Hizb ut-Tahrir: What Kind of Caliphate?

Hizb ut-Tahrir: What Kind of Caliphate?

Spring 2019 15 credits

Bachelor’s Thesis Word count: 13697 Number of pages: 38 Uppsala University

Department of Government Author: Albin Dahlander

Supervisor: Jonas Larsson Taghizade

Contents

1. Introduction ... 1

1.1 Founding of Hizb ut-Tahrir – Shaykh Taqi ud-Din an-Nabhani ... 2

1.2 Hizb ut-Tahrir today ... 3

1.3 Purpose of the study ... 3

2. Previous research ... 4

2.1 Previous research on Hizb ut-Tahrir ... 4

2.2 Previous research on Islamic rule ... 5

2.3 Hizb ut-Tahrir as a vanguard party ... 7

3. Method and material ... 9

3.1 Material ... 9

3.2 Method ... 9

3.3 Analytical framework – Ideal types of democracy and guardianship ... 10

3.3.1 Guardianship ... 10

3.3.2 Ideal type democracy as per Dahl ... 13

3.3.3 Type of rule ... 14

3.3.4 Method of assigning representatives ... 15

3.3.5 Role of the ruling entity ... 16

3.3.6 Role of the citizens ... 16

3.4 Operationalisation ... 16

3.4.1 Type of rule - How is the caliphate structured? ... 17

3.4.2 Method of assigning representatives – What does HT say about representation? ... 17

3.4.3 Role of the ruling entity – What is the role(s) of the ruling entity according to HT? ... 17

3.4.4 Role of the citizens – What does HT say about the role of the citizens? ... 17

4. Results ... 18

4.1 Type of rule - How is the caliphate structured? ... 18

4.1.1 The judiciary ... 18

4.1.2 Required conditions for being a caliph ... 19

4.2 The method of assigning representatives/rulers ... 19

4.2.1 The process of appointing the caliph ... 20

4.2.2 Removal of the caliph and accountability ... 21

4.3 What is the role of the ruling entity? ... 22

4.4 What is the role of the citizens? ... 23

4.5 What is said about representation? ... 24

5. Analysis ... 26

5.1 Type of rule ... 26

5.2 Method of assigning representatives/rulers ... 27

5.3 Role of the ruling entity ... 29

5.4 Role of the citizens ... 30

6. Conclusion ... 31

References ... 33

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1. Introduction

The party Hizb ut-Tahrir recently made headlines in Sweden after a campaign in several socioeconomically vulnerable areas in which it encouraged all Muslims to abstain from voting in the 2018 general elections. While some described this activity as a threat to democracy as a whole, perhaps our focus should be on the party’s target demographic. Democracy is, ideally, built on a system wherein all layers of society participate in the political process in an equal capacity, but this is rarely so. Consequently, one could argue that democracy as a whole is indeed threatened if one or more minority groups regularly show a lower turnout than the minority. With this said, one could pose the counterargument that focusing on the democratic system as a whole, in a macro-perspective, risks us losing focus on the segments of society which needs addressing.

Thus, the activities of HT risks undermining the democratic, and therefore political power, mainly among those segments of society which needs empowerment the most.

Sweden has grappled with the issue of integration after receiving a large number of Syrian refugees following the crisis in Syria. Partially due to government policy allowing refugees to choose where they wish to settle down instead of forcing a settlement, certain suburbs, often close to a major city, contain a disproportionate number of individuals that are themselves immigrants or of immigrant background. Although no official statistics are kept individuals’

religious identities in Sweden, a large portion of immigrants above and or refugees are from Muslim majority countries such as Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia. Asylum seekers from these four countries constituted 26% of all asylum seekers to Sweden from the year 2000 to 2018 (Migrationsverket. Asylsökande till Sverige 2000-2018).

Furthermore, participation in elections is lower overall among foreign-born individuals than native Swedes. Indeed, the discrepancy between voter turnout in the municipality in the capital city Stockholm with the highest turnout and the municipality with the lowest was 15.2% in the 2018 general elections (Valmyndigheten. 2018). Moreover, these numbers show that voter turnout can be related to socioeconomic status. The municipality with the second highest voter turnout in the Stockholm region; Danderyd, is the most well-educated

municipality in Sweden with 57% of its inhabitants possessing at least a bachelor’s degree (SCB, 2017). What is more, the municipality with the second smallest rate of voter turnout, 78,24% (Valmyndigheten. 2018); Botkyrka, contains a high number of foreign-born

individuals and is listed as an “especially vulnerable area” by the Swedish police. This means

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that the area has a high concentration of criminals, parallel societies exist in the area, people are less likely to testify in courts for fear of verbal or physical reprisals (NOA, 2017:10). All these facts combined means, in effect, that the interests of foreign-born individuals are less represented, making them a politically weaker demographic, despite having equal opportunity to participate in elections. If HT was to grow in size, further reducing the proportion of voters among already vulnerable groups in society, it risks reducing their political power even more.

Developing a deeper understanding of the group, then, is of both societal and academic interest.

1.1 Founding of Hizb ut-Tahrir – Shaykh Taqi ud-Din an-Nabhani

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, or the Islamic liberation party, is an Islamist political movement founded in the year 1953 in Jerusalem by the Al-Azhar educated Islamic scholar and jurist Taqiuddin an-Nabhani (Karagiannis. 2010:38). As a student in Cairo, Nabhani supposedly was in contact at times with the Muslim Brotherhood, but it is unclear if he ever was a

member of it or not. After his 1932 graduation, he went to the British mandate of Palestine to work as a teacher in Islamic legal science. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war would eventually lead to him fleeing Palestine, ending up and settling in Jordan where he worked as a lecturer in courses on Islamic sciences (ibid.). Sometime between his departure from Palestine and settling in Jordan, Nabhani was assured that the Arab world needed saving through a

vanguard party that could unite their interests and end the oppression of the west (ibid.:39).

Nabhani wrote many works during his lifetime critical of what he refers to as “the west” and

ideas that are emanating from it, such as capitalism and democracy. These two, in turn, are

seen as exploitative systems imposed upon the rest of the world for the benefit of the west

(Orofino, 2015). The word “liberation” in the party’s name refers to the liberation of the

exploited and oppressed peoples around the world, referring primarily to Muslims. The party,

as of writing, has branches around the world. Relevant to this study is that the party is active

in both Sweden and Denmark (Karagiannis. 2010:40). HT does not give out statistics on its

membership, and thus, it is not known how large or small the group is. One reason for this

secrecy is that the group is banned in several countries where it remains active. In some

countries, membership can lead to torture or even execution (Taji-Farouki, 1996:162ff). As a

consequence of this, estimates of the group’s numbers vary. Karagiannis (2010:72) claims

that HT has approximately 25000 core members and many more sympathizers in the central

Asian region. As for western Europe and the Americas region, the group likely enjoys its most

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substantial following in the UK with London as its base (Yilmaz, 2010:508). London is also where the groups publishing house, Khilafah publications, is active.

1.2 Hizb ut-Tahrir today

HT has expanded slowly and steadily since its founding and is now active on all the major continents of the world. It distributes a magazine, al-Khilafa, to its members in these regions and uses the internet to spread the party’s message throughout the world (Taji-Farouki, 1996:153). The party has also become increasingly active in western countries wherein it can enjoy a freedom of expression not found in the central-Asian countries where it has its base and core following (Karagiannis, 2010:58), (Taji-Farouki, 1996:153). The party also has a strong following in Jordan. This is partly because the country has a large Palestinian population, Palestine being the nation in which it was founded. Furthermore, the party was able to operate more openly and freely after Jordan launched its new political program of tolerance following rioting in 1989 (Taji-Farouki 1996:154ff).

1.3 Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study is to clarify what kind of ruling system that is envisioned in the writings of HT. The research question posed to answer the purpose is the following: Where does the ruling system of HT fall on a scale between ideal type guardianship and democracy?

At first glance, the answer to this is obvious. HT envisions an Islamic caliphate ruled by a caliph with sharia inspiring the judicial system. How, then, are we to classify such a state?

Surely it cannot be radically different from every current existing state system. Providing an answer to this question is important for several reasons and has important implications for people of different backgrounds in society.

The study will contribute to the literature of Islamic rule in general and on the growing mass of research on HT. The latter is especially important as little to no research of this kind has been conducted on the group as far as the author is aware. Secondly, by studying the kind of ruling system that HT propagates, we will deepen our knowledge about the kind of

democratic views that the group is teaching its members. This could be important in assessing how much of a threat the group poses to democratic values.

The method used to answer the question will be an ideal type analysis, the meaning of which will be expanded upon in a later section, although, a brief mention of why and what it is shall be discussed henceforth. I will use an ideal type of democracy and an ideal type of

guardianship. The two are in several ways diametrical opposites. Democracy is built on the

belief that the members of a specific group, be it citizens of the state or some other

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association, are about as equal and competent as anyone else as to what regards their interests.

Thus, the participation of every individual in the decision-making process is intrinsically valuable.

Guardianship, on the other hand, is built on the belief that there is no value to the quantity of opinion. Instead, matters of importance that concerns an association, be it a nation-state or a comedy club, should be decided upon by the most qualified individual(s). This is due to a foundational principle of guardianship, which is that specific individuals are more capable in terms of looking after the affairs of men by virtue of their genes, their biological superiority.

Thus, for the good of all citizens, these more qualified individuals should be vetted and educated in the art of ruling from an early age. Furthermore, this care shall be given to their offspring only if they prove to be equally or even more competent. This will ideally create an elite cadre that makes society better for everyone.

2. Previous research

2.1 Previous research on Hizb ut-Tahrir

Hanif (2012:202) points out that much of the current academic literature on HT has focused on HT as a political actor in the central Asian region, where it has been the most successful.

Other literature has focused on HT as a potentially dangerous political actor, acting as a steppingstone for more radical Islamist movements that encourage violence, such as al-Qaeda (ibid.). Despite some of these claims, the US government has affirmed that “[…] is continuing to monitor Hizb ut-Tahrir. Despite statements of governments of the region, the united states has found no clear ties between Hizb ut-Tahrir and terrorist activity. Hizb ut-Tahrir has not been proven to have involvement in or direct links to any recent acts of violence or terrorism.”

(Globalsecurity).

Baran (2005:68) argues that “HT is not itself a terrorist organization, but it can usefully be

thought of as a conveyor belt for terrorists. It indoctrinates individuals with radical ideology,

priming them for recruitment by more extreme organizations where they can take part in

actual operations.”. The author goes on to claim that HT serves as a major actor for the

radicalization of British youth and that individuals involved in the London bombings were

connected to a splinter group of HT (ibid.:69). Furthermore, Baran states that “Since HT

occupies a gray zone of militancy, with its activities involving more than the mere expression

of opinion but less than terrorism, regulating its activities poses a unique challenge to liberal

democracies.” (ibid.:70).

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Karagiannis (2010:103) claims, in concurrence with Hanif (2012) that: “There is a widespread perception, which has been partly fueled by the tragic events of 11 September 2001 that engaging political Islam is synonymous with the War against Terrorism.”. Not unsurprisingly, the USA:s military engagements in majority Muslim countries as a part of the war on terror has fuelled stereotypes and suspicion of “the other” on both sides of the conflict, for example, a study conducted by Gross & Sides (2013:596) on white non-Muslims in America showed that they, on average, view both Muslims in general and American-Muslims as more prone to being violent and more untrustworthy than other ethnic groups.

Nonetheless, research by Karagiannis (2010:112) on the group's central Asian branch has shown that it is opposed to using violence even under harsh governmental repression.

Likewise, despite sharing their ultimate goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate with groups such as al-Qaeda, HT has “[…] remained peaceful for more than 55 years […]”

(ibid.:104). Karagiannis (2010:112f) attributes HT’s history of nonviolence to its strong ideological cohesion. The group wants to establish the caliphate following in the footsteps of the prophet Muhammad who, instead of resorting to aggressive tactics against those who were in opposition, sought to win over the hearts and minds of those he encountered.

Consequently, the group expects to meet resistance from different corners of society as this was how the prophet was treated by polytheists and atheists when he first started to profess the religion of Islam. Moreover, the group withholds that wars and combat, in general, should only be waged once the nation has been built, and with that, under the command of an amir (ibid.).

The current analysis seeks to contribute to the literature on HT by providing clarification on the structure of its caliphal ruling system as envisioned in the texts of al-Nabhani. While there are many real-world examples of caliphates and so-called Islamic states to draw information from, they look vastly different from each other in reality. Iran and Saudi Arabia are, for example, two Islamic states. Aside from this label, the differences between them outweigh the similarities.

2.2 Previous research on Islamic rule

Lapidus (1992:14) identifies two so-called golden ages of Islam. Golden age refers to an

idealized point in time that is thought to be superior to what was before and what came after

it. The first golden age takes place during the time of the prophet Muhammad and the four

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rightly guided caliphs that ruled after him. This specific period in time is often talked about as the greatest period in time by Islamist movements that seek to rid society of its ills and

corruption by reverting to this golden age.

As Kandil & Aswānī (2012:140) mentions: “In Egypt, and across the Muslim world, Islamists had so far monopolized the power of nostalgia. When preaching about the future, they enticed their audience with recurrent references to an age that actually existed, the time of Prophet Muhammad and his Rightly Guided successors, a time of prosperity, justice and

predominance.”.

No doubt, the Prophet Muhammad was a statesman and a diplomat as well as a messenger of God. During his brief time as leader of the Muslim community in Medina, he served as a spiritual guide and head of state at the same time. Thus, from the very beginning, the religion of Islam was intertwined with a ruling apparatus (Lapidus, 1992:14). The Caliphs who came after him did not inherit prophethood. Instead, they had the duty to uphold and implement what was revealed and consequently put down in writing in the Qur’an. This time of spiritual richness and a just society came to an end in the eyes of many Muslims with the death of the last rightly guided Caliph, Ali (ibid.).

The second golden age came with the Ottoman Empire as an imperial Islamic power that spread the religion of Islam far and wide. In broad strokes, the role of the state differed from the first golden age in that it was separated from the religion but still poised to uphold it.

Thus, religion was a matter for individuals and practicing communities to carry on

(ibid.:16f). What then of the Islamic states of today? Lapidus (1992:19) argues that Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iran, and Pakistan are the only states that still cling to a notion of legitimacy as upholders of Islam. Despite this, they differ from the states of the abovementioned golden ages in that none of the states claim that their head of state is a caliph, the ruler of Muslims.

Saudi Arabia and Morocco are mentioned as being the closest to a caliphate as they are ruled by monarchs. They too differ as the monarchs’ power formally does not stretch past their respective nation-state borders; a concept foreign to the caliphates of the golden ages (ibid.:20).

As Lapidus points out, most Muslim societies throughout history did not strictly adhere to

Islam as the guiding principle for all life, private and public. Consequently, most Muslim

majority countries, as of today, are built on the grounds of a secular nation-state following the

post first and second world war era (Lapidus, 1992:21).

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Indeed, the concept of a caliphate was challenged by many Islamic thinkers during the 20

century. Among them is Ali Abd ar-Raziq. Ar-Raziq was an Egyptian theologian that had studied literature and philosophy both in Kairo and Oxford (Hedin, 2005:78f). According to ar-Raziq, there existed no evidence from the Qur’an nor hadith that proved the necessity of an Islamic caliphate. Aside from the first four caliphs who ruled after the prophet Muhammad, all others had come to power by force, carrying political motivations that diverged from Islam (ibid.:79). Consequently, ar-Raziq argues, there is no single ruling system in detail described by the Qur’an and hadith.

Thus, an Islamic state need not be modeled after the caliphates of the golden ages; instead, any state is legitimate in theory as long as it protects and upholds the religion of Islam.

Furthermore, ar-Raziq argued that there was no religious precedent for waging jihad in terms of waging war against unbelievers and the enemies of Islam. That such a thing had taken place in the past was only proof of how politically motivated leaders used religious scripture to justify expanding their sphere of influence. Jihad was to strive after becoming a better person and helping others with that same thing (ibid.:80).

Opponents of ar-Raziqs, at the time radical stance, maintained that there is only one, authentic form of Islamic rule. However, as Hedin (2005:81f) points out, if this was the case, only one unique Islamic state can exist at any given time. For example, which state is the real Islamic one between Iran and Saudi Arabia? The author goes on to mention that the only thing these states have in common is often the first sentence of their respective constitutions, which states that God is the highest of sovereigns. Thus, what comes after that sentence depends on how lawmakers interpreted Gods will when making the laws, influenced by societal, political, and cultural factors (ibid.:82).

2.3 Hizb ut-Tahrir as a vanguard party

Karagiannis (2010:48) draws parallels between HT’s party structure and recruitment

strategies with that of the Bolsheviks. This is of interest to the current study as Dahl (1989:53)

mentions Lenin and his ideas of a vanguard party as a modern incarnation of guardianship, as

opposed to the ideas Plato discussed centuries ago. As was discussed in section 2.3.1 on

guardianship, Lenin envisioned a small group of enlightened individuals that had been taught

extensively in the science of Marxism that would lead the workers of the world to a state of

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communism where no ills exist. Thus, for the time being, only a small amount of people was fit to rule as they had received the schooling for it, and who possessed the tools to cast off the ignorance that came with centuries of capitalist oppression (ibid.:53f)

Karagiannis (2010:48) states that: “Hizb ut-Tahrir operates through a network of underground committees and cells […] resembling those that the Bolshevik revolutionaries employed as the groundwork for their seizure of power in tsarist Russia in October 1917.”. At the lowest level of organization, the leader is called a mushrif. The mushrif is in charge of a local study circle that contains about five novices which serve to transfer the proper ideology to them.

One rung above the mushrif, we have the naqib who serves as leader and coordinator of a local district.

Thirdly, there is the provincial representative who goes by the name of Mu’tamad. The mu’tamad who can be responsible for a large area of operations, such as a whole nation or parts of it, oversees nation operations and takes orders directly from the person at the top of the pyramid, the amir, that is the leader of the international party (ibid.:48f). With the

organization structured this way, an infiltration at a lower level would not be able to do much harm or extract much information about the group as a whole as the separate cells only know about the local members.

He goes on to claim that the group’s founder, al-Nabhani, borrowed concepts from Lenin’s

vanguard party. Thus, the members of HT are the revolutionary clique that has received

proper training in the party’s ideology, which has prepared them for the coming of the

caliphate. Al-Nabhani mentions that the group must be united in understanding, which is

similar to Lenin’s idea of false consciousness in that most Muslims are perceived by the group

to live an improper and corrupt life as they do not understand that the only correct ruling

system for a Muslim to live under is a caliphate (ibid.:49f). Karagiannis attributes this to al-

Nabhani having come into contact with Lenin in the post-world war two period, as he was a

popular figure in third world countries during that time.

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3. Method and material

3.1 Material

My analysis will rely heavily on the book: The ruling system in Islam. The book outlines and describes in detail the various institutions of state and their roles in the caliphate. Granted the purpose of this study, this is a natural choice of literature for analysis. Previous research has shown that this book among others are used to introduce novices to the group, in a study conducted by Wali (2017) on the parties’ study circles and their effect on individual’s radicalization he states: “[…] the first phase of Halaqah was assigned to studying the book Nidham al-Islam (system of Islam).” (ibid.:114).

At the beginning of the study, I pondered the possibility of answering the research question by analyzing interviews given by core members of the group to model the caliphate after what members are saying today. This approach seemed inferior due to two main reasons. First of all, members rarely give interviews to people except for those who have gained the group's trust; thus, the availability of such material is hard to come by. Secondly, previous research has pointed out the ideological rigidity of the group, stemming from its founder’s extensive writings on the caliphate and various aspects of how the group should act in order to realize its goals.

3.2 Method

The method I will be using to analyze the material – ideal type analysis, is situated within a broader category of qualitative research, the main category being text analysis and the subcategory being qualitative descriptive text analysis. Esaiasson et al. (2017:136f) mention that there are, in broad strokes, two main strands of descriptive text analysis. The strand that is of relevance to this study is one of classification. With this type of analysis, we seek to

classify a particular phenomenon, political party, and government, among others, in well- defined categories in order to bring clarity to our description of reality (ibid.:136).

Esaiasson et al. (2017:137) argue that a theoretical construction constitutes the foundation of

qualitative text analysis with a classificatory purpose. The reason being the need for a point of

comparison when classifying something. How can we, for example, classify a political party

on a left to right-wing scale without clearly defining what constitutes a right- or left-wing

policy? The theoretical construction helps us to compare what we read and analyze with our

analytical tool of measurement. Ideal type analysis is a form of classificatory analysis that is

used in order to measures certain degrees or levels of something (ibid.:140).

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Most commonly associated with the German sociologist Max Weber, he called the concept of an ideal type as “[…] sketchy and therefore perhaps partially incorrect.” (Swedberg,

2018:182). Nonetheless, he stressed the importance of not mistaking the concepts used in researching reality with reality itself. On this note, it is worth reminding the reader of the fact that the current study will not be conducted on an actual state or nation. Instead, the materials used for analysis is the writings and publications by HT. Thus, the final results cannot provide more clarity than can be expected from a theoretical ruling system based on its description in theory. I argue that the study still is of relevance as it helps bring light as to what the Islamic state, according to HT, would look like were it to come to fruition.

Why then, use an ideal type analysis to study what kind of system HT envisions?

An ideal type or ideal type definition is an extreme and or complete version of something, meaning it does not exist in reality. Instead, we seek to clearly define what we mean by something by listing its defining characteristics, and thus, what is typical about it (ibid.). For example, if we were to put the label “liberal democracy” on a state, both parts need to be defined for it to be of academic value. What is the definition of democracy used? Moreover, what are the criteria for being more than that, namely a liberal democracy? With a definition and criteria in place, we may take our analysis even further, assigning the state a ranking on a spectrum of liberal democracies.

Esaiasson et al. (2017.:141) Mentions the usefulness of using two ideal types as a tool of measurement. This enables the researcher to place the unit of analysis on a scale, making the study more precise as it is possible, after the analysis, to conclude which of the two ideal types the object of analysis is closer to.

Nonetheless, some criticism of the method is warranted, especially given the object of

analysis. Firstly, an ideal-type analysis is being used to analyze written material that describes a caliphate. Thus, it can be argued that the study bears little relevance to reality as it deals to heavily with theoretical possibilities. Yet, as mentioned above, the method is still of use as it would help clarify what kind of political views that is being taught to new members of the group.

3.3 Analytical framework – Ideal types of democracy and guardianship 3.3.1 Guardianship

In his magnum opus, “Democracy and its critics” Dahl (1989) analyses democracy as a

political system and, viable contending alternatives to it. The two leading contenders, he

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proposes, are Guardianship and Anarchy. Dahl describes it as such: “Two kinds of objections to democracy are so fundamental that unless they can be satisfactorily met any further

exploration of the democratic idea would be futile.” (ibid.:37), that is, if it cannot be argued that democracy is the better ruling system of the three, we shall not denigrate ourselves by delving further into it. While exploring both guardianship and anarchy would be interesting, it is the former that is of interest to this study, and that will henceforth be discussed.

Guardianship, as described by Dahl, is the rule of the most competent individuals for the good of everyone (ibid.:52).

This form of government has been discussed in the past by philosophers such as Plato in his book “The Republic”, which serves as a basis for Dahl's version of Guardianship. To

elaborate on the introductory statement on guardianship, its proponents argue that rule by the majority, democracy, is an inferior system due to several reasons. One of them, the

proponents claim, is that people, in general, do not know much about governance and politics, how the polis is to be ruled, for instance. To put them in place to rule themselves and others, then, is, if not suboptimal, harmful. The population, the demos, would be better off were it to be ruled by those individuals most competent in the art of ruling.

As every individual is born with a unique genetic code and thus varies in his or her capabilities, mental and physical aptitude and talents, it would only be natural that those individuals fit to rule would do so (Dahl, 1989:52f). A proper analogy could be drawn

between two people that practice sprint. If both put in as much effort as the other, ate the same foods and followed the same routines, it is likely that one of them will be physically superior genetically and thus be the one most fit to sprint. Likewise, according to someone arguing for a rule of guardians, some individuals are bound to be more apt at managing state affairs than others.

Fast forwarding to the 20

century, Dahl (1989:54) brings up another historical example of

rule by guardians, namely Lenin’s vanguard party. This revolutionary party is to consist of

individuals that can help the working class achieve its common goal of liberation from the

capitalist oppression. With the liberation of the working class, what would follow is a

classless society where the means of production are collectively owned, in turn meaning that

oppression would disappear entirely, leading to the possibility of every individual pursuing

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his or her interests and realizing their full potential as human beings (ibid.). Despite playing a central role in achieving it, this utopia cannot be brought forth by the workers themselves.

They have been conditioned by exploitation and oppression in the capitalist system to a point where we cannot expect them to understand their wants, needs, and goals. Thus, what is needed, as described by Dahl in his interpretation of Lenin’s vision of the vanguard party is

“[…] a dedicated, incorruptible and organized group of revolutionaries, a vanguard who possess the knowledge and the commitment necessary to that task.” (Dahl, 1989:54).

This knowledge, then, can only be gained from what is called “the science of Marxism”.

Consequently, as the working class will realize the vanguard party is acting on behalf of their liberation, the workers will give it their silent consent. Guardianship can be summed up into a table as follows:

Table 1 Guardianship - Characteristics

Type of rule Consensual Authoritarian Method of assigning

representatives/rulers

Meritocracy

Role of the

ruling/representative entity

Ensuring the general good

Role of the citizens Support for, and loyalty towards the ruling class. Political complacency, utilizing their innate abilities and

competencies for the good of society.

I will now expand upon the definition and meaning of the characteristics. The consentual

authoritarian rule differs from pure dictatorships where the opposition is routinely silenced

through different means in that it entails some form of popular support. As outlined above, a

rule of guardians is not the same as rule by evil despots. In order to qualify as a guardianship,

the ruling system must be built around bringing up and funneling the ablest individuals to

positions of power. As this, in theory, would result in the best form of rule for all citizens, it is

only reasonable to assume that the masses ruled over would give direct or indirect consent,

despite lacking the personal representation that a vote constitutes in democratic nations.

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Moving on to the next column then, method of assigning rulers, a state with a ruling guardianship differs from systems such as monarchies in that those who rule may not be granted their positions because of their family background. Contrary to being a hereditary rule of elites, those individuals unfit to rule would be expelled from the upper echelons and placed in a position apt for their abilities.

The same is true for those in power. An individual may only be a guardian insofar as he or she remains capable of what it entails. Old age or crippling disease would disqualify the

previously most fit of guardians. As concerns the role of the state, it primarily exists to better the lives of the collective and seeing to the best of their interests. This is contrasted with a democratic state in that it is assumed that certain individuals are more capable of ruling and understanding the interests of others by their inherent abilities.

Lastly, the role of the citizens is to follow the guardians and remain loyal to them. This relates to Lenin’s idea of the vanguard party. For different reasons, we cannot expect the general population to be the judge of its own best interests. In the case of Lenin, this is because the workers have been conditioned by exploitation and repression for too long. This has made them blind and unaware of what is best for them, and thus, a party of enlightened and incorruptible individuals is needed to bring forth the liberation of the working class. More broadly applied, individuals that lack the capabilities to rule and conduct politics should accept being ruled over and look for other occupations or roles to be filled in a society which more aptly fits their unique abilities.

3.3.2 Ideal type democracy as per Dahl

What follows in this section will be a discussion and sketching of the ideal type of democracy as envisioned by Robert Dahl. The ideal type of democracy will be used along with ideal type guardianship as an analytical tool for the study. Dahl (1989:220f) distinguishes democracy from what he calls polyarchy. The former is the ideal type, and the latter is the existing form of rule in many nations that are commonly referred to as democracies. What follows is a theoretical framework containing the main characteristics of democracy:

Table 2 Operationalization

Type of rule Democratic

Method of assigning representatives/rulers

Popular preference

Role of the ruling/representative entity To carry out the will of the population

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Role of the citizens Actively choosing representatives, self- fulfillment

3.3.3 Type of rule

The category “type of rule” might be confusing to the reader as it implies control over

someone or something. In light of the criteria outlined above, it is to be understood as rule by the citizens for the citizens. This, in turn, entails that no political representative has more or less power than is granted to him or her by the citizens he or she represents. Consequently, this means that no one is ruled over; instead, the state and the citizen's representatives are tools for enacting and implementing collectively binding decisions, not for autonomous decision-making.

Any kind of democratic rule is fundamentally built on the idea that the members of a group, be it citizens of a nation-state deciding on a nationally binding piece of legislation or a group of friends deciding on which bowling alley to visit, are more or less equally qualified at making a decision and providing input on it insofar as they are affected by the decision.

This is what Dahl (1989:31) calls the “Strong Principle of Equality” and defines it thus: “The members believe that no single member, and no minority of members, is so definitely better qualified to rule that the one or the few should be permitted to rule over the entire association.

They believe, on the contrary, that all the members of the association are adequately qualified to participate on an equal footing with the others in the process of governing the association.”.

Furthermore, Dahl claims that democratic rule tends to produce the overall best possible system of rule for several reasons.

Underlying this reasoning is what is described as the idea of intrinsic equality, which is the core of, among others, the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states in article 1 that: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” (United Nations, 2015:4). According to Dahl, similar ideas have been around for a long time in different societies in all parts of the world, but gained traction with the Abrahamitic religions of Islam, Christianity and Judaism which states that all humans were created equal by God (Dahl, 1989:85f).

Keeping this in mind, a proponent of democracy would go further than stating that all humans

are of equal worth and that this is sufficient for the democratic system, for it could be argued

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that if this holds, the best way to govern would be through a system of guardianship, so that all humans could enjoy living in the best possible governed state lead by those who are the most competent in matters of ruling. Not only would all citizens be equal in the ideal

democratic state, but they would also, on the premise of this statement, be the best judges of their interests.

In summary, the democratic system of rule is built on the foundation that all humans are of equal worth from birth, that no single individual or small group of individuals are so much more capable than their peers that they should be granted the power of making collectively binding decisions and lastly, that no one may, on legitimate grounds, claim that they are the better judge of the personal interests of any one individual as this insight is impossible to attain without being the person.

3.3.4 Method of assigning representatives

As for assigning representatives instead of holding direct elections, this is a necessity in any larger association as gathering tens of thousands or more in one place to make their voice heard would be near-impossible and wholly impractical in reality. Even in ancient Athens, often called the birthplace of democracy, assembling all eligible citizens to participate in the political process directly was starting to become problematic when they started to number approximately forty thousand citizens (Dahl, 1989:16f).

Dahl describes it as such: “Once the locus of democracy shifted to the national state, the logic of political equality, now applied to countries enormously greater than the city-state, clearly implied that most legislation would have to be enacted not by the assembled citizens but by their elected representatives.”. Nonetheless, in an ideal type of democracy, every citizen would be his or her representative.

Seemingly impossible in real life, one could imagine a one hundred percent digitally

integrated democratic state wherein decisions could be brought up on the agenda and voted on by every citizen, emulating the idealized democracy of the ancient city-state of Athens. Thus, one could choose to represent oneself in all matters of concern regarding issues of

government. With that said, it should be within the powers of a citizen to delegate his or her

vote to someone they trust would carry out their will. Forcing every individual to be his/her

representative would not be part of the ideal democratic state. Consequently, representation

would still be mandated through popular preference insofar as an individual or group of

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individuals are within their rights to delegate their voices to someone else. These individuals may withdraw their given mandate at any time they see fit.

3.3.5 Role of the ruling entity

The role of the “ruling” entity is mainly to ensure the quality of procedures by which binding decisions go through all instances of government and become collectively binding. This includes the rigorous practice of making sure that any decisions that are on their way to the final stage may be altered and revised at any level and also completely retracted if it were to be in the interest of the citizenry.

This does not mean that each and everyone has a veto on all decisions, being able to block them at any time, but if a majority of eligible citizens should decide on the decision being retracted, this must be done. Thus, the ruling entity(ies) never has the mandate to enact binding decisions that exceed the power granted to them by the citizens.

To summarize the role of the ruling system: it is to organize the process through which items are brought up on the agenda and consequently voted on. Furthermore, the system, however it may be structured and who or what constitutes it, is only ever a servant of the citizenry and could never act autonomously.

3.3.6 Role of the citizens

The citizens are the rulers and the ruled at the same time. All individuals may choose to participate in politics and matter of governance as much as he or she wants to do. With that said, it is assumed that the citizens of a nation or the members of a particular association want to participate and have their voice heard in decision-making processes if the decision could affect them in any way.

Furthermore, the citizens in the ideal-type democracy are the ones who decide on which matters should be put on the agenda. Additionally, it is the role of the citizens to choose representatives as they see fit actively and to dismiss those who are deemed undesirable. The condition of enlightened understanding would also require that the citizens actively seek out information about the nations political system and scrutinize the actions of elected

representatives. Ideally, all eligible citizens should, by their own free will, reach a level of understanding of the political system so that they know each part of the decision-making process and know precisely how to hold representatives responsible and lastly, how to affect the agenda.

3.4 Operationalisation

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Table 3 Operationalization

Type of rule How is the caliphate structured?

Method of assigning representatives

What does HT say about representation?

Role of the ruling entity What is the role(s) of the ruling entity, according to HT?

Role of the citizens What does HT say about the role of the citizens?

3.4.1 Type of rule - How is the caliphate structured?

This question aims to encompass the overarching structure of the caliphate. By this, I am referring to the institutions and departments that constitute the ruling apparatus. If this question were to be asked of the ruling system of America, for example, one would discuss the executive branch, judiciary branch, legislative branch and, moreover, all related

subordinated departments and their respective functions. This is important so as to draw the framework in which the ruling entity, the citizens, and representatives act within when

conducting political matters. Thus, when classifying information regarding the structure of the caliphate from the object of analysis, all information regarding the overarching structure will 3.4.2 Method of assigning representatives – What does HT say about representation?

This question is intended to assist in finding sections of the material of analysis that treats the matter of representation in the caliphate. Furthermore, not finding information regarding representation is of equal interest as it would inform us about HT’s stance on political representation. It is safe to assume that it is not regarded as important if little to nothing is mentioned of it.

3.4.3 Role of the ruling entity – What is the role(s) of the ruling entity according to HT?

With this question, we seek to gather the information that treats the role of the ruling entity in the caliphal system as envisioned by HT. What kind of powers should it exercise and why?

What is important for the ruler to do in the Islamic state?

3.4.4 Role of the citizens – What does HT say about the role of the citizens?

By role of the citizens here is mainly meant their role in the political system. What can an

individual or a group of people do to participate in politics? Are they able to exercise any

power, or are they mostly left out of the ‘corridors of power’? As was briefly discussed in

section 2.4.2, little or no information about this would also be of value as it signals the

unimportance of popular participation in politics.

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4. Results

4.1 Type of rule - How is the caliphate structured?

A quick opening remark of the question is in order. The ruling system which HT propagates is an Islamic state or a caliphate, the two being synonyms. This question deals with the

overarching institutions of the state, to use a metaphor; it is the skeleton of it or the base. As Hizb ut-Tahrir (1996:12) states: “Since Islam is an ideology that covers the state, society, and life as a whole, the ruling becomes part of it, and the Muslims are commanded to implement this ruling by establishing the state, i.e., to govern by the Islamic laws.”.

The caliphate is a ruling system that differs from that system which is used in a nation-state. It is a sovereign entity that is not strictly defined by borders and is considered the only

legitimate authority for all Muslims around the world (ibid.:35). The entity that is at the top of this ruling system is the divine laws passed down by God in the Qur’an through the prophet Mohammad. This also includes the hadith and consensus of the community, the umma. Thus, sovereignty in a caliphate does not belong to the people nor the caliph; it belongs to the holy scripture.

4.1.1 The judiciary

The judiciary of the caliphate is complex, and there is no room for describing it in great detail here. Nonetheless, a particular institution is of interest to this study, namely the court of unjust acts. The judge of the court of unjust acts is the only person with the power to have the Caliph removed after he has been granted office (ibid.:220f). Furthermore, the judge of the court of unjust acts may remove any of the caliph’s assistants and appointed governors. At a glance, this institution seems like one of the few instances that can keep checks on the caliph’s

powers, and this is so in theory. The issue is that this judge is appointed by the caliph himself, and nothing is said about prohibitions to this position with regards to having a personal relationship with the caliph.

Thus, it seems unlikely that a caliph would appoint a judge to this position that holds an unfavorable opinion of him and so the only institution that can have the caliph removed is also under his complete control. Indeed, the caliph may have the judge of the court of unjust acts dismissed or replaced at any time, except for when a process of removing him has started.

Still, the caliph may, in anticipation of an investigative process against him, have the judge of

the court of unjust acts removed and replaced with a loyal one.

19 4.1.2 Required conditions for being a caliph

The man whose duty it is to enforce and spread the word of Islam is the caliph, whose specific role and obligations will be discussed in the next section. In order to candidate for and to become a caliph, one must be valid according to seven different conditions (ibid.:55). These conditions are the following:

I: The caliph must be a Muslim.

II: The caliph must be a man. This condition is justified by a hadith on the prophet saying that

“people who appoint a woman as their leader will never succeed.” (ibid.:57).

III: The caliph must be mature. This entails that he is not a child, although no specific age requirement is given.

IV: The caliph must be sane. This entails that he does not suffer from any prohibitive mental condition that could hinder his ability to enforce the laws of God.

V: The caliph must be a just person.

VI: The caliph must be a free man. This means that a slave cannot aspire to the post of the caliph as he would be too restricted by his slavery to carry out the necessary duties properly.

VII: The seventh and final condition state that the caliph must be able and skilled in carrying out his duty. This condition can be said to sum up all the previous ones, in order to be a proper caliph, then, one must be a just sane mature free Muslim man competent enough to fulfill his duties.

Any Person who satisfies all the seven necessary conditions may thus aspire to the position of caliph (ibid.:76).

4.2 The method of assigning representatives/rulers

The proceedings by which this process is carried out can differ according to the situation.

Hizb ut-Tahrir (1996:82) mentions five different processes.

I: In the first kind of process, the caliph is nominated by expert opinion. After the death or resignation of the caliph,

“A multitude from the people in the center (capital) of the Khilafah state, or the influential

people there, or those who represent the majority of the Muslims, or the best prominent

people qualified for the post of the Khilafah. They may meet after the death of the Khaleefah

or his resignation or dismissal and nominate one or more persons exclusively for the position

of Khaleefah, then they choose one of them, in any style they see fit.” (ibid.). This way of

appointment relies on experts and “those who represent the majority of Muslims”, yet no

information is given about who these people are, that represents the majority of Muslims. The

phrase indicates approval of guardianship in the sense that certain people are considered

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representative of a large number of people and that there are experts who know better than the average person about who should be appointed caliph.

II: The second process involves the caliph more. He may, when he feels he is close to dying, consult people around him considered competent, about who would be apt for the position and by relying on their opinions nominate a person for the post of caliph (ibid.:86).

III: A caliph in the process of dying may put forth any number of candidates for his post without consulting expert opinion or the people (ibid.:88).

IV: If none of the three processes above were initiated, a group of ordinary people or experts may approach a suitable man and ask him to candidate for the position of caliph (ibid.:92).

V: The fifth and final process entails a citizens’ council by the name of shura appointing valid candidates for the post of the caliph. These candidates will be put on a list that is announced to the citizens at which point a vote will take place. The voting is conducted either by the citizens’ council or by the Muslim population. The person with the largest number of votes is then put forth as the final candidate for the post of caliph (ibid.:93).

These are the processes through which a person can be nominated for the post of the caliph.

With that, a nomination does not mean being appointed.

4.2.1 The process of appointing the caliph

The caliph is appointed by the Bay’ah of the Muslims, roughly translating into a pledge of allegiance (ibid.:62f). This pledge is similar to a vote in a democratic state. Furthermore, a pledge of allegiance must be given in a consensual manner, if it is given under duress or through threatening someone, it is considered illegitimate (ibid.:63).

The pledge of allegiance may only be given by Muslims. Furthermore, the appointment of a caliph does not require that a majority pledge their allegiance to him. In theory, a small number of people pledging their allegiance to a candidate could suffice to make him caliph.

This on the condition that no protests are made about the candidate from the rest of the

community. Thus, consent is given through a pledge of allegiance or by remaining silent. If

five people pledged allegiance to a candidate, and the rest of the community remained silent

on the candidate’s appointment, this would count as having reached consensus (ibid.:69).

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The process of appointing the caliph is democratic but exclusionary, as only Muslims may pledge their allegiance. Although it differs from candidacy to become a caliph, in that both male and female Muslims have an equal right to give their vote. Furthermore, Hizb ut-Tahrir (1993:69) states that: “[…] every Muslim should be able to participate in appointing the Khaleefah, by genuinely enabling him to do so.”. Thus, it is the right of every citizen of the Islamic state, meaning every Muslim, to be able to cast his or her vote regarding who should be caliph. While this is not enough to qualify the Islamic state of HT as a democracy as per Dahl, it does indicate active participation by the citizenry as important.

4.2.2 Removal of the caliph and accountability

Once a caliph has been chosen, he may be removed from office if any of these three conditions are met:

I: If the caliph changes his religion from Islam to another, or if he becomes an atheist, he will be immediately removed from his post and thereafter killed (ibid.:118).

II: If the caliph's mental condition deteriorates to a point where he cannot function in his capacity as caliph anymore, he is stripped of all his powers and removed from the post (ibid.:119).

III: If the caliph is rendered immobile by being jailed by a foreign power and the possibility of freeing him is unlikely, he will immediately be stripped off his powers (ibid.:).

There are an additional five conditions that warrant the removal of the caliph. If any of these conditions are met, a court may remove the caliph from power.

I: If the caliph were to become unjust for any reason, he would be suspect to investigations by a court which may decide to remove him from his position.

II: If the caliph becomes a female or becomes feminine, a court may decide to have him removed. As stated before, being a man is a necessary condition for candidacy. Thus, femininity is grounds for being removed.

III: If the caliph contracts a mental illness that hinders him from performing his duties, a court

may have him removed.

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IV: If the caliph becomes seriously injured or physically disabled for any reason, a court may have him removed if he is unable to fulfill his duties.

V: If the caliph becomes easily influence or swayed by close friends and family, a court may have him removed (ibid.:120f).

4.3 What is the role of the ruling entity?

As previously mentioned, the ruling entity in the caliphate is the caliph. He is chosen through a pledge of allegiance from the ummah, meaning the citizens of the caliphate.

As is stated in Hizb ut-Tahrir (1996:31): “He is a representative of the Ummah in ruling and power, where the Ummah selects him and gives him the pledge of allegiance willingly so as to implement on her the shar’a of Allah. He is restricted in all his actions, judgments and

looking after the affairs of the Ummah and her interests by the divine rule.”. Thus, the caliph is the legislator of the state, but he may only legislate insofar as it relates to what HT

considers the word of God: The Qur’an, the hadith, and Sunnah. What is more, once the caliph is in office, his duty is not to represent those who pledged their allegiance to him.

Rather, he must legislate and rule according to the word of God.

In theory, the caliph is the tool by which the people are enabled to live in an Islamic state, and not the one who rules over them. He is merely to legislate to the best of his abilities and thus keeping the ummah content. Nonetheless, the caliph does possess vast powers in office, presumably to make him an effective ruler.

The caliph decides on all foreign- and domestic policies in the caliphate. He is the supreme commander of the army and in charge of all military affairs. He is the one who appoints and dismisses ambassadors. Furthermore, he is responsible for the caliphates budget. As can be imagined, one person doing all this would be difficult in all but the smallest of state

constellations. Thus, he also has the power to, and is responsible for, appointing representatives with different roles (ibid.:104).

The assistants are of two types: delegated assistants and executive assistants. The caliph may

appoint a delegated assistant who must be Muslim, free, sane, mal, and just. Once given this

role, the delegated assistant is given all the powers of the caliph, except for the power to

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appoint other assistants and to remove the caliph. Thus, the delegated assistant is responsible before the caliph, and he may be removed or replaced at any time in case of misconduct (ibid.:145f).

It is stressed that the delegated assistant is not allowed to look over a specific department in the caliphate. He has to conduct general matters like the caliph, and he has to report all his actions back to the caliph. The reason given for this is that the caliphate, unlike a democratic state, has a central power and does not allow for specific delegations that would reduce the power of the caliph. It is debatable whether this would remain so in reality, as ruling is complex and requires a wide range of expertise.

Nonetheless, Hizb ut-Tahrir (1996:146) writes that: “This reality of the assistant or the Wazir in Shari’ah terms is totally different to the reality of the ministry in the democratic system.”.

In a later paragraph, the following is written: “The Mu’awin should also be from the competent people in the duties of ruling, in order to be able to assist the Khaleefah in shouldering the tasks of the Khilafah and the responsibility of ruling and authority.”

(ibid.:149). Although the writer of the text does not elaborate on who the “competent people in the duties of ruling” are, it is a preference of competence in a particular field, something which bears a resemblance to a guardian of sorts.

4.4 What is the role of the citizens?

Despite the vast powers of the caliph and his appointed ministers, the citizens of the Caliphate are encouraged to participate in the political life regarding some issues and are required to participate actively in others. All citizens, male, female, Muslim and non-Muslim, are allowed to, and encouraged to hold the caliph and any of his ministers accountable for his or their deeds if they are unjust or sinful (ibid.:238).

While the people are not allowed to remove the caliph from his office, they have the mandate

to remove local rulers, called wulah, amil and amir if they are discontent by their handling of

local affairs (ibid.:261). Furthermore, the Muslims must “speak truth to the ruler” as it is

stated by Hizb ut-Tahrir (1996:263): “‘The best of Jihad is a word of truth before a tyrant

ruler.’ This is a text regarding the censure of the ruler and the obligation of uttering the word

of truth in his face, considering it as the best form of Jihad.”.

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Thus, it is obligatory for the Muslims to call out those in power if they abuse it or act unjustly.

This is done through an institution called the people's council, which will be discussed in the next section on representation. Nonetheless, the orders and laws drafted and implemented by the caliph must be obeyed even if they are considered unjust (ibid.:277). The only exception to this rule is if he orders something which is flagrant disbelief (ibid.:280). The exact

definition of flagrant disbelief and what it encompasses is not expanded upon. At first glance, it seems contradictory that it is an obligatory duty upon the Muslims to hold the caliph

accountable if he acts unjust or commits evil deeds while at the same time requiring complete obedience towards him, except in the case of him showing flagrant disbelief.

This contradiction is explained as follows: “Allah ordered the Muslims to hold their rulers accountable and strongly commanded them to challenge them if they withheld the citizens’

rights, neglected their duties towards them, ignored any of the citizens affairs, violated the rules of Islam or ruled by other than that which Allah has revealed.”

And: “The Messenger of Allah has ordered showing the disapproval toward the ruler and has made this obligatory by any possible means on condition that it is without fighting, i.e., without the use of the sword unless he showed open kufr by the tongue by saying something, or by the heart if one were not able to use the hand or tongue. He considered the one who does not disown the wrong deed as being an accomplice to the ruler in the sin, for he said if anyone approved of their bad deeds and imitated them he would be doomed and would not escape the blame and the sin.” (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 1996:284).

Thus, the Muslims must call out the caliph on matters as mentioned in the quote above but are not entitled to have him removed or to disobey him.

4.5 What is said about representation?

The caliphate contains what is called a people’s council or the council of the ummah. This is

an institution containing elected representatives with the primary role of representing the

voice of the people and conveying it to the caliph (ibid.:244). As it is not an institution with a

mandate to decide on matters of ruling, it is permissible for women and non-believers to

participate in the people’s council (ibid.:246). The people’s council may provide its opinion

on any matter and the caliph may if he wants to, consult the people’s council on any matter he

pleases. The opinion of the people’s council does not have any executive power over the

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caliph and matters of ruling in the caliphate unless the caliph chooses to adopt its opinion on a matter, in which case it would become binding (ibid.:245f). This comes with an exception in

“[…] those matters that do not require study or scrutiny.” (ibid.:245).

Furthermore, it is stated that: “The Khaleefah has to consult the Council and the Council has the right to advise him in the practical matters and actions that do not require investigation and scrutiny such as the matters of ruling, education, health, economy, trading, industry, farming and the like. The opinion of the Council in these matters is binding.” (ibid.:249f), moreover, “[…] the intellectual and the technical matters together with the finance, army and foreign affairs are referred to the opinions of the experts and the professionals without giving any weight to the opinion of the people whether they were minority or majority.” (ibid.:252f).

From these quotes, we may infer that the people’s council – the only institution which represents the citizens, only has power over matters that requires no expertise or specialized knowledge.

Yet, Hizb ut-Tahrir (1996:260) states that: “The Council of the Ummah reserves the right to express discontent towards the Wulah or the ‘Aamileen. Its opinion in such case would be binding and the Khaleefah should dismiss them at once.”,

and, furthermore: “The Muslim members of the Council have the right to restrict the nomination of candidates for the Khilafah. Their opinion in such a matter is binding, and candidates other than those put forward by the Council should accordingly not be

considered.”.

It is quite remarkable that the people’s council is the most important voice when it comes to assigning a new caliph. Firstly, its opinion on matters requiring expertise is regarded as unimportant, yet, the people are tasked with vetting the right candidates for the office of the caliph which comes with more or less limitless powers over the caliphate and is the final instance in all matters of the state.

Secondly, it would seem that the structure of this arrangement is self-contradictory as it seeks

to keep the general population away from “important” matters, yet, it alone chooses which

candidates are to run for the office of the caliph, an office which in theory requires more

expertise and knowledge of state affairs than any one expert could possess.

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5. Analysis

5.1 Type of rule

I will now compare the overarching structure of the caliphate with the ideal types of

democracy and guardianship. To start with the caliph, he is considered the head of state and the state at the same time. Thus, he can shape its form and appoint ministers with the same power as him. Once in office, the caliph cannot be removed except in rare circumstances, and with that only by a judge which he appointed and can remove at will. As was discussed in section 4.1.3, 4.1.4 and, 4.4, a caliphal candidate must receive the pledge of allegiance from the citizens in order to become a caliph. Thus, choosing a caliph is the role and right of the Muslims, and any Muslim which meets the criteria outlined in 4.1.2 may choose to candidate and seek the office of the caliph.

With that said, there is a significant difference between the caliph and a head of state in a democracy. The caliph and in extension, the state as well, is not tasked with representing the people of the caliphate, nor is it the role of the two. It is their role to implement Gods word in the caliphate and to uphold it through the various institutions of the state. Furthermore, the people must obey the caliph and his ministers once he is in office no matter how tyrannical he is unless he commits an act of flagrant disbelief or orders the citizens to commit such acts. As long as the caliph implements the word of God, he cannot be removed, and as the Islamic state is not an extension of the voice of the people as in a democratic state, it is not in their power to do so.

Moreover, it is not necessarily the duty of the Islamic state to act according to what the citizens want and what they feel they need. Indeed, one of the reasons HT opposes democracy is that the party believes the Muslims needs guidance from a righteous caliph, lest they

commit sins and live confused lives which do not suit them.

Furthermore, the personal freedoms that usually come with the democratic ruling system are described as such: “One of the severest afflictions brought to humanity is the idea of general freedoms initiated by the democratic system. This idea caused nothing but disaster for humankind and societal decadence in democratic countries to a level lower than that of animals.” (Zalloom, 1995:14).

Thus, if personal freedoms lead to inferior outcomes, they must be stifled, and that is ultimately what the Islamic state is built to do – make sure the Muslims live “proper” lives.

Consequently, the caliphal system of rule is not much different from the ideal type of