The ontological assumption – what the nature of reality is – is that the world is socially constructed. Interpretivism focuses on the interpretation of research and aims to understand it rather than explain it. This complements constructivism (see 2.1), the chosen theory for this thesis since constructivism is dependent on interpretation. This thesis draws a distinction between interpretivism and constructivism, which is important to stress since it is apt to cause confusion at first glance. To elaborate, in this thesis, interpretivism focuses on the researcher’s interpretation of the research of, for example, actors during a specific time frame and context. In contrast, constructivism focuses on understanding how meaning is constructed by the actor and his or her context in the situation being studied, in this case, Finland and its leadership during the Continuation War.

Interpretivism focuses on flexibility, contextuality and reflexibility. In relation to

flexibility, an interpretivist research design is usually abductive, i.e., it is conducted using an open-ended hermeneutic loop that goes back and forth. However, the fixed structure of this thesis means that conducting a flexible research design is limited. Additionally, most research designs are compliant with the neo-positivist paradigm, which is built on hypothesis-testing. Interpretivist research design does not follow (neo)positivism in that it possesses an open-ended approach which lacks both a formalized hypothesis, random sampling and variables (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 3). Accordingly, this thesis will not compose a hypothesis but

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instead investigate a research question that will be answered by understanding the patterns and underlying values taken from the relevant actors, settings and events of the pertinent time frame (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 53).

Further, this thesis focuses on contextuality and does not aim to generalize to a large population the same way a neo-positivist research would. This thesis’ aim is to understand the implicit case of Finland using an in-depth qualitative analysis to engage with meaning making of that time and context (Lamont, 2015, p. 46; Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 11). Meaning making includes understanding motivations, meanings, and feelings (Risjord, 2014, p. 44).

Additionally, interpretivism argues a difference exists between human and non-human behaviour, and in contrast to neo-positivism, the social and natural world are distinct. This can be explained by the importance of human consciousness and normativity in the social world – the social world is partly created by rules, values and norms in human society, which are highly interconnected and can explain state and individual action. In other words,

interpretivism holds that scientific and social knowledge are separated – this is known as mind-world dualism. This gives interpretivism the epistemological view of being anti-naturalist, since it disregards that only natural explanations – the naturalist view of the neo-positivist paradigm – are correct (Risjord, 2014, p. 8, 53, 54, 155).

Additionally, the methodological consideration and criterion for interpretive research of reflexivity needs to be addressed. The author recognizes one’s own “presence” in the research such as one’s own biases, background beliefs and presuppositions. The author acknowledges this can affect the research and will attempt to appropriately “self-monitor” what is studied and the understanding produced from one’s own feelings (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 5, p. 98; Risjord, 2014, p. 62). Due to the centrality of reflexivity in this research design, the subjective features of the researcher must be addressed to provide transparency and epistemological robustness (Risjord, 2014, p. 59, 62). The author has Finnish and Russian heritage but was born and raised in Sweden. Accordingly, this thesis is written from a Western point of view.

3.2. Limitations – methodology

Interpretivism is epistemologically anti-naturalist, which is considered a limitation by some researchers like neo-positivists who apply a methodological paradigm based on

naturalism in their research (Risjord, 2014, p. 43). Neo-positivist scholars argue that humans are a part of the natural world and should therefore be examined using the same mechanisms

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applied in the natural sciences. The interpretive anti-naturalist approach is considered a limitation by neo-positivists since interpretivism does not contend that there is only one form of scientific knowledge (Risjord, 2014, p. 53). Furthermore, interpretivism recognizes that no method is methodologically unbiased (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 5). Hence, it is acknowledged there are limitations with the chosen methodology since the author of this thesis is “part of the research”. Since the research is dependent on the author’s interpretation, this thesis cannot achieve total objectivity due to the unintentional biases spawning from one’s own

experiences, knowledge and background. Another question asked about interpretivism is whether the norms and values that differ from the authors can be quantified, explained and predicted (Risjord, 2014 p. 34, 64)? Even if achievable, such a process is fraught with difficulty and suggests methodological issues will likely arise. For example, how can the author know what the subject (Finland’s leadership) thought or believed when making decisions at Leningrad and Murmansk? Lastly, since neo-positivism is the dominant research paradigm, it is often compared to interpretivism. This causes confusion as both theories rest on different epistemological and ontological assumptions, and the vocabulary used differ to a degree.

3.3. Method

Research requires at least one or more tools – described here as a method – to conduct the investigation (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 4). The chosen methodology in research informs the method, and since this thesis is based on an interpretive research design, the method used will be interpretative-qualitative (Risjord, 2014, p. 57). The method for this thesis is a case study method (Yin, 2009, p. 4). Using Finland, its society and leaderships’ role in the Continuation War as a case study for this thesis is highly relevant – it complies with the theory of

constructivism, the methodology of interpretivism and aims to deeply understand complex social phenomena. The material used in this thesis includes various in depth-secondary sources such as books to complement a primary source – Mannerheim´s memoirs. The sources used in this thesis are primarily written in Swedish and English but include an

additional German source. This may be of benefit compared to using Finnish sources as it will mitigate source bias since the sources are written by “outsiders”. Due to source criticism and subjectivity, analysing memoirs may produce some limitations owing to the trustworthiness of the text. Despite this, interpretivist research considers memoirs a part of the social setting and a rich source of information that represents Mannerheim and his experiences at a specific point in time and is thus of great value (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 111).

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3.4. Limitations – method

Each method used in research has its limitations, biases and sources of error which can be difficult to detect (Risjord, 2014, p. 16, 24). Accessing certain primary sources for this thesis is a limitation since archived material and protocols are restricted from public access.

However, this thesis will make use of Mannerheim´s memoirs as a source which is

acknowledged to contain errors – following screening from questions in source criticism and the four principles of reliability: authenticity, time, dependency and tendency (Thurén, 2019, p. 12). It is acknowledged Mannerheim´s memoirs were written after the war and are a political statement. An additional limitation is that the author of this thesis has difficulties reading the Finnish language, which automatically limits the possibility of using credible Finnish sources. Furthermore, using a case study method, as opposed to interviewing the participants, denies the participants the ability to elaborate their interpretations further. Lastly, methods for analysing data in interpretivist research is different from neo-positivist research and is viewed as a limitation by neo-positivist scholars (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 21). Rather than using a quantitative method, neo-positivists favour research that utilises qualitative analysis in experiments using mathematical models which aim to uncover correlation and causality (Risjord, 2014, p. 9).

3.5. Ethics

It is the opinion of this thesis’ author that one cannot conduct war studies without contemplating ethics and engaging in self-reflection and one’s own ethical responsibility. Every step in the enquiry should be informed by research ethics (Lamont, 2015, p. 61). In compliance with Woods (2006) and Lamont (2015, p. 58-59), the researcher should keep ethical guidelines in mind at all times, especially prohibited practices which can be written out as the principle of “do no harm”, including mental and physical harm. The two most paramount ethical considerations for this thesis included: (1) human subjects, such as the victims of war; and, (2) the polarisation in politics as highlighted by the sensitive nature of current academic debates regarding the Second World War. Furthermore, serious ethical issues can arise from politics and propaganda, for example, actors can use research as

propaganda, and it is therefore essential to be cognisant of such motivations. Actors will use a researcher’s declarations for their own purposes, which can have real life consequences (Käihkö, forthcoming, p. 9).

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4. Empirical results

This section offers relevant empirical results used to analyse what happened at Leningrad and Murmansk. A brief background will be presented and then Germany’s war aims will be explained, followed by Finland’s.

4.1. Background

Finland broke free from Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution in World War I and declared its independence on 6 December 1917. A civil war closely followed between the Finnish “Whites”, led by Mannerheim, and the Finnish “Reds”, who were revolutionaries (Järv, 2006, p. 16). Finland and Germany’s military relations can be traced back to this period; the Whites turned to the Germans for support who willing backed Finland’s

independence (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 6). The other two wars proceeded close to one another and took place during World War II. Despite being a “small player”, Finland’s role during the Second World War was nonetheless pivotal. The first of the two remaining wars – called the Winter War – began when the Soviets attacked Finland on 30 November 1939. Fortunately for the Finnish forces, led by Mannerheim again, the Soviets underestimated their fighting capabilities and consequently had underprepared (Ekberg, 2000, p. 18). However, as the war progressed, Finland found itself on the verge of collapse and eventually agreed to the Soviet’s demands and acceded to the terms of the Moscow Peace Treaty in March 1940. The terms of the treaty permitted Finland to maintain its independence but contained numerous other harsh terms. For example, Finland was required to relinquish approximately ten percent of its vital agricultural land (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 109). The Finns living in these areas – approximately 12-13% of the Finnish population – were forced also to abandon their homes, the majority of which were from the Karelian Isthmus (Sandström, 1991, p. 17). Finland agreed to the

Soviet’s terms despite harbouring a strong detest for the stipulations. For a visualisation of the annexed areas, please see Appendix A. Shortly after, the Soviets started taking actions beyond the scope of the Moscow Peace Treaty. For example, the Soviets demanded the use of

Finland´s railroad systems to transport its troops. In June-July 1940, the Soviets annexed the Baltic regions of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Finland began to fear it would be next on the Soviet agenda. During this time, Finland found itself under constant threat and aggression from the Soviets. For example, on 14 June 1940, the Soviet’s shot down a civilian airplane, killing all nine passengers aboard, the majority of which were Finns (Ekberg, 2000, p. 22). To make matters worse, Finland was isolated from the outside world and not one of its Western

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Allies, including Sweden, reached out to offer support. While this was occurring, Nazi Germany had established itself as the only nation that could offer Finland reciprocal resistance against the Soviets (Lunde, 2011, p. 30; Mann, 2002, pp. 66–67; Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 170).

4.2. The escalation begins – 15 months of “peace”

It is arguable that the escalation in the Continuation War began long before the launch of Operation Barbarossa. Barbarossa was the code name for the invasion of the Soviet Union launched by Hitler on 22 June 1941 (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 109; Glantz, 2001, pp. 234–235). The escalation started during the 15 months of “peace” or, as Brunila et al. (2000, p. 19) calls it, a cold war – between the Winter War and the Continuation War. Germany had already factored in Finland’s participation in Operation Barbarossa in December 1940. In May 1941, the Nazis invited the Finnish leadership to send Finland’s military officers to Germany to discuss what actions would be taken if the Soviets attacked Finland. Finland´s society and leadership were exhausted from the Winter War, being isolated from the rest of the world and their fear of becoming a Soviet state, and thus accepted the Nazi’s invitation (Vehviläinen 2002, pp. 88-89). The Finnish leadership went on to accept the Nazis’ offer of security at the cost of participating in their planned attack. Their primary motivation stemmed from the security the German forces offered against the Soviets, who they labelled as the “eternal threat from the east” (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 171). The perceived necessity of self-defence prompted Finland´s leadership to collaborate with the Germans who possessed one of the strongest armies of the time. Germany had enjoyed military success from using its blitzkrieg-tactic in various parts of central Europe. Whereas, the Soviets had performed poorly during the Winter War and the prediction was that Germany could win a war against the Red Army in only a couple of months (Norrback & Meinander, 1999, p. 228). During the interim war years, Germany provided military support to Finland and was the only country selling it military supplies including weapons. Germany also provided the Finns with additional support such as food, economic aid and built important transportation links including roads and railways. Hitler saw value in Finland owing to its strategic geopolitical positioning and his desired transit rights for German troops through Finland and Norway, which was eventually agreed upon through a transit agreement (Ekberg, 2000, p. 23; Krosby, 1968, p. 96; Lunde, 2011, p. 30). Finland also established its own SS battalion; the SS – short for Schutzstaffel, which means protection squad – was an institution of the Nazis that represented its ideology (Dear &

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Foot, 1995, p. 1044). Additionally, numerous clandestine meetings took place between both nations in tandem to a steady increase in German troops in Finland’s north.

On 17 June 1941, the German troops stationed in northern Finland began to mobilise. Finland provided the German army with an additional 475 000 soldiers from its then population of approximately four million people. The Nazis put Operation Barbarossa into action on 22 June 1940, which saw roughly three million German troops, 2000 aircrafts and 3500 tanks initiate the offensive by crossing into Soviet territory through Finnish borders (Mann, 2002, p. 74). Several days later, the Soviets carried out an air offensive against fifteen locations in southern Finland, which comprised six major cities including Helsinki.

Interestingly, the air offensive was aimed solely at Finnish targets and disregarded German troops stationed in the north of Finland. It is arguable the Soviets saw the German troops in Finland as a threat and were responding accordingly (Sandström, 1991, pp. 10–11).

Furthermore, it is likely the Soviet Union was provoked by Finland and its engagements with the Nazis. The Finnish leadership saw the Soviet attack as an opportunity to repair the damage suffered during the Winter War. Thus, following the Soviet bombings on 25 June 1941, Finnish forces launched their offensive against the Red Army, initiating the Continuation War (Please see Appendix C in conjunction with Appendix B). Mannerheim, who led Finnish troops in the Finnish Civil War and the Winter War, would assume command of them once more.

The Finns have labelled this war the Continuation War since it was a continuation of the Winter War. While some argue that Finland committed an error in joining forces with

Germany, others assert that Finland had no choice. It was a matter of survival for Finland, and the Finns would have inevitably been drawn into another losing battle against the Soviets regardless of joining Germany or not (Lunde, 2011, p. 2). Mannerheim already suspected a Soviet offensive and had asked to mobilise in August 1940, which was prior to establishing proof that the Soviets were preparing an attack (Brunila et al., 2000, p. 58). It is arguable the Finns could have fallen victim to the Soviet’s plan in late-1940 had it not been for the agreements their leadership had reached with Germany.

4.3. Finland joins the Continuation War

In the beginning of the Finnish military campaign and following the commencement of Operation Barbarossa, the Finnish army obtained military superiority in their local areas of

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operations and rapidly advanced. The Finnish soldiers were better equipped than during the Winter War thanks to the weapons received from Germany. Despite suffering many casualties in terrible and bloody combat, the initial stages of the campaign were considered a triumph for Finland (Ekberg, 2000, p. 25). By July 1941, the Finnish forces had reclaimed most of the territories lost during the Winter War in the south of Finland (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 93). The Karelian Isthmus had been incorporated into the Finnish war aims in 1941, and the Finnish military continued to enjoy success as its forces retook the city of Vyborg one month later on August 29. By September 1, the Finnish troops had reached the pre-Winter War borders located in the Karelian Isthmus and were now roughly twenty kilometres away from

Leningrad. However, on 9 September 1941, Mannerheim made the decision to halt his troops advance despite enjoying a highly successful offensive. Up until now, Finland had fought alongside Germany who were conducting a full-scale total war. The Finnish leadership’s goals in conducting warfare were, however, not the same as the German’s, even after being pressured by them. Similarly, Mannerheim never ordered his troops to cut off the Murmansk Railway, which went against military rationality; the Murmansk Railway was logistically vital to the Soviet war effort. Initially expected as a war of short duration – many called it the “summer war” due to the expectation it would be conducted through the summer months of 1941 only – would continue for three more years. The Finnish leadership experienced difficulties in withdrawing Finland from the war due to the country’s dependence on the Germans for aid, primarily fuel and grain (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 372). The major turning point in the war occurred after the German forces failed to capture Stalingrad. Furthermore, the Finnish population was becoming increasingly resentful towards the war the longer it went on. In August 1944, Mannerheim was chosen as Finland´s president and would oversee the truce arrangements with the Soviets. The Continuation War eventually ended in

September 1944 and saw Finland withdraw its forces and create a ceasefire agreement with the Soviets called the Moscow Armistice. Stalin demanded Finland´s leadership initiate war against Germany. The Finnish leadership, acting in accordance with the Moscow Armistice, severed all ties with Germany and agreed to disarm and or expel any German troops that remained within Finnish borders (Drakenlordh, 2002, p. 98). This resulted in the Finnish forces escalating warfare against German troops in Finland, which culminated in the Lapland War.

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4.4. Leningrad

Leningrad held exceptional value, both symbolically and strategically, for the Soviets. During the Continuation War, it was a critical objective of the German forces to obtain, control and demolish. This is clearly demonstrated by the Nazis’ Directive No. 1 which concerns Leningrad and stated that “the Führer has decided to erase the city of Petersburg from the face of the earth. We have no interest in the preservation of even a part of the

population of the city” (Forczyk, 2009, p. 11). The German advance occurred on 8 September 1941 and resulted in Leningrad being encircled by Germany’s forces who cut-off all land supply routes in and out of the city. Once encircled, it was expected that Leningrad would fall quickly to the German forces’ siege. The Nazis wanted Finnish troops to participate and assist German troops with the attack via the north of Leningrad (Polvinen, 1969, p. 18). The Finnish troops had positioned themselves defensively about twenty kilometres north of Leningrad in the Karelian Isthmus (Please see Appendix D in conjunction with Appendix D). Yet, despite the predictions that Leningrad would fall swiftly before the spring of 1942, and

notwithstanding the pressure from the Nazis to participate, Mannerheim, in accordance with the Finnish government, refused the participation of Finnish troops in the siege (Jowett, 2006, p. 11; Nenye, 2016, p. 11; Vehviläinen, 2002, pp. 94–95). The Siege of Leningrad lasted significantly longer than the Nazis had predicted, and it is arguable that after 1942 the siege made no contribution towards the German troops’ survival or the Soviet´s defeat. The siege would continue until January 1944 and end with Germany’s forces defeated. From the outset of the siege, the Finnish leadership continued to de-escalate and refused to provide any significant assistance. By the end of the war, the Finnish leadership would even refuse to provide German troops with artillery support (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 95). Finland´s leadership severed its ties with the Nazis on 2 September 1944, in accordance with the terms of the Moscow Armistice. The Siege of Leningrad lasted for 900 days and saw more than one million non-combatants die (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 683).

4.5. Murmansk

The German forces’ primary objectives in North Finland involved cutting off the Murmansk Railway to isolate the Port of Murmansk. The port provided vital strategic

importance to the Soviet Union since it was ice-free year-round, connected the Soviets to the rest of the world and enabled the Soviets to receive essential supplies from the U.S. and Great Britain. The railway was 1,350 kilometres in length and connected Murmansk to Leningrad

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and provided the Soviets with vital war materials, reinforcements and aid (Erfurth, 1950, p. 47; Lunde, 2011, p. 62; Mann, 2002, p. 70; Nenye, 2016, p. 53). Secondly, Murmansk gave the Red Army the means to threaten the Petsamo nickel mines, which were important to the German war effort (Lunde, 2011, p. 65; Mann, 2002, p. 70). Knowing the significance of these locations, German and Finnish military leaders devised an offensive, dubbed Operation Silver Fox, to be conducted by their troops stationed in Finnish Lapland. Silver Fox required the German and Finnish troops to split into three groups and attack from different directions while simultaneously undertaking separate operations called Reindeer, Platinum Fox and Arctic Fox (Please see Appendix B in conjunction with Appendix E) German troops would carry out Reindeer and Platinum Fox with assistance from Finnish soldiers and attack from the north via Finland and the Norwegian territories it occupied. While Finnish troops would primarily participate in Operation Arctic Fox and attack from the south (Mann, 2002, p. 69; Nenye, 2016, p.54). The Finnish troops’ task was assigned to one of their divisions and placed under German command but was, however, led by the Finnish Major-General Siilasvou (Mann, 2002, p. 87; Vehviläinen, 2002, pp. 95–96).

When the Murmansk offensive began on 29 June 1941, the German troops did not expect much Soviet resistance nor did they account for the difficulties of the terrain, which possessed innumerable natural and logistical obstacles. Additionally, the majority of German troops were underprepared as most were raised in urban environments and had never encountered such wilderness before (Brunila, 1980, p. 94; Erfurth, 1950, p. 48; Mann, 2002, p. 70). In contrast, the Finnish soldiers were acclimatised to Northern Finland’s harshness and fared much better than the German troops who found themselves bogged down and unable to progress with their operations and becoming reliant on successful Finnish advancements. The Soviet troops were also prepared thanks to the railway which enable them to mobilise

sufficient numbers for their defence (Nenye, 2016, p. 58). The failed advancements at

Murmansk caused Hitler to order all operations to stop at the end of September 1941. Despite Hitler’s command, the second advancement on the Murmansk Railway began on 1 November 1941, and the Finnish army was initially successful in breaking through the Soviet’s defences. However, the Finnish forces’ advancement was halted once again due to the German troops’ inability to accomplish their tasks and because Mannerheim refused to send any

reinforcements (Nenye, 2016, p. 16, 62-63) The Finnish troops might have succeeded in cutting off the Murmansk Railway without help from German troops, but their efforts in accomplishing this were “half-hearted” at best (Brunila, 1980, p. 95). The lacklustre efforts by

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the Finnish troops resulted in the loss of 83, roughly one third, of their officers in combat the following week (Brunila, 1980, p. 95; Erfurth, 1950, p. 74). Despite being under German command, when Mannerheim discovered this, he became enraged and immediately ordered the advancement to stop. In fact, Siilasvou had already terminated the advancement before Mannerheim´s order had time to arrive on 17 November 1941. One last operation comprising of German and Finnish troops would be proposed and involved severing the Murmansk Railway in the summer and autumn of 1942. Mannerheim seemed eager to participate and had previously proposed a winter offensive that would have commenced much earlier on 25 September 1941. Mannerheim argued, however, that the German forces’ successful capture of Leningrad was an essential precondition for such an operation to commence. Furthermore, on 4 December 1941, Mannerheim wrote to German Field Marshal Keitel that:

The importance of the Murmansk Railway for the Soviet Union´s ability to wage war is undoubtedly great, not only with respect to the importation of war materials and food from the U.S. and Great Britain, but also by the morale role it plays as the main communication route between Russia and its allies. A prompt severing of this connection is of paramount importance. (Lunde, 2011, p. 217)

After this statement was made, however, Mannerheim cunningly referred to his precondition that Leningrad must fall before an attack on Murmansk could occur, which had yet to

transpire (Lunde, 2011, p. 217). On 6 December 1941, the situation quickly changed when Great Britain declared war on Finland, which meant Finland was now officially at war with two super powers (Meinander, 2017, p. 225). This was also a turning point for Mannerheim who began to doubt whether the Germany forces could end the war as victors (Erfurth, 1950, p. 90). The decision to abstain from cutting off the Murmansk Railway proved influential to the outcome of the war, partly owing to the Soviets’ importation of steel and aluminium but mostly from the food supplies it received via the port. The port also provided the Red Army with significant quantities of war materials. Nenye (2016) explains that:

Eventually about one-quarter of all aid that was to reach the Soviet Union arrived via this route, including 5,218 tanks, 7,411 aircraft, 4,932 anti-tank guns, 4,000 rifles and machine guns, 4,338 radios, 2000 field telephones, 1,803 radar sets, 473 million projectiles, nine torpedo crafts, four submarines, 14 minesweepers, 10 destroyers and a battle ship. (p. 64)

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On 3 February 1942, Mannerheim and Finland’s President Ryti were now certain that Germany and its army would collapse at any time. Accordingly, Mannerheim indicated to Ryti that he would abandon the proposed Murmansk offensive for 1942 due to the risk of Germany’s forces’ offensive collapsing (Nenye, 2016, p. 17). Mannerheim managed, in a polite and diplomatic way, to negotiate the Finnish troops´ non-participation in the proposed operation, basing his decision on political considerations (Järv, 2006, p. 219, Lunde, 2011, p. 224). Unsurprisingly, the proposed offensive was abruptly halted before it began. Thus, despite coming tantalisingly close, the plan to cut off the Murmansk Railway ended up being nothing more than a dream for the Nazis (Brunila, 1980, p. 94- 95).

4.6. Germany’s war aims

During World War II, Nazi Germany conducted a total war and its military – one of the most successful of the time – was already engaging in combat by the time the Continuation War commenced. Hitler composed Germany´s war aims in Directive 21 – the directive for Operation Barbarossa. Hitler’s primary aim was the complete destruction of the Soviet Union and encompassed crippling its economic and military potential. Germany was a totalitarian state and its war aims are thus clearly specifiable since public opinion presented little bearing on its creation (Brunila et al., 2000, p. 35; Lunde, 2011, p. 55). Operation Barbarossa was a voracious war of conquest and destruction. Barbarossa permitted the use of force against both military and civilian targets, and with great severity. Barbarossa violated international law in that no German soldiers would be prosecuted at the time for committing war crimes against Soviet civilians (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 110). The Nazis saw this as an opportunity to wage a war to fulfil its dream of “Lebensraum”, which included annexing vast areas of land in the east that belonged to the Soviets, some of which would be given to Germany’s allies (Lunde, 2011, p. 55). “Lebensraum” – means “living space” used by the Nazis to describe their expansionism in the East and was part of Germany’s war aims in Barbarossa (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 109, p. 675; (Glantz, 2001, p. 210)). Additionally, the Nazis, in compliance with its agenda of National Socialism, incorporated the final solution into Germany’s war aims to annihilate all European Jews (Järv, 2006, pp. 208-2090). The Nazis’ death squads – Einsatzgruppen – were assigned the task of systematically murdering the Jews, along with many other targeted groups who were deemed inferior to the Nazis, such as Slavs. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, the Nazis’ ideology will not be discussed in its entirety. Operation Barbarossa contained two important goals: (1) capture Leningrad; and, (2) cut off the

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Murmansk Railway to isolate the port city of Murmansk. Throughout the war, the Nazis desired an alliance with Finland. Despite exerting considerable pressure on them, Finland’s leadership did not accept their proposal and the Nazis eventually conceded and agreed to act as co-belligerents instead (Järv, 2006, p. 221).

4.7. Finland’s war aims

Finland´s war aims are not as ascertainable as Germany’s (Lunde, 2011, p. 55). The Finnish military’s initial war aims were to reclaim territories lost to the Soviets in the Winter War and under the Moscow Peace Treaty. Finland’s leadership also expressed that the war was waged against the Bolsheviks (Brunila et al., 2000, p. 142, Järv, 2006, p. 82). Yet, a contradiction exists in their claim: Finnish forces had advanced into Russian territory which they had no legitimate claim over, such as Eastern Karelia. To elaborate further, when the old 1939-borders were retaken, Finland’s leadership began entertaining the idea of “The Greater Finland”. The concept of “Greater Finland” can be traced back to the Peace of Tartu and was coined in 1920. This dream, however, became irrelevant when the Soviet Union became a great power during the 1930s. This idea was awakened nevertheless and came into full bloom in 1941 upon the commencement of the Continuation War. It is arguable that the Finnish leadership had possessed expansionist thinking during the Continuation War and may have contemplated incorporating it into Finland’s war aims. It is possible the Finnish leadership was prepared to wage war outside of Finland’s 1939 borders – an idea predominately supported by the far-right. On the one hand, Greater Finland would annex land containing Finnish-speaking people. On the other hand, it would also include territories which had never belonged to Finland, such as Eastern Karelia. Even so, there were still two important reasons for the Finnish leadership to incorporate this goal into their policy: (1) it would be easier to defend a front further to the east; and, (2) the expectation that the Soviet Union would be defeated and the Finnish peoples’ desire to unite with their “ethnic brothers over the border”. (Vehviläinen, 2002, pp. 91–92). This goal was almost achieved when most of East Karelia was occupied by Finnish forces – Finnish soldiers first marched into the city of Petrozavodsk in the autumn of 1941 and remained there until 1944 (Norrback & Meinander, 1999, p. 247).

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5. Analysis

This section will assess Finland’s leadership’s decision to de-escalate through an

interpretivist-constructivist analysis. The Finnish peoples’ (1) shared knowledge, ideas and culture; (2) norms; and (3) the identity of Finland, its people and it´s leadership during the Continuation War, will now be discussed. This order has been deliberately selected to demonstrate how shared culture and understandings, and norms, inform and shape identity. The author intends to stress the point that the findings of the analysis should not be read in isolation – the three key concepts of constructivism are highly interconnected, inform one another and often overlap (Agius, 2019, pp. 76-77). For the sake of clarity, however, each concept will be presented separately. Lastly, due to his influence, Mannerheim (and the Finnish leadership) and his role in Finland’s decision making will be presented separately.

5.1. Shared knowledge, ideas and culture

Most of the Finnish public supported the war on the condition that it remained defensive (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 89). Finnish novelist Väinö Linna, who had served in the war and had written down his experiences, said: “[f]or many, in its early stages the new war represented a kind of second round, in which Finland would recover the losses it had incurred in the Winter War” (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 89). Vehviläinen (2002, p. 91) expressed that “[t]he offensive operations were not necessarily in conflict with the claim of a defensive war as long as they were aimed at getting back the territory lost in the Peace of Moscow”. In other words, the Finnish public supported entering the war, especially those who were forced to flee the annexed lands during the Winter War. The Finnish people wanted to regain their lost lands and they considered the Soviet’s air offensive as no different from the Soviet’s unprovoked attack at the beginning of the Winter War. The Finnish people saw hope that together with one of the largest armies by their side – the Wehrmacht – they would be able to rise and exhibit a strong defence. Many Finnish people deemed the Treaty of Moscow as unfair and were prepared for one more defensive battle (Sandström, 1991, pp. 12–14). When the war broke out, President Ryti told his fellow Finns that it was a defensive war, a “Continuation War”, which he exclaimed to them via radio (Sandstöm, 1991, p. 61). Since the Winter War was a defensive war and this was simply the continuation of it, this war must thus be a defensive war too. When compared to the German forces, Finland’s military was not waging the “same kind of war”. Wanting to take back “what was once yours”, like Finland’s military aimed to do and did initially achieve at Karelia, is one thing. However, if Finland’s military

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did participate alongside Germany’s troops in the Siege of Leningrad and Murmansk, it would have been considered an offensive war.

The reason “defensive” is in quotation marks is due to a contradiction with this notion. On the one hand, Finland’s military was officially waging a defensive war, i.e., the continuation on the Winter War. On the other hand, evidence exists suggesting the goal of starting the conflict was to fulfil the idea of a “Greater Finland”, as explained in 4.7. The question whether the Finnish leadership wanted to restore part of Finland’s identity, i.e., reconnect with the Finnish speaking people in Eastern Karelia, or if this was an expansionist idea is beyond the scope of this thesis. The author of this thesis acknowledges that an extensive debate exists regarding the question of the Greater Finland and is a subject of much disagreement. However, the Finnish peoples’ reaction to the idea of achieving the Greater Finland is important to this thesis. To elaborate further, most Finnish people did not want to initiate war beyond the pre-Winter War borders. The Finnish public demonstrated their discontent toward the idea of the Greater Finland when Mannerheim had promised, in

accordance with the dream of the “Greater Finland”, to liberate Eastern Karelia. The question concerning Greater Finland might not seem relevant to Leningrad or Murmansk, yet, a clear link is observable by the overall lack of support the Finnish population had for the war, since it was no longer considered defensive. It is arguable that the Finnish leadership would be justified in annexing East Karelia since most of its population was Finnish speaking. Even so, the Finnish people were still not pleased with the idea of annexing that land. Hence, it is easy to comprehend the negative impact an attack on Leningrad or Murmansk would have had on the Finnish people. If Finnish forces had attacked those locations, Finland would have been at risk of losing its national unity, something the Finnish leadership recognized after taking East Karelia. Thus, the shared beliefs of the Finnish people that they should only take back what was once belonged to Finland is significant. This ties back to Finland’s identity which

contributed to the de-escalations at Leningrad and Murmansk, since both locations were never a part of the Finnish peoples’ collective knowledge, ideas and culture.

5.2. Norms

5.2.1. The lack of shared political norms with Nazi Germany

Suggested previously, Finland’s long-standing underlying norms as a democracy contributed to its leadership´s decision to de-escalate at Leningrad and Murmansk. This section explains that Finland and Germany did not share strong political traditions and had

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significantly different world views. Finland became a democratic country after declaring independence in December 1917, after separating from the Soviet Union during the First World War (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 167). To explain the norms as a democracy, Finland enjoyed a strong military cooperation with Germany during the First World War and the Finnish Civil War too, where Germany advocated Finnish independence. Notwithstanding this, Finnish-German relations changed over the course of the Second World War. The Continuation War was a substantial conflict within the Second World War. It extremely complex and primarily fought as total war that contained numerous actors with differing interests. The Finnish leadership did not want to ruin relationships with other world players in the long run, especially nations who shared similar democratic values such as the United States. Brunila (1980, p. 95) suggests this explains why Finland’s military did not continue its offensive at the Murmansk Railway despite possessing the capabilities to cut it off

successfully. Brunila argues that the Finnish troops´ “half hearted” efforts were due to the Finnish leaderships’ hesitation to demonstrate total commitment to this goal, which required their forces to fight without the Germans and risk aggravating their Western Allies further.

Finland was the only democratic nation who fought alongside the Axis, and Nazism was not something the Finnish people had much fondness for. Finland’s values, norms and

political dimensions were however agreeable to other Scandinavian and western democracies (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 167). In compliance with Scandinavian policy, Finland sought to maintain neutrality between the ideologies of Nazi Germany and the communist Soviet Union. This links back to the decision to de-escalation at Leningrad – Leningrad was

strategically and symbolically important for Nazi Germany to conquer, and for the Soviets to defend. This contributed to a symbolic war of a personal nature that saw a power struggle between Hitler and Stalin, which Mannerheim likely desired no part of. (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 683). Additionally, the Finnish people did not tolerate antisemitism and despite a small minority of Finns being sympathetic to the Nazis, Nazism never gained a foothold in Finland, nor did Nazi propaganda succeed there (Sandström, 1991, p. 122). It was previously

suggested that the Finnish leadership chose to act as co-belligerent with Nazi Germany as it was “the lesser of two evils”. Thus, norms help to explain the Finnish leadership’s decision to de-escalate during the Continuation War and end its cooperation with the Nazis stemmed from a lack of shared political and ideological values, i.e., most Finnish people and their leadership, including Mannerheim, did not support Nazism (Mann, 2002, p. 67). This is connected to the concept of identity too and how the Finns wanted Finland to be seen by other

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nations. The Finns’ shared ideas and possessing the norms of a democracy contributed to their leadership’s decision making as they wanted to be seen in a certain light, i.e., the Finns

wanted to have a neutral identity and not be seen as subscribers of Nazism. This can help explain why the Finnish leadership chose to avoid being too closely associated with the Nazis and Nazism.

5.2.2. Lack of common war aims

In addition to lacking shared values, the Finnish government was very clear about waging war separate to Germany and neither state acceded to a formal treaty. Thus, an alliance was never officially established between the two nations in the Second World War. Therefore, in accordance with constructivism, the Finnish leadership changed their view on the war upon their forces reaching the old pre-Winter War borders. Therefore, participating in the Siege of Leningrad and cutting off the Murmansk Railway was never a part of the Finnish

government’s true intention, especially since these territories has no connection to Finland. The author of this thesis acknowledges the current debates about this claim. The argument suggests, on the one hand, that the Finland entered the war as co-belligerents with Germany because “they had no choice” and should thus not be considered allies even despite both nations making numerous military arrangements together. Vehviläinen (2002, p. 170) suggests that Finland´s decision was heavily influenced by “[t]he Winter War and the Peace Treaty of Moscow” which “threw Finland into the arms of Germany”. It is arguable that until the Finns reclaimed their lost territories, they would piggyback on Germany and adhere to the motto that “the enemy of my enemy if my friend”. On the other hand, some arguments

contend that Finland’s leadership was aware of their role in the war, since they had already anticipated the Soviets attacking and had prepared to counterattack. This would also give Finland’s leadership a legitimate reason to start the war and should therefore be considered as an offensive war waged as allies with Germany, and that the title of co-belligerent was merely a cover. Regardless of which argument is more convincing, there are factual differences between both nations war aims that suggests two separate wars were being waged. Finland’s leadership was clear about being at war with the Soviets for their own reasons and stated that Finland was never by definition allies with Nazi Germany but instead co-belligerents.

Additionally, the Finnish leadership never signed a treaty to become allies with Germany and did not endorse Nazism either. The Finnish troops fought under Finnish command too – Mannerheim. Furthermore, despite the Continuation War taking place during the Second World War, Finland´s war aims were solely to achieve its objectives and to reclaim its

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Winter War territories, as discussed in 4.7. In addition, while the Greater Finland idea had Eastern Karelia in mind – which did not extend beyond the old border – as a Finnish objective initially, it did not comply with Germany´s war aims to conduct offensives at Leningrad and Murmansk. Mannerheim also never demonstrated any interest in conducting a total war. For example, he ordered the Finnish troops to stop short of Leningrad and commenced a

defensive strategy for the remainder of the Continuation War. In short, since no treaty existed between Nazi Germany and Finland and both nations had different war aims, the Finnish leadership eventually made the decision to de-escalate. Regarding the Murmansk Railway, it is arguable that Mannerheim failed to find a valid enough reason to conduct an attack there. For example, the attack was not even remotely related to Finland’s identity or its war aims and would have aggravated the Western Allies too (Mann, 2002, p. 70).

5.2.3. Values – public opinion on the war changed

In accordance with constructivism, the sudden shift in the Finland’s war aims shaped and changed the public opinion and support for the war. This was noticeable within the

democratic nation from when the war was first announced, with its initial aims, and then as time went on and the Finns opinion of the war began to shift as it progressed and the deaths started to grow (Sandström, 1991, p. 113). Previously mentioned in 5.1.1., most of the Finnish government knew that announcing the goal of the Greater Finland and annexing East Karelia, would be met with discontent by the Finnish people. The announcement to “liberate” East Karelia by Mannerheim was considered as an embarrassment, especially by the Social Democrats at the time, who came close to resigning follow the release of this statement. Despite never knowing if the Finnish leadership would have gone through with the plan, they understood that such war aims threatened national unity. Additionally, the Finnish leadership quickly realised that the Finnish peoples´ support for the war and will to fight relied on strong national unity. Thus, strong national unity was likely only maintainable by strictly adopting defensive thinking (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 93). Furthermore, the public opinion on the war shifted the longer it went on, especially once the public started to comprehend the true nature of the Nazis and their ideology. Hence, as the war progressed, the Finnish public opinion became more concerned about what Nazi ideology represented – antisemitism – which opposed democratic values and was incompatible with a democratic nation like Finland. Eventually, Finland became a hostile environment for the Nazis. For example, the Finnish press, despite some censorship, began writing increasingly negatively about the Nazis involvement in the war (Sandström, 1991, p. 142).

De-escalation amid a Total War? : An interpretivist-constructivist analysis of Finland&apos;s involvement (or lack thereof) in the Siege of Leningrad and Murmansk during the Continuation War 1941-1944