Bolsonaro and Social Media: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Brazilian President’s Populist Communication on Twitter

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Department of Informatics and Media

Master’s Programme in Social Sciences, Digital Media and Society specialization

Two-year Master’s Thesis

Bolsonaro and Social Media: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Brazilian President’s Populist

Communication on Twitter

Student: Yago Matheus da Silva Supervisor: Johan Lindell

June 2020

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Abstract

The present study explores Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro’s online communication on the microblogging platform Twitter. The aim of the study is to present the populist characteristics embedded in the president’s tweets, as well as the strategies he uses in his communication on the social media platform. The pillars that structure this work are the different theories on the topic of populism, which address central points in relation to the phenomenon’s characteristics, such as dichotomization between groups (the good and the bad people), a strong anti- establishment stance, creation of scapegoats and enemies, and the centrality of the leader.

Additionally, theories that explain the relationship between populism and social media are also employed for the full comprehension of the problem at hand. The analysis examines Bolsonaro’s first year in office (2019) and focuses mainly on three different periods within that year. The data consists of 110 tweets submitted to analysis utilizing Discourse-Historical Approach, an analytical approach with strong focus on context. The findings show how Bolsonaro’s communication on Twitter is immersed and dependent on strategies common to populist discourse, employing argumentative and discursive strategies that rely on the aspects such as topoi, demonization of others, shifting of blame, positive self- and negative other- presentation, provocation and calculated ambivalence. This study contributes to the understanding of populist online communication in the Brazilian context, shedding light on the phenomenon of populism, in particular the current populist wave, outside the European and North American contexts, expanding the understanding about the topic to the global south.

Key Words: Populism, Social Media, Twitter, Bolsonaro, Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA).

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List of Tables and Figures

Table 1 - Overview of the number of tweets selected in the sampling process 51 Table 2 - List of different types of Topoi relevant for the analysis 56

Figure 1 - Simplified Model of Argumentation 55

Figure 2 - Symbolic aspect posted by Bolsonaro linked to example 5 62 Figure 3 - Screenshot from an online news piece in example 10 65 Figure 4 - Screenshot from the newspaper Folha de São Paulo in example 23 75

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1. Introduction

The phenomenon of populism has regained power in recent times. Political events such as Brexit and Donald Trump’s election, make it possible to affirm that the political context in different societies is witnessing a populist moment (Mouffe, 2019), or a populist zeitgeist (Mudde 2004). Questions related to how this phenomenon develops and what consequences and risks it poses in its current form have been raised, while examples of the growing appeal to populism are abundant and growing.

A great effort has been made to explain the success of populism and to understand its problems.

Different causes are pointed out as possible sources to its growing power, ranging from economic, political, social, and cultural to technological changes in society. As Gerbaudo (2018) explains,

Contemporary populists are the product of a tumultuous era marked, on one hand, by deep economic crisis that is affecting large sections of the population, significantly worsening their living conditions, and, on the other hand, by rapid and highly disruptive technological innovation, which is redefining the way in which people communicate, work and organise. The combination of these two trends has opened a window of opportunity for populist movements to appeal to electorates that are both digitally connected and politically disgruntled. (p. 748)

A variety of studies about the use of new technologies related to communication have focused on the role of the digital populism in different settings, with special attention to Donald Trump’s election in 2016. As debated by Gerbaudo (2018), Trump’s victory represents one case in a broader trend, as social media savviness has characterized different movements across the political spectrum. In short, it can be seen as an “[…] ‘elective affinity’ between social media and populism: social media has favoured populists against establishment movements by providing the former a suitable channel to invoke the support of ordinary people against the latter” (p. 746).

In this same context, despite the idea of populism bypassing traditional media and journalism in order to directly communicate with its audience, Kristof Jacobs and Niels Spierings (2019) point to the fact that populists’ online communication lacks a systematic theorization or studies that show this relationship empirically. There are also examples of studies dealing with the populist use of social media, which are relevant to understand how the phenomenon is

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investigated and what aspects are prioritized. For instance, Engesser et al. (2017) deal with the fact that social media became a channel that provides populists with the possibility to spread ideas related to topics that characterize populism, such as emphasis on people’s sovereignty, invoking the heartland and the people, attacking the elites, and ostracizing others. In this same context, Ernst et al. (2017) investigate the role of social media in relation to how political actors make use of populist communication strategies online on social media to manifest themselves and reach their populist purposes. Flew & Iosifidis (2020) look at the problem of contemporary populism from the perspective of the many shifts in the world in the last decades, emphasizing the common association of populism, nationalism, authoritarianism, intolerance and other imbalances attributed to globalization as the main cause for such scenario. Moreover, the authors emphasize the importance of social media as a tool that enables populism to function, spread and mobilize supporters, exploit the public sphere and disrupt realities, as well as a way to manipulate political emotions with the help of social media technology.

Research about populism and social media has also developed around establishing explanations about the relationship between them and what the conditions that power the populist success are. For instance, Gerbaudo (2018) highlights the different global trends that have propelled the wave of populism nowadays, arguing that the worsening of economic prospects and technological changes could be the cause for populist gaining of power. John Postill (2018), on the other hand, advocates the necessity of expanding the scope of geographical breadth and historical depth in order to develop a general explanation of the link between populism and social media. The author defends the overcoming of geographical bias, based on the idea that social media and populism are considered global phenomena, thus making it necessary to expand the analysis from the United States, Britain and Europe, and breaking this almost exclusive focus on these regions. Moreover, he suggests that for a full understanding of the link between populism and social media, research must look at particular areas such as the rise of what he calls theocratic populism, investigate the roots of populism itself, the relation between populism and ideology, the relation of non-populist politicians and social media, as well as the embedding of social media in larger systems of communication. From Postill’s (2018) perspective these points are fundamental for building a global theory on the topic.

Taking into consideration the characteristics that define the current situation of investigation

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2018, the present study deals with populist communication taking place online. In short, the aim of this study is to examine Bolsonaro’s communicates online via Twitter and showcase the populist characteristics present in his tweets, focusing on the arguments and strategies used by the president on the platform. Furthermore, an important aim of the study is to understand the populism away from central capitalist powers in the world, that is, it is important to observe the development of the populist phenomenon outside European and North American political scenarios, looking at the characteristics the populist phenomenon possesses in different political contexts and how it emerges and develops. The Brazilian case is an interesting one particularly because Brazil is a country with a disturbing recent past, where democracy has only recently been established, inequality is blatant, and the political scenario is marked by corruption and scandals that cause frustration and disbelief in politics.

Looking at contemporary populism outside the North American or European context is a necessary move in order to show how the phenomenon develops in the global South, and what its characteristics are in relation to the established notions about populism, its specificities and strategies.

In light of the above, this study aims to answer the following main research question:

- How did Bolsonaro communicate via Twitter in different moments during his first year as president?

The main research question is divided into the following sub-questions:

- What populist characteristics are embedded in Bolsonaro’s communication on Twitter?

- What are the main strategies used by the president in his communication on the platform?

Twitter1 has a central role in this study, being one of the social media channels Bolsonaro makes most frequent use of, and thus, a platform which can provide rich and relevant content to be analysed. Tweets, which are the short texts of maximum 140 characters posted on the platform, were collected for the purpose of the present study. The analysis process focused on identifying

1 “[…] a form of blogging in which entries typically consist of short content such as phrases, quick comments,

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strategies and populist characteristics in Bolsonaro’s communication, as well as understanding the tweets with the support of the concepts that are part of the theories that guide the study.

In short, the theoretical pillars that support the study are constituted by different theories dealing with the topic of populism, which employ different views on the problem, addressing different characteristics, as well as the common aspects that are agreed in relation to how populism is structured and understood. The theoretical framework is based on ideas such as dichotomization, the importance of the leader and the people, creation of enemies and scapegoats by populist leaders, as well as the relationship between social media and the practices and developments that rendered possible the wave of populism seen in recent times (Laclau, 2007; Moffitt, 2016; & Urbinati, 2019).

The present study focuses on Bolsonaro’s first year in office, more specifically, three different periods within the year of 2019 were observed in depth: May, August and November. These time periods were selected in order to make the analysis more efficient and manageable, but also due to their relevance in terms of context, which takes us to the method utilized in the analysis of the tweets: Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)

Broadly speaking, DHA is a branch of Critical Discourse Analyses focused on developing conceptual frameworks for political discourse (Wodak, 2012). The main characteristics of this approach are the strong reliance on aspects that include historical and intertextual perspectives within a social and political background related to discursive practice. Another feature of this approach is its focus on establishing a theory of discourse through the connection between fields of action, genres, discourses and texts. Also, it focuses on how intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses develop, taking into account the social, political and historical aspects related to events investigated (Wodak and Meyer, 2016).

The importance and relevance of examining Bolsonaro’s tweets and investigating the characteristics and main aspects of his online communication lies in the essential need for a detailed and complete understanding of the problematic aspects that the content of his tweets carry. His tweets are not mere words and expressions, they have intentions within them, they have power, they influence opinions and views, invoke feelings, instigate hate, conflict and polarization, they are embedded in contexts that offend and attack opponents, destabilize democratic practices and increase fear and frustration. The election of Bolsonaro as president

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is the result of a political context immersed in chaos, where a figure like him gained power due to a scenario of crisis and instability.

Disposition

In this first section, a short introduction regarding the problem dealt with in the present study is provided, including a brief overview of the theoretical framework and methodology, as well as the study’s research questions. Section two presents the background of the case, including the main characteristics important for understanding the problem at hand. It introduces the events that occurred in Brazil during the last decades, beginning with the re-democratization period in the late 80’s. This section also includes a definition of the idea of Bolsonarismo and its main aspects. In section three the theory and previous research on populism are presented, including the main ideas that constitute the understanding of populism and the relevant concepts that guide the analysis, as well as the development of the knowledge on the topic of populism along the last decades. The methodology is presented in section four, where the approach utilized in the study, Discourse-Historical Approach, is explained in detail together with its main features, as well as details regarding the analytical procedure. Section five consists of the analysis presented along with examples that illustrate the points made in the process. Finally, the sixth section consists of the concluding discussion, where the findings are presented, and the analyst’s critical stance is developed in relation to the findings and with the support of the main theories that the study is based on. This chapter also presents suggestions for further research regarding populism and social media in the Brazilian context.

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2. Background

Brazil’s political context has not been the most stable in the past years. The country went through turbulent political processes, including corruption scandals and mass demonstrations against politicians and governments. There has also been an increase in dissatisfaction and frustration due to the economic instability and political polarization in the country. It was in this scenario of chaos that Bolsonaro emerged and was elected president, with the promise of changing the Brazilian political context with his new way of doing politics. This section presents the main historical, political, social and economic events that took place in Brazil in the last decades in order to give the reader a base to understand the present situation of the country in terms of political, economic and social developments.

The Brazilian Case

Brazil is a complex country with many problematic aspects of its past reflecting in the present in different ways. Understanding the recent history of the country is important and relevant in order to be able to follow the development of the problem presented in this study. A good starting point to understand the recent history of the country is the year of 1988, when Brazil’s current federal constitution was created. From that point on, after a 25-year-long military dictatorship, Brazil experienced moments of democratic prosperity. The years that followed Brazil’s democratic rebirth were marked by economic, political and social difficulties (Schwarcz & Starling, 2015). Despite the struggles, the country came through, the 1990’s came to an end with a stable democratic scenario. The beginning of the new century was marked by an important shift in the political scenario, with the Worker’s Party (PT) coming to power in 2003 (Nobre, 2013). The party ruled Brazil for over a decade and during this period the country prospered economically and socially. Poverty and inequality decreased, the commodities boom guaranteed a stable and growing economic scenario, and oil reserves were found in the Brazilian coast, which gave the country the hope of a future of development and prosperity (Carvalho, 2018). This feeling of hope was predicted by influential economic periodicals such as The Economist (2009), which in one of its issues pointed that Brazil was “taking off”.

Although the time during which Worker’s Party government held office was also marked by corruption scandals that shocked the country, steady and stable economic growth guaranteed

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election, Dilma Rousseff’s election represented a continuity of PT’s project in power. Her first four-year term in office was successful, whereas the second term was marked by chaos in the political and social scenarios. In fact, the problems, which have always been there, ignited and grew stronger in the 2013 mass demonstrations that took place around the whole country (Nobre, 2013). This unprecedented mobilization, which had many different aspects to it in terms of demands, brought to light the frustrations Brazilians had towards the political segment.

2013’s demonstrations are seen as a key moment to understand the country’s recent history (Santos & Guarnieri, 2016).

The following year the Brazilian economy started slowing down giving signs of failure.

Inflation was growing, unemployment rising, and political polarization was as strong as ever in the political realm. Rousseff won her second term, but only to experience the worst moments of her time in power. The end of the Worker’s Party rule in Brazil came in 2016 with Rousseff’s impeachment (Santos & Guarnieri, 2016). After that, the country entered into economic recession, which is said to be the worst the country has ever experienced.

The end of PT’s time in power was marked by new corruption scandals being uncovered in the state-run oil company, Petrobrás. Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato) became a key point to understand Brazil’s contemporary political events. Investigations by the Federal Police brought to light the biggest corruption schemes the country had ever discovered, which had PT deeply involved, as well as many influential and powerful businesspeople in the country (Feres Júnior & Kerche, 2018).

In a scenario of corruption scandals, economic and political crisis, the country found itself in deep frustration, distrust and anger in relation to the political class. Here it is possible to make a direct link to this study’s theme: populism. Nadia Urbinati (2019), argues that “populism finds fertile soil in countries in which the distrust of parties and partisanship has been very strong”

(p. 173). This is exactly the scenario in Brazil, and where we can move the discussion to the central figure of this study: Jair Bolsonaro.

Jair Bolsonaro is not a new actor in the Brazilian political context. His political career started almost three decades ago as he had different mandates as a congress representative before becoming president. Within the chaos that was created in the Brazilian political context in recent years, his image gained visibility as an option outside the traditional and corrupt political

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class. He was known for his politically incorrect remarks, which include homophobic, misogynistic and racist statements. Bolsonaro is also known for defending ideas that can be framed as conservative, being openly against many minorities’ rights, in favour of gun ownership by civilians, and pro authoritarian regimes. As well as that, the president has close ties and strong support from within the military segment, to which he himself belonged before starting his political career in 1988.

Bolsonaro’s success in the 2018 presidential election was possible due to different factors, particularly the influence of digital mobilization, which consisted of a rhetoric containing permanent use of alarmist and conspiratorial content, accusations against enemies, the existence of channels of direct communication between the leadership and the audience, as well as constant delegitimization of professional press and other institutions (Cesarino, 2019).

To summarize, Bolsonaro represents the blending of violence and brutality with an amusing or funny behaviour. He says what he wants, he acts stupidly and with violence, but plays the role of the funny and sympathetic man, which is precisely what allows people to identify with him (Catalani, 2018).

The next section deals briefly with the idea of Bolsonarismo, the name attributed to the phenomena related to Bolsonaro’s ascension to power. The section explains the main aspects necessary to understand what bolsonarismo represents and what constitutes its structure.

Bolsonarismo

Representing a central role in Bolsonaro’s recent political success, bolsonarismo can be explained as a mass ideological adherence mechanism, as pointed out by Catalani (2018), in which the fears and frustrations of the people are used by the president to gain support and political strength. Bolsonaro’s role within bolsonarismo is that of agitator and figure that provides stability in the context of tension, uncertainty and crisis the country has been through.

As Laclau (2005) argues, a context of crisis is necessary for the charismatic leader to thrive, as a claim to be the sole figure capable of bringing order to a corrupted system can only be made in such circumstances. In the Brazilian case, the scenario of crisis begins from the 2013

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anti-corruption and pro-impeachment movements that grew in the country in that period, as well as the worsening of the economic situation, which represented a strong component for frustration. Regarding this scenario, Urbinati (2019) explains that

populist leaders do not arise when the economy grows, and the citizens feel themselves to be in communication with democratic institutions. They arise in times of economic distress, in times when citizens witness gross violations of equality amid the general indifference of their representatives, and in times when the most powerful acquire more voice in the state. The populist leader’s claim to embody the condition of exclusion is what makes him or her attractive. (p. 118/119)

Letícia Cesarino (2019) further explains that the idea of chaos, mainly in the form of moral chaos, was produced through different media, particularly WhatsApp, where different groups supporting Bolsonaro were active and had a strong influence during the presidential campaign.

Further aspect that can be pointed as part of Bolsonaro’s strategies and vital to Bolsonarismo is its anti-petismo (anti-Workers Party – PT) that extends to the progressist or left-wing politicians and parties, as well as social movements and the intellectual segment. To understand Bolsonaro’s rhetoric one must understand his dependency on the groups he presents as enemies.

Such factor can be explained from the perspective of Urbinati's (2019) who advocates the idea that populist leaders “deploy propaganda against enemies who are never fully repressed, as a tonic to secure their appeal and build the people’s faith. Irresponsible leaders can also shield their mistakes or failures with conspiratorial rhetoric; such rhetoric requires that enemies be alive and active.” (p. 133)

Combined with the need of an enemy that must be defeated, it is possible to identify the use of an emotional apparatus in Bolsonaro’s rhetoric that places him closer to his supporters. This idea can be understood from the perspective that Bolsonaro became the personalization of the nation after the knife attack he suffered before the presidential election in September 2018.

Cesarino (2019) explains that the attack helped in the development of the idea of embodiment of the leader’s body as the political body, or as a symbol of the Brazilian nation. The attack symbolised the idea of the threat which the country is under, translated into what happened to Bolsonaro. Therefore, the need for prompt action is necessary, the idea of urgency in the enactment of actions within short timelines, or else terrible things will occur (Moffitt, 2016).

For that reason, the fight against the common enemy, the left and the corrupt, is a must – a matter of urgency.

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A populist leader has the power and ability to set what actions are necessary and who the enemies are, and this task is operated through emotional manipulation, combined with a language that contributes to a sense of fear, danger and insecurity and communicated through social media platforms. Nowadays, these platforms represent the main environment for the reproduction of their ideas and mobilization of supporters, giving media, not only social media but traditional as well, a central role that must be observed and taken into consideration for an understanding of the contemporary developments of populism to be established. As Maldonado (2017) elaborates the emotional apparatus associated with populism,

The affective core of populism reveals itself in the display of an emotional language that is both verbal and non-verbal, in the relationship between the leader and the followers, as well as in the make-up of a collective subject (the people) that stands against its enemies (the elite, or the establishment). […] populist movements tend to depend on their founding leaders, and it is reasonable to affirm that they play a key part in setting up the emotional regime of their movements. (p. 5)

Associated with these ideas is the notion of performance, which is a strong tool or aspect present in Bolsonaro’s communication. Maldonado puts forward the idea that populist performance relies strongly on the public support, and this performance does not only include verbal communication embedded with strong symbolic and affective power. Maldonado (2017) argues that in populist performance, the use of non-verbal aspects of communication are strong and a key aspect that builds the public image of the populist leader and is becoming more relevant in the task of catching the attention of the democratic society.

This performative idea can be understood and seen in Bolsonaro’s discourse, in the way he expresses himself, in his actions and behaviour, which are often aggressive and violent. His actions, speeches, and aggressive answers to journalists can be interpreted as funny, stupid, violent or as some believe, just a trace of his personality. However, since these aspects represent his style, thus, neglecting them make an analysis of his online communication empty, as even the simplest expression said or tweeted, a picture or video published, even clothing and appearance, carry a symbolic content that must be understood.

Therefore, having presented the main aspects that characterize and help to understand the

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concepts that will guide the analysis in the thesis, as well as an overview of the previous studies dealing with the topic of populism and the use of social media by populist leaders.

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3. Theory and Previous Research

Different theories dealing with the populist theme guide this study throughout. This section starts by defining the idea of populism presenting the main aspects that constitute the phenomenon. Subsequently, the ideas of dichotomic division, centrality of the populist leader, the people, and the relation between populism and democracy are discussed. The main concepts and ideas that guide this study are also presented, focusing on the theme of populism as the core of this framework. Finally, the relation between populism and social media is exposed, focusing on the ideas that have led to the online world’s influence in politics and how populism benefits from it.

Defining and Conceptualizing Populism

A variety of different interpretations of what populism is have been formulated in the last decades. As Waisbord and Amado (2017) state, “[…] the populist label has been attached to such a wide variety of phenomena, it is hard to reach a consensus on the defining attributes of populism in order to build a family resemblance” (p. 1331). Indeed, a concise definition of populism is rather difficult to be found among the variety of different existing definitions.

However, some common points can be defined and are presented below.

Defined by Ghita Ionescu and Ernst Gellne (1969) as a “spectre haunting the world” (p. 1), it is possible to affirm that populism is not a new phenomenon. Margaret Canovan (1981) explains that the term populism has been used to describe direct democratic techniques, dictatorships, parties with loose ideology, as well as reactionary feelings and movements. Some examples are commonly used to illustrate the origins of populism, such as the classic cases in the nineteenth century represented by the Populist Party in the United States and the Narodniki in Russia.

According to Cas Mudde & Cristóbla R. Kaltwasser (2012), these experiences were different despite having the word populism as a common description: Populist Party in the United States represented a mass movement of farmers demanding the change of the political system, while the Russian Narodniki consisted of middle-class intellectuals with romanticized ideas and views of rural life. The twentieth century was marked by the emergence of important cases of populism, often used as examples for the phenomena. One such case is Peronism in Latin America, considered one of the most relevant examples of the phenomenon and the case that

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Many scholars developed definitions of populism, its characteristics, modus operandi and consequences for society. Among these definitions are ideas that view populism as an ideology, with Cas Mudde as the main contributor to this conceptualization. He advocates a minimum definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). Populism has also been defined as political logic, which Ernesto Laclau defines as a structuring logic of political life that becomes powerful with the triumph of the logic of equivalence over the logic of difference (Laclau, 2007). Furthermore, populism has been defined as a discourse, an idea which is linked to Chantel Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau’s early theoretical work, as well as other scholars that represent the Essex School of discourse analysis. The approach looks at populism as an anti-status quo discourse that constructs a simplified symbolic division of society between the people and the other, in order to establish a simplified political space (Panizza, 2005).

Another definition found for populism looks at it as a political style. For example, scholars such as Margaret Canovan and Pierre-André Targuieff have looked at populism from this perspective. Nowadays, the idea of populism as a style gained relevance in Benjamin Moffitt’s (2016) work, who defines it as “the repertoires of performance that are used to create political relations” (p. 38).

The resurgence of interest in populism in academia in recent years shows that an understanding of what the idea of populism represents still carries ambiguities, as a consensus is hard to established when it comes to studying the phenomenon (Panizza, 2005). Nevertheless, some common aspects exist and will be presented below.

Dichotomic Division

The departure point will be the idea of antagonism, that is, the separation of society into two groups. The notion of populism as an antagonistic phenomenon is a common denominator in the literature on the topic. This aspect is an important one due to the fact that it helps to understand the way populism functions, being a strong feature to characterize the phenomenon.

The separation corresponds to there being an elite, a group that can represent a power bloc, a corrupt block or an enemy, which is opposed to the people, the good or right people, which according to Canovan (1981), populism produces an exaltation of (‘the people’). As Cas Mudde (2004) explains, populism can be seen as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt

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elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (p. 543).

It is important to mention that populism has its variants, that is, populism can be seen as

“chameleonic” ideology (Taggart, 2004). It adopts different ideological colours according to where it stands in the political context. In other words, it is a phenomenon not representative of one specific side of the political spectrum, and it is possible to find examples of populist leaders both the political left, right and centre. As argued by Biegon (2019), “[…] populism can be leftist, rightist or centrist. It can be top-down or bottom-up, statist or neoliberal” (p. 520). The author further explains that populism operates differently for the different poles in the political spectrum: it “[…] implies a kind of demagogic agitation in right-wing criticism, while, for left- wing critics, it denotes the subornation of socialist struggle to common prejudices, assumptions and habits, as displayed in some fascist movements. It is ideologically ambiguous” (p. 520).

It is possible to affirm that populism attempts to go beyond the idea of ideology, due to its transversal political logic, which is centred on the principle of popular sovereignty (Postill, 2018). As well as the idea of transversal political logic, populists claim to break with the idea of party politics, advocating the idea that they represent the people, leaving aside the divisions established by Right and Left. As explained by Nadia Urbinati (2019),

while populists resist being identified, and while they claim to propose visions of popular interests that are alternative - either exclusionary nationalist (right wing) or radically inclusive (left wing) - they still have the populist style of political action in common. Left-wing forms of populism claim to be inclusive (for instance, of new immigrants) and antiprotectionist; in this sense, they are the opposite of right-wing nationalist populists. But they do not make their claim in the name of democratic promises - rather, they frame it as a movement of opposition against the establishment, much as right-wing populism does. Neither Right nor Left or beyond Right and Left is the common denominator of today’s various populists. (p. 204)

Urbinati (2019) argues that it is necessary to understand the populist ambition of transcending Right and Left divisions as an essential step to make the process of factionalism viable.

Populism is a factional phenomenon, due to its claim of politics being a fight for supremacy between two different groups, which in essence is the idea of dualism that shapes populism as a phenomenon that excludes by creating a division in society.

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In Bejamin Moffitt's (2016) conception, populism sees the people as its central audience, as well as the true holders of sovereignty. The idea of dualism for the author consists of a dichotomic opposition, which positions the elite as an idea of enemy of the people, characterized in different figures in different contexts (the Establishment, the system, minority groups, immigrant workers, asylum seekers, etc.). Moffitt (2016) explains, “[…] it is ‘the elite’

or ‘the Establishment’ that is the source of crisis, breakdown, corruption or dysfunctionality, as opposed to ‘the people’ who in turn have been ‘let down’, ‘ripped off’, ‘fleeced’, rendered powerless, or badly governed” (p. 44).

The idea of dualism is also advocated by Ernesto Laclau (2007) who explains the idea of populism as an opposition between two parts. According to the author, this idea can be best understood by the antagonistic characteristics that are present in populist discourse: the position of the people against the elite, or the idea of an underdog against an oppressive block. Politicians that are inclined towards populism claim that they are the ones to represent the people against the oppressive part, the elite, which has failed to deliver the demands by the people, or in other words, the will of the people. As Laclau (2007) observes, this dichotomic arrangement is clear for the fact that:

populism requires the dichotomic division of society into two camps – one presenting itself as a part which claims to be the whole; that this dichotomy involves the antagonistic division of the social field; and that the popular camp presupposes, as a condition of its constitution, the construction of a global identity, out of the equivalence of a plurality of social demands. (p. 83)

A fundamental point in Laclau’s theory is the distinction between the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence, which helps to further understand the idea of dichotomic division. The logic of difference can be understood as the logic of ordinary politics, in which different sectors of society have demands, and the hegemonic political bloc gain legitimacy by addressing such demands via the construction of alliances, coalitions and negotiation to make the overcoming of differences possible. The idea of equivalence, on the other hand, can be characterized by the demands not being fully satisfied, creating the perfect condition for populists to build an idea of equivalence, an idea of opposition between the people and the bloc in power (Hallin, 2019).

Such notion is useful to understand populist discourse, and necessary in this study, for the fact that it is one of populism’s defining features. As Laclau (2007) explains it, the idea translates into the “[…] formation of an internal frontier, a dichotomization of the local political spectrum through the emergence of an equivalential chain of unsatisfied demands” (p. 74).

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The dualism operated by populism is radical due to the fact that it excludes and fragments, emphasizing the dualism between the “pure” and the “inauthentic”. According to Urbinati (2019),

The people is the part: it is an entity with a social and substantive meaning that includes only the “ordinary” people, not all people, and certainly not the political establishment.

Clearly, only one “part”—the ruling few and their acolytes—is expunged from the ordinary and authentic many. This because that part, in the populist mind, negates the other(s). In practical terms, this kind of radical polarization serves to justify calls to force the existing political class out of power. This is a task that populists achieve through a representative process that relies on a strong leader: someone who is as “pure”

of political power as “his” or “her” people. The dualism between “impure”

establishment and “pure” people, therefore, is only apparently moral. (p. 50/51)

The Centrality of the Leader

In Urbinati’s (2019) explanation, the leader is presented as a strong aspect that deserves to be defined. The leader must be understood as a figure that is capable of unifying claims, of representing the people and becoming the voice of the collective. These characteristics take to the notion of embodiment of the people which is the idea that relates to populist leaders’ claim of authority. In their rhetoric, populists employ a constant idea of condemnation against those they consider their enemies, the corrupted, the immoral. Their claim is that they are to bring the true people to power, giving them a divine status. Therefore, as well as being the voice and body of the people, these leaders also claim to be the only authority able to bring the right people back to power.

Populists rely on practices that allow them to build and develop these strategies in society.

Urbinati (2019) explains such notion by presenting the idea of a tendency towards holism, that according to her, makes populists rely on a constant need to keep the people mobilized around issues they choose to focus on or stress. There is a constant need for instability, a constant feeling that anti-populists are conspiring against the people, which leads populists to be in a constant campaigning mode.

The populist leader has a variety of characteristics: they can be considered saviours or heroes with the mission to save the real people, they can be seen as charismatic figures or extraordinary

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The populist leader plays the role of the “reconstructor of authority,” not merely that of counterpower. Not by chance, this leader emerges in times of social distress, which see the decomposition of traditional representation. This does not mean that he replicates mandate representation and party democracy, though: he “absorbs” the collective body in his person and acts “as” the people, which is the condition for him to act “for” the people. This further distinguishes this leader from any ordinary party representatives, who would never claim to be “like” and speak “as” their people in order to act “for”

them. (Urbinati, 2019, p. 118)

These ideas of Ordinariness and Extraordinariness are also discussed by Benjamin Moffitt (2016) who explains that populists must play both the role of an ordinary and extraordinary leader. They must project themselves as having political experience, as being an insider to politics, while also an outsider, in this way playing a contradictory game. As Moffitt (2016) states, the idea of extraordinariness must be blended with ordinariness, since “[…] populism is ultimately about ‘the people’, so populist leaders must be able to present themselves as possessing outstanding leadership qualities – that is, extraordinary – as well as being of ‘the people’ – that is, ordinary” (p.57).

From this perspective, the idea of ordinariness functions as a way of distancing the populist leader from other politicians, creating the idea that the populist is an outsider, in an attempt to dissociate themselves from the elite, technocratic or “political as usual” as Moffitt (2016, p.58) indicates. This performance of ordinariness is nothing more than a rhetorical and aesthetical matter.

Extraordinariness, on the other hand, can be understood in the way populists present themselves as figures that can solve problems, intending to sacrifice for the people they represent or symbolising the idea of a sacred saviour of the people. Regarding this topic, Moffitt (2016) states that

in populism, the leader does not simply represent ‘the people’ but is actually seen as embodying ‘the people’. […] In ‘doing’ populism, populist leaders attempt to present themselves as strong, virile and healthy in order to present ‘the people’ as strong and unified. This is because within populism, ‘the people’ are a homogeneous and united collective body who ultimately find their voice through the populist leader. (p. 64) Ordinariness and extraordinariness play, as has been explained, an important role when it comes to the way populist leaders present themselves. These characteristics lead to a scenario where not only the discursive content used by populist leaders matter to understand their strategies,

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but one in which it is essential to explore the aesthetical and performative practices that are present and define the populist phenomenon. For this reason, it is important to understand the idea of populism as a political style as put forward by Moffitt (2016). According to the author, the phenomenon of populism as a political style is used by different actors in different contexts.

The definition of populism as a political style is not new, having been addressed before, but never fully developed.

Moffitt (2016) presents the definition of political style as “[…] the repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performance made to audiences that are used to create and navigate the fields of power that comprise the political, stretching from the domain of government through to everyday life” (p. 38). It should be stressed that such idea encompasses both rhetoric and aesthetics aspects related to populism. The relevance of performance within politics is a central point of Moffitt’s idea, having some overlapping aspects with the idea of populism as a discourse, but going beyond. As the author explains:

political style’s focus on the performative folds in a number of discursive features, such as use of language, speech, written texts and so forth. However, political style also moves beyond these features, taking in aesthetic and performative elements that the discursive approach does not take into account, including images, self-presentation, body language, design and ‘staging’. There is a clear distinction here: while discourse approaches focus primarily on discursive ‘content’ and have a tendency to side-line the ways in which this ‘content’ is presented, framed, performed, enacted or broadcast, the pollical style approach is sensitive to both features. It recognizes that ‘style’ and

‘content’ are linked, and that both need to be acknowledged. (Moffitt, 2016, p.40)

Having understood the idea of populism as a political style and the relevance of performance for this approach, it is possible to present the idea of bad manners, a notion that helps understanding manifestations by populists and how their performance is structured. What Moffitt (2016) calls bad manners is characterized as the disregard that populist leaders have towards following the appropriate ways of acting in the political realm. Bad manners can thus

“[…] manifest in a number of different ways, including self-presentation, use of slang, political incorrectness, fashion or other displays of contempt for ‘usual’ practices of ‘respectable’

politics.” (Moffitt, 2016, p. 58). In other words, bad manners can be understood as the way in which politicians present themselves, ways that can be unexpected, or as Moffitt puts it, in more colourful ways, transforming the leader into a performer.

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Bad manners can also take the form of political incorrectness. This can be understood as the populist leaders’ practice of mentioning the unmentionable, their claim to be saying what everyone thinks. Its opposite, political correctness, is usually associated as a feature of the elites, whose practices are maintained within the boundaries of what is considered expected behaviour. To summarize the point,

The central point is that it is populists’ performances – not just their policies. Ideology, discourse or so-called content of their populism – that are disruptive to ‘mainstream’

politics. […] We assume that they should be polished, professional, composed and ‘play the game’ correctly. In short, we expect them to have ‘good manners. As such, the unpolished, seemingly off-the-cuff ‘bad manners’ of populist leaders can appeal in an era when political performances often seem homogenous, circumscribed, stage- managed and predictable across the political spectrum. (Moffitt, 2016, p. 61)

The idea of bad manners is directly related to the figure of the leader. Populism can exist without a party or a movement but not without a leader whose image becomes the symbol that represents populism. As relevant as this idea, is the fact that populist leaders are often seen as extraordinary or an embodiment of the people. As argued by Moffitt (2016), the populist leader enjoys a position of celebrity or messiah-like status from the audience’s perspective, seen as a representative, able to channel their will and desires.

An interesting aspect associated with the power or strength put on the leader in populism is the name of the leader becoming a representation of the populist regime, as indicated by Urbinati (2019). As the author claims, the name of the leader becomes an element vital in the construction of a popular subjectivity, with a strong homogenizing function and the role to constitute the collective, which leads society to find a principle of identification in the name of this same leader. “[…] This leader carries (out) the people and becomes its voice and figuration”

(p.117). In this same context, the notion of the leader as an embodiment of the people becomes ever so strong as “all populist leaders stage a representative performance, which makes them capable of being seen and accepted by their people as the embodiment of those same people”

(p.123).

Considering the image of the leader and its representation as an embodiment of the people, where even the name becomes a homogenizing symbol, it is possible to present an important concept in Laclau’s theory, the idea of empty signifiers. Drawing from Ferdinand de Saussure (2011), who defines language as a system of signs, in which the sign is the combination of a

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signifier, for instance a sound, and a mental concept, which represents the signified. This combination results in an understanding or a meaning. As Laclau (1996) explains, “we know, from Saussure, that language (and by extension, all signifying systems) is a system of differences, that linguistic identities – values – are purely relational and that, as a result, the totality of language is involved in each single act of signification” (p. 37). The idea of an empty signifier, therefore, can be defined as a signifier without the signified, a place constitutively irrepresentable within the system of signification that remains empty, but, as the author points out, it is an emptiness that can be signified, for the fact that it is a void within signification (Laclau, 2007). According to Gerbaudo (2018), empty signifiers allow populists to fuse together disparate demands. “[…] They attempt to overcome a situation in which people are fragmented along multiple class and identity lines, trying to make people aware of their common interests and common enemies ( p. 751).

In Laclau’s (2007) explanation, the name of the leader becomes the point of identification of the group, a point of singularity derived from heterogeneous elements kept equivalentially together, that is, “the equivalential logic leads to singularity, and singularity to the identification of the unity of the group with the name of the leader” (p. 100). In this scenario emerges the figure of the populist leader, whose role can be related to the idea of empty signifier for the fact that they represent a structural function of an empty signifier of unity (Hallin, 2019; Arditi, 2010) and. In Bolsonaro’s case, his name becomes the representation of Bolsonarismo, and he himself the leader and point of identification for the group. To summarize such notion in a clear way:

under populism, the name of the leader begins to act as an empty signifier in which ‘the people’ can lay their various demands and complaints about the system. Because of their shared opposition to the system, these demands become linked in what Laclau calls an

‘equivalential chain’ under the name of the leader, and thus it is through the leader that disparate identities become symbolically linked together as a new political subject –

‘the people’. (Moffitt, 2016, p. 53)

The People

In this context where the leader represents a central figure for equivalential unity, the people emerge as an essential piece necessary for the completion of the dichotomic arrangement. The conception of the people can be understood from Laclau’s (2007) perspective, whose

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the underprivileged. […] in order to have the ‘people’ of populism, we need something more:

we need a plebs who claims to be the only legitimate populus – that is, a partiality which wants to function as the totality of the community” (p. 81).

Laclau (2007) discussed the process of discursive construction of the people, which he explains as having been built from a missing, the lack of a fulness which is necessary for the harmonious continuity of the social. This lack is decisive to the construction of the people, due to the fact that without it, an antagonism could not be constructed. In Laclau's (2007) words:

without this initial breakdown of something in the social order – however minimal that something could initially be – there is no possibility of antagonism, frontier, or, ultimately, ‘people’. This initial experience is not only, however, an experience of lack.

Lack, as we have seen, is linked to a demand which is not met. But this involves bringing into the picture the power which has not met the demand. (p. 85/86)

As Laclau (2007) points out, a demand is always attributed to an actor, whose duty is to fulfil demands. Failing to fulfil them sets the ground for the dichotomic idea presented here: the plebs see themselves as the populus, “the part as the whole: since the fullness of the community is merely the imaginary reverse of a situation lived as deficient being, those who are responsible for this cannot be a legitimate part of the community […]” (p.86).

Populism and Democracy

Having identified the main characteristics of populism, namely, the idea of dualism, the power of the leader, the importance of the people opposed to the establishment, a good way to proceed is by presenting populism’s relationship with democracy, for the fact that populism features aspects that are directly related and opposed to it.

As has been argued up to this point, populism revolves around anti-establishment and anti- pluralism attitudes which claim to have moral monopoly over representation. Such notion puts populism in a concerning position in relation to democracy as

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populism is therefore intrinsically anti-democratic as it challenges the very foundations of modern democracy: the polyphony of the people, political representation and pluralism, and the recognition of intermediate institutions. In the populist conception of politics, the people are envisaged as homogeneous, morally pure, and with nothing in common with the immoral, corrupt, and parasitic elites. According to the author, this vision illustrates a concerning relationship between populists and democracy: for populists, all other representatives of citizens are illegitimate in one way or another.

(Berville, 2017, p. 2)

The debate around the effects of populism in relation to democracy has its pros and cons. Some authors advocate that populism is a part of democracy, an element that is itself important in democratic contexts, even considered a normal pathology or the purest form of democracy (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012), while others believe populism uses democracy and transfigures its foundations (Urbinati, 2019).

Some aspects of populism place it in a position that shows its negative sides. As argued by Mudde & Kaltwasser (2012), among the negative aspects of populism is the fact that it can, with its claim of popular sovereignty, undermine the ‘checks and balances’ and the vital separation of powers in liberal democracies. As well as that, populism tends to ignore minority rights by claiming the notion of the rule of the majority. It also undermines the formation of political coalitions through the antagonistic cleavage created between the populists versus non- populists, and creates an idea of moralization of politics, which makes compromise and consensus hard to be guaranteed. Populism also has a tendency to hang towards the plebiscitary transformation of politics, which puts the legitimacy of vital political institutions in check.

Finally, populism’s anti-elite thrust promotes the shrinkage of the political, causing the contraction of the effective democratic space. A good way to summarize this complicated relationship between the two ideas is the notion that

it might be the case that populism emerges partly as a product of the very existence of democracy. Since the latter is based on the periodic realization of free and fair elections, it provides a mechanism by which the people can channel their dissatisfaction with the political establishment. At the same time, democracy generates aspirations, which if not satisfied might well lead to political discontent and thus a fertile soil for the rise of populism. […] there are good reasons to think that populism follows democracy like a shadow. (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 17)

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Populism and Social Media

This section focuses on the way populists make use of social media and what the main characteristics of this proximity are. In Moffitt’s notion of populism as a political style, an aspect that helps understanding the approach further is the idea that the media has become a central stage for contemporary populism. The author presents an explanation of populism’s relationship with traditional media, its friend and foe aspects, and how traditional means such as television is still relevant for populism, due to the fact that it is a performative phenomenon.

However, for the purposes of this thesis, the focus will be on the newer aspects of the media landscape, which have a major importance in current times. The internet nowadays represents a new power of which political leaders, not only populists, have taken advantage and opportunities to channel their ideas through social media networks.

The idea of mediation, Moffitt (2016) explains, is an essential point and cannot be put aside since cotemporary populism is not merely a direct or unmediated phenomenon when it comes to the way the people and populism interact, on the contrary, “[…] populist representations of

‘the people’ rely on a complex process of mediated claim-making between populist leaders, audiences, constituencies and media” (p. 96).

The concept of mediation, according to Roger Silverstone (2002), can be described as an uneven but fundamental dialectical process in which the different types of institutionalized media of communication, press, radio, television, and the internet, are an important part of general circulation of symbols in social life. He explains the idea of mediation being an uneven dialectical process

because while it is perfectly possible to privilege those mass media as defining and perhaps even determining social meanings, such privileging would miss the continuous and often creative engagement that listeners and viewers have with the products of mass communication. And it is uneven, precisely because the power to work with, or against, the dominant or deeply entrenched meanings that the media provide is unevenly distributed across and within societies. (Silverstone, 2002, p. 762)

In this context, Moffitt (2016) explains that there are two main changes that took place and must be addressed: populists no longer rely on traditional media outlets as the stages for their performative practices, and the more permeable and flexible geographical limits of their

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performances. The latter will not play a relevant role for the focus in this thesis, while the former should be scrutinized.

Populist actors have the possibility to leave aside traditional media by being able to contact their audiences directly via social media networks, turning the internet and social media into an important asset for their political organization and mobilization. According to Moffitt (2016),

“such sites and platforms allow populist leaders and parties not only to distribute their message more easily and freely but also to portray a sense of immediacy, closeness and intimacy with their followers, giving the appearance of direct accountability and representation” (p. 89). As the author further explains, populism takes advantage of this “new media galaxy” (p. 92) for three reasons: the idea of dichotomisation of the political flourishes in online environments such as, blogs, comment sections and other platforms in the Web 2.0; the notion of bad manners becomes evident in communication via online messages and posts on different platforms, that now find an easier channel to go viral through the internet; and finally, the glorification of the people is seen in these environments, where non-elites gain a special status and common sense takes the place of expert knowledge.

Moffitt understands mediation as an idea that goes against what the literature on populism establishes – the idea that the populist leader relies solely on a type of direct connection with the people in an unmediated way. However, a more complex setting exists, one in which mediation has a central role, since the idea that the mediation populists take advantage of nowadays has transformed itself. The experience of direct face-to-face interaction between citizens and their representatives has given place to a mediated form through media channels such as television and internet. “Rather than ‘real’ immediacy with political representatives, we instead now have a ‘simulation of immediacy’ or ‘virtual immediacy’ aided by channels of mediation” (Moffitt, 2016, p. 100).

As the author further explains, the notion of a “virtual immediacy” coincides with the imaginary identification of populist representation, that is, “[…] the presumption of enjoying a direct relation with the people and the imaginary identification of the latter with the leader”. This sense of directness or immediacy, however, does not mean that forms of mediation disappear from populism or other forms of representative politics” (Moffitt, 2016, p. 100).

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The idea that the construction of the people relies to some extent on mediated images is a relevant point, as it represents an essential feature in the way contemporary politics function, that is, images and the idea of a spectacle are blatant in the claims certain politicians make to speak in the name of the people. Mediated images are essential in the construction of the people.

They are presented as simplified and schematic mental representations that focus on who represents the legitimate people utilizing an aesthetics that is easy to grasp (Moffitt, 2016).

In this same context, the use of symbolism is also present in the attempt to spread the idea of the heartland. This symbolism combines elements that evoke sentiments and emotions, as well as vague and blurry aspects, in the sense that they lack any rational basis. It is represented by flags, signs, colours and other aspects that evoke complex notions of the heartland, combined with a sense of homogeneity and cohesion in the people. As explained by Moffitt (2016),

“visual representations of ‘the people’ also give the heartland a certain sense of ‘concreteness’, strongly implying presence and corporality – and thus existence – of ‘the people’” (p.104).

Such idea connects to the perspective of Michael Billig’s work on banal nationalism, where the author advocates the idea that the concept of nationalism has been transformed into something unnoticed in our realities, a power that has supposedly lost its importance, but as argued by him, still reproduced and is ready to be triggered if needed. As stated by Billig (1995),

Because the concept of nationalism has been restricted to exotic and passionate exemplars, the routine and familiar forms of nationalism have been overlooked. In this case, ‘our’ daily nationalism slips from attention. There is a growing body of opinion that nation-states are declining. Nationalism, or so it is said, is no longer a major force:

globalization is the order of the day. But a reminder is necessary. Nationhood is still being reproduced: it can still call for ultimate sacrifices; and, daily, its symbols and assumptions are. (p. 8)

The last aspect about mediation that must be addressed is how the transmission of performance takes place. On the one hand, traditional media do have an importance in this regard, being a significant and important means through which, depending on the level of support, populism is portrayed positively or negatively. On the other hand, new media has a broader reach in terms of addressing the voice of the people in relation to populist claims, owning to the fact that new media can be multidirectional. Therefore, both traditional and the new media have a multifaceted role when it comes to their relationship with populism, the role of broadcasting populist claims to the people, but also to judge the legitimacy of these same claims. This leads

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to a scenario where the “[…] mediated representations of ‘the people’ have been short-fused: a populist actor makes a claim to represent ‘the people’, but rather than those who identify as ‘the people’ answering the claim, the mass media judges the claim for them, and speaks on their behalf.” (Moffitt, 2016, p. 110), which in turn shows that mass media acts both as the mediator of the image and voice of the people simultaneously.

In this context, the idea of mediatization of politics is an important aspect. According to Jesper Strömbäck and Frank Esser (2014), mediatization of politics can be understood as a process of increase in the importance of the media and its effects on political processes, involving institutions, organizations and political actors, or as Stig Hjarvard (2013) argues, the political, including its institutions, becoming gradually dependent on media and its logic.

The author further explains that the mediatization of politics is characterized by double-sided development, in which media integrates daily practices of political organizations and in the communication of political actors, serving different political ends. Moreover, “[…] the media have evolved into a partly independent institution in society that controls a vital political resource in democracy: society’s collective attention” (Hjarvard, 2013, p. 43).

In a context where politics become mediatized and media constitutes an important aspect in relation to the political scenario of society, it also becomes necessary to acknowledge the importance of Web 2.0 and take into consideration that politics have become an online practice in the current era. Taking to the online environment as a space, or even a new version or extension of the public sphere that in our times has significant power, has become a must for political actors. It is possible to affirm that “before the advent of the internet, interaction (not simply communication) used to entail some sort of physical presence. It also involved a vivid experience of the public sphere, as different from a private one. The internet changes this radically.” (Urbinati, 2019, p. 179). Social Media has changed the way connectivity happens, enabling users from around the world to express themselves, which in turn has modified democratic process and the public sphere itself (Flew & Iosifidis, 2020).

As Urbinati (2019) points out, “the revolutionary condition of ‘digital networks’ is one of several factors behind the populist renaissance” (p. 178). Social media and populism have a