Capturing the Epiphany of Time

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A Bergsonian Reading of Virginia Woolf's Mrs Dalloway

Tao Xu

[English Studies] [Bachelor Level] [14 Credits] [Spring 2019]

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Abstract

This research paper aims to introduce four main aspects, which are closely connected to Virginia Woolf's novel Mrs Dalloway (1925). First, this thesis looks at the definition of literary epiphany from both Morris Beja and Wim Tigges' point of view to use the combined understanding from these two definitions to create a broader, yet more complete definition of the literary epiphany. Second, this paper looks at Henri Bergson's concept of time - la durée (duration) and élan vital (vital impetus), which contain the crucial elements to build up a different type of temporal epiphany. Third, this paper relates literary epiphany and Bergson's theory of time to present an understanding of a Bergsonian epiphany of time. Fourth, the thesis demonstrates a Bergsonian way of reading Virginia Woolf's novel Mrs Dalloway as well as compares two key characters: Clarissa and Septimus. Finally, the thesis concludes with a discussion on how literary epiphany is not only used as a structural device, but also a method of characterization for Woolf's novel.

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In literary criticism stream of consciousness refers to the style of writing and narrative technique often found in modern novels, beginning in the early twentieth century. As an important part of modern novels, the narrative technique of stream of consciousness is particularly common when the author introduces an inner monologue, which is directly connected with a character's mental activities. Distinguishable writers who use the narrative technique of stream of consciousness in their novels include James Joyce, William Faulkner, and Virginia Woolf.

This paper is focusing on Virginia Woolf's novel Mrs Dalloway (1925). The novel itself was published in 1925, and it is famous for adapting the writing style of stream of consciousness, as it contains a large amount of inner monologues, and frequent flashbacks of memories. The context, in which the novel was written, is highly relevant to note. First, the novel was written after the Great War, which caused immense shock and loss in British society; Woolf quickly realised the social and psychological impact of the war. For example, soon after she begins writing the novel, Woolf recollects the image of Betty Flanders holding out her dead son's shoes.

Furthermore, psychological studies had developed a lot at the time, particularly Sigmund Freud's studies and his psychoanalysis during the early period of the twentieth century, which had a significant impact on literary studies. Especially psychological studies were successfully providing a way of how modern authors could try to present their characters' selves and utterance. Differing from the full dominance of the narrator in early Victorian novels, the modern novels are willing to present more attention to the personality or individual development of a character. Those characters from the Victorian era may soon become empty and tedious when they are compared with their later modernism followers. Third, it is the continuous breakthrough of philosophical studies in biology and temporality issues, such as the individual feeling of time that offers a solid foundation for the development of modern novels. The philosopher, who is well known in dealing with this task, is the French philosopher Henri Bergson.

Bergson's theory of time is considered an important source for literary theories in connection to the stream of consciousness technique which has been used by many literary critics since the beginning of the twentieth century, the time when stream of consciousness novels begin to appear. However, along with the end of the Second World War, the influence of his theories has suffered a rapid decline in popularity after his death. According to Keith Ansell-Pearson, the position of Bergson's theories is quickly replaced with the rise of existentialism (1). That is to say, through most of the twentieth century, Bergson and his theories have been largely ignored in academia for several decades. Until recent years, a new trend of looking into Bergson's theories has appeared among many philosophers. As Ansell-Pearson argues, Bergson's theories are experiencing a serious

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renaissance nowadays (1). Additionally, a very important historical background for Bergson's theories is: Neo-Darwinism has obtained a lot of social and academic attention at the beginning of the twentieth century. For Darwin's Naturalism and Biologism, both have brought Bergson a significant influence. As Ansell-Pearson concludes, two main criticisms have been brought up against Bergson's theories: one is that Naturalism cannot account for differences in kind as it reduces modes of existence to differences of degree; the other is that Bergson's thinking is guilty of the error of Biologism (12). Therefore, in Bergson's discussion of the philosophical meaning of life beings, he, in particular, mentions the importance of the vitality for them.

Another noteworthy point is the development of the literary epiphany. The use of epiphanies in the literary field can be dated back to the British poet William Wordsworth, who is well known for his contribution to romantic poems. As Wordsworth calls a moment of suddenness “spots of time” in his poem The Prelude (1799), it is exactly such a moment that James Joyce begins to call

epiphany for the first time after about a century. While the word epiphany originally comes from a

manifestation of Christianity, the concept itself has gained its popularity and is followed by many other imagist and symbolist poets and even modern writers. Coleridge's “Phantasy,” Shelley's “Moment,” Browning's “Infinite moment,” Yeats's “Great Moment,” T. S. Eliot's “Timeless Moment,” Pound's “Image,” Wallace Steven's “Moment of Awakening,” Heaney's “Revelation,” Pater's “Pauses in Time,” Henry James's “Sublime Instants,” Conrad's “Moment of Vision,” and Woolf's “Frozen Moment” are examples of how other writers engaged with the idea of epiphany although calling it something else. Specifically, there are two core basis for literary epiphany: religious background and psychological background. Although the philosophical background for this kind of connection is still not clear, Morris Beja has provided a suggestion that there exists some kind of connection between literary epiphany and one of Bergson's concepts of time, the élan

vital. This unrecognised connection, which is suggested by Beja, is one of the aspects that this paper

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2. Definition of the Literary Epiphany

The word epiphany can always be traced back to its origins of religious value, in which its origin appears mysterious for a long period of time; until, the Irish author James Joyce begins to describe a crucial moment in his abandoned work Stephen Hero (1944), by borrowing the word epiphany from Christianity, then, the word itself begins to gain impetus in the field of literary studies. In this paper, I wish to highlight that the concept of epiphany, which is being discussed here needs to be distinguished from its very origins of religious manifestation. As in Beja's book Epiphany in the

Modern Novel (1971), Beja defines epiphany as a moment of illumination (24). And for Joyce, he

would call such a moment an epiphany in his novel Stephen Hero (213). Then, we shall fully acknowledge that when we are talking about literary epiphany we are also looking at those specific moments in novels.

Before I can give an analysis of the literary epiphany in modern novels, there is a need for us to look back at the traditional definition of a literary epiphany. For Beja, who has been solely working on the issue of identifying the literary epiphany, he has made some important progress at the very early stage of solving this issue. In his book Epiphany in the Modern Novel (1971), Beja begins his statements with introducing Joyce's novel Stephen Hero and mentioning Stephen, one of the main characters. In the novel, Stephen describes epiphany as a sudden illumination, which is produced by apparently trivial, even seemingly arbitrary causes (13). As Beja himself concludes, the manifestation of an epiphany is a sudden spiritual manifestation, “a showing forth,” “an illumination,” “a revelation” (14-5). Then, Beja systematically looks into the religious and psychological origins of the word epiphany, and mentions D. T. Suzuki and his book Zen Buddhism (1927) as a link to Joyce's epiphany. The reason why Beja insists on the connection between mystical experience and literary epiphany, is because Beja thinks “both are sudden and intensive moments of exhilaration or pain, and both involve a new sense of awareness” (25). According to Beja's interpretation, among eight characteristics of the experience of Satori or Enlightenment in Suzuki's book, four of them can be found relevant with the definition of a literary epiphany. As Suzuki points out, the religious experience of Satori including being irrational, intuitive, authoritative, and momentary (Suzuki 103-8). Besides, Beja has displayed several other features, which can also be related to literary epiphany. For example, the experience of an epiphany always has to be individual and it puts its concern on the emphasis of subjectivity, also in the epiphany physical sensations are prominent (Beja 25). In his book, Beja further comes up with his own definition of a literary epiphany which is very much based on Joyce's usage of the word (Joyce's usage of the word epiphany will be discussed alongside the discussion of literary epiphany in

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scene, event, or memorable phase of the mind – the manifestation being out of proportion to the significance or strictly logical relevance of whatever produces it (18). So hereby, we can somehow conclude that the essential features of a literary epiphany, which Beja has pointed out are: suddenness (momentary experience), spiritualness (illumination, awareness or revelation), and triviality (personal and subjective feelings). All three features are the essential elements to form a literary epiphany, according to Beja's interpretation of epiphany in Joyce's novel Stephen Hero.

On the other hand, Wim Tigges tries to bring us to an understanding of the typology of literary epiphany by introducing his trigger mechanism. Similar to Beja, Tigges also agrees on the necessity and effect of having trivial things to trigger off an epiphany in the novel; while Tigges points out epiphanies can only exist in the involuntary memories (recapture things of the past) rather than in the voluntary memories (collect experience or knowledge at present) (20-21). As Beja explains, “voluntary memory forces us to use our mere intellect, but involuntary memory – 'true memory' – engages the creative, re-creative imagination” (62). Here, the point that Beja calls the involuntary memory as a “true memory”, is because this type of memory does not need to rely on the fact of having vision, while the other type of memory does need vision as it records things. For vision only records things which happen in the present, while memories of the past can flow up to our current conditions to create some kind of a dimension in our mind. It is within such a dimension that our mind is able to become imaginative and creative.

Tigges points out that there are three aspects we can recognize as methods to define a literary epiphany: first, it makes a sudden recall (involuntary memory, recapture the past); second, it evokes a sense of immortality (rebirth, the climax of this entire process); third, it generates a sense of elation, ecstasy, “truth” even inspiration (experience or knowledge) (20). Therefore, only if this process had been accomplished, can an epiphany eventually be created. Tigges compartmentalizes literary epiphany into two major types: subjective epiphany, which is experienced by a character; objective epiphany, which is transferred to the reader (20). Additionally, Tigges further gives five specific types of literary epiphany are as following: an epiphany that is related to a place; an epiphany that is occasioned by the encounter with a person; an epiphany that is triggered by an object; an epiphany that is evoked by the verbal perception; and an epiphany that is related to the “ultimate moment” (28-30). And this is the most important breakthrough in Tigges's development of the categorization of literary epiphany.

By acknowledging Tigges's trigger mechanism, we understand that the previous three kinds of essential features of a literary epiphany, which are given by Beja, are not enough to be used as the key section to identify the entire process of a literary epiphany. As Tigges says, “Beja leads us to know about epiphany as a phenomenon by empathizing or identifying with it rather than analysing

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it” (20). Since, for example, an illusion can also fit with all those features, which are given by Beja, and the illusion can be automatically generated at any time without going through Tigges's trigger mechanism. Unlike for the epiphany, for the illusion, it does not require any kind of motivation or purpose, and the vision can keep engaging things around us. Thus, according to Tigges, we cannot simply adopt a binary way of understanding when we try to acknowledge a literary epiphany as our eyes could sometimes fail us. Also, unknown things might occasionally trigger us off. Therefore, when we try to identify a literary epiphany in the novel, we do not only need to figure out the features of the process, but we also need to put the phenomenon into a frame of the mechanism like the one that Tigges has provided. Then, we can finalise the process of a literary epiphany as the spiritual process, which is triggered off by the triviality, and it is a sudden change of a character's quality of mind. Meanwhile, this process needs to connect with the memory of the past and has to follow the trigger mechanism that prepares it. Eventually, we can reach Tigges's typological understanding of a literary epiphany under his categorization of literary epiphany.

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3. Henri Bergson's Theory of Time

Henri Bergson, the 20th century French philosopher, who is well known for his work in defining several important philosophical ideas in the history of philosophy; including la durée (Duration) and élan vital (Vital impetus), two concepts that are extremely important to understand Bergson's theory of time. In this paper, I wish to quote two of Bergson's core works to cover both Bergson's concepts of time. Those two books are Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of

Consciousness (1889), Bergson's doctoral thesis in which for the first time Bergson has introduced

his concept of duration; and Creative Evolution (1907), where Bergson continues to develop his concept of duration, and where he also comes up with another concept élan vital when he intends to explain the philosophy of life. What we need to take note of here, is that those two works are closely related and echo each other when we try to use them to make a clear explanation of Bergson's concepts of time. Before we begin to look at Bergson's concepts, we need to cautiously clear out any confusion or misunderstandings when using Bergson's books on philosophy. Differing from real time or what Bergson would call the material time, the concept of time which Bergson tries to explain is dedicated to a philosophical understanding of time, or it can be called “inner time.” Furthermore, both Bergson's concepts of time contain several general phenomena. For example: time, memory, consciousness, self, life, and so on. Therefore, to avoid any kind of misreading, I hope to apply each of the concepts one at a time, in the order that Bergson introduced them.

Firstly, I begin the presentation with Bergson's theory of time by introducing the concept of la

durée. As the main structure of supporting Bergson's theory of time, duration highlights the

philosophical dimension of time, also, it answers two key questions about time itself. In his statements, Bergson has clearly shown his interests of time in the facts that are affected by people's internal conditions, as Bergson attempts to spend his effort on figuring out the relationship between time and individual feelings. In his book Creative Evolution (1907), Bergson gives an example of waiting for sugar to dissolve in a cup of water, to help us understand the true meaning of time (13). Through adopting such an example, Bergson tries to indicate that the experience of waiting is a sense of feeling that people experience in their everyday life.

To better understand Bergson's example, Keith Ansell-Pearson provides an explanation that the time, which Bergson discusses, is not mathematical time but rather a type of human experience of time as, for example, the time experienced while someone is waiting for something (18). That means the type of time that Bergson tries to describe is independent from how we usually understand time as a physical thing, such as clock time. For this type of time cannot be used to match with the real time. As internal time (philosophical time), may change and adjust itself very

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diversely; while the external time (physical time), is always forced to be strictly spaced. As Ansell-Pearson points out, the key difference between extensibility and intensity is, the external space traversed is a matter of extension and quantity (it is divisible), but the internal movement is an intensive act and a quality (63). Thus, Ansell-Pearson concludes that, Bergson's fundamental argument is that we are, in fact, dealing with changes in quality (58). Those qualitative changes, we only engage them within the dimension of the internal time – the duration. And the duration is, as Bergson defines it in his book Creative Evolution (1907) – Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances (7). That is to say, duration is considered as a psychic length that connects the original state of the past with our conditions in the present.

As Bergson has illustrated in his example, our experience of waiting is accumulated since the beginning until the present moment, then until a certain moment we begin to realise the occurrence of a qualitative change. And this process between the past and the present, from a perspective of philosophy, is what Bergson tries to explain within his theory of time. Additionally, according to Bergson's explanation, duration is also consistent and linear. For our memory can keep itself growing, and the qualitative changes have to be repeated again and again, then we are able to bring our past being into the consideration of our current states. From here we might realise, the way to form the duration is, not by the spatialization of the real time, but instead, by creating consistent clips in the human brain, as with the different parts of memories from the past. In his book Time

and Free Will (1889), Bergson points out that pure duration (the philosophical duration, to be

distinguished from the physical duration) is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself to live, when it refrains from separating its present states and its former states (100). As through the succession, our life can continue to move forward and expand, to be able to gain a way of evolving oneself ceaselessly. The ceaselessness, on the other hand, is exactly what guarantees the consistent growth of the self – to let the ego live, it must be placed within a non-stop process of enhancement. According to Bergson, we are seeking only the precise meaning that our consciousness gives to this word “exist”, and we find that, for a conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly (Creative Evolution 10). Thus, for an individual being, to exist means to endlessly create a new self from the past to the present.

However, Bergson has also acknowledged the limitation of the duration. He claims that from the survival of the past it follows that consciousness cannot go through the same state twice. The circumstances may still be the same, but they will no longer act on the same person, since they find him at a new moment in his history (Time and Free Will 8). Here Bergson is trying to remind us that

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every single qualitative change can never happen twice. Once we are engaging a moment like this, meanwhile, we are also leaving it. According to Bergson, as far as we cannot get into the same state twice, then this process stays irreversible. For we have to leave the previous state to separate ourselves from it, then move to the next stage. So we can never go back to the previous states, as the time forces us to move only forward rather than backwards. Or, in other words, it is impossible for the time that has already passed to turn back. As Ansell-Pearson explains, we cannot live in a single moment over and over again, and we have to treat time as both irreversible and unforeseeable (19). Therefore, we realise that this process is also progressive, it mobilizes itself one step at a time and pushes out the qualitative changes within it one after the other. Overall, we acknowledge that the philosophical duration refers to a sense of human feeling of the dimension of time between the present and the past within a consistent, linear, progressive and endless process of mentality alongside different kinds of qualitative changes. And those qualitative changes lead us to know Bergson's other concept of time.

Now, I hope to introduce my readers Bergson's second concept of time – élan vital or in English “the vital impetus.” In Bergson's book Creative Evolution (1907), he clearly shows his interests to overcome the difficulties of changing the way people think of philosophical life and its practice as a metaphysical problem. For Bergson, he is peculiarly interested in discussing the vitality of life and he associates life with the phenomenon of organic creation such as growth, maturation, ageing, and so on (Ansell-Pearson 99). Therefore, the most important understanding of this significant moment in its process is that it is closely related to the qualitative changes of philosophical life.

By adopting the concept, Bergson aims to draw our attention from the external appearance into internal changes, a creative evolution when an organic being is matured. As Bergson says, “so that all life, animal and vegetable, seems in its essence like an effort to accumulate energy and then to let it flow into flexible channels, changeable in shape, at the end of which it will accomplish infinitely varied kinds of work. That is what the vital impetus, passing through matter, would fain do all at once” (Creative Evolution 276-7). From Bergson's statement we realise that, what the vital impetus refers to is the ability for creatures to make qualitative changes during their life circles. And the process of this change is spontaneous as the spontaneity of life is manifested by a continual creation of new forms succeeding others (Creative Evolution 96). Therefore, the vital impetus is used as an explanation of the continuous changes within a self of existence.

Also, the vital impetus is what Bergson uses to explain the movement of creative evolution, which unfolds itself in the living system of duration. We need to understand that in Bergson's scenario, the vital impetus is an already finished product of the flow of our mind, an outcome of the

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evolutionary source of our lives. It is a phenomenal manifestation in the process of an organic life; meanwhile it's also a process of changes in the continuity of human awakening. As Bergson states, “The impetus which causes a living being to grow larger, to develop and to age, is the same that has caused it to pass through the phases of the embryonic life” (Creative Evolution 22). And Ansell-Pearson addresses that for Bergson a living body is characterised by a continuity of change, the preservation of the past in the present, and by real duration (99). Therefore, as Bergson has concluded earlier with his concept of duration that for an individual life, to live is to change itself ceaselessly. It is through those qualitative changes, we see the evolution of life, and we see the vitality and creativity of living beings. Additionally, as Ansell-Pearson points out, the vital impetus, is immanent to an evolutionary moment (106). Thus, if the vital impetus is included in such kind of an evolutionary moment, we need to think about the qualitative change in a continuous living process. It is in a significant moment we see the qualitative changes; and those changes, they further reflect the vitality of existing life. Then, as Bergson concludes, the meaning of life is considered the continuation of one and the same impetus, divided into divergent lines of evolution (Creative

Evolution 60).

So, if the concept of duration is considered as an attempt for Bergson to understand the function where time acts, then the vital impetus can give us an idea of what this function exactly stands for. Life in Creative Evolution (1907) appears to work in an essentially twofold manner: as a vital impetus that can explain the movement of creative evolution, and as a duration that can account for the complexity of living systems (Ansell-Pearson 100-1). This means that the qualitative changes should be considered as a reflection of the vital impetus within such a crucial moment. As Bergson further explains, “Mechanism excludes absolutely the hypothesis of an original impetus, I mean an internal push that has carried life, by more and more complex forms, to higher and higher destinies” (Creative Evolution 113). And this further leads us to think of qualitative changes as the climax of duration. At the beginning of his book Time and Free Will (1889), Bergson argues that as far as we can understand our consciousness has potentials to grow and attenuate, there must exist a magnitude of intensity to measure the strength of our feelings (1-2). Furthermore, he illustrates,

“this conception of intensive magnitude seems, indeed, to be that of common sense, but we cannot advance it as a philosophical explanation without becoming involved in a vicious circle. For it is beyond doubt that, in the natural series of numbers, the later number exceeds the earlier, but the very possibility of arranging the numbers in ascending order arises from their having to each other relations of container and contained, so that we feel ourselves able to explain precisely in what sense one is greater than the other.” (Time and

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Free Will 2)

In some way, Bergson seems to suggest that, first, when we consider the magnitude of intensity, it needs to be put into a circle; second, within our psychic length, there are different degrees of fluctuations; third, the magnitude needs to be placed within an order. Although it is almost impossible to measure the different levels of psychic intensity, to say how much someone feels more happy or sad today than they did yesterday. This is because the intensity of our mental states is only affected by our feelings and physical conditions, which come from outside of our body. Namely, our sensation is always individual and subjective. Then, we only recognize people's moods by significant manifestation, for example, if someone feels happy or not today compared to yesterday. As Bergson argues, we attempt to distinguish intensities by objective causes, and we judge intensity without knowing the magnitude or nature of the cause (Time and Free Will 4). However, we can still detect those significant psychic states that appear when they reach their finalised forms – when our psychic state is fully loaded and has achieved its most intensive strength. For Bergson, these are atomic moments which refer to sudden moments when we compare the present state of the ego with its previous states, within such a moment the cause of psychic strength is perceived in its entirety and its effect is experienced at the same time (Time and Free

Will 5). Bergson also concludes that we attempt to distinguish intensities by those atomic moments,

but it is the sensation, which is given in consciousness, and not the movement (Time and Free Will 6). Therefore, this is the way in which we can possibly figure out the intensity of someone's psychic states; not by the mental activities, but through those distinguishable moments. By doing so, we see the qualitative change beginning to make its effect by exposing someone's conscious conditions. For the climax of those qualitative changes unfolds itself in those atomic moments and only releases itself when the intensity of our psychic states have been raised up to a maximum level. Those atomic moments, they are somehow like sparks in the darkness that we can spot only when they turn out being tremendously energetic, as they begin to burn themselves and show off their luminance. Thus, those atomic moments exist in our continuous inner duration, they gather qualitative changes and release them one by one when the intensity of psychic state is maximized. Therefore, the vital impetus is a kind of spontaneous ability for a whole organic self to mobilize from one qualitative change to the next: an ability of transforming and accumulating individual experience. It is also the process that leads to the climax of living time, our duration.

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4. A Bergsonian Epiphany of Time

In this paper, I hope to highlight that Bergson never mentioned any conception that can be directly linked to the concept of literary epiphany. The Bergsonian epiphany of time is based on the understanding of this paper's author on literary epiphany and Bergson's theory of time. First of all, both literary epiphany and Bergson's concepts of time attempt to describe a kind of accumulated process. As both literary epiphany and Bergson's concepts of time try to highlight the accumulated process of waiting, memorising, or expecting. Second, both the literary epiphany and Bergson's theory of time aim to expose the subjective and individual experience of a sudden moment. Both have revealed a progress that evokes some kind of self-awakening within the entire accumulated process. Third, both processes are spiritual and contain an obvious climax. Both also aim to illuminate the sudden change of mental states, and the relationship among the changes. Fourth, both the literary epiphany and Bergson's theory of time must connect with involuntary memory. As both literary epiphany and Bergson's theory of time have mentioned the dimension of connecting the conditions in the past with the states in the present. Therefore, to become a Bergsonian epiphany of time, it needs to include all those common features, which have been listed above between literary epiphany and Bergson's theory of time.

Besides, as far as the Bergsonian epiphany of time needs to be considered as a different type of literary epiphany, it still needs to follow the basic principles that a common literary epiphany does. Then, this type of epiphany needs to cover Beja's three basic elements and Tigges's trigger mechanism. That is to say, a Bergsonian epiphany of time still needs to be triggered off by triviality. Additionally, this process needs to follow the mechanism that Tigges has presented, as it needs to make a sudden recall, then it reaches up to a psychic climax, and finally it can generate some kind of experience or knowledge. However, what makes the Bergsonian epiphany of time unique is that as it is brought up with the contribution of Bergson's theory of time, the experience of this type of epiphany has to deal with the momentary feeling of time. For literary epiphany puts its concern on the length of the psychic condition and sudden changes, while Bergson's theory of time focuses on the continuity of the philosophical length and the growth of the inner self. That means the Bergsonian epiphany of time deals with changes that are relevant to temporal issues, concerning growth, ageing, and so on. This indicates that for this type of literary epiphany, the experience or knowledge that are produced by it, needs to deal with consequences of experiencing the flow of inner time, as this process concerns the self-growth and philosophical development. Therefore, it can be concluded that the definition of a Bergsonian epiphany of time is a sudden spiritual manifestation of subjective and individual experience of time, which is closely related to the accumulation of human memories. It is triggered off by triviality and it generates experience or

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5. A Bergsonian Reading of Virginia Woolf's Mrs Dalloway

In James Joyce's novel Stephen Hero (1944), the epiphany itself is still a suspended one. It does not make any distinctions or changes. In the novel, the concept of epiphany is adopted by mobilizing a character whose name is Stephen Daedalus. As presented in the novel,

This triviality made him think of collecting many such moments together in a book of epiphanies. By an epiphany he meant “a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself”...This is the moment which I call epiphany. First we recognize that the object is one integral thing, then we recognise that it is an organised composite structure, a thing in fact: finally, when the relation of the parts is exquisite, when the parts are adjusted to the special point, we recognise that it is that thing which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance. The soul of the commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems to us radiant. The object achieves its epiphany. (Joyce 213)

Joyce's idea of using the word epiphany in his novel has caught a lot of literary scholars' attention. As Herbert F. Tucker says, “a Joycean epiphany is the account of an experience, of a secular instant as sudden and complete as what was once called grace” (1208). Tucker has pointed out the Joycean epiphany as a kind of experience, its most significant feature is its suddenness. However, Tucker's specific view is not enough for us to cover the whole meaning of a Joycean epiphany. As Joyce himself has already provided the scholars some helpful suggestions; such as, for example his suggestion that an epiphany has to be a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. Therefore, besides the suddenness, we also notice that a Joycean epiphany includes features such as spiritualness and triviality.

For instance, Jurate Levina comments that Joyce seems to suggest that the epiphanic experience is regarded as a kind of religious revelation, it seems for him that everyday un-reflected actions, ordinary unnoticed events, and common objects of the lived world have a symbolic divine meaning that come forth in an epiphany (191). To maintain such a high level of spiritual intensity, the observer of the momentary experience must consistently keep engaging such moments. To be able to achieve this effect, the triviality must vary. As Levina argues, in Joyce's novel an epiphanic manifestation comes through the vulgarity of verbal or bodily gesture, while itself being spiritual – that is, something other than the vulgar gesture or the common object that brings it forth (191). And this is possibly how Joyce could keep triggering off as many epiphanies as he could for Stephen in a one-day novel.

On the other hand, we can also recognize that as a writing method, Joyce uses epiphany as an aesthetic tool to fulfil the goal of a character's self expansion of his/her mental world by engaging

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all kinds of trivial things. As Florence L. Walzl concludes, the epiphany in its meaning of a manifestation has offered Joyce a term, which can be placed in a literary setting to signify both revelation in its usual technical sense and spiritual manifestation in psychological and symbolic senses (450). While the meaning of the revelation is less significant to Joyce, what matters to him is the importance of highlighting it to demonstrate a character's psychic climax. I would argue that Joyce's one-day fantasy on the street of Dublin certainly cares more about quantity than quality. Thus, in his novel, Stephen's epiphanies appear ceaselessly while the contents of those epiphanies are too pointless to have our attention.

To clarify and distinguish the similarities and differences of literary epiphanies in modern novels, also as a comparison with the Joycean epiphany, I hope to add an additional discussion of Virginia Woolf's crucial moment, which is called “moments of being” by the editor of the book

Moments of Being (1972), Jeanne Schulkind. The “moments of being” contains several similar as

well as different characteristics compared to the Joycean epiphany. The main reason why I want to stress the comparison between Woolf's “moments of being” and Joyce's epiphany is because, according to Beja epiphany is one of the most useful and central techniques in modern fiction, it is associated with the dominant themes of modern fiction and its function as a structural device is used by many modern authors, especially Joyce and Woolf (22).

Beja discovers that both Joyce's epiphanies and the experience that Woolf describes involve a kind of revelation, both seem to arise for no reason. As they both contain a unifying role, which evokes a significant moment of irrational and intuitive experience (115-116). In addition to this, Beja adds that with the introduction of meaning, of something revealed, into the artistic form, we begin to see a relationship with Virginia Woolf's moment of vision - which, like epiphany, involves a sudden spiritual manifestation (126). Somehow, we can see that, both Woolf's “moments of being” and Joyce's epiphany are able to fit with the definition of a sudden spiritual manifestation, as far as they can be triggered off by the triviality. However, we need to be aware that Beja is certainly not suggesting that there is some sort of obscure relationship between Woolf's “moments of being” and Joyce's epiphany. As Schulkind explains, “such a moment for Virginia Woolf is one of recognition and then revelation – the value of which is independent of the object that is catalyst – and, as such, is very close to Joyce's notion of epiphany” (Schulkind 19). Although for Woolf herself, she seems much less interested in explaining such an ambiguous and general concept of the momentary experience. By contrast, Woolf writes,

These scenes, by the way, are not altogether a literary device – a means of summing up and making a knot out of innumerable little threads...A scene always comes to the top; arranged; representative. This confirms me in my instinctive notion – it is irrational; it will

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not stand argument – that we are sealed vessels afloat upon what it is convenient to call reality; at some moments, without a reason, without an effort, the sealing matter cracks; in floods reality; that is a scene – for they would not survive entire so many ruinous tears unless they were made of something permanent; that is a proof of their reality. (Moments

of Being 142)

In Woolf's statements, what can be noticed is that in her novel she seems not just trying to describe a moment that a character experiences, but more importantly, she attempts to figure out a sense of reality for the character. Woolf seeks the meaning behind the sense, and she tries to excavate the real condition for the character. Suzette Henke, who has defined the “eyeless epiphany” in Woolf's novel To the Lighthouse (1927), comments,

Hence the significance of 'Time Passes', the interchapter in which nature and the universe are seen without a self, and the human eye/I has been obliterated. The reader sees the world from the vantage point of a cosmic interpreter casting an indifferent gaze over the follies of human history. Almost every paragraph of “Time Passes” evokes an “eyeless” epiphany articulated by the philosophical voice of a cosmic narrator. (Henke 263)

Here, Henke is suggesting that to achieve such an effect, Woolf intends to give the narrator more space of utterance rather than to a character. By adopting such a writing skill, Woolf could possibly cut off the vision of a character, while she can leave more reminders to the reader by providing an epiphanic vision, in which it allows the reader to look into the quality and condition of a character. What truly concerns Woolf in such a moment is the reality that is concluded from the revelation of the moment rather than the revelation itself. As Beja argues, for Woolf, her statements show that to her the moments themselves are far more important than the meaning they involve (114). Therefore, this is the feature that marks the difference between Woolf's “moments of being” and Joyce's epiphany.

If we take a specific example from Woolf's explanation in her collection, Moments of Being (1972), she says, “I feel that I have had a blow; but it is not, as I thought as a child, simply a blow from an enemy hidden behind the cotton wool of daily life; it is or will become a revelation of some order; it is a token of something real behind appearance; and I make it real by putting it into words” (72). By following Schulkind's explanation, it becomes clear that the individual in his daily life is cut off from reality, but at rare moments receives a shock. These shocks or “moments of being” are not, as she had imagined as a child, simply random manifestations of some malevolent force but a token of some real thing behind appearance (Schulkind 17). This indicates that what supports Woolf's “moments of being” to become an immortality and also a climax is the reality, which is concluded most probably by the reader, for this whole process seems more objective. To Woolf, this

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reality stands for the awakening of a secular woman in a world dominated by men. That is to say, if Joyce could possibly produce as many epiphanies as he could as a writing method, then, Woolf attempts to add new meanings into those moments, make them become more durable.

Woolf's novel Mrs Dalloway (1925) begins with an inner monologue of the main character in the novel, Clarissa Dalloway, as she feels herself being like a child on the beach, while she is walking on Bond street in London one early morning (3). This is the very early consciousness we can see of Clarissa in the novel. Then Clarissa's memory starts to flow back, as she can remember scene after scene at Bourton and she suddenly wonders if Peter Walsh would be with her, what would he say? (6). At the same time, Clarissa's memory is also accumulating. When Clarissa has reached the gate of St James's Park, she feels very young, and she thinks her only gift is knowing people almost by instinct, when she stands in front of the gate (7). Through these examples, we can already see Clarissa's flow of memories between present and the past. And her consciousness keeps appearing in the rest of the novel. For example, when Clarissa is ready to cross the road, she starts to think that she would much rather have been one of those people like Richard who did things for themselves, and if she could have had her life over again when walking on to the pavement (9). When she is pushing through the swing door of Mulberry's the florists, she cries to herself: 'nonsense, nonsense' (11)! Then she sees a motor car driving down Bond street, Clarissa thinks it is probably the Queen sitting in the car, and the Queen may go to some hospitals, opening some bazaar, as Clarissa is coming out Mulbery's with her flowers (14). There is a car accident on Bond street and the traffic is blocked. Clarissa thinks that, 'nobody can pass now, not even the Queen!' (14). At the moment when Clarissa is back home, she feels like a nun, who has left the world and feels fold round her, the familiar veils and the response to old devotions (25). Then she feels blessed and purified, and she thinks how moments like these are buds on the tree of life, flowers of darkness they are, she continues to think that one must repay in daily life to servants, yes, to dogs and canaries, above all to Richard her husband, one must pay back from this secret deposit of exquisite moments (25). When we look into those small details of Clarissa's inner activities, she is still actively engaging those moments, her consciousness does not cease, while she is already aged.

So far, we see an aged upper class lady, who lives in London and still feels very young, or from a perspective of mental growth, we see a Clarissa, who is still being school girlish, for her mental states still maintain being extremely active, imaginative and creative. Meanwhile, we can also see the consistent flowing back and increasing of her memories. However, we certainly need to notice that, in Mrs Dalloway, the narrator is being very overt and omniscient; for example, there are two scenes in the novel, which are covered by the narrator. First, when Clarissa is pausing for a moment at the window of a glove shop, where before the war you could buy almost perfect gloves

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(9). Second, when the aeroplane is passing by the sky of London, people look up to the sky and remember leaves are still alive; trees are alive (17-9). Therefore, the clue is, in Mrs Dalloway Woolf has adopted large quantities of free-indirect discourses, which opens at two-and-a-half times rate (Fletcher & Monterosso 89). For example, at the first part of the novel, Woolf writes,

What a lark! What a plunge! For so it has always seemed to her when, with a little squeak of the hinges, which she could hear now, she had burst open the French windows and plunged at Bourton into the open air. How fresh, how calm, stiller than this of course, the air was in the early morning; like the flap of a wave; the kiss of a wave; chill and sharp and yet (for a girl of eighteen as she then was) solemn, feeling as she did, standing there at the open windows, that something awful was about to happen. (Mrs Dalloway 3)

As Fletcher and Monterosso have explained, the scientific account of free-indirect discourse makes us more attuned to minds outside our own by offering a peek into the first-person experience of others (85). And they further argue, in indirect writing, it is not a shift into the first person that nurtures society, but a shift away from the first person, for the author's admission of the limits of his own perspective is what allows others to see the value in his personal point-of-view (87). That is to say, those indirect free discourses need to be considered as a type of cognitive effect, which is offered by the narrator. Within them, we cannot see any traces of a character's inner activities. Within an evident moment, we see a character's inner self, that is the moment when we see the flow of his/her memories, in other words, their consciousness.

Apparently, Clarissa has also experienced the war, and both scenes are also drawing her attention, but what is significant to note, is those common memories that are not directly connected to Clarissa's inner activities, instead, they are presented by the narrator. Thus, we need to distinguish those moments from Clarissa's own mental states in the novel. Then comes the climax of the whole story: when Clarissa reads the telephone pad, which is sent from Lady Burton to her husband, she finds that she is not even invited (25-6). Clarissa feels shocked and her memory starts to flow back: how her share was sliced year after year; how little the margin that now remained was capable of stretching any longer, of absorbing, as in the youthful years, the colours, salts, tones of existence, so that she filled the room she entered, and felt often, as she stood hesitating one moment on the threshold of her drawing-room, an exquisite suspense (26). When she pauses by the open staircase window, she feels herself suddenly shrivelled, aged, breast-less, the grinding, blowing, flowering of the day, out of doors, out of the window, out of her body and brain, which now failed together (26). Then Clarissa thinks, women must put off their rich apparel, at midday they must disrobe (26). At this moment, we can see a complete process of a Bergsonian epiphany of time from the inner activities of Clarissa. As she gets triggered off by the telephone pad, which is sent by Mrs Burton,

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her memory flows back, and she suddenly notices the physical changes on her body after years. Then she just realises, women must be independent and strong from the inside of their hearts, they cannot simply just put on luxurious clothes to attract a man, but instead, they need to remove all those apparel decorations to expose the real essence of themselves. And this experience of ageing is echoed with the information that was provided in the previous part, since Clarissa still feels very young, but is simultaneously aged. This is also reflected later, where it is described how Sally Seton runs along the passage naked (29). Clarissa can see that what she lacks is not beauty, not mind; it is something central which permeates; something warm which breaks up surfaces and ripples the cold contact of man and woman, or of women together (27). As then Woolf writes,

It was a sudden revelation, a tinge like a blush which one tried to check and then, as it spread, one yielded to its expansion, and rushed to the first farthest verge and there quivered and felt the world come closer, swollen with some astonishing significance, some pressure of rapture, which spilt its thin skin and gushed and poured with as extraordinary alleviation over the cracks and sores. Then, for that moment, she had seen an illumination; a match burning in acrocus; an inner meaning almost expressed. But the close withdraw; the hard softened. It was over – the moment. (Mrs Dalloway 27)

Therefore, a significant moment of this process is when an epiphany occurs. It is obvious to see that literary epiphany plays a very important role here to help us identify something extremely crucial behind a character's appearance in Woolf's novel, either Clarissa or Septimus. However, only using the definition of literary epiphany is not enough to deal with the consequences in Mrs Dalloway. How shall we explain that Clarissa is unspeakably aged, while she still feels very young? And how shall we explain at the end of the novel that Septimus, the Great War veteran and hero, chooses to commit suicide? Thus, this is the reason why we need the help of explanations from Bergson's theory of time. As Shiv K. Kumar explains, Bergson's philosophical arguments and opinions have shown that how Bergsonism provides an important clue to the understanding of the creative impulse behind stream of consciousness novels, which has so far been treated in literary criticism mostly as a technical innovation (173). Through connecting the definition of literary epiphany with Bergson's theory of time, we could somehow achieve an ascendant position, where it allows us to look into the living conditions of a character in the novel by the experiment of time passing. What we can see behind a Bergsonian epiphany of time, is the vitality of a character in the novel. It is the evidence of a character growing, maturing, developing, and being alive; not only from a physical point of view, but also from a philosophical aspect of life. It is simply because if someone's inner self is dead, then he/she only carries his/her body by his/her legs, like a walking dead. Behind Clarissa's one-day activities, what we see in the novel, is her subjective and individual experience of time passing by,

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then turning back and letting it go. Her memories keep flowing throughout the entire novel. This is how we can see her vitality of life through an exquisite moment of being awakened: a moment when her psychic condition reaches its climax. For example, as when she has heard the news of Septimus's suicide. As Thomas C. Beattie concludes,

“its heart is the climactic scene in the little room where Clarissa withdraws to experience an epiphany in which she reaffirms herself and her way of life. The epiphany is flanked on one side by the growing success of the party, temporarily arrested for Clarissa by the Bradshaw's news of Septimus' suicide, and on the other by a dénouement in which Woolf contrasts a renewed Clarissa with the more static Sally Seton (now Lady Rosseter) and Peter Walsh.” (529-530)

Then Kate Haffey adds,

“many critics argue that Septimus's suicide causes an epiphany for Clarissa, one that allows her to leave the internal world of her memory and return to the physical world of the party. If this scene is an epiphany, it is one of quite a different sort. It is a moment that allows Clarissa to see the presence of her past, to experience the pleasure of having her past return to her.” (146)

Both Beattie and Haffey are very much interested in the way that Woolf has adopted the epiphany of a final scene as a structural tool, which, Beja would also agree with. As Beja points out, the important functions for the epiphany in modern fiction are both as a structural device and as a unifying or integrating device (22-23). And his opinion also gains some support from academic communities; such as Terry L. Palls, who explains that the epiphany as a literary technique has many positive functions: as a structural device it may mark climaxes, it may introduce a flashback to provide necessary background information, or it may serve to integrate seemingly unconnected threads of a narrative instantaneously (65). However, we need to note that an epiphany is not only used as a structural device, but also as an access that allows us to look beyond the conditions of different characters in a novel.

As Herbert F. Tucker has argued, “the vitality of epiphany entails the contextualization of life...To the apprehending consciousness, an epiphany may intimate the meaning of life, but to the observer of that consciousness, an epiphany signifies the meaning of a life” (1210). And this meaning of life, in some way, looks more like a competition in life, which is presented between Clarissa and Septimus. When Big Ben strikes, the force of time is making its effect. Everyone has to make a move. In this case, people who fail to create internal changes will not be able to keep themselves competitive in the competition of life. We can clearly see that Clarissa' memory is increasing from the beginning of the novel until the very end of her party. For example, when she is

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walking down the room with the Prime Minister, she feels it has been good for the Prime Minister to come (148). And when Lady Bradshaw and Sir William come to the party, Clarissa thinks, no one will like Sir William to see one unhappy (155). In the middle of the party, Clarissa hears about the death of Septimus from her husband and she thinks, oh, here is death (156). When Clarissa is straightening the chairs and pushing in one book on the shelf, she thinks, “nothing can be slow enough, nothing lasts too long, and no pleasure can equal” (157). When Clarissa pulls the blind and the clock begins striking, she feels herself somehow very like Septimus, and she feels glad that Septimus has killed himself, throwing it away while they go on living (158).

On the other hand, we see in the novel, another character, Septimus whose consciousness no longer exists. In the novel, both Clarissa and Septimus have witnessed the loss of their loved ones. For Clarissa, she has seen her dear sister Sylvia's death caused by a falling tree (66). And for Septimus, he has experienced the death of his very close friend, Evans, who was killed on the battlefield in Italy (73). Therefore, both Clarissa and Septimus' growth of inner time has been pressed, limited, and struck. Differing from Clarissa's consistent internal changes, for Septimus, we may notice something different. In the novel, Septimus appears on Bond Street when he is waiting for the traffic. In his mind, an image appears of a motor car standing, with drawn blinds, and upon them a curious pattern like a tree, and he feels terrified of the traffic (13). Then he wonders if it was him, who is blocking the traffic for some sort of reason (13). When Septimus and his Italian wife are sitting on a seat in Regent's Park, they see an aeroplane pass through the sky. Spetimus then thinks the aeroplanes are signalling to him (18). The next scene of Septimus's inner activities moves to when his wife says the wedding ring does not fit her finger any more for her finger grows thinner, so she puts the ring into her purse; for Septimus, this indicates that their marriage is over (57). When a shepherd boy climes higher, Septimus thinks the boy's elegy is played among the traffic (58). After crossing the road, Septimus starts to think how wonderful it is when people look at the sky, but at the same time, how strange it is (71). When Septimus and his wife are leaving Newhaven on a train, he looks at England from the train window, and thinks to himself that it may be possible that the world itself is without meaning (75). As his wife is trimming hats for Mrs Filmer's friends, Septimus thinks, his wife looks oale, mysterious, like a lily, drowned, under water (75). When Dr Holmes comes again to see Septimus, Septimus writes on the back of a postcard, “once you stumble, human nature is on you. Holmes is on you” (78). Septimus lies on the sofa in the sitting-room, he thinks, “fear no more, fear no more” (118). When his wife is sewing, he thinks, she makes a sound like kettle on the hob, and he continues to think, he will wait (122). The last moment we see Septimus's inner activities is when his wife brings him his papers, the things which he has written, and she has written for him, as Septimus thinks, “she does up the papers, and ties the parcel almost

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without looking, as if all her petals are about her” (125). From here, we do not see any traces of Septimus's consciousness, then comes the scene where the message of his death arrives to Clarissa's party. Throughout the novel, we cannot see any development of Septimus's physiological world. His consciousness stops growing, most obviously, when he fails to notice his wife's finger growing thinner. However, one thing we need to notice is that Septimus has survived the war and he has fought bravely through the war (73). That is to say, during the war, Septimus's inner-self was actually growing. And it also has been proven that, according to his wife's memory, Septimus has been through the war and is happy most of the time (127). Septimus's crisis does not begin from outside the world, not from the war but rather, originates from inside of his body, his philosophical world; it arises from the moment when he fails to see his Italian wife's finger becoming thinner so she cannot fit the wedding ring any more.

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6. Conclusion

Although the influence of stream of consciousness novels nowadays is not as significant as during the beginning of 20th century, it certainly does not mean that the writing methods, which are adopted by stream of consciousness novels, are out of date. Taking Woolf's novel Mrs Dalloway as an example, we can see that many critics, through several decades have mostly been focusing on topics such as time, secular living, mental illness, existential issues, feminism, bisexuality, and war trauma. However, even though Mrs Dalloway has been considered as a classic novel of stream of consciousness style, we can still find new angles to read the novel.

Undoubtedly, we need to borrow the theoretical methods that we can use them to expand our cognitive capabilities and extend our understandings of the novel. Therefore, the renaissance of Bergson's theory of time provides us with an entirely different idea to read Woolf's novel. Based on the very original work by Morris Beja and Wim Tigges, we are able to understand a complete process of literary epiphany, and this is very important for creating the foundation for a Bergsonian reading. Although, Bergson's concepts of time, la durée and élen vital were largely ignored for a long period of time (until scholars in philosophy such as Keith Ansell-Pearson began to write about Bergson's thoughts on time in recent years), it gives an idea of combining Bergson's thoughts on time with literary epiphany into a single conception: a Bergsonian epiphany of time. Thus, this is exactly the new theoretical method that will enable us to generate a different idea when we read Woolf's novel. By getting rid of the interruption from those free indirect-discourses, we are able to see a completely different structure. It is no longer about those traditional angels of criticism, rather, it is about the inner growth of a character, the psychic difference between characters, where we see those tiny details through their consciousness; we see their creativities, vitalities, and spontaneities; we see their joyfulness, sadness, and frustration within those moments; and we see their daily life circumstances and also their living conditions. Those characters are exposed to the reader when readers can feel the character's experience of being moved, joyous, or sorrowful.

Going back to Woolf's novel, we can see a world only with different characters' monologues and inner activities that are only available to the reader. We are presented with a Clarissa who still feels young, meanwhile she is unspeakably aged. Moreover, we also see a Septimus, who fights bravely in the war, but then fails to notice his wife's finger becoming thinner. It is by using the theoretical methods that we are able to see the diversity of different character's qualities, we see the magic how Woolf was able to place life and story into a character's body, help him/her get out of the situation that seems reckless and vacuous, as they can only exist in a world of black and white – they only exist on paper. And this is the sublime for the word epiphany, from an original religious manifestation to a position where it has gained its new space to grow and bloom in the world of

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literature. And we need to remember that it is exactly both literary epiphany and Bergson's theory of time that allows us to create an entirely different angle to comment on those characters in Woolf's novel. The creativity, vitality, and spontaneity of lively beings are what the Bergsonian epiphany of time is supposed to inform us as readers; also, this is what makes the Bergsonian epiphany of time special. It does not only provide a detailed view, but also gives a character a solely different meaning of life. Therefore, this new combination will give us a different taste of sorrow and happiness when we read Woolf's Mrs Dalloway again.

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Capturing the Epiphany of Time - A Bergsonian Reading of Virginia Woolf&apos;s Mrs Dalloway