Royal Military Academy, Military Academy Karlberg,
Brussels Stockholm
Sweden’s future military capabilities
A study of possible consequences in a ten-year perspective
Cdt Kristine Rohlén
Supervisor: Lt Col Bruno Janssens
This bachelor thesis comprises 18 ECTS and is included as a compulsory part of the Swedish National Defence College Officers’ Programme 2011-2014 (180 ECTS) at the Military Academy Karlberg, Stockholm
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?" "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.
"I don’t much care where--" said Alice.
"Then it doesn’t matter which way you go," said the Cat. "--so long as I get SOMEWHERE," Alice added as an explanation. "Oh, you’re sure to do that," said the Cat, "if you only walk long enough."
Acknowledgement
I would like to give thanks to my supervisor Lt Col Bruno Janssens for sharing some of his extensive knowledge of the field of World Politics with me.
I wish to acknowledge the support from the staff of the Department of Conflict Studies, particularly the general assistance provided Mj Koen Troch.
I also want to acknowledge Ingrida Leimanis from the Swedish National Defence College who provided valuable guidance. Her language support was invaluable in the making of this thesis.
Finally I would like to thank my family. As always your encouragement is the best support I can imagine.
Abstract
This thesis will look at possible consequences that ”new” threats to Sweden’s security might have on the development of military capabilities in a ten-year perspective. By using a method of a comparing content analysis the study first examines three sub-questions. These three questions represent where Sweden is now, what they might come to face and finally possible routes that they might take. The three sub-questions, or chapters, each contributes with data, which will be beneficial when studying the central research question, “What are possible consequences of ”new” threats to Sweden’s security on the development of military capabilities in a ten-year perspective?” When presenting the answer to this research question, the study suggests four possible consequences to Sweden’s future military capability development that might occur if the factors presented in the sub-questions are not taken into consideration. These are;
• The cost for Sweden to develop new military capabilities becomes too high. • Sweden cannot meet the time requirement to develop new military capabilities. • Sweden does not have the ability to receive or give military support.
Table of content
1. Introduction ... 7
1.1 Purpose and research question ... 8
1.1.1 Central research question ... 10
1.1.2 Sub-‐questions ... 10
1.2 Method ... 10
1.2.1 Systematising ... 11
1.3 Material ... 11
1.4 Previous research ... 12
1.5 Concepts and definitions ... 13
1.5.1 Security ... 13
1.5.2 ”New threats” ... 14
1.5.3 Military capabilities ... 15
1.5.4 The six scenarios ... 16
1.5.5 The Five Avenues ... 18
1.6 Research limitations ... 19
1.6.1 Ten-‐year period (2014 – 2024) ... 19
1.6.2 Military capabilities ... 20
1.6.3 EU as the sole international perspective ... 20
2. Analysis ... 21
2.1 What are the existing conditions for development of military capabilities in Sweden and the EU respectively? ... 21
2.1.1 A EU shared military capability ... 21
2.1.2 CFSP ... 22
2.1.3 CSDP ... 23
2.1.4 Other organisational obligations ... 24
2.1.5 Sweden’s military capability ... 25
2.1.6 Comprehensive approach ... 26
2.1.7 The economic perspective ... 27
2.1.8 Pooling and sharing ... 30
2.1.9 Results and discussion ... 32
2.2 What are the threats and how do they correlate to those identified by the EU for the same time-‐period? ... 34
2.2.1 Threats identified from a Swedish perspective ... 34
2.2.2 Russia ... 34
2.2.3 The Baltic Sea region ... 37
2.2.4 The Arctic ... 38
2.2.5 Long-‐range precision weapon systems ... 39
2.2.6 Energy ... 39
2.2.7 IT technology and cyber security ... 40
2.2.8 Threats identified from a EU perspective ... 41
2.2.9 The correlation between the perspectives ... 42
2.2.10 ISSUE report nr. 16 Scenarios ... 43
2.2.11 Threats to the European homeland ... 43
2.2.12 Threats to critical infrastructures overseas ... 43
2.2.13 Aggressive regime in the Middle East ... 44
2.2.14 Results and discussion ... 44
2.3 What organizations could contribute to Sweden’s future military capability development? ... 47
2.3.1 EU ... 47
2.3.2 UN ... 49
2.3.4 Nordic defence cooperation – NORDEFCO ... 51
2.3.5 Results and discussion ... 53
2.4 What are possible consequences of ”new” threats to Sweden’s security on the development of military capabilities in a ten-‐year perspective? ... 55
2.4.1 The cost for Sweden to develop new military capabilities becomes too high. ... 56
2.4.2 Sweden cannot meet the time requirement to develop new military capabilities. ... 57
2.4.3 Sweden does not have the ability to receive or give military support. ... 59
2.4.4 Sweden must have a continued emphasis on its own defence industry. ... 60
2.4.5 ISSUE Report nr. 16 avenues ... 61
2.4.6 Results and discussion ... 63
3. Conclusion ... 64
4. Suggestions for further research ... 65
1. Introduction
When reading literature, articles and other documents that address the current and future threats to security there is one re-occurring theme; this is the ever changing evolvement of these threats and how it is becoming increasingly difficult to not only identify but more importantly to prepare for these threats and how to increase the possibility to be able to react to them in time and finally, how to eliminate them.
The security challenges we are facing today are numerous, complex, interrelated and difficult to foresee: regional crises can occur and turn violent, new technologies can emerge and bring new vulnerabilities and threats, environmental changes and scarcity of natural resources can provoke political and military conflicts. At the same time, many threats and risks spread easily across national borders, blurring the traditional dividing line between internal and external security.1
This thesis intends, not just to re-establish the belief that threats to security are changing, but to look at the possible consequences this could have on Sweden’s security policy and in turn how it will, or perhaps should, effect the development of military capabilities. The capability perspective is highlighted considering how the availability of military capabilities inevitably shapes the way that nations can handle threats to their security.
The world as a whole faces increased volatility, complexity and uncertainty. A multipolar and interconnected international system is changing the nature of power. The distinction between internal and external security is breaking down.2
As these words from the European Council illustrate, it is a prerequisite, in order to investigate a national perspective, to also investigate this issue in a global context. Particularly since Sweden in 2009 implemented a new security policy with an increased emphasis on solidarity.3 This was a natural development considering the ratification of the
Lisbon treaty that encompasses the mutual assistance obligation4 and arguably this is an especially interesting development in the direction that Sweden’s security policy has developed considering the country’s history of neutrality. Issues that concern the change in
1 European Commission, Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector: A new deal for European defence, Brussels: European Commission (2013), p.7
2 Ashton, C., Preparing the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence
Final Report by the High Representative/Head of the EDA on the Common Security and Defence Policy, Brussels: EEAS (2013), p.1
3 Proposition 2008/09:140, Ett användbart försvar. Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet
4Official Journal of the European Union C2007/306/01, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Lisbon: EU
direction of Sweden’s security policy have been the subject of plenty of other research and this thesis will instead focus on how this history might affect the future.
Threats recognized in a global context pose several challenges to policymakers today. One of these is, as identified by the quote below, that not only is there a discussion regarding what could, or should be regarded as a threat, but also how to prioritize what threats to prepare for.
[…] that while there is a loose consensus that the combination of new wars, proliferation, terrorism and non-military security threats constitute a new global security agenda, there is little international agreement on the priority and hierarchy that should respond to these problems […]5
But perhaps the most difficult aspect of this whole conundrum is in what way nations, in a time of a receding economy and reduced defence budgets, should prepare militarily for the threats to security that they have identified. There are several alliances, agreements and common policies and it is of great interest to consider how this joint effort affects the individual nations’ capability to defend itself and for this thesis, Sweden will be looked upon as an example of this.
1.1 Purpose and research question
Concerning the continuing globalization occurring at this time in history, it is of great relevance to examine how globalization is affecting future threats to security, both nationally and internationally. However, for this study the consequences on the military aspects are the part that will be examined.
In order to study future threats to security one must try to establish the factors shaping our future, and globalization is one such factor. The relevance of this is described by Ian Clark, who studies globalization and its connection to international relations, as presented in this quote “What is interesting for Clark is the way that security is being reshaped by globalization and the changes that this is creating for the security agenda of states.”6
5 Cottey, A. Security in 21st Century Europe. 2nd edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2013), p.35 6 Baylis, J. Smith, S. Owens, P. The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations.
Additionally it has been over 13 years since the EU first established the predecessor for CSDP, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Sweden has participated in several ESDP operations and has expressed that its commitment to the EU and the CSDP is of a central role for Sweden’s domestic security.7
Security and defence policy is still national policy, according to Article 4 of the Treaty of European Union8, but Sweden, as most of the EU member states, is coordinating these policies in the framework of CFSP/CSDP. The growing importance of this was demonstrated when the European Council had its first meeting in five years dedicated to common defence and security issues in December 2013.9 The outcome of this meeting generated three themed objectives for the EU to focus on regarding the development of the current CSDP. These are; increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP; enhancing the development of capabilities; and strengthening Europe's defence industry. There is also another meeting planned in June 2015, and the European Council has expressed that the purpose of this gathering is to ‘assess concrete progress’ regarding the future of CSDP.10
Moreover, voices have been raised regarding disappointment in the outcome of the long awaited European Council meeting on CSDP.11 Both the meeting and the reactions to the
outcome bring relevance to this research since it points towards a belief that CSDP, as it now stands, does not correlate to the changes in security threats that are continuously occurring. Furthermore, as identified by the European Council, development of capabilities, suited for responding to future threats and risks, is a priority for the EU and therefore the CSDP and finally the national security and defence policy of the member states.
In May 2013, a Swedish commission released a report on the future for Sweden’s foreign and security policy, “Vägval i en globaliserad värld”12. They have also been assigned to prepare a report on the future defence policy; this report was delayed due to the current circumstances in Ukraine but was eventually released in May 2014.13 The reports are to be used as a 7 http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/10/09/87/e611b8f5.pdf (visited 2014-03-30) 8 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:d1b6b3e1-17dc-4d21-9a47-30b523bc1710.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (visited 2025-05-26) 9 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140214.pdf (visited 2014-03-30) 10 Ibid. 11 http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/en/outcomes-december-defence-council (visited 2014-03-30) 12 Ds 2013:33, Vägval i en globaliserad värld. Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet
foundation for a new Defence Bill, (Försvarspolitiskt Inriktningsbeslut) for the Swedish Armed Forces. This new Defence Bill is to be implemented not later than 2015.14
The focus of the thesis is to highlight possible consequences to the development of military capabilities recognized by Sweden in comparison to what the EU has identified as a common focus for the member states. In order to emphasize these both official and unofficial documents, reports and statements will be compared in order to achieve as wide of a perspective as possible.
1.1.1 Central research question
• What are possible consequences of ”new” threats to Sweden’s security on the development of military capabilities in a ten-year perspective?
1.1.2 Sub-questions
• What are the existing conditions for development of military capabilities in Sweden and the EU respectively?
• What are the threats and how do they correlate to those identified by the EU for the same time-period?
• What organizations could contribute to Sweden’s future military capability development?
1.2 Method
In order to conduct research that answers this study’s central research question as accurately as possible, a qualitative method will be used. This is based on the fact that this method is more commonly used when trying to find a relation between a few subjects rather than large quantities of sources as described in the book Political Research – Methods and Practical Skills “Qualitative research tends to be based on the discursive analysis of more loosely coded information for just a few cases.”15, and such is the case in this thesis.
14 http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/495/a/203076 (visited 2014-03-30)
15 Halperin, S. Heath, O. Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012), p.7
Furthermore, the nature of the research question requires interpretation of information in order to find a possible answer and this is in accordance with a hermeneutic approach. Considering that the following is stated about this method; “Today, ‘hermeneutics’ refers to theories and methods that are used in the interpretation of texts of all kind.”16, and since interpretation will be necessary in order to answer the proposed research question, a ‘hermeneutic approach’ is an appropriate method for this study.
More specifically the interpretation will take the form of a “content analysis method.”17 Since the main research question is to identify “possible consequences” the content of several sources must be analysed in order to have accurate data available for comparison and from that it might be possible to derive an answer for the proposed research question.
1.2.1 Systematising
This thesis consist of one central research question, and in order to find an answer, three additional sub-questions have been formulated. By structuring the study in this way, it will hopefully contribute to building up a greater understanding for the circumstances that might help explain the results of the central research question, which should add value to the discussion.
Moreover, see point’s 1.5.4 and 1.5.5, they have been acquired from the ISSUE report nr. 1618
and will be used as a framework for a complementing analysis, in order to have a common denominator with which to compare the obtained results from several different materials as presented below.
1.3 Material
The five main sources used in the study are selected in order to generate a broadened selection of relevant data for the content analysis comparison:
• Försvarsdepartementet. Försvarsmaktens redovisning av perspektivstudien 2013
16 Halperin, S. Heath, O., (2012), p.40 17 Ibid., p.40
18 Rogers, J. Gilli, A. Missiroli, A. (red.) Enabling the future European military capabilities 2013-2025: challenges and avenues, Report nr. 16. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies (2013)
• Försvarsdepartementet, Vägval i en globaliserad värld (2013)
• Andrén, Krister. Krigsavhållande tröskelförmåga – Det svenska försvarets glömda huvuduppgift? (2014)
• European Council 19/20 December 2013
• EU Security Strategy 2003 “Dec 08 Council Decision on Implementing ESS”
1.4 Previous research
Earlier research related to this field has mainly been focused on the development of the Swedish security policy, and predominantly on its relation to the history of neutrality. In 2013 Cdt Dan Lundquist wrote a thesis on ”Swedish Security & Defence Policy 1990-2012”19 In that thesis the following quote reads;
By identifying factors (both internal and external) that have affected Sweden’s actions and policymaking, the thesis provides an understanding of the gradual conversion from neutrality, isolation and national defence to military non-alignment, cooperation and international operations. The thesis discusses a future renationalisation in international relations and identifies difficulties with Sweden’s policy of being militarily non-aligned in peacetime aiming for neutrality in wartime.20
Lundquist’s research is definitely related to the focus of this thesis, which is to investigate how possible threats to Sweden’s security will affect future capability development, and in order to investigate, it is of relevance to understand what constitutes a threat to security in Sweden and how the nation’s security policy is shaped thereafter. So the aspects that have shaped the constitution of Sweden’s security policy and the results of Lundquist’s written assignment should be taken in consideration whilst researching the questions of this thesis. Furthermore, Magnus Christiansson, employed at the Swedish National Defence College, has written a report analysing the relationship between sovereignty and solidarity and the consequences for Sweden’s security policy.
The conclusion of this analysis is that the Swedish security policy discourse currently could be interpreted as a two-dimensional game of solidarity and sovereignty, and that this perspective challenges the notion that a change of identity is necessary for a lasting change in security policy.21
19 Lundquist, D. Swedish Security & Defence Policy 1990-2012: The transformation from neutrality to solidarity through a state identity perspective. Brussels: Royal Military Academy (2013)
20 Ibid., p.4
21 Christiansson, M. Solidarity and Sovereignty – The Two-Dimensional Game of Swedish Security Policy. Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College (2010), p.1
This duality that he speaks of is also linked to the topic of this thesis. By comparing domestic and global issues, sovereignty and its impact on how domestic security policy and military capabilities correlates to a multi-state cooperation such as the EU is part of this research.
1.5 Concepts and definitions
In order to find the most accurate answer as possible to our research question, there are several concepts that need to be emphasized and suitably defined. The following paragraph will therefore contain necessary explanations to such concepts in order to have a common understanding of meaning before further analysis can commence.
1.5.1 Security
The definitions of security differ quite extensively depending on what source you are consulting. But today there are two main categories into which security has been divided. The first and by many considered the traditional definition of the concept is that of a “national security”, this definition was broadly accepted during the time of the Cold War and its focus was mainly on military aspects.22 More recent research, however, claims that the definition of security must contain a much wider perspective and should include subjects of interest such as “political, economic, societal, and environmental as well as military aspects”23
This focus on non-military security has in recent years grown and formal documents such as the EU’s first official security strategy document from 2003 includes “[…]poverty, disease,
dependence on transport, energy and information infrastructure, state failure and organized crime as security threats.”24
If the wider perspective on what constitutes security is taken into consideration, the effect on what threats to that security have on the development of specifically military capabilities is still of significance. Military capabilities might still be the most appropriate instrument in managing a threat, even though the threat might be considered as non-military.
22 Baylis, J. Smith, S. Owens, P., (2011), p.230 23 Ibid., p.230
1.5.2 ”New threats”
Since the end of the Cold War, the view on what constitutes a threat to security has altered. The main concern has shifted from the fear of “total war” to more asymmetrical threats such as terrorism. Some argue that the EU and NATO respectively together constitute a “European security community” and that the mere existence of such a community prevents a full scale “total war” in Europe.25
As a consequence, the existence of a security community in the western half of the continent is the defining feature of the new European security order, not only precluding war between its members but also acting as a dominant pole of attraction for most of the continent.26
Europe has certainly tried to adapt to these changes considering the fact that several different reforms have been carried out. “With the end of the Cold War, EU countries have implemented a variety of reforms concerning their defence and military structures which have allowed them to adapt to the new international system and its related challenges.”27 But even so, one must consider the possibility that these changes have not been enough to ascertain capabilities that can withstand the challenge of meeting the “new threats” to security. This thesis intends to further examine more comprehensively what both Sweden and the EU consider as “new threats” or “challenges”.
”What is less clear, given the relative shrinking of many European militaries, is whether they would be able to respond (by themselves or with a little help from their friends and allies) to potential new challenges which might manifest themselves by 2025”28
Concerning the relevance of research on future threats, one issue is certain: the most dangerous threats are those that have not yet been identified, although there is still value in the effort of doing so, as illustrated by the following quote;
However, given the amount of ‘strategic surprises’ the international community has had to grapple with over the past twelve years – from 9/11 to local insurgencies, from maritime piracy to the ‘Arab Spring’, from cyber-attacks to commando-type terrorist actions against civilians (in Mumbai or Algeria) – these scenarios may come to constitute a useful mental map to play with and bring along.29
25 Cottey, A., (2013), p.60 26 Ibid., p.14
27 Rogers, J. Gilli, A. Missiroli, A., (2013), p.5 28 Ibid., p.25
1.5.3 Military capabilities
The concept of military capabilities contains several different aspects. For this thesis the main definition will be the one presented in the report Measuring National Power in the
Postindustrial Age30 where in the chapter titled “Measuring military capability” one argument
presented is;
The notion of military capability as the output level of national power is premised on the understanding that a country’s military organizations receive national resources and transform them into specific warfighting capabilities.31
This “warfighting” that is mentioned could of course be used for other purposes such as catastrophe relief aid, or crisis management but it is noteworthy that even though the purpose of the capability may differ, the capability should be dimensioned for war.
Moreover, it is ascertained how military capabilities are instruments that leaders of a country have at their disposal to fend against threats and also possibly use against their enemies. The following quote illustrates how military capability is labelled as an output from what resources the military is given from their respective government.
The framework for examining military capability as the output dimension of national power is patterned analogously to the larger framework for assessing national power. It seeks to identify the strategic resources a military receives from the government it serves; the variables bearing upon the means by which these resources are converted into effective capabilities; and, finally, the capabilities of the combat force itself understood via a spectrum of warfighting competencies that may be attained to a greater or lesser degree and which may be compared across countries.32
30 Tellis, A. Bially, J. Layne, C. McPherson, M. Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age. Santa Monica: RAND (2000)
31 Ibid., p.134 32 Ibid., p.135
Finally, the following illustration shows the different elements that together can be described as military capability, and these are elements that we will consider when examining the consequences “new threats” will have on Sweden’s military capabilities.
Illustration 1.33
1.5.4 The six scenarios
All six scenarios and the threats that they pose to European security have been obtained from ISSUE report nr. 1634.
1st Scenario - Threats to the European homeland
This threat is quite self-explanatory. If a nation in any way threatens or attacks European territory this should be considered as a threat to the European homeland. Special emphasis is placed on cyber-attacks and intelligence gathering as something that could be quite dangerous.
2nd Scenario - Critical instability in South-East Asia
This possible scenario is valid in case one specific country continues to develop rapidly and in this process gains to much power so that an imbalance occurs in this region. Considering that Europe has several trade agreements and therefore an economic and naturally also a
33 European External Action Service. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/index_en.htm (visited 2014-05-25) 34 Rogers, J. Gilli, A. Missiroli, A., (2013), p.25
humanitarian interest in South-East Asia and maintaining the balance there, a continuation of this development could be considered a threat to European security.
3rd Scenario - Power struggle in the Indo-Pacific
Again the issue of imbalance is of interest. If a power struggle in the Indo-Pacific area leads to the creation of client-states, by giving support in the fields of economy, politics and military, the effect could be a full scale war in the Arabian sea area.
4th Scenario - Humanitarian emergency in Central Africa
In this scenario a small country in Central Africa has been as a result of several different circumstances, such as economic instability, and the effect is uprisings by a group of minorities. These revolts are directed towards the country’s leaders and they spread rapidly. The consequence is that the military is sent in to restore the stability in the cities, but unfortunately, the opposite happens and the minorities rally. The result for Europe is widespread outrage and a public demand for action against crime against humanity.
5th Scenario - Threats to critical infrastructures overseas
If an actor manages to establish weapon sites, consisting of artillery and rocket batteries, at critical geographical points, such as the Suez Canal they could gain control over that area. If they then threaten to attack commercial vessels the effect would be increasing insurance premiums or escalated costs because of re-directions and new routes. This would in turn result in European shipping companies, and energy corporations demanding action from Europe’s decision makers.
6th Scenario - Aggressive regime in the Middle East
The last scenario and threat is focused on what would happen if a unpredictable regime in the Middle East would attain nuclear capability and if the range of this threat would be sufficiently far to threaten European territory. If the regime in question would like to expand its reign and mount incursion into a smaller neighbouring and pro-western country, the effect would be an increased unstable situation, which would need attention from European leaders to ensure security.
1.5.5 The Five Avenues
In the ISSUE report nr. 16 the following avenues are presented as different capability options necessary to be considered in order to succeed in developing military capabilities to counter the threats previously discussed. Or as quoted;
From these ends, the Report has derived five capability options, or rather avenues, which should be understood as cumulative (not necessarily mutually exclusive) sets of solutions – or means – that work around a dominant logic, namely the way in which those means can be achieved.35
The following avenues are quoted directly from the report in order to assure that the meaning of them does not get lost from transcription and use them as a common denominator whilst conducting the comparative content analysis.
1st Avenue - Consolidation
Implementing consolidation to generate military efficiency. In times of crisis, restructuring is necessary. Some member states need to achieve net savings from their military expenditure while others must liberate resources from old equipment to allocate to new capabilities development. Thus, the first option suggests a coordinated reduction of redundant and obsolete capabilities to generate immediate and future savings.36
2nd Avenue - Optimisation
Favouring optimisation to boost military (cost-) effectiveness. Defence cooperation in Europe has often neglected operational needs, with deleterious economic and commercial (let alone military) consequences. This option suggests giving priority to those needs, through either specialisation among and across military services or procurement procedures that emphasise theatre needs.37
3rd Avenue – Innovation
Promoting innovation to enhance military technology. Innovation is not only a source of efficiency and effectiveness, but also of technological advancement – and thus of more incisive armed forces, as military history abundantly proves. This option proposes relatively simple solutions to promote innovations and thus expand the EU’s combined military capabilities.38
4th Avenue - Regionalisation
Framing and regionalisation to bolster width and depth. Some EU countries seem particularly keen on working with their neighbours, or partners who share a similar approach. Such targeted (bilateral or mini-lateral) integration could lead to payoffs in the maintenance and acquisition of a wider spectrum – and, to some extent, greater depth – of military forces, especially if such ‘islands’ of cooperation are coordinated at EU level.39
35 Rogers, J. Gilli, A. Missiroli, A., (2013), p.35 36 Ibid., p.6
37 Ibid., p.7 38 Ibid., p.7 39 Ibid., p.7
5th Avenue – Integration
Moving towards integration to further increase depth and to elevate sustainability. Bringing together the member states’ armed forces under an EU-wide force structure would create sizeable overall military capabilities, enabling Europeans to vastly boost their logistical capacity, thus allowing them to undertake the most demanding operations that the future security environment could require.40
1.6 Research limitations
1.6.1 Ten-year period (2014 – 2024)
The first research limitation in this study is that of the time frame for the research being restricted to a ten-year period. There are several reasons for this selection.
• The first is the problem of looking ahead to far into the future. Possible future scenarios are a difficult field to exercise, and the longer the time period investigated the smaller the possibility becomes of having made the correct estimation. Therefore this study will only focus on a ten-year period from 2014 to 2024.
• Secondly, this study will, to a great extent use the ISSUE report nr. 1641 and the scenarios and avenues presented as results within it as a method of comparing with Sweden. In the said report the authors have chosen to focus on the time period 2013 to 2025 and therefore this thesis will focus on almost the same time period.
• And thirdly, several different reports have recently been published in Sweden largely based on the common belief that different circumstances in Europe call for a new Defence Bill. The fact that these reports are published and that changes to policies are being discussed both nationally in Sweden and in Europe, indicates that we are facing changes and therefore the chosen time period is of great interest.
40 Rogers, J. Gilli, A. Missiroli, A., (2013), p.7 41 Ibid.
1.6.2 Military capabilities
The study of the ”new threats” will demonstrate that ensuring security can only be achieved in a comprehensive way, using all instruments available in a coordinated way. This study will only focus on the contribution of military capabilities.
1.6.3 EU as the sole international perspective
Furthermore another limitation in this study is that the EU will be the main representative of the international perspective. Other alliances such as NATO or the one existing between the Nordic countries could also have been incorporated within the study but the focus will be on the EU. The main reason for this is naturally that Sweden is a member state in the EU and not NATO. However even though the focus is on the EU it is of interest to investigate the reason as to why Sweden has chosen not to pursue a NATO membership. Additionally it is of interest to investigate how Sweden’s involvement in the EU relates to the national security policy or vice versa.
2. Analysis
2.1 What are the existing conditions for development of military capabilities in Sweden and the EU respectively?
There are several different aspects that have shaped and continue to shape the conditions of future development of military capabilities. In order to answer this sub-question it is necessary to look at some of these different aspects and by doing so examine the conditions for both Sweden and the European Union when it comes to future development of military capabilities, since it is necessary to know the current situation in order to determine possible future consequences.
2.1.1 A EU shared military capability
It is commonly known that the USA has the largest military force in the world. What is not as unilaterally recognized is that the EU, when counting all of the member states’ national military forces, they together constitute the second largest military force in the world, ahead of both Russia and China.
Contrary to current conventional wisdom and media reports, the European Union as a whole still is, de facto, the world’s second strongest military ‘power’, encompassing two nuclear powers, highly effective conventional medium powers, and several smaller states with substantial military capabilities of their own.42
Even if this is the case, and seemingly a good foundation to start building a shared military capability, there are several aspects that unfortunately create problems when trying to actually put together a joint EU military force in practice.
Together Europe has many capabilities that are a prerequisite for modern warfare, however the resources are scattered over many states and often they exist in a limited amount. Europe has relatively large quantities of forces, but it has limitations in the quality, mobility and responsiveness. Therefore communication and collaboration is conducted within the EU, NATO, and the Nordic countries and with the USA.43[own translation]
There has been considerable hesitance for a while now regarding the direction in which Europe seems to have been heading. However, there seems to be a consensus regarding the need for clarification on how security in Europe should be managed. This becomes tangible
42 Rogers, J. Gilli, A. Missiroli, A., (2013), p.9 43 Ds 2013:33., p.47
when studying the discussions in some of the latest meetings that have taken place, both within the European Council and the European Defence Agency. At the most recent EDA meeting in March 2014, the Greek Minister of Defence, Dimitris Avramopoulos, during his opening remarks, shared his views on the relation between the concept of solidarity within the EU and its possible effect on the perception of national sovereignty.
Despite the concerns about the possible loss of national sovereignty that managing and developing military capabilities together may entail, I fully agree that Europeans are already losing sovereignty by not consolidating, not optimizing, not innovating, not regionalizing and not integrating their military capabilities. Without these joint developments, they risk losing their ‘strategic autonomy’.44
A very concrete example of an ambition to create a joint military capability that has transformed from theory to practice is the EU Battlegroup concept, which was declared fully operational in 2007.45 The general idea of the EU Battlegroups is to ensure that Europe has the capacity of a rapid military response, in case such a capability should be needed. As of yet no Battlegroup has been deployed, even though several conflicts have met the qualifications for a military response to be carried out. The reason for this is by some considered to be related to the protection of one’s own interests.
On several occasions member states opposed the use of ‘their’ Battlegroup (and the risk of casualties among their soldiers) when they did not consider the proposed CSDP operation as essential for their own foreign policy interests.46
This is a clear indication that, in order for a joint military capability to be effective, the governing principles and policies needs to be absolutely clear and be consented by all members that have a share or part of the capability.
2.1.2 CFSP
In 1993, the common foreign and security policy was established in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty.47 This was an important first step towards a shared foreign policy within the Union. However, the purpose of the CFSP was initially regarded differently by individual nations.
44Schoeffmann, E. Allan, T. Acting on defence capability gaps, European Defence Matters - A magazine of the
European Defence Agency, Issue 05 (2014), p.17
45 Keukeleire, S. Delreux, T. The foreign policy of the European Union. 2nd edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2014), p.177
46 Ibid., p.178 47 Ibid., p.46
For many member states the main rationale was to allow the EU to manage interstate and inter-institutional dynamics within the Union and not, or not primarily, to deal with the outside world.48
By looking at what regions the CFSP focuses on we can learn something regarding the interests of the member states. And this distinctive interest could also function as an explanation to the reason behind such a nations actions and decisions in policy making. Considering the diverse cultural history that exists in Europe and the lack of motivation from many member states to join their military forces together, it is not an uncomplicated foundation for the development of a European CFSP. And even though there have been several efforts to strengthen the idea of the need for a CFSP, Försvarsberedningen honestly notes; ”The effective and unanimous foreign policy that was foreseen in the Lisbon treaty has not yet come to full effect.”49 [own translation]
If we take into account the consequences of a conflict of interest between nations regarding a perceived threat, it is clear that in order to build an effective joint military capability, the security policy that constitutes its function must be unconditionally clear to all parties. And this is perhaps the hardest step to achieve in this context, or as Försvarsberedningen expresses it; ”The challenge continues to lie in uniting the member states in the structuring of common foreign policy related positions”50 [own translation]
2.1.3 CSDP
There has existed a resistance towards a common security and defence policy in Europe for a long time. Already in the 1950s, there was a failed attempt to ratify a document called “the European Defence Community Treaty”.51 Since then however it seems that although Europe
has come to an agreement, there is in fact a need for a joint European security policy recognised by all the Union’s members. In the 1990s, due to the escalating conflicts in the Balkans, the need for a European security and defence policy was again raised and extensively discussed, and in the year 2000 the ESDP was adopted.52
48 Keukeleire, S. Delreux, T., (2014), p.156 49 Ds 2013:33., p.62 50 Ibid., p.64 51 Keukeleire, S. Delreux, T., (2014), p.172 52 Ibid., p.172
This was an important step towards a shared military capacity. The motive behind the ambition to establish such a policy was; “[…] the Union must have the capacity for
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so”53 In 2008 the ESDP was reworked, restructured and also renamed as CSDP.54
There is a growing concern that Europe does not have the necessary military capabilities to operationalize its CSDP and, as a consequence, is still too dependent on US military assistance, as demonstrated during the military intervention to manage the Libyan crisis in 201155. This has been one of the driving forces behind the emphasis from several nations on a well-functioning CSDP.56
2.1.4 Other organisational obligations
There is perhaps one issue that stands out as the most problematic when it comes to deciding the course for an assurance of Europe’s future security; this is the different alliances, both military and political, which already exist within Europe today. Countries that are members of NATO are naturally devoted to that organisation’s joint military force in the first hand; this is partly due to NATO’s origin since many consider it primarily a military alliance.
The cooperation between the EU and NATO on the security- and defence arena has an especially important role, since 22 of the EU’s 28 member states (from the second quarter of 2013) are members in NATO.57[own translation]
The Swedish Armed forces are quite blunt in their report when they express disbelief in unification within the EU on the subject of a common defence. They also recognize the influence NATO undoubtedly has had considering once again the many European nations with double membership. This has led to NATO becoming the standard for almost all military capabilities, since many nations already have dimensioned their military forces according to their NATO alliance. There is no strong argument for producing a unique EU military standard considering the enormous economic consequences the adaptation towards two separate military standards would entail for each separate member state.
53 Cottey, A., (2013), p.110 54 Keukeleire, S. Delreux, T., (2014), p.172 55 Cottey, A., (2013), p.98 56 Ibid., p.111 57 Ds 2013:33., p.55
Today there is little that indicates that the states within EU can unite around the development of a common defence. NATO is, for a majority of the European states, a higher priority concerning a national defence and Försvarsberedningen states in their report 2013 that NATO’s standards and technology constitutes the foundation for defence cooperation within the EU.58 [own translation]
Försvarsberedningen is also quite straight forward in its statement that NATO has been the focus for many states; ”Several member states have prioritized the defence cooperation within NATO. In addition, the on-going economic and financial crisis has been the central concern for politicians.”59 [own translation]And the many different obligations and organisations that exist in Europe today certainly affect the ability to develop and uphold a joint European military capability.
However, it could also be helpful that a state has a double membership since any development of military capabilities, be it in the framework of the EU or NATO, would be beneficial for that state to use in both organizations.
2.1.5 Sweden’s military capability
With the disappearance of the Eastern bloc, Sweden decided to limit its neutrality to military non-alliance, join the EU for economic reasons and also help shape a new European security order60
The effect of this has meant quite a transformation for the Swedish Armed Forces. It has changed from a large force consisting of conscripts and dimensioned for protection against invasion, into a small force of professional soldiers with the new focus of preserving international peace and security (including crisis management) and thus engage in international operations.61 This transformation has logically also contributed to a radical
change in the areas concerning military capabilities; and the effects are now becoming quite evident.
In 2012, the Swedish Supreme Commander, Sverker Göransson was quoted in the media with
58 FM2013-276:1, Försvarsmaktens redovisning av perspektivstudien 2013, Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, p.12 59 Ds 2013:33., p.67
60 Wyss, M. Military transformation in Europe’s neutral and non-allied states. The RUSI Journal, Vol 156 (2011), p.47
61 FOI-R-3852-SE,Andrén, K. Krigsavhållande tröskelförmåga – Det svenska försvarets glömda huvuduppgift? Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet (2014), p.20
the following statement; “Sweden could independently defend itself against a military attack for no longer than a week or so. To survive beyond that, the country would need outside help.”62 This was the starting point of a debate regarding the current state of military capabilities in Sweden. To some, this statement was considered an exaggeration made in order to generate attention to the issue, for others the statement was considered to be an underestimation.63
Apparently the Swedish Armed Forces have a different perspective than the government and politicians on what is an adequate military capability, and the defence minister also claimed in the wake of General Göransson’s statement;
[…] the Swedish government, and especially Defence Minister Karin Enström, have sought to give assurances that the capabilities of the armed forces as well as the defence budget are at an adequate level.64
Sweden has had a strong defence industry for a long time, and this can be contributed to the nation’s will to remain self-sustaining after the Cold War.65 When the relationship between the Government and the Swedish Armed Forces was reviewed, the importance of the continuation of a strong defence industry was addressed. The value of this is also considered to be a source of influence on other nations.
The committee would like to emphasise that the defence industry has a central role in Swedish defence policy. This gives Sweden influence and meaning in our pursuit to integrate by security and defence cooperation’s with other countries.66 [own translation]
2.1.6 Comprehensive approach
The concept of a comprehensive approach has recently become well known. It is an idea that is based on the notion that there are several different methods that should be used in order to manage crises and conflicts in the most effective way. The EU, as previously mentioned, is not primarily seen as a contributor of a substantial military force, but instead its main ability lies within other fields of expertise. This reasoning transpires in the UK House of Lords’
62 Salonius-Pasernak, C. Swedish defence illusions are crumbling: The changes in Swedish defence policy - necessitate a debate about NATO prior to the Finnish parliamentary elections in 2015, FIIA Comment, Vol 6 (2013)
63 Ibid. 64 Ibid.
65 RiR 2014:8, Försvaret – en utmaning för staten Granskningar inom försvarsområdet 2010–2014, Stockholm: Riksrevisionen, p.19
report concerning the value of the EU;
[…] its strength lays in operating smaller-scale, complex interventions where a mix of political weight, economic know-how, development, security sector training and sometimes a military capacity is needed.67
The High Representative of the European Council, Catherine Ashton, released a report in 2013 with the objective of further explaining and strengthening the idea of a strategic context, based on the European Security Strategy from 2003. In this report the notion of a comprehensive approach is emphasised as one of the main priorities that must be developed and strengthened in order for Europe to meet the security challenges it is facing.
The comprehensive approach - the use of the various instruments at the disposal of the Union in a strategically coherent and effective manner - must also apply to capability development, to make best use of scarce resources.68
In a communication released by the European Commission the concept of a comprehensive approach is explained in the following terms;
The EU is stronger, more coherent, more visible and more effective in its external relations when all EU institutions and the Member States work together on the basis of a common strategic analysis and vision. This is what the comprehensive approach is about.69
However, it does appear as if official policymakers are now trying to strengthen the military aspect of the comprehensive approach, and this change is certainly of interest to this study.
2.1.7 The economic perspective
When bearing in mind military capabilities there is naturally an economic perspective that should be taken into consideration. The financial acquisitions of a nation certainly regulate what can be budgeted for new military capabilities. The reality today is unfortunately that the economic perspective has become rather grim. ”Over the past decade, European defence budgets have been declining steadily. The current financial crisis is exacerbating the situation and results in further uncoordinated cuts.”70
67 Keukeleire, S. Delreux, T., (2014), p.147
68 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140214.pdf (visited 2014-05-25) 69 European Commission. Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council - The EU's
comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, Brussels: European Commission (2013), p.3 70 http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/final-p-s_30012013_factsheet_cs5_gris (visited
For a long time the on-going decline of the European member states military capabilities is of central importance. As is the case in Sweden, shrinking defence budgets combined with a reformation with emphasis on international crisis management ability is also the case for them. The earlier extensive territorial NATO-defence of the European continent is today fragmented.71 [own translation]
It is not surprising that a harsh economic climate, caused in part by a financial crisis, leads to decreasing budgets. However, what is more alarming in this context is the uncoordinated way that nations carry out these defence budget cuts. This could have substantial long-term effects on military capabilities, not only from a national perspective but also for the whole of Europe; and the numbers are clearly visible from which this conclusion is derived.
The crisis in public spending induces cuts in defence budgets, which exacerbate the situation, in particular, because they are neither co-ordinated nor implemented with regard to common strategic objectives. From 2001 to 2010 EU defence spending declined from €251 billion to €194 billion.72
Not only is the budgetary situation not favourable for development of new military capabilities, but the very nature of these capabilities poses a challenge as well. To counter the new threats to security, which can emerge in the future, the standard and quality of the military capabilities dimensioned to do so must be high.
Defence budgets are falling, and the cost of modern capabilities is rising. These cost increases come from the long-term trend of growing technological complexity of defence equipment73
When taking into consideration that those new generations of capabilities probably bring with them an increase in the costs of acquiring such means, it is evident that this could lead to problems. This was addressed by General Håkan Syrén in his keynote speech in 2012, where he revealed his view on how to remember the challenges of increasing acquisitions costs “As a Chief of Defence I used the rule-of-thumb that new generations of capabilities double in price every 15-20 years.”74
Furthermore, when there are large investments that have to be made in order to acquire the proper capabilities there is also another aspect that is of great importance to take into account; 71 Andrén, K., (2014), p.11 72 European Commission, (2013), p.7 73 Ibid., p.7 74http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1749978/ceumc_keynote_speech_cyprus_presid_seminar_19_sep2012 _2012.pdf, p.2 (visited 2014-05-25)
this is the time of development. Developing new military capabilities is a time consuming project and therefore, by nature, something that should be coordinated to ensure the highest outcome.
Minister Søreide for example underlined the positive effects of better co-ordinating long-term equipment planning-cycles. It can take between 15 and 20 years to plan, specify and take delivery of a submarine for example, one of the most costly of all military capabilities.75
The current situation is, as has been discussed, considered by many to be grim and there is doubt that anyone, except for some optimistic politicians, expects Sweden to have the adequate military capabilities to be able to deter a possible enemy from attacking, and taking responsibility in managing crises and conflicts. However there has just recently been an occurrence concerning this particular aspect and this should also be mentioned.
On the 15th of May Försvarsberedningen released their second and final report “Försvaret av Sverige - Starkare försvar för en osäker tid”76intended to be used as a guideline for the development of a new defence bill in 2015. This report has been much anticipated and as previously mentioned, it was delayed due to Russian activities in Ukraine.77 These recent events also seem to have shaped the content somewhat since the Ukrainian crisis is mentioned throughout the report and is also attributed as the motive for some of the recommendations that Försvarsberedningen presents, and the tone is at times quite sinister.
The Russian aggression towards Ukraine and the illegal annexation of the Crimea is the largest challenge against the European order of security since it was established a quarter of a century ago.78
The main difference from this report and the one released earlier is that it focuses on the analysis of future security policies, which is evident when Försvarsberedningen gives recognition to the need of strengthening Sweden’s ability to defend itself. The title of the report, which translates into “The defence of Sweden – A stronger defence for an uncertain time” [own translation] clearly reflects this. Moreover, it is also stressed that the Ukrainian crisis could affect Swedish security as well.
75Schoeffmann, E. Allan, T., (2014), p.9
76 Ds 2014:20, Försvaret av Sverige – Starkare försvar för en osäker tid. Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet 77 http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/495/a/203076 (visited 2014-05-20)
Crises or incidents that also contain military means of power can arise and looking further into the future, threats of military attacks can never be excluded. Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine means that the risk for such events has increased, also in our immediate area.79
According to the report the existing conditions might change in a not so distant future. It is the first proposal in a long time to raise the defence budget and this is going against a general European trend.80
2.1.8 Pooling and sharing
In 2010, Sweden in collaboration with Germany, released a petition after a meeting of the EU defence ministers in Ghent (Belgium) where the issue of strengthening Europe’s military capabilities was discussed, and that plea has become known as the ”Ghent initiative”81 The
background for the initiative was stated as;
Given the steady increase in both investment and operational costs in the defence sector, combined with declining defence budgets, it will be difficult for some nations to sustain all military capabilities needed without cooperating.82
Furthermore the main purpose of this was to bring attention to the benefits of a joint European capability both in relation to development and management described as;
The goal of the initiative is to preserve and enhance national operational capabilities – with improved effect, sustainability, interoperability and cost efficiency as a result. It could even make possible a broadening of military capabilities.83
The reasoning behind this is that the circumstances in the world today demand a new view on how development of new capabilities should be managed. It is not only the current financial climate and the continuing globalisation that need to be taken into account. As previously mentioned, the time aspect also plays a large part, since future conditions do not seem to make the climate for national development easier.
During the following 5-10 year period the assessment is that the economic development
79 Ds 2014:20., p.21 80 http://www.foi.se/en/Top-menu/Pressroom/News/2012/Defence-spending-in-the-wake-of-the-budget-crisis/ (visited 2014-05-20) 81http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260511deseinitiative_/sede26051 1deseinitiative_en.pdf, p.1 (visited 2014-05-25) 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid.
