Expanding Our Concept
of 'Free Will'
A Case for the Development of Eliminativist
Revisionism
By: Diana Svensk Mentor: Christian Loew
The Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies Course: Filosofi C
Abstract
This paper puts forth the thesis that free will skeptics should be motivated to develop revisionist eliminativist accounts of free will. As a starting point for this argument, it discusses
and expands upon Shaun Nichols (2007) modeling of our reactive attitudes in narrow and wide psychological profiles. Utilizing this descriptive and prescriptive thesis, the paper then puts forth two main claims: 1. that revisionism is likely to produce our best descriptive accounts of free will beliefs, and 2. that it is plausible that eliminativist revisionist is likely to produce our best
prescriptive account of free will, as it is can capture some of the value in our “narrow
Table of Contents
1. Introduction: Why Eliminativist Revisionism Deserves Our Attention...1
2. Background...4
2.1
Conventional Accounts of Free Will & Historical Debate...42.2
Revisionsim...52.3
Eliminativist Revisionism...73. The Descriptive Question...8
3.1 Narrow And Wide Psychological Profile...8
3.2
The Descriptive Hum Drum Thesis...93.3
The Narrow And Wide Psychological Profiles In Our Cultural Context...124. The Prescriptive Question...13
4.1
The Prescriptive Hum Drum Thesis...134.2
“Business as Usual”? The Prescriptive Question and the Looming Subterfuge....185. Discussion: Challenges & Possible Starting Points For Eliminativist Revisionists...20
5.1
The Challenge of Fixing Our Borders...205.2
Fixing The Borders #1: The Psychological Profiles as Starting Points...215.3
Fixing The Borders #2: The Practical Implications of Space-Creation...236. Conclusions...23
1. 1
.Introduction: Why Eliminativist Revisionism Deserves Our
Attention
I remember the first time I came across the idea that we may not have free will. I was 22 and writing a paper for a class at Komvux in Stockholm (the Swedish institution where adults can acquire a high school degree). My paper had to do with liberalism and through my web searches I came across information about an upcoming philosophy seminar in Stockholm. The seminar was set to discuss the “ongoing question” of free will. This was the first time I learned that free will was something that could be questioned. Moreover, it was the first time I learned that there exists a non-insignificant amount of people [philosophers] who apparently do. At the time, this confounded me. Not because it presented a threat to my (then) fiercely liberal worldview; but because I found it bemusing. However, it didn't take long for the novelty to wear off: I was so confident in my own experience of free will, that I quickly decided that the discussion must have no-to-little real-life applications. Thus, people who engaged with it, to me, were looking to create issues where there were none: they were, simply put
“världsfrånvända” - a Swedish word which describe people who are seen as turned away from the
world.
The question is: what was it back then that made me so quick to brush off an idea which later, through my philosophy studies, I found important and interesting enough to dedicate the larger part of my senior year researching? The truth is pretty straightforward: back then, I had an incredibly strong
feeling of having free will. Funny enough, had I been hard pressed to answer what I thought “free will”
was, I probably wouldn't have been able to. Yet the idea that I did not have some ultimate overriding power of will when it came to my decisions, was a clenched fist around an otherwise elusive concept. One could say I had faith in free will.
Later, as a philosophy student at University, I was forced to confront my muddled free will-beliefs, and I turned to hard incompatibalism: it made perfect sense that there couldn't exist any reference-property for what I had formerly experienced as an ability to override the forces in my external (and internal) world. However, as I began researching free will skepticism for this very paper, I became conflicted. Although there were much about skeptic optimism1 which appeared true, there also seemed to exist an 1 Optimism entails the view that we don't have the type of free will required for moral responsibility, but that re-arranging
unreasonable expectation to conform human beliefs into something that was neatly philosophically uniform. After I had wrapped up my prep-research for this paper, thus, I began doubting my skepticism. I still had the intuition that key moral prescriptions in skeptic accounts was “right,” and non-negotiable. However, I now had acquired two more equally strong intuitions: firstly, that descriptive-prescriptive convergence of free will beliefs are implausible2, and secondly, that conventional accounts of free will3 are unable to capture the full scope of this psychological reality. The only account of free will that seemed to be able to square with my intuitions, was eliminativist revisionism: the only problem was, this account was barely ever mentioned in the free will literature, and when it was mentioned, it was only referred to as a possibility – and never an actuality. Thus, I became interested in the development of eliminativist revisionism.
In this paper, I attempt to present a case for why free will skeptics ought to be interested in the development of eliminativist revisionism. The arguments I present here will mainly be in direct
conversation with Shaun Nichols' (2007) article A Naturalistic Defense of The Reactive Attitudes. This may seem like a round-about way to argue in favor of eliminativist revisionism, given that Nichols' own account of free will is conventional compatibalist4. However, as of now, revisionism is an outlier
in the free will literature - and the idea of eliminativist revisionism is virtually unheard of. Thus, the pursuit of my thesis required me to indirectly consult an opposing view. The reason I choose Nichols' article is because I think his descriptive account of our psychological landscapes best captures the intuitions which led me to believe there is a need for eliminativist revisionism. Though our paths diverge on the prescriptive question, Nichols' account still usefully unveils some reasons why I think eliminativist revisionism potentially has advantages over other prescriptive account of free will.
Following a brief description of background information in chapter 2, I use the first part of my investigation, sections 3.1-3.2, to trace Nichols' (2007) claims regarding “the descriptive question.” I begin by reviewing Nichols' usage of 'wide' and 'narrow' psychological profiles, and lend my support to
2 in other words, that what we do believe about free will can align with what we ought to believe about free will 3 See definition section 2.1 (forthcoming)
what I call his “descriptive hum drum thesis.” In these sections, I also posit that the “descriptive hum drum thesis” cannot be captured by conventional accounts of free will, and how this supports that our best diagnostic account of free will is likely going to be revisionist. Lastly, in section 3.3, I attempt to expand on Nichols descriptive thesis by suggesting some features which perhaps should have been more emphasized in it.
In the following chapter (chapter 4), I move – alongside Nichols - from “the descriptive question” to “the prescriptive question.” In this part of his paper, Nichols (2007) claims that as a prescriptive account of free will, “the hum drum thesis” will likely yield better (consequentialist) outcomes than skeptical accounts. He also argues that the “intuitive pull” of the fairness argument is not substantiated enough to show a similar yield in utility. In my response to these claims, I argue two points: 1. The utility of the attitudes in our narrow psychological profile can be captured by an eliminativist
revisionist account and 2. The potential utility of the fairness argument on a societal level is unmoved by the “moral anger” in our narrow psychological profile. I end this chapter in section 4.4, by
discussing some other issues with “the prescriptive hum drum thesis,” which may put its overall utility into question. I also speculate on whether eliminativist revisionism would be better equipped to
respond to these concerns.
Important to note in the reading of this paper is that it is assumed that some of the prescriptions of free will skepticism are morally desirable, such as “the fairness argument.” In order to stay focused on the topic of revisionist eliminativism, my defense of said argument has been kept fairly brief. However, a more encompassing, positive account of eliminativist revisionism would arguably have an interest in developing this defense further - as well as clearly define the areas of their accounts which are revisionist, and which are more “orthodox.” This is a sizable task that I am unable to pursue in full here. Instead, the purpose of this paper is to contribute to this task in a more modest way, by illustrating why eliminativist revisionism is a position worth considering. Thus, it is my hope that by the end of this paper, I have made clear why the answer to the question: should free will skeptics be motivated to
develop eliminativist revisionist accounts of free will? Is “yes.”
attempt to put forth an account of free will [or, rather lack thereof] which better capture the scope of our psychological realities (in ways conventional accounts of free will are not able to). In other words, a skeptic concept of “free will” which ultimately face the world we do live in.
2. Background
In this chapter I will briefly review the various free will accounts which revisionist eliminativism is positioned within. I will begin by introducing the term conventional accounts of free will, and their historical importance. I will then define what I take revisionism to be, and what I call its “two basic claims.” Lastly, I will provide an outline for revisionist eliminativism, and how it distinguishes itself from its conventional counterpart.
2.1 Conventional Accounts of Free Will & Historical Debate
For a long time, the free will debate was dominated by two main positions: Firstly, 'compatibalism': the idea that free will is compatible with determinism. Secondly, 'incompatibalism': the idea that free will is incompatible with determinism. 'Incompatibalism' then branches out into two very different accounts of free will: libertarianism and skepticism (i.e., eliminativism)5 about free will. 'Libertarianism' is the
view that our conception of free will is not compatible with determinism, but that our universe is not deterministic, thus we can and do in fact have free will. 'Skepticism' (eliminativism) is the view that our conception of free will is not compatible with determinism, and because our universe is
deterministic, we can't have free will6. In adopting Manuel Vargas (2011b) terminology, I will refer to
these accounts as conventional accounts of free will. 'Conventional accounts' are marked by a strive for “consistency between prescription and diagnosis” (Vargas 2011b, 6). For example, compatibalists
diagnose that our intuitions says that free will is compatible with determinism, thus we ought to be
compatibalists. Likewise, incompatibalists diagnose that our intuitions says that free will is
5 I distinguish “eliminativism” and “skepticism” the following way: eliminativism is a position that rejects free will. The skeptic also expunge 'free will' from their prescriptive principles, but does so maintaining that one can be a skeptic without rejecting the [unlikely] possibility of free will. Since this distinction has little bearing on the arguments put forth in this paper, I will use these terms interchangeably.
incompatible with determinism, thus we ought to be incompatibalists.
Historically, the focal point of the free will debate among conventionalists, was to argue whether or not free will is compatible with determinism [and to some degree; whether determinism is true]. According to Vargas (2011a), the question of moral responsibility were rarely factored into the debate: instead, influential practices derived from this notion was presumed unjustifiable without it (Vargas 2011a, 1). More recently, however, there has been a decreased focus on the descriptive metaphysics of free will, and an increased focus on its normative impact. Moreover, this expanded conceptual space is
presumably what has paved the way for free will revisionism.
2.2 Revisionsim
Though Vargas (2005; 2009; 2011a; 2011b) definition of 'revisionism' and its varieties has evolved over the years, I have pieced together two main claims which seems to persist. Those are that 'revisionism' entail the following principles:
P1: Whatever we ought to believe about free will, comes apart from what we do believe about free will, and
P2: What free will ought to be is first and foremost a question that will be settled by approaching “free will” from the perspective of ethics.
P1
As posited in section 2.1, conventional accounts of free will have typically sought to locate our
our best diagnostic account.” (Vargas 2011a, 28). Diagnostic account in this context being our best
descriptive account of free will; whereas our prescriptive accounts are those which indicate what we
morally ought to believe about free will. For example, a 'revisionist' account could be one that acknowledges our incompatibalist intuitions, but think we ought to be compatibalist because compatibalism can justify some of our most valuable normative practices. Another example of a revisionist account could be one that diagnoses the “folk” intuition as compatibalist or libertarian, but because we do not have free will, prescribes that it is unjustifiable to continue our practices as if we do. As Weigl (2013, 31-32) suggests, a revisionist account could also be one that diagnoses that “we do think of compatibilism and incompatibilism as mutually exclusive, but ought not to think that way because we need both to make all the ethical distinctions we need to make.”
According to Vargas (2011b), correcting the diagnosis of what we typically take free will to be, though an important part of the revisionist project, is not sufficient to be called 'revisionist' (Vargas 2011b, 10). For example, if a revisionist eliminativist account is put forth which grounds its prescriptive conception of 'free will' in the idea that our intuitions are libertarian, but it then turns out that people's intuitions about free will was actually eliminativist all along, it wouldn't be a case of paradigmatic revisionism. Rather, it would be a case of correcting our diagnostic account of free will.
P2
The second principle, “What free will ought to be is first and foremost a question that will be settled by approaching “free will” from the perspective of ethics” is more ambiguous, as there is no one single unified theory of ethics. Indeed, in many ways the question of free will for the revisionist will be a reflection of the same complexity which moral philosophy faces in general. However, in order to provide a broad framework for this principle (P2), I posit that it is a factor of these two (sweeping) ideas: 1) an account of free will which contributes to the human “good” and 2) an account of free will where multiple factors are taken into consideration, using “Rawls Reflective Equilibrium” as a
governing principle (see, e.g., Vargas 2011b, 8-9).
values does not lead to the maximization of consequentialist outputs. It is however plausible that consequentialist concerns play some role when the “good” is considered. The second factor (2)), “Rawl's Reflective Equilibrium,” is a governing philosophical idea where “normative theories are to be generated by working back and forth between considered judgments (or intuitions), the principles we take to explain them, and the considerations that speak in favor of those judgments and principles” (Vargas 2011b, 16). By definition, thus, Rawl's reflective equilibrium captures the unlikelihood that such “goods” will be the output of a single idea or intuition (like a uniform intuition about free will). Instead, it underscores the importance of the many considerations our deontological commitments should sift through before we heed to them.
Identifying what factors to input into our equilibrium is in and of itself an extensive project for revisionism which adheres to these two principles. In this paper, I have mainly focused on aspects of our psychological reality which I think have been vastly overlooked in conventional as well as revisionist accounts of free will. I will however again touch briefly on the specific challenges that comes along with the revisionist Rawlsian approach to free will beliefs (see forthcoming discussions in chapter 5).
Within the scope of this essay (and within the parameters that I am both a proponent of revisionism as well a critic of its most populated versions), these will be the two main principles through which 'revisionism' is understood here.
2.3 Eliminativist Revisionism
sections 5.1-5.3.
3. The Descriptive Question
In Nichol's (2007) A Naturalistic Defense of the Reactive Attitudes, he attempts to explain how the existence of a 'narrow psychological profile' and a 'wide psychological profile' provides support for, what I will refer to as, his “descriptive hum drum thesis.” 'The descriptive hum drum thesis' states that learning that determinism is “true” is not sufficient to spark the type of “revolution” that free will skeptics typically assume will follow.
In the following section 3.1-3.2, I first introduce the narrow and wide psychological profiles, and then the descriptive hum drum thesis. I also discuss the usefulness and appeal of Nichols' (2007) mapping of the reactive attitudes onto psychological theory. I then put forth reasons why I find the framing of 'wide' and 'narrow' psychological profiles valuable, and why our best descriptive account of 'free will' ought to acknowledge their existence. I will also argue that since conventional accounts of free will typically seek binary descriptive-prescriptive convergence, their descriptive accounts will either be unsatisfactory (false), or prescriptively collapse under more accurate descriptive accounts. The aim of this chapter is to: 1. illustrate how our free will beliefs are influenced by some key aspects of human psychology and 2. show that these can only be accurately captured within the theoretical framework of revisionism. Thus, this chapter functions to lend support to the revisionist thesis, and to provide a backdrop for why we want to be 'eliminativist revisionists' rather than simply “eliminativists.”
3.1 Narrow And Wide Psychological Profiles
This local reactive tendency, i.e., our immediate reactions to emotionally triggering situations, are part of the 'narrow psychological profile. The 'wide profile', on the other hand, makes up a more complex part of our reactive patterns, and is under influence of a lot more factors outside the locality of the situation, such as abstract thinking, memory etc. The reactive patterns contained within the wide psychological profile is often triggered by the narrow psychological profile, but describes our thinking about the immediate fear based reaction, once we are more psychologically removed from it (Nichols 2007, 413).
For example, upon wide reflection, we may come to realize that the spider is harmless, and that the unprovoked killing of an insects is not something that we ought to be doing. In order to avoid such outcomes, we may come up with a strategy to actively remind ourselves that the spider serves a useful purpose in eating pesky insects, thus, distracting ourselves away from the narrow reactive attitude. Another strategy could be to try to face the emotion head on by letting rational thinking dissolve it. This dissolving, suggestively, would come from actively trying to internalize the notion that the spider poses no real threat (Nichols 2007, 413-414). Conclusively, the belief-systems which are contained in the narrow psychological profile function very differently than those contained in the wide
psychological profile.
In order to distinguish between the two, I will sometimes be referring to “emotional beliefs” when discussing beliefs embedded inside our narrow psychological profile, and “reflective beliefs” when talking about beliefs which is part of the wide psychological profile.
3.2 The Descriptive Hum drum thesis
enforced it will be. When applying this to beliefs about determinism and free will, we can see how the upstream influence of our narrow free will beliefs on our wide determinism-belief is not plausibly particularly forceful.
Chris Weigl (2013), in utilizing Construal Level Theory (CLT) (the idea that our response to a situation depends on whether it is “distant” or “proximate”) offers a similar explanatory mapping of our
diverging free will beliefs in his (2013) paper Experimental evidence for free will revisionism. CLT states that mentally, we process what appears more concrete as psychologically “proximate,” whereas the level of psychological distance increase as concepts become more abstracted. Since thoughts about the universe – such as determinism – is an abstract concept, whereas our feeling of having free will is more immediate and concrete, CLT could explain why empirical data seem to imply that our intuitions about free will are inconsistent (Weigel 2013, 37).
If Nichols' (2007) (and Weigel's 2013) explanations are correct, they would support the descriptive hum-drum thesis the following way:
1.
Folk hold incompatibalist intuitions like “free will is not compatible with determinism” [because determinism is a “reflective belief” these intuitions are mostly contained in the wide psychological profile]2.
Folk also hold libertarian and compatibalist intuitions like “I have a strong emotionalexperience of having free will, so it must be true” [because our experience of having free will is immediate and concrete, these intuitions are mostly contained in the narrow psychological profile]
3.
Since information that appeal to the narrow psychological profile are more likely to take hold in cultural norms, learning about 'determinism' will have neglect-able impact on the way we live our lives.Moreover, it is becoming more and more clear that our intuitions about free will are a mixed bag – not only between people and cultures, as can be expected – but also within one and the same individual (Nadelhoffer & Tochetto 2013,119; Weigel 2013, 32). Though this link between our psychological theories and our free will beliefs do not yet have substantial empirical support, I posit that if this mapping was not accurate, it would make our free will beliefs a psychological anomaly. Thus, I believe Nichols (2007) is successful in providing a naturalistic defense of the reactive attitudes. Moreover, I also believe his reasoning behind “the descriptive hum drum thesis” is highly plausible: if “folk” came to learn about the “truth” of determinism, it would likely be more or less “business as usual.”
Moreover, if we accept that the “descriptive hum drum thesis” is true, it also lends significant support to my claim that revisionism is true; at least as Weigel (2013, 1) points out – descriptively. In other words, what we ought to believe about free will must come apart from what we do believe about free will, and since conventional accounts assume perfect descriptive-prescriptive convergence, they fail to diagnostically capture this. However, it should also in a sense be self-explanatory support for why we
ought to be revisionist: because conventional accounts inability to capture this psychological reality, we
would have to pay a significant diagnostic price. Why is it important to not pay this cost? Presumably, because what we currently do believe about free will has significant influence on the way we see ourselves, the way our interpersonal relationships function and the way we structure our societies (Caruso 2018; Morris 2015). Diagnosing our free will beliefs is not only crucial to understand how this influence works, but also for anyone (which presumably is everyone in the group of free will skeptics) who thinks what we ought to believe in some ways depart from what we currently do believe about free will. Without knowing the location of our current free will beliefs (the full scope of them), it will be impossible to learn how to move from this current reality, and closer to the reality we strive towards.
3.3. The Narrow And Wide Psychological Profiles In Our Cultural Context
Though Nichols acknowledges that the beliefs and reactive patterns contained in our narrow psychological profiles are not completely insulated, he does posit that the hold they have in us are strong enough to not end up being “too bothered” by learning about the “truth” of determinsim. For example, one of Nichols (2007) own experiments with Adina Roskies (2007) shows that people who are read, in non technical terms, a deterministic scenario, and then asked whether people could be held morally responsible in such scenarios, tended to answer “no,” whereas people who were read the same scenario but told that the deterministic universe were their own world, tended to answer “yes” (Nichols 2007, 409). In other words, our emotional belief of having free will seems highly motivated to pick out
reasons as to how we can override our incompatibalist intuition that free will is impossible without
determinism. So far, this seems to support the descriptive hum-drum thesis – it clearly does – but it doesn't tell us why our emotional belief is so strong: and why learning the truth of determinism is not enough to really nudge our emotional beliefs of having free will. Additionally, Nichols (2007) as well as Weigl (2013) have seemed to imply that free will belief manifestation has innate, naturalistic explanations – but I am inclined to believe that the reason our emotional experience of having free will is so strong, is that it's enforced “downstream” by a wide reflective profile: even if it is not made up out of input that explicitly has dealt with the question of free will.
I think it is perhaps in here – in our current cultural context – where we find strong explanations as to
why our experience of having free will is so highly motivating to us: it is constantly enforced by
practices that are also part of our wide profile. Though these practices are rationally looking quite ad
hoc, they are so enforced in us that, when we are asked a question about determinism which pertains to
our own world, we are fairly quick to relinquish a belief that we otherwise held as rational or intuitive: something which, I believe, the experiment by Adina Rosies and Shaun Nichols (2007, 409) shows.
Even if “truth about determinism” makes it into our popular culture, this is likely only ever going to be a drop in the complex pool of the wide profile. As individualist culture, which continuously enforce that we should hold people accountable will continue to proliferate, “the truth of determinism” is not going to apply enough rational pressure to make changes to the emotional beliefs in the narrow profile. We are simply going to have to work harder than that – if changing these beliefs is something we find
worth doing.
In sum, I think we have plenty of reason to assume that the model of wide and narrow psychological profiles are immensely useful to understand the reactive attitudes that they encapsulate, and, vis a vis, that we have good reason to believe that the descriptive hum drum thesis is true. Whether, and in what way this would warrant a move to a prescriptive hum-drum thesis, on the other hand, is another question: one that I will attempt to answer in the next chapter.
4. The Prescriptive Question
As Nichols (2007, 405) points out, even if we descriptively can (with significant effort) be trained to relinquish even our most well rooted narrow reactive attitudes, it tells us nothing about whether (and to what extent) we should succumb to that effort.
skeptic prescriptions. Moreover, he argues that the “intuitive pull” of the “fairness argument” is not substantiated enough to show a similar yield in utility. In my response, I will argue two points: 1. Much of the utility of the reactive attitudes in our narrow psychological profiles can be captured in an
eliminativist revisionist account, and 2. The utility of the fairness argument on a broader, societal perspective is untouched by the moral anger in our narrow psychological profile. Lastly, I also discuss whether “the prescriptive hum drum thesis',” which tells us that we ought to continue as if “business as usual,” may itself come with significant deontological and consequentialist losses.
4.1 The Prescriptive Hum Drum Thesis
Firstly, I want to point out that I agree with Nichols that the attitudes which follows from the narrow psychological profiles aren't something we should default to feel an aversion towards. To quote Nichols: “when you’re looking for a mate, you probably want to avoid the ones who don’t feel guilt.” (Nichols 2007, 421). Most of us don't have to consult a reflective equilibrium to feel the intuitive pull of that statement. Even if we assume with Nichols (2007, 417) that it is correct that 'determinism true' + 'incompatibalist intuition' = 'guilt is irrational from a rational choice perspective', that irrationality should far from be the only input into our reflective equilibrium. Thus, I have no issues in conceding to Nichols (2007) that we may want allow several (irrational) “emotional beliefs” to play a role in human lives. Furthermore, I agree with Nichols (2007, 420) that it is implausible that a majority of these can be easily “fungible” by other emotions (Nichols 2007, 420). What I put into question in this section, however, is if such concessions imply that we should make a move from our acknowledgment of their existence (and in some cases,value), to a prescriptive hum drum thesis.
Using moral anger as an example, however, this is exactly what Nichols (2007) suggests. In his paper, Nichols claims that from the perspective of utility, we are likely justified to retain our practice of moral anger. Nichols begins by describing that anger is an immediate response within the narrow
psychological profile:
On the narrow profile, an appraisal of injustice or a demeaning offense will trigger the emotion of moral anger. If an agent comes to believe that determinism is true, is moral anger still the appropriate response to a demeaning offense? By the narrow lights of the moral-anger system, the answer is presumably yes.
In other words, if we feel like we have been treated unjustly, our immediate outburst of anger is likely not going to be subjected to a reflective equilibrium, determinism or whatever other factors we
deliberate on in our wide psychological profiles. At this point, Nichols is still tracing the descriptive question, and my inclination is that – as was discussed in the previous chapter – this is a plausible description of our psychological realities. In other words: so far so good. Nichols then suggest that there exist significant data that supports the value of anger in behavioral regulation (2007, 417-420). As an example, Nichols uses economical games-experiments to illustrate how expression of moral anger (through the ability of the participants to punish each other) lead to more cooperation among
participants, and “better” economical outcomes (2007, 418-419). So far – still good. I am not going to argue with the empirical data. Lastly, Nichols argues against Pereboom (2001, 204-206) suggestion that emotions such as anger or guilt could be easily replaced by another emotion, such as sadness. Here, Nichols (2007) points out empirical data implying that sadness as a replacement for moral anger is likely to lead to diminished utility. For example, empirical studies show that predominant sadness in infants have been connected with poor outcomes in life, such as “giving up,” whereas anger has been linked to stamina and the ability to overcome obstacles (Nichols 2007, 420). Still, I am good with this. In fact, I am not going to use this section to argue against the usefulness of our narrow profile anger – anger is, after all, a complex emotion which is hotly debated. I will personally let it remain an open question whether anger, like Morris posits (2018, 305-307) contributes to more negative than positive utility, or, whether, like Nichols (2007) argues, the opposite is true.
What I question in Nichols conclusion, rather than the utility of the locally triggered and immediate anger which he discusses, is how he can use the attitudes in the narrow psychological profile, to justify a rejection of “revolutionaries” prescriptive principles on a whole, when many of the reactions in the narrow psychological profile appear untouched by them. There is nothing in Nichols argument which implies that we would loose anything of value in the reactive attitudes, if, prescriptively, for example, we were to revolutionize the legal and penal system the way hard incompatibalism prescribes7. Let me
expand a little on this objection. The legal and penal system are governed by a set of processes – and laws – which passes through much deliberation, and many hands. If anything, it is likely a process that moves slower than most people involved in said processes would like it to. What these processes do
facilitate, however, is ample time for reflective deliberation. Not only are laws and processes
abstracted, they are abstracted in a way that does not only include the mind of a single person, but the reflections of several people. Moreover, these people have typically gone through extensive training in the principles of law. In other words, if there is ever a circumstance which involved mainly the wide psychological profile, this ought to be it – as it is the psychological profile more likely to be able to weigh factors such as cultural context, determinism and our psychological reality into questions regarding crime-response.
According to Nichols, the only response hard incompatibalist can give in this regard, is to counter our intuition that it is fair to punish people with the intuition that it is unfair to punish people in a
deterministic universe. The reason for this is that Nichols plausibly assumes that there is a direct correlation between utility and living according to our intuitive truths. In other words, which free will account of the two (i.e., compatibalism and hard incompatibalism) can provide the most utility will be determined when we know which of the intuitions:
i. It’s often fair to hold people responsible for their actions and
ii. It’s never fair to hold people in a deterministic universe responsible (i.e. the incompatibilist intuition) is strongest
(Nichols 2007, 424).
According to Nichols, the second intuition is encapsulated in the incompatibalist “fairness argument” (Nichols 2007, 422-423) which is often invoked by incompatibalists to show why our practices of moral responsibility are unjustifiable. Nichols then speculates that the hard incompatibalist needs to be able to show how deep the second intuition runs, in order to justify overriding the first intuition, but that hard incompatibalists have failed to do so (Nichols 2007, 422-423). To me, however, it is not at all clear why the intuitions within the narrow psychological profile should be given significant weight in a process which takes place in the wide profile deliberations. It is unclear to me how placing our
conflicting beliefs on a scale should tell us anything about their prescriptive value – neither
consequentially nor otherwise. It comes across as thinking that has fallen victim to the conventionalist
will.
The strength of intuitions aside, perhaps one could still argue that a utilitarian defense could be made for reasons to negate the implied prescriptions of (ii.). E.g, that the utility of capturing this intuition (regardless of its potency) will simply lead to much worse outcomes than the prescriptions of (i.). Perhaps it could be argued that, if we do not have a legal outlet for our moral outrage, a societal collapse would ensue. This is certainly what illusionists8 like Smilansky (2013) seem to propose.
However, it is very questionable whether we have empirical data to support such claims. For example, Caruso (2018) points out how in a first-of-its kind investigation, the Alliance for Safety and Justice found that “...victims of violent crime say they want to see shorter prison sentences, less spending on prisons, and a greater focus on the rehabilitation of criminals” (Caruso 2018, 16). Thus, victims
themselves – when placed in situations that are a bit more distant from the actual crime (and thus more likely influenced by the wide psychological profile), presumably believe that retributive punishment of individuals are less likely to lead to “good” outcomes. This empirical data certainly do not seem to express a need for vengeance. Though it is somewhat plausible that a victim would have felt a wish for retributive revenge soon after, or even during a crime has been inflicted upon them, it is unclear why this immediate burst of moral anger (which may be justified on a narrow psychological profile) would contribute to more overall utility, than those we think are correct or justified on a wide psychological profile.
Furthermore, Nichols, when referring to the studies on moral anger that he uses in its defense, writes that “there are three important facts about the relationship between punishment and cooperation in these studies. First, cooperation deteriorates without punishment” (Nichols 2007, 419). Although this may be true in the studies that Nichols puts forth, I believe the presumption that the practices of “punishment” in our immediate relationships would translate to serving similar utility in the abstracted process of our criminal justice system is, well... presumptuous. It is an empirical truth that lengthy prison sentences and the death penalty does very little to deter criminals9. Penal punishment is not
personal. Thus, it does not serve that same role of social regulation as moral anger supposedly do in our interpersonal relationships (or in the games that Nichols refers to).
8 Illusionism is the idea that if people came to internalize free will skepticism, it would lead to detrimental consequences for individuals as well as society at large. For this reason, philosophers and scientists ought to keep “the truth” and discussions surrounding free will opaque and esoteric (Smilansky 2013, 97-111)
Nichols writes that: “at a minimum, it seems that we would want to be very cautious about fomenting a revolution if it means we lose the benefits of moral anger charted above” (2007, 420, my cursive), and I think this identifies a key issue with conventional thinking about free will: it assumes uniformity, and thus an either-or-scenario when it comes to what our intuitions ought to prescribe. Though Nichols (2007) at least acknowledges that our intuitions about free will diverge, he still falls for the
“conventionalist fallacy” in that he assumes that the strength of these intuitions is going to have perfect convergence with their normative utility.
4.2 “Business As Usual”? The Prescriptive Question And The Looming Subterfuge
Before I close this chapter, I would like to look into one aspect of the move from “the descriptive hum drum thesis” to “the prescriptive hum drum thesis,” which I find particularly troublesome. This is not brought up by Nichols (2007) himself, but is something which I believe diminishes the overall normative value of his thesis.
When we prescribe “business as usual” (i.e., the prescriptive hum drum thesis”) we do not create any space for moral discussion on whether these practices are worth continuing or not. In a circular way, they justify themselves. Since, as I posited in section 3.3, the feedback loop between a culture which enforces free beliefs and the individual which internalize them is likely to continue, it seems to imply that, from Nichols point of view, there is little value in even having moral discussions about whether these beliefs should be altered. Elzein (2013) have brought forth critique towards Vargas' (2005; 2007; 2009;2011) revisionism which functions in a similar way. ThoughVargas' compatibalist revisionist account of free will (2005; 2009; 2011a; 2011b) is distinguishable from Nichols' (2007) “prescriptive hum drum thesis” in that: 1. Vargas does not start with a desire to make a connection between what we do believe and what we ought to believe and 2. Vargas believes we should actively change the
reference of 'free will' so that we can continue justifying our current practices, I think they are conceptually similar enough to be hit by the same critique. Neither of them places any value on the import of moral discussion and wider engagement with the public. Neither create “the conceptual space” required to determine whether our current practices of moral responsibility are truly justifiable.
of “conceptual space” for moral discussion in that the eliminativist thesis naturally provides “a break” in the individual-culture feedback loop, I do think her critique pin points an issue which eliminativists in all variations ought to also respond to. Before ending this chapter, I will go over this issue briefly:
First, I would like to expand a little on what I take the creation of “Conceptual Space” to practically entail – and what implications it has. What is not completely clear is what is meant by “conceptual space” in this regard. Though Elzein never exactly explicate what is meant by creating “conceptual space” for moral discussions mean, I will attempt to put forth my own more concrete interpretation of the term. To me, it would seem as if the conceptual shrinkage that takes place in compatibalism does not typically apply to philosophers of free will. Case in point: Elzein's own (2013) article indicate that philosophers have plenty of conceptual space to dissect and respond to potential subterfuges. Thus, I must assume that the “conceptual space” for moral revisions more likely applies to those who will be blissfully ignorant that the justification-referent of their practices just changed: i.e., “the folk.”
After all, the work of philosophers is in part to push conceptual space to its borders. The philosopher will very much be aware of such proposed shifts and even more likely; have plenty of opinions about them. Thus, it would seem more plausible that the conceptual space which Elzein believes Vargas' robs us of, is robbed from the minds of the people who are influenced by the concept in the dimension where it arguably truly matters: the social dimension. After all, if one have an issue with intentional opaqueness (which I think we do, at least intuitively – at least it seems to be something that Elzein's argument assume – and something that I am willing to accept on face value) one ought to also have an issue with unintentional opaqueness, when such can be identified. However, even if we seek a prescriptive account of free will which serves the human “good,” such conception may be best developed by engaging the wide psychological profile of the “folk” which it is meant to serve. As I have posited, it may even be morally imperative. Though such an argument would require a lot more development, the indication of its possibility should perhaps motivate us to attempt to do so. For now, I think the implied value of wider moral engagement is overlooked in Nichols (2007) as well as in Vargas (2005; 2009; 2011a;2011b) and thus ought to cast some further doubt on the utility of the “prescriptive hum drum thesis.”
from “business as usual” type thinking. However, as I will briefly touch on in section 5.3., I do think the acknowledgment of the importance of creating space for moral discussion, may come at some cost for its practical feasibility. At the very least, this is something that I believe all accounts of eliminativism ought to acknowledge.
5. Discussion: Challenges And Possible Starting Points For
Eliminativist revisionists
5.1 The Challenge of Our Fixing Borders
I think Morris has (2015) correctly identified revisionism as “an ambitious project.” Determining the border of any revisionist account is a strenuous task which requires keen attention. Moreover, I think that any revisionist account should acknowledge that:
“A key issue here has to do with the acceptable boundaries of the revisionist project itself. While one can attempt to revise the term “free will” in any way he or she desires, there seems to be clear restrictions on how far the
attempted revision might go before it becomes philosophically unacceptable”
(Morris 2015, 310).
Though, arguably, it is the flexibility of revisionist eliminativism that is its greatest strength (and arguably what makes it most likely to bring forth a desirable normative account) it is also what poses its greatest challenge. Any one account of free will cannot plausibly diagnose everything we do believe about free will, why that is and to what extent these beliefs can and should be influenced. In the end, the revisionist eliminativist needs to find the balance between pulling at a bandwidth that needs expansion, without breaking the band which makes out its boarders.
are seemingly endless, branching into larger systemic, political and cultural questions. More concretely, an eliminativist revisionist may want to look to the skeptic works of philosophers like Pereboom (2001; 2007) and Caruso (2018) and start bordering off key elements that a prescriptive revisionist
eliminativist account want to adhere to – and those which we may want to be more unorthodox about.
However, in the end I believe revisionist should heed – but not feel perturbed – by this challenge, brcausein significant ways all normative questions deal with these complexities, but it is not as if the difficulty of determining what we ought to believe in moral theory, more generally, stops us from pursuing what is “good and right.” In the face of ambiguity, we still keep aiming at the elusive (and moving) target of morality. Likewise, I think we ought to turn our gaze to the elusive (and moving) target of revisionism. Given the immense influence free will beliefs have on our societies, we should feel motivated to shed light on any and all crevices of this debates which seem like it can plausibly serve our normative interests, by moving the free will debate forward. In this paper, I have argued that it is plausible that eliminativist revisionism is better equipped to do this than its conventional
counterpart, and that free will skeptics whom see its appeal should feel motivated to take on the strenuous task of trying to draw up some borders for what such an account can and can't look like.
In the next two discussion-sections, before concluding this paper, I will attempt to contribute to this strenuous task in small ways by highlighting how two key aspects of this paper could be weighted in a reflective equilibrium. In section 5.2., I will look at the psychological profiles as possible
methodological starting points, and in section 5.3., I will expand on my discussion in section 3.3 and 4.2, on the implications of our cultural influence and the practical implications of expanding the conceptual space for moral discussions.
5.2 Fixing The Borders #1: The Psychological Profiles as Starting Points
is to abstract and treat the “emotional beliefs” as if they where actually inoculated from influence of the wide psychological profile. This way, the revisionist eliminativist could usefully border of its project without having to ignore the “emotional beliefs” diagnostically, nor where their value is deemed important (or difficult to reach) prescriptively.
For example, a revisionist eliminativist could posit that:
1.
We are free will eliminativists prescriptively when it comes to processes which are part of the wide reactive attitude (deliberations which include more complex factors, such as abstract thinking, epistemic knowledge, conflicting intuitions – etc.)2.
We are moral emotivists10 when it comes to the narrow psychological profile (i.e., emotional beliefs and intuitions which are immediate and direct responses to local triggers)Even though these attitudes are movable – and will eventually be moving, as culture evolves, do so – an emotivist reading of the beliefs in the narrow psychological profile would help simplify the
eliminativist project by bordering of the beliefs that are “semi-innoculated” as if they were in fact fully innoculated. This would allow the eliminativist revisionist to focus on goals that are under the vaster influence of the wide psychological profile, such as the processes in the legal system. For example, it may be that the best way to direct the feedback loop between culture and individual, which is a plausible source cause for this inoculation (see section 3.3), is to isolate the way we treat questions which fall under wide reactive attitudes, contra those which fall under narrow reactive attitudes. This would be a more pragmatic eliminativist approach, for example, than those which claim we ought to change all our reactive patterns simultaneously (i.e., conventional skeptic accounts), as a result of internalizing incompatibalism.
This does not mean that the narrow profile won't eventually come under enough pressure to change (especially if these are societal processes that we seek to justify), however, it does reflect a shift in
10 Emotivism entailing, in broad terms, that an expression of an attitude is subjective, and does not pick out a moral
focus: and an acknowledgment and openness to the fact that not all of our “irrational” beliefs are bad, or even able to plausibly altered as they (at least currently) are inoculated to some degree.
5.3 Fixing The Borders #2: The Practical Implications of Space-Creation
In section 4.2, I argued that Elzein (2013) accurately identifies that trying to change our moral values by “stipulation” is a dicey matter. In this section I would like to discuss what the actual practical implications are for free will theorists that acknowledges the importance of creating “conceptual space” to discuss what we ought to believe – and how this factors into the importance of eliminativist
revisionism in particular.
If we assume that the conceptual space we're concerned with here are contained in the “folk” mind, rather than philosophers', it seems to have some implications.Firstly, it may imply that free will eliminativism is prerequisite for broader engagement in the question. Secondly, it leads to difficult question about how much theoretical frameworks of free will can be extracted from their (assumed) intended practical usage. For the eliminativist revisionist, this may entail having to ask to what extent effort should be focused on engagement with the folk, and whether such engagement does indeed lead to accounts that are “philosophically unacceptable.” Bending open the conceptual space for
eliminativism comes with its own challenges. How and to what extent popular culture can and should be influenced is an open question. Rather than attempting to respond to these questions here, I have merely attempted to highlight them.
6.
Conclusions
In this paper I have made two main claims: firstly, that what we ought to believe about free will comes apart from what we do believe, and that this can be usefully modeled in the idea of a 'narrow' and a 'wide' psychological profile (the descriptive hum drum thesis). Assuming the importance of the psychological landscape which this model frames, the existence of a wide and narrow psychological profile lends general support to revisionism. Secondly, I looked at the “prescriptive question.” I first reviewed Nichols (2007) “prescriptive hum drum thesis,” and argued that the move from “the
emotions such as “moral anger” could be substantially acknowledged by eliminativist revisionism, but not by its conventional counterpart. I then discussed Nadine Elzein's (2013) call for “conceptual space” and whether its realization depends on some sort of engagement with eliminativism. Finally, I
speculated on what possible methodological starting points for revisionist eliminativism my findings implies, and also what challenges they may have to give rise to.
It was the aim of this investigation and its findings to support the thesis that free will skeptics should have good reasons to develop eliminativist revisionist accounts of free will. So how did I do in
fulfilling the purpose of this paper, i.e., give an answer to the question whether free will skeptics indeed
have good reasons to do so? I do believe that, through my investigations in this paper, I have been able
to significantly show that the two main claims I've put forth in favor of my thesis are plausible. These two claims were: 1. that revisionism is likely to produce our best descriptive accounts of free will beliefs, and 2. that it is plausible that eliminativist revisionist is likely to produce our best prescriptive account of free will, as it is can capture some of the value in our “narrow psychological profile” in ways its conventional counterpart is unable to. In chapter 3, I supported my first claim by showing that our free will beliefs are influenced by some key aspects of human psychology and that these can only be accurately captured within the theoretical framework of revisionism. In Chapter 4, as well as my discussions in section 5.2, I showed how eliminativist revisionism plausibly can retain the value of our “emotional beliefs” without buckling under the need for uniformity (the way their conventional
counterpart do).
It is then argued that these two claims, in combination with the normative influence of free will beliefs, should provide sufficient motivations to develop eliminativist revisionist accounts of free will.
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