Whose Peacebuilding? The post-liberal, hybrid peace and its critiques in Northern Ireland and the Border Region with the EU Peace III Fund

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Peace and Conflict Studies III Bachelor 12 ECTS Tutor: Ivan Gusic

Malmö University

Whose Peacebuilding?

The post-liberal, hybrid peace and its critiques in Northern

Ireland and the Border Region with the EU Peace III Fund

“Hands Across the Divide”, Londonderry/Derry (diego_cue, 2011)

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Abstract

Post-liberal, hybrid peace, a new model of peacebuilding, aims to step away from the top-down imposition of liberal peace. In order to recognise the local, the new model considers the interaction between the international and the local as a dynamic power interaction, through which the means and ends of peace can be mediated. Yet, it has already been criticised for its theoretical underpinnings which would, ultimately, impede it to achieve its objectives. This thesis aims to determine the concrete impacts of the elements pinpointed by the critiques. It adopts an alternative focus on both the programme itself and the affected population’s perspectives. Through an instrumental case study of the EU Peace III Fund’s peacebuilding in Northern Ireland and the Border Region, the thesis highlights that these critiques can take different, practical forms. It enables to unveil the importance of exploring the affected population’s perspectives, of the initial context as well as the external peacebuilder’s belief that it knows, still, what is best over the affected populations.

Key words: case study, post-liberal peace, hybrid peacebuilding, EU Peace Fund,

Northern Ireland Words: 13838

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Abbreviations

EU European Union IRA Irish Republican Army

NISRA Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency NGO Non-governmental organisation

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1 Introduction

How to build peace, and what kind of peace, is at the core of the debate about peacebuilding. Since the end of the Cold War (Richmond, 2011:1), the liberal peace framework was considered to be the most efficient, universal blueprint to ‘repair’ post-conflict societies. The model concentrated on building up (neo)liberal state institutions, economies and societies that resembled the Western ones (Mac Ginty, 2008:114). From the mid-1990s, as the liberal peace started to be criticised with the movement of the ‘peace from below’ (Leonardsson, Rudd, 2015:826), a new model was discussed: the post-liberal peace model. This model is meant to turn away from (neo)liberal, top-down Western-based programs which fail to take root and build sustainable peace (Richmond, 2011). It aims to counteract the issue of an externally-imposed peacebuilding detached from local realities and needs. To do so, its advocates redefine the relationship between international organisations (intervening for peacebuilding) and the local society affected by conflict. They see it as interactive, a process by which both define the peace to be sought (Richmond, Mac Ginty, 2015; Richmond 2015). This model intends to incorporate and even base peacebuilding on a bottom-up process, in which the variety of local agencies and perceptions of peace are recognised (Richmond, 2011; Visoka, Richmond, 2017:114). It inscribes itself in the general ‘local turn’ aiming at recognising and building peace according to the ‘local’ (Leonardsson, Rudd, 2015:834). Yet, today, this renewed interest in the ‘local’ is criticised as being a set of buzzwords that are, in reality, not applied in practice (De Coning, 2013:1).

Research problem

The current debate seems to revolve around the question of how one builds sustainable peace embracing local realities? Post-liberal peace is part of this debate, advanced as the model that will enable a constructive relationship between international agencies, and local populations in peacebuilding. Hybridity, a part of this model, is increasingly used in policy (Barguès-Pedreny, Randazzo, 2018:1548) and applied in the practice of peacebuilding. Nevertheless, there are already several critiques against it, claiming that the theoretical standpoints behind the model inherently impedes it to achieve its objectives (see Barguès-Pedreny, Mathieu, 2018; Sabaratnam, 2013; Randazzo, 2016).

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The underlying matter that is tackled in this thesis is: does the current state of the art of peacebuilding tackle the necessary points to develop a peacebuilding theory for a sustainable, local peace to be built? When looking at the critiques of one of the current peacebuilding models — post-liberal, hybrid peace —, are the issues that they pinpoint, indeed, an impediment to effective, sustainable peacebuilding, and for a peacebuilding tailored to the affected populations?

Research aim

The aim of this research is to determine the concrete impacts of the elements of the post-liberal, hybrid model that its critics identify as counter-productive. By analysing a concrete case of such peacebuilding, it aims to determine if, and how, it affects the peacebuilding process. Ultimately, it aims to contribute to the current debate about peacebuilding, by offering an alternative, concrete analysis of what the current model and its critics theorise about.

Research design

To do so, this thesis synthesises the critiques of the post-liberal, hybrid model into a theory. Then, it is applied on the European Union (EU) Peace III fund in Northern Ireland and the Border Region (2007-2013) through an instrumental case study. To provide a complete analysis, this research studies both the programme itself and the perspectives of the affected populations on the peacebuilding it implemented.

Research question

The leading research question is the following:

- How do the issues raised by the critics of post-liberal, hybrid peace concretely affect the peacebuilding process?

In order to answer it, the research firstly tackles the following operational questions:

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- Can the issues raised by the critics of post-liberal, hybrid peace be found in the peacebuilding programme of the EU Peace III Fund in Northern Ireland and the Border Region? If yes, what form did they take?

- Were they observed by the affected population? If yes, what were the effects on the peacebuilding process, from their perspective? Did they consider it as impeding or enabling the peacebuilding process?

Relevance to Peace and Conflicts Studies

While the academia of Peace and Conflict Studies theorises about the right model for peacebuilding, the practice of the field can take different forms than what it imagined. Today, many authors develop on how peace and conflicts are inherently complex on the ground (see for instance Nordstrom, 2004). Reality, practice and theory must dialogue for the field to elaborate models that are as developed as possible. As Linklater stated (1998:10): « normative arguments (…) are incomplete without a parallel sociological account of how they can be realised in practice (…) and normative and sociological advances are incomplete without some reflection on practical possibilities ». Moreover, Peace and Conflict Studies as well as the practice of peacebuilding has been criticised for its partiality and eurocentrism (see for instance Mac Ginty, 2008). Inscribing itself in this debate, this thesis investigates such biases and aims to provide an alternative take on it, to contribute to the overall study of Peace and Conflicts and its practice.

Delimitations

As much as this thesis aims to assess the debate without taking specific standpoints, other than that peace should be sustainable and tailored to the affected populations, the research’s potential biases must be reflected on. Born and raised in a Western society with negative peace (see Galtung, 1969), despite making endeavors towards critical stance towards Western academia, my background could influence the interpretations carried out during this thesis. The method chapter intends to clarify and shed light on the underlying logics behind any interpretations that are made. Besides, as the research is made of a desk review and uses analyses made by other authors in the context of other researches, the thesis is not as detailed and complete as it could be. To counterbalance such limitations, this thesis combined different perspectives, using as much data sources as possible.

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Thesis outline

After this introductory chapter, the thesis secondly discusses the issues raised by the critics of post-liberal, hybrid peace in a literature review. Thirdly, these critiques are synthesised and re-organised into a theory. Fourthly, the method employed during this research as well as the choice of the case is elaborated on. Fifthly, a short background on the conflict in the island of Ireland and on the EU Peace Fund is provided. Sixthly, the analysis of the case is carried out. Lastly, the concluding chapter reflects on the outcomes of the research.

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2 The critiques of post-liberal, hybrid

peace

Post-liberal peace, and more precisely hybridity, is increasingly used in peacebuilding but also is already criticised. The model recognises the variety and importance of local agency in peacebuilding, and redefines the relationship between international peacebuilders and local agents. It becomes a dynamic interaction made of opposition, resistance and adaptation, cooperation and compromise (Richmond, Mac Ginty, 2015; Richmond 2015). Peace becomes the product of this interaction, ideally recognised as legitimate on all levels — international, regional, national and local (ibid.:16). But the critics affirm that the theoretical standpoints behind the concept lead to several issues: it maintains and exacerbates difference, favours a Western perspective, and fails to tackle power relations.

Difference

First of all, critics argue that the theoretical framework of post-liberal peace encompasses an emphasis on difference that it precisely sought to overcome. Barguès-Pedreny and Mathieu (2018:289) identify differentiating processes in the model’s interest in the ‘local’, and the interaction with ‘international’ actors. Difference is seen as « indispensable for building peace ». But as it aims to go beyond difference by conceptualising peacebuilding as an interactive process between all actors, it involves the very determination of it: it requires the identification of what makes the difference. It reifies it and essentialises it « as inescapable » (ibid.). Similarly, Randazzo (2016:1360) claims that the concept of hybridity necessarily involves the identification of lines of difference. Despite the model’s efforts to embrace the complexity and entirety of the ‘everyday’ and blur the lines that run along actors, the ‘international’ and ‘local’ identities are constrained in a binary way. This binary distinction involves a homogenisation of the two (ibid.:1359) — whereas it can be argued that both international peacebuilding agencies and local communities are made of individuals from various backgrounds and holding various identities.

In continuation to these arguments, Sabaratnam (2013) finds the source of this differentiation in eurocentrism. She highlights that the ‘international’ is seen as culturally distinctive to the ‘local’: the liberal West is opposed to the

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non-modern and non-Western local (ibid.:266-267). This difference is considered as fundamental by the proponents of the model and at the centre of the challenges of peacebuilding (ibid.:267). She sees this as the replication of eurocentrism’s processes, where other ‘civilisations’ are presented as culturally different in order to fabricate Western distinctiveness (ibid.:267-268). Consequently, despite its efforts, the post-liberal model still focuses on what the ‘locals’ ‘are’, their essentialised ‘culture’ — rather than for instance on what they « do », the « political » (ibid.: 272). Therefore, the post-liberal, hybrid model is criticised for being based on difference, dividing and categorising actors in a binary, essentialised way— the contrary of what it initially aimed for.

In response to this criticism, Richmond and Mac Ginty argue that a distinction should be made between the theory and the current applications of the concept. Drawing on post-colonial arguments (Richmond, Mac Ginty, 2015:4), they conceptualise hybridity as a dynamic power interaction between the external intervener and the ‘locals’ (ibid.:10-11). In their opinion, this theoretical conception cannot be instrumentalised in practice (ibid.:2-3) and they distinguish it with what could be its practical applications: hybrid politics and hybrid peace. Hybrid peace is the « mediation » of ‘local’ and ‘international’ scales and norms, institutions, law, rights, needs and interests, and can generate either negative or positive hybrid peace (Richmond, 2015:51). Yet, even though they distance their conception and application of hybridity with its current applications, they do not address the critiques about the limitations of hybridity — not more than affirming that it was the first step for the field to evolve beyond binaries (Richmond, Mac Ginty, 2015:5). What the critics identify as problematic is that the very concept does not escape the identification and separation of actors along binary, essentialised distinctions — a tendency that reflects a Western mindset, the critics argue.

Western, liberal standpoints

Subsequently to the previous argument, critics highlight the underlying Western standpoints in the post-liberal theoretical framework. Barguès-Pedreny and Mathieu (2018:289) argue that since the identification of difference is made by referring to one’s own normative frameworks, this difference is perceived through a Western lens — the ‘normal’. The different other is then stigmatised as deviant (ibid.). They see this differentiation as the continuity of the Western attitude towards difference: either assimilating and therefore silencing difference, or seeing difference as inferiority, stigmatising the different one who must be transformed (ibid.:290). In their opinion, in the post-liberal model, the different ‘local’ is seen as abnormal and in need of change.

Additionally, Randazzo (2016:1361) highlights that the way the model differentiates still transcribes normative aspirations about how societies should be

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— that is, Western-like. Notably, this is exemplified in how the model selects the actors appropriate for the bottom-up, ‘local’ peacebuilding. She observes that the people considered as ‘locals’ with agency are strictly non-violent, peace-promoting agents, with multicultural claims — disregarding other forms of violent resistance (ibid.:1356). For her, this entails a potential for marginalisation that contradicts the model’s aim to include the ‘locals’ in their entirety. It subjectively selects actors according to a Western normative framework: « a militant, normative understanding of what societies should look like » (ibid.:1361). In sum, the post-liberal model would base itself on a Western understanding of what societies are, and what they should be.

In continuation to this, Sabaratnam (2013:268) observes that the peace objectives set by the post-liberals still resemble Western ideals: the Western social contract, welfare democracy and liberal rights and duties. The ‘social contract’ is considered as essential to balance power inequalities and to bring about accountability — what evokes to her the ‘classical liberal framework’ (ibid.). Moreover, as post-liberals criticise the neoliberal measures carried out by liberal peace, she identifies a praise for the state provision of welfare, social rights, and economic state intervention. It is for her an advocacy for a ‘state-led social democracy’ that resembles the ‘postwar Western Europe’ (ibid.:269). Recalling Randazzo (2016:1361), it evokes a ‘militant’ approach to peacebuilding, in which the ‘local’ must be transformed into a Western-like society and political system, in order to achieve peace.

However, building on Sabaratnam’s arguments, and about all the critique above, the post-liberal model seems to be more ‘liberal’ than ‘Western’. Other political traditions than liberalism were developed and embraced in the ‘West’ — for instance, Richmond (2015:54-56) is positioning himself against neoliberalism. The model is rather referring to liberal political thought and aspiring to establish a liberal political system and society. The underlying motivation appears to be the belief that it is the right and necessary one to pursue; an eurocentric tendency to believe that the West is at the forefront of science and knowledge, as Sabaratnam (2013:162) points out. This tendency can also be traced back to the international agencies’ attitudes towards locals, and their analyses of structural and power relations underlying the post-liberal, hybrid model.

Structural and power relations

The critics distinguish in the analyses and applications of post-liberal peace and hybridity a failure to identify and tackle structural and power inequalities, on an international and local scale. Sabaratnam (2013:263-264) argues that ’locals’ — or the people targeted by the interventions — are excluded, marginalised and/or not considered as active agents in analyses and evaluations. She observes a tendency to focus the evaluation of interventions on the intervention itself, and to

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assess it strictly through Western intellectual frameworks and traditions. The people targeted by the intervention and their perspectives, instead, are disregarded and barely integrated into the analysis. Similarly, in other critical analyses which highlight the governmentality and neoliberalism of liberal peace, she observes that the ‘locals’ are still not considered as active actors. They are passive and endure the actions of the neoliberal ‘internationals’. Once again, she claims that the analysis is strictly focused on the interveners themselves (ibid.:266). Echoing this, Randazzo (2016:1356-1357) observes that as post-liberals critique the liberal peace as dominant, they disregard and fail to identify any other dominant, marginalising and alienating behaviours and structures in the local context. Because the post-liberal model considers the ‘locals’ as passive, and disregards their perspectives in analyses and evaluations, its peacebuilding is accused of failing to fully grasp the local context – and to design interventions that are truly building peace.

To counteract this tendency, Sabaratnam (2013:272-273) argues that academics should rather carry out full-scale, in-depth context and conflict analyses and evaluations including the locals’ perspectives. Yet, it could be argued that her and all the authors above are still sustaining the tendency to disregard the ‘locals’. Their analysis is still focused on the ‘West’, on the actions of the ‘international’ peacebuilding organisations. They do not seem to directly consult the ‘locals’, the affected populations, their perspectives and opinions on the post-liberal model; on their inclusion in peacebuilding processes; and on their relationship with the international actors involved in peacebuilding. It echoes certain international structural inequalities, in which international agencies impose their vision on ‘locals’ through peacebuiding.

For Richmond and Mac Ginty (2015), it is in this kind of structural and power relations that the issue with the current application of hybridity lies. They argue that it creates, or is contented by, negative hybrid peace. This form of peace is still the result of a dynamic debate between all of the international and local factions involved. But it fails to tackle what they seem to consider to be the root of conflicts: structural violence (see Galtung, 1990) and unequal power relations, at both local and international levels. Concretely, they consider that the current hybrid peacebuilding builds upon these structural inequalities. On an international scale, it perpetuates the liberal peace model, fabricating a form of (neo)liberal top-down governance (Richmond, Mac Ginty, 2015:7). It claims to aim to include locals but in reality, works only with the « friendly local » (ibid.) — that is, the people unresistant to the model. Ultimately, it disregards local agency and still imposes liberal peace (ibid.). On a local scale, they observe that it builds on, and so maintains, existing local power structures. It means that this form of hybrid peacebuilding works with elites instead of the ‘subaltern’ – the underdogs of these structures. The perspectives and agency of the latter are ignored — while they should be the foundation of the peacebuilding project, they argue (Richmond, Mac Ginty, 2015:11-12).

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While their analysis of structural issues in the current hybrid peacebuilding echoes the critiques above, certain biases can be pointed out. Richmond’s advocacy for ‘emancipatory peace’ (another label for post-liberal peace) still evokes what Sabaratnam and Randazzo pinpointed as the militant endeavour of the model. (Classical) Liberal rights (Visoka, Richmond, 2017:113; Richmond, Mac Ginty, 2015:11, 13) and politics, with a system of institutionalised, democratic politics (Visoka, Richmond, 2017:115), welfare and social rights are seen as the key for peace (Richmond, Mac Ginty, 2015:11, 13). The model still evokes liberal normative frameworks, and seems to maintain precisely what Richmond and Mac Ginty identified as an issue in hybrid peacebuilding: the support of liberal international structural domination. Further, while they affirm to recognise local agency through their model, they also argue that complete ‘local autonomy’ is undesirable. ‘Locals’ require the intervention of ‘internationals’ to tackle the issue of power structures (ibid.:11) and address reforms (Richmond, 2015:54). Barguès-Pedreny and Randazzo notably (2018:1551), discussed this tendency of international agencies to view intervention as ‘necessary’ and ‘unquestionable’, in which international peacebuilders are capable of distinguishing ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and « affect the course of the process » (ibid.:1552). It also evokes Sabaratnam’s (2013:162) discussion of eurocentrism, where the ‘West’ is at the forefront of knowledge and the only active agent of history — while the ‘others’, passive, will require the assistance of the ‘West’ to go on the right path towards the right peace. According to the critiques, liberal ideals are still preferred and seen as the ends of peace in the post-liberal, hybrid model.

To conclude, the post-liberal, hybrid model is criticised for continuing to concentrate and halt on difference, to disregard the populations targeted by the interventions, and to replicate liberal ideals and maintain power structures. All in all, the model seems to still be imbued by liberal thought, and Western self-centrism and sense of ‘knowing better’. Yet, all the above are mostly theoretical discussions (apart from a few concrete examples, such as the selection of local actors) that lack the consideration of the actual effects of this framework. Rather than further exploring the underlying assumptions of hybrid, post-liberal peace (or even its critiques), another approach could be beneficial. The appraisal of the model from the perspective of the affected populations, the ‘locals’, could enable the field to go beyond its biases and limitations — which is what this research aims to carry out. By testing the issues pointed out by the critics onto a case of post-liberal hybrid peacebuilding, this thesis aims to shed a different light on the current understanding of peacebuilding. In order to do so, these issues are synthesised and re-organised into a theoretical framework in the following chapter.

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3 Theory:

the

three

points

of

contention

In order to determine the impact of the issues raised by the critics of the post-liberal, hybrid model on the peacebuilding process, this research bases itself on a theory built from the literature review. The content of the debate about the model was synthesised and re-organised into three main issues: difference, the preferred external and disregarded internal perspective, and the liberal ideal.

Starting from difference

As seen in the previous chapter, post-liberal peacebuilding is criticised for basing its operations on difference — between international and local actors, as well as between various local actors. The critics argue that even though the model aims to go beyond difference, its theoretical framework involves the very identification of difference. The model differentiates its actors in an essentialised way. That is, it implies a categorisation of actors along fixed homogenous and intrinsic characteristics, labelled as ‘cultural’. Further, this differentiation tends to be binary — especially between the individuals related to ‘international’ peacebuilding agencies and ‘local’ ones. As Sabaratnam (2013:274) mentioned, it is difficult for Westerners to step out of this framework motivated by eurocentric thinking. Yet, Richmond and Mac Ginty (2015:5) affirm that the hybridity concept, even if involves differentiation, enables the field (and I would argue, Westerners involved in Peace and Conflict Studies) to step out of this framework and think beyond difference and binaries. The purpose of this research is then to determine the concrete impact of starting from difference on the peacebuilding process.

Preferring the external

As previously discussed, the post-liberal, hybrid model is also criticised for disregarding the perspectives of the affected populations, while preferring the external ones. On the one hand, post-liberal authors clearly position themselves in opposition to liberal peace. They claim this new model would enable constructive

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and dynamic interactions between external and internal actors, and recognise the agency of the affected populations. On the other hand, its critics argue that it sustains the liberal peace’s tendency to disregard the perspectives of the affected populations. It reflects the international structural violence and power relations that are identified as the core of the issues of international peacebuilding. Drawing on the concept of eurocentrism, it reflects the beliefs that, while the West is the agent of history, the ‘locals’ and so targets of intervention are conceptualised as passive. Guided by the underlying belief that the West is at the forefront of knowledge, the conflict and/or context analyses and evaluations are centered on the intervention itself, and/or assessed through Western intellectual frameworks and/or traditions. Meanwhile, the populations targeted by the interventions and their perspectives are disregarded, and not included in these analyses.

Moreover, at the same time as the model focuses on the external, it fails to fully grasp the local context and integrate the affected population as a whole. Because of the post-liberal intention to discredit the liberal peace framework, by exposing it as dominant and imposed, it also disregards any other forms of structural violence in the local context. The lack of integration of the affected populations’ perspectives, and this disregard of local structural violence is seen here as the source of the current hybrid programs’ failure to tackle the latter. It is accused of basing peacebuilding upon existing power structures — in concrete terms, elites — and failing to concentrate the peacebuilding efforts onto the subaltern. In Richmond’s (2015:64) argumentation, ‘elites’ are defined as the privileged minority in terms of state (ibid.:51), economic (ibid.:55), and political (ibid.:58) power, and as actors of structural violence (ibid.:55). They are opposed to the subaltern, the ‘grassroots’ (ibid.:52), or in other words, the rest of the population — ‘the masses’ (ibid.:64). Overall, the argument is that failed hybrid peacebuilding programs focus on elites and disregard the rest of the population.

The highlight on the absence of local perspectives in analysis and evaluation, and the foundation on existing power structures is a rather concrete critique that evokes a wider issue. Generally, in the critique, it appears that the model continues to prefer the external perspective, and the external in charge of design and evaluation. Post-liberal, hybrid peacebuilding is accused to adopt a perspective that is disconnected from the one of the affected populations. This research then intends to determine how the preference for the external concretely affects the peacebuilding process.

Aiming for the liberal ideal

Lastly, deriving from international structural inequalities, and so the preference for the external, the model is criticised for carrying out a militant peacebuilding that directs the ends of peace towards a liberal ideal. As ‘locals’ are considered different, they must be transformed into ‘normal’— into the liberal conception of

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society. In continuation to the previous section, it also echoes the eurocentric belief that the West is at the forefront of knowledge and knows the ‘right’ approach. Concretely, it means that external, (and today mostly) Western organisations are considered to know best, and control design and decision-making in peacebuilding. While the critics focus on the ‘Western’ quality of today’s peacebuilding, I argue here that it is a generalisation that misses out the particular political standpoint that is taken: it rather resembles a liberal ideal.

This means that the ends of peacebuilding resemble the (classical) liberal political system (with a liberal democracy based on a social contract), and/or state (a welfare state with economic intervention), with a set of liberal social rights. It also envisions the desired society as liberal. In practice, it means that the decisive actors in peacebuilding (those to be funded and/or included in the management and/or design of the programme) are selected according to these ideals. They are

concurring with the liberal approach, are non-violent, peace-promoting agents with multicultural claims. It implies that it excludes actors using more violent and/or having identity-based claims — labelled here as the ‘uncivil’ society.

In general, it evokes again the difficulty to get away from one’s own intellectual frameworks (Sabaratnam, 2013:274). The matter at play here is not whether liberal rights or non-violence are desirable or not. It is rather whether this standpoint is imposed, and whether it marginalises and excludes the affected populations and their initiatives that might not resemble the liberal ones – discarded because being ‘out-of-the-box’. Echoing de Coning, the question here is about whether external peacebuilders should concentrate on the ‘means’ employed and not the ‘ends’ of peacebuilding (2018:301). But as Randazzo (2016:1358) asks, « What happens if a local wants to be ‘liberal’? ». This research therefore intends to determine how the aim for a liberal ideal affects the peacebuilding process.

Limitations

Another recurrent theme in the critique that was left out of the theoretical framework of this thesis is the linear thinking behind liberal and post-liberal peacebuilding (Randazzo, 2016:1361, De Coning, 2018; 2013). This choice was motivated by the large-scale analysis that it involves: in order to build his critique, de Coning (2018; 2013) based his research on Complexity theory. Moreover, it was motivated by the difficulty to pinpoint the causality between linear programming and the affected populations’ perspectives in the available data. This matter, I believe, would be enough for one entire (and larger) thesis.

If not exhaustive, the theory employed here seems sufficient. Three main issues were distinguished from the review of the literature about post-liberal, hybrid peacebuilding: it starts from difference, prefers the external, and aims for a liberal

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ideal. Once operationalised (see section 5.3.), it leads the analysis through an instrumental case study method that is developed in the next chapter.

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4 Method: from theory to practice

Design

In order to determine how the issues raised by the critics of the post-liberal, hybrid model affect the peacebuilding process, this research carries out an instrumental case study (Stake, 1995:3). This type of case study consists in understanding one particular case (ibid.:3), « typical » of the subject under study (ibid.:4): post-liberal, hybrid peacebuilding. Just as all case studies, it consists in reviewing a large and diverse amount of data (Yin, 1998:6) to determine the « facts » of the case (ibid.:7).Through the lens of the model’s critiques, the thesis explores how the joint peacebuilding of the EU Peace Fund and the local (funded) non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Northern Ireland and the Border Region unfolded.

The issues explored in the literature review chapter, and synthesised in the theory, are currently motivating debates within the field — they constitute the ‘puzzlement’ behind this case study (Stake, 1995:3). These are often theoretical statements. Applying them on a real-life, concrete case such as the EU Peace Fund could shed a different light on the debate. Moreover, as seen in the previous chapters, one issue that is considered major here is that the affected populations’ perspectives are barely integrated. Consequently, this thesis aims to assess the effects of the issues raised by the critics with the affected populations’ perspectives. Beyond understanding this specific case, this thesis aims to generate different understandings of the theory — the issues related to the post-liberal, hybrid model —; or rather, a « refinement of understanding » (Stake, 1995:7). Yet, to do so, it requires a case that fits the concept of post-liberal, hybrid peacebuilding.

Case selection

In order to explore the concrete implications of the critiques of post-liberal, hybrid peace, the thesis analyses the case of the joint peacebuilding carried out by the EU Peace Fund and the local funded NGOs.

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A hybrid peacebuilding case?

The choice for this case was motivated by, firstly, Northern Ireland’s potential for a (positive) hybrid peacebuilding. Richmond and Mac Ginty (2015:11) notably mentioned Northern Ireland as a case where inequalities and differences were ‘bridged’, where a ‘balance’ enabled by local and international power was found (ibid.:12) — ultimately, where a positive hybrid peace « may eventually » be found (Richmond, 2015:53). Among Northern Ireland’s recent peacebuilding operations, the EU Peace III Fund programme (2007-2013) was selected (SEUPB, 2020a). It was chosen because of the large range of data available about the programme: it has already been completed, evaluated and studied. Also, the programme was previously remarked as resembling the hybrid dynamic interactions between locals (the funded NGOs) and internationals (the funders) (Hyde, Byrne, 2015:97-98).

Additionally, the EU Peace III Fund is mostly (85%) funded by the EU (SEUPB, 2020a). The EU was the largest funding agency for conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security in 2014 (Dalrymple, 2016:14), when the last EU Peace programme was launched. To study the peacebuilding operations of a contemporary major international actor in the field appears relevant here, to assess the wider critiques of post-liberal, hybrid theory and peacebuilding. To conclude, it is argued here that while an ideal-type of the model is unlikely to be found, this case – if not perfect – appears to sufficiently correspond to it to assess the concrete impacts of the critiques.

Pre-existing inequalities between the international and the

local?

Even though Northern Ireland might not be subjected to unequal international power relations as obviously as other countries commonly understood as part of the ‘Global South’, its experience of colonialism points out to the contrary. The island is a former colony of the British Empire, with similar colonising patterns as for instance Canada, India and Australia (Rahman, Clarke, Byrne, 2017:1). On a social perspective, it was observed that during Victorian Britain (De Nile, 2004:5), it lead to the othering of the Irish population (ibid.:5), based on a hierarchical understanding of human societies (ibid.:7). Ireland was seen as « lagging behind » the rest of the United Kingdom, with its population needing a « civilising influence » (ibid.:12). It is argued that similar social, economic discrimination and exploitation of the island by the British mainland can still be observed at the start of the twenty-first century (even if silenced in contemporary Britain) (Mac an Ghaill, 2000:137-138). Such processes resemble what the post-colonial literature today highlights as part of typical relationships between the ‘Global North’ and the ‘Global South’ (see Comaroff, Comaroff, 2012). These are

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international and local structural inequalities that are widely identified within the liberal, post-liberal and hybrid debate as the source of peacebuilding issues.

Operationalisation of the theory

The analysis in this thesis is two-fold: on the one hand, it deals with the programme itself, and on the other hand, with the affected population’s perspectives on the programme. The two sets of operational questions are then the following:

- Firstly, about the programme: can the critique be found in the EU Peace III Fund? If yes, what form did it take?

- Secondly, about the affected populations’ perspectives: was it observed by the affected population? According to them, what were the effects on the peacebuilding process? Did they consider it as impeding or enabling the process of peacebuilding?

For each element of the theory, several indicators were identified. Regarding difference, the theory is understood to correspond to the division, homogenisation and categorisation of the population (both the affected population and external

workers) according to essentialised characteristics, likely to be labelled as

‘cultural’. The analysis also looks for the opposition of actors along binary lines. About the preference for the external, the research looks into whether the programme is disconnected from the affected population. In the programme (the first operational questions), it is understood to correspond to an absence of input from the affected population (in terms of opinions and/or perspectives) in the

context and/or conflict analysis and evaluation of the programme (carried out by

the funding organisation). It also explores whether the funded actors and the

perspectives taken into account in the background and evaluation analyses are

taken from the elites or grassroots. When it comes to the affected populations’ perspectives (the second operational questions), the analysis looks into whether they consider the programme to be disconnected from the affected populations, and/or whether the programme is considered to be misguided (because of a failure to identify the issues at play). It concerns the programme context and/or conflict

analyses, evaluations as well as design and implementation (considered here to be

the consequences of the background and evaluation analyses). It also explores whether they consider the programme to support elites or grassroots (in funding and analyses).

Regarding the aim for a liberal ideal, the research concentrates on elements indicating the building up of a liberal political system (liberal democracy, social

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selection of (funded) actors according to ‘civil’ or ‘uncivil’ standpoints (identity

or multicultural stance, use of violence or non-violence) is analysed too.

Regarding the affected populations’ perspectives, the same indicators for a liberal

political system and selection of civil or uncivil actors are looked for, as well as

whether other actors, projects or initiatives were discarded.

Data discussion

The first operational question is answered by analysing the internal documents of the funding organisation: its Operational Programme (SEUPB, n.d), Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (SEUPB, 2007), Implementation Analysis (Haase, 2009), Final Report (SEUPB, 2016), and evaluation reports (SJ Cartmin, 2013; ASM Horwath, 2010; NISRA, 2014). The analysis also studies an external evaluation carried out by the Understanding Conflict Trust (Morrow, Faulkner-Byrne, Pettis, 2018) and analyses of the programme by academics (McEvoy, Shirlow, 2011). Since certain documents may contain biases (especially the internal documents of the programme), the data was triangulated with these different sources to enhance the validity of the thesis.

The second operational question is answered by reviewing interviews gathered and analysed by academics as well as by internal and external evaluators. When possible, the data was triangulated between the three. Due to the general lack of analyses of the programme from the perspectives of the locals, the data is mostly crossed-checked between the interviews carried out by academics and by internal evaluators. The academic interviews were carried out by Sean Byrne, but analysed together with a variety of other academics — enhancing its internal validity. Done in 2010, it consisted of in-depth or semi-structured interviews of approximately 90-120 minutes, with 120 grassroots and/or civil society actors and funders’ development officers from Londonderry/Derry and the Border Counties (Armagh, Cavan, Derry, Donegal, Fermanagh, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan and Tyrone) (Hyde, Byrne, 2015:101). Their initial aim was « to generate respondent images and perceptions regarding the impact of external funds on reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts in Northern Ireland and the Border region » (ibid.). This aim is considered here to correspond enough to this thesis — broad yet ultimately dealing with the overall matter at play.

Limitations

I am aware that the design of this research would ideally involve carrying out my own interviews, with questions framed around the theory to answer the second operational questions. Yet, it would require a timeframe and funds that go beyond

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the scope of this thesis. In terms of limitations, it means that the data used here is not as specific and detailed as it could ideally be. Nevertheless, Sean Byrne’s work and interviews provides, I believe, a sufficient amount of data to complete this research.

It must be noticed that it also means that the thesis is highly reliant on his and his colleagues’ work, method and analyses — their understanding of it, as well as their selection of what is to discuss or not. Yet, I believe that the wideness of their work and interviews enables to gather enough data for this thesis. Also, that the content of the interviews was not directed towards the theory used here may even provide more strength to the results. That the elements studied here can still be observed, without asking questions framed around this specific theory, would show their indeed existence in the perspective of the affected populations.

Moreover, it must be mentioned that the internal documents from the funding organisation are susceptible to be biased — especially the evaluations and reports — and may be shaped to fit the organisation’s interests in showing the successes of its programme. To compensate this fact, other evaluations carried out by other, external organisations and academics are integrated into the analysis.

More generally, it must also be mentioned that the possibilities for generalisations from this and only case can be limited. As Stake (1995:8) observed, it is first of all about understanding this particular case, and that the produced knowledge from it rather takes the form of a « modified generalisation », rather than a « new generalisation » (ibid.:7). It is hoped that this case will enable to shed an alternative light on the debate, but this research does not intend to generate a new, universal theory.

Finally, this research is still the result of the researcher’s own perspective. As Stake discussed (1995:9), « interpretation is a major part of all research »: any assertions made in this study are the result of a process of interpretation. This method chapter aims to provide the reader with information about the processes behind any interpretations made in this thesis, in a transparent manner.

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5 Northern Ireland and the EU Peace

Fund

Ireland, Northern Ireland and the United

Kingdom

As mentioned previously, Ireland is a former colony of the British Empire. British domination can be drawn back to the twelfth century with the Norman Invasion of the island (Rahman, Clarke, Byrne, 2017:16). It is in the twentieth century that the rejection of British rule became more prominent (Tonge, 2002:5). The demands for Irish independence blossomed among noticeable parts of the population. After the First World War (from 1919 until 1921), it took the form of an armed conflict, notably between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British forces sent to re-establish order. Ultimately, the conflict led to the final partition of the island in 1921 with the Anglo-Irish Treaty (ibid.:14). The centre and south of the island become the today Republic of Ireland, and the North (roughly corresponding to the province of Ulster) becoming Northern Ireland, still bounded to the United Kingdom (ibid.:13-14). The partition resulted in a Civil War due to disagreements about the content of the treaty until 1923 (ibid.:15-16).

The Northern part of the country was more industrial than the rest, with a more prosperous, skilled working-class (Tonge, 2002:6) and with a majority of the population from Protestant households (ibid.:13). The series of Home Rule policies implemented during the tensions with the British mainland were opposed by the majority in Ulster (ibid.:7-8). After the partition, the region further experienced a polarisation of the population over the bounds with Britain or with the rest of the island (ibid.:8-13). The perceived discrimination of Catholics in the region sparked conflicts (commonly called ‘the Troubles’) in the region from the mid-1960s – from Civil Rights movements to outbreaks of violence, with involvement of the British Army (ibid.:38-39). As the conflict went on, it led to the re-emergence of the paramilitary IRA in the region, under the name of Provisional IRA (ibid.:41-42) and the growth of Loyalist paramilitary groups (ibid.:46).

The conflicts that occurred during the rest of the century are often described along the division between Protestants, in favour of the Union with the United Kingdom, and Catholics, for the reunification with the Republic of Ireland.

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Yet, even though this polarisation exacerbated as the conflict went on, it is reductionist to simplify the conflict according to Loyalist or Unionist or Protestant versus Republican or Nationalist or Catholic. The divisions and allegiances between were not as straightforward and entailed more social, political and cultural complexities (see Tonge, 2002:50-74).

The country endured a range of violence, from paramilitary activity to criminality, political disagreements as well as structural violence during the rest of the century, with notably regular shootings and explosions (Tonge, 2002:44). The conflict can be seen to have continued until the end of the century, despite the peace agreements and ceasefires formally declared during the 1990s. During the 2000s, paramilitary activity, insecurity and direct violence were still observed in the country, with marked sectarian tensions among the population (Jarman, 2004:422-428).

The EU Peace Programme

The EU Peace Fund (I, II, III, IV) spanned from 1995 to 2020 (at the time of writing, closing the IV programme) (SEUPB, 2020a). The overall programme was initially implemented to provide « a positive response to the paramilitary ceasefires of 1994 » (SEUPB, 2020b). The general objectives of the programme as a whole are the « cohesion between communities involved in the conflict in Northern Ireland and the border counties of Ireland » and « economic and social stability » (Kołodziejski, 2020).

The III programme was funded by the European Regional Development Fund, with roughly €333m (SEUPB, 2020a). In terms of the local NGOs that it funded, it accepted 220 projects and saw at its outset in 2013 the completion of 213 projects (SEUPB, 2016:8). It operated in the Northern part of the island, including Northern Ireland as well as the counties in the Republic of Ireland located at the border (see Figure 1.1.). The Overall Objectives of Peace III are « to reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation » (SEUPB, n.d:42). It comprises two Strategic Objectives: « reconciling communities » and « contributing to a shared society » (ibid.:41).

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6 The peacebuilding of the EU Peace

III Fund

In this analysis chapter, the theory is the framework that leads the study. Each element is studied, first of all in the programme itself, and then from the affected population’s perspectives. It appears that this case of peacebuilding started from difference in order to achieve multiplicity. As an external, it attempted to integrate the local, but favoured the liberal over the local.

From difference to multiplicity

The first element identified in the theory is that post-liberal, hybrid peacebuilding is criticised for starting from difference. I would base its operations on a binary division and categorisation of actors (within the affected population, and between them and external workers) along essentialized, homogenised characteristics labelled as ‘cultural’. While the difference between the affected population and external workers was not directly observed in this case, it was found when it came to the affected population.

Identifying divisions to mix the population

In the programme, the population is viewed through a binary lens, focusing on ‘Catholics’ and ‘Protestants’ (SEUPB, n.d.:6, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 29, 55). In the context analysis, the conflict is framed around tensions and divisions between « the region’s principal communal and national identities — Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist » (ibid.:6). Throughout the text, this binary distinction is repeated: « the two communities » (ibid.:14, 18, 23) « working with communities on both sides » (ibid.:53) « in both communities » (ibid.:16, 60, 104). These two groups also seem to be homogenised in the text: the labels Protestant, Loyalist, Unionist are apparently used interchangeably, and Catholic, Nationalist and Republican as well (SEUPB, n.d). Moreover, in the requested Attitudinal Survey following the programme, the evaluation focuses strictly on these two groups. It observes the attitudes towards « the other community », and so « it could only include people who indicated that they were from one or other of the two main community backgrounds (Protestant and Catholic) » (NISRA, 2014:69). Then, the programme concentrates on these two homogenised categories of actors.

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Yet, it also considers another category of the population: « other ethnic minorities » (SEUPB, n.d.:16). It recognises that « Northern Ireland and the Border region are no longer bipolar societies » (ibid.:17), but an « increasingly diverse society » (ibid.:17). The tensions related to this ‘new’ category of the population — « increased racial prejudice » (ibid.:17) — are claimed to be taken into account. Nevertheless, a comment here could be that the binary, homogenising thinking can still be observed, this time between the ‘natives’ and other « ethnic minorities ». These minorities are barely described more than being « particularly from Eastern European countries » (ibid.:17) and are directly opposed to the rest of the population, marked by « a culture of intolerance » fuelling racially motivated crimes (ibid.:18). Then, even though it considers a third part of the population, the same binary and homogenising mechanisms can be observed.

The way difference is used is clearer in the programme’s objectives. Both of the main objectives comprise the notion of binary division and difference: it acts « cross-community », « cross-border », dealing with « commonalities and differences » and the « polarisation of places » (SEUPB, n.d.:37-38). It also employs the notion of cultural distinction, though more sporadically: the programme aims to promote « cultural and attitudinal change » (ibid.:49), « promoting cultural diversity » (ibid.:54) and a « multi cultural society » (ibid.:65). Also, the largest part of the funds are dedicated to the « reconciliation » of the population (ibid.:65). The programme’s definition of ‘reconciliation’ is enlightening here:

« Relationship building or renewal following violent conflict addressing

issues of trust, prejudice, intolerance and in this process, resulting in accepting commonalities and differences, and embracing and engaging with those who are different to us » (ibid.:29).

As this definition shows, the relationship between groups perceived as different is at the core of the programme. While identifying the lines of difference, the programme is about mixing people over these lines: it starts from difference to achieve multiplicity. The rationale of the programme concentrates on the differences and divisions of the affected population, especially into the binary categories of ‘Catholics’ and ‘Protestants’, but also between the ‘natives’ and the ‘ethnic minorities’. The entire programme is dedicated to tackle these divisions, to firstly recognise difference in order to secondly mix these groups, and ultimately achieve reconciliation.

A welcomed focus but not enough

According to the affected populations, this approach had positive outcomes in terms of societal relationships, yet also missed out certain matters that they

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considered as vital for the peace process. The interviewees saw the programme as primarily aimed at bringing ‘different’ communities together (Skarlato et al., 2012:45; SJ Cartmin, 2013:36). For instance:

« the delivery of Peace III now is that it’s not about sustaining community

groups for the sake of sustaining them, it’s about encouraging them to reach out and do something that they would not normally do, which will help with better relationships within their community or with … a neighbouring community, or a community across the Border » (Skarlato et al., 2012:52).

They observed that the structure of the programme pushes one community to interact with another: « if you didn’t have a cross-community partner you didn’t get the money » (Karari et al., 2013:593). For the majority, while it was « forced » at the beginning, it enabled the participants to go beyond difference and work with the ‘other’ community: « people either deliberately or unintentionally ended up engaging and talking », becoming « natural partners », and generating « cross-community involvement » (ibid.) — which would not have happened without the programme (SJ Cartmin, 2013:55). For several interviewees, that the programme focused on mixing the two communities enabled to create neutral spaces (Karari et al., 2013:593; ibid.:93), places that are « open to everybody » (ibid.:593). It enabled to have better, « good » relations with the other community (ibid.:593). People would connect and cooperate (ibid.:595), learn about the perspectives of the other (ibid.:594; Skarlato et al., 2016:175), creating « a sense that there is commonality » (Karari et al., 2013:594). Taking part in the programme enabled participants from different communities to see each other in a more humanised way (ibid.:596), realising that they « are the same », that « the other community […] were just ordinary » (ibid.:595). Similarly, several interviewees considered such an approach as necessary, and beneficial for the peace process: « we need to look at how to bridge the gap and begin to understand each other » (Maiangwa et al., 2019:52). For instance:

« Ignorance breed’s mistrust you know if you don’t know your neighbour

you don’t trust your neighbour… funding has made it possible for so many people to get to know each other. » (Karari et al., 2012:91)

Yet, several interviewees pinpointed issues with the programme’s focus on difference. Some expressed doubts on how genuine the demanded collaboration was: « much of it is sometimes lip service in order to get the funding » (Karari et al., 2013:597). The focus on difference was also not enough for several respondents: « a lot of groups tend to feel it’s almost like a compulsory … […] Being pushed and forced to it isn’t the way […] » (ibid.:599); « the peace money has done well to encourage dialogue but whether dialogue alone is going to solve anything I would have serious doubts » (Ahmed et al., 2012:13). Some considered that it led the programme and its participants to miss out the roots of the conflict:

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« [we should be] exploring the motivation for sectarian behaviour » (Maiangwa et al., 2019:46-47) — that is, structural inequalities (Karari et al., 2013:598). Some even argued that selecting actors along community lines was inadequate and perpetuated the tensions (Maiangwa et al., 2019:52), supporting only the « political people », in turn reinforcing political divisions (Karari et al., 2013:598). About the homogenisation of the two communities, one interviewee notably warned against putting Protestant, Loyalist and Unionists in the same category as inaccurate (Maiangwa et al., 2019:53). Another interviewee also notably pinpointed that the programme did not achieve to take into account the ethnic minorities (SJ Cartmin, 2013:59).

Overall, the primary intention to ‘mix’ the Catholic and Protestant communities was observed by all the interviewees — while the interaction with ethnic minorities was largely unmentioned. Many shared the positive impacts of starting from difference to push the participants to interact with the ‘other’, in terms of interaction, learning, understanding and relationships. Yet, it was also remarked that the approach was not enough: sometimes forced and not genuine, the interaction between the two communities on its own did not tackle issues seen as essential to go beyond the conflict — structural inequalities.

No differentiation between the affected population and the

external workers?

One element central to the theory was that the post-liberal, hybrid standpoint differentiated and opposed the affected populations (the ‘local’) and the external workers (the ‘international’). The elements behind this theoretical affirmation were found neither in the programme nor in the population’s perspectives. This could be for several reasons: the programme did not publicly publish any Code of Conduct of any form that this research could study, and the question was not directly asked to the affected population. Yet, that it did not appear in the multiple interviews studied here, could also indicate that it was not thought about as an issue. Or, it could also mean that it takes a different form for the affected populations. This matter will be elaborated in the discussion section (6.4).

In the EU Peace III Fund, starting from difference meant that the focus was on the divisions within society, identified as revolving primarily around ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestants’ — the ‘ethnic minorities’ being mentioned but ultimately, seemingly absent in practice. Consequently, the programme pushed the local NGOs to work with people identified as part of the ‘other’ community. It can be remarked that it does fit with what the critics identified: it starts from difference, and aims to go beyond it. From the affected population’s perspectives, while this focus improved relationships in society, it also fell short in tackling root issues such as structural inequalities. To conclude, it seems that the start from difference did not impede

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the peacebuilding process as such, but that using it on its own had shortcomings regarding the overall peace process.

The external integrating the local

The second element of the theory is that as post-liberal, hybrid peacebuilding reflects international structural violence and power relations, it would prefer its external perspective over the one of the affected populations. In its analysis, evaluations and design, it is criticised for being disconnected from the affected populations by prioritising external (or ‘international’) perspective. As a consequence, it would fail to fully grasp the local context and the local structural and power relations, building the programme onto local elites and excluding the subaltern.

Efforts at integrating the affected populations’ perspectives

On the one hand, the programme consulted the affected population for their input — to a certain extent. In its context analysis, it uses the opinions and perspectives of the population (gathered through surveys) concerning communal divisions. They are integrated into the analysis to illustrate the degree of divisions and tensions between communities (SEUPB, n.d.:14-19) — but their perspectives are not integrated when it comes to the economy, or « labour market conditions » (ibid.:20-22). In continuation with the EU Peace II programme, it also took into account the community uptake about perceived inequalities along community lines in funding (ibid.:29-30). In this way, in terms of community relations, the perspectives and opinions of the affected population seem to have been consulted. Moreover, the initial Operational Programme was submitted to an Ex-Ante evaluation by Irish academic organisations (the Economic Research Institute of Northern Ireland and the Economic and Social Research Institute Ireland). Their comments and recommendations regarding the conflict analysis (about adding more focus on community relations, security and ethnic minority groups and the historical and political dimensions of the conflict) (ibid.:33), led the programme to adjust it, and consequently, to adjust its overall design. More cross-border activities were implemented as well as more interactions with national governments (ibid.:33). Similarly, the Operational Programme was submitted to a Consultation Process throughout the island about the kind of actions, lessons from the previous programme, implementation and management of the new programme and priorities it should have. It meant public consultations, consultations with governments, with implementation actors of the Peace II, representatives of all sectors of the population (such as business, agricultural, trade unions, etc), and online consultations (ibid.:31). As with the Ex-Ante evaluation, the

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recommendations of this Consultation Process led to the amendment of the Operational Programme (ibid.).

In terms of evaluation, the Aid for Peace framework that was used encouraged surveys for the majority of the outcome indicators (SEUPB, 2007:52). When it comes to the actual evaluations of the programme, it seems that efforts were given to integrate the affected populations’ perspectives, but with a majority of respondents being from the funding organisation (SJ Cartmin, 2013:61; ASM Horwath, 2010:12) — except for the Attitudinal Survey, entirely dedicated to the perspectives of the wider population (NISRA, 2014). In terms of elites or grassroots, it prioritised the perspectives of local elites (such as state members or political representatives) or external workers (SJ Cartmin, 2013:61; ASM Horwath, 2010:12). Overall, it appears that while the programme consulted the affected population throughout different phases of the programme (context analysis, design and evaluation), the majority seem to correspond to local elites (intellectual, political or state elites) as well as the external workers themselves.

Combining elites and subalterns

When it comes to whether elites or grassroots were prioritised in terms of funding, the programme aims to combine both elites and grassroots. In the context analysis, it seems to identify structural violence as the source of conflicts which must be tackled: it considers « sectarianism, isolation, marginalisation, mistrust, lack of citizenship and participation in civil networks » and the « new challenges for integration and cohesion within the context of increasing ethnic diversity » (SEUBP, n.d.:37). The integration of the grassroots and the marginalised (in other words, the subaltern) into society is identified as the source of conflict and as the challenges of the programme.

Expectedly, this initial diagnosis influenced the design of the programme. Throughout its Operational Programme, it claims to focus on the subaltern. In the areas it targets, it aims to concentrate on « disadvantaged areas » in terms of infrastructure, economy and social development and integration (SEUPB, n.d.:49). The people targeted by the programme are also intended to correspond to those that are marginalised, either due to the conflict or in the overall society (ibid.:50). Similarly, one of the cross-cutting themes of the programme is « equality of opportunity », and « poverty ». It means that throughout its activities, the programme aims at tackling the matter, to « ensure the targeting of resources and effort on people, groups and areas objectively shown to be the most socially disadvantaged » (ibid.:50). Both in terms of areas and participants, it affirms to give the subaltern a particular attention and position.

Additionally, the programme claims to give power to grassroots. It affirms that it « emphasised » that in the activities implemented by the local funded NGOs, « there is a very high level of local decision making » (SEUPB, n.d.:34). It also mentions that the funded NGOs should also comprise « disadvantaged

Whose Peacebuilding? The post-liberal, hybrid peace and its critiques in Northern Ireland and the Border Region with the EU Peace III Fund