Safety Optimization of Material Handling Forklift Truck Operations

IN

DEGREE PROJECT MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, SECOND CYCLE, 30 CREDITS

STOCKHOLM SWEDEN 2020,

Safety Optimization of Material Handling Forklift Truck Operations

CARLOS CONDE CARVALHAL

KTH ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT

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Carlos Conde Carvalhal August 2020

Master of Sciences Thesis KTH Royal Institute of Technology Production Engineering and Management

SAFETY OPTIMIZATION OF

MATERIAL HANDLING FORKLIFT TRUCK OPERATIONS

A study case at Linde in Enköping

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© 2020

Carlos Conde Carvalhal ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

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Abstract

The prevention of incidents and injuries is fundamental for any industry activity since those events may result in serious economic, environmental, and human losses. Due to the centralization of Linde filling operations within Sweden, several of their plants are being phased out to move the production to Enköping. The elevated raise of Linde's production led to a high increase of forklift drivers and stock levels and consequently brought up the number of incidents related to forklift driving. This thesis aims to obtain knowledge to mitigate forklift truck related safety hazards as well as understand how to eliminate risks and unsafe situations at this type of operation. This project was divided into 3 phases. Phase I consisted of understanding operations routines and its safety risks, assessing Enköping site internal state (with a safety survey, and several visits and interviews), and benchmarking the most common practices based on other companies' forklift-related processes (with visits and interviews). In phase II, parallelly to I- Site software implementation, studies utilizing different engineering tools (Spaghetti Diagram, VSM, Fishbone Diagram, and FMEA) were performed in order to gather information and understand how to optimize the site's forklift-related safety. In this phase, a tailored observational KPI was developed in order to assess the site independently of incident measurement regarding four groups: Site, Pedestrian activity, Forklift operation, and Forklift operator behavior. In phase III, all data acquired was discussed, and conclusions were made based on the data analysis and discussions of the results of Phase II implementation allied with the theoretical references. The survey findings showed the high degree of importance given to safety at Linde in Enköping. It also revealed, in addition to all engineering tools applied, which elements should be focused in order to optimize the forklift trucks operational safety (mainly related to Technology dimension). Based on the benchmark comparison, it is possible to allege that the absence of a maintenance facility is the main disadvantage of Linde in Enköping. In contrast, the usage of I-Site fleet management software represents an important step towards safety. The I-Site knowledge and the awareness of its benefits grew among management and operators as setup issues, and technical malfunctioning was eliminated. The observational KPI has obtained preliminary overall values above 0,82 for all groups (on a scale of 0 to 1), proving itself capable of measuring the safety performance and identifying risks and unsafe situations.

Keywords: Forklift truck. Material Handling. Operational Safety. Observation. Incident. Risk.

Unsafe Situations. Digitalization.

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Sammanfattning

Att förebygga incidenter och skador är grundläggande för all branschaktivitet eftersom dessa händelser kan leda till allvarliga ekonomiska, miljömässiga och mänskliga förluster. På grund av centraliseringen av Lindes fyllningsverksamheten inom Sverige har flera av deras anläggningar fasats ut för att flytta produktionen till Enköping. Den utökade produktionen på Linde Enköping skapade behov av fler truckförare, högre lagernivåer och ökade följaktligen antalet incidenter relaterade till gaffeltruck. Avhandlingen syftar till att få kunskap för att mildra säkerhetsrisker för gaffeltruckar samt förstå hur man kan eliminera risker och osäkra situationer vid denna typ av verksamhet. Detta projekt delades in i tre faser. Fas I bestod av att förstå driftsrutiner och dess säkerhetsrisker, utvärdera det interna tillståndet på Linde Enköpings arbetsplats (med en säkerhetsundersökning, flera besök och olika intervjuer) och benchmarka de vanligaste metoderna baserat på andra företags gaffeltruckrelaterade processer (med besök och intervjuer). I fas II, parallellt med I-Site-programvaruimplementering, utfördes studier med olika tekniska verktyg (Spaghetti Diagram, VSM, Fishbone Diagram och FMEA) för att undersöka och förstå hur man optimerar verksamhetens gaffeltruckrelaterade säkerhet. I denna fas utvecklades en skräddarsydd observations-KPI för att utvärdera verksamheten oberoende av att mäta incidenter avseende fyra grupper: Plats, fotgängare, gaffeltruck och beteende för gaffeltruck. I fas III diskuterades alla förvärvade data, slutsatser gjordes baserade på dataanalysen och diskussionerna om resultaten av fas II-implementering tillsammans med teoretiska referenser. Undersökningsresultaten visade hur högt säkerhet prioriteras vid Linde Enköping. Den avslöjade också, utöver alla tillämpade konstruktionsverktyg, vilka element som bör fokuseras på för att optimera truckens driftssäkerhet (främst relaterad till teknikdimension).

Baserat på den benchmarking som genomfördes är det möjligt att hävda att frånvaron av underhållsanläggning är den största nackdelen med Linde i Enköping. Däremot är användningen av mjukvara för I-Site-flottanhantering ett viktigt steg mot säkerheten.

Kunskapen om I-SITE och medvetenheten om dess fördelar växte bland ledningen och operatörerna när installationsproblem och tekniska funktionsfel eliminerades. Utfallen för observations-KPI har erhållit preliminära totalvärden över 0,82 för alla grupper (i en skala från 0 till 1), och visar sig kapabel att mäta säkerhet i genomförande samt att identifiera risker och osäkra situationer.

Nyckelord: Truckar. Materialhantering. Driftsäkerhet. Observation. Incident. Risk. Osäkra

situationer. Digitalisering.

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Aknowleadgements

Primarily I am thankful to God.

To my wife, Laura, my deepest gratitude. Without her dedication, love, care, encouragement and academical advices, none of this would be possible.

Then I would like to thank my parents, Carlos Roberto and Hortência, my brother, Felipe, who have always supported me.

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my grandparents, Glória (in memoriam), Waldyr (in memoriam) and Maria Hortência (in memoriam), for their love and encouragement, and for being examples of hard workers which kept me pursuing my dreams.

And lastly, I would like to thank my supervisors Danial Mulazzani (Linde), Jerzy Mikler

(KTH), and Tobias Vikberg (Linde) for the help, understanding and contribution in this project.

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Table of Contents

List of Figures viii

List of Tables x

List of Abreviations xi

1. Introduction 12

1.1. Background 12

1.2. Problem definition 13

1.3. Objective 13

1.4. Research Method 14

1.5. Work Structure 15

2. Literature Review 16

2.1. Safety Concepts and Definitions 16

2.2. Logistics and Material Handling 21

2.3. Forklift Truck (FLT) and its Safety problem 22

2.4. Safety Legislation (Arbetsmiljöverkett) 27

2.5. Spaghetti Diagram and Value Stream Mapping (VSM) 29

2.6. KPI for Safety 29

2.7. Fishbone Diagram and Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) 31

2.8. I-Site (Toyota Fleet management Software) 32

3. Methodology 37

3.1. Current operations and Safety assessment 37

3.2. Benchmark Visits/ Interviews 37

3.3. Survey 39

3.4. Forklift operations Spaghetti Diagram and Process Mapping 40

3.5. Forklift Safety Observation for KPI development 41

3.6. Fishbone diagram and FMEA 44

3.7. I-SITE Implementation 44

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4. Results 50

4.1. Current operations and Safety assessment 50

4.2. Benchmark Visits/ Interviews 56

4.3. Survey 64

4.4. Spaghetti diagram and VSM 67

4.5. Safety Observation KPI 73

4.6. Fishbone and FMEA 77

4.7. I-Site 83

5. Discussions 86

5.1. Enköping and benchmark companies’ comparison 86

5.2. Forklift truck safety optimization 87

5.3. I-Site implementation 92

6. Conclusion and Future work 94

6.1. Conclusions 94

6.2. Future work suggestions 95

7. References 97

8. Appendix 102

A- FMEA Criteria 102

B- Forklift Safety Improvement Survey 103

C- Arbetsmiljöverket Forklift Compliance 108

D- Forklift Safety Inventory for Observational KPI 111

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List of Figures

Figure 1.1. Project research proposed and implemented. ... 14

Figure 2.1Definition of incidents and accidents at Linde. ... 18

Figure 2.2 Evolved Heinrich’s Domino Theory. ... 18

Figure 2.3 Unsafe acts model. ... 20

Figure 2.4 Evolution of logistics until an integrated Supply Chain concept ... 21

Figure 2.5 Forklift Driving Permit Example. ... 23

Figure 2.6 Forklift Truck components ... 24

Figure 2.7 Reported accidents with sick leave cases in Sweden from 2008 to 2012 ... 25

Figure 2.8 Example of Forklift operator’s poor visibility. ... 26

Figure 2.9 Fishbone diagram example ... 31

Figure 2.10 I-Site hardware communication system ... 32

Figure 2.11 Operational information available at I-Site. ... 33

Figure 2.12 Battery discharging information graph. ... 34

Figure 2.13 Shock incident comment window at I-Site. ... 35

Figure 2.14 I-Site on-board panel. ... 35

Figure 2.15 I-Site benefits summary. ... 36

Figure 3.1 Ranking exercise map. ... 40

Figure 3.2 Five regions for site KPI observations. ... 42

Figure 3.3 I-Site implementation process chart. ... 45

Figure 3.4 Shock settings section within the machine details interface at I-Site. ... 46

Figure 3.5 Battery settings section within the machine details interface at I-Site. ... 47

Figure 3.6 POC settings section within the machine details interface at I-Site. ... 47

Figure 3.7 I-Site Pre-Operational checklist at the I-Site interface. ... 48

Figure 3.8 New drivers and new machines addition routine. ... 49

Figure 4.1 Cylinder distribution process mapping. ... 50

Figure 4.2 Overview of the current state layout of the plant in Enköping. ... 51

Figure 4.3 Canopy (top) and adjacent uncovered (bottom) loading/ unloading areas. ... 52

Figure 4.4 Pedestrian path marking of current (left) and future (right) state map. ... 53

Figure 4.5 External (left) and internal (right) charging facilities. ... 53

Figure 4.6 Forklift truck daily checkup control card. ... 54

Figure 4.7 Reactive maintenance Kanban board. ... 54

Figure 4.8 Daily checkup control card used at Dahl. ... 57

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Figure 4.9 Safety rules advertisements... 58

Figure 4.10 Leirdal stock and loading/ unloading external areas. ... 60

Figure 4.11 Safety Billboards. ... 61

Figure 4.12 Forklift truck maintenance (left) and charging facilities (right). ... 62

Figure 4.13 Internal (top) and external (bottom) loading/ unloading areas. ... 63

Figure 4.14 Gender, Age, and Position distribution results (from left to right). ... 64

Figure 4.15 Safety Culture Likert results. ... 65

Figure 4.16 Safety Behavior Likert results. ... 65

Figure 4.17 Risk behavior and situations open-ended question answers distribution... 66

Figure 4.18 Accident prevention open-ended question answers distribution. ... 67

Figure 4.19 Map with important locations at Linde in Enköping internal logistics. ... 68

Figure 4.20 Propane cylinders (left), Propane Maxi cylinders and Bundles (middle), and Propane Blue camping cylinders (right) Spaghetti diagram. ... 68

Figure 4.21 Industrial gas (left) and Specialty gas (right) cylinders Spaghetti diagram. ... 69

Figure 4.22 Spaghetti diagram for High Bay (left), Health Care (middle), and Dry Ice (right) products. ... 70

Figure 4.23 Empty pallets (left), Import products (middle), and general outbound for maintenance (right) orders spaghetti diagram ... 71

Figure 4.24 Propane inbound and outbound order completion of internal logistics. ... 72

Figure 4.25 Pedestrians inventory unsafe observations. ... 76

Figure 4.26 Forklift Operator Behavior inventory unsafe observations. ... 76

Figure 4.27 Forklift Operations Activities inventory unsafe observations. ... 76

Figure 4.28 Site inventory unsafe observations. ... 77

Figure 4.29 Forklift truck fishbone diagram. ... 78

Figure 4.30 POC report with warning example. ... 84

Figure 4.31 BDI notification alert (left) and BDI discharging graph (right) examples. ... 85

Figure 5.1 Forklift truck and pedestrians flow interactions map. ... 89

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Safety Culture and Behavior features... 19

Table 2.2 Types of Material Handling Equipment. ... 22

Table 2.3 Mechanism of Forklift truck-related fatalities ... 26

Table 2.4 Checklist of Forklift trucks equipment and environment... 29

Table 2.5 FMEA table header's content. ... 31

Table 3.1 Scalable opinion statements correlation with safety definitions. ... 39

Table 4.1 Forklift incidents at Linde in Enköping overview ... 55

Table 4.2 Forklift incidents at Linde in Enköping characterization ... 55

Table 4.3 Areas at Linde in Enköping ranked by danger awareness ... 66

Table 4.4 Propane cylinders orders overview ... 69

Table 4.5 Safety inventory per groups ... 73

Table 4.7 Initial results for Pedestrian safety KPIs. ... 74

Table 4.8 Initial results for Behavior safety KPIs. ... 74

Table 4.9 Initial results for Operations safety KPIs. ... 74

Table 4.10 Initial results for Site safety KPIs. ... 75

Table 4.10 FMEA failure modes, effects, and causes for Site group ... 79

Table 4.11 FMEA control and RPN calculation parameters for Site group ... 79

Table 4.12 FMEA failure modes, effects, and causes for Pedestrian activity group ... 80

Table 4.13 FMEA control and RPN calculation parameters for Pedestrian activity group ... 80

Table 4.14 FMEA failure modes, effects, and causes for Operation group ... 81

Table 4.15 FMEA control and RPN calculation parameters for Operation group ... 81

Table 4.16 FMEA control and RPN calculation parameters for Behavior group ... 82

Table 4.17 FMEA control and RPN calculation parameters for Behavior group ... 82

Table 4.18 List of Forklifts for I-Site implementation at Linde Enköping ... 83

Table 4.19 POC usage overview. ... 83

Table 4.20 Average duration of POC. ... 84

Table 4.21 Personal access overview. ... 84

Table 4.22 BDI discharging per work pass report example ... 85

Table 4.23 Shock data overview ... 85

Table 5.1 Safety assessment comparison ... 86

Table 5.2 Proposed FMEA control/ detection measures and new RPN ... 91

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List of Abbreviations

LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas

DFC Distribution Filling Center

FLT Forklift truck

VSM Value Stream Mapping

KPI Key Performance Indicator

FMEA Failure Mode Effect Anaysis Linde REN Linde Region Europe North

FAC First Aid case

OHSAS Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series

HSC Health and Safety Commission

SC Supply Chain

CSCMP Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals

SCM SC Management

MH Material Handling

TLP Truckläroplan

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

AV Arbetsmiljöverket

AFS Arbetsmiljöverket Code of Statute

NVA Non-value-added

VA Value-added

TCIR Total Case Incident Rate

LWDC Lost Workday Cases

TRDC Total Recordable Cases

RPN Risk Priority Number

BSI Battery Status Information BDI Battery Discharging Information

POC Pre-Operational Check

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1. Introduction

1.1. Background

The prevention of incidents and injuries is fundamental for any industry activity since those events may result in serious economic, environmental, and human losses. Knowing this importance, the Linde Group is committed to avoiding harm to people, society, and the environment (Linde, n.d.-a). At Linde, the prevention of accidents is performed by controlling and managing the risks (Linde, 2019).

Linde’s history started in 1878 when Carl von Linde founded the company that would become a leader within the field of Engineering and Industrial gases, reaching €25 billion in 2019 sales results. The company has about 80,000 employees and serves customers in more than 100 countries worldwide in many types of markets, including aerospace, chemicals, food and beverage, electronics, energy, healthcare, manufacturing, and primary metals. During the 2000s, the Linde group acquired the innovative Swedish gas company known as AGA. A company founded in 1904 which the Nobel laureate Gustav Dalén help to grow, from his start as an engineer until getting appointed as CEO. (Linde, n.d.-b; Nobel Media AB, 2020)

Linde Enköping (former AGA) is located just outside Enköping, 70 km northwest of Stockholm. The site consists of three filling facilities located at the plant within the city with the same name. It produces specialty gases for the Northern Europe region, Helium, and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) for middle and northern Sweden and the Distribution Filling Center (DFC), responsible for dry ice and industrial gases production for the whole of Sweden.

The filling of medical gases, currently produced at Rötebro, will start during the last half of 2020. (Linde, n.d.-c)

The LPG filling and the Specialty gas were established, respectively, in 1992 and 2005.

In DFC, Filling, sorting, and picking of industrial gas cylinders is done with fully automated processes and systems since 2018, enabling a better result in terms of quality, cost, and safety.

An average of 1400 cylinders is filled every day. With 120 workers, the plant where specialty gas production is carried in one shift, LPG filling functions in two shifts, while filling of industrial gases and unloading and loading of trucks (Material Handling), mainly performed at the plant exterior, is done in three shifts. (Linde, n.d.-c)

Linde Enköping is, over last years, consolidating most cylinder operation sites to

Enköping, both filling and distribution activities. The centralization started in 2016 and will be

13 completed in 2021. This reduction of locations was planned to benefit filling operations, competence development, customer interfaces, and improve logistics operations, i.e., reducing stock planning complexity.

1.2. Problem definition

Due to the centralization of Linde filling operations within Sweden, several of their plants are being phased out to move the production to Enköping. The increased amount of production and product flow volume at the plant required changes at the plant. One of the departments most affected by the new demands was Material Handling. In 2019, Linde Enköping produced 1.022.700 cylinders, 57,4% more than the previous year (Linde, 2020a). In 2020 (until April), the plant had 376.447 cylinders filled, 46% more than the same period in the previous year (Linde, 2020a).

Material Handling can be defined as the group of operations that enables the company internal logistics functioning by moving, protecting, storaging, and controlling products and materials within a company production site and warehouse. Material Handling operations require the usage of a Forklift truck (FLT) due to the high workload and product weight.

The elevated raise of Linde’s production led to a high increase of forklift drivers and stock levels and consequently brought up the number of incidents related to forklift driving (with and without personnel injuries). The basic challenges in industrial traffic management are to increase productivity and to mitigate risks related to safety and health. In order to avoid problems, both the planning and design phase must consider the functions, movements, and activities of people, forklifts, and other vehicles.

The high level of change increased the number of forklifts trucks and forklift operators needed, resulting in a higher number of incidents.

1.3. Objective

The main areas of study are Operational Safety and Digitalization, which will only be applicable to outside plant grounds, including activities under the canopy. The expected result of this work is to support the creation and implementation of guidelines for what is needed for Linde to have best in class forklift handling and, if the data analysis is proved to be efficient, replicate in other Linde sites.

This thesis aims to obtain knowledge to mitigate forklift truck related safety hazards,

and the research question to be answered throughout this project is: “How can the safety within

14 Linde in Enköping be optimized?”. That one may answer this question, some intermediate objectives are necessary:

• To investigate operational rules and practices capable of enabling forklift drivers to have an optimal safety performance, based on Benchmarking, literature research and internal investigations (including safety regulations compliance);

• To investigate the forklift maintenance routines, charging program and related facilities (i.e., parking and material handling operations spaces) in order to suggest improvements;

• To develop a measurement system for the safety performance capable of evaluating Forklift operations safety, regardless of incident occurrence;

• To implement Toyota I-Site for all forklifts (a fleet management software that enables high productivity, better safety, high machine performance, and lower production costs).

1.4. Research Method

Figure 1.1 presents the research method used to carry out this project.

Figure 1.1. Project research proposed and implemented.

As seen in Figure 1.1, this project is divided into 3 phases. From its initial stage, a

continuous Literature review was conducted on the subject, allied with a revision of

Arbetsmiljöverket legislation (Swedish Work Environment Authority) and Linde’s internal

standards.

15 Phase I consisted of understanding Forklift operations routines and its safety risks, assessing Enköping site internal state, and benchmarking the most common practices based on other companies’ forklift-related processes.

In phase II, two parallel activities were held, namely I-Site (a fleet management software created by Toyota) implementation and studies utilizing different engineering tools (Spaghetti Diagram, Value Stream Mapping (VSM), Key Process Index (KPI), Fishbone Diagram and Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)).

In the end, in phase III, all data acquired was discussed and correlated, and conclusions and future work suggestions were made based on the data analysis and discussions of the results of Phase II implementation allied with the theoretical references.

1.5. Work Structure

For clarity, the project report structure will be presented as follows:

Chapter 1 presented the background of this thesis work, introducing the problem definition, defining the objectives and delimitations, and introducing the research method followed throughout the research.

Chapter 2 reviews the literature concerning occupational safety, material handling operations, and tools adopted in this thesis work.

Chapter 3 describes the methodology of research, explaining how data was gathered and how the research problem was addressed.

Chapter 4 presents the results acquired in every step of the research.

In Chapter 5, the results presented previously are analyzed and discussed.

In Chapter 6, the conclusions of the thesis are presented, and suggestions for future work are introduced.

Chapter 7 consists of this project references and the appendix (chapter 8) contain

documents that should help the understanding of the applied methods in this thesis, including

the performed Arbetsmiljöverket safety compliance.

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2. Literature Review

2.1. Safety Concepts and Definitions

Safety is defined as the condition where any danger, risk, or injury is unlikely to happen.

In any work environment, many factors might affect workers’ health and safety. Occupational Safety in the field whose objective is to identify, evaluate, and control risks in a work environment to ensure the best safety and health conditions. Safety importance is particularly high at Logistics dependent business (Hofstra, et al., 2018) due to its high accident occurrence (Arbetsmiljöverket, 2019). A large amount of material handling, the presence of heavy transportation machines nearby pedestrian workers, and the stressful and tight schedule workload may justify those undesired events (Cantor, 2008; De Koster, et al., 2010; Goode, et al., 2014). Nascimento and Melo (2010) states that safety may be interpreted as the result of all work activity variables.

In order to minimize the misinterpretation of technical definitions, enabling a better understanding of the developed study, some safety-related concepts are presented at the following sub-sections.

2.1.1. Danger, Risk, Defect, and Failure

The concept of danger is the set of conditions that can generate a series of unfortunate events that lead to unwanted incidents, causing injury or death, material damage or loss, or an environmental disaster (Roland & Moriarty, 1990). Risk is the product of the undesired event occurrence frequency by the consequences that it can cause (Nascimento, 2010). The turning point for a dangerous event to happen might be a failure of a component, an environment condition, a wrong procedure specification, or a mix of multiple factors. Reason (1990) defines failure as the system’s inability to overcome the performance requirements while defects are malfunctioning of a part or system that may contribute to a more significant system failure.

2.1.2. Incident and Accident

Incidents are unforeseen events with the potential to cause personal injury, damage, material loss, or environmental disaster. Heinrich (1931) categorizes incidents in two types

“near miss” and “key incident”. Near miss are events which under slightly different

circumstances, could have resulted in harm to people, harm to the environment, damage to

property, or loss to production (Linde, 2020b). In contrast, the key incident has potentially

17 dangerous consequences or incidents that demonstrate process failures that require further investigations to avoid its repetitions.

An Accident is an incident that results in personal injury or material damage (British Standards Institute, 2007). Linde Region Europe North (Linde REN) classifies accidents into four Severity Levels (Major, Serious, Moderate and Minor incidents) based on consequences to People (injury or work-related sickness), Financial costs, Environmental Impact and Company reputation (Linde, 2020b):

a. Minor incident: consists of accidents that resulted in no treatment or a First Aid case (FAC), where insignificant damage to the environment occurred, requiring minimal clear up and no long-term effects or minor regulatory concerns. In those cases, no regulatory response is required, and no fine should be anticipated or imposed.

b. Moderate incident: consists of accidents that resulted in injury or sickness, requiring more than first aid treatment, and material damage do not result in long-term effects. In those cases, Arbetsmiljöverket representatives must be informed and attend the site and or a formal incident report. A corrective action plan may be required.

c. Serious incident: are accidents which caused an injury or sickness resulting in Lost Workday Cases (LWDC), permanent disability or chronicle sickness;

caused significant damage that requires correction with significant regulatory non-compliance; results in costs between 100.000 and 500.000 US$; and or results in formal notification following repeated non-compliance, formal notice or conditioned prohibition action on-site by the regulatory Government Agency.

d. Major incident: is the type of incident with an actual major consequence which meets at least one of following criteria: Fatality resulting from an occupational sickness/disease (with immediate cause and effect link) or accident injury;

Ecological disaster, serious and long term damage to the site and or surrounding areas occurred; Financial costs exceed 500.000 US$; and or Linde personnel is prosecuted, a regulatory agency order the site shutdown or imposes formal court action.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the definition of an accident as a specific type of incident that is

adopted by Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series (OHSAS) and followed at

Linde.

18 Figure 2.1Definition of incidents and accidents at Linde.

Heinrich et al. (1980) studied an extensive amount of incident cases in order to identify mechanisms of accidents. One may infer that risk behavior acts (88% of the cases) and unsafe site and machine conditions (10%) are the main causes of industrial accidents (Manuele, 2011).

The Domino Theory (Heinrich, 1931) illustrated the idea that accident is caused by a sequence of issues (social environment/ancestry, fault of the person and unsafe acts and hazards) that results in an injury. Based on new behavioral concepts incorporated into accident causation theory over the century, Nascimento (2010) summarizes a new model (Figure 2.2), which kept the initial idea that an incident has its immediate causes related to unsafe conditions and risk behavior.

Figure 2.2 Evolved Heinrich’s Domino Theory (Nascimento, 2010).

19 Hence, it is noticeable that the accident prevention and control action plan should focus, as a short-term goal, at the elimination of the third piece of the model while a continuous long- term plan improves and promotes the company safety culture (the first piece of the domino model).

2.1.3. Safety Culture and Safety Behavior

The safety culture is the combination of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and behavior towards safety within a company (Health and Safety Commission (HSC), 1993). Safety Culture dimensions may be divided into people, procedures, and technology (Reiniers, 2010; Reiniers, et al., 2011). People’s dimension takes into consideration the employee’s safety knowledge, commitment, and prioritization within the company. The second dimension evaluates the existence of safety guidelines and visual aid material. Moreover, the third dimension reflects if the machines, software, and the facilities in a company may reduce or avoid dangerous conditions and risks scenarios (Hofstra, et al., 2018).

While safety culture represents the company’s structural aspects of safety, safety behavior is perceived at the employees’ individual actions and thoughts, often guided by the existent safety culture (Hofstra, et al., 2018). Hofstra (2018) proposed that the three dimensions model (Reiniers, 2010; Reiniers, et al., 2011) should be applied to behavior features. Table 2.1 exemplifies Safety Culture and Behavior features within all dimensions.

Table 2.1 Safety Culture and Behavior features (Adapted from De Koster, et al., 2010;

Reiniers, et al., 2011; Hofstra, et al., 2018).

Dimension Safety Culture Features Safety Behavior Features

People

• Safety leadership

• Safety commitment

• Involvement in safety

• Knowledge about safety

• Open communication on safety

• Prioritization of safety

• Responsibility feeling on safety

• Communication about safety

• Applying knowledge towards safety

Procedures

• Safety markings and signs

• Policies, practices, and routines related to safety

• Safety documentation

• Education program efficiency

• Knowing own safety role

• Safety adherence

• Safety procedures user-friendliness

Technology • Equipment and software

• Site layout and structure

• Inspecting, maintaining and

updating safety assets

20 Safety behavior is the product of Safety Culture and other influencing factors. The translation of safety culture into an individual safety behavior may be influenced by motivational mechanisms such as financial rewards and professional acknowledgment or punishment mechanisms such as penalties (Hofstra, et al., 2018; Zohar & Erev, 2007). A time pressure workload, often present in Material Handling activities that require the assistance of heavy machines, may induce an unsafe behavior, an even more dangerous situation considering that heavily loaded transportation equipment might be operated in the proximity of other employees (Hofstra, et al., 2018).

An unsafe act is an error or a violation that may result in an accident when performed in the presence of a potential hazard (Reason, 1990). While errors may be classified as skilled- based (slips and lapses due to lack or misplaced attention), rule-based (mistakes due to the unfitting rule applied) and knowledge-based (mistakes due to overconfidence or lack of knowledge) deviation from the optimal action performance, a violation is a deliberated unsafe action that may or may not be reprehensible (Reason, 1990).

Reason (1990) developed an unsafe action system based on the human behavior capable of classifying incidents mechanisms based on human behavior (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3 Unsafe acts model.

Linde developed an internal algorithm to classify employee behaviors, similar to

Reason’s algorithm. A simplified framework of this recognition and consequence divides

behaviors into Excellence, Expected, Error, and Violation, suggesting the outcomes for each

kind, from reward to dismissal, in case of a severe incident due to reckless action or violation

recurrence.

21 2.2. Logistics and Material Handling

Supply Chain (SC) is the group of activities and infrastructure necessary to bring products, services, and information from production to the customer (Snyder and Shen, 2019).

The Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP) defines a supply chain as the planning and management of all activities involved in finding suppliers (“sourcing”), purchasing (“procurement”), production (“conversion”) and all logistics activities necessary to enable the product or service arrival to the end customer (Ballou, 2007). Logistics is the area within the supply chain, as illustrated in Figure 2.4, responsible for the planning, implementation, and control stages of flow and storage of goods to meet the customer requirements (Ballou, 2007).

Figure 2.4 Evolution of logistics until an integrated Supply Chain concept (Ballou, 2004).

As seen in Figure 2.4, even before concepts of strategic planning, information,

marketing, and finance were only integrated with the Logistics into SC Management (SCM)

during the early 2000s, Logistics management was already responsible for inbound and

outbound shipments, inventory and warehousing, areas in which Material Handling (MH) plays

an important role (Ballou, 2004). MH is responsible for short-distance movements within a

company’s physical location or between the physical location to the transportation responsible

through handling, storage, and control of materials (Kay, 2012).

22 Warehousing is the activity in the supply chain that stores raw materials, work-in- process, or finished products for a planned period. In a warehouse, the product is picked, sorted, and distributed efficiently (Kay, 2015). With the adequate support of material handling equipment, the warehousing operations are performed faster and efficiently.

Among Material Handling operations, there are: Picking the correct products to fill an order or to move between defined positions, sorting the different products, loading, and unloading products from/to vehicles, staging products close to the loading area (forward picking), Scanning products before the order is completed.

There are five types of MH equipment that can be grouped based on their usage purpose:

Transport, Positioning, Unit Load Formation, Storage, and Identification and Control Equipment (Kay, 2012). Table 2.2 presents a purpose description and examples for each equipment type.

Table 2.2 Types of Material Handling Equipment (Adapted from Kay, 2012) Equipment

Type

Purpose Examples

Transport Equipment

Moving materials between places Conveyors, Cranes and Industrial Trucks

Positioning Equipment

Handling materials in a single location for subsequent handling, machining, transport, or storage

Industrial robots, Lift/ Tilt/

Turn Tables, Manipulators, and Dock leveler

Unit Load Formation Equipment

Holding materials together as a single unit, maintaining its integrity and facilitation handling and transportation

Pallets, Baskets, Boxes, Containers, and Crates Storage

Equipment

Holding or buffering materials during a defined period

Racks, Shelves, and Drawers

Identification and Control Equipment

Collecting and communicating the information necessary for controlling the material flow within a determined location and process

Bar codes and tags

2.3. Forklift Truck (FLT) and its Safety problem

The forklift truck is an industrial motorized equipment with forks or other lifting devices

utilized to lift, lower, and carry materials through short distances (Prevent, 2011). Before the

advent of forklift, transportation of goods was done manually using wagons and carts. Loading

and unloading were done with the help of levers and planks with which the packages were

lifted. (MA System, 2018)

23 The first efficient forklift trucks were manufactured in the USA in early 1930, mainly due to pallet standardization (Intella Liftparts, 2015). Over the decades, it has been gradually developed, and today there are a variety of types and dimensions, design for different purposes and environments (MA System, 2018).

Due to its versatility, easy operation, and high demand in material handling, forklift trucks became one of the most familiar types of industrial powered machinery within warehouses, manufactory plants, and construction sites. As for its power system, a forklift can have a combustion engine (LPG, gasoline, or diesel) or an electric system (battery or fuel cell) (MA System, 2018). Although combustion-powered Forklifts may have stronger power, an electric one compensates it with zero-emission and more silent functioning, important characteristics for both environment and work health conditions.

Figure 2.5 presents an example of a category table used in a Forklift driving permit (körtillstånd).

Figure 2.5 Forklift Driving Permit Example (Toyota Material Handling, n.d.).

The classification in this Körtilstånd follows the forklift truck 10 curriculum (Truckläroplan, TLP 10), dividing the machines into four categories. Category A contains the low-lift trucks and rails, category B contains high-lift trucks such as counter-balance and sliding forklifts, category C contains large forklift trucks such as container trucks and timber trucks, and category D contains tow, flatbed, and terminal trucks. (Prevent, 2011)

Even though forklifts may vary in size, the basic components and working principles

are all similar (Linde, 2016). Figure 2.6 shows the positions of the main components, namely

divided in Data Plate, Lifting Mechanisms, Forklift controls, and Instruments panel.

24 Figure 2.6 Forklift Truck components (Linde, 2016).

At the data plate, the driver may find the manufacturer specifications regarding safe working load and mast height (collapsed height, maximum lift height, and free lift). The lifting mechanism of a forklift truck, controlled with the lifting control, contains Mast, Load backrest (Load Apron), Tilt and lift cylinders, and the Forks (Linde, 2016).

The Counter-balanced (classified as B1, Motviktstruck, by Arbetsmiljöverket) is a common type of forklift in industry. It handles the load in front of the drive axle where the forks are positioned, and it has counterweight at the rear, which enables it to offset the weight of the loads to be moved. When those kinds of forklifts are not loaded, the risk of tipping over is greater than when loaded. (MA System, 2018)

In the United States, around 110.000 accidents involving forklifts are reported yearly.

This resulted in an extremely high 1:10 accident per machine ratio, considering that

approximately 1.000.000 forklift trucks are available (Bostelman & Shackleford, 2010). In

Sweden, even though the market is much smaller, with 100.000 operating forklift trucks (MA

System, 2018), the number of accidents is still considered high. According to the Swedish work

environment agency, 4.000 accidents with injury or sickness caused by industrial trucks were

reported between 2008 and 2012 (Arbetsmiljöverket, 2019), as represented in Figure 2.7.

25 Figure 2.7 Reported accidents with sick leave cases in Sweden from 2008 to 2012

(Arbetsmiljöverket, 2019).

Figure 2.7 confirms the dangerous environment in which forklift trucks are operated.

The basic challenges in industrial traffic management are to increase productivity and to mitigate risks related to safety and health. In order to avoid problems, both the planning and design phase must consider the functions, movements, and activities of people, forklifts, and other vehicles. Hence the design of the traffic environment must provide safety for the pedestrian workers where forklifts are vehicles and the forklift pathways defined as roads.

(Larsson, et al., 2003)

Forklifts trucks are very dangerous since the driver awareness of passengers at their surrounding is limited (Figure 2.8), hence, whenever working close to those heavy machines, workers should be aware of (Larsson, et al., 2003):

• forklifts may cause collisions with pedestrians;

• forklift rollover, moving unexpectedly or too fast can crush the operator;

• while loading and unloading the operator visibility is reduced;

• forklift might cause accidents due to dropping the load or crashing into a stacked load.

26 Figure 2.8 Example of Forklift operator’s poor visibility (Schmitz, 2007).

Table 2.3 presents the results of a study performed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) in the United States from 1980 to 1994 regarding the mechanism of forklift-related fatal accidents.

Table 2.3 Mechanism of Forklift truck-related fatalities (adapted from NIOSH,2001).

Accident type Number Percentage

Forklift overturns 225 22%

Pedestrian hit by forklift truck 204 20%

Victim crushed by forklift truck 263 16%

Fall from forklift 92 9%

Others 337 33%

As seen in Table 2.3, most of the fatalities occur due to the encounter of forklift and pedestrian path. Thus, in order to eliminate accident risk situations, vehicles and pedestrians should be separated (with overhead walkways or barriers) or have a prevented interaction, always ensuring that workers and visiting drivers and other pedestrians wear high-visibility clothing. (Larsson, et al., 2003)

The site layout design must be based on the flow of the work process and all the necessary movements of people, loads, material, and equipment. Minimizing the cross-flow of traffic, intersections, and eliminating blind spots in order to achieve the necessary production quality. (Horberrya, et al., 2004; Horberry, 2011)

Clear warning signs in well-positioned areas will remind people of the hazards and other

requirements. Proper lighting allows workers to carry out their work without risk to health and

safety as well as compensate bad weather, shadows from plants, and blind spots that might

reduce visibility. (Larsson, et al., 2003; Horberry, 2011)

27 2.4. Safety Legislation (Arbetsmiljöverkett)

The Swedish Work Environment act is a set of regulations created to prevent health endangerment and accidents at work. It contains rules for cooperation between employer and employee regarding technical, physical, organizational, social, and work content factors.

In Sweden, the public authority responsible for verifying if all companies and organizations follow the work environment laws, including safety regulations present at the Swedish Work Environment Act, is the Arbetsmiljöverket (AV). Their main goal is “to reduce the risks of ill health and accidents in working life and to improve the work environment from a holistic perspective” (Arbetsmiljöverket, 2016). In addition, to check regulations compliance, AV is also responsible for clarifying regulations, produce safety statistics, promote cooperation between all involved parts, and disseminate information (Arbetsmiljöverket, 2016).

The use of Forklift trucks and other lifting equipment is regulated by Arbetsmiljöverket Code of Statute (AFS) 2006:5 and its amendments AFS 2010:15 and AFS 2014:20 (Arbetsmiljöverket, 2020).

Forklift risk assessment and working conditions investigation should be done regularly.

The machine characteristics, type of usage, environment, ergonomic conditions, required protection, truck maintenance, and operator knowledge must be checked. Based on this investigation, the results must be evaluated, and the corrective measures are taken in order to avoid illness and accidents. (Arbetsmiljöverket, 2006)

All drivers must have their Forklift training and permits documented by the employer, the responsibility for the work environment (Arbetsmiljöverket, 2006). The training should provide knowledge regarding the equipment operation, risks, and how to reduce risks, both at theoretical and practical sections. An annual update of the knowledge gives the best effect (Arbetsmiljöverket, 2006; Prevent, 2011).

In order to standardize the training, aiming at safety, fewer injuries, efficiency, and lower costs, a set of guidelines defining learning objectives, namely TLP10, was created by many parts interested. The TLP10 training gives the truck driver specifically instruction regarding (Prevent, 2011):

• Truck types, truck construction, and attachment;

• The truck’s working methods, stability, and load limits;

• Material handling & packaging;

28

• Goods handling with trucks;

• Ergonomic working;

• Daily supervision;

• Traffic, risks and safety regulations;

• Work environment and laws;

• Dangerous goods.

The employer must create procedures and rules for their own plant as well as follow up its compliance. The use of trucks must be planned in order to prevent an adverse event. The operators must follow the instructions and use the truck responsibly. Otherwise, safety risks may be created (Arbetsmiljöverket, 2006). Through the recommendations bellow, AV summarizes an optimized safety routine (Arbetsmiljöverket, 2018):

• To separate pedestrians from forklift truck traffic by using markings or physical barriers and rectify places in the site with poor visibility;

• To smooth the site’s ground, reducing the risk of shock and vibration (harmful for the operator health);

• The Forklift condition (by performing the daily maintenance check) and Ergonomics (by adjusting the driver’s seat, controls and steering wheel to a comfortable and safe position) must be assessed before operating the equipment;

• Operators should have work break every hour;

• One must wear safety shoes whenever working with or near forklift trucks;

• The site speed must be adjusted to each situation;

• The truck or trailer should have its wheels secured or blocked during forklift trucks load or unload activities;

• To vary the operators’ tasks so that they do not drive all day.

AV also provides a set of questions in a yes/no checklist format in order to facilitate the

compliance verification. Those questions are divided into nine categories: Risk assessment,

Knowledge and Permits, Ergonomics, Person-Lift, Supervision and Maintenance, Charging

Station, Forklift safety equipment, Site, and Pallet rack. Each question presents the

corresponding regulation section in which it may be found its corresponding explanation (Table

2.4).

29 Table 2.4 Checklist of Forklift trucks equipment and environment (adapted from

Arbetsmiljöverket, 2020).

2.5. Spaghetti Diagram and Value Stream Mapping (VSM)

The Spaghetti Diagram lean mapping tool consists of a visual representation of materials, machines, or worker path within a defined location using lines in an aerial map

It is a powerful tool to evaluate the transportation of materials within a site since it can reveal (Jensen, 2015; Senderská, et al., 2017; Williamsen, 2005)

• Layout design inefficiency;

• Wastes such as transportation, motion and waiting time;

• Unnecessary movements that might lower efficiency and cause unnecessary fatigue;

• Safety hazards.

The Value Stream Mapping (VSM) is another lean tool used to record processes, identify wastes, and enable continuous improvement and by understanding the flow of materials and information in a production or service line. The VSM enables the visualization of Non- value-added (NVA), and value-added (VA) activities. (Mikler, 2017)

NVA activities require time, resources, and space that do not improve the product, while VA activity contributes positively to the process or product’s final quality. Even though MH activities may add Value with time and place utility, it is difficult to identify and quantify those benefits. Hence, the most common is to consider MH as a cost to be minimized (Kay, 2012).

2.6. KPI for Safety

A Key Performance Indicator (KPI) is a measurable performance value that enables a company to set goals (economic, technical, or operational). Epstein (2018) listed 5 KPIs to optimize safety operations within an organization: Incident measurement, Inspection, Training, Safety Suggestions, and Observation.

Recording the accidents with metrics such as Total Case Incident Rate (TCIR) is the

most commonly used KPI, since it may be used as a benchmark comparator with other

30 companies (Epstein, 2018). The number of reported incidents (and accidents) will influence other metrics with a more direct relationship with production activities, i.e., time lost due to accidents, machine availability due to breakdown, safety training needs, and the perception of management commitment towards safety.

At Linde, there are multiple KPIs related to incidents recording that must be periodically reported to each department management. These include, for example, monitoring injuries and sickness through Lost Workday Cases (LWDC) and Total Recordable Cases (TRDC), Vehicle Incidents, and Rollovers (separating commercial and non-commercial vehicles statistics) (Linde, 2019).

While it is important to record the number of incidents in any industrial activity, monitoring inspections, training, employees’ safety suggestions, and safety observations is as much important as this more orthodox KPI.

Monitoring inspections as a process index may be performed by, for example, recording the number of audits in a site and checking if all machines receive the recommended amount of preventive maintenance. The training performance may answer questions such as the level of understanding or the percentage of employees that need to be re-trained. Moreover, analyzing safety suggestions is useful for tracking how many of the identified hazards sources were cleared or how many of the suggested corrective actions were put in practice. (Epstein, 2018)

A behavior-based safety observational KPI allied observation of the work environment conditions may provide tools for preventing accidents since it may extinguish the incident source. Analyzing the data of those observations, one may identify and quantify different risks and areas where their occurrence might be bigger. After this, the management may apply corrective actions that should mitigate any dangerous source. (Epstein, 2018)

Nascimento (2010) developed a safety management system for industrial sites. This

system consisted of 2 behavioral safety observation systems based on a compliance level

assessment. The first system observed safety behavior and unsafe condition in a specific

environment, and the second obtained safety routines and requirements adherence at the same

place based on pre-defines safety rules and procedures. The author concluded that the

implementation of such a monitoring system enables continuous safety improvement in any

type of industry, contributing to the enhancement of the company’s safety culture.

31 Dickety et al. (2005) studied forklift truck operational safety and proposed workplace safety based on observations of forklift truck operation, driver behavior, pedestrian activity, and housekeeping unsafe situations. From these observations, a safe/unsafe relationship can be obtained, and this relationship should be an indicator of the degree of safety of these operations.

2.7. Fishbone Diagram and Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)

The Fishbone diagram is a method for showing the different causes of a studied process failure. This diagram, which name comes from its form resemblance with the bone of a fish, helps to list and to group the causes into categories (Pyzdek & Keller, 2009), as shown in Figure 2.9.

Figure 2.9 Fishbone diagram example (Lange, 2008).

In these diagrams, the many causes of a studied problem should be grouped per similarity into different categories. All the root causes result in the ultimate failure effect.

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (Table 2.5) is a lean tool used for identifying risks or problems in a product or process by investigating the causal and effect relationship of the system failure modes (Pyzdek & Keller, 2009). It is an important tool for continuous improvement since it may be used at the planning phase of the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) managing method (Pyzdek & Keller, 2009).

Table 2.5 FMEA table header's content.

Failure Mode

Effect(s) of Failure

Se ve rit y

Cause(s) of Failure

Oc curren ce

Current Controls / Detection

De tec ti on

RPN

In a Process FMEA, a table (exemplified at Table 2.5) is completed following steps are followed (Mikler, 2019):

1

: Identify each Failure Mode for the analyzed system;

32 2

: List potential effects and possible causes for each failure mode;

3

: Identity possible current control measures for each failure mode;

4

: Rate each item according to its failure severity, failure occurrence rate and detection effectiveness, which the product will result in the Risk Priority Number (RPN), as seen on Equation 2.1;

5

: Recommend appropriate risk mitigation measures based on RPN.

Equation 2.1 RPN equation

Severity × Occurrence × Detection = RPN

Appendix A presents a traditional scale for Severity, Occurrence, and Detection (Nuchpho, et al., 2014; Linde, 2020b).

2.8. I-Site (Toyota Fleet management Software)

I-Site is a fleet management web-based software created by Toyota that provides Forklift truck and driver administration tools. Figure 2.10 shows the communication system overview.

Figure 2.10 I-Site hardware communication system (Toyota Material Handling, 2020).

I-Site collects the data from the forklifts and regularly uploaded via a mobile network to the central server. The equipment consists of a Data Handling Unit, panel for Pre-Operation Check, shock sensors and driver access system, card reader, or log-on keypad. The website interface, and an additional I-Site mobile application, displays the information and allows administration commands. (Toyota Material Handling, 2020)

After implementation, Forklift access is achieved by entering a PIN code or using personal id cards. Among the data that can be gathered with this system are (Toyota Material Handling, 2020):

• Driver’s license information, machine access permissions, history, and performance;

Server

33

• Machines utilization, when and by whom machines are operated;

• Battery performance;

• Impact registrations;

• Follow-up of performed machine health checks.;

• Preventive and repair machine maintenance follow up.

The Forklift trucks and driver’s utilization information combined with detailed activities log and hour meters gives tools for optimizing the fleet (number and type of machines) and for planning the number of drivers, as well as identifying the need for a re-training section (i.e., based on time for completing an activity or number of incidents). Figure 2.11 below exemplifies some of the drivers and forklift information available.

Figure 2.11 Operational information available at I-Site.

Among the forklift data available is battery performance on the forklift truck, both as battery status information (BSI) and battery discharging information (BDI). The BSI consists of a color system classification where green is used for normal, and the grey icon means not activated function, while red and amber are alert colors due to power loss, short time recharging or rapid discharge conditions.

A BDI graph shows battery discharge levels, power capacity, usage, and recharging in

weekly intervals for the selected machine. Each starting and ending point at the BDI graph will

show information details regarding the work pass, such as driver, driving and lifting time

estimation based on the consumption rate, number of driving starts, number of lifting instances,

total lifting time, log off method, and cause for warning alerts (Toyota Material Handling,

2020). Figure 2.12 shows a typical BDI graph of a forklift truck over a week.

34 Figure 2.12 Battery discharging information graph.

The type of logoff method used is an important factor to optimize the battery life since it will notify the user if the machine was turned off normally, due to inactivity or by battery disconnection (unwanted practice). By controlling the charging activity, the user may optimize the machine and battery usage and lifetime.

In this kind of graph, the green lines represent a normal working pass while a yellow and a red line illustrates an opportunity charge, rapid discharge, or power loss. The yellow line means that that the battery has been disconnected, forklift truck was shut down with an emergency switch, or the battery discharge measured when crossing either 60% or 30% marks was faster than expected but not critical. The red lines mean that battery performance was bellow critical levels specified by the manufacturer. (Toyota Material Handling, 2020)

The shock sensor will record the amount, the intensity of impact, and the date of each incident, classifying it as low, medium, or high according to a pre-calibrated impact level. Once the impact recorded exceeds a pre-determined threshold, the forklift may be locked-out. In this scenario, only a supervisor user may reset the machine (both remotely with an I-Site app or with log-on access), preferably, after checking for injuries, damages, and that the machine is safe to operate. (Toyota Material Handling, 2020)

The incidents may be classified on type of impact and damage directly at the platform

(Figure 2.13). Comments (i.e., event location) may be added to each shock registration and are

especially useful for follow-ups of shock lock-out incidents. The collision data acquired may

35 be used by the company management when planning measures to improve safety and reduce damages to machines, goods, and racking.

Figure 2.13 Shock incident comment window at I-Site.

The Pre-Operational Check (POC) feature is based on checklists for control of the machine condition. The lists are yes-no questions regarding the forklift condition that must be created at the I-Site website user interface and transmitted to the machines on-board panel shown in Figure 2.14

Figure 2.14 I-Site on-board panel (Toyota Material Handling, 2020).

The checklist must be completed by the operator after the machine log-on. In case of POC failure (either due to a wrong answer or to timeout), the machine operation will be impaired, and based on pre-settings, a designated user must unlock the machine. The completed checklist is communicated back to the web site for follow-up of this preventive maintenance routine result.

The same on-board panel may also be used as a communication channel from manager

to operator. This Convenient in remote or noisy sites since it allows a quick way to send safety

36 messages, to allocate the job to a driver, to request ‘return to base’ or to call drivers into a meeting.

I-site notification system enables instant notification alerts via email and I-Site mobile application based on the user setup for the followings cases: Pre-Op Check fail, Shock Lock- out alert, Supervisor Lockout (machine has been locked for usage by a supervisor user), Battery Incident (BDI level below lower limit) and Driving License expiration.

In case of failure, a service request command is available at the I-Site mobile application to contact Toyota maintenance assistance, sending the malfunctioning Forklift ID, the case description, and allowing photos to be uploaded. A supplementary feature, namely My Fleet, gathers information regarding Toyota’s carried out preventive and repair machine maintenance as well as fleet lists, contracts, and costs.

Figure 2.15 summarizes the improvements and benefits enabled by I-Site in key areas such as Cost Control, Productivity, Environment, and Health and Safety.

Figure 2.15 I-Site benefits summary.

37

3. Methodology

3.1. Current operations and Safety assessment

Different types of information acquisition were used to understand better the key aspects of forklift Operations and Safety at Linde in Enköping outside-yard. During this initial assessment, information regarding the following subjects was obtained:

• Outside yard layout and FLT facilities available;

• Product groups handled in Enköping description and volume;

• MH team organization (i.e., the number of operators and number of shifts);

• Overall MH and FLT routines, including maintenance currently performed (Preventive and Reactive);

• FLT inventory (i.e., brand info, fuel type per machine, number of machines);

• Training program structure within Linde in Enköping;

• Accident history at the outside yard;

• Current FLT safety compliance.

Initially, informal talks and qualitative meetings with managers and operators provided an overview of the Material Handling activities at the Linde in Enköping yard. Internal standards and legislation revision were held to identify operations and safety rules and procedures. Throughout the project, several visits to Enköping’s site were performed to follow Material Handling operations, Forklift trucks operations, maintenance, charging, and to investigate specific safety aspects relevant to this project.

Additionally, a safety compliance review based on Arbetsmiljöverket’s checklist, and an accident history review was performed for incidents reported between 2017 and 2019, a period affected by the production growth. The safety compliance was performed with the support of an experienced operator, and the accident review was created based on Linde’s incident report system (namely Synergi) data.

3.2. Benchmark Visits/ Interviews

Benchmark investigations were performed with three different sites: Dahl warehouse at

Kallhäll (Sweden), Linde Filling, and Logistic plant at Riihimäki (Finland) and Leirdal

(Norway). Due to geographical limitations, only Kallhäll site was visited while Riihimäki and