The Russians are Coming A qualitative text analysis of external threat representation in official policy documents

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The Russians are Coming

A qualitative text analysis of external threat representation in official policy documents

Maja Rudin

Kandidatuppsats i statskunskap, 15 hp, VT21

Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Uppsala Universitet Handledare: Lars Wikman

Antal ord: 10 807

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to elucidate which issues that are portrayed as external threats during a disarmament process versus an armament process in Sweden by studying two Defence Committee reports. To understand what is portrayed as external threats, an analysis of both reports and a comparison between them have been made. The research question for this thesis is: How are external threats portrayed in Defence Committee reports during a disarmament process versus an armament process? A qualitative text analysis is made with Carol Bacchi’s WPR method combined with the theory of securitization to analyse the material. The material consists of two Defence Committee reports, one from 2003 and one from 2019 to represent disarmament and rearmament.

Previous research of Sweden’s disarmament process has shown that Russia is the main objective affecting Swedish defence policy. However, this thesis concludes that representation of the stability of the world order is affected by the United States being portrayed as reliable in case of conflict which affects the Defence Committee’s representation of external threats.

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Table of Contents

Introduction 5

1.2 Previous Research 6

1.3 Purpose & Research Question 8

Theoretical framework 9

2.1 Securitization 9

Material and Methodological Framework 11

3.1 Material 11

3.2 Methodological framework 12

3.2.1 Qualitative Text Analysis 12

3.2.2 Carol Bacchi - What’s the Problem Represented to be? 13

3.2.3 Analytical Framework 14

3.2.4 Problems & Limitations 17

3.2.5 Validity 18

3.2.6 Reliability 18

Analysis and Result 19

4.1 Threat representation in Ds 2003:8 19

4.2 Threat Representation in Ds 2019:8 24

4.3 Comparison 29

Conclusion & Discussion 30

References list 32

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1. Introduction

Twenty years ago the Swedish government began a radical period of disarmament of the Swedish Defence system. The great threat of the Russian Federation, hereafter Russia, that had permeated defence policy for centuries was gone due to the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. From 1985 to 2005 the number of military brigades were reduced with 90 percent, amphibian battalions were reduced with 95 percent and military spendings were drastically cut (Westberg, 2021). Nevertheless, Russia did not stay off the Swedish radar for long. In 2014 Russia committed an illegal annexation of Crimea, Ukraine. By doing so, Russia ones again changed the Swedish view of risks of external aggressions against its territory. In December of 2020 the Swedish government proposed a new Defence Acts for armament of the defence over the next five year period. The new Defence Act, titled Totalförsvaret 2021-2025, was passed through parliament with very little opposition. The debate that did occur concerned if this Defence Act was drastic enough and if the defence should get an even bigger budget as new threats had emerged (Sveriges Riksdag, 2020). The new Defence Act will develop the Swedish defence to deal with a set of wider threats to the state's security, a reinstallation of regiments and a greater number of conscripts to rebuild the Swedish defence (Sveriges Riksdag, 2020).

To understand the current policy development we need to remind ourselves of Swedish history in conflict, or rather the lack of conflict. During both World Wars in the first half of the last century Sweden was neutral and did not take part in any kind of warfare, at least officially. This successful approach that kept Sweden out of war spilled over into peacetime and during the Cold War Sweden remained without alliance to both the West and the East. Yet, in post Cold War investigations it has been noted that Sweden as early as 1948 examined the possibilities to establish American flight bases for western powers in Sweden to be able to withstand a future possible aggression from Russia (Westberg, 2021).

This could not jeopardize the portrayal of Sweden as neutral and the Swedish Defence during the Cold War was therefore well equipped to withstand external attacks without help from other actors. After the fall of Russia and the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991 there was a large consensus in the international community that traditional wars were obsolete. In Sweden, the legacy of neutrality was switched to a policy of solidarity. The Swedish defence would come to be downsized and be used mostly for international peacekeeping and peace forcing missions through international

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cooperation instead of as a traditional total defence [totalförsvar], meaning societies entire defence capacity. These drastic changes to the Swedish defence system just twenty years apart are of course costly and complex. How is it then that these changes are made and why?

1.2 Previous Research

A large amount of research has been made in regards to Sweden's disarmament process during the first years of the 2000’s. However, as the current armament process started to develop during the years prior to this thesis the research of this change of agenda is thin.

There is a broad consensus in previous research that the disarmament of the defence was largely due to Russia not being seen as an external threat to Swedish security at the moment. Jacob Westberg argues in Svenska Säkerhetsstrategier: Teori och praktik (2021) that post Cold War Sweden abandoned the strategy of “neutrality in war, alliance free in peace” (Westberg, 2021, p.211) as Sweden entered the European Union, hereafter the EU, and therefore lost the ability to refer to being neutral. Westberg suggests that this change in Swedish policy would not have been possible if not for the fall of Russia and the Soviet Union in 1991. The end of the Soviet Union, with Russia as its leader, meant the end of the bipolar world order that had embossed defence tactics for fifty years. Due to this evolution Sweden was in no need to position itself as a third, neutral, way in world politics.

Westberg argues that this in combination with Sweden entering the EU and becoming a member of the NATO led organisation Partnership for Peace, PFP, meant that Sweden could downsize their national defence system as there was no realised threat to the Swedish security with Russia gone (Westberg, 2021).

Edström & Gyllensporre adress how the Swedish defence doktrin has changed in a post Cold War world in Svensk Försvarsdoktrin efter kalla kriget: förlorade decennier eller vunna insikter (2014). Between the years 1994 to 1998 Swedish defence doktrin contained policies that portrayed that the defence should be most forceful in Mälardalen, the region surrounding Stockholm and be able to deal with Russia's military ability and possible aggressions. The possibility of this form of traditional threat was seen as unlikely to occur according the Edström & Gyllensporre at the same time as the spread of nuclear weapons and terrorism appeard as a new threat to national secuirty (Edström and Gyllensporre,

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2014). As the risk of the traditional Russian threats was perceived as unlikely, the Swedish defence was used for international missions. The authors argue that this was perceived as valuable for Sweden in the future. This stability in the Nordic region and perception of the threats as being further away was crucial for Sweden to participate in international missions and later disarm the defence (Edström and Gyllensporre, 2014). By rearranging the defence to international peacekeeping and peace forcing missions Sweden could reduce the military budget and at the same time position itself as a serious actor internationally.

Edström and Gyllensporre agree with Westberg regarding the depiction that Sweden went through the disarmament process as Russia was not seen as a serious threat to national security in the nearest future anymore and therefore could abandon its policy of neutrality (Edström and Gyllensporre, 2014).

Wilhelm Agrell is in his research critical of the disarmament of the Swedish defence during the early 2000’s. Agrell means that the enticement of peace was grave and led the government to perceive external threats to Swedish security as lesser than they might have been. In Fredens illusioner: det svenska försvarets nedgång och fall 1988-2009 (2011), Agrell argues that after the Cold War a filter of peace and prosperity blinded the Swedish government and even though there might have been signs of external threats, a consensus prevailed that peace would dominate the future which led to this notion becoming the only logical truth (Agrell, 2011). Agrell describes the disarmament as a process were the defence at first was put on a time-out as the threat of Russia disappeared, but when this was not the case anymore the initial thought of this time-out was forgotten and as a result, large parts of the defence has been terminated (Agrell, 2011). The entire process of disarmament was, in Agrell’s view, partly incoherent and thoughtless; “The national defence was not disbanded, one day it was just disbanded.” (Agrell, 2011, my translation, p.241). Agrell means that the entire process of disarmament was directly connected to Russia being perceived as a non-threatening state and therefore the Swedish government saw the future of the state as part of an European security system that was permanent and untouchable (Agrell, 2011). In Säkerhetspolitik:Analyser och tillämpningar (2002) Nils Andrén does not agree with the view that this development was entirely problematic.

Andrén means that the disarmament process led to a paradigm shift in what security meant to Sweden; this could be seen as both negative and positive, as Sweden became more dependent on international actors for defending its territory (Andrén, 2002).

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This previous research shows how there is quite a broad consensus regarding the disarmament of the Swedish defence being directly dependent on the fall of Russia and the Soviet Union and the lack of threat from Russia during late 1990’s and early 2000’s. Now, Sweden stands in front of a period of armament with regiments being reconstructed, defence collaborations with Finland and an increase in military artillery and material. Does this mean that the view of external threats have changed? Has the illusion of peace discussed by Agrell disappeared, and if so why? Why did Sweden go through with such a drastic disarmament, was it just because of the lack of threats or is there something else that differs between then and now? Is the only difference that Russia again is portrayed as an external threat? The previous research points to this being the case. This thesis will contribute with an understanding of how external threats are represented in policy documents during an armament versus a disarmament period in a Swedish context. This will be done by a systematic reading of two Defence Committee reports that are representative of the two time periods and a comparison of said reports.

1.3 Purpose & Research Question

The purpose of this thesis is to elucidate which issues that are portrayed as external threats during a disarmament process versus an armament process by studying two Defence Committee reports. One report from 2003 and one from 2019 have been chosen to better understand which external threats influenced the Swedish government to divert the defence in polar opposite ways just twenty years apart. The aim is to hopefully understand which external threats are different in the disarmament process and the armament process, or if some external threats are portrayed the same way. A comparison of two reports will contribute with a problematization of the external threats and the basic assumptions that underpin the representation of external threats in both Defence Committee reports. By doing so this thesis will nuance the understanding of how external threats influence and determine the boundaries of politics in Sweden. Consequently, this thesis research question is:

How are external threats portrayed in Defence Committee reports during a disarmament process versus an armament process?

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2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Securitization

As the purpose of this thesis is to understand how threats are portrayed in official policy documents, securitization has been chosen as the theory to understand what external threats are and how these can be identified. Security in its simplest terms means survival in the face of an existential threat according to Buzan Wæver & Wilde in Security: An New Framework For Analysis (1998). What varies is what is constituted as existential. In this thesis, the existential threat is defined as external threats to the survival of the nation and its territory. Security should be viewed according to this theory as something intersubjective that is shaped by both actors and socially constructed. A referent object needs to be viewed as something that should be protected with general legitimacy. Thereby the securitizating government can point to something as an existential threat to the referent object that is in need of protection (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

Securitization as a theory emerged from the Post Cold War era when international relationship researchers began to question the traditionalist view of the field, where military actions and power is viewed as the main aspect of security. Securitization argues for a widening of security studies meaning that more aspects should be added into what could be viewed as concerns for security. The widening implies that the concept of security has to include more aspects than just military security. Such as the economic, social and political sector in contrast to the traditionalists view of security studies that argue that security studies are about the phenomenon of war and therefore studies the use of threat and military force (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998). Buzan, Wæver & Wilde proposes that the military sector, the environmental sector, the economic sector, the societal sector and the political sector as parts of society that need to be included when security is discussed.

Important to note is that even though this widening theory aims to include more sectors than the traditionalist view, this does not entail that securitization of all these sectors in itself is a utopia according to securitization. On the contrary, Wæver argues that desecuritization is preferred as this means that fewer issues are set in this kind of emergency mode and can be re-lifted into the normal political process (Buzan, Wæver &

Wilde, 1998).

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What makes up a security threat according to securitization is that it becomes justifiable to use extraordinary measures to handle them. The existential threat is a key component of this theory and how it is defined. The threat may only be understood in relation to the referent object in question (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998). The reference object can be explained as the one thing that is in need to be securitized in order to protect it from threats. What the referent object is can vary depending on what sector that is studied. As this thesis focuses on disarmament and armament of the Swedish defence the referent object is based in relation to the military and political sector of Sweden. In the military sector the referent object is usually the state that the military is designed to protect the sovereignty of. Buzan, Wæver & Wilde suggest that in advanced democracies, such as Sweden, the traditionalist military referent object to defend, the state, is becoming one of many undertakings for the military. For example, advanced democracies may train their military for peacekeeping in other parts of the world or humanitarian interventions, whereas traditionalists would argue that this is not part of the state's own security. In these instances, the military referent object is moved from the traditional state to a wider referent object of world order (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998, p. 22).

In the political sector, the traditionalist view of existential threat concerns the basic constitutional principles, such as sovereignty, that is threatened by questions of legitimacy or recognition of political powers. The referent object that is existentially threatened and therefore needs to be protected by extraordinary masseurs is the sovereignty of the state.

Interstate organisations, such as the EU, are also included in this sector by securitization as the ideology or the ambition of growing as a power in the European territory may be threatened by external powers (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998). Above all, anything can end up in the securitizing arena of politics or military actions as it depends on what the actor doing the securitizing views as an existential threat to the reference object. It varies across both states and in the same state across time and therefore is useful for the purpose of this thesis (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998). According to securitization it is always a political act to securitize a referent object and likewise to accept the securitization in question (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998). Thus, by making a political choice to move an object into securitization, it is a way for the ruling party to also move it out of the political context and into the existential context of an external threat to the state’s security. Some reference objects have been securitized for such a long time that the word security may appear without arguments to substantiate that this reference object is in a existential need

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of protection because it has been discussed in the context for such a long time. “Behind the first layers of ordinary bureaucratic arguments, one will ultimately find a- probably irritated - repetition of a security argument so well established that it is taken for granted”

(Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998, p.28). This entails that the existential threat has been institutionalized and therefore everybody knows that it is a securitized object without needing argumentation surrounding it (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

3. Material and Methodological Framework

3.1 Material

The empirical material for this thesis has been chosen based on its purpose. Every four years the Swedish government proposes a new Defence Act for how the Swedish Armed Forces will develop over the upcoming years. Before the government proposes the new budget and direction for the military in parliament, a Defence Committee compiles reports based on their view of Sweden's current security situations and how it could develop in the nearest future (Regeringskansliet, 2003). The Defence Committee consists of representatives from all parties represented in the Swedish parliament and experts in the field (Regeringskansliet, 2020). Thereafter proposition concerning the new Defence Act is put forward in the Swedish parliament by the government where a debate is held before they go to a vote concerning the proposition. Every aspect of the process described has been studied prior to this thesis being conducted and the Defence Committee’s reports have been chosen for the analysis as they contain what at the time was represented as threats to national security. Choosing to analyse the debate in the parliament was also considered, however, the debate from 2004 consists of very few arguments concerning threat and focused more on the internal disputes in parliament regarding Göran Persson, prime minister at the time (Sveriges Riksdag, 2004). The Defence Acts from 2004 and 2020 have also been considered, however these have been ruled out as they may contain more political arguments from Socialdemokraterna, the ruling party both in 2004 and 2020, than the Defence Committee reports as these consist of members of all parties in parliament and experts. As the Defence Acts are based on the portrayal of the current

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situation by the Defence Committee the same external threats, and the portrayal of these, should be found in the Defence Committee reports as well.

The Defence Act from 2004 is considered to be one of the most drastic acts in Swedish Defence history as it changed the structure of the defence from being a traditional total defence to an operational defence. This Defence Act is based on two primary Defence Committee reports; Vårt militära försvar- vilja och vägval (Ds 2003:34) and Säkrare grannskap- osäker värld (Ds 2003:8) (Försvarsdepartementet, 2004). The latter has been chosen to analyse in this thesis as its content better corresponds with this thesis’s purpose than the other. This decision was made after a readthrough of both policy documents. As a polar opposite to the Defence Act from 2004, the Defence Act from 2020 put forward a total armament of the Swedish Defence and contains plans how this will be realised until 2025. The two primary Defence Committee reports that the Defence Act of 2020 is based on are; Motståndskraft - Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021-2025 (Ds 2017:66) and Värnkraft – Inriktningen av säkerhetspolitiken och utformningen av det militära försvaret 2021–2025 (Ds 2019:8) (Försvarsdepartementet, 2020). The latter has been chosen to analyse in this essay as it contained more material suited for this thesis’s purpose after a readthrough of both policy documents. One Defence Committee report has been chosen from each Defence Act based on lack of time and that the reports chosen best correspond to the purpose of this thesis. As a result, the Defence Committee report Ds 2003:8 and Ds 2019:8 have been chosen. Both have been accessed through regeringen.se, the official website of the Swedish government.

3.2 Methodological framework

3.2.1 Qualitative Text Analysis

To be able to reach the core of this thesis’s problematization it is crucial to understand how a threat to security is represented and portrayed in the policy documents that will be analysed.

As the purpose of this thesis is to elucidate which external threats are represented during a disarmament process versus a armament process by reading public policy from the two different time periods a qualitative text analysis will be the method used when engaging with the Defence Committee Reports; Ds 2003:8 and Ds 2019:8. One important reason for choosing this method is that the qualitative text analysis is suited when the purpose is to

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understand the material as a whole instead of as random pieces of information. The reasoning behind policy may also lay hidden between the lines and by using a qualitative text analysis one is able to study this aspect rather than just the words printed in the public policy (Esaiasson et al., 2017). This thesis aims to study the formulations of both the policy in itself and the implications behind the policy documents and aims to understand the underlying notice. By reading the Defence Committee reports actively and asking questions to the report by operationalising the WPR approach by Carol Bacchi, further explained in chapter 3.1.2, the aspiration is to be able to answer the research question of this thesis with this method. More specifically a systematic research approach of the policy documents will be used to illuminate the meanings behind the arguments made and bring clarity into the texts (Esaiasson et al., 2017). This requires the researcher to decide before conducting the thesis how the material will be approached. As it is not clear in advance what will be the result of the thesis, keeping the questions semi-open ended in the operationalisation may help with carrying out the analysis (Mayring, 2014).

3.2.2 Carol Bacchi - What’s the Problem Represented to be?

Carol Bacchi proposes the What is the Problem Represented to be approach, hereafter WPR, as a method to engage with any kind of public policy. The method’s origin stems from examining how women’s rights and inequality has been handled in, mostly a western setting of, policymaking. The method is based on the assumption that the policy contains proposals concerning how a problem in society should be handled and this leads to an understanding regarding what is viewed as problematic to policymakers (Bletsas and Beasley, 2012). For instance, if education for women is proposed in a policy the policymakers view the problem being that women are not educated enough and therefore propose this change. Problems are connected to the proposed actions by policymakers, even if the problem is not explicit in the policy document. Bacchi emphasises that depending on the person using the WPR framework, the outcome may differ even though the material is the same as we view ourselves and our surroundings differently depending on who we are and our context (Bletsas and Beasley, 2012). In other words, policy has an undeniable cultural dimension to it and is somewhat shaped by its context (Bacchi, 2009).

Likewise, researchers are also set in cultural, societal and historical context and therefore what we think should be done about a problem, or even what a problem is, depends on who reads the material and when. It is therefore important, when using the framework, to

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remember one’s own subjectivity when reading policy and being open about these aspects (Bacchi, 2009).

Bacchi suggests that policy produces problems rather than solving them as it affects which things get attention from the government and are problematized at the same time as other subjects are left unproblematic. As a result, society is governed by problematizations rather than policies in itself (Bletsas and Beasley, 2012). The way to fix the problem is not always openly discussed in the policy and therefore the WPR approach helps with finding problems, even if they are not meant to be directly understood by the public. The focus is consequently not on the intentional shaping of the issue by policymakers but rather on finding what it is that shaped policy deliberately and what policymakers really view as being of importance by portraying policy in a certain way (Bacchi, 2009).

3.2.3 Analytical Framework

As mentioned in the previous chapter, 3.2.2, Carol Bacchi proposes the WPR approach to analyse public policy. Bacchi constructs six questions that can be asked to the material systematically and by doing so finding the representation of problems in the public policy document (Esaiasson et al., 2017). The WPR approach is not set in stone and can therefore be changed and adapted to fit the specific policy that will be analysed. In this thesis the

‘problem’ has been changed to ‘external threat’ and defined by securitization to fit the purpose. The original questions presented by Carol Bacchi are as presented below.

“1. What’s the problem represented to be in a specific policy report?

2. What presumptions or assumptions underpin this representation of the problem?

3. How has this representation of the ’problem’ come about?

4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the problem be thought about differently?

5. What effects are produced by this representation of the problem?

6. How/where has this representation of the ’problem’ been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been (or could it be) questioned, disputed and replaced?”

(Bletsas and Beasley, 2012, p. 21).

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Under every original question a set of more detailed questions has been added to operationalize the theoretical definition of an external threat by securitization in combination with Bacchi’s WPR approach to answer this thesis’s purpose. By combining Bacchi’s questions with securitization and from that operationalise the question that will be asked the Defence Committee Reports good validation should be attained (Esaiasson et al., 2017).

Presented below are the operationalized questions and subquestions. The questions are based on securitization's definition of external threat. External threat is operationalised as a threat from a foreign actor, direct or indirect, but need to be based or referred to as being based in another state/region and not with origin in Sweden. The threat is operationalized based on securitization as something that extraordinary measures need to be taken to overcome the problem. This may come through in the Defence Committee report as something that is repeated over and over again or as something that a big part of the budget is directed towards.

1. What’s the ’external threat’ represented to be in the Defence Committee report?

The first question proposed by Bacchi is straightforward and constitutes the starting point for the analysis (Bacchi, 2009). As the problem has been substituted for external threat in this thesis the sub questions have been designed to identify the representation of the external threat and which the external threats are represented to be.

- Which foreign actors are mentioned in the report as a threat to Swedish security?

- Which foreign actors are mentioned in the report?

- Which actions by foregin actors are expected against Sweden?

- Are the external threats coming from state actors or non-state actors?

2. What presumptions or assumptions underpin this representation of the ’external threat’?

Bacchi uses the second question to understand the premises that underlie the problems that are represented (Bletsas and Beasley, 2012). In this thesis, question two will be used to find what is portrayed as the referent object and if support is questioned, unquestioned and if external threats are mentioned without context as this should be able to portray what is underlying the representation of external threats.

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- What is mentioned as important to protect?

- Is support from any other state or organisation left unquestioned?

- Is support from any other state or organisation questioned?

3. How has this representation of the ’external threat’ come about?

With this question the author is able to study the processes of how the problem has been understood and how this has affected the specific policy that will be studied (Bletsas and Beasley, 2012). As this thesis studies two policy documents from different time periods this question is not used to study a process, as Bacchi does, but instead is used to shed light on how the reports explicitly highlight how geneology is used to portray the external threat.

- Which previous conflicts are referred to to support actions proposed in the report?

- Is Swedish history in conflicts referred to?

- Are other actor’s actions portrayed that indirectly or directly affect Sweden?

4. What is left unproblematic in this external threat representation? Where are the silences? Can the ’external threat’ be thought about differently?

Bacchi uses the fourth question for careful examination of possible gaps in the representation of the problems and to envision if the problem could be portrayed in another way (Bletsas and Beasley, 2012). This question will be used to, instead of studying silences in Bacchi’s way, study if explicit silences occur in the reports concerning specific threats or if groups that could be problematized aren't.

- Are any groups/countries/organisations actions left unproblematic?

- Are western countries left unproblematic?

- Are there silences regarding the Defence Committees position on certain actions?

5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ’external threat’?

Carol Bacchi’s original intention with the fifth question is to consider how the problem representation can restrict people’s way of perceiving what is relevant and shape how the problem is understood in later instances(Bletsas and Beasley, 2012). As this thesis is not interested in understanding how the representation later changes people’s perception of the external threat, this question has been altered to capture if fear is represented in the report

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to try to change how the external threat is represented. Fear is used as this is a part in the securitizing action by the actor to try and securitize an issue.

- Which fears for a foreign actor are portrayed in the report?

- Which fears for a certain kind of threat are represented in the report?

- Is the report trying to install fear in civil parts of society for an external threat?

6. How/where has this representation of the ’external threat’ been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been (or could it be) questioned, disputed and replaced?

The last question is used to sharpen the awareness of arguments surrounding the formation of the representation of the problem (Bletsas and Beasley, 2012). In both Defence Committee reports there are appendices containing differing views of the portrayal of external threats based on party affiliation. The subquestion is therefore used to capture these disagreements, if there are any.

- Are there variations of views on the external threat depending on party affiliation?

3.2.4 Problems & Limitations

There are several limitations to this thesis. The result can only be an indicator for the Swedish context of external threats and can not necessarily be applied to other states in other contexts. The results can not be generalized to show which specific external threats that are significant to other states and affect disarmament and armament there. Further, this thesis has a limited explanatory value when describing the process from disarmament to armament as it only studies two specific Defence Committee reports. The limitation to the two reports may also distort the result as the Defence Acts that the reports contribute to are based on a greater number of reports than just the two chosen to analyse in this thesis.

However, as only two reports are analysed the result can contribute with a more in depth analysis of these specific documents and how external threats are portrayed in these reports. As both reports are representative of the time eras, an in depth qualitative analysis is still valuable. A different kind of research design would also be necessary to understand the entire process of securitization better. This thesis will not be able to elucidate if the attempts to commit securitizing acts in the policy document were later accepted by the audience of the Swedish parliament.

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3.2.5 Validity

Validity is defined as the accordance between theoretical definition and operationalised indications and the absence of systemic wrongdoings. Meaning that if the theoretical definition of external threats and the operationalisation of this concept correspond, a high degree validity in this thesis should be attained (Esaiasson et al., 2017). A problem that may occur in this thesis is that Carol Bacchi’s questions are redesigned into smaller questions and if these questions do not correspond to capturing what the external threat really is, this will lead to a lack of validity. This could lead to systematic faults in the thesis, which means that every time the question is asked to the material the same fault reoccurs (Esaiasson et al., 2017). If the questions capture something else in the Defence Committee reports this would mean that something other than the external threats according to securitization are captured in the analysis and result. Therefore it is important that the operationalization is closely linked to the theoretical definitions to avoid problems with validity (Esaiasson et al., 2017).

3.2.6 Reliability

A high degree of reliability is attained through a lack of unsystematic faults (Esaiasson et al., 2017). In this thesis context, this would for example occur if the material is wrongfully translated or if notes have been misread. Thus, it is important to use the operationalisation of Bacchi’s question for what they are meant to do to reach a high degree of reliability.

Parts of this thesis may be regarded as being at risk of lack of reliability as there is a great amount of interpretation between the operationalised questions based on the theory and the material. As the two Defence Committee reports consist of a lot of information concerning external threats against Sweden, this may lead to the author picking the most important parts according to one's own pre-knowledge. Even though this thesis tries to break down Bacchi’s six questions to combat this problem and make it easier to replicate this research and get the same result, the material is very large and can therefore be affected by pre-knowledge of what an external threat should be and therefore a lack of reliability may occur. It is therefore important to abide by the questions proposed in the operationalisation when analysing the material and not deviate from these questions (Esaiasson et al., 2017).

The material has been analysed several times to establish a higher degree of reliability and avoid unsystematic errors.

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4. Analysis and Result

4.1 Threat representation in Ds 2003:8

The Defence Committee report from 2003 that laid the groundwork for the 2004 Defence Act is permeated with representation of a peaceful world where Sweden coexisted with and within the EU. An external threat to Swedish security is portrayed in regards to that it would be problematic if western values were not the norm in the regions close to the EU, and therefore close to Sweden’s terrority. The stability of the states that are seeking EU membership is according to the Defence Committee report a crucial step in bringing stability to these states and therefore dismantling external threats against Sweden (Regeringskansliet, 2003). Foreign actors that are mentioned in the report as non-threatening are NATO, the United States, several European states with emphasises on the Baltic region and the other Nordic countries. No external threats are portrayed as being realised against the Swedish territory in Ds 2003:8. Yet a concern of weapons of mass destruction being spread by actors such as North Korea and terrorist networks is represented as in the future jeopardizing the state's security (Regeringskansliet, 2003).

As the terrorist attack against the World Trade Center in New York happened just two years prior to this Defence Committee report this is something that it brought up both in regards to peacekeeping missions and NATO’s way forward with the United States in focus. However, a terrorist attack is not realised as an external threat to Swedish territory.

Important to note is that even if Sweden views the terrorist attacks as something grave, it is not seen as an external threat by securitization measures. It is brought up as important in regards to 9/11. Yet, these crimes should be dealt with in the ordinary judicial system rather than something that needs to be lifted out of ordinary politics (Regeringskansliet, 2003). Although an attack from Al Qaida or any other terrorist network is not realised as a threat to Swedish security it is portrayed as a threat against western values, which involves Sweden (Regeringskansliet, 2003).

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Sweden is not mentioned throughout the report as something that is important to protect as a territory. Rather western values, human rights and democratic principles are what is mentioned as something that should be protected from external threats. The reference object is therefore much bigger and far away from Sweden and viewed as something global that may only be protected by preventing conflict where they start. To do this the United Nations, hereafter UN, are mentioned as an organisation where Sweden can get a broad distribution of the values that are important to the state as well as their interests in international security and peacekeeping missions (Regeringskansliet, 2003). More than Sweden being referred to as important to protect, the EU is used to symbol western values and what is important to protect from external threats.

Support from NATO is crucial for proposals in the Defence Committee report. As the reference object is far away and value based, international peacekeeping missions are what the Swedish military will be used for. For example, 90 percent of the internationally stationed Swedish military were in 2003 led by NATO in the Balkan region (Regeringskansliet, 2003). This is brought up as something important as this positions Sweden in a credible place in regards to international missions (Regeringskansliet, 2003).

It may therefore be argued that international missions are important for Sweden in dealing with external threats, rather than having these threats move closer to the state's own borders. This way forward is represented as being dependent on NATO and therefore left unquestioned.

Sweden is very positive regarding the development of the EU. The EU had expanded both to the east and south prior to this report which was seen as positive for Swedish security as this development nudged western values into these regions (Regeringskansliet, 2003). The expansion of the EU is not viewed as something with a definitive stop and left largely unquestioned. For example, if these states should not gain their membership or if states would not want to become members are scenarios that seem unreasonable in the Defence Committee report (Regeringskansliet, 2003).

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As Ds 2003:8 portrays a largely peaceful world in the aftermath of the Cold War, conflicts are not brought about to argue for development of the Defence against external threats.

Conversely, the lack of conflicts or how far away the conflicts that do exist are referred to to support Ds 2003:8. For instance, Sweden participated in peace forcing missions with NATO as a member state of PFP in Kosovo and Bosnia during the 1990’s and that these international corporations are portrayed as being crucial for Sweden to be able to be a part of European collaborations surrounding peace and crisis (Regeringskansliet, 2003). When it comes to referring to Swedish history in conflict there is an overall lack of these types of arguments. This may be because of the lack of actual armed conflicts that Sweden has seen during the past centuries but also because the missions that Sweden has been a part of during the years leading up to Ds 2003:8 are described as peacekeeping and peace forcing missions, and not armed conflict. Other state's actions that may affect Sweden are largely represented as positive. For example, the number of EU states increase and therefore spread western values and move external threats farther away (Regeringskansliet, 2003).

In Ds 2003:8 it is mentioned that the United States has expressed concerns regarding if Al Qaida could get a hold of weapons of mass destruction such as chemical or biological weapons. The Defence Committee acknowledges that this is portrayed as the United States biggest threat to their national security. However, there is a silence regarding if this concern is shared by the Defence Committee (Regeringskansliet, 2003). This illustrates how actions by the United States often are acknowledged but not elaborated into as the Defence Committee’s opinion on this matter or that american actions are directly harmful.

This is the most common way of discussing the United State’s actions in Ds 2003:8, with exceptions for when the Defence Committee worries that actions taken by the United States may spill over into larger conflicts in areas such as Afghanistan and Iraq (Regeringskansliet, 2003). According to Ds 2003:8 there were fifteen active armed conflicts in 2002, all of these were intrastate based conflicts. The conflicts where technological warfare was used were all peace promoting (Regeringskansliet, 2003). This shows how the representation of western peace promoting and peacekeeping missions is unproblematic where there is no risk of a spill over into other parts of the regions

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discussed. As the subjects of conflicts in the world and western peace mission are discussed in the same paragraph of the Defence Committee Report, one may anticipate that the peace forcing missions should be included with the other conflicts, this leads to portraying western states as unproblematic in their actions and not consisting of an external threat at the same time as intrastate conflicts are a risk for Swedish security as they could spread. For instance, the war in Afghanistan was legitimized by the UN security council and therefore it is not problematized at the same time as other smaller conflicts are problematized where Western state’s are not involved in warfare (Regeringskansliet, 2003).

The Defence Committee report highlights that Russia during, then new leader, Vladimir Putin has moved closer to the EU through both economical trade and in not imposing a military threat and therefore the Defence Committee mentions only positive aspects of Russian development. However, when discussing Swedish military on missions in other parts of the world it is brought up that Swedish military officers are stationed inEstonia, Latvia and Lithuania to train their military. These three countries were just a decade before the Defence Committee report part of Russia and training their domestic military could be seen as something positive as this means that Russia in the future would have a more difficult time trying to re-integrate these countries into the former Union and therefore have greater power over the Baltic Sea and therefore put Sweden in troubles way. Yet, there is a silence in regard to why it is important to Sweden to train the Baltic state’s military (Regeringskansliet, 2003)

Other than there being concerns portrayed in regards to certain groups or states getting a hold of weapons of mass destruction there is very few arguments being made with fear as rhetoric. The states that already have access to weapons of mass destruction are seen as a problem that could lead to conflicts (Regeringskansliet, 2003). Illustrating this fear is for example North Korea's use of missile testing and ignoring UN sanctions against the state.

However, as Sweden has faith in the UN this is not brought up as existential, rather that it could become a relaised threat in the future. Other than fear regarding weapons of mass

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destruction there is a lack of fears represented by external threats in Ds 2003:8 (Regeringskansliet, 2003).

6. How/where has this representation of the ’external threat’ been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been (or could it be) questioned, disputed and replaced?

In Ds 2003:8 there are rather extended appendices regarding differing views concerning external threats from the parties represented in the Defence Committee. Folkpartiet, a very NATO friendly party, are concerned with Swedish interest being forgotten now that Russia and NATO have come to agreements regarding corporations. Folkpartiet suggests that Sweden should join NATO and that the Swedish neutrality policy that was very active during the Cold War has played its part and by joining NATO external threats could be dealt with easier (Regeringskansliet, 2003). Moderaterna agrees with Folkpartiet in regards to NATO. They mean that neutrality has no purpose as there is no threat of war. They also argue that security should not be a concept that is widened into including other threats that traditional military threats as that is what the world looks like (Regeringskansliet, 2003).

They also believe that an attack on Swedish territory should not be ruled out as the development in Russia is something that should not be taken for granted (Regeringskansliet, 2003). Kristdemokraterna shares the views of the Defence Committee report in regards to Russia becoming more stabilized over time. However, they worry that this trend is seen as indisputable in Ds 2003:8 and mean that this could change, which would be worrying for Sweden, something that Moderaterna agrees with as well (Regeringskansliet, 2003). Miljöpartiet does not oppose large parts of Ds 2003:8, however they suggest that the environment should be incorporated into larger parts of the defence Committee report as this could lead to external threats in the future. The party that possesses the most differing view of external threats is Vänsterpartiet. They do not consent to the protration of external threats and mean that Swedish neutrality should be portrayed better and that NATO needs to be problematized further. They mean that as the United States remains the only superpower after the Cold War this will affect Sweden and the United States actions could undermine international law and the UN and therefore jeopardize Swedish security (Regeringskansliet, 2003).

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4.2 Threat Representation in Ds 2019:8

In Ds 2019:8 the external threats represented in the report are both state based and derive from non-state actors. This is realised in Russia being portrayed throughout the report in reference to a large variety of subjects in the Defence Committee report. In addition to Russia, a external threat from Islamiq terrorism is brought about, realised in Daesh and Al Qaida. As both these threats should be handled with military power and is not argued around as a political position of a singular party it is an external threat according to securitization.

Russia is mentioned as a threat to Swedish security. The invasion of Crimea in 2014 is brought up as a sign that Russia is on the move and does not care about other state’s sovereignty. Russia has through these actions violated the European security order. With Russia on the move Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’s security is jeopardized and therefore Swedish security as well according to Ds 2019:8. Even though an outright attack from Russia is not mentioned, the indirect threat of Russia's provictions is a pervasive theme throughout the report. An attack on Swedish territory is something that could be released in the near future according to 2019:8 (Regeringskansliet, 2019).

Other than Russia, islamiq terrorism is brought up in Ds 2019:8 as an external threat. The terrorist organisations Daesh, also known as the Islamiq State, and Al-Qaeda are brought about as specific organisations that may expose Sweden to external threats. That Daesh has lost their territory in Syria is not seen as the threat being less against Sweden. The Defence Committee acknowledges that even though Daesh has lost traction, followers to this group instead turn to Al-Qaeda. The ideology and motivation of committing terrorist attacks are believed to still consist within this network, and by these supporters returning to Sweden, this becomes a threat to Swedish security (Regeringskansliet, 2019).

China is discussed as a state that in the future may pose as an external threat to Swedish security. Both in regards to developments in the Arctic region where China has increased their presence to fight for natural resources of the area (Regeringskansliet, 2019), but also as a threat to international security as tensions between the United States and China may

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develop in the future and affect Sweden. A worst case scenario being that tensions may lead to a force measurement between the United States and Russia and China (Regeringskansliet, 2019). This strain between powerful states is portrayed as a serious risk for Swedish security, both by being an Arctic State but also that China increases their interests in other regions of the world, such as the eastern parts of Europe, which negatively affects the EU and therefore Sweden as well (Regeringskansliet, 2019).

Important to protect in Ds 2019:8 is Swedish values, sovereignty, interests and Swedish rights against pressure both in the military and political sector (Regeringskansliet, 2019).

To protect these things from external threats it is viewed as important to assert Sweden’s territory and integrity and in doing so protect the reference object. The Swedish territory is therefore the most important thing to protect in Ds 2019:8 and by doing so protecting everything else that is mentioned above. Therefore the reference object is Sweden's territory and in some cases the surrounding area including the Baltic Sea and the other Nordic Countries. For example, if the Baltic States are well-equipped to meet aggression from Russia, Sweden will have a better chance of handling that aggression as well (Regeringskansliet, 2019).

The Defence Committee refers to the development in the United States being troubling from a Swedish perspective. Beginning with President Obama’s, and during Donald Trump’s, administration The United States has turned from being engaged in Euro Political problems to being more engaged in the development in Eastern Asia, with the trade war with China in focus. The Defence Committee means that the kind of protectionist politics that the Trump administration has put forward will harm smaller economies dependent on global trade and export, such as Sweden (Regeringskansliet, 2019). The shift of American interests have not only economic consequences for Sweden. Relocation of the United State’s interests are also affecting Sweden in military and political ways. The United States power is being questioned by both China and Russia and this becomes a threat to Sweden as the United States has been Sweden’s guarantee against threats from Russia (Regeringskansliet, 2019). The annexation of Crimea in 2014 can be seen as a threat

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where Russia ignores European security principles and as the United States became more protectionist the world order has shifted to a place where Russia examines aggressive behavior and the United States does not correct it (Regeringskansliet, 2019). As the United States in Ds 2019:8 is problematized, international organisations such as the UN, OSSE and NATO become problematized as well. These organisations are described as crucial for smaller states, as Sweden, for defence and security rules and practices (Regeringskansliet, 2019).

This report portrays Sweden's last twenty years of lack of conflict as something that was necessary at the time, but as the situation has changed this is brought up to support new policy in this report. In the years leading up to this report international peacekeeping missions had been the norm in the international community. As China and Russia have grown their military budgets the Defence Committee means that these international missions have changed in character from combating less qualified actors to meeting greater equibed actors leading to the defence being in need of expanding and developing to stand a chance in combat (Regeringskansliet, 2019).

In chapter 8.7 En förändrad hotbild - ett förändrat försvar the Defence Committee concludes that Sweden, and the rest of the world, saw stability after the Cold War that led to drastic cuts in defence expenditure. That other states did the same thing, such as most of the NATO states and the Warsaw Pact is referred to to justify actions taken in the past twenty years. Defending Swedish territory was not important until this point in history as an armed attack was not seen as realistic. This is brought about in Ds 2019:8 to justify that the world now looks more like before the end of the Cold War and therefore the Swedsh Defence should be equipped to handle an external threat (Regeringskansliet, 2019).

An indirect threat to Swedish security is the Middle East region being unstable and containing weak states. This is portrayed as being possible to lead to Daesh growing stronger in the region and thereafter committing terrorist attacks in Sweden as well. For example, the conflict in Yemen has led to Al-Qaeda and Daesh gaining power. Stability in the Middle East may therefore be seen as a way for Sweden to gain stability in its own territory (Regeringskansliet, 2019). Where states in the middle east are discussed

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throughout the report, it is in regards to stabilizing the region so that terrorist organisations will not grow. It may therefore be argued that stability in the middle east is important to Sweden, not because the value in stability in itself, but for islamiq terrosim not gaining power.

Sweden has a strong connection to the EU in Ds 2019:8. When the state's security is discussed in the report it is often in regards to european security and collaboration. The membership in the EU is described as fundamental in Swedish security and therefore it may be argued that the EU as an institution is left unquestioned. Challenges facing the EU are brought about. Such as Russian aggressions, Brexit, far-right/euroscepticism in the member states and the United States turning their interests more to Asia. But the organisation in itself is not questioned as something good and something that should be protected as it can help Sweden with external threats (Regeringskansliet, 2019). “The European Union is Sweden's most important foregin- and security political platform”

(Regeringskansliet, 2019, p.52).

When Ds 2019:8 describes the armament of the Swedish defence they thoroughly go through the different branches of the military. As examples for development of the defence in the future the island Gotland in the Baltic Sea is brought up in context to different sectors of the military. However, there is silence regarding why Gotland is the region used to describe development of the entire defence (Regeringskansliet, 2019). As it is only one region of Sweden one could believe that other regions would be exemplified as well, however Gotland seems important without the Defence Committee writing why.

A certain kind of fear produced in Ds 2019:8 is coming from the increase in segregation in Sweden. This might not seem as an external threat at first glance, nonetheless the Defence Committee suggests that this can be used by foregin powers to jeopardize Swedish security. Trust in the government and a strong society without segregation is vital for battling foregin actors and to withstand aggressions on Swedish territory

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(Regeringskansliet, 2019). Thus, as a strong society that together can defend itself is the ambition, a fear of segregation is installed in Ds 2019:8 as something foregin actors can exploit to Sweden’s disadvantage. As this report is aiming to rebuild Sweden’s total defence the civil defence is discussed throughout Ds 2019:8. As the civil will to defend the state is a crucial part, the external threat may affect civilians as well. By discussing civilians' will the Defence Committee points out that there is a fear that civilians are ill equipped to handle an external threat and therefore need to be incorporated in the total defence. Both military and civilian roles in both peacetime and during a future conflict need to be educated and aware of threats facing them (Regeringskansliet, 2019). Especially grey zone problems is an area where civilians need to be educated on how that kind of threat could play out as this would help the combined total defence of Sweden.

6. How/where has this representation of the ’external threat’ been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been questioned, disputed and replaced?

In the appendices of Ds 2019:8 three parties have deviating views of external threats from Socialdemokraterna, which are the ruling party of Swedish government together with Miljöpartiet. At large there is a consensus in the Defence Committee regarding what are the greater external threats and views on these issues do not differ at large.

Sverigedemokraterna agrees with the larger picture in the Defence Committee report. They acknowledge that there is a growing number of external threats facing Sweden, however they would like to see the legislature establish that two percent of Sweden’s BNP should go to the defence budget to better combat Russia (Regeringskansliet, 2019). Vänsterpartiet have differing views concerning that Ds 2019:8 contains information that an attack on Sweden could be realised in the near future. They believe that this could lead to unnecessary concerns and a view of reality that does not correspond to the actual level of threat (Regeringskansliet, 2019). The last differing view in the appendix comes from Miljöpartiet, however this only concerns that larger parts of the deviating perception is in regards to that the Swedish Defence should be developed to deal with climate change and disasters, which in this thesis is not included in external threats as this is not coming from an actor in the Miljöparti’s differing opinion (Regeringskansliet, 2019).

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4.3 Comparison

Sweden is facing an entirely different kind of world and variation of external threats in 2019 compared to 2003. The greatest change is of course that Russia has gone from being seen as a future partner to NATO, the EU and not threatening the Baltic Sea area and its states. To become a realised threat to Swedish security due to the invasion on Crimea, strengthening their defence and ignoring European security order (Regeringskansliet, 2019). Russia’s development into, ones again, a superpower that challenges Swedish security is also the external threat that is used most to argue for an armament in 2019 as previous research has shown.

Nonetheless, Russia is not the only difference in the external threats representation when comparing Ds 2003:8 to 2019:8. Terrorism has become a realised threat to Swedish territory over the sixteen years between the reports. In 2003, terrorism was discussed in the context of the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 and how that would affect the United States. Terrorism was viewed as a international threat that should be dealt with through international corporation and be seen at its core as a criminal act that should be judge within the ordinary justicesystem (Regeringskansliet, 2003). Although Ds 2019:8 points out that terrorist attacks still happen at large outside of Europe, these attacks occur in Europe in larger numbers, including Sweden (Regeringskansliet, 2019). Much because of the fear of islamiq terrorist returning to Sweden as the caliphate is destroyed in the Middle East and therefore carrying out attacks in Swedish territory (Regeringskansliet, 2019). This has led to terrorism becoming an external threat to Sweden’s own territory.

At the same time as terrorism and Russian aggression has led to the reference object moving from being about protecting western values around the world and preventing conflicts were they start to being about protecting Swedish territory and society. One may also argue that this shift in reference object leading to change from disarmament to armament also is affected by the United State’s position as world leader. Going from being largely unproblematized in 2003 to being questioned and viewed as challenged by Russia and China at the same time as they have become protectionsistic and not protecting Europe to the same extent as in 2003. This in itself is not seen as an external threat, however, that the United States and NATO are not seen as an indisputable protection against external

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threats changes the entire view of external threats likelihood to attack Sweden as protection from NATO is not seen as self-evident to the same degree.

5. Conclusion & Discussion

The purpose of this thesis has been to elucidate which actors and issues that are portrayed as external threats in Defence Committee reports and how these differ during a disarmament process versus a armament process in Sweden. To do this Carol Bacchi’s WPR approach has been used in combination with the theory of securitization to be able to understand how a threat to national security can be represented and described in public policy documents. By doing so instability in the world order has been recognised as a key factor, apart from the development in Russia, to affect Sweden’s armament. As earlier research has described the development in Russia as the main impact on the disarmament process, that Defence Committee report Ds 2003:8 has been chosen to portray that period and Ds 2019:8 has been chosen to portray the current armament. This thesis analysed if the return of Russia as an external threat was the sole explanation for the armament in Ds 2019:8.

As this thesis has shown, to understand why Sweden is building up it's defence it is not as simple as Russia has emerged, once again, as an external threat to the Swedish territory.

This thesis points to the need to nuance the threat construction with a contextual understanding of other actors, their actions and how Sweden portrayed these in policy documents. For example, terrorism has become a realised threat to Swedish security. The reference object has moved closer and international missions are no longer seen as important. This thesis has concluded that a military threat is once again realised as a possibility in the nearest future as the illusions of peace are no longer present. However, a complete lack of external threats in Ds 2003:8 should not be seen as the only reason for disarmament. During that time, support from western power with the United States at the forefront was unquestioned and not seen as something that in the nearest future would disappear. Collaborations through PFP with NATO and therefore a reference object being far away was therefore seen as beneficial for Sweden. As discussed in the analysis this has changed since then and contributed to Sweden being forced to rebuild the defence to be able to withstand external threats.

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As this thesis is limited to only two Defence Committee reports, further research into the other reports that examined external threats prior to the Defence Act in 2004 and the one in 2020 would be beneficial to generate a greater understanding of the external threats during a disarmament process versus an armament process. A comparative analysis between Sweden and another state that has had the same kind of development would be useful for the purpose of understanding if some external threats are persistent when arguing for armament or disarmament there too. Using a different kind of method from representation of the external threats could also be beneficial as this might capture other aspects of the Defence Committee reports. Adding to this thesis through studying of the process of external threat representation over a greater amount of time might also contribute to the understanding of which external threats that are repetitive in Sweden’ defence history.

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