The united European response on Covid-19

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The united European response on

Covid-19

A qualitative analysis on the integrative process in the EU health policy as a response of the pandemic crisis.

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Abstract

The European emergence of Covid-19 has come to characterise a new kind of enemy for the EU, a cross border health threat which knows no borders and affect the EU’s health, economic, social and transport sectors

indiscriminately. Therefore this thesis aims to explores the measures taken by the EU to respond to the outbreak of Covid-19. By using three European integration theories, neofunctionalism and liberal and new

intergovernmentalism, different aspects behind the EU’s crisis response can be analysed and later put into evaluation in relation to the European

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List of Abbreviations

BARDA - Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority BDI - Federation of German Industries

CJEU - Court of Justice of the European Union The Council - the Council of the European Union CRII - Corona Response Investment Instrument CPM - Civil Protection Mechanism

EAA - European Economic Area ECB - European Central Bank

ECBG - the European Border and Coast Guard ECCL - Enhanced Conditions Credit Line ECDC - European Centre for Disease Control ECRE - European Council on Refugees and Exiles EFSM - European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism ESM - European Stability Mechanism

EMA - Europe Medical Agency EMU - Europe Monetary Union EP - European Parliament

ESI - European Support Instrument EU - European Union

HERA - Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority HSC - Health and Security Committee

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PCSL - Pandemic Crisis Support Line of credit PPE - Personal Protective Equipment

SCIFA - Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum SURE - Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency TFEU - The Functioning of the European Union

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1 Introduction

In the near end of 2019, the world observed with caution the sudden outbreak of a novel coronavirus, later titled Covid-19, which began to spread

throughout China. On the 24th January, the first case had been reported within the European continent in France and shortly after, the virus had spread to every corner of Europe. Since then, as disclosed by the European

Centre of Disease Control (ECDC) on the 16th September 2020, over 4.3

million cases have been reported and over 200 000 deceased in Europe. Concurrently, the spreading virus has brought vast impacts on the majority of the European Economic Area (EAA), with forecasts suggesting sharp GDP contractions, mass unemployment and an output level lower at the end of 2021, than 2019 (European Commission, 2020a).

Compelled to take action, the European Union (EU) has announced that the management of the outbreak of Covid-19 to become the utmost priority the political agenda of the EU institutions and its agencies. The European Council Presidency’s decision to mobilize the Integrated Political Response Mechanism (IPCR) has been managed at the highest political level. The IPCR is an initiative that opened up for the facilitation of joint cooperation and decision-making between the European Council, other EU institutions and agencies as well as member state representatives (De Miguel Beriain, Atienca Macías and José Armaza Armaza, 2015; European Council, 2020a). The focal points of the EU’s crisis response have revolved around four overarching strategic goals that should serve as guidance for the EU

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European institutions and agencies are given responsibilities execute actions which relate to each of these goals (European Council, 2020b).

Nevertheless, the EU today does not have primary responsibility of

organising, coordinating or providing health services and medical care to its member states. Rather the Union serves to complement the national policies of the member states as declared by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 168. Meanwhile, as brought forward by a 2020 survey commissioned by the European Parliament, nearly 70% of the participants would like the EU to be able to manage situations such as the Covid-19 crisis more adequately (Uncertainty/EU/Hope Public opinion in times of Covid-19, 2020). This paired with a growing political landscape of Euroscepticism puts further pressure on the EU’s level of legitimacy and assertiveness as well as a Union and united actor against the Covid-19 crisis (Celi, Guarascio, Simonazzi, 2020)

The European Union’s history is characterised by crises. Since the turn of the century, the EU has met immense challenges with events such as the

financial downturn of 2008 and the ensuing Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis in 2015 and the recent debate around the United Kingdom exiting the after its referendum in June 2016 (Hobolt, 2016). These remarkable

circumstances are usually at the core of an integrative shift within the Union’s responsibilities, policies and powers, and have been the subject of scholarly debates. In the same way, the discussion arises in whether the Union can mantle the growing expectations and overcome the Covid-19 crisis.

1.1 Research purpose and research questions

This thesis aims to explore the response of the European Union on the

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Union and the European Council in order to mitigate and overcome the Covid-19 pandemic. Furthermore, this research aims to provide clarity on whether the responsive measures have influenced the integration process of the European Union, and in which way. The following research questions have been formulated in order to guide the research:

What measures has the EU taken to respond to the outbreak of Covid-19? Which measures were taken by the EU within the field of health policy to respond to the outbreak of Covid-19?

Has any of these measures affected the prospect of future deepening the European integration project?

1.2 Delimitations

In order to keep the extent of the thesis within reasonable limits, following demarcations are made. First and foremost, the research on will be conducted on responses made by the EU between January and November 2020.

Furthermore, the thesis will not consider the EU’s international role to combat the Covid-19, but will rather be specified to that within the Union. Third and finally, in the investigation of supranational institutions, the research will only consider to the European Commission as a way of narrowing the scope of the thesis.

1.3 Disposition

From here on the thesis will be organised as follows. The next section constitutes the theoretical framework of the thesis, where neofunctionalism and liberal and new intergovernmentalism are presented. Following is the methodological chapter which outline the chosen methodological approaches for the research. After that is a presentation of the empirical material

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2 Theoretical framework

Within this section the theoretical framework is presented. It begins with a brief presentation of what European integration theory is. That is then followed by the three chosen approaches for the research, namely neofunctionalism and liberal and new intergovernmentalism. Finally, previous research on neofunctionalism and liberal and new

intergovernmentalism is presented and discussed respectively.

2.1 European integration theory

European integration refers to the process where European Union member states decide to shift their national competence toward EU-level competence. The study, and theorization, of integration then revolves around the aim to describe the underpinning dynamics that drive these integrational processes and outcomes. Efforts, which in extension not only provide knowledge in the present state of the political landscape, but also in the articulation of

assumptions on the development and the behaviour of institutions in the future. Ever since the study of integration theory began to develop shortly after the end of the Second World War, the ideas, models and theories on how and why these processes and outcomes should be explained have been many. However, out of these, two theories have been more dominant than others - Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Wiener and Diez, 2009).

As a way of evaluating the integrative process taking place in Europe during the Covid-19 crisis, this research will make use of these traditional

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desired European integration arising due to the interdependency between sectors. It will also be used to uncover integrative advancements spurred by national elites, transnational organisations or the supranational entities themselves. On the other hand liberal intergovernmentalism will be useful in the exploration of member state’s account in the decision-making process around the measures taken against the corona virus.

One fairly recent development of the liberal intergovernmental understanding – the new intergovernmentalism (Bickerton et al, 2015), will also be

integrated. Therefore , the new intergovernmentalist framework by Bickerton et al (2015) published in ”The New Intergovernmentalism: States and

Supranational Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era” will serve as basis and

further nuance in the analysis of the material, with the prospect of

uncovering patterns related to the “integrative paradox”, where integration can be moved to EU-level but not necessarily toward supranational

institutions.

Like Hooghe and Marks (2019) reason, this research will not see

neofunctionalism and liberal and new intergovernmentalism as mutually exclusive theories, but rather complementary to one another. As cited by Hooghe and Marks (2019 p. 1128), “Each theory disciplines thinking about

the behavior of key actors, the arenas in which they act, and the causal mechanisms that connect their actions to institutional outcomes.”. By

approaching the data from contrasting perspectives, different themes and patterns can be distinguished and accentuated under various scholarly contexts. Further Hooghe and Marks (2019) state that the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis and Brexit, among other examples, can and have been considered as episodes comprising elements of intergovernmental

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these three theories to highlight different parts of the crisis response and decision-making progress.

2.2 Neofunctionalism

The origins of neofunctionalism were first brought to light by Ernst. B Haas and Leon Lindberg in the late 1950’s as a reaction to the growth of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community (Wiener and Diez, 2009). The newly founded pan-European institutions presented interconnected dynamics between each other. When one institution seemed to develop, the effect would also carry over to its sister institutions, even in other sectors, as stated in Haas work from 1958 the

Uniting of Europe. This “spill over” effect is a central idea as to why further

integration occurs and is a necessity due to the interconnected nature of some institutions and policies. Further, in contrast to the contemporary dominant classical realistic school of thought, which Haas set out to question,

neofunctionalism posits that multiple actors seek regional integration not only due to the power but also due to values based on interests and desires. When these actors decide that such interests and desires are better fulfilled through supranational institutions rather than their own national equivalents, integration is to be expected. Through the integration process, Haas and Dinan (2004) in accordance with Wiener and Diez (2009), suggests that actors are inclined to shift their preferences, activities and perhaps even loyalties toward a more supranational nature as a consequence of gained benefits through joint- competence and decision making.

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present (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). Haas and Dinan (2004 p. 296) give the example that the integrative progress would have to be made in the

transportation sector if progress would be made in the coal and steel sector, or else the latter would not function properly. The choice to incorporate neofunctionalism in this thesis rests partially on the argument that it will provide insight in the identification of any functional interdependencies between the current health policy sector other policy sectors. In turn, will also help in uncovering where such interdependencies between policy sectors faulter as a consequence of the pandemic impacts. From this, it will be able to discern integrative advancements made in order to fill these gaps and “future-proof” the sectors against similar crises.

Political spill overs concern integration that are based in the interests of

various elites and interest groups that are convinced that supranational cooperation better fits their desires and interests than cooperation on the national level. This kind of integration is, according to Haas and Dinan (2004) as well as Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (2016) a consequence of a deliberate political process driven by politicians, lobbyists and

stakeholders through pressurizing national governments into seeking further cooperation at EU-level. In this, neofunctionalism will be advantageous in examining the willingness of national elites and transnational actors to push for collective responses toward the pandemic, and in extension, potentially increased integration.

Cultivated spill over takes into account the situations where the integrative

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in the midst of the “empty chair crisis” in the 1960’s (Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2016). The Commission later gained back some influence with the establishment of the single market and the new

commencement of the European project in the 1980’s, and power once again began to relocate from member state governments to European institutions. Today, it could be argued that the equilibrium of political power within the European Union is more ambiguous than it has been before (Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2016; Nugent and Rhinard, 2016; Novak, Rozenberg and Bendjaballah, 2020). Nevertheless, as put forward by Nugent and Rhinard (2016) the Commission still plays the foremost role as agenda-setting actor within the EU. Both in explicit terms but also in implicit terms with the help of other European institutions. The emergence of novel European agencies and institutional bodies might have come to question the influence of the Commission, with some power consequently being

reallocated to these more recent actors. However, the Commission holds the prime responsibility of bringing legislative propositions forward to the judicial branch of the EU and can still exert influence on the formation of policies as well as the EU’s priorities and agenda (Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2016).

As described by (Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2016; Wiener and Diez, 2009), the Commission is keen to coordinate its legislative initiatives with various institutions and agencies of the Union, taking their evaluations and advice into account. This is a way to devise proposals going through the co-decision process of the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament (EP). This, as highlighted by Novak, Rozenberg and

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enough support to pass the voting in the Council or the EP (Novak, Rozenberg and Bendjaballah, 2020).

It is worthwhile mentioning that although Neofunctionalism may be one of the most recognized theories of integration, has also gained critique. The intergovernmental scholar Stanley Hoffman argues that European integration does not come from a supranational entity, but rather from the participating member states. The speed, the form and the level of integrative progression all depend on the national government's decision and willingness to integrate. Further criticism is garnered from Schmitter (2005) who argues that

neofunctionalism fails to fill the gap around the growing complexity that comes with an enlarged Union. The growing amount of member states translates into a more heterogeneous set of wills within the community. This in extension leads to large transformations in the scope of the Union and a greater risk of members pulling the Union in different directions, where someone will feel cheated in the end.

2.3 Intergovernmentalism, liberal and new

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According to Wiener and Diez (2009), liberal intergovernmentalism should be seen as a synthesis of theoretical elements, which together constitute a framework for understanding the integrative progress. Moravcsik (1993) as well as Wiener and Diez (2009) thereby present the following elements: a liberal approach to national preference making, an intergovernmental theory on interstate negotiation, as well as a choice and delegation to international institutions.

National state preferences are construed by values derived from demands and interactions of domestic societal groups which affect the national

government's agenda. The demands are, as Nugent (2010) describes, often guided by limitations and opportunities given by economic interdependence. Sometimes preferences are mistaken to be static, but Moravscik (1993) rather argues that preferences are only constant within a particular matter and period of negotiation and can very much be able to change depending on the circumstances or the timeframe.

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that member states that are more self-sufficient and not as dependent on the Union are better off in situations of bargaining. Other factors have not shown the same amount of influence.

The subsequent part of the potential cooperative arrangement is first and foremost a mutual decision to merge competence within a centralized collective institution, and then the structural makeup of the institution. The logic behind decisions to delegate and pool sovereignty within centralized supranational entities are attributed to its efficiency. Supranational

institutions are created by the parties in order to lower the transaction costs for future negotiations, with the thought that greater efficiency can be reached through collective activity and shared technocratic experience and information. There is also the argument of an increasing credibility of the agreements themselves through the establishment of both transparency and accountability between states (Wiener and Diez,2009).

As previously stated, liberal intergovernmentalism holds national states as the essential actors. Nevertheless, the distribution of power and influence in the EU is argued. Kassim and Menon (2010) write that the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty both have redistributed the power in favour of the member states rather than the Commission. Limitations have been imposed on the Commission's executive abilities along with its

autonomy with the increased legislative power of the EP and the Council. In comparison to other Union bodies, the Commission’s domain of importance has diminished over time (Kassim and Menon, 2010). While the

neofunctionalist theory’s foci is mainly out of a supranational perspective, the liberal intergovernmental theory, in contrast rely on member state actors as the principal agents of integration. This approach will assist in

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bargaining in relation to the corona pandemic – something that is overlooked in the neofunctionalist theory.

Like neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism has garnered both much approval and criticism in its applicability in the case of the integrative

development of the EU (Rosamond, 2000). While it does describe the impact of interstate negotiative processes on European integration in isolated cases, it fails to take the resulting internal effects on the framework's own elements (interdependence, preferences and bargaining power) into consideration. Neither does it explain how sequences of cases of integration can be interconnected and influence each other (Schimmelfennig, 2018a).

Furthermore, Finke (2009), Nugent (2010) and Wincott (1995) concur that the practicality of liberal intergovernmentalism so far has been shown to be quite narrow, and the criteria on which cases it selects, too rigid to depict the day-to-day progression of European integration. Something which Wiener and Diez (2009) does not fully agree with, since much of the daily decision making of the EU, and to a certain degree the daily integrative progress, is made through consensus or unanimous agreement, rather than supranational arrangements.

New intergovernmentalism is in some parts a continuation of its liberal counterparts, yet in other parts it has sought to frame the integrative process in different lights. While it, like its liberal equivalent, recognizes national governments as central acting powers behind the European integrative process, it does not necessarily acknowledge the polarization between intergovernmental cooperation and supranational supremacy. According to Nugent (2010), new intergovernmentalism is a middle range integration theory based in the political and legislative workings of the EU, its functions and executive capabilities.

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which continuous integration is likely to happen but not necessarily toward a supranational end goal. Integrative progress does not simply mean that competencies are shifted from national to supranational political accounts but rather to that of specialized de- novo institutions with concentrated functional abilities and autonomy. Conventional institutions representing the

supranational powers of the EU (i.e the Commission, the CJEU and the EP) still have their purpose in community policies of more traditional nature. They are not however, as stated by Puetter (2014), the member states favoured choice in the decision-making or coordination of more contemporary policy-areas. Here, the integration paradox come into consideration for the thesis, as it in in opposition to neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, will be able to highlight shifts moving from national level to EU-level, but not automatically toward supranational institutions.

From this development, the influential powers over day-to-day activities instead move toward EU bodies representing the member states, where the European Council is the most prominent political actor of the EU. New intergovernmentalism posits that European integrative advancements are largely based on the established consensus of its member states, explaining their representative EU bodies’ growth of responsibilities since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. While the European Council has gained a larger role in leading the EU, the Council have garnered new and increased policy-decision capabilities. According to Puetter (2014), it has become a central decision-making institution, which under the supervision of, and extensive deliberation with, the European Council have managed to circumscribe the autonomy of conventional institutions to initiate and define legislation and policies.

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displayed by member states, deliberative intergovernmentalism. As a way of streamlining the increasing process of lengthy policy negotiations and debates that has followed with the post Maastricht- transformation in policy dynamics have led to: “permanent attempts at institutional engineering that

are aimed at increasing the consensus generation potential of the EU's main forums for member state representation: the European Council and the Council of the European Union” (Puetter, 2014 p.34). The new

intergovernmental theory will then be useful for the thesis to highlight the prominence of consensus-seeking rather than bargaining, thus being able to determine the roles of the European Council and the Council in the outcome of the pandemic response.

2.4 Integration theories in crises

As told by the extensive amount of research pertaining to explain the

integrative processes of the European Union, significant integrative shifts in the past have frequently been linked to critical episodes taking place under particularly unusual circumstances. Something which has characterized the last decade’s European landscape with the emergence of the Eurozone crisis around 2010, the refugee crisis of 2015 and the British exit of 2016. These, and equally decisive examples, have been ascribed to the increasing efforts of EU- specific integrative research made since 2010 and forward (Hodson and Puetter, 2019; Hooghe and Marks, 2019). Two of the most disastrous examples, the Eurozone crisis around 2010 and the refugee crisis of 2015, helps in showcasing the integrative advancements, and setbacks. According to Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2018) these two crises illustrate the problems that has followed with the Union’s shifted focus from integrative measures within the market sector, to sectors closer to the core state. Schimmelfennig (2018a p.969) further describe the similarities between the two cases where” exogenous shocks exposed the functional shortcomings of both integration

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well as an unprecedented politicization of European integration in member state societies”. Arguably, the sudden outbreak of Covid-19 seems to display

the same characteristics as the ones described by Schimmelfennig (2018b). Further it is directly related to the health policy area, a policy-sector in which the competence is still largely at the national level, meaning it might prove to display the same problem as presented by Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2018).

2.5 The neofunctionalist perspective in previous crises

The unfolding consequences of the Eurozone debt crisis was a hard blow for the European Union, but even more so for some of its member states. As written by Niemann & Ioannou (2015) and Schimmelfennig, (2017), there were multiple dysfunctionalities present at the time of the crisis which according to the authors amplified the impacts of the crisis. One such dissonance for example, was the detached competences allocated between the EU and the national governments. While the management of the

monetary policies had been assigned to the EU, the fiscal policies had been given to the member states to control. Niemann and Ioannou (2015) further describes that in addition to this, the Union lacked the appropriate

instruments to adequately supervise financial developments and manage the increasing pressures of the financial crisis. Similarly, another critical event that has proven to challenge the functional balance of the European Union is that of the European migration crisis. Around 2015 and 2016 , several hundreds of thousands refugees and displaced people sought acute refuge within the EU as a result of the escalating conflicts within the Middle Eastern region around the period - causing the largest inflow of acute migrants to the Union since the Second World War (Niemann and Zaun, 2018).

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it had revealed underlying dysfunctionalities between the supranational Schengen agreements in conjunction with an inadequately developed

external border. The Schengen agreement had been largely Europeanized and coordinated at a supranational level, the external border controls had been left a primary responsibility of the EU’s member states (Genshel and Jachtenfuchs, 2018; Niemann and Speyer, 2018). Something which subsequently had left the Union and its members poorly equipped to deal with the steeply increasing influx of refugees where the: “...crisis thus

constituted a catalyst that exposed the weaknesses of the system that had been constructed in the 1990s and not been sufficiently advanced and Europeanized since” (Niemann and Speyer, 2018 p.38). Genshel and

Jachtenfuchs (2018) in accordance with Niemann and Zaun (2018) further assert that there were bottlenecks and deficiencies in the responsibility-spreading abilities within the EU, leaving the most affected member states incapable of resolving the growing crisis.

From this, the common solution lied in the development of the European Border and Coast Guard (ECBG) regulations and further integrational steps within the European FRONTEX agency. Strengthening the security of the external borders had been the preferred option, as it would mean a reduction in the imbalance of competence between the Schengen structure and the governmental external border control. The Commission had proposed internal solutions - including a quota system aimed to allocate the inflows of migrants proportionately as well as and raised standards for the facilitation of asylum seekers, both of which had been dismissed by the majority of the member states (Niemann and Speyer, 2018). In the Eurozone crisis the common solution lied in the establishment of a banking union, as well as more supranational influence in the supervision of the fiscal management of its members and through the European Stability Mechanism

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From a neofunctional perspective the Eurozone crisis revealed benefits of a strong and interconnected Eurozone, but also underlined its functional gaps. The advocated answer for finding a resolution to the crisis has been to intensify the progress of integration forward as a way to fill these functional shortcomings. These same arguments were brought forward by multiple national governments and several EU institutions with the general discourse now revolving around furthering the integration. At the same time

organisations, industrial leaders and other interest groups were keen to promote objectives leading to further integration, if that would solve the crisis and rescue the euro (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2018; Niemann and Ioannu, 2015). Like with the Eurozone crisis, several governmental and non-

governmental actors had been quick to show their approval toward a

continuation of the Schengen area, and had advocated for a strengthened Union in the asylum and border policy sectors as well as its crisis

management capabilities. Niemann and Speyer (2018) describe that there had been meetings between political bodies such as the Working Party on

Frontiers, Justice- and Home Affairs Council (JHA) counsellors and the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) which had facilitated for lowered political thresholds. Simultaneously,

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where the above-mentioned actors could, and likely have, stimulated the decision-making processes to some degree.

In the process of managing the Eurozone crisis, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Central Bank (ECB) were the principal actors in European context. Although these supranational entities were tasked to handle the crisis, several of the crisis management initiatives were taken on an intergovernmental basis rather than through the

Commission according to both Hodson (2013) and Niemann and Ioannou (2015). The intergovernmental spirit displayed by the European Council and the Eurogroup in the Eurozone crisis left the Commission with little room for its own proposals. Nevertheless, the Commission’s role shifted with the crisis by initiative of the member states, leaving it with a more extensive role in tasks such as safeguarding and surveilling financial stability. Through this, the Commission was granted both new competence and autonomic promise. But it steered the Commission’s aptitude in proposing new policies, more toward that of supervising and managing already existing ones (Bauer and Becker, 2014; Hodson, 2013). Still, its scope and power of policy

recommendations and agenda setting powers had been expanded. This was assured as the European Parliament made certain that the supranational aspect in the legislative processes was retained and that the procedures efficiency was increased, hence constraining the member states. The ECB played an essential role in keeping the Euro stable and mitigating the escalation of the crisis. Governments and financial markets alike, put their trust toward the ECB to repress the crisis (Heldt and Mueller, 2020). It was an initial advocate that pushed for further deepening integrative

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In contrast, the Commission was seen as the driving force of integrative policies within the JHA section and had displayed many characteristics of a supranational policy entrepreneur in the refugee crisis. Its role as an

advocating mediator in the trilogue with the European Council and the EP had played an important part in advancing the integrative responses around the migration crisis. The Commission had been a well-coordinated and confident actor in the matter, managing to construct and communicate a proposal on the development of the ECBG at the right moment, in record time. By acting as swiftly as it did, the Commission managed to circumscribe the involvement of the member states and depoliticize some of the

components within the proposal. The Dutch Presidency managed to further the ECBG deliberative processes through decisive leadership and an ability to take advantage of innovative solutions and time pressure. The

Commission had been further assisted by the Dutch Presidency who consciously adopted a confirmatory strategy to quickly direct the member states towards a common solution. Nevertheless the Council with the Presidency in the lead accomplished to expand their powers in the authorization of intervention through a compromise. This meant that the authorization would happen through qualified majority voting, rather than through the Commission’s originally proposed committee system.

2.6 The liberal and new intergovernmentalist framework in previous crises

The framework of liberal intergovernmentalism provides insight into the national preferences of governments that arose with the Eurozone- and refugee crisis and the ensuing intergovernmental negotiations. As

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would follow. Both financial and political resources and authority were at serious risk of being lost. Rather, the solution proposed had been further collaboration, in a more efficient and coordinated manner. In reality, as written by Schimmelfennig (2018b) the definition of what “efficient” and “coordinated” meant differed between member states. A large discrepancy between creditor members and debtor members emerged around the

distribution of the cooperative measures, with each bloc urging for their own preferential solutions. While creditor countries pushed for nationalized financial adjustments and economic austerity, the debtor countries rather promoted and highlighted a mutualized resolution (Schimmelfennig, 2018b). Although the Eurozone countries were deeply interdependent of each other, the intergovernmental negotiations disclosed asymmetrical aspects between the parties. In this case, in favour of the creditor members. Finke and Bailer (2019) Frieden and Walter (2019) as well as Schimmelfennig (2015) present the Franco-German tandem which had great clout in the stipulation of terms in the Eurozone negotiations. Schimmelfennig (2015) however, concluded that the outcome of the Eurozone negotiations largely pursued the

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intensified the political importance in immediate action, thereby pressuring the finance ministers into progressing the EFSM as fast as possible. In the progressions of the ESM and the banking union, the European Council instead played a more subtle role. In this case, the European Council partook in the progression of the initiatives in a lesser degree, but rather was seen as a sounding board offering guidance (Smeets and Zaun, 2020).

In relation to the refugee crisis, the intergovernmental tensions and the clashing national preferences may have been an essential component in its outcome (Wiener, Börzel and Risse, 2019; Wolf and Ossewarde, 2018). As with the Eurozone crisis, Schimmelfennig (2018b p.1586) present that there had been clear preference constellations of the refugee crisis, based in the direct effect of the influx of migrants where “... their affected-ness depended

on their position toward the main migration routes, and this position was a function of geography and economic as well as regulatory asylum

conditions”. In accordance, Wien, Börzel and Diez (2019) state that the

preferences in this episode are largely derived from the domestic societal and public domain, where migration policies tended to show greater salience in directly affected states, in contrast to less affected states. The authors separate the constellations into four groups: Front-line states, destination states, transit states and bystander states. The two latter constellations' national preferences had generally been more tolerant as evident in the ensuing negotiations to resolve the crisis. Biermann et al. (2019),

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Malta) and destination states (Sweden, Germany and Austria) negotiated desperately to convince the remaining members of a joint solution.

The Commission’s proposal of an establishment of a migration quota system which would introduce a proportional distribution of the influxes of asylum-seeking migrants had been greatly supported by the affected states. While managing a one-time relocation of around 160 000 migrants, under strong opposition by the Eastern member states, a permanent system failed to be adopted. The Commission’s permanent proposal had been voted down by transit- and bystander countries, who deemed the costs too high in proportion to the status quo. Schimmelfennig (2018b) and Biermann et al. (2019)

ascribe this to be a consequence of the highly asymmetrical nature of the crisis and the lacking interdependence of the asylum and migrant policy sectors in contrast to that of the Euro crisis. The willingness of cooperation had been greater around the ECBG regulations where member states had found more to gain from joint instead of national external border control. The perceived cost and responsibility of such integrative advancements were less in comparison joint initiatives of facilitating and receiving migrants and asylum seekers.

3 Methodological framework

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3.1 Case study

This research will base itself on an exploratory approach. With the aim of exploring the measures taken by the EU in response to the corona pandemic, this research aspires to provide further insight into the Union’s capabilities of crisis management and response in general, and specifically in relation to a cross-border health emergency. Seeing that the phenomena studied are relatively novel, it is argued that the decision on an explorative design is better fit for the rather than that of a descriptive or explanatory design of research (Schmidt, 2020; Wolff and Ladi, 2020). As noted in section 2.4 in this thesis, there has been a linkage between critical moments and a tendency of increased willingness of further integrative advancements as a way to react to current critical situations, as well as prevent future crises of the same sorts. For these reasons, the manner in which this thesis undertakes these questions is done by grounding itself in the single case research approach, focusing on the European Union, with the Covid-19 outbreak and the health policy area as the units of analysis. Generally, crisis coordination and

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The exhaustive nature of the case research method generally allows for, and requires, the chosen phenomena to be studied from multiple perspectives. This aids in the discovery of underlying patterns and latent factors of explanations. It also provides the benefit of permitting the utilisation of various sources of explanatory aspects to enrich the research’s quality

(Bryman, 2012). Gerring (2004) in accordance with Yin (2003) further writes that case studies are considered to be more empirically based than methods founded in quantitative nature. Hence, it is considered to be better suited for research which has not been extensively explored. It is important to note however that due to the very same complex nature of most case studies, it can be an inappropriate tool for generalization. Although considering the circumstances in this research, the non-generalizability of the contributions should not be regarded as a hindrance due to its novel circumstances. The aim with this thesis is not to provide generalizable results, but rather to provide insight into the decision-making dynamics of the EU’s responsive measures against Covid-19, and the potential impacts on integration those measures might have.

3.2 Material

The choice of material carries great weight in the outcome of the study. This thesis will examine several various sources of documents and texts in its objective to answer the posed research questions. The main fragments of the data collection will be based on legislative documents released by the EU. These consist of proposals brought forward by the Commission, as well as already implemented proposals, related to the response toward the Covid-19 pandemic between January and November 2020. Further, there are additional documents which are relevant to the study. These come in the form of

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another, these documents hold great value considering that the Covid-19 crisis is still relatively novel. This material will help in illuminating indicative standpoints within the EU, regarding the measures proposed or taken to mitigate the Covid-19 crisis and prevent future crises of similar character.

The majority of these documents, as well as the legislative propositions, and implementations mentioned above, have been drawn from the Commission’s and the Council’s web sites respectively. In reaction to the pandemic, both the Commission and the Council have each established a new web section dedicated to gathering the EU’s responses toward Covid-19 in a

comprehensive way. Whilst the Commissions and the Council’s respective section gather all the material in one place, the collective material still constitutes a massive amount of information. Therefore the choice was made to focus specifically on the material presented within each of the two

institution’s established timelines of action, which chronologically highlights the initiatives taken by the EU and are regularly updated. Here, each of the actions are presented by a smaller notice, including a link leading to a full press release by the respective institution. Within these press releases there are often links included to the relevant material (proposals, legislative documents, conclusions, communications and negotiation positions etc). Both timelines have directly linked all this material via the EU’s judicial and bibliographical platform EUR-Lex, meaning that the material is officially released under the EU.

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wider range of sources, including the Politico and Euractiv, Euronews and the Financial Times. Naturally, it would be preferable to rely on primary sources for this data, such as transcripts of national- and business leader speeches as well as statements, positions and legislatives directly released by the same. However, given the time required to collect, read and analyse the sufficient amount of material to cover these actors' positions fully the choice fell to rely on articles as a second-best option. With this, a chosen few scientific articles are included from the following authors: Agosto et al., 2020, Anderson, Mckee and Mossialos (2020), Brooks and Geyer, 2020, de Feo (2020), Greer and de Ruijter (2020), Johnson et al, (2020), Lehner (2020).

3.3 Data analysis strategy

As a way of exploring the integrative progress of the EU during the Covid-19 crisis, the material used in this thesis will be scrutinized through a thematic content analysis. Bryman (2012) describes that the method is a research approach used to thoroughly examine the collected data in order to reveal underlying information, patterns and themes. The methodology will not only help to analyse the data, but it will also be of assistance in the organisation of the vast amount of data that often accompanies research of qualitative nature. While there is an abundance of different ways to perform a content analysis, it is generally done through a procedure of coding - labelling and

categorizing, the data at hand. The intention of this then, is to derive meanings from data extracts and sort them in various larger groups of collective meanings. (Bryman, 2012). Further, the chosen approach of this thesis - the thematic analysis of content, as described by Guest, MacQueen and Namey (2012) requires great amounts of both involvement and

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mean that the former excludes the latter, they are rather seen as additional perspectives of interpreting the data (Bryman, 2012; Guest, Macqueen and Namey, 2012).

With this study being focused around the EU’s crisis response toward the Covid-19 pandemic and the following integrative progress, the procedure of the coding will be grounded in a set of initial concepts and codes derived whilst reading the material. This serves as the first framework for further decisions on the course of the coding as well as the identification and extraction of the overarching themes. Then, the process of coding the material in a reliable manner requires a rigid, thorough and repeated process of reading and rereading the material. This is done in order to be familiarized with it and the data, as recommended by both Bryman (2012) and Guest, Macqueen and Namey (2012). From this, not only manifested meaning may appear but also meanings of latent characteristics.

3.4 Methodological discussion

As previously mentioned, the choice of conducting case studies commonly entail hardships in generalizability, due to its complex and interpretive foundation (Bryman, 2012). However, the aim with this thesis is not to provide generalizable results, but rather to provide insight into the decision-making dynamics of the EU’s responsive measures against Covid-19, and the potential impacts on integration those measures might have.

As important, is the discussion regarding the replicability of the study, which refer to the extraction and comprehension of the meanings within the chosen body of material. These processes should be both transparent and replicable, where the presented results should prove to be consistent over time and independent of the researcher itself. Bryman (2012), further explain that in order to ensure strong replicability, the research procedures must be

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data itself in section 3.2 of this thesis, as well as provided an analytical framework in the forthcoming section, 3.5. Here the main arguments of the European integration theories as well as their related indicators are presented and described, both in text and comprised as seen in table 1 below.

3.5 Analytical framework

3.5.1 Operationalisation of European integration

European integration, as disclosed in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, takes place when competence is transferred from national level to EU level. It can transpire either through agreements between member states to

collaborate at EU-level, by allocating the legislative and executive influence toward institutions and agencies within the EU or through a collective decision to centralize autonomy through supranational governance. In this regard, expressed demands and decisions to collectively respond to the Covid-19 crisis through the EU would imply the process of European integration. Within the health policy area specifically integrative

advancements would be related to the transference of legislative influence and competence. In contrast, expression of the need for further sovereignty of states, intergovernmental bargaining separates from the EU and decision making at the national level and hindrance of supranational proposals would indicate the need of less integrative advancement.

3.5.2 Operationalization of European integration theories

In order to discern the central ideas of the included integrative theories in a digestible way, their respective main arguments will be put through a framework. This framework will be of assistance in the process of analysis and the evaluation of the theories suitability in relation to the empirical data.

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Sub concepts Main arguments Indicators Degree of

centralization

High - multiple actors seek supranationalism as a way to gain

influence and fulfil their values

The policy frameworks are more centralized. Functional spill over Integrative advancements are interconnected and happen trans-sectorally No other possible alternatives are present.

Legislation is created/adjusted specifically to address trans-sectoral gaps.

Political spill over Elites at the national level promote integrative developments at EU level European interest groups and organisations encourage European integration Legislative or responsive actions are driven by stakeholders.

Cultivated spill over

Supranational

organisations within the EU incite integration

Legislative or responsive initiatives are driven by the Commission. Liberal intergovernmentalism

Sub concepts Main arguments Indicators

Degree of centralization

Low - Member states are the main driving force of integration.

The policy frameworks remain largely

decentralized National

preferences

National preferences are moulded by domestic, societal pressures - and are regularly discrepant with other states.

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Intergovernmental bargaining Integration is mainly a product of rational governments decisions to initiate collaborative deals Asymmetrical in terms of wealth, size and population and urgency

Intergovernmental

bargaining situations arise in response to initiatives States with better

bargaining power influence the outcome through coercion New intergovernmentalism Degree of centralization Low - although supranational

institutions have their role in traditional community policies.

The policy frameworks remain largely

decentralized yet

supranational institutions can get more competence in traditional policies. Integrative paradox Competence is transferred to agencies/ de-novo institutions rather from national to EU-level.

Legislative or responsive initiatives in favour of de-novo institutions.

Consensus and Deliberation

Increased deliberation Legislative or responsive

initiatives are based on deliberative consensus,

Table 1, operationalization of European integration theories,

As gathered from the neofunctional understanding on European integration, supranationalism is a product of multiple actors' decision to shift competence from national to regional level. Member states put their reliance and in some cases their loyalty in the hands of centralized governance with the ambition to gain influence and better fulfil their values and desires. This occurs mainly as a response to the three spill over effects - functional, political and

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tendencies of the power dynamics formalized in the EU, these three areas of spill overs will be included in the operationalization of neofunctionalism. Arguments regarding the functional spill over effect revolves around the functional performance of a current policy area. Should a dysfunctionality arise or an imbalance in the current system appear, there would be arguments for further integrative progress as a solution. The idea behind functional spill overs is based in the functional dissonance between the status quo and existing limitations within it, visualized by a critical event, calling for further integration to quell the crisis. Therefore indicators of functional spill over would encompass claims of lacking functional capacities of the EU to properly respond to the situation created by the Covid-19 outbreak. It Political spill over identifies the condition where national and transnational elites and various interest groups shift their activities, confidence and loyalty from national level toward that of the European Union. This is done in the event where the domestic capacity is not sufficient to solve an arising discrepancy. In turn, the ascension of domestic issues might itself bring potential integrative development. The involvement of these actors by adding political stimulus and fostering consensus in the European Union deliberative forums. Here cases of political spill over are indicated by national elites and transnational organisations affecting the policy-making outcomes by

pressurizing member states into seeking more cooperation.

In terms of cultivated spill over, the supranational entities themselves are the driving force of integrative progress within the European Union. In the frame of this research, arguments for cultivated spill over encompasses the

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The intergovernmental understanding accentuates the importance of the member states as the key actors for integrative development, whereby the intergovernmental bargaining between the member states is central. This negotiation process is the system in which member states present their

national preferences and ambitions with interstate cooperation, and thereafter decide on the most cost-beneficial alternative. The decision then, is to build the operationalization of the liberal intergovernmental theory upon the process of intergovernmental bargaining.

Even though the Covid-19 outbreak is a central event which has spread throughout the European continent, national preferences of states may perhaps still be incongruent with each other. Meaning that negotiations around the responsive measures against Covid-19, along with the

preventative initiatives to similar events, are likely to arise. Statements from governments and their representatives will indicate their standpoints in these negotiations. In extension, this will also indicate whether they are inclined to push for more integration through the EU, or are seeking other means to solve the crisis. This also brings out the aspect pointed out by the liberal intergovernmentalist scholars, that the bargaining process more than often is asymmetrical in nature, meaning that the participating parts are not equal to one another. There may be instances where states at a better bargaining position will be able to influence the outcome of the negotiations at the expense of less influential states. More resourceful states may express restraint toward further interstate or supranational cooperation since the chance that their relative contribution is larger in comparison. This was exemplified within the previous chapter, in both the Eurozone- and the refugee crisis where the better off bargaining parties demonstrated restraint in initiatives deemed too costly.

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vice versa, but rather to that of national to collective and agency specific. This is understood as a paradoxical phenomenon, where national competence de facto shifts and is pooled in a collective manner. Nevertheless in contrast to neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, such shifts do not automatically transfer to a supranational endpoint. Instead as written demonstrated by Bickerton et al (2015a) and Puetter (2014) de novo institutions designed to specifically address the objectives at hand.

Concurrently, this development has resulted in the expansion of the Council and the European Councils powers at the expense of conventional entities within the EU, such as the Commission. Such shifts would indicate new intergovernmental logics in the outcomes responses and policies.

4 Analysis

The analytical section is established into two parts, where the first part will present the empirical material through three main themes. After that, a discussion of the empirical material through the three approaches of European integration is presented.

4.1 Background to the virus and the initial outbreak

4.1.1 The European emergence of Covid-19 and the initial responses

The first case within the borders of the European Union had been reported on the 24th of January 2020 in France within weeks from the first reported case, the coronavirus managed to sweep over the whole European continent, amounting to over 100 000 deaths in the first four months, of which France, Spain and Italy were hit particularly hard (Euronews, 2020a; Euronews, 2020b). Up until the end of February, “the number of cases in the EU/EEA

was low and cases in Europe were either imported or part of well-defined transmission chains in Germany and France” (Johnson et al, 2020 p.3), with

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monitoring of the transmission chains. Still, the hold of the virus managed to grow stronger and by the beginning of March, several European countries experienced increasingly uncontrollable internal contamination

(Euronews,2020b).

As of the 11th of March, the World Health Organisation (WHO) announced the sweeping outbreak of Covid-19 a global pandemic as a result of the rapidly intensifying emergency now amassing up to over 118 000 cases in 114 nations, whereas Europe had become the epicentre of the virus (Politico, 2020a). Early findings had suggested that social distancing, use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and finally, large scale restrictions had been effective in combating the spread of the virus. Come mid-March, almost the entirety of the Union's member states had imposed so called

non-pharmaceutical intervention in the lack of any effective non-pharmaceutical countermeasures such as vaccinations or therapy (Agosto et al., 2020). These interventions included the imposition of strict lockdown restrictions, closure of several public establishments and institutions and the issuing of extensive confinement rules. In addition, travel bans, and enforcements of the external border were also strictly regulated throughout the European nations (Agosto et al., 2020).

Early on, the European Council Presidency had activated the Union’s crisis response mechanism - the IPCR on the 28th of January, thereby opening up for the facilitation of regular joint communication between the EU, its institutions and member states along with other concerned stakeholders (Council of the European Union, 2020a). The Commission was called upon by the Council to shoulder the responsibilities associated with that of a coordinating and executive crisis manager. These responsibilities have revolved around the four prioritized areas set out by the European Council, namely: 1) Limiting the spread of the virus, 2) provision of medical

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consequences (European Council, 2020a; European Council, 2020b). At this point the EU had two established structures it could use to mobilize direct actionable measures in light of a cross border health crisis, as disclosed by Brooks and Geyer (2020). First, there is the framework on health security staked out in the 2013 Decision on Serious Cross Border Threats to Health. This outlines the responsibility of the EU and member states respectively concerning the preparation, planning and execution of health threats and emergencies. In short, in the case of an emergent health threat, member state representatives in liaison with necessary experts and the Commission are assembled to the Health Security Committee (HSC). Through the

Committee, the concerned parts consult each other on the actionable, and potential, responses available to mitigate the pending emergency. The framework further assigns the ECDC the role of leading the administration and monitoring of crisis development via information shared from national health authorities, providing continuous updates on the situation (Brooks and Geyer, 2020; Council Decision No 1082/2013/EU). Then, there is the Civil Protection Mechanism (CPM) functioning as a joint pool of strategic resources where Member states file records on their ready and available goods, services and personnel to be used for medical, safety and rescue purposes. These can then be deployed to other member states requesting support (Brooks and Geyer, 2020).

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by the EUs member states, has generally occurred unannounced and in an uncoordinated manner (Johnson et al, 2020). According to Brooks and Geyer (2020), the full potential of the HSC and ECDC both remained

unfulfilled, as a consequence the unilateral manner displayed by the member states, as their capabilities in large are based on member state participation and willingness to coordinate.

Complications also arose with increasingly severe shortages of PPE, necessary critical medicine and healthcare equipment that appeared as a consequence of massive demand increases as well as export stoppages both outside and inside the Union (Euractiv, 2020a). Part of this also

encompassed the accumulation of necessary medical- and personal protective equipment, as was showcased with the German, French and Czech

imposition of export bans of medical equipment - three of the four main European producers of such equipment save for Poland (Euractiv, 2020a; Politico, 2020a). This had worsened the situation in the most hard-pressed countries at the time, and Italy, who had been one of the worst fairing

countries in the world during the initial stages of the pandemic outbreak, had repeatedly pleaded for Union solidarity (Financial times, 2020a; Politico, 2020b). By the end of February, Italy had resorted to the CPM, asking the Commission to activate it on Italy’s behalf as a call for assistance with the rapidly shrinking medical and protectionary supplies. However, Italy’s requests for assistance were met with silence, ultimately leading them to seek assistance from China instead (Financial Times, 2020a; Politico, 2020b). Concurrently, these events had sparked public dissatisfaction within the Italian public, which in turn have given Eurosceptic political bodies

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proceed with legal repercussions under the infringement procedure against Germany had the bans been repealed (Politico, 2020c). The resolution would end in a temporary export ban encompassing all members of the Union which had restricted the movements of medical- and protective equipment outside EU-borders under the Commission Implementing Regulation 2020/402 (European Commission, 2020b; Euractiv, 2020b). Ultimately the shortages of medical equipment have been alleviated after the Commission successfully managed to acquire under a long-awaited joint procurement agreement in which 25 of the 27 member states participated in (Euractiv, 2020c). In similar fashion, the Commission has managed to partially solve the issue of national border closures through the proposal and adoption of prioritized “Green Lanes” and EU-wide border navigation, thus keeping cross-border export-chains alive (European Commission, 2020c).

Further, early fiscal responses were proposed by the Commission in order to ease the impact of the socio-economic consequences wrought by the

pandemic (European Commission, 2020d). Commission president von der Leyen promised full flexibility in member states fiscal commitments and targets, stating:

“Today we propose maximum flexibility for our rules which will allow our

national governments to support everybody - their healthcare systems, staff as well as the people so severly affected by the crisis. I want to make sure that we respond to the human as well as socio-economic dimension of the Coronavirus pandemic in the best way possible.” (European Commission,

2020e)

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immediate economic cushioning for the member states (European Commission, 2020d).

When the death rates seemed to decline continually throughout the European continent by the beginning of April up until June, nations gradually began to ease their restrictive interventions and once again open up - giving the European governments and the EU some leeway and time to recoup (Euronews , 2020c). Prior to this the Commission, together with the

European Council, laid forth a joint roadmap for exit strategies Commission presented the Joint Roadmap towards lifting the COVID-19 containment

measures that would formalize the exit strategies of the member states. The

roadmap entailed:

“recommendations to Member States, with the goal of preserving public health while gradually lifting containment measures to restart community life and the economy. It is not a signal that containment measures can be lifted immediately but intends to inform Member States’ actions and provide a frame for ensuring EU-level and cross-border coordination, while

recognising the specificity of each Member State.” (European Commission and European Council, 2020 p.3.)

The purpose of the roadmap would be too coordinate the EU and its member states in order to minimize the consequences brought not only by the

pandemic itself, but the also the entailing socio-economic impact from the unilateral border- and containment measures – which had put the functioning of the Single market and the Schengen project at question:

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Single Market, in that whole sectors are closed down, connectivity is

significantly limited and international supply chains and people’s freedom of movement have been severely disrupted.” (European Commission and

European Council, 2020 p.2)

This roadmap has not been as fruitful as hoped for, as illustrated by the continuance of highly differing epidemiological strategies presented by the member states (Politico, 2020d. Euractiv, 2020d).

4.2 Resilience building within the Union

4.2.1 The Eurogroup package

In European context, the pandemic has shown to be a double-edged sword. On one side it has vastly impacted the public health of the European Union's citizens, remaining a constant threat and reminder that the situation can intensify even further, should the spreading not be adequately mitigated. With a majority of the member states' national healthcare capacities already strained to their limits, such an increase would be disastrous as argued by Greer and de Ruijter (2020) as well as Anderson, Mckee and Mossialos (2020). On the other hand, the imposition of strict confinement rules and border controls have proven to greatly impact the stability and potential of the European economies, as disclosed by the Commission (European Commission, 2020f). Meanwhile according to the same document, the unemployment rate throughout the continent would amount to 9% as a result of the impeded consumption and the halted productivity (European

Commission, 2020f).

In response to these economic aspects of the crisis, the Eurogroup had announced a €500 billion threefold strategy on the 16th of March

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(ECCL) available to all euro area sovereigns for financial support up to 2% of their respective GDP (Eurogroup, 2020). In addition the strategy included two more targeted measures, in which one of these entailed a €37 billion large investment package under the title “Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative” (CRII), which had been brought forth by the Commission

(Eurogroup, 2020). The CRII-package opened up for the use of still unallocated budgetary resources based in several cohesion and structural funds, redirecting them toward the EU member states and their most critical affected sectors (European Commission, 2020f). The last part of the three-pillared strategy consisted of, yet another Commission-proposed financial instrument intended to address the mounting socio-economic implications and employment disruptions brought about by the pandemic - “Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency” (SURE) (European Commission, 2020g; Euractiv2020e).

Nevertheless, the strategy had not been accepted without several

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Even though the latter of the two coalitions, being 14 members strong, had pressured the former to comply they were at a large fiscal disadvantage and stood most to gain from the agreement (Euractiv, 2020f, Politico, 2020f). The northern coalition made their position clear with the Dutch finance minister Hoekstra’s statement:

“Eurobonds is a thing I wasn’t OK with, I am not OK with and I will never be OK with.”, (Politico, 2020f).

Further conflicting points within the agreement had also caused

postponements of the strategy. For instance, there had been discussions regarding the practicality of the ESM and the conditions under which its credit could be used. The Dutch and Austrian government had demanded clear, country-specific conditions with coverage limited to that against the pandemic (Euractiv, 2020f, Politico, 2020f, Financial Times, 2020b).

Meanwhile, the Italian government had instead prompted, as stated by Italian finance minister Roberto Gualtieri, that:

“conditionality was off the table on the use of ESM financing” (Financial

Times, 2020b).

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foci being unemployment support but also including coverage within health sectors (Euractiv, 2020f, Euractiv, 2020g).

4.2.2 The multiannual financial framework

On the 23rd of April, the European Council held its fourth videoconference concerning the pandemic and its effects within the Union. During the meeting they commended the newly agreed Eurogroup relief package and presented the next step toward a comprehensive EU-level response:

“We also agreed to work towards establishing a recovery fund, which is needed and urgent. This fund shall be of a sufficient magnitude, targeted towards the sectors and geographical parts of Europe most affected, and be dedicated to dealing with this unprecedented crisis.

We have therefore tasked the Commission to analyse the exact needs and to urgently come up with a proposal that is commensurate with the challenge we are facing.” (European Council, 2020c)

About a month later on the 27th of May, the Commission had introduced the European Parliament with a proposal on the multiannual financial framework (MFF), the EU's long-term budget, set to run from 2021 to 2027.

Accompanying this a proposal named Next Generation EU (NGEU), a massive financial stimulus package aiming to encourage the crisis recovery, had also been brought to the table (European Commission, 2020f; European Commission, 2020h). The proposal was according to the Commission itself been an integral part in the comprehensive plan of the European response and recovery:

The united European response on Covid-19