A Jihad on Love

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A Jihad on Love

A study on the phenomenon of love jihad in relation to Hindu nationalist constructs of identities in India

Joakim Björkelid

History of Religions and Social Sciences of Religion E Spring 2021: MA Thesis, 30 Credits

Supervisor: Jens Wilhelm Borgland Examiner: Gabriella Beer

Department of Theology: Uppsala University Email: Joakim.bjorkelid@gmail.com

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to investigate the Indian Hindu nationalist concept of “love jihad”, an idea based upon the alleged fact that Muslim men actively seeks out non-Muslim women for conversion to Islam by various methods including, false promises of love and abductions.

While the accusation that Muslims are conducting love jihad currently is being propagated by several active Hindu nationalist groups, the focus of this paper lies on the Viśva Hindū Pariṣad (VHP) and the Rāṣṭrīya Svayaṃsevak Saṃgh (RSS), two major branches within the so-called family of Hindu nationalist organisations, or the Saṃgh Parivār. The material primarily con- sists of articles pertaining to love jihad, published in each organisation’s mouthpiece magazines. Utilising theories on Indian nationalism placed within a structure of analysing propaganda, based on the propaganda model of Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, this paper investigates the idea of love jihad in relation to the VHP and RSS constructs of Indian identities.

Keywords: India; Hindu nationalism; communalism; propaganda; Vishwa Hindu Parishad; Is- lam; hindutva

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1 Introduction ... 1

2 Purpose and aims ... 4

2.1.1 Purpose ... 4

2.1.2 Research Questions ... 4

2.1.3 Material ... 4

2.1.4 Method ... 6

2.2 Theory ... 7

2.2.1 Propaganda ... 7

2.2.2 A perspective on the nationalism in the post-colonial milieu ... 10

2.2.3 Previous research ... 11

3 Hindutva: an overview ... 14

3.1.1 Saṃgh Parivār ... 15

3.1.2 Rāṣṭrīya Svayaṃsevak Saṃgh ... 15

3.1.3 Viśva Hindū Pariṣad ... 16

4 Analysis: The phenomenon of love jihad ... 20

4.1 A conspiracy targeting love ... 20

4.1.1 “Destroying the fundamental culture of this country” ... 20

4.1.2 A game of numbers ... 23

4.1.3 An international conspiracy ... 25

4.2 Constructing the Muslim and the Hindu ... 27

4.2.1 “Her life will be worse than hell” ... 27

4.2.2 “We have become the slaves of Western modernist customs” ... 37

4.2.3 Proposed solutions ... 39

4.3 Visual interpretations of love jihad ... 41

4.4 Target audience ... 43

5 Conclusion and final remarks ... 46

6 References ... 50

6.1 Sources ... 50

6.2 Bibliography ... 51

Appendix ... 55

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1 Introduction

On the 14^th of February 2021, seventeen people were arrested in Bhopal in two separate in- stances of vandalism where young men, equipped with cricket bats and the Bhagavā Dhvaj,¹ stormed a restaurant and a hookah bar destroying the interior while accusing the owners of promoting love jihad (lav jihād). They threatened customers claiming they would return to kill them if they were seen there again.² Three years earlier on the same date members of the Ba- jrang Dal (Brigade of Hanuman), youth branch of the Viśva Hindū Pariṣad (World Hindu Council), where reported shouting at couples, warning them not to celebrate valentine’s day as it promotes love jihad.³ In 2017, Bajrang Dal activists, dressed in saffron coloured scarfs and armed with lathis, were reported having harassed women while abusing their male friends and forced other couples to do sit-ups as punishment for celebrating valentine’s day.⁴ Although Valentine’s day has long served as a symbol within Hindu nationalist circles representing a Westernisation of Indian traditions, accusations of it being connected to the so-called phenomenon of love jihad is a relatively new occurrence.

Love jihad is one of the latest campaigns from the Hindu right in an attempt to create fear and alarm within Hindu society, claiming it being under coordinated attacks by primarily Muslim men. The term love jihad is commonly used by members within the Saṃgh Parivār (Family of Hindu Nationalist organisations) to refer to the alleged fact that Muslim men actively targets non-Muslim women, by either abduction or giving them false promises of love, in order to force them into converting to Islam.⁵ These forced conversion are frequently

1 The historic saffron colour flag of the Marathas adopted as emblem of the Hindu nationalist organisation Rāṣṭrīya Svayaṃsevak Saṃgh (National Volunteer Corps). The national flag of India was not recognised by the RSS until 1950 and still stands second to the Bhagavā Dhvaj of Shivaji as it holds essential symbolic value to the RSS. It embodies a historical reference to Shivaji’s battles against the Mughals and a claim to an undivided Hindu nation in war with a Muslim enemy.

Smyth, Douglas C., “The Social Basis of Militant Hindu Nationalism”, The Journal of Developing Areas, April, Vol 6, No. 3, 1972: 327

2 Scroll Staff, “17 people, including former BJP MLA, arrested in two cases of vandalism on Valentine’s Day in Bhopal, Scroll.in, 15 February 2021, https://scroll.in/latest/986967/17-people-including-former-bjp-mla- arrested-in-two-cases-of-vandalism-on-valentines-day-in-bhopal

3 Bagchi, Poorbita, “Valentine’s Day: Bajrang Dal, VHP Members Scare Couples In Ahmedabad To Protest Against “Love Jihad”, The Logical Indian, 14 February 2018, https://thelogicalindian.com/news/valentines-day- bajrang-dal-vhp-members-scare-couples-in-ahmedabad-to-protest-against-love-jihad/

4 The Logical Indian, “Bajrang Dal Goons Beat Couples On Valentine’s Day: For Them, The Law Is Just A Joke, The logical Indian, 16 February 2017, https://thelogicalindian.com/opinion/bajrang-dal/

5 Gupta, Charu, “Allegories of 'love jihad' and ghar wapsi: interlocking the socio-religious with the political”, in Rise of Saffron Power: Reflections on Indian Politics, ed. Mujibur Rehman, Routledge, 2018: 84-110

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described in Hindu nationalist propaganda as being organised and financed by Pakistan and Arab countries in a conspiracy with the underlying purpose of increasing the Muslim population.⁶ One of the most recent examples of this was a photo circulating on social media in December 2020, depicting a flyer supposedly issued by the Kerala-based Islamic organisation the Popular Front of India, inciting young Muslim men to marry non-Muslim women in exchange for monetary rewards. The flyer, which relatively quickly was proven to be a fake, promised a 500.000 INR reward for marrying a Hindu Brahmin girl, 300.000 INR for Jain girls and 150.000 INR for Buddhist girls. This is just one example demonstrating the sensitivity of the subject of Interfaith marriages in India.⁷

While proponents of anti-love jihad regularly argue that within a marriage based upon love there is no need for conversion, there are several reasons for changing religion. One of the reasons is based on preference, but there are also legal reasons to which a person might want to convert before marriage. A request under the Special Marriage Act requires inter-religious marriages to be filed thirty days in advance before any marriage can take place, under which time the request is open for objection. A conversion circumvents this issue which could be a reason for couples whose parents might object to their marraige.⁸ Well aware of this, the VHP and the Rāṣṭrīya Svayaṃsevak Saṃgh, (National Volunteer Corps), have launched several campaigns urging legislators in Delhi to draft national anti-love jihad laws.⁹

Although the term was first coined in late 1990s and later adopted by Hindu nationalist groups in the early 2000s, the conspiracy to which it refers is much older. Charu Gupta, Professor at the Department of History at Delhi University, has identified similarities between the modern Hindu nationalist anti-love jihad campaigns and the socio-political Śuddhi Āṃdolan (Purification Movement) conducted by the Ārya Samāj, beginning in the 1880’s, which aimed to reduce the number of conversions to Christianity and Islam as well as to purify untouchables, transforming them into the clean castes.¹⁰ During the 1920’s in Uttar Pradesh, members of the Hindu reform movement Ārya Samāj published articles and pamphlets with titles such as Hindū

6 Sinde, Ramesh, “Lav jihād viśva bhar meṃ ek bhayaṃkar ṣaḍyantra”, Hindū Viśva, Vol. 28, September 16-30, 2020: 10-13

7 Team WebQoof, “Flyer Asking Muslims to Practice ‘Love Jihad’ Not Issued by PFI”, The Quint, 22

December 2020, https://www.thequint.com/news/webqoof/flyer-asking-muslims-to-practice-love-jihad-falsely- linked-to-pfi#read-more

8 Gupta, “Allegories of 'love jihad' and ghar wapsi: interlocking the socio-religious with the political”, 2018: 296

9 Varma, Ananya, “VHP writes to Delhi LG and CM Kejriwal, Requests 'Love Jihad' Law in National Capital”, Republic World, 26 December 2020, https://www.republicworld.com/india-news/law-and-order/vhp-writes-to- delhi-lg-and-cm-kejriwal-requests-love-jihad-law-in-national-capital.html

10 Johnson, Gordon; Jones, Kenneth W., ed. The new Cambridge history of India. 3, [The Indian Empire and the beginnings of modern society], 1, Socio-religious reform movements in British India, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1989: 101-102

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auratoṃ kī lūṭ (The abduction of Hindu women) and Hindū striyoṃ kī lūṭ ke kāraṇ (The reason behind the abduction of Hindu women).¹¹ A hundred years later in September 2020, the VHP publishes a special issue of their mouthpiece magazine, Hindū Viśva (Hindu World), with the title Lav jihād se deś bacāe āo alakh jāgeṃ (Save the country from Love Jihad, it is time to wake up), consisting primarily of articles pertaining to the subject of love jihad.¹²

11 Gupta, Charu, “Hindu Women, Muslim Men: Love Jihad and Conversions”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 51 December 19-25, 2009: 13-15

12 See “Material”

VHP, “Lav jihād se deś bacāe āo alakh jāgeṃ”, Hindū Viśva, Vol. 28, September 16-30, 2020

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2 Purpose and aims

2.1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how Hindu nationalist organisations in India have communicated about the so-called phenomenon of “love jihad” (lav jihād) through magazines, pamphlets and websites. The main focus of the study lies on organisations within the Saṃgh Parivār (Family of Hindu nationalist organisations), with a particular focus on the Viśva Hindū Pariṣad (World Hindu Council) representing the Parivār’s religious branch. Furthermore, it is the ambition of this project to produce a deeper understanding of contemporary Hindu nationalist propaganda by analysing the framing of love jihad in relation to India’s history of Hindu nationalism. Analysing the material using qualitative content analysis this thesis demonstrates how organisation within the Saṃgh Parivār conducts an aggressive campaign with the intention of portraying Muslims as a threat to India and the Hindu community.

2.1.2 Research Questions

In order to achieve the previous stated purpose, this project aims to provide answer to the following questions:

- In what ways do organisations within the Saṃgh Parivār frame their propaganda of love jihad? What methods are used to construct the Muslim, the Hindu and India?

- How can love jihad be understood from the perspective of India’s history of Hindu Nationalism

2.1.3 Material

The main material consists of selected articles in VHP’s bimonthly Hindi magazine, Hindū Viśva (Hindu World), with a particular focus on the 2020 September issue Lav jihād se deś bacāe āo alakh jāgeṃ (Save the country from love jihad: It is time to wake up), which solely consist of articles relating to lav jihād.¹³ In addition to this the 2014 September issue of RSS’

English magazine The Organizer – Love Jihad Reality or Rhetoric?, has been selected as its cover story pertains to the same subject.¹⁴ Hindū Viśva serves as the primary mouthpiece of the VHP generally consisting of articles dealing with various topics pertaining to the organisation’s

13 VHP, “Lav jihād se deś bacāe āo alakh jāgeṃ”, Hindū Viśva, Vol. 28, September 16-30, 2020

14 The Organiser, “Love Jihad Reality or Rhetoric?”, The Organiser, vol 66, No. 10, New Delhi, 7 September 2014

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activities such as the construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya, cow protection (gau rakṣā), or love jihad. It is one of several magazines published by the VHP and often comes with covers depicting Hindu deities, an undivided India (Akhaṇḍ Bhārat), Mother India (Bhārat mātā), or angry groups of Muslim men.¹⁵ An issue of Hindū Viśva generally entails of about 28-30 pages unless it is a special issue, as is the case with the 2020 September issue comprising 44 pages.

The magazine was created in 1965 by VHP founder, and first General Secretary Shivram Shankar Apte, acting as its first editor. Subsequent editors include the second General Secretary of the VHP, M P Degwekar and H C Srivastava. The magazine has been described by Eva Hellman as primarily dedicated to propaganda.¹⁶ Further sources pertaining to the magazine and its current staff is limited, or at the very least difficult to obtain, revealing a gap in the field of research of the VHP and Hindū Viśva.¹⁷

The Organiser is a weekly magazine published for the first time in 1947, just a few weeks before the partition of India. While the then chief of the Hindu nationalist Rāṣṭrīya Svayaṃsevak Saṃgh (National Volunteer Corps) Keshav Baliram Hedgewar was reluctant to the idea of a journal or newspaper published directly by the RSS, he would allow for the creation of trusts which would publish papers sympathetic to the RSS. After its first couple of issues the Organiser soon reached a national audience, becoming the foremost tool for expressing the activist point of view of the RSS.¹⁸ On the Organiser’s website, the magazine’s motto is described as “SERVICE to the Motherland and a sense of dedication to the nation coupled with true secularism is the hallmark of ORGANISER”.¹⁹ A typical issue entails about 50 pages. Further RSS affiliated publications to follow the success of the Organiser includes Pāñcajanya, whose name refers to the śaṃkha or conch of Hindu god Vishnu, first published in Lucknow in 1948.²⁰ The content of Pāñcajanya is similar to the Organiser, often relating to the same or similar subjects with articles mimicking those of the Organiser. As this is also the case with its 2014 September issue on love jihad, it has been excluded from the material.

15 VHP, “Publications”, Vhp.org, http://vhp.org/category/publication/hindi-publication/

16 Hellman, Eva, Political hinduism: the challenge of the Viśva Hindū Pariṣad, Univ., Diss. Uppsala University, Uppsala, 1993: 21

17 In correspondence with scholars active in the field of Hindu nationalism, including Christophe Jaffrelot, I was advised to visit the VHP headquarters in Delhi for inquiries. Unfortunately, due to current Covid-19 restrictions I was unable to do so.

18 Andersen, Walter K; Damle, Shridhar D, The brotherhood in saffron: the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu revivalism, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1987: 115

19 The Organiser, “About us “, https://www.organiser.org/encyc/2019/8/23/About-Us.html

20 Jaffrelot, Christophe, The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics: 1925 to the 1990s : strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilisation : (with special reference to central India), Hurst, London, 1996: 124

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In the process of selecting which sources to analyse in the material, the decision to only focus on sources pertaining to the theme of love jihad, or abductions, has been made since the ambition of this paper is to investigate love jihad rather than the magazines as a body. This means that articles within the material not pertaining to said theme, such as articles in Hindū Viśva concerning the Bajrang Dal’s opinions on how money earmarked for cow protection should be handled, have been excluded.²¹ In addition to solely focusing on articles pertaining to love jihad within these magazines, I have included the cover art and photos attached to the magazines in my analysis.

2.1.4 Method

In order to give sufficient answers to the posted research questions, the analysis will be performed by placing the material within the context of selected theories of propaganda and nationalism using the methodological approach of qualitative content analysis. The theoretical framework is based upon an earlier framework I developed for my bachelor thesis.²² Content analysis as a method allows for large bodies of material to be managed systematically through the selection process of texts, including any written, oral or visual media, such as textbooks, magazines, newspapers, letters, personnel records, audio-, video recordings, films, paintings, images and architecture. ‘Text’ is in this sense defined as “any object, artifact or behaviour that involves symbol use”.²³ While the effect of the researcher’s bias is reduced by focusing on already written sources in contrast to producing material through interviews or observations, content analysis is not without the risk of bias due to its reader-dependent nature. Therefore, any meanings in text should be viewed as constructed rather than discovered.²⁴ As this is true with any form of textual analysis, it is therefore important to strive for all reasonings and results to be as objective, valid and replicable as possible in accordance with the chosen method.

Since the majority of the source material is written in Hindi it has therefore been translated into English. All translations from the Hindi source material are of my own. The transliteration from Devanagari script is conducted according to the International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration (IAST), with exclusion of the inherent a in medial and final positions

21 VHP, “Govaṃśa kī rakṣā hetu vihip-bajaraṃg dal jhuṃjhunū ne jñāpan diyā”, Hindū Viśva, Vol. 28, September 16-30, 2020

22 Björkelid, Joakim, "In the spirit of the constitution: A study of Amit Shah's rhetoric on immigration and Indian Identity", Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2019

23 Nelson, Chad; Woods, Jr, Robert H., “Content analysis”, in Strausberg, Michael; Engler, Steven, ed. The Routledge Handbook of research methods in the study of religion, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011: 109

24 Chad; Woods, “Content analysis”, The Routledge Handbook of research methods in the study of religion, 2011: 112

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not prevalent in Hindi, as well as in several other Indo-Aryan languages. The exception to this is when spelling words, common names and places already established in Roman script.

2.2 Theory 2.2.1 Propaganda

Attempting to understand propaganda as an analytical tool is not a simple task as it is an elusive term often used in a normative sense, but seldom explained. A common, yet limiting, understanding of the term is to equate it with the act of manipulation in order to achieve a desired intent, fraud, lies, deceit, or a relatively recent term made popular during the past decade: fake news.²⁵ It is important to note that none of these definitions should be considered as being inaccurate as propaganda often consists of some, or all of these elements. Attempting to find definition of propaganda in the sea of dictionary definitions and existing propaganda theories is a challenging undertaking. However, the one definition of propaganda deemed useful for this project is the one created by Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell in relation to their 1984 book, Propaganda & Persuasion:

Propaganda is a deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.²⁶

I deem their definition to be the most useful because it embodies all the aspects of propaganda in how I approach the sources; it is deliberate, meaning that propaganda is carefully design ahead of time; propaganda is systematic, implying that it is precise and methodical, operating with organised regularity; it is an attempt, highlighting the importance of identifying propaganda by its intention rather than its effect; shaping perceptions, focusing on how the receiver interprets a message or action; manipulate cognitions, changing the receivers ways of thinking; direct behaviour, provoking the receiver to act.²⁷

In addition to contributing an appropriate definition of the term, Jowett and O’Donnell provide us with a ten-step model of how to analyse propaganda which takes its starting point from already established theories of propaganda. The model is extensive and intended, in its full application, to be used in analysis of the entirety of a propaganda campaign. While, the full use of every step embodied in this model is not relevant for the purposes of this project, a

25 Allcot, Hunt, and Gentzkow, Matthew, “Social media and Fake News in the 2016 Election”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2017: 211-235

26 Jowett, Garth; O'Donnell, Victoria, Propaganda & persuasion, Sixth edition, SAGE, Los Angeles, 2015: 7

27 Jowett; O’Donnell, Propaganda & persuasion, 2015: 8

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selection of steps deemed useful for the analysis will be made. The ten steps are as follows; (1) the ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign; (2) the context in which the propaganda occurs; (3) identification of the propagandist; (4) the structure of the propaganda organization;

(5) the target audience; (6) media utilization techniques; (7) special techniques to maximize effect; (8) audience reaction to various techniques; (9) counterpropaganda, if present; (10) effects and evaluation.²⁸ By evaluating which of the steps would be useful and feasible to apply in relation to the chosen material, steps (3), (6), (8), (9) and (10) have been excluded since these categories would require additional material and research to be useful in what this project is aiming to accomplish. In the case of step (3), identification of the propagandist is of little to no use for the analysis since the entirety of the source material has clear sources of origin.

(1) The ideology and purpose; The first step concerns the underlying ideology of the campaign and overall purpose which the propagandist aims to accomplish. Jowett and O’Donnell characterise Ideology by using Martha Cooper’s definition: “a coherent worldview that determines how arguments will be received and interpreted”.²⁹ It embodies notions of what constitutes a society, either opposing or condoning, for example, the existence of social classes and certain roles vis-à-vis gender, religion and race. An ideology also represents an acceptance to certain rules within established social, economic, and political structures. At this step the analyst searches for a set of norms, values, beliefs and accepted behaviours that constitutes a way of thinking of how a society should be. This can be found by looking for ideology in visual and verbal framings which could potentially contain references towards value systems, current- and pre-existing struggles or future objectives.³⁰

(2) The context in which the propaganda occurs. As propaganda seldom emerges out of nothing, it is important to contextualise it against the situation from which it appeared. How does the propagandist use history, or past events as a tool of power in the framing of the propaganda message? Which symbols are used and how are they represented? What is the prevailing circumstance in which the propaganda occurs? Are there any specific issues currently at hand, and which barriers must be overcome to resolve these? What myths are represented in the propaganda? These are all excellent questions suitable for an early outset in an analysis. However, the last-mentioned question is of particular interest due to its potential as a source for social action. In this context ‘myth’ is understood as a story which exhibits

29 As I am inclined to agree with this definition it will therefore remain as the primary interpretation of the term for this paper.

Jowett; O’Donnell, Propaganda & persuasion, 2015: 315

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meaning through reappearing symbols and events, or a concept to which people already subscribe.³¹ A good illustration of this is to look at the effect of Ramanand Sagar’s 1987 televised series of the epic Rāmāyaṇam, often considered to be a catalyst that would initiate the so-called Ayodhya dispute, as well as the rise of Hindu nationalism.³²

(4) The structure of the propaganda organization. A well-structured and centralised organisation is often an advantage when aiming to conduct a successful propaganda campaign.

This step analyses the leaders behind the propaganda along with the overall structure of the organisation itself. Structure includes how the organisation is arranged and how it recruits, but also the articulation of goals and objectives, as well as the manners specified in how to accomplish them. Goals are defined as usually pertaining to long term ambitions while objectives refer to easier tasks able to be accomplished on a shorter notice.³³

(5) The target audience. Being aware of who the propagandist’s target audience are is probably the most important factor when structuring a propaganda message as an ill directed, or poorly constructed propaganda campaign could result in an outcome with less, or the opposite effect of the intended purpose. This is equally true for a marketing company when selecting a target audience in order to maximise the potential effect of their product marketing.

In many cases there is not one, but several target audiences. Relevant factors to look for includes; how the message is constructed, is the propagandist communicating with the audience implicitly or explicitly? Call for recruitment, does the propagandist urge the audience to become members of the organisation, sign up for a mailing list, or subscription to any of its mouthpieces?³⁴

(7) Special techniques to maximize effect, refers to a broad definition of several approaches by which to disseminate propaganda. Whether this is done by displaying various symbols of power such as, the utilisation of flags, the choice of music played during a video, a specific location in which a speech is held, choice of language, arousal of emotions, or the review of source credibility, it all falls under the extensive category of special techniques to maximize effect.³⁵

32 See Rajagopal, Arvind, Politics after television: religious nationalism and the reshaping of the Indian public, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2001

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2.2.2 A perspective on the nationalism in the post-colonial milieu

Although theories of propaganda are useful in organising sources, providing a helpful structure in how to approach the material, they are limited to its communicative aspects and should therefore be viewed as a supplement to additional theories providing historical and ideological context. An important aspect in understanding political Hinduism is to understand the ideological foundation upon which it is constructed. As nationalism is located at the centre of the ideological field constituting the Saṃgh Parivār and its affiliated organisations, theories of nationalism are essential in understanding the conditions from which the primary source material derives. For these purposes, the fundamental concept of nationalism is defined in accordance with the theories of Benedict Anderson’s Imagined communities, defining the nation as a socially constructed community, imagined into existence by the people identifying as belonging to it.³⁶ Building upon the theories of Anderson, anthropologist and social scientist Partha Chatterjee’s the Nation and its fragments adds the layer of viewing nationalism within the context of the colonial and post-colonial milieu.³⁷

Anti-colonial nationalism, as according to Chatterjee, declares its domain of sovereignty within colonial society by dividing the idea of social institutions into two spheres, the material and spiritual. The former represents what Chatterjee defines as the domain of the outside, consisting of economic, governing, technological and scientific institutions regarded as areas in which the West must be recognised and replicated. Contrary to the material, the latter concerns an inner domain focusing on the establishing and reinforcement in areas including, cultural identity, religion, language, values, traditions and national identity. While adopting and imitating ‘western aspects’ of the outer domain, a need of protecting areas of the inner domain from the colonial power emerges.³⁸ Anti-colonial nationalism is based on maintaining a difference with the colonial power in the inner domain while challenging the rule of colonial difference in the outer domain.³⁹ Family and values serves as an example of a domain early claimed by Indian nationalist discourse. In an early phase of social reform of

‘Indian traditions’ through the influence of colonial power, nationalists objected. The colonial

36 Anderson, Benedict R. O'G., Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, Revised edition., Verso, London, 2016: 6

37 Chatterjee, Partha, The nation and its fragments: colonial and postcolonial histories, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1993

38 Chatterjee, Partha, The nation and its fragments: colonial and postcolonial histories, 1993: 9-10

39 For further reference on ‘the rule of colonial difference’ see, Bhabha, Homi K., The location of culture, 1. ed.

in Routledge Classics with a new preface by the author, Routledge, London, 2004

Chatterjee, Partha, The nation and its fragments: colonial and postcolonial histories, 1993: 10-11

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power, who often had focused on religious and cultural practices in their critique, used terms such as blood-thirsty and barbaric in order to describe treatment of women in particular.

Nationalists objected, not to the claim that social reformation was needed, but rather to the choice of agency.⁴⁰ Any involvement concerning cultural identity or reform of ‘traditional’

society would not be allowed to originate from the colonial power, such changes could only come from within the nation itself. This eventually resulted in what Chatterjee calls the ‘new woman’, and the emergence of a new patriarchy in the world of the nationalist middle class.

Constructed as being different from both ‘Western’ women and the ‘traditional’ order, the ‘new woman’ had to be modern while at the same time demonstrate features of national tradition.⁴¹ The point by which the nationalism of the inner domain is imagined into existence and ultimately declares dominance over it, is the moment when the contest for political power and stronger demands for a rule of indifference in the outer domain begins. In India’s struggle for independence, this meant that nationalists who asserted their own rule of cultural difference with the west, had to emphasise a rule of indifference in the domain of the state to form what would eventually become the post-colonial state. As the ideology of the post-colonial state was founded on the principles of a modern liberal-democratic state emphasising its differences on the public and private, the nationalist elite who had imagined their community on the differentiation between the spiritual and material found it difficult navigating in those areas of the private sphere where the modern liberal-democratic state demanded to remain indifferent to concrete differences such as class, caste, language, race and religion.⁴² Before continuing, it should be noted that while a state may strive to remain unbiased in such areas, the reality of society is often more complicated, as in the case of caste-based discrimination. Being outlawed in 1948 and later added to the Indian constitution, the idea of representation on the basis of caste and community is still a commonly used distinction that dominates Indian political discourse.⁴³

2.2.3 Previous research

The field of contesting Indian nationalism(s) has been thoroughly studied during the last decades since India’s independence from British colonial rule. Studies by Political scientist Sunil Khilnani illustrate the conflicting ideas of Indian national identity that played a major

40 Metcalf, Barbara Daly & Metcalf, Thomas R., A concise history of modern India, 2. ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006: 82

41 Chatterjee, Partha, The nation and its fragments: colonial and postcolonial histories, 1993: 9

42 Chatterjee, Partha, The nation and its fragments: colonial and postcolonial histories, 1993: 11

43 Chatterjee, Partha, The nation and its fragments: colonial and postcolonial histories, 1993: 223-224

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part in the construct of India’s post-colonial identity, largely based on the secular-nationalism of the Indian National Congress.⁴⁴ Related to this, Social and Political scientist Ashutosh Varshney illustrates how the emergence of recent Hindu nationalism can be understood as a reaction to the separatist nationalism of Kashmir and Punjab as well as the political milieu of the 1980’s in relation to the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).⁴⁵

In regards to the Saṃgh Parivār much has already been written. Prominent research by Thomas Blom Hansen, John Zavos, Walter Anderson, Shridar Damle, and Christoph Jaffrelot in particular, have mapped out and followed the growth of the Saṃgh Parivār since the 1980’s.⁴⁶ In a relatively recently published anthology consisting of several essays by scholars of various academic fields, Jaffrelot and Blom alongside historian and anthropologist Angana P. Chatterji investigates the effect of Hindu nationalism in contemporary India since the inauguration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014. They argue that majoritarian ethno-religious Hindu nationalism has ingrained itself in formal institutions, fostering a discourse of enmity between groups allowing for increased elbow room for non-state actors to take charge of local societies by means of violence and moral policing.⁴⁷

Not as much has been written on the subject of love jihad. Among those active in the field Charu Gupta, Professor of History at Delhi university, stands out as one of its most productive scholars. Gupta’s research on the pivotal role of gender in the imagining of the Hindu identity in early 20^th century north India, show how the dictates of accepted and un- accepted sexualities were related among communal lines, often connecting “inappropriate”

demeanour with Islam and the “lascivious Muslim”.⁴⁸ Further, Gupta has illustrated that there

44 Khilnani, Sunil, The idea of India, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1997

45 Ashutosh Varshney, "Contested meanings: India's National Identity, Hindu Nationalism, and the Politics of Anxiety", Daedalus, Vol. 122, No. 3, 1993: 227-261

46 On the topic of Hindu nationalists’ emergence on the political stage in the 1990’s, see Hansen, Thomas Blom, The saffron wave democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1999, in which he investigates the Majoritarian discourse of hindutva, illustrating how organisations within the Hindu right manages to articulate the apprehension of the Indian middle and working classes by combining discourses of universalist claims, relating to rights and entitlements, with xenophobic and heavily paternalistic rhetoric in a call for a “conservative revolution”. On the fundamental ideology and development of thoughts of the founding fathers of Hindu nationalism, see Jaffrelot, Christophe, Hindu nationalism: a reader, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 2007. On the connection between late 19^th century and early 20^th century social reform movements and the development of Hindu nationalism, see Zavos, John, The emergence of Hindu nationalism in India, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2000. On the history of the RSS and its impact on shaping the discourse of hindutva and Indian identity politics, see Andersen, Walter; Damle, Shridhar D., Messengers of Hindu Nationalism, London, 2019.

47 Chatterji, A.P., Blom Hansen, T. and Jaffrelot, C. ed. Majoritarian state: how Hindu nationalism is changing India. London: Hurst, 2019

48 Gupta, Charu, Sexuality, obscenity, community: women, Muslims, and the Hindu public in colonial India, Palgrave, London University, New York, 2002

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exist some similarities in the construct of gender and community between the contemporary anti-love jihad movement and identity politics of the early 20^th century, including the Śuddhi movement of the 1920’s.⁴⁹ In a recent publication on mass conversions, political scientist Laura Dudley Jenkins dedicates one chapter dealing with the dissemination of love jihad rumours, arguing that discourse pertaining to means in order to protect against the presumed threat of love jihad often is formulated on the basis of protecting religious freedom.⁵⁰

On research relating to the VHP much is yet to be done. While the VHP have become a more studied subject in recent years due to their influential part in the Ayodhya dispute concerning the birthplace of Ram, most studies on hindutva and affiliates of the Saṃgh Parivār prior to the destruction of Babri Masjid seldom devotes more than a couple of pages to the VHP. Manjari Katju’s book Vishva Hindu Parishad and Indian Politics gives a detailed account on the history of the VHP’s and its shift from a small grassroot group to a well- structured mass organisation with ties to political and religious leaders.⁵¹ Eva Hellman’s dissertation, Political Hinduism: The challenge of Viśva Hindu Parishad, explores the structure and ideological foundation of the organisation, analysing VHP’s understanding of hindutva against the backdrop of the campaign to “liberate” the birthplace of Ram in Ayodhya.⁵²

49 Gupta, Charu, “Hindu Women, Muslim Men: Love Jihad and Conversions”, 2009

50 Dudley-Jenkins, Laura, Religious freedom and mass conversion in India, 1st edition., University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2019

51 Katju, Manjari, Vishva Hindu Parishad and Indian politics, Orient Longman, 2003

52 Hellman, Eva, Political hinduism: the challenge of the Viśva Hindū Pariṣad, Univ., Diss. Uppsala University, Uppsala, 1993

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3 Hindutva: an overview

At the ideological centre of most Hindu nationalist organisations, including the as of 2014 ruling Bhāratīya Janatā Pārṭī (Indian People's Party), lies the ambiguous concept of hindutva (hinduness). Originally formulated by the Maharashtrian Brahmin Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966) to describe his ideological framework of an ethno-religious nationalism that de- fined India’s territoriality on a common Indian culture, hindutva incorporated a sense of na- tional identity linked to the Vedic period.⁵³ In his 1923 book Essentials of Hindutva, Savarkar argued for the establishment of a Hindu nation based primarily on territory, cultural unity and ethnicity.⁵⁴ According to Savarkar, Hindus share a direct connection to the Aryans, who already had established a nation on the banks of the Indus river “[..]long before the ancient Egyptians, and Babylonians had built their magnificent civilization[..]”.⁵⁵ It was this claim of a common ancestry with the Aryans which served as the primary cornerstone of Savarkar’s definition of a Hindu. Religion was to be considered as just one aspect of hindutva and what it meant to be a Hindu. In this broad definition, any religion originated from India whose believers viewed India as their holy land (pavitra bhūmi) was considered as belonging to Hindu society. This meant that Muslims, Christians, Parsis and Jews personified an outer threat to the establishment of the Hindu nation (hindū rāṣṭra), but since they share a common descent, they could become part of Hindu society as long as they remain loyal to Hindu culture.⁵⁶ Savarkar’s nationalism emerged in a particular context as a reaction to what Gyanendra Pandey argues was perceived as a unique and alarming form of political organisation of primarily pan-Islamic movements.⁵⁷ It has been described by Jaffrelot as a nationalist identity built upon the stigmatisation and emulation of “threatening others”, and still serves as the foundation upon which several of India’s contemporary Hindu nationalist organisations derive their ideology.⁵⁸,⁵⁹

53 Hansen, The saffron wave: democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India, 1999: 77

54 Jaffrelot, Hindu nationalism: a reader, 2007: 86

55 Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar, Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu?, 1928: 3 [originally published as Essentials of Hindutva]

56 Jaffrelot, Hindu nationalism: a reader, 2007: 87

57 Gyanendra Pandey, “Which of Us Are Hindus?,” in Hindus and Others: The Question of Identity in India Today, ed. Gyanendra Pandey, New Delhi, Viking, 1993: 244

58 This description also reflects the context surrounding the book as it was written during the time Savarkar served in prison in Ratnagiri and came in contact with Muslim Pathans belonging to the Khalifat movement.

There Savarkar came to his realisation that it was the determined and physically superior Muslims who posed the biggest threat to the Hindu nation rather than the British.

Jaffrelot, The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics: 1925 to the 1990s : strategies of identity- building, implantation and mobilisation : (with special reference to central India), 1996: 25

59 For a more detailed analysis of the content of V.D Savarkar’s Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? See Björkelid, "In the spirit of the constitution: A study of Amit Shah's rhetoric on immigration and Indian Identity, 2019: 19-23

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3.1.1 Saṃgh Parivār

Literally meaning “the family of organisations”, the Saṃgh Parivār is a collective term which refers to any Hindu nationalist organisation affiliated with the Rāṣṭrīya Svayaṃsevak Saṃgh, but most commonly used when talking about the three major organisations the Rāṣṭrīya Svayaṃsevak Saṃgh, the Bhāratīya Janatā Pārṭī and the Viśva Hindū Pariṣad.⁶⁰ Hansen describes the usage of the term as an attempt by the RSS in "[..]evoking connotations of warmth, security and emotional attachment beyond ideology and reasoning,”⁶¹ utilising the metaphor of the family as a strategy of recruitment as the Parivār aims to portray itself in terms of a surrogate family, or brotherhood to its members. The RSS is often regarded as the parent organisation of the Saṃgh Parivār with the BJP representing the political branch and the VHP the religious branch.

3.1.2 Rāṣṭrīya Svayaṃsevak Saṃgh

Building upon the ideological foundation put forth by V.D Savarkar, the Rāṣṭrīya Svayaṃsevak Saṃgh (National Volunteer Corps) was arguably one of the most successful Hindu nationalist organisations of the early 20^th century in utilising the idea of establishing a hindū rāṣṭra to organise the Hindu nationalist movement. The founding of the RSS in 1925 marks a point in time where the Hindu national movement adopted the strategy of shaping its organisation into a military structure with uniformed paramilitary cells. As one of its central founders, Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (1889-1940), witnessed the 1923 Nagpur riots, he came to the realisation that the Hindu community needed to be trained and organised in order to counter what he perceived as a growing threat of Muslim unity.⁶² The RSS represented an opposition to the national vision of the Indian Congress Party and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi who insisted that an independent India must be established on the principle of welcoming all of its communities. The vision propagated by the RSS, instead, represented a nation built on the idea of India as a land primarily for the Hindus.⁶³ The founding members envisioned an organisation that would not directly be involved in party politics by participating in elections but rather serve as the institutional backbone of the Hindu nationalist movement, allowing for other affiliated organisations to serve as the political voice of hindutva. In order to achieve this, local training

60 Hellman, Political hinduism: the challenge of the Viśva Hindū Pariṣad, 1993: 16

61 Hansen, Thomas Blom, “Controlled Emancipation: Women and Hindu Nationalism”, in Wilson, Fiona &

Folke Frederiksen, Bodil, eds. Ethnicity, gender and the subversion of nationalism, London, Cass, 1995: 93

62 Jaffrelot, The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics: 1925 to the 1990s : strategies of identity- building, implantation and mobilisation : (with special reference to central India), 1996: 34

63 Metcalf; Metcalf, A concise history of modern India, 2006: 227-229

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branches (śākhā) specialised in ‘Hindu discipline’ were established to foster a new generation of physically fit and devoted Hindu males. Informed by the education provided by the RSS, it was the ambition that these recruits would become future leaders in the cause of organising the Hindu community.⁶⁴

Beginning with just a handful of branches in the 1920’s, the RSS has since the 1990’s become the world’s largest non-governmental organisation with approximately 1.5-2 million participants in their 57.000 branches according to Walter Andersen and Shridhar D. Damle.⁶⁵ According to their mission statement, RSS’s overarching ambition is to spread the ideology of hindutva with a goal that is “[..]to carry the nation to the pinnacle of glory, through organising the entire society and ensuring protection of Hindu Dharma”.⁶⁶ However, there is no formal RSS definition of what hindutva constitutes, something that Anderson and Damle describe as a conscious strategy due to the various perceptions of the term by the different actors within the Parivār.⁶⁷ In fact, the RSS seldom makes any attempt in defining Hinduism, ‘Hinduness’

or use religious symbolism that might mediate a preference of some Hindu sects over others – a strategy which most affiliates of the Parivār employs with the exception being the VHP who frequently utilises religious iconography.

3.1.3 Viśva Hindū Pariṣad

The Viśva Hindū Pariṣad (World Hindu Council) was formed in 1964 by the then RSS chief Madhavrao Sadashivrao Golwalkar (1906-1973), Shivram Shankar Apte (1907-1985) and spiritual leader Chinmayananda Saraswati (1916-1993). At its inception, the VHP was made up of an assorted set of members with various ideas and ambitions. At the core of early VHP objectives was the intention to lay the social groundwork for a political alternative to the

64 Khaki uniformed men of the śākhā are arguably one of the most recognisable traits of the RSS. The concept is based on older institutions, such as the akhāḍā which represents a setting where young men meet for daily exercise in both physical and mental activity often in the form of wrestling and weight-lifting. The akhāḍā is often in close vicinity to a temple which generally is dedicated to the god Hanuman, representing strong loyalty and great physical strength. Participation is not exclusive to any particular social class, and its members are described as developing a strong collective attachment to it.

Jaffrelot, The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics: 1925 to the 1990s : strategies of identity- building, implantation and mobilisation : (with special reference to central India), 1996: 35-36

65 It should be noted that Andersen and Damle refer to numbers provided by the RSS general secretary’s annual 2017 report which can be found at, http://rss.org//Encyc/2017/3/23/rss-Annual-Report-2017-English.html.

Furthermore, these numbers only pertain to the daily participation in local branches. The exact number of active members within the organisation is unknown as the RSS are reluctant to publish statistics concerning their members.

Andersen; Damle, Messengers of Hindu Nationalism, 2019: ix

66 RSS, “Vision and Mission”, rss.org, 22 October 2012, https://www.rss.org/Encyc/2012/10/22/rss-vision-and- mission.html

67 Andersen; Damle, Messengers of Hindu Nationalism, 2019: 77

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dominating Congress Party as well as to serve as a platform from which representatives of different Hindu denominations (saṃpradāya) could work together towards the goal of organising the Hindu community. The context surrounding the birth of the VHP has been described by Hellman as a climate of increased nationalism with a growing polarisation between Hindus and Muslims.⁶⁸ The VHP was formed by the RSS as a non-political platform that sought to attract those Hindus dissatisfied with the secular-nationalism represented by the congress government, but reluctant to openly support the Jana Saṃgh,⁶⁹ or the RSS.⁷⁰

Activities of the VHP during the 1960’s and 1970’s focused on community service programs, such as improving living standards for untouchables, rather than the more hostile activism associated with the later VHP of the 1980’s. Indeed, the early administration stood in stark opposition to the practice of untouchability (aspṛśyatā) and worked to elevate their social status.⁷¹ Projects aimed to curb what was perceived as a Christianisation of India by Western countries was another integral part of early VHP activity. Hellman writes that Indian Christians were equated to anti-nationalism, and that the focus on Christians and Christianity could be argued as being an extension of the critique formulated in the 1956 Madhya Pradesh Niyogi Commission report on controversial missionary activities in India.⁷² Furthermore, Katju argues that the early leadership probably saw religion and religiosity as tools that could stabilise Indian society and counter what was perceived as a Westernisation, partially brought about by Christians, and Nehruvian politics equated with modernisation and communism.⁷³

The beginning of the 1980’s marks a point in VHP-history defined by Hellman as “the activist phase”.⁷⁴ This period is characterised by the addition of mass-campaigns, mobilisation and the addition of the more pernicious anti-Muslim rhetoric associated with the current VHP.

In reaction to a number of events in 1981 where large groups of Hindus converted to Islam, the VHP published articles in several issues of Hindū Viśva proclaiming the conversions as being

68 Following the Sino-Indian war in 1962, which testified to an ill prepared Indian army that could not defend its boarders, many Indians felt dissatisfied with the politics of the ruling Indian Congress resulting in the elevated support for organisations and political parties, underscoring the importance of nationalism and strong national defence, such as the Jana Saṃgh and the RSS.

Hellman, “Political Hinduism: the challenge of the Viśva Hindū Pariṣad”, 1993: 74-76

69 Bhāratīya Jana saṃgh (BJS) was the predecessor to the Bhāratīya Janatā Pārṭī (BJP)

70 Katju, Vishva Hindu Parishad and Indian politics, 2003: 21

71 Katju, Manjari, “The Early Vishva Hindu Parishad: 1964 to 1983”, Social Scientist, May - June, Vol 26, No.

5/6 1998: 35

72 Hellman, “Political hinduism: the challenge of the Viśva Hindū Pariṣad”, 1993: 81

73 Katju, “The Early Vishva Hindu Parishad: 1964 to 1983”, 1998: 36

74 Hellman, “Political Hinduism: the challenge of the Viśva Hindū Pariṣad”, 1993: 82

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part of a larger conspiracy, financed by Islamic nations.⁷⁵ According to the VHP, there was monetary incitement behind the conversions as converts allegedly had been offered a sum of 500 INR. The motivation behind these conversions was claimed to be an attempt by Muslim actors to increase the Muslim population in India as well as to establish an independent Islamic state within its borders.⁷⁶ As the majority of the converts belonged to the scheduled castes, the VHP leadership became determined in increasing their efforts for reforms that would erase the inequality between castes. In an endeavour to unite Hindus from all denominations, several procession campaigns were undertaken in collaboration with other affiliates of the Saṃgh Parivār that would travel all across India with the intention of spreading a spirit of unity. The processions often included vehicles decorated with urns containing water from the Ganges and portraits of Bhārat Mātā. These symbols were chosen as they were considered as being neutral and respected by every denomination belonging to Hindu society.⁷⁷

The most significant of these processions was the so-called Rām Rath Yātrā, or Ram’s chariot procession, in 1990. The procession was organised by the then-President of the BJP, Lal Krishna Advani (1927-), together with the VHP in support of VHP’s demands to construct a temple dedicated to the Hindu deity Ram on the location of the Babri Masjid. Erected in the 1500’s on orders by the first Mughal Emperor Babur and claimed to have been built on top of a temple marking the birthplace of Ram, the Babri Masjid had by this point come to serve as a central issue of the VHP. An issue which represented an historic oppression by Muslims that had left a wound in the national pride of the Hindu community –a wound that could only be healed by the destruction of the Mosque and the ‘reclamation’ of the site.⁷⁸ Advani’s Rath Yātrā travelled approximately 300 kilometres per day and visited hundreds of villages and cities, often followed by armed members of the VHP’s militant youth wing, the Bajraṃg Dal (Brigade of Hanuman), who often stirred up communal violence along its path.⁷⁹ The procession has often been described as one of the more impactful events leading up to the storming and destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992.⁸⁰

75 The main event referred is the 1981 Meenakshipuram conversion, also known as the Meenakshipuram incident, where approximately 1.000 scheduled-caste Hindus in Meenakshipuram, Tamil Nadu converted to Islam in February of 1981.

Upadhyay, Surya P, and Robinson, Rowena, “Revisiting Communalism and Fundamentalism in India”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 47, No 36, 8 September 2012: 42

76 Hellman, Political Hinduism: the challenge of the Viśva Hindū Pariṣad, 1993: 83

77 Hellman, Political Hinduism: the challenge of the Viśva Hindū Pariṣad, 1993: 86

78 Hansen, The saffron wave democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India, 1999: 172-173

79 Hansen, The saffron wave democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India, 1999: 165

80 The events surrounding the destruction of the Babri Masjid have been analysed and illustrated by countless scholars and are seldom excluded in research on the history of Hindu nationalism.

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In the almost 30 years since the events of the Babri Masjid, the VHP have kept busy in their efforts of organising the Hindu community. Similar to the RSS, the VHP are reluctant to keep records on their memberships but claimed to have approximately 6.8 million members in 2008.⁸¹ Among their latest activities are the anti-love jihad campaign.

For further references see Ludden, David E, ed., Contesting the nation: religion, community, and the politics of democracy in India, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1996, and Rajagopal, Arvind, Politics after television: religious nationalism and the reshaping of the Indian public, Cambridge University Press,

Cambridge, UK, 2001

81 Garner, Hannah, “New Delhi left grasping for answers to violence”, The National News, 13 October 2008, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/asia/new-delhi-left-grasping-for-answers-to-violence-1.538433

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4 Analysis: The phenomenon of love jihad

This chapter deals with the analysis of the source material pertaining to the campaign against the so-called love jihad phenomenon by the different Hindu nationalist organisations within the Saṃgh Parivār (Family of Hindu nationalist organisations). This step of the analysis is concerning the special 2020 September issue of Hindū Viśva, lav jihād se deś bacāe āo alakh jāgeṃ (Save the country from Love Jihad: It’s time to wake up), and the 2014 September issue of The Organizer, Love Jihad Reality or Rhetoric? The analysis is performed, utilising a content analytical approach of selecting a set of themes based on their recurrence in the material. The themes are then analysed in relation to a theoretical framework of nationalism and propaganda presented in 1.3. The selected subsequent themes are: A conspiracy targeting love; Constructing the Muslim and the Hindu; Visual interpretations of love jihad; Target audience

4.1 A conspiracy targeting love

Jihadis utilising pure emotions like love, makes it difficult for the native Hindu society to understand its reality.⁸²

This section aims to locate the underlying ideology of the anti-love jihad campaign beginning by looking at the different interpretations of what the concept is supposed to mean according to the writers.

4.1.1 “Destroying the fundamental culture of this country”

Beginning with the choice of wording, love jihad (lav jihād in Hindi) is made up of two words deriving from the English, love, and the Arabic, jihad. Strictly speaking, words associated with languages deemed as ‘foreign’ to India. Already in the name, love jihad manages to evoke feelings of intrusion by foreign forces, demarking anything associated with the term as different and external. While indigenous words for love such as ishq or prem could have just as well been used, ‘love’ combined with jihad sits better with the Hindu nationalist as it exudes asso- ciations with a set of specific ideas relating to a colonial past as well as to Muslim conquest in the Indian subcontinent.⁸³ Furthermore, the use of the word Jihad adds an additional angle of

82 Shinde, Ramesh, “Lav jihād viśva bhar meṃ ek bhayaṃkar ṣaḍyaṃtra”, Hindū Viśva, Vol. 28, September 16- 20, 2020: 11

83 Gupta, Charu, "Love Taboos: Controlling Hindu-Muslim Romances", The India Forum, 8 Jan 2021, https://www.theindiaforum.in/article/love-laws-making-hindu-muslim-romances-illegitimate,

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danger to the term as jihad often is used in Hindu nationalist media to imply religiously moti- vated violence or terrorism. Thus, jihad combined with a term such as love becomes an expres- sion of defining an utmost heinous activity performed by those just as heinous.

Love jihad is, according to several of the articles in the material, described as an ongo- ing attack on Hindu society perpetrated by primarily Muslim men. These attacks are alleged to be financed by nations with the majority of its populations consisting of Muslims. In the open- ing editorial of the 2020 September issue of Hindū Viśva titled Lav jihād sīdhā sīdhā deś ke Viruddh majhabī yudhd kī ghoṣṇā hai (Love jihad is a direct declaration of war against the country), its current editor Vijay Shankar Tiwari writes:

Love jihad is not only a planned Jihad in order to play with the feelings of girls and women, but it is an open violation of her human rights. [..] The process is a well-organised conspiracy to bring the population of the country in favour of one religion. It is a well-planned conspiracy to increase the population of a certain religion and affect the democratic voting process on its basis. In this way this action affects the sovereignty of the country, which seems to steer the country towards the concept of ISIS and an Islamic state. By studying several registered cases, it becomes clear that all these activities are [part of] a plan to deliberately destroy a particular religion (Hinduism) which is considered against him by religious tactics and to take his followers by any means.⁸⁴

Tiwari describes an alarming situation where India, democracy, and Hinduism in particular, is under attack by Islam. The text implies that interfaith marriages between Hindus and Muslims are treacherous since there is an alleged current national crisis of Muslim men working in accordance to a calculated conspiracy to deceive Hindu women. This is asserted to be done in order to increase the Muslim population, thus undermining India’s democratic system. Claims that India’s voting system is being manipulated by certain parties, often belonging to the left or centre of the political spectrum, is a common rhetorical tool employed by Hindu nationalist.

The accusations are based on the idea that such parties are carrying out so-called vote bank politics, a term referring to specific communities, or bloc of voters, supporting a particular candidate or party with the expectation of gaining certain privileges, usually at the detriment of other communities. This type of discourse is used to portray an imagery of communal un- fairness and Hindu victimisation. Hindu nationalists, such as the VHP, often assert that India

84 Tiwari, Vijay Shankar, “Lav jihād sīdhā sīdhā deś ke Viruddh majhabī yudhd kī ghoṣṇā hai”, Hindū Viśva, Vol 28, September 16-30, 2020: 4